of al such things in the which we offend And coÌ„monly to our euil demeanure this also is annexed y when we offende it suffiseth vs not to offend to y only destruction of one but that it greatly delighteth vs to impart our naughtinesse with many if so by any meanes we may heape the same vpon the heds of our neighbors And herevpon it riseth that â—ur eyes béeyng dazeled with the brightnesse of gold we oft times repete from the botome of our heartes this saying of Euripides So riche I may be thought how yll no care at all I take If riche he be men aske if good no men enquirie make Not whence nor wherefore asked is but what he hath to lende Eche man esteemed is no more than as he may dispende What were vnfit for vs to haue dost aske nothing at all In wealth I wish to liue if not for present death I call Who so doth dye he well doth dye that makes a welthy ende This money is the greatest good that God to man may sende Than which ne may thy mothers loue so much thy minde delight Ne loue of father nor of child is halfe â—o deere in sight No not the loue of comely shape that in thy face doth stay Of men beneath and Gods aboue she beares the only sway So therefore I say it delighteth vs to liue as betwéene vs and beastes there may be found no difference but only that of spéeche we enioy the libertie whiche wholly they wante To whome if like libertie were also graunted if of them thou wouldest then demaund what thing aboue the rest they chiefly desire what other aunswere at all would they make but only to enioy that whiche best delighteth their appetites whyche bringeth most pleasure and delectation to their senses and all this for no other reason than for bycause they account the plesure of the body their chiefest felicitie Therefore let it be farthest off from your opinion my friendes that Riches are to bée déemed good the rather since Democritus Crates and dyuers other héeretofore haue forsaken their wealth to the ende that being both bare and without encombance they mighte so followe Vertue the better who of hir selfe is both single and bare and consisteth not in the vncertentie of riches made subiect to forren inuasion but is otherwise established in perfecte firmenesse and stabilitie which Lucilius considering saith That is not thine which Fortune thine by chaunce hath made to bee What wishing brings may wel betide another as to thee What ritches then is there I pray you vpon the which there doth not casually depende Neede Hunger and Beggerie the rather since God hath so ordered the state of humaine causes to be such that the best good things of this world are always held with greatest care and that no man may so greatly be deceiued by reposing his trust in any state or degrée of Fortune as vpoÌ„ that which in the iudgemeÌ„t of the world is accouÌ„ted greatest For this occasion we thinke it alwaies néedeful of one felicitie to maintaine another bicause eche thing that happeneth by chaunce is vnstable and that which riseth most high is apwed test still to fall But that which best aboue all things is allowed vnto man may neither be giuen nor taken away by any man for that it lieth without the power of man to disanull the same The which since so it fareth it is doubtlesse therefore the greatest madnesse that maye be to followe the desire of that brittle substance chiefly with al our studie care and diligence which is subiect still to the inuasion of others The propertie whereof is also so variable that if at this day it be to morow it may hap to be found in no place This verely was the cause why Stilbon when he had already lost both his wealth and dignitie being asked of Demetrius who held from him the possession of his Citie what he had lost made aunswere nothing For al that is mine doth remaine with me stil And that Bâ—as did also â—he like Cicero doth likewise testifie who when his enimies had taken from him his Countrey Pryenna and that diuers did flie from theÌ„ce taking with them great part of their treasure being admonished by a friend of his to do y like made answere Suerlie so I do for I haue alwaies about me as much as is mine Whereby it séemeth y these contented persons did thus contemne despise their welth for that they estéemed nothing to be good vnlesse it were honest so as of these vanities of Fortune which we call ritches they made no reconing knowing that it was to theÌ„ the greatest felicitie not to want felicitie fully perswading them selues that the whole world was allowed vnto theÌ„ by nature for their patrimonye accounting also that wealth by the lawe of nature was estéemed pouerty and that nothing could séeme vnto them more foolish filthy than to frame the goodnesse of a resonable mind out of vnresonable things LISIP. Truly Tales thou hast herein played the Philosopher most excellently But I pray thée tel me dost thou take Wisdome for a Vertue or no TA. No verely LISIP. What reason I pray thée perswadeth thée so TALES For that if wisedome were a Vertue this thereof would folow that Vertue were not abiding within vs but shold come outwardly vnto vs whiche absurditie were great since Vertue is a thing that may neither be giuen nor taken away by any man as before we haue declared But Wisedome we finde may conueniently passe ouer from one to another therfore it must consequently ensue that of it self it is no Vertue y which may be also proued another waye For if Wisdome were a Vertue it should also be good if so it were good it should likewise make them to be good which are counted wise But since otherwise it appeareth y diuers before this time haue become Philosophers to the only end to know what were good what were euil rather than for that they desire to become any thing y better by the knowledge of the same It is therfore to be doubted of no man but that we haue rightly termed Wisdome y is to say Knowledge to be no Vertue For if Knowledge were a Vertue the doctrine therof might doubtlesse be taught which if it were possible then woulde there bée founde both teachers and learners of Vertue as of other sciences But for as muche as they are no where founde it thereby appeareth that neither Knowledge nor anye other thing concerning the Minde maye be called Vertue as Plato himselfe doeth plainely affirme LISIPPVS What then of Justice I pray you maye that be counted a Vertue or not TALES If wée denie Wisedome to bée a Vertue wée lesse yéelde Justice lesse Fortitude or Modestie of themselues to bée Vertues since all these thinges Wisedome taken awaie are not onely worth nothing but also doe rather more hurte than good For Justice without the gouernemente of Wisdome what else maye
