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A55100 A Plea for liberty in vindication of the commonvvealth of England wherein is demonstrated from Scripture and reason together with the consent of the chiefest polititians, statists, lawyers, warriours, oratours, historians, philosophs and the example of the chiefest republicks, a commonwealth of all politick states to be the best, against Salmasius and others / by a friend to freedome. Pierson, David. 1655 (1655) Wing P2510; ESTC R2913 187,096 198

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governed them most gently and amicably Rer. ant l. 2. c. 1. 3 Let it be so many of the Egyptian Kings in old did tyrannize over them and they notwithstanding were not punished and cut-off by the People and inferiour Judges What then That will never conclude their unwillingness and unreadiness to execute judgment on their tyrannous Kings but that they wanted opportunity and power to do such a thing So it went as is said already with the People and inferiour Judges under Amasis tyrannous yoke But so soon as they got the opportunity they verified the old Maxim Quod differiur non aufertur Yea Diadore telleth us That the People did withstand the Priests and those who with-held honourable and solemn burials from the bad Egyptian Kings in old Which affordeth us matter to aver That if the inferiour Judges in Egypt did not execute judgment on their wicked and tyrannous Kings it was not because they were unready to do so but because the People were refractory thereto No question they would much more have withstood the off-cutting of their Kings then the want of solemnities at their death for what is it I pray you that draweth People on to act and engage for their Princes but because they take them up in the notion of half-gods and far above the teach of ordinary men Whereupon they conclude that both their Persons and Authority are altogether inviolable They dote so much upon them that they think they should in no terms be resisted far less cut-off and punished according to their deserts This daily experience teacheth Therefore the People of Egypt would far more have withstood the inferiour Judges in cutting-off their Kings then in denying them sumptuous and stately burials for their offences 4 It is easie to be learned from Diadore that the Egyptians esteemed the want of honourable burials to their Kings more then any punishment could have been inflicted upon them Know this they were a most superstitious People tainted with a world of blind zeal And withall as Diadore stor●eth the fear of the want of honourable and solemn burials provoked their Kings to live circumspectly and keep themselves within bounds Whereupon we conclude That both King and People thought no punishment more capitall and more hurtfull to the King then the want of an honourable buriall And so the inferiour Judges imagined that in with-holding from tyrannous Kings sumptuous and stately burials they executed more judgment upon them then if they should have brought them to the Scaffold and cause strike the heads from them Therefore if Salmasius shall not admit the third Reason which though it be true in general yet not in this particular case as is most probable though not demonstrative he must needs confess that the Praetors of Egypt not only in their apprehension but also in the up taking both of the King and People acted more against some tyrannous King or other in depriving him of an honourable and sumptuous buriall after his death then the Representative of England did in bringing King Charles to the Scaffold and causing his head to be cut-off As for that which Salmasius saith alledging that Aristotle saith that the Oriental Kings in old did not simply govern 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to Law Well let it be so If they were any wayes subjected to Law as Aristotle in even-down terms confesseth they were it is far from Salmasius his cui quod libet licet Qui legibus solutus est Yea and which is more Aristotle saith That the very government of the Heroes was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to Law and in some things their power was determinat and not absolute This is far from Salmasius his mind who will have the King to be of an infinit and illimited power The man would have a care that he do not speak blasphemy and knoweth not of it I take infinacy in power to be only proper to GOD. And 't is not good to abuse it in applying it to the creature Howsoever I heartily subscribe to what Aristotle saith concerning the Orientall Kings I do not think but in old as namely in and about the dayes of the Heroës Kings as Gods were adored by men But Salmasius must give me leave to say that even then Kings were punished by the People We read how the heroick Theseus was banished by the Athenians Val. Max. l. 5. c. 3. Diod. Sic. rer an t l. 5. c. 5. Plut. in Thes I do not deny but as these Historiographers report as likewise Heraclid de Pol. Ath. Theseus before that time had restored liberty to the Subject and had put Power in the People's hand It is also reported that Agamemnon the King of Kings was thrust from his Charge because he would not suffer his eldest Daughter to be sacrificed to satisfie the fury of Diana for the Roe which he killed feeding about her grove Dict. Cret l. 1. That of Theseus and of Agamemnon were done about the time the Children of Israel did seek a king to reign over them We might also here alledge examples of other ancient kings who were brought into subjection to the sentence of inferiour judges But we pass them as not beseeming the purpose in hand for they are relative to after-ages of latter years then what Aristotle speaketh of Yet we find one example or two more then what we have alledged already answering to this purpose It is reported that Sardanapalus because of his beastliness and sensuality was dethroned by his Subjects Arist Pol. l. 5. c. 10. Metasth an Pers lib. Just l. 1. Diod. Sic. l. 3. c. 7. Miltiades was incarcerated by the Athenians and died in prison Val. Max. l. 5. c. 3. Aemil. Prob. in vit Milt Plut. in vit Cim Albeit he was not the Athenian king yet was he their great Generall and crowned king of Chersonesus Herod l. 6. Aem. Prob. in vit Mil. It is needless to examplifie this any more for afterward it shall be shewed by multiplied examples how that kings in all ages have been brought to the Stage and punished by the People Therefore Salmasius shall do well not to imagine that in old times all Kings were absolute and the inferiour Judge did not sit upon the Bench against any of them And for my self I do not deny but in old Kings were of a vast and absolute power though I cannot be moved to think that either all of them were absolute or any of them so absolute as Salmasius dreameth of But more of this afterward And I do also think that the Assyrian Monarchy caeteris paribus was in it-self rather more then lesse absolute then either the Median or the Persian though by some accidental occurrents as afterward shall appear it was not Indeed it had the first start of them and was in the time wherein Royal Power was more in request then either before or after This makes Aeschylus to call the king of the Argives 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a governour that
scarcely be called it 's own Which maketh me in reason conclude that then there was little time left for exercising Policy and putting Lawes in execution This Polydorus Virgilius telleth in a word whileas he saith that before Henry 1. there were few Conventions made by the Kings amongst the people for ordering according to Law the businesse of the Kingdom Angl. hist lib. 11. Although in an absolute notion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 we may say that from Brutus unto Cassivelanus and from Cassivelanus unto William the Conquerour Kingly Government in England was non-absolute and without full power yet we cannot say so in a relative notion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as afterward shall appear 3. As the Kingdom of England was about the dayes of the Conquerour whether a little before or afterward unto this time We deny not but under the reigne of the Conquerour himself Regall Government in England was of a most absolute and arbitrary power In this we take Salmasius by the hand He needed not Def. Reg. cap. 8. to have troubled himself to have cited any Authors for proof thereof Very reason it-self teacheth the point for he subdued England by strength of hand But sure I am a Conquerour may dispose upon a conquered Kingdom according to his pleasure It is an act of favour in him if he do not destroy all much more as an absolute Lord to rule over all In the interim I desire Salmasius to take a view of Polyd. Virg. Angl. hist lib. 9. where he shall find the point evidenced to his heart's desire beyond any Historian he citeth Although in this we go-along with him as we must needs do yet notwithstanding we cannot say so much whether concerning Edward who preceded or those who succeeded him Let it be so that those who succeeded the Conquerour had the same priviledges which the Conquerour did arrogat to himself Yet can it not be denied but according to Edward the Confessour his Lawes or as they are called the ancient Lawes of the Kingdom Kingly Government in England is regulated and not absolute We make the point good from these reasons Firstly because according to these Laws the King of England is not hereditary And therefore we read not that ever Edward did tie the Crown of England to Royall succession I confesse it is alledged that he promised the Crown after him to William the Conquerour who was of neer kinred and great credit with him if he had not children of his own But this is not only improbable in it-self but also it is so judged And why shall we think otherwayes of it seing the Conquerour came not to the Crown of England by blood-right but by meer Conquest having the whole Kingdom of England against him And Polydore saith Hinc colligere licet vel Edovardum non servasse fidem Gulielmo quam à principio de hereditate regni non satis considerate dedisset vel nullum quod verisimilius est fecisse promissum Angl. hist lib. 8. This he gathereth from that which Edward spake to Haraldus whileas he prayed GOD that either he would avert the comming of England into the Conquerours hand or else that he would keep him back from it so long as he lived Therefore to me it is more then apparent that the Confessour did not in his Testament assigne the Conquerour to the Crown albeit Salmasius alledgeth