importance so greate it behoueth me rather to hold my peace than to speake For what learning at all do you perceyue in me or what witte that I may worthily séeme on the suddayne to deale in a case so difficulte and of suche weight as requireth of it selfe no small skill and practise to be looked for in him that should meddle with the same Verely my friendes of all those causes that are haÌ„dled in Philosophy there is no one thing more grauely vttered or with a greater maiestie Wherefore this ought rather if I may iudge to be youre charge and duetie who in the studie of Philosophy and of all other knowledge haue profit ably spente the greatest parte of your age LYSIPPVS Go to Tales and despaire not with thy selfe of thy owne habilitie eyther to defyne or to dispute of Vertue for as much as the ornaments therof by the iudgement of all men do greately appeare in thée In â—uche sorte as if the Gods had pleased to appoint thée to haue bin borne in the time when Socrates and Plato did liue there woulde haue appeared vnto them no other Phaedrus or Alcibiades than they selfe in respect of thy greate and singular towardnesse giuen thée by nature Wherefore persuade thy selfe my friende that for thy knowledge thou arte able to debate and that exactly of the worthinesse thereof since by the gift of God thou hast obteined to haue hir the ruler and directer of thy florishing life EVD. I can for my parte Tales no otherwise thinke of the perfection of thy witte nor of the estimation of thy behauioure than as Lisippus hath already thought and in trouth the most parte of those that know thée besides are of the same opinion Wherefore to each of vs thou shalt do my friend a singular pleasure if as in other things thou were héeretofore wont so thou wilte nowe at this our request set downe vnto vs some approued rules and preceptes of Vertue both what it is by the opinion of others also what thou estéemest therof thy selfe TALES Thus it is to offer violence neither dothe it oughte auayle by what reason you perswade me since playnely you compell me for to gainesay the earnest request of my friends chiefly in a matter of honestie as it may séeme a thing vngratefull so is it vnreasonable Diuers therefore debating of Vertue béeyng diuers of opinion among themselues haue diuersly spoken But Plato in his Booke entituled Menon where questioning of many things as his manner was he hathe expressed in order the seuerall opinions of diuers writers and with excellent reasons hath confuted them all séemeth verily to define That Vertue is nothing else than goodnesse it selfe But what that goodnesse is and where it doth remaine there haue bin héeretofore and are still depending manye controuersies among the Philosophers The Stoickes did suppose the same to remaine in Vertue The Epicures did estéeme it to consist in Pleasure as those y thought it impossible to separate Pleasure from Vertue nor any man to liue honestly that liued not pleasauntly and againe no man to liue pleasauntly that liued not honestly The Peripatetikes were of opinion that there were thrée kindes of goodnesse that is to say of the Minde of the Body and of Fortune The goodes of the minde they thought to be those things that remaine in aduice and in the excellencie of witte as Prudence Iustice Fortitude and Modestie Of the body those things whiche nature hath gyuen profitable to the body as Swiftnesse Force Personage and Health Of Fortune those things which by lotte or happie chaunce do prosperously befall as Birth Education Riches Authoritie Possessions Friendes and such like But for honesties sake we will in this place omitte the opinion of the Cinicke secte as those that liued no lesse like Dogges than they spake and will agayne returne to the triple destinction of Goodnesse wherein whatsouer shall be sayd of Goodnesse the same you must also intend to be spokâ— of Vertue For if Vertue may rightly be termed goodnesse no lesse may goodnesse as rightely also be called Vertue since by the rule of Logike the definition and the thing defyned may lawfully be conuerted Nowe therefore let vs farther consider what these former Philosophers did properly accounte this goodnesse to be or in what actions they placed y same Wherin I do many times with Cicero call in question the wisedome of those learned meÌ„ who thought the weake and chaungeable gifts of the body and also of Fortune worthy only in speach the name of goodnesse wheÌ„ in very déede they were theÌ„selues farre otherwise of opinion concerning the inteÌ„t and meaning of the same In somuche as Epicurus himselfe who referred all goodnesse vnto pleasure when he was vexed disturbed with hys greatest griefe behaued hymselfe both stoutely boldly Saying when the stopping of his vrine the incredible griefe of his belly exulcerated did pitifully torment him O how happily do I endure this last and ending day of mine For as diuers sundry times we may sée a great and mightie personage take his beginning from base and lowe parentage so may we also as ofte behold a stout and valiaunt mind shrowded vnder a body both weake deformed vnhealthful And therfore since nature can daily make proofe vnto vs that a noble vertuous minde may possible lie hid vnder each kind of forme the deformitie of the body ought not to embase y estimatioÌ„ of the mind but the beautie of the mind ought rather to adorne the feature of the body Neither is it to be thought y olde men bycause the strength of their bodyes is decayd are therefore to be worse estéemed thaÌ„ yong men since it is manifest that the greatest exploites are not alwayes brought to passe by strength swiftnesse or agilitie of body but rather by counsell authoritie and iudgement wherein olde men are most experienced The whiche if any man by contentioÌ„ wil seme to denie what other thing I pray you may there follow therof but that Bulles Lions ElephaÌ„ts such other beasts may also be said to be better thaÌ„ meÌ„ bicause they are stronger which no man I thinke dare venture to affirme vnlesse some such as desireth to be taken accounted for a foole For albeit I confesse that nature hath made man vnarmed yet notwithstanding she hath giueÌ„ him two things especially aboue y rest wherwith to defend his body froÌ„ the harme of such as are stroÌ„ger thaÌ„ himselfe that is to say Reason and Societie But let vs leaue to speake of beasts let vs returne to men themselues who of body haue bin passing strong What then I pray you shall we say of â—iphaeus Briareus and diuers other Giants What of Milo who is said to haue passed the whole race of Olimpia with a liue Oxe on his shoulders neuer taking his breth by the way What of Antheus and Hercules shall we say y such men are therfore better thaÌ„ those who by force
this verie way the end thereof may vndoubtedly be attained from the which we must vnfainedly confesse that happines of life conioyned with safetie and perpetual tranquilitie doth onely procéede LIS. I cannot a little marueyle Eudoxus since there is nothing among vs here that may be termed happie howe and in what sorte it may so come to passe y possible in this worlde we may come to inioy y happinesse of life which you speak off EVDO. What néede you thereof to maruel at all if willingly you wil allowe but so much vnto man as Plotinus thought good to impart vnto beastes LISIP. If that shuld be so that a Man maie be happie hauing no more allowed him than is allowed vnto beasts then haue we in my opinion a greate deale more cause of meruaile than before EVDOXVS His verie wordes my frende if thou doe marke shall giue thée thereof to vnderstande as hée spake them Thus therefore in the bookes whiche he wrote of the happinesse of life he doeth saye Synce well to liue and to bée happie are accounted as one then whether doe wee also allowe the same vnto beastes if so it bée giuen to them by Nature to passe their liues without impedimente according to the lawe in whiche they were created what then shoulde lette them also to liue well that is to saye happyly For whether wée accompte this liuing well to consiste in the well behauing of youre selues or in the due performing of oure naturall duetie wée muste also be contented to imparte the same vnto beastes To whoÌ„ it is both as possible to behaue themselues wel and also to performe that speciall worke of nature as it is vnto vs For example let vs firste consider of musicall birdes Wherein it cannot I thinke be denyed but that they among the rest do behaue themselues well for as naturallie they are taught so duely they sing and thereby it séemeth they maye rightly be sayde to followe a wished and well behaued kinde of life But if farther it be sayed that there is also required a happie ende to be made which ought to consist in the last closing vp and conclusion of nature By the same very waye we must likewise confesse they may be counted happie For when by course of kynde they drawe to theyr ende the ordinarye motion of Nature doth ceasse in them whereby she endeth that harmelesse life of theirs whiche from the firste beginning to the departure of the same shée throughlye performed And therefore if eyther in the naturall endyng of theyr lyues or in the due performaunce of the duetie whervnto they were created there remaine anye happinesse Theâ— doubtlesse may beastes be sayde to be both happye and blessed All whiche if it be true Lisippus according as Plotinus hath sette downe the same what then shoulde hinder man who hath all his affections subiecte vnto reason and hath chosen hir to guide him in his actions that he also shoulde not here enioye that happinesse of life For when the minde of manne shall firmelye despise all the casuall aduentures of thys transitorie estate and shall haue broughte all hir familiar causes to depende vppon hir selfe supposing also all worldlye affaires to bée inferiour vnto Vertue duelye searching for that than the whiche there maye nothing be wished for better that is to saye Goodnesse perfectnesse and Justice It is necessarye then that it bee voyde of perturbation féeling in it selfe the fruite of tranquilitie and also of quietnesse by meane whereof it becommeth happie Notwithstanding it bée still abiding within that frayle and mortall bodie LISIPPVS I thinke it altogither inconueniente for mée to answere at this time to the saying of Plotinus synce the matter he helde is in effecte so absurde that there is scarse anye one to be founde that will togyther assente with hym in the lyke For verilye for my owne part I am yet to learne in what causes he woulde haue well behauiour to be placed But let vs suppose that beastes for the purpose doe behaue them selues well according to his saying yet howe maye they by this reason be accounted happie who do not only not know the goodnesse of theyr felicytie but also are ignoraunt of their owne estate Or if they doe vnderstande it yet do they as the Philosophers affirme but grosely vnperfectly and obscurely vnderstande the same For although it be common to them togither with vs to loue to hate to desire to feare to sorrow and other such