the contrary Def. Reg. cap. 8. What Doth not Polydore tell us that because Edgarus was of young and tender years he was not admitted by the people to reigne And fearing lest the Conquerour should succeed to the Crown they rejoyced greatly that Harald took upon him to reigne in Edward's room Whereat as may be learned from Polydore Edward was not displeased himself but very well satisfied that Harald should succeed to him Whereupon we fear not to say that not onely the power of enki●ging was in the people's hands but also that the Confessour did not promise the Kingdom to the Conquerour after him although the contrary be alledged And is it likely that the people would have so much declined and withstood the Conquerour if Edward had assigned him to the Crown as his heir No verily for they adored him as their Law-giver It is known that Rufus was but third son to the Conquerour and yet he was created King Him the people preferred before Robert his eldest brother What Would they have done so if blood-right by the Law of the Kingdom had been the title to the Crown No verily It is remarkable that Rufus was ordained King and it was not so much as objected that Robert was elder then he he being but the third son to the Conquerour and Robert being the eldest Yea Rufus dying without children they appointed Henry the Conquerours fourth son King as yet passing-by Robert the eldest And which is more though Henry 1. had left in his Testament his daughter Mathildis together with her sons as heirs of the Kingdom yet notwithstanding the people created Steven Nephew to Henry 1. By the authority of Parliament it was ordained that Steven so long as he lived should enjoy the Kingdom of England and that Henry 2. son to Mathildis daughter to Henry 1. should succeed to Steven in the Kingdom of England passing-by any that was begotten by Steven Likewayes the people created John King although K. Richard dying without heirs had left Arthure son to Gaufredus who was elder then John heir to the Crown I might speak more for clearing this purpose but I forbear judging this sufficient Whence it is more then evident that the Crown of England since the dayes of Edward the Confessour by no Law of the Kingdom is hereditary I confesse since that time now and then the Kings eldest son did succeed and was holden as He●r of the Kingdom But this was onely by custome through favour of the Race in which according to the manner of Nations which I must needs call an abuse very ordinarily the first-born is preferred as the onely lawfull Heir of the Crown Therefore seing the Crown of England since that time hath not been at least precisely hereditary to me it seemeth very probable that for that time it hath not been absolute and arbitrary for so the original and fountain-power of enkinging is in the People's hands And consequently in this respect the People are simply above the King as the cause is simply above its effect Philosophers say That causa est nobilior suo effectu And so seing the King of England dependeth from the People no question they have simply a power over him and not he an absolute power over them Secondly Because according to these Laws the liberty of the subject is vindicated and the Prince is subjected to Law Because in Henry 1. his time a Parliament was holden At which time Parliamentary Power by the Law of the Kingdom was declared the Supream and highest Authority for any thing of weight was referred to it So that whatsoever was done
Isocrates Panath. saith That Democracy amongst the Athenians lasted 1000 years But that cometh not up by many hundred years with the duration of the Assyrian Egyptian and other Kingdoms But in the interim we humbly desire Bellarmine not to imagine the Scythian kingdom to be of such antiquity and stability that it is not only more ancient then any other kingdom but also as yet was never conquered by any forrain power for though Justine doth alleadge no lesse whose testimony Bellarmine citeth Lib. 1. de Rom. pont cap. 2. yet notwithstanding the contrary is evident from Berosus ant lib. 5. 5. Facility of governing This propriety floweth not only from the intensnes of its authority but also from its faculty of preventing division confusion for as by the one its purposes are speedily acquired and cheerfully gone about so by the other distraction and diversity of opinions is removed By vertue of all these proprieties Kingly Government hic nunc of all Governments proveth the sweetest But these Gentlemen and Court-parasits who because of these proprieties conclude it simply and absolutely to be the choicest of Governments must give me leave to say they are a little mistaken for at the most they conclude it to be secundum quid and in some respect the chiefest Government But a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ad 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 non est consequens Assert 5. Regulated and mixed Monarchy per se and in it self is of all Governments the sweetest Firstly Because per se and as it is in it self it moderateth and removeth the evils of all Governments for as it is monarchick it preventeth division and confusion the evils of Aristocracy and Democracy And as it is regulated and mixed it obstructeth the foule emanations of tyranny Who can deny that to be the chiefest Government per se and as it is in it self which per se and as it is in it self moderateth the evils of all Governments and serveth to remove them Such is the case of regulated and mixed Monarchy Secondly Because per se and as it is in it self it doth partake of the good of all Governments for so it is the medium of all Governments composed and made-up of all their natures And consequently it including within it all the degrees of political goodnesse as it is in it self in such a notion cannot but be far more excellent then any kind of Government for any other Government in it self doth only include one simple kind and degree bonitatis politicae And in this sense these say well who affirm Regulated and mixed Monarchy to be of all Governments the choicest But they will do well to advert that though it be so in its essentials and pure naturals yet it is far otherwise in its accidentals and way of administration Assert 6. Monarchy consecutively in respect of the fruits and effects it may and doth produce simply and absolutely of all Governments is most dangerous and least to be desired We establish it thus Firstly we make it good from Scripture-example It cannot be denied but as there were moe evil Kings then good Kings amongst the Jews so there was more evil done by the one then good by the other 1 Sam. 13.14.15.22.23 c. 2 Sam. 21. 1 King 12.13.14.15.16.20 22. 2 King 3.8.10.13.14.15.16.17.21 24. 2 Chron. 10.11.12.18.21.22.24.25.26.27.28.33 36. What doth not this hold-out to us that there is greater danger and hazard to be expected and looked for at the hands of Kings then good So it fared with the people of the Jews at the hands of their Kings Amongst them all there were but six good all the rest wicked Of whom it is said That they walked in the wayes of Jeroboam who made Israel to sin And it is not for nought that such a causal epithet is most often registred in Scripture and annexed to the wicked Kings of the Jews 1 King 15.16 22. 2 King 3.10.13.14 15. Now let the indifferent Reader judge whether or not that causal epithet be so often ascribed and given to them in vain There is a great emphasis in that who made Israel to sin If we plumb the bottom of it arightly we shall find it coucheth as much as that Kingly Government is most dangerous and produceth badest effects And it is the more evident by comparing the state of the Jewish Commonwealth under Kings with the state of it as it were under Judges Peter Martyr from severall pregnant reasons proveth That the condition of the Jews was far better under the Judges then under the Kings Com. in Judic cap. 1. His Reasons we digest thus 1. The Judges did alwaies deliver them from misery and bondage Judg. 2.3.4.5.6.7.11.12.13.14.15.16 20. Whereupon it is said Nevertheless the Lord raised up Judges who delivered them out of the hand of those that spoiled them Judg 2. But the King did not alwaies so 1 Sam. 28. 29. 1 Kin. 24. 2 Kin. 6.7.12.13.16 17. 2 Chr. 12.18.21 28. They oftentimes destroyed them 1 Sam. 22. 2 Sam. 21. 1 Kin. 18. 22. 2 Kin. 16. 21. 2 Chr. 24. They compelled them to slavery to sodomy and idolatry 2. The people of the Jews were not led into captivity under the Judges as they were under the Kings 2 Kin. 18. 25. 2 Chr. 36. Yea under Judges as is clear from the places above quoted touching them the people were never brought into any misery and affliction because of them They were not only ordained by God to deliver and did deliver the Jews out of all their calamities but also they laboured to keep them back from sinning which was the cause of all their sorrows Judg. 2. But the wicked Kings who did reign over them not only did not disswade them from committing iniquity but also did draw them on unto the perpetrating of manifold and most greivous abominations whence it was many sad and sore judgments were infflicted upon them 3. There were very few good Kings But we read not of any evil Judges save Abimelech and Samuel's sons And it is very observable that because Abimelech perverted judgment and usurping the authority did reign as King God judicially plagued him Judg. 9. Yea for the bribery of Samuel's sons he rented the Kingdom from them And it was no won though the most part of the Judges were good and few of them wicked 1 Because as Peter Martyr saith in electing them they had no regard to their riches but to their vertue and godlinesse Exod. 18. and Deut. 1. 2 Because as the same authour saith they were not declared by the voices of men but by the ordinance and inspiration of God Posterity or succession was here of no force Judg. 2. And 't is remarkable these two conditions being slighted the Judges were corrupt and dissolute But they being observed they were ever found holy and much for the good of the people Then tell me is it any wonder though the Jews were in a far better condition under