like yet to foresée which nature hath only giuen vnto man to discourse to finde out or to remember any thing they possibly can not Onely that whiche soone passeth ouer hath nature allowed them that is to saye the imagination of thyngs presente But for things that are paste shée hath giuen them a memorye altogither confused whiche neuer calleth any thing agayne to remembraunce except by the viewe of things y are present So also for things that are to come she hath likewise allowed theÌ„ no knowledge at al. By what meanes then if I may aske may they be counted happie whose case is such that they knowe not their owne estate neyther yet are able to make any difference betwéene good and euil But nowe on the other side as touching the state and condition of man who liueth I pray you so orderly that at no time féeleth anye trouble of minde what man so perfect that neuer yéeldeth to his passion who so singular but if he auoyde pride couetousnesse possesseth his hart If he shunne couetousnesse anger disquieteth his patience if he suppresse anger gluttony delighteth his tast if he eschewe gluttony enuie consumeth his carcas if he repulse enuie slouthfulnes ouerwhelmeth both soule and body Whereby it commeth stil to passe that no man may be vtterly found deuoide of fault for as the Poet sayth Eche man that is by nature fed is by his priuate pleasure led Which since it is so I sée not my friendes how any man in this life may be accounted happie vnlesse perhappes we shold recken happinesse to consist in wordes that are wisely vttered vnder honest eloqueÌ„t termes The which if so it were it wold then come to passe that such as haue most learnedly discoursed of Vertue shoulde therefore be accounted more happy than others But that this is not so not only experience but also Cicero himself in his Tusculans questions auoucheth How many Philosophers caÌ„ you shew me saith he so honest in maners so staied in iudgement order of life as reason requireth Who is he y obeyeth his own rules or putteth his owne precepts in practise Some of them shall you â—ée so ful of boasting and vaunting y it had bene better for them to haue neuer learned the name of a letter other couetous of money other desirous of glorie and others made subiect to their owne luste so as their liuing and teaching are commonlye contrarie whiche thing in my iudgement is most vntollerable For as he that professeth himselfe a Gramarian if
the first inuenter of all good lawes the only teacher of learning of manners and of all good nurture Wherin if but accordingly we could put in practise all that we cal honestie so easyly as we may talke discourse of the same should not then I pray you both we our selues and al other that haue vsurped the name of Philosophers be iudged happie But the case in very déed stāding thus that Philosophie of it selfe requireth both liuing and doing wel which is hard to be atchieued rather thā saying and speaking wel which may easily be attained from hēce I say it procéedeth that many men haue béene contented with the onely name and title of Vertue when of the true intent and meaning therof they were altogither ignorant Notwithstanding in the true iudgement of al men he only is to be taken and accompted for wise who in worde and déede both when thou séest hym when thou hearest him is alwayes one and the same without alteration But the foole on the other side as Salomon sayth is changed like the Moone now this in words nowe that in action declaring therby the contrarietie of his minde EVDO. Where a little before we reasoned friende Lisippus of the propertie of Vertue and of that happinesse which she bestoweth vpon those that guyding themselues by hir warie order liue an honest and vertuous life we were not I remember so farre foorth gone as to affirme that anye man coulde liue deuoyde of faulte for this we knowe was the onlie and peculiar priuiledge of Christ our sauiour neither went we about to proue that all men embraced Vertue But this onely we said that if beastes when they performed their naturall operations might be accompted happie according to the former opinion of Plotinus muche more ought we then to iudge the same of man especially if Reason haue that preeminēce in him as it ought and that al his affections be subiect stil to hir gouernement But if to that which is spoken I may be lawfully suffered vppon better aduisemente to adde one thing more then thus I procéede Albeit at some time certaine fonde affections contrarie to reason do appeare in vs yet so lōg as they preuaile not nor get the vpper hād of reson a man is not therefore to be estéemed either euil or vnhappie For without faultes no man liueth and he is best that is troubled with fewest If this rule may but thus be graunted as in trouth it is euident then without question we shal be able to finde out diuers notable good men For in al ages there haue flourished many who by their holy and iust liuing by their manifolde and notable vertues for diuerse are the giftes whiche the Soueraigne God powreth downe vppon his people haue deserued great honor and estimation in the world Of whiche number it shall not I thinke be amisse if I repete in this place some few And firste what say we of Socrates who so manly demeaned himselfe in al his actions that at no time either in aduersitie or prosperitie his countenaunce was founde to be altered Neywas it at all in him to be maruelled since so lightly he estéemed the verie terrour of death that when oportunitie was conueniently offered him to haue escaped the same he vtterlie refused the aduauntage thereof knowing right well that death was onely dreadfull vnto those with whose mortal life all glory all honor and all estimation did vtterly perish and not vnto those whose Vertue and renowne was alwayes lasting and coulde neuer decay for he according vnto Reason applied his doctrine to the bettering of his life