Heroicism and gallantry of old some were of a simply vast and absolute power and in nothing subject to Law 29 The first erecters of Kingdoms and planters of Colonies were of an absolute power altogether unsubject to Law 34 Personal endowments and extraordinary gifts have drawn-on People to devolve an absolute and full power without all reservation upon some men 40 Conquering Kings in old were of an absolute power 47 Vsurping and tyrannous Kings in old had an absolute power 47 Except for some of these causes there was never any King so absolute but his power one way or other according to Law was restricted Ibid. SUBSECT 2. The wicked Kings of the Jews had an arbitrary power both over Religion and the People of GOD. 120 The tyrannous and usurping Kings of the Jews in all probability had an arbitrary power over the Republick Ibid. The good Kings of the Jews because of personal endowments had exemption and immunity from Law 121 The Kings of the Jews de jure had no arbitrary and uncircumscribed power 125 SECT II. Royal Power ectypically is the choicest of Governments 135 Monarchy 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the best Government 136 Monarchy demotically in respect of the disposition of people is the choicest Government Ibid. Kingly Government consecutively in respect of its fruits and consequences may be hic nunc the best of all Governments 138 Regulated and mixed Monarchy per se and in it self is the sweetest Government 140 Monarchy consecutively in respect of the fruits and effects it may and doth produce simply absolutely is of all Governments most dangerous and least to be desired 141 SECT III. Democracy arightly constituted simply absolutely is the sweetest Government and most for the good of the People 152 Moses before the counsel of Jethro had a Kingly power 155 After the accomplishment of Jethro's counsel and the institution of the seventy Elders neither Moses nor any of the Judges had a Kingly power 157 No man by Nature in a formal and antecedent way is born subject to Government 165 Nature per accidens and in a secondary way intendeth Government 169 SECT IV. It is not lawful to resist the King as King nor the Kingly power as the Kingly power 171 It is lawful and commendable to resist the tyranny of the King and the abuse of his power Ibid. Kingly Government may very lawfully be declined that one better may be set-up 180 SECT V. We are tied by League and Covenant to maintain and espouse Christ's interest absolutely notwithstanding any thing may ensue thereupon Ibid. By no Oath or Covenant can we be absolutely tied to espouse the King's interest and preserve Monarchy involably Ibid. A SURVEY of POLICY OR A Free V●NDICATION of the COMMON-VVEALTH of ENGLAND PROEME COURTEOUS READER I Beseech thee judge of me impartially Do not imagine I speak my mind more freely then is pertinent Let me tell thee my freedom is upon a good accompt I may hold my face toward Heaven and say what I speak it is from the simplicity of my spirit My record is from on high I do not speak from a by-assed principle and if I do so shall not my Lord try it out Why I pray thee wilt thou stumble at my freedome in expressing my mind against Kingly Government in behalf of that which is popular Verily I desire thee not to cleave to my judgment implicitly Yet would I have thee duly examining without prejudice what I speak and embrace that which is good wilt thou learn so much of that which the world cals Scepticisme as to suspend thy judgment a little and not sentence against me at the first Be not wedded to thine own opinion but try all things and hold that which is good Do thou kindly embrace any thing which is of GOD in this Book I do ingenuously profess I shal forthwith be of thy judgment if thou shew me better grounds inforcing the contrary of what I maintain Well the main subject in hand resolveth upon this Question Whether or not is the Commonwealth of ENGLAND an usurped power These Questions being put aside that follow it is easily answered 1. Whether or not is the power of the King absolute 2. Whether or not is Royall Government the choicest of Governments 3. Whether or not is a Commonwealth the best of Governments 4. Whether or not is it lawfull to resist the Royall Person and decline the Royall Authority 5. Whether or not doth the Covenant tye us to preserve Monarchy inviolably Of these as followeth SECT I. Whether or not is the power of the King absolute THe Court-Parasits and Nation of Royalists do plead much for an arbitrary and illimited power to the Royall Person But in this matter we do freely offer our judgment ASSERT I. The power of the King as it commandeth just and lawful things is absolute and in such a notion cannot be lawfully contraveened It is made good firstly from that which Solomon saith for he doth whatsoever pleaseth him Where the word of a King is there is power and who may say unto him What dost thou Eccl. 8. These words by Writers are diversly expounded 1. Some expound them concerning the absolutenes of the Kings power whether in things lawfull or unlawfull good or bad And in this we find none more willing then Salmasius the Humanist Defens Reg. cap. 2. 2. Others again who are no friends to absolute and unlimited Monarchy do interpret the words not de jure but de facto Regis i. e. they opinionat that Solomon doth not speak here of the power of Kings which according to Law and Reason doth belong to them but concerning the absolute way of governing which one way or other is conferred upon Kings whether by usurpation or tyranny or by a voluntary and free subjection of the people to an absolute and arbitrary power in the Kingly Person Yet 3. I do choose a way distinct from either of these And I expound the words concerning an absolute power in the King in things lawfull and honest This I make good from the Contexts 1. The Preacher saith I counsell thee to keep the Kings commandment and that in regard of the oath of GOD. Now what power the Holy Ghost here giveth to Kings is such a power whose ordinances he exhorteth to obey and that under an obligation being tyed to obey it by a lawfull oath the oath of GOD. But we cannot obey the unjust Acts and Ordinances of an arbitrary and illimited power Unless you will say that it is lawfull for us to sin against the LORD and to do the will of man rather then the will of GOD which is contrary to that which is spoken Act. 4. and 5. Yea as afterward is shewed arbitrary Monarchy invested with a boundlesse power to do both good evill is sinful and unlawfull And therefore we cannot tye our selves by the oath of GOD to maintain it Sure we are we can not lawfully swear to maintain and obey
a King as that to reign over them If he affirm it then they sought a tyrannous King to reign over them And so he belieth himself If he deny it then it followeth that in even-down terms they sought no King but one who would judge them in righteousnesse But this Royallist will have them positively to seek an absolute King to reign over them Then tell me how can this agree with these pretences whereupon they sought a King to wit to reform their Commonwealth and to banish corruption out of Judgment-seats and because Samuel was not able to perform this as they alledged therefore they sought a King But Samuel might have said to them in seeking an absolute King ye seek a remedy worse then the disease Such a King whom ye seek having power to govern at randome according to his pleasure will not be a fit man to redresse the enormities of your Estate He may well aggravat the burdens under which ye now groan but he will not lessen them and ease you of your burden Be sure ye will get few or no good Kings but ye will have many bad who having a vast power will make you groan under their yoke So then might Samuel have said ye can no wayes pretend a sense in you of the want of the exercise of righteous judgment and of corruption and enormity in the Judges Ye scorn your selves to enforce your purpose therefrom in seeking a King whenas in seeking an absolute King ye forthwith give your selves the lie and undermine your own grounds Again if positively as is manifest from these ends above-written they sought no King to reign over them but such who would govern them according to Law and reason then is it more then apparent that positively they sought a regulated and non-absolute King to reign over them for as governing according to judgment and righteousnesse is done according to Law and reason so it can never absolutely be performed unlesse the governing power be absolutely hemmed in by Law and regulated thereby Now the absolute ends which the Israelites did set before their eyes in seeking a King do resolve upon governing according to judgment and righteousnesse And I would fain know of this man how he can conclude this consequence The people of Israel did seek a King to govern them according to judgment and righteousnesse Ergo they did seek an absolute King and did not deprecat the greatest of tyrants Verily the consequence at least virtually is repugnant to the Antecedent for in so far as they seek a just and righteous King fit to govern them according to Law and reason in as far they abominat an absolute King one in a capacity of tyrannizing over them Thus you see that the people of Israel do neither positively nor negatively seek an unjust and tyrannous King to reign over them We hasten now to the Assumption And we observe that the man contradicteth himself in it for he saith not onely cap. 5. but also cap. 2. that there were many Kings of the Nations at that time subject to Law And for proof of this he citeth Aristotle Pol. l. 3. c. 10. and 11. Diod. Sic. l. 2. But as a man awaking out of his wine he recalleth to his memory what hath escaped him and laboureth to correct it And so he addeth that though Diodore storieth that the Kings of Egypt were subjected to Law yet do we never read saith he that ever any of them was cut-off and beheaded by the inferiour judges And though Aristotle quoth he saith that all the Oriental Kings did govern 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 yet notwithstanding they did rule with an absolute power though more remisly then did other Kings Def. reg c. 5. 8. Albeit this man doth not admit a plenary and full subjection of Kings to Law yet nevertheless he is constrained by force of example to acknowledge that Kings were some way or other kept under the power and reverence of Law And he cannot deny but Diodore storieth of a most wonderful subjection of the ancient Aegyptian Kings to Law He telleth us that they were subjected to Law in their eating and drinking lying and rising yea in preserving their health they were restricted to Law And which saith he is more admirable they had not power to judge to gather Money together nor to punish any through pride or anger or any other unjust cause And yet saith Diodore they took not this in an evil part but thought themselves happy to be subjected to Law I trow this is far from Salmasius his cui quod libet licet He will have the King above Law not subject to any Law But the Egyptians will have their Kings under the Law and subject to it And though this immodest man doth say That the Egyptians notwithstanding did not cut-off any of their Kings yet catcheth he nothing thereby 1 Because the Egyptian Kings as Diodore telleth us were most observant of the Laws Therefore he saith Plurimi regum the greatest part of their ancient Kings lived blamelesly and died honourably Rer ant l. 2. c. 3. But I beleeve that Law cannot strike against the innocent 'T is iniquity to kill a man who deserveth not death Diodore telleth us of three things which made the ancient Egyptian Kings to walk closely and keep themselves within bounds Firstly their wayes were narrowly hedged-in by Law Secondly they were alwaies attended with the Sons of the Noble and Chief-Priests whose eyes were alwayes fixed on them Thirdly Kings that walked not straightly as nothing was proclaimed in their life-time to their praise but to their discredit so in their death they wanted the honor of solemn and sumptuous burials which were given to good Kings after their death The fear of this hedged-in their wayes and made them stand in awe 2 We deny not but Diadore in that same place insinuates there were many evil ancient Egyptian Kings Yet we say not tyrannous as Salmasius would have it for we do not think that though many of their Kings were wicked in themselves they got liberty to tyrann ze over the People The Egyptian Laws were more strict then that they would dispence such a liberty to any of their Kings Diodore saith they were tied to the Law no less then private men And withal he saith their Judges were most impartial and could not be bought-by either by favour or gain Which maketh us imagine that they hemmed-in the wayes of the most dissolute King amongst them and did not give him liberty to tyrannize over the People Therefore it is very observable that Amasis getting power in his hands did tyrannize over the Egyptians Whose tyranny the Egyptians did tolerate so long as Diodore saith as they wanted the opportunity of punishing him till Actisanes King of Ethiopia came down into Egypt And then saith the story the Egyptians called to mind old quarrels against Amasis and falling from him to Actisanes they unkinged him and set-up Actisanes in his room who
disobedient but not rebels to Noah They acted against his will but not in despight of his will They took not liberty from him to do his will though they took liberty to do their own will also We can not think that the light of Nature was so far extinguished in them that they did not honour him as their father A debording son as Esau can entertain Isaac with Venison though he walk not in his wayes And I do not think if they had not honoured him as their common father unlesse they had been extraordinarily restrained they had destroyed him and all his followers Sure I am they wanted not power to do so The godly party was but an handful in respect of them What then I pray you could be the ordinary mean of their restraint but their natural respect and affection toward him Nay they honoured him so much that they esteemed him their Coelum their Sol their Chaos the semen mundi yea and the father both of the greater and lesser gods Ber. ant lib. 3. And what we have spoken of Noah the like also may be said of Adam Before the Flood there was also a golden age 1556 years Wherein men lived as under one common father each of them knowing the intimate relations one to another until Monarchy was erected till the close of the 500 year of Noah's age as is shewed already Before which time Adam had died 626 years and Seth 514 years But so long as Adam lived what superiority Noah had over his posterity in the golden age after the Flood Adam had it rather in a more then lesse measure then he Adam was not onely their common father but also he was their first and primary father As we have evinced the truth of this point from examples in Scripture so we may evidence it from examples in humane Histories V. G. The Mitylenians gave to Pittacus an absolute power of governing because of his personal endowments Diog. La. de vit Phil. lib. 1. de Pit Arist Pol. lib. 3. cap. 10. The like power did the Athenians confer upon Solon upon the same accompt Diog. La. de Sol. Plut. in Sol. So it is alledged that James 6. because of his pretended personal endowments obtained an absolute power and a negative voice in Parliament In the interim observe That those who allow absolute Monarchy because of personal endowments do not imagine that Kings have an absolute power because they are Kings but as they are such Kings i. e. Kings not only in respect of station but also in respect of qualification exceeding all others And so they conclude that a King so qualified may very conveniently be entrusted with an absolute power for they apprehend that though such a man have power above Law yet will he not act against Law And likewise they imagine that such a man being in all respects above all men both in respect of station and qualification can no wayes be inferiour to any man Thus Aristotle inclineth to absolute Monarchy of this moulding Pol. lib. 3. cap. 11 12. Conclus 4. Kings in old were of an absolute power without the bounds of all restriction by vertue of purchase and conquest So were the grand Heroes as is shewed already Hence was it that Nebuchadnezzar and the Kings of the Persians had an absolute power over the People of the Jews Conclus 5. Kings in old by meer usurpation and tyranny had an absolute power without any circumscription So Pharaoh had an absolute power over the children of Israel and the wicked Kings of Judah at least of Israel over their people Thus Nebuchadnezzar had an absolute power not only over the people of the Jews but also over all his subjects Of whom it is said Whom he would he slew and whom he would he kept alive and whom he would he set-up and whom he would he put-down Dan. 5. After this manner Ahasuerus and Artaxerxes had an absolute power over the people of the Jews though we deny not but what either of them did act or intend against the Jewes was by the mediation of evil Counsellours So had Herod an absolute power Matth. 2. Jos Ant. lib. 15. Yet we deny not but it was through other men's means more then his own that he had a power to tyrannize and govern at random The ten persecuting Kings Dan. 7. Rev. 13. had an absolute power over the People of God But moe examples of Tyrants you may read Judg. 1. and 9. 2 Sam. 21. Mat. 27. Luke 23. Act. 12. In the books of Apocrypha as Tob. 1. Jude 2. 3. 1 Macc. 10. 2 Mac. 4.14 c. See also Beros Ant. lib. 1. Diog. La. lib. 6. Plut. de Dionys Brus lib. 6. cap. 21. Arist Pol. lib. 5. cap. 10. What needeth us so to accumulate quotations and examples when as it is evident both from divine and prophane writ that there have been almost tot Tyranni quot Reges Conclus 6. Vnlesse it had been for some of these causes above-written there was never at any time any King so absolute but one way or other according to Law his power was restricted In establishing this Conclusion we observe this order Firstly we prove the point from example And in doing so you will do well to observe that examples to this purpose are of a twofold kind 1. There are some which point-out to us That Kings in old were no lesse subject to Law then any of the People 2. Some of them shew to us That though the King's power for the most part hath been absolute yet notwithstanding in some case or other it hath been hemmed-in by Law Of the first kind we have examples both in the dayes of the Heroes and in after-times That in the dayes of the Heroes some Kings were no lesse subjected to Law then the People may be examplified both from the Commonwealth of the Jews as also from the condition of some Kingdoms amongst the Gentiles But we forbear till afterward to speak any thing of the Jewish Commonwealth And amongst the Heathen you have to begin with the ancient and stately Kingdom of Egypt It cannot be denied but the Kings of Egypt in old were most precisely hedged-in by Law Whatsoever they did was according to Law They walked they washed they lay with their wives they did eat and drink according to Law They wrote Letters and dispatched Messages according to Law It was not permitted to them to treasure-up silver to judge or punish any at random and according to their pleasure but as privat men they were subjected to the Laws the yoke of which they did bear patiently willingly submitting themselves thereto and esteemed themselves happy to be subject to them Diod Sic. rer an t lib. 2. cap. 3. This Diodore as he confesseth himself hath from the writings of the Egyptian Priests which he diligently searched as he saith Out of whose writings he giveth us three reasons why the Kings of Egypt were for the most part good and kept
libido Regum pro legibus habebatur And aftervvard he speaketh how they vvere reformed by Solon and hovv Pisistratus and others vvho succeeded him did tyrannize over them Lib. 2. Solon looked upon the Athenians under Pisistratus reign albeit he governed according to Solon's Lavvs as under the yoke of bondage 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Diog. La. de vit Phil. lib. 1. in Sol. And it is reported that Cleon and those who followed him destroyed the Commonwealth Great tyranny there indeed and arbitrariness of power Her de Pol. Ath. Thus we see clearly how that not onely Kings in after-times were regulated and in all things subjected to Law but also as some of the Athenian Princes were inferiour so some of them were superiour to the Athenian Kings In Corinth the Kingly Government was also regulated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Herac. de Pol. Corinth i. e. Periander first changed the Commonwealth taking to himself a guard and at last appointing to himself a Senate Now you must not think that this Senate had not power over Periander 1. Because that Senate cannot properly be called a Senat wherein the King hath a negative voice It is but at the most a cypher far from the nature of Senates that were in old amongst the Athenians Carthaginians c. 2. Because Periander in his Epistle to Solon advised at him what he should do in securing himself from those who went about to kill him And Solon in his Epistle to him advised him to lay-down his lording power It is very easie to know what hath been the cause why his own subjects endeavoured to cut him off for it is reported of him that he was the first King who went conveyed with a guard of Souldiers