accompting the substaunce of Philosophie to consist in the equal choyce betwéene good and euill besides in this one pointe be shewed himselfe more wise than the reste in that he withdrewe the course of his disputation from the searching out of celestiall and supernatural causes wherin many haue heretofore spent both their witte and their time to no purpose at all What of Pithagoras who shewed himselfe as a spectacle to the worlde both of learnyng and Vertue and who among other hys manyfolde giftes was of modestye so great that being demaunded by what surname of honor he woulde be called refused the title which others his inferiours had taken vpon them and that whiche in those dayes was cōmon to al such as were learned choosing rather to be called not Sophos but Philosophos not wise but a searcher and louer of Wisedome What of Plato who though he were accompted of al the wisest and also attained to so wonderfull perfection of learning and eloquence as if Iupiter himselfe woulde haue discended from the heauens he coulde neuer haue vsed a more copious style yet notwithstanding he refused the title of his own glorie wherevnto he had right and ascribed the honour of all hys workes vnto Socrates hys Maister shewing thereby himselfe no lesse commendable for demeanour than honourable for his knowledge What of Cato the elder who in the iudgement of all men was accompted the verye image of Vertue the honor of the Romans and the staye of the whole Empire he I meane whose name and Vertue was after supported by Cato the yonger that noble and princely sonne of his What of Seneca who was of stomacke so stoute that with patience he mastered the very terrour of death when by the cōmaundemēt of Nero the tirant he was therunto enforced What of Fabricius the Roman a man so sincere and vpright of minde that not with the vehement temptation of golde it selfe he was able to be corrupted who first as the storie affirmeth refused the large and mightie proffers of Pirrhus estéeming it more worthy and more worth than a kingdome to neglect and contemne the brybes of a King And after whē the proffer was made him for the secret dispatche of that Romaine enimy he woulde not only not suffer the same to be done but gaue him warning himself of the treason pretended adding thereunto these wordes that followe Enioye thy longer life by this my meanes O Pirrhus and be nowe glad of that whiche thou haste heretofore lamented that is that Fabricius thy enemye woulde not be corrupted To conclude manye other there haue bene who albeit they haue crred in some pointes like menne yet wholye in their mindes they styll embraced Vertue by whose meanes theyr liues were both Blessed and Happie at all times so behauing themselues that of theyr sayings and doyngs there styll remayneth to the worlde a perpetuall remembraunce So then on the other syde though manye there haue béene besydes who haue not so sufficiently bene able to performe the same in action whereof they haue so gloriouslye talked yet notwythstandyng it can not therefore I thinke be denyed but that these men did also greate good in the worlde whyle disputing of Vertue they opened the waye by theyr holesome precepts howe other mighte more easily attaine to the same For if the lyfe of learned men were aunswerable in all pointes to the
the best as Riches Strength Witte and whatsoeuer he hath besides eyther of himselfe or of Fortune For all these are nothing else than instrumentes of force seruing the Wicked to the ruyne of themselues and also of others and the Good not onely to their owne aduantage but to the generall profite and commoditie of al men So that the maner of the doing thereof teacheth vs by what name the acte is to be called for that whiche is well done is termed Honest and that which is euil done is termed Vnhonest As for example Eloquence when it is well vsed there is nothing more prayse worthy nothing more commendable nor nothing more fit eyther to stirre vp admiration in those that shall heare vs to confirme the hope of those that shall néede vs or to winne the fauor and good will of those that shall be defended by vs but when it is abused nothing is then more hurtful than the same whereof this writeth Cicero in the preface of his bookes de inuentione I haue ofte times mused with my selfe sayth he whether Eloquence haue bene occasion of more good or harme to the state of mâ—n and to the maintenance of common weales for when on the one side I call vnto my remembrance the diuerse calamities of the Roman Empire the lamentable subuersion of manye flourishing estates I theÌ„ perceiue a great part of such distresse to haue only procéeded from men of great eloquence when after on the other side I call to minde againe by the recorde of antient monuments things done long since far beyond the age and remembrance of man I finde that many Cities haue bene founded many warres ceased many leagues concluded many friendshippes ioyned partly by Wit and Pollicie but chiefly by EloqueÌ„ce By loÌ„g debating wherof in fyne I am thus resolued That wisdome without eloqueÌ„ce may but smally aduaÌ„tage that eloqueÌ„ce without wisdom maie manie times harme but seldome profit Wherfore if any maÌ„ neglecting the study of Philosophie wherby Duetie is to be learned Wisdome increased wil wholy spend his time in the exercise of Oratorie what other benefite may therof arise but y therby he shal become an vnprofitable friend to himself a dangerous meÌ„ber to the common Wealth But he that furnisheth hymselfe with Eloquence to the entente to bende the force thereof not to assaulte but to defende and maintaine the wealth of his countrey he I say in my iudgemente séemes a member very profitable both priuately for hys friendes and generally for the whole estate Wherefore the Minde of man ought first to be well instructed for from thence our reasons from thence our words and from thence the conformitie of our bodie both for countenaunce and behauiour do procéede And certaine it is that the whole disposition of our life is tempered and proportioned onely by our Minde and by it is wholye gouerned For if the Minde be well and in good plight our talke our manners and al the rest of our demeanour shall be fitting and conuenient for the credite of an honest man But if the Minde be weake and euill disposed then all things come presentlye to ruine and decay For the auoyding whereof it is necessarie first that we flée to the succour of the Liberal sciences and after to the comfortable admonition of Diuine knowledge since the Minde is not otherwise strengthened than by good letters and by the coÌ„sideration of things natural For y goodnesse of the Mind which we cal Vertue the whiche as before we haue declared falleth downe from aboue is toubtlesse maintained and increased by Studie Wherevnto that therby the rather we should employe our selues with plesure and delight it is ordained from the first that all men by a speciall instinct of Nature are desirously giuen to learne and are drawen on by Kinde to a singular loue desire of knowledge wherin as to passe al others they accompt it a thing of great estimation so on the other side to slide to erre to be ignorant or to be deceiued they recken it as a matter of gret disgrace For this occasion Nature hath the rather giuen vs a curious searching wit who being priuie to hir own Arte and excelleÌ„cie hath purposely appointed vs y only beholders of al such hir miraculous works as appeares in the world to this intent as it séemeth that by the regarde of suche rare and wonderful sights both in heauen and on erth we might yéeld vnto God such honor in the same that the excellencie of his workes made subiect to our knowledge might not couertly passe away without some testimony of his Glorie All which he created to none other end it appeareth than y by the view of such visible things we might intellectually ascend to y farther coÌ„sideratioÌ„ of things inuisible who although he hath made subiected to our vse all the inferior creatures of the erth yet is not this the cause of our gretest woÌ„der But it is rather a thing far surpassing the rest that by the knowledge therof he leadeth vs on to a farther vnderstanding of things more Diuine with the rare opinioÌ„ imagination wherof we ar moued to serch into farther causes thaÌ„ are vsually subiect to the view of the eie wherby the rather we are brought by degrées into a greater admiration of the handyworks of God froÌ„ thence at last vnto the reuerence worship of his holy name for he knoweth best how to do him worship y hath most vnderstanding of his omnipotent power since perfectly wholy it is vnpossible he may be coÌ„prehended of any man as the scripture affirmeth The study therfore of Diuine letters is wont in suche sort to dispose the Reason vnderstanding of our Senses y if y mind of a good maÌ„ were possible to be séen we should doubtlesse find a like perfectioÌ„ in the same as remaineth in those bodies that are aboue the Moone wher al things are both cleare bright without either teÌ„pest or trouble For albeit he liue here among the manifold miseries calamities of this world yet as the Sunne whose beames though they shine vpoÌ„ diuers sâ—uttish vncleanly places do gather notwithstaÌ„ding no corruptioÌ„ froÌ„ the same so he assisted always with the helpe of God notwithstanding he daily remaine amoÌ„g the contagious alluremeÌ„ts of Vice preserueth himself stil perfect cleane Yet this I wold not haue you to looke for at his hands y if for the maintenaÌ„ce of any quarrel yea touching the honor of god himself he were cruelly inclosed within y scorching bul of Phaleris the tirant he should arrogaÌ„tly say togither with Epicurus y it were swéete and pleasant For many there be y are rather endued with an hardnes of hart than with any noble or manful courage who wil not sticke to affirme y a wiseman hath no féeling of griefe But such men séeme neuer to haue tasted therof themselues or otherwise experience would haue remoued theÌ„ in time froÌ„
that their fond arrogant opinioÌ„ no lesse enforced theÌ„ though sore against their willes to haue confessed the truth For as to haue a sense féeling of griefe is incidente to the nature of all men so to endure the same with stoutnes of corage is the propertie only of him y is valiaÌ„t Thys I say is he that will patiently suffer any punishments whatsoeuer yet not so but that he must still confesse to haue a natural motion and féeling therof And therfore my friends such as in this sort do rightly know how to séeke after Vertue and hauing therto attained how to order the same séeme veryly in my mind men worthy for God in whom to the example of others he may apparantly make proofe how much the nature of man is able to suffer for the maintenaunce of Vertue and Honestie For doubtlesse a good man is inferiour but a little to those heauenly spirites that are aboue and is onely sayde to be the true disciple and assured ofspring of God himselfe Whome that magnificent Father as one that exactly requireth the good life of hys children bringeth vpto goodnesse and discipline according to the manner of suche as are accompted both wise and seuere parentes But lette vs for the purpose admitte that some of those that are verye well learned doe wylfullye abuse that theyr skill and knowledge as well in matters of Humanitie as also Philosophie from whence there maye as we haue alreadie declared so many commodities to good purpose procéede yet the sciences themselues ought not as I take it to be therefore disproued though ignoraunte people doe discommend the same vnaduisedlye speakyng accordyng to theyr knowledge and that in matters of greater importaunce than are any waye subiect to their barbarous capacitie who neuer more notably do publish their follie then when most they would