Whereupon he suffered none to live in the City This could not but irritate his subjects against him and make them conspire against his life See Herod lib. 5. Diog. La. de vit Phil. lib. 1. in Sol. Periand Herac. de Pol. Corin. Thra. sibulus counsel was just contrary to Solon's He desired him to spare none whether friend or foe but cut all off Which he did indeed as Herodot reporteth But we must think that he advised with Solon after he had put in execution Thrasibulus counsel for Solon in his Epistle to him telleth him That the way to secure himself in his Kingdom was not to cut-off any but to lay-down his lording power over them This insinuateth that he had followed Thrasibulus counsel and had cut-off his subjects before either Solon wrote to him or he had advised with Solon And Heraclid saith in even-down terms That he was neither unjust nor violent hating all gross and scandalous vices and commanding all those to be drowned in the sea who were prostitute to such manner of wickedness This could not be in the time of his tyranny when he made havock of his people and of which Heraclid speaketh before he entereth a-talking any thing of his justice and reservedness Which is more then apparent to us that he became a just and moderat man leaving-off his tyranny and oppression upon Solon's counsel and advice And so we fear not to say that he did put power in the peoples hand adding a Councel to him for keeping him within the bounds of Law This we may learn from Heraclid who having spoken of his moderation and justice telleth us That he did constitute 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a Councel or Senate Verily we cannot think but it was Periander's wisdome and choice to follow Solon's counsel in giving liberty to the people and in priviledging them with a power over him to hedge-in his wayes by the rules of Law Aristotle saith that his lording over the people made them lay their heads together against him Pol. 5. cap. 10. And Solon counselled him to leave-off his lording power as the chief and only vvay of securing himself and conciliating the favour of the people Who can think that such a vvise man as he who is reckoned-up amongst the seven Sages vvould have despised the counsel of such a vvise man another of the Sages also Yea Chilo in his Epistle to Periander though in a satyrick way is little or nothing different from that vvhich Solon counselled him to And that Periander practised according to Solon's advice and counsel is clear by comparing it vvith vvhat Heraclid speaketh concerning Periander He had the vvise men his fellows in vvisdom in greater respect then to postpone any of their advices as is evident from his Epistle vvhich he vvrote to them Diog. La. de vit Phil. lib. 1. in Per. 3. Because it vvas Periander's express judgment that Popular Government was better then Monarchy Dio. La. ibid. Now this could not be while-as Periander delighted to lord and tyrannize over his people And so 't is more then probable that as he changed his judgment he likewise changed his practice These two go alwayes hand in hand together Wherefore to me it is more then evident that Periander gave his people power over him and willingly subjected himself to Law Regal Government amongst the Carthaginians in after-times was regulated and in all things subjected to Law But you will do well to consider with me these things 1. As Carthage was in its beginnings 2. As it was in after-ages In the first respect it cannot be denied but Regal Government in it was absolute Firstly Because Dido the first founder of Carthage was worshipped by the Carthaginians as a Goddess Secondly Because Dido by her own proper industry builded Carthage and made the Carthaginians a People Just lib. 18. Thirdly Because in the beginning Kingly Government was most in request And therefore Kingdoms in the beginning were governed by Kings So say Aristotle Justin and Salust Then men were little acquainted with the rules of Policy Which makes Aristotle say that Kingly Government in the beginning was established because it was then difficult and hard to find-out many men of wit and judgment to govern the Commonwealth Pol. lib. 3. cap. 11. lib. 4. cap. 13. We shall therefore not judge it strange that Kings in the beginning of any Kingdom were absolute and of an arbitrary power People then had not policy and knew not how to exercise Law aright and to keep their Kings within the bounds thereof But according to the second respect we must think that there was a change in Court Then the Carthaginian Kings became subjected to Law It is therefore reported that Machaeus or as Orosius saith Mezeus vvas banished by the Carthaginians And finding that after he vvas by strength of hand released from his banishment he endeavoured to lord over them they accused him and executed judgment on him as on a malefactor and paracide both as a Rebel against his Country and as a murderer of his son Just lib. 18. Tell me not that Machaeus was not their King but the general Captain of their Army 1 Because his son Cartalo was by the Carthaginians trimmed-up in a Kingly attire instead of
in Rufus Henry 1. Steven Henry 2. and Richard 1. did remain purum putum Monarchicum the power of even-down and unmixed Monarchy And though saith he in the reigne of King John that power was lessened yet was there nothing derogated from the King's supremacy and absolutenesse remaining unviolated untill the perjured English rebels at this day have altered and diminished the just greatnesse of the King of England Def. reg cap. 8. Ans I admire that this man knoweth nothing but to rail on them whom he knoweth not Well I cast him over into GOD'S hands and fall to examine what he alledgeth Sure I am notwithstanding all his railing it cannot abide the touch-stone It is known to be a manifest lie which he alledgeth concerning the immediat successours of the Conquerour It is reported in even-down terms that these kings of whom Salmasius expresly speaketh esteemed Norman Laws established by the Conquerour too rigorous and unjust And therefore before they got the Crown they promised to the people to abrogate them and in place of them to establish the Laws of the Confessour Yea every-one of them promised more then another and to keep themselves within the bounds of Law to the very heart's desire of the people This was not only promised by themselves but also by others in their name And unlesse they had so promised they could never have gotten the Crown They got it upon the expectation of the accomplishment of their promise as the English Histories do abundantly storie And it cannot be denied but Henry 1. did give the Englishes a free Parliament and made it the government of the kingdom So that he is called the first king in England in whose time the power of Parliament was established And as for John it is very well known that because he did not stand to his oath and promise at his Coronation for establishing the ancient Laws of the kingdom but endeavoured to governe after the manner of the Conquerour in an arbitrary and loose way therefore the people rose-up in arms against him and dethroning him did set-up another in his room And whereas this man saith that the ancient Lawes of the kingdom did not derogate from the supremacy and absolutenesse of the king the contrary of that is already proved It seemeth strange to me that he is not ashamed to affirm that what Laws were established by Edward the Confessour and granted by King John were preserved inviolable to this day derogating nothing from the absolutenesse of John's successours Who knoweth not that the liberties of Magna Charta and de Foresta subject the King to Law And because that Henry 3. did not stand to the maintenance thereof after he had given his Oath at a Parliament at Oxford to maintain them inviolable therefore the People took up Arms against him till after many debates between them they caused him often to promise that they should be inviolably observed as well by him as by all other Thus they tied not only him but also his heirs to govern according to the ancient Laws of the Kingdom And because Edward 2. did act against these Laws following the counsel of Peter Gaveston and the two Spensers therefore he was imprisoned and dethroned after several conflicts between him and the People 'T is remarkable that the People refused to crown him till firstly he did put P. Gaveston from him And likewise Edward 5. was deposed after he had reigned two moneths and eleven dayes and was obscurely buried in the Tower of London Where then I pray you is the absoluteness of the King of England Inst 6. Vnder Edward 4. saith Salmasius it was enacted That the King might erect a publick Judgmet-seat by his Letters patent in any part of the kingdom he would Vnder Henry 7. it was enacted and declared That the King had a full power in all Causes in administring Justice to every one In the first year of Edward 6. a Statute was made declaring all authority both Spiritual and Temporal to be derived from the King Def. Reg. cap. 9. Answ I must needs say This hath more colour of probation then any thing the man as yet hath objected But notwithstanding this he will do well to observe this distinction 1. What is given to the King by way of complement and Court-expression 2. What is giving to him in reality and by way of action The truth is in the first notion there is as much ascribed to the King of England as if he had been indeed an absolute Prince On him you have these Court-Epithets The King of the Parliament The sovereign Lord of the Parliament Yea and the Parliament is called The Parliament of the King He is called The Original both of Spirituall and Temporal power having full power over all causes and persons and to erect Judicatories in any part of the kingdom where he pleaseth This is spoken But what then Examine the matter aright and you will find it but spoken What cannot Court-Parasites and flattering Councellors passe a fair compellation upon their Prince 'T is the least thing they can do to bring themselves in credit with him Read the Parliamentary Acts of Scotland and you will find just as much spoken if not more of the King of Scotland In Parl. 18. Jam. 6. Act. 1. 2. James 6. is called Sovereign Monarch absolute Prince Judge and Governour over all Estates Persons and Causes And yet who dare say but the King of Scotland according to the Law of the kingdom is a regulated and non-absolute Prince But according to the second notion let us examine the strength of these Epithets And so in the first place we fall a-discussing particularly these three Sanctions of which Salmasius speaketh The first saith That the King by his Letters patent may erect Court-Judicatories in any part of the Kingdom where he pleaseth This will never conclude that the King of England hath an absolute power This Act only speaketh of his power of calling inferiour Judicatories What is that to the purpose The King of England had power to call and dissolve the Parliament the highest Judicatory of the Land Yea Henry 1. did ordain and constitute the Parliament Yet notwithstanding that as is shewed already the King of England cannot be called absolute The King of Scotland hath power of giving-out Letters of Caption Parl. Jam. 2. chap. 12. Courts of Regalities are justified by the King's Justice chap. 26. And the Parliament petitioned the King to cause execute the Act anent the Establishment of Sessions for executing Justice chap. 65. The power of the Colledge of Justice is ratified and approved by the King Jam. 5. Parl. Edinb Mar. 17. 1532. But who will therefore call the King of Scotland an absolute King The second Sanction giveth the King full power over all persons and all causes But I pray you doth this give the King power over the Parliament and Laws No verily It only giveth the King power over all persons and estates separatim