séeme to be cunning in all things For nothing truely may appeare more grosse and absurde to be grauÌ„ted than bycause at sometime through our owne abuse they hurte vs therefore to condemne the singuler giftes and ornamentes of Nature whiche if it were tollerable what thing I pray you so euidently â—ending to the benefite of man may there be founde but that the misdemeanour of euill persons may peruersely apply to the contrary For if so we shall wey the giftes of nature by the behauiour of those vpon whome they are bestowed it will then appeare that we haue receyued nothing from hir at all but that whiche tendeth to the hurte and hinderaunce of our selues For example who by this meanes may accompt it a coÌ„moditie to sée or to speake to whom shall not life it self than the which we holde nothing more déere be thought a very torment full of miserie But it is in truth so farre beyoÌ„d reason thus to reproue ether the benefites of Nature or of Artes or of Sciences or of any kinde of Knowledge and that for no other occasion than for the misbehauiour onely of those that peruersly vse them to their wicked intentes as if we should condemne the Arte of Oratorie for the faultie lyfe of some licentious Orator For albeit these good Artes do not of themselues adorne our mindes with the present possession of Vertue yet do they prepare vs and make vs apt as we haue saydbefore to receyue the same Neyther coulde God haue giuen vs any other thing more fitte conuenient to laye the foundation for so great a benefite Thus muche at this time I haue thought it conuenient to speake of Vertue and you my friends I do farther exhort that nothing than the same you estéeme more déere that withall you preferre no worldly benefite before hir Than the which though nothing more graue nothing more diuine nor nothing more plentyfull may be founde to be spoken of yet I doubte not but many things I haue ouerslipped that might well haue bene remembred bicause you sodenly enforced me beyng altogither vnprouided to discourse vpon a cause of so great importance EVD. Therefore Tales since on the sudden you haue so learnedly disputed vpoÌ„ so difficulte a questioÌ„ we may easily coniceture what farther successe by longer continuance is to be hoped for at your hands such truely as not without cause the most reuerent Potentates of this our coÌ„mon wealth do greatly regarde For as in all other things you are sufficientlye prouided so by this your orderly and wel piled communication you haue gretly satisfied and perswaded my fansie and no lesse as I take it the lyking of Lisippus but for my selfe I assure you you haue fully brought me to be of your opinion and verily I beleue that all those that rightly déeme of Vertue as they ought caÌ„not but yéeld vnto you the same LISIP. And I for my part Tales do the rather agrée with you in opinion concerning Vertue for that Aristotle himself and also diuerse other wel learned Philosophers haue so in effect defined of the same saying that Vertue is a good qualitie of the minde gotten by vse and exercise For as the professors of other arts so soone as they begin to learn their principles are not forthwith entitled by the names of those sciences wherin they séeme to haue a litle procéeded but after when by continuance they appeare to haue very well profited theÌ„ at the last they borrow to themselues the surnames and titles of those learned maisteryes wherin they haue made some proofe of their skill and are therewithall beautified with such other ornaments as séeme of right to belong vnto the same so they that endeuoure themselues to the getting of Vertue if perchaunce they performe some two or thrée notable and singular exploytes are not therfore straight ways to be accompted Good or to be called Honest but then onely are they to receiue the recompence of that reward wheÌ„ both by continuance and long experience they haue throughly attayned to such singular perfection that in ech kind of Fortune eyther prosperous or aduerse they can patientlye carrie one alwayes and the same vndisturbed mynde obseruing that in their manner which in Horace is there spoken to Quintus Delius O Delius thou to dreadful death that subiect art each day In aduerse chaunce of Fortunes froune thy minde see that thou stay And eke no lesse in prosperous hap so temper thine estate That out of rule and measure thou ne ioye aboue thy rate Wherin for as much also as all our power appeareth to be placed either in Mind or Bodie if therfore vsing rather y authoritie of the Mind than the seruice of the Bodie we remeÌ„ber with our selues y the one of these twaine we haue coÌ„mon with beastes the other with God vnderstaÌ„ding y Vertue is also in our reach power to obtayne that when by occasioÌ„ therof we shal haue throughly brought all our fleshly desires and earthly vanities in vs to be perfectly oppressed oure victorious soules shal ioyfully then returne vnto God that is to the firste originall from whence
runne and to be conuersant in warre without respect eyther of heate or of dust to hinder their beauties rather than to liue so deliciously at home as was the maner and guise of other laborous nations By this occasion the race of the Amazones became so famous To this intent the Romanes also brought vp their people in the vsuall exercise of warfare learning and husbandrie For nothing is there more certaine than that the faults of this ydle solitarinesse are to be auoyded by labour Wherin if I were disposed to vtter the diuers examples of manye notable men what a number might I recite of those that haue rather made choyce to liue not in the wildernes but in moste famous and flourishing Cities that so they might therby employ their time to the benefite first of the Common wealth next of their parents and lastly of their friends and countrie thinking this to be farre more commendable and prayseworthie to the worlde than beast