Kingdome had or can be warranted by the Law of GOD Indeed I will not say so of Henry 8. for it is known that in his young years he did put the managing of the Kingdom into the hands of the Princes as did others of his predecessors before him And as for Edward 6. I must needs say his times were better then any times of his predecessors But it appeareth to me that as both Henry and he have encroached very far upon the liberties of the Church so called so did they encroach too far upon the liberties of the State But leaving Henry of whose power I find not so much spoken as of Edward I must tell you one thing concerning Edward and it is this Those who write of him and namely Foxe do crie him up beyond all the Kings of England for piety wisdom and learning And Foxe runneth so far out in his commendation that he esteemeth him inferiour to no King though worthy to be preferred to many Whereupon he feareth not to match him with Josiah and put the qualifications of both in one ballance Which maketh me imagine that the foresaid act emitted in Parliament under Edward's reign did passe in his behalfe because of his personall endowments The like act upon that same ground though in respect of him it was meerly pretended without any reality in his person did passe Parl. 18. upon K. Iam. 6. Thus the case is extraordinary We denie not but because of personall endowments Kings may be and have been advanced to greatest power What will this conclude an ordinary president thereof and a standing law therefore No verily There is no consequence from extraordinaries to ordinaries The standing ancient lawes both of England and Scotland are against absolute Princes Of Scotland and of England we have spoken already at length Verily the example of Edward 1. though there were no more may serve to clear our purpose He to repair what was done amisse by his father Henry 3. who was at variance with the people touching the liberties of Magna charta and de foresta did much gratifie the people restoring them to great liberty and abrogating all lawes which did make for the bondage and slavery of the people Howsoever the matter be sive sic sive non these sanctions above-cited by Salmasius do conclude the Parliament to have power above the King The reason is because if we look precisely on these acts what power the King hath is from them They not onely declare but also they enact and ratifie his power to be such such And so the king's power is the creature of the Parliament depending from it as the effect from the cause But sure I am causa est nobilior suo effectu And consequently if the king hath an absolute power by vertue of the Parliament then must the Parliament's power be more absolute for propter quod unumquodque est tale illud ipsum est magis tale And nemo dat quod non habet Inst 7. Bractonus saith Salmasius doth averre that the King hath power over all that is in his kingdome And that those things which concern peace and power do only belong to the Royal dignity Every one saith he is under the King and he is inferiour to none but to GOD as reason requireth In power he ought to be above all his subjects for he ought to have none like him nor above him in the Kingdom De Angl. Monar lib 4. cap. 24. sect 1. lib. 1. cap. 8 sect 8. lib. 2. de Reg. In Rich. 2. stat 18. cap. 5. it is said Corona Angliae libera fuit omni tempore non habet terrenam subjectionem sed immediate subdita est DEO in omnibus rebus nulli alteri Act. 24 Parl. Henr. 8. Regnum Angliae est Imperium ita ab orbe fuit acceptum Act. Parl. 24 Hen. 8. Quod hoc tuae gratiae regnum nullum superiorem sub DEO sed solum tuam gratiam agnoscat Fuit est liberum a subjectione quarumcunque legum humanarum Cap. 9. Ans We stand not to glosse Bracton's words He lived in Henry 3. his dayes And finding the King and States at variance about superiority as a Court-parasit he wrote in behalf of the King as Royallists do now-a-dayes He did just so as they do now Bracton had that same occasion of writing in behalf of the King which Salmasius hath to-day As the late King was at variance with the people of England for claiming absolute power over them so the controversie stood just so in Bracton's time between Henry 3. and the people But I pray you was it not as free to Bracton to flatter Henry as for Salmasius to flatter Charles Leaving this man to himself I hasten to examine the strength of these Acts which Salmasius citeth And in a word they do not plead so much for the absolutenesse of the king as of the kingdom They do not speak de Rege Angliae of the king of England but de corona or Regno Angliae of the Crown or kingdom of England Howsoever none of them doth speak for immunity and exemption to the king of England from municipall but from forraign Laws And therefore they declare the Crown of England to be a free Crown and subject to no other Crown and the kingdom of England to be a free kingdom subject to the Laws of no other kingdom I confesse they declare the king to be above the kingdom and inferiour to none but to GOD. Which is true indeed taking the kingdom in esse divisivo but not in esse conjunctivo Indeed the King is above all in the kingdom sigillatim one by one And in this respect he is inferiour to none but to GOD though taking the kingdom in a collective body he be inferiour thereto Inst 8. In the first year of James his reign in England the Parliament acknowledgeth him to have an undoubted title to the Crown by blood-right And therefore they did swear alleageance both to him and his posterity Whereupon Camdenus saith that the King of England hath supreme power and meer empire De Brit. lib. And Edvardus Cokius saith That according to the ancient Laws of the Kingdom the Kingdom of England is an absolute Kingdom Wherein both the Clergy-men and Laicks are subjected immediatly under GOD to their own King and head Cap. 9. Ans As for that concerning James we make no reckoning of it He was declared the righteous and undoubted heir of the kingdom through the defection and back-sliding of the times What other Kings of England hinted at before that he did execute Because he became King of Great Britain and entered the kingdom of England upon blood-relation therefore flattering Malignant and Antichristian Counsellours did declare his title to the kingdom of England to be of undoubted hereditary right I pray you friend were there not Malignants then as well as now I may say there were moe then then now at least they had greater
Saul and defending himself by arms against him was extraordinary He was anointed and designed by God as successour to Saul But the man is far mistaken for if it be lawful in an extraordinary case to resist Kings no question in it self it is lawful to resist them And so it being in it self a thing lawful it may be put in action both in an extraordinary and ordinary case See subsect 2. prop. 1. And though David was designed King by the Lord yet was he not formally called thereto by the People in the time of Saul's reign Will any deny but Saul so long as he lived was King over Israel and that David was his subject Otherwise David was very far out of it in calling him The Lords Anointed his Master Lord and King We say no more but refer you to Lex Rex quaest 32. Salmasius finding-out another starting-hole saith David with arms only defended himself against Saul 's tyranny but not to cut him off as the English Rebels and bloody butchers did in cutting-off Charls 1. Def. Reg. cap. 4. This is all we say concerning David And there was very good reason for it why David did not cut him off though he was several times at his mercy Firstly because he could not do it legally Though he had power legally to resist him yet had he not power legally to cut him off The very Law of Nature teacheth self-defence though by the smallest means But the off-cutting of the Delinquent only belongeth to the Magistrate and Judge unlesse it be in an extraordinary case Nature hath alwaies Law enough for self-defence but not so for punishing Delinquents The one is natural the other political Secondly no question David by extraordinary impulsion was carried-by the off-cutting of Saul While as Abishai went about to kill him David forbade him And told him he should be cut-off and perish another way 1 Sam. 26. Where you shall find David dehorting Abishai from laying hands on Saul from these two grounds Firstly from the non-legality of the fact He is the Lords Anointed Thus he holdeth Saul as his superiour And therefore he had not power to cut him off 'T is usurpation in the inferiour to rise against the superiour Secondly from the assurance of Saul's perishing another way As the Lord liveth the Lord shall smite him or his day shall come to die or he shall descend into battel and perish Would David say It is needlesse either for me or for thee Abishai to lay hands on Saul Assure thy self he shall be cut-off another way But I beleeve this man cannot say the Representative of the English Commonwealth had such reasons for them For keeping them back from cutting-off Charles Stuart 3. Elishah commanded to shut the door upon Jehoram's teeth He calleth him the son of a murderer See ye how the son of a murderer hath sent to take-away mine head Look when the messenger cometh shut the door and hold him fast at the door 2 Kin. 6. Thus he giveth orders to the Elders those who did sit in the Sanhedrin being with him in the house violently to keep it out against Jehoram and his messenger The word in the original 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 proporteth a most violent way of resisting It signifieth a holding fast at the door with pressing So the Seventy Chaldee paraphrast Avenarius and others do render it 'T is a vain thing in Royallists to imagine Elishah and the Elders with him did not resist the King but his messenger 1. The text maketh clear against this Is not the sound of his masters feet behind him Thus Elishah commandeth the door to be shut upon the messenger because the King was backing him and coming-in immediatly after the cut-throat This intimateth to us the shutting of the door and the out-keeping of the house was mainly against Jehoram himself His immediate approaching upon the back of the messenger is the ground of shutting the door and keeping-out the house They alleadge also this to be an extraordinary act Quasi vero self-defence were not a thing most natural and ordinary Away with this elusion 2. Because what the King's emissary doth in the King's name is done by him as in the King's person and authority And so virtualiter at least it is all one to resist the King's emissary and to resist the King himself Salmasius would loose the knot another way And saith he the impure Puritans can conclude nothing from this for cutting-off the head of Charles 1. The Prophet did not take it on him to cut-off Jehoram That was done by Jehu whom God extraordinarily stirred-up thereto Def. Reg. cap. 4. Who ever saw such a man as this He only raileth and shifteth the Question The Question between us now is not concerning the off-cutting but the simple act of resisting Kings And though Elishah did not cut-off Jehoram yet he cannot deny but he withstood him and defended himself against his violence This is all for the present we crave Neither can he deny but Elishah gave orders to one of the children of the Prophets to anoint Jehu King Whereupon he went forth and did cut-off Jehoram executing the purpose of God on the house of Ahab From which example is shewed already to be lawful to cut-off delinquent Kings It is the Magistrat's part and not the Prophet's unlesse it be by extraordinary impulsion to cut-off the delinquent And so as from the example of Elishah it is lawful to resist so from the example of Jehu whom Elishah caused to be anointed for cutting-off the house of Ahab it is lawful to cut-off delinquent Kings 4. Libnah made defection from Jehoram and revolted from him 2 Kin. 8. 2 Chr. 21. Salmasius studieth to elude this yet he saith nothing against it but what others of his own tribe said before him And saith he Libnah's revolt in respect of God the Judge of all the earth was a just punishment of Jehoram 's sins But in respect of the revolters it is no where justified in all the text Def. Reg. cap. 4. But with his leave the text insinuateth the contrary This you may learn from comparing the revolt of Libnah with the revolt of the Edomites So the Edomites revolted from under the hand of Judah unto this day There is nothing added to that The same time also did Libnah revolt from under his hand This is added as a reason because he had forsaken the Lord God of his fathers Thus is abundantly holden-out unto us that Edom and Libnab revolted from Jehoram in a different way No question in respect of God the cause and ground of the revolt of both is one God caused both to revolt to punish the sins and transgressions of Jehoram But in respect of the Revolters there are different causes The Edomites revolted because they disdained to live under the yoke of the King of Judah The text saith they chose a King of their own And from that which is added as a ground of Libnah's revolt it
is more then apparent to us it revolted from a principle of Religion And these who comment upon the text say Libnah revolted because Jehoram pressed the people of the Land to Idolatry I suppose upon good reason Libnah's revolt is far more justifiable then the defection of the ten Tribes from Rehoboam The one revolted upon a natural and the other upon a spiritual accompt And yet as is shewed already the ten Tribes revolted allowably 5. Uzziah was withstood by Azariah accompanied with fourscore valiant Priests of the Lord. And in this contrary to the doctrine of Royallists we shall make good these three things 1. That they resisted him violently 2. allowably 3. that they dethroned him The first is evident from the text Firstly because it is said they withstood him They withstood Uzziah the Ki●● 2 Chron. 26. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 They are words of violent resistance signifying to stand against And for this cause the fourscore Priests are called men of valour 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sons of strength So the Seventy and Arius Montanus translate them It maketh us imagine they were purposely selected from amongst the rest of the Priests because of their valour and strength to withstand Uzziah in sacrificing Secondly because they did thrust Uzziah violently out of the Temple Azariah the chief Priest and all the Priests thrust him out from thence Ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifieth to thrust out with violence They hurried him out of the Temple as the word importeth The second is also manifest because the Lord attended the undertaking of the Priests with miraculous and extraordinary succesfulnesse They no sooner laid hands on the King but beyond all expectation the Lord did put hand in him also He did back them notably They no sooner did resist the King but assoon the Lord from Heaven did strike him with Leprosie And is it imaginable but the Lord one way or other had plagued them also if they had failed in their duty to the King I can see no reason why he should have spared them in failing in their duty more then he did not spare Uzziah in failing in his duty And which is more the Priests do not groundlesly withstand him They argue from the King's duty and from their duty They tell him in plain terms It did not become the King to sacrifice Num. 18. but the Priests Ex. 30. Upon these grounds they set-to to withstand him and keep him back from burning incense Which insinuat that their act of resisting him was in no part of his duty and that which was proper to his kingly charge but only in maintaining their own liberties and what according to God's Law was due to them Would they say We will withstand thee O King and have reason to do so because as thou dost that which is not incumbent to thee so thou encroachest upon the peculiar liberties of our charge The third is beyond controversie though Royallists start much at it 1. Because he was cut-off from the house of the Lord. This was because of his Leprosy for according to the Law the Leper was cut-off from the Congregation Thus the Priests spare not to execute the Law upon the King though Royallists esteem him to have exemption and immunity therefrom And Uzziah the King was a leper unto the day of his death and dwelt in a several house being a leper for he was cut-off from the house of the Lord 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifie a solitary house far from resort and society Thus Uzziah was separated so long as he lived from the society of men Which is the Law concerning the Leper Levit. 13. 2. Because his son was enkinged so soon as Uzziah was separated from the Congregation And Jotham his son was over the King's house judging the people of the Land Ibid. and 2 King 15. Tell me is it likely or can it stand with reason they would have enkinged the son the father as yet remaining King And I pray you had it not been great madnesse in them to retain the kingly power in Uzziah's hand after he was cut-off from the house of the Lord because of his leprosie Firstly because he was as an excommunicate man And those who had not interest in the Church had not interest in the State the Jewish Church being national What David doth in reforming the State is in relation and subordination to the good of the Church Psa 101. Secondly the man being thus cut-off was as unfit to govern as either stock or stone I beleeve God appointed not idiots and unfit men to reign We shall speak nothing here of these examples whereby is holden-out not only the lawfulnesse of resisting but also of off-cutting of Kings this not being the proper place thereof We do only here speak of the simple act of Resistance We adde to these examples a few reasons Firstly These who have power to resist the tyranny of the King and will not offering both their bodies goods to his fury may very justly be called negative murderers and robbers of themselves Thus they expose them needlesly to the Kings mercilesse cruelty Not unlike the man who being able to preserve both his life and his goods from the robbers committeth all unto their mercilesse hands Who will not say and that justly but such an one is a self-murderer and self-robber Secondly It is against very Nature it-self men having power in their hands to defend themselves against the unjust violence and rage of the King and yet to be wanting therein Either Nature hath conferred upon them such power in vain or not You cannot say in vain unlesse you reflect upon the Authour of Nature who worketh every thing to good purpose And Nature as it is in it-self is good and perfect So it is repugnant for it considered as it is in it-self to work unsquarely and produce bad effects 'T is against the proportion that is between the cause and the effect Which maketh Aristotle say God and Nature adoe nothing in vain De Coel. lib. 1. cap. 5. Thirdly It is a negative betraying of God and his interest 'T is a denying to act for God contrary to the King's will Sure I am Christ cannot away with negatives He putteth them up in the score of enemies Mat. 12. 'T is against the practice of the Apostles not to act for God against the will of the Ruler They determine to act for him whether man will or not Man without exception They make no reservation of the King They resolve to do God's will though contrary to man's Acts 4. and 5. And I beleeve the King be but a man Inst It is altogether against that which Paul saith Rom. 13. say Royallists to resist the King This is much urged by Salmasius He concludeth the Apostles of Christ altogether to have been against the doctrine of Resistance This he gathereth not only from the place above cited but also from Tit. 3. 1 Pet. 2. Def. Reg. cap. 3.