like to liue in the secret and vnfrequented places of the earth to the onely pleasure and contentation of themselues Which thing we first and principally doe reade of Pythagoras who by his presence and doctrine the estimation whereof being diuersly spred abroade is saide to be the first that gaue light vnto Italie The like we reade also of Socrates for Greece who as he was a painefull and diligent learner so was he a bountifull and liberall teacher practising that in y trade of his life which he professed in his doctrine and perswading himselfe that no man was rightly to be reckned wise that sought not to imprint that in his hart whiche he learned in his bookes Hym succeded Plato and Aristotle well knowen to be men of moste excellent learning who making chiefly their abode in Athens beautified that Citie wyth ciuile behauiour honeste lawes and reuerent institutions of diuine knowledge What shall I néede to naâ—e either Minos who made the lawes for the people of Creta or Philolaus the Corinthian who framed the common wealth of the 〈◊〉 or Solon and Lycurgus of whome the first gaue lawes to the Athenians the seconde to the Lacedemonians or the like done by the Gymnosophistes to the Indians or the Magi to the Persians All these I pray you did they not liue among meÌ„ and by so liuing did they not ende â—â—ur to amend the vntamed natures and dispositions of the people by their good and politique Institutions Eyther why shoulde I relate the infinite number of Orators Poets and Philosophers who altogyther refusing thys Solitary liuing made wholy their abode for the moste parte in Cities thereby the rather to kindle among men eyther by perswasion of their Eloquence or by allurement of their verses or by their argumentes and sillogismes of reason a perfecte loue and affection vnto Vertue as the two noble Catos are reported among the Romaines who were so honoured for their graâ—itie at home and so renoumed for their vertues abroade that well neare all the worlde stoode in admiration of their excellency The example of whome many notable men of Rome but especially Tully that greate Prince of Eloquence did after imitate who although at sometimes he séemed to commend the Solitary life and also vsed the same himselfe yet did not that humour of his proceade from his voluntary liking but rather from necessity for that with others he was theÌ„ enforced to forsake the Citie which he estéemed more pretious than any golde and to remaine for a while in banishement bicause in priuate conference he rather preferred the cause of Deiotarius than of Julius Caesar who therein writeth of himselfe as followeth Being put by force and by occasion of the war from all my dealings in the common welth I now haue here great store of leysure and therefore I walke and take my pleasure of the Countrey and am many tymes alone Or to what ende shoulde I repeate the manyfolde examples of Emperours Kyngs and Captaynes who while they lyued soughte nothyng more than to defende theyr Countreys and to enlarge theyr dominions by theyr valyaunte enterprises and noble déedes of armes As of Alexander the greate of whome we reade that hée subdued the greatest parte of the worlde that he enlarged his Empire as far as the Occean sea and that by his valor he purchased to himselfe such estimation and renowne as the remembrance of hys name will always endure Or if Antiochus the great king of Syria of whom it is also reported that he added to his auntient dominions bothe Babilon Aegipt and Iâ—rie Or of Hanniball who ioyned so many battels obtayned so many victories against the Romanes Or of Mithridates â–ª who so greatly augmented the Parthian Empire Or of Epaminondas Prince of the Thebans Or of Pyrrhus the good king of Epirus Or of diuers others who pressing downe their griseâ—ed heares with their warrelike helmets put their enimies to flight in sundrie famous battels As for the purpose of Scipio surnamed Affricanus who made Carthage tributarie vnto Rome Or of Scipio Emilianus who ouerthrewe Numantia and vtterly raced vp the foundations of Carthage Or finally of Caius Marius â–ª who ledde â—â—gurth as a captiue in his triumphe vanquished the people called Cimbri in France the Germanes in â—talie and solemnelye triumphed vpon them both What may we thinke of these may we imagin they thought any other thing worthie in this life to be estéemed of saue only that which was good and laudable But if to the authoritie of these you will not yet séeme to yéelde consider then I besech you in what places the bodie of Christ our sauiour was commonly remayning whome we knowe came downe into the worlde for none other occasion than that in liuing among vs here he might by his secret power heale all our infirmities and so againe reconcile vs to the fauour of our heauenlye father And weigh with your selfe whether his holye Apostles gaue vs any example to lurke in such solitarie corners those I say that being inspired with the holy ghost and filled with vertue from aboue trauayled throughout the greatest part of the earth bringing so many barbarous and heathen nations vnder the yoke and obeysance of Christ Among whome remember onely that chosen vessell S. Paule where he I say bestowed his time he that in countries so farre distant a 〈◊〉 planted the Gospell and he that for the safegarde of his brethren wished himselfe to be cursed before the face of god And forget not I pray you where the manifolde numbers of Martyrs and Bishop that are alredy deade did spende their dayes those that cared for nothing but to conuert the people to the holy faith those that onely sought to increase the flocke of Christ and those that when occasion was offered refused not to surrender vp their owne liues for the safegarde of others All whiche being so be no whit now ashamed to yéelde if not to the reasons and examples profane of those that went before yet at least wise to the