it was in and about his time 1. Because it is very unlike that ever he would have called the Roman Caesars Princes 'T is an epithet of lesse honour and power then Kings And so I imagine that he would rather have called the Kings of England Princes then them Sure I am the Roman Caesars were more powerful did reign in a more kingly way then the English Kings 2. Beause he contradistinguisheth in positive termes the Government of England as it was in old from what it was of late saying That in old Britain obeyed Kings but now saith he it is governed by many and divided into factions And Salmasius himself cannot get this denied Of which Princes Caesar speaks himself Principesque undique convenire se civitatesque suas Caesari commendare coeperunt De bel Gal. lib. 4. Thus the kingdom was delivered-up into Caesar's hands not by one man the King but by many the Princes And lib. 5. he saith Summa imperii bellique administrandi communi consilio permissa est Cassivelauno On which words Camden noteth That Britain then was not governed by one but by many taking that same course by common consent in choosing Cassivelaunus General and chief leader to them as the Frenches did in choosing Divitiacus to repel Caesar Brit. chorogr de prim incol But what needeth us to stand here We shall make it more appear in proving the second particular The first is also confirmed by the testimony of Mela Fert Britannia saith he populos regesque populorum De sit Orb. lib. 3 cap. 6. And what power those Kings had I mind not to say precisely that it was so restricted as the power of the Lacedemonian Kings Neither will I say that it was so narrow as the power of the English Kings after the Conquerour Yet I may justly say That it was not boundless and arbitrary as Salmasius dreameth-of So saith Dio Niceus ex Xiph. epit Apud hos populus magna ex parte principatum tenet i. e. Amongst them viz. the Britains the People in a great part do govern This telleth that in old even in the time of Kings in Britain there was Popular Government Kings then in Britain were not sole Lords but the People did govern also Hence it is that Cordilla jussu populi was set to reign over the Britains So Gintolinus Populi jussu Rex dicitur Polyd. Ang. hist lib. 1. Because of the People's swaying power of old in Britain Kingly Government somewhat before the dayes of C. Caesar was altogether abrogated as in part is shewed already But Salmasius shall not think that of old England was singular in this There were in old other parts in Britain where the kingly power was limited and hemmed-in by Law Concerning the Aebuaan Isles Solinus thus speaketh Rex unus est universis Rex nihil suum habet omnia universorum ad aequitatem certis legibus stringitur Ac ne avaritia divertat a vero discit paupertate justitiam utpote cui nihil sit rei familiaris cap. 25. i. e. all of them have one King The King hath nothing proper all things belong to the people he is compelled to equity by certain Laws And lest avarice should withdraw him from the truth he is taught justice by poverty to wit as one that hath nothing belonging to himself The second particular is manifest from Strabo who saith Complures apud eos sunt dominationes lib. 4. In the original dominationes is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifieth Princes or Rulers Thus they were governed toward his time by many and not by one And Salmasius from this is made so to say albeit he endeavoureth to elude what Tacitus saith hist lib. 1. The words are already cited and vindicated But Diodore is most clear to this purpose speaking of Britain Reges principes que ibi sunt plures pacem invícem servantes Rer. ant lib 6. cap. 8. But sure I am Salmasius will not say that such had an absolute power over the people Their Kings had not such power Ergo far lesse they Yea the Heduan Vergobret who did reign over moe then any of them had not an absolute and arbitrary power Which maketh me think far lesse had they any such power And 't is observable what they did was communi concilio Caesar de bel Gal. lib. 5. So much touching the State of England in the second notion i. e. as it was from the dayes of Bretan Brito or Brutus 3. We come now to speak of England as it was under the Romans Saxons and Danes As it was under the Roman yoke speaking precisely England had no Kings but the Roman Emperours And what power they had is spoken already concerning the Roman Dictators And as for the power of the Danish and Saxonick Kings in England no question they had greater power then any of the Kings of England in old or since the dayes of the Conquerour if we except K. James But to say that their power was boundless and arbitrary is more then I dare affirm I will not deny but the first whether of the Danish or the Saxonick Kings had that same power which the Conquerour had over England As he subdued England so did they And it is the Conquerours priviledge to rule at random Such do ordinarily conquer against Law And I pray you why do they not also rule without Law But that all who succeeded these had the like power also I cannot be moved to affirm It cannot be denied but even under their reign there were Parliaments and Councels And I trow they were not cyphers I might enlarge this but I judge it needless for I care not which of the parts be affirmed Under these Kings England was not its own but a subdued and unsetled Nation Which maketh me say that it was no wonder albeit then there was no time for it to exercise the Laws against its Kings Thus at length I have offered my judgment freely concerning the power of the Kings of England both of old and of late And that we may shut up this whole purpose in a word for cutting-off all that Salmasius can object you shall be pleased carefully to distinguish between extraordinary and ordinary Monarchy As for an extraordinary Regal power which was conferred on Kings whether for extraordinary heroicism personal endowments or such like we shall not stand to say that such had not only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an all-commanding power but also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an all-willing and arbitrary power See Concl. 1 2 3 4. Yet we cannot say so much of ordinary Monarchy if we look to the precise and ordinary way of the power of Kings This by example is at length shewed already And so we come Secondly to prove it by reason Can any in reason imagine that people unlesse it be for some extraordinary cause or other will subject their necks to the pleasure and arbitrement of any Nay it is a combing against the hair for
people to resign their liberty into the hands of any man giving him a full power to dispose upon them at random It is very observable That once Kings in Asia had not only an all-commanding but also an all-willing power So Nimrod Belus Ninus and Semiramis as is shewed already Concl. 1. And yet at last this pambasilick and arbitrary power turned over into a despotick power governing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to Law Polit. 3. cap. 10. Under these four Kings the condition of Regal power was very extraordinary And so it was no wonder though they did reign in an extraordinary way having more will then other Kings But the kingdom becoming setled the power of their successours was hemmed-in Their wings were a little clipped And may we not judge so of all other Nations Verily I think it holdeth a majori for the Assyrian Kings were universal Monarchs and no kingdom could ever match with the Assyrian empire Which makes me imagin that as the Kings of the Assyrian empire in an ordinary and setled case were reduced to Law far more in that respect hath the case of other kings been such And withall observe there was a time when Regal Government was much in request It was much cried-up in the dayes of Heroicism And that rather in the flower and beginnings then in the fadings and after-times thereof And so it was no wonder though at that time kings were invested with a vast power But by process of time Monarchy became lesse esteemed The power of it became much lessened partly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the kings themselves dimitting and partly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the people detracting from their greatnesse So saith Aristotle Polit. 3. cap. 10. So then we must not imagine that though kings sometimes had a vast and arbitrary power they alwaies had such a power and their wings were never clipped Nay the disposition of every age is not for Royal power it-self much lesse for the arbitrariness thereof Let me never dream that the ordinary way of people is to bring their necks under such a yoke What is more consonant to nature then libertie and what is more dissonant to it then tyranny Can any deny but arbitrary power in actu primo is tyranny It is still in a capacity either of tyrannizing or non-tyrannizing It hath still a disposition for acting either according to or against Law Can people then have an ordinary temper for taking with such a yoke No verily that is against the haire with them 'T is repugnant to their innate liberty and the natural desire thereof Yea 't is repugnant to the natural antipathy which all bear in hand against tyranny This being done we hasten now to give a direct and particular answer to that which Salmasius alleadgeth for proof of the second Proposition We confesse that some Kings of Assyria had an absolute and arbitrary power But we deny that such power was competent to all the Assyrian Kings as is proved already It will never follow that because the first Kings of Assyria who were extraordinary Heroes in whose time the condition of the Kingdom was unsetled had an arbitrary power therefore all the Assyrian Kings had the same power also while as the Kingdom became established The one way the case is extraordinary and the other way it is ordinary But there is no consequence from extraordinaries to ordinaries And Salmasius concludeth very unjustly the Assyrian Kings to have been absolute because the Persian Kings were so I confesse the Persian Kings had a power to do any thing they pleased but this was by the means of the great Persian Monarchs Cyrus and Darius We read in Daniel 6. ch that in their dayes the Persian Laws were unalterable And so we conceive that Law which gave the King of Persia a power to do every thing according to his pleasure was made under their reign Otherwise they could not have decreed unalterably Neither could Darius have decreed that none for fou●●y dayes should pray to any but to him unless he had had an absolute god-like power conferred upon him by the Law of the Kingdom Of this Law Herodot speaketh lib. 3. in the history of Cambyses marriage with his german sister And it is known that Cambyses did shortly after succeed to Cyrus And it is already said by us more then once that conquering Kings may and did reign at random And so it was no wonder though the Persian Kings had an absolute power 1. Because it was established amongst the first and fundamentall Laws of the Kingdom It was enacted by the power and means of the first Founders of the Persian Monarchy who subdued the Assyrians and brought them under But you can never shew me a Law amongst the Assyrians establishing the arbitrary power of their Kings 2. I do not deny but arbitrary power may be retained in succession being once acquired by some of the predecessours for some short time So arbitrary power acquired by Nimrod continued till in and about the reign of Zames And if you say that it lasted longer sure I am it did not exceed the dayes of Heroicism After which time Monarchy in Asia became despotick and heril Neither can you shew me as is proved already that in the dayes of the Heroes regal power was arbitrary unlesse it had been in some extraordinary case Well I stand not to grant that arbitrary power once acquired may endure some few hundred years But I cannot be brought to say that such a power can be retained into many ages This you may learn from what foregoeth Now the Assyrian Monarchy continued about 1547 whereas the Persian Monarchy lasted but 230 years And though Ottanes defineth Monarchy to be that to which every thing is lawful unpunishably yet he doth so by way of taxing the greatnesse thereof And positively he taxeth the greatnesse of the Persian Kings objecting to the people the licentious arbitrarinesse of Cambyses and Magus Thus he endeavoureth to disswade the People from establishing Monarchy telling them that it was neither good nor pleasant And he giveth this reason for it because saith he it hath a priviledge to do every thing unpunishably Herod lib. 3. So then he defineth Monarchy after that manner not because he esteemeth it to be its due priviledge but because he holdeth it as that which is competent to it against the pleasure and profit of the people Therefore is it that he useth it as a disswading motive for provoking the people no longer to set-up Monarchy amongst them We stand not here to glosse Artabanus mind who commendeth that Law amongst the Persians whereby was enacted That the King should be honoured as the Image of GOD. He was a great Courtier with the King of Persia And it is the least thing Courtiers can do to flatter Although we do verily think that Artabanus did allow vast and arbitrary power in the Persian King yet that can be hardly drawn from his words In Scripture Kings are