any good end VIII Moreover it is opposite to the nature of sin to produce of it self any good effect as an evil tree cannot bring forth good fruit Mat 7. 18. nor darknesse produce light of it self 2 Cor. 4. 6. but the same great and glorious God who out of his omnipotence brought forth light out of darknesse can also out of our sins take an occasion to illustrate his infinite wisdome his righteousnesse and his goodnesse But these are the effects of a divine power as of a cause working properly and of it self to the production whereof there needs no assistance nor strength from our sins which as to those effects are but meerly contingent and but by accident Those words therefore of David Psalm 5. which St. Paul alleageth Rom. 3. 4. I have sinned against thee 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that thou mayest be justified when thou speakest are not so to be understood that David for that end committed murder and adultery or that it was lawfull for him so to do that God might be justified in his words but the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and some other Greek particles of the same signification in many places of Scripture are to be understood according to the interpretation of St. Chrysostome not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to denote and inferre the event only and not the true cause of the thing For as he who is in a serious argumentation can inferr a true conclusion from the false praemises which before were granted by another and yet the same Disputant would show himself ridiculous if to prove a true conclusion should willingly make use of some salse assumptions for Truth doth not stand in need of the patronage of Falshood so Almighty God and we also in some respect may do the like can dispose of things that are ill done into good but it is neither congruous to the divine Justice and Goodness neither is it any ways lawfull for us to will and to do evil that good may come thereby IX The third argument is taken a naturâ boni Actus from the nature of a good Act to the complement whereof the concurse of all requisite conditions is so necessary that if one be but absent amongst so many of them although all the other be present and subservient yet that Act shall not be morally good Most remarkable is that Axiom Bonum ex causa integra malum ex quolibet defectu Good proceeds from an upright and an entire cause but evil from any defect And it is besides manifest in all kind of things that there are more required to raise up than to throw down or to destroy The defect of a good Intention is enough to prove any Action evil for that the end whereof is evil must of necessity be evil it self but it is not enough it is not sufficient that a good end or a good Intention should prove the Action good unless all the other requisite conditions be conjoyned Now that any Action whether the internall of the will or the externall of the work may approve themselves to be good we are to understand that there are three distinct goodnesses viz. the goodness of the object the goodnesse of the end and the goodness of the circumstances The quality of every Act doth first of all and principally depend on the quality of the object or of the matter about which it is conversant so that from thence every Act may indefinitely and according to the whole species of it be denominated either good or evil in this respect we affirm that Theft and Adultery are evil in the whole Species of them and that Prayer and the giving of Alms are good in all their severall respects and the acceptations of them but with this difference that things which in themselves are simply evil are so evil that neither upon the account of the end although good nor yet on the account of their circumstances although never so promising they can ever be made truly good But things which are good in their own nature may yet be so corrupted by the end or by undue circumstances that they may leave off to be good and become evil The pravity therefore of the object being presupposed we are altogether to abstain from the Acts of Theft or of adultery as being simply evil in themselves But the goodnesse of the object being presupposed it is not safe for any one at the first either to undertake to do it or to approve it being done unless he hath diligently weighed before hand the end to which it is directed and the severall circumstances with which it is attended and cloathed In these things therefore in which it is said that the Goodness of the Act doth depend on the end and that the end doth discriminate and crown the actions they may be said so for to be true if the Acts be good in consideration to the object or the matter or at the last if they be of a middle nature and indifferent but not if they are evil For the goodness of the object being supposed the Act doth chiefly take its goodness or its evilnesse from the end For examples sake the Act of giving a poor man an alms though it be a good Act in respect of the matter or the object yet if it be done for vain-glory it is morally an evil Act because it is not ordinated to a good end The same Act if it be to relieve the necessities of a neighbour is an Act so far good that it hath a lawfull matter and a right Intention and so partaketh of both the goodnesses above mentioned to wit of the object and the end but it cannot yet be affirmed to be simply good unlesse it be moreover duely circumstanced for to this complement of a good work besides that goodness of the object and the end there is required the goodnesse of circumstances And from hence it is that commonly it is spoken that the goodnesse of the Act doth depend upon its circumstances not primarily and principally but ultimately and for the accomplishment of it the goodness of the object and the end being first laid down seeing therefore these three things are required to the goodness of every moral Act and they are all to be conjoyned to wit the matter lawfull the intention right and the circumstances due it is most manifest that a right intention cannot alone suffice by it self and by consequent that nothing can be performed out of a good Conscience whatsoever the Intention be that is either unlawfull in the object or defective in the circumstances X. But some there are who peradventure will object unto this those words of our Saviour Mat. 6. 22. If thy eye be single thy whole body shall be full of light but if thy eye be evil thy whole body shall be full of darkness Where if the intention be undesstood by the eye which is the judgment of almost all the Interpreters upon
according to his good pleasure he may either delegate a dispensation of either power to another or he may reserve it to himself Therefore it would not be absurd if any man should grant that God in some measure hath delegated a Legislative power to the Magistrate of obliging Consciences but hath reserved the Judicial power over them entire unto himself But there is no necessity that compelleth us to grant 〈◊〉 or to use any expressions that may be helped although by never so gentle an interpretation For we do not say this that God hath given to the Magistrate a power to oblige by his Laws the Consciences of those that be under him but this rather which is a more wary and a more commodiouâ— kind of speaking that God hath given to the Magistrate a power of making Laws which but by the only Authority of God himself do oblige the Consciences of his Subjects For to speak properly the Magistrate doth not oblige the Conscience to obey the Law but God obligeth the Conscience to obey the Magistrate XL. And by this a way is made for an 〈◊〉 to the last objection I do grant indeed 〈…〉 effects of Actions ought not to be extended 〈…〉 the intention of the Agents nevertheless where there are more Agents subordinate there is 〈◊〉 hindreth but that the effect may be extended beyond the intention of the inferiour Agent provided it doth not exceed the Intention of the principâ—â— Agent As in the generation of a Monster which being but boyes we have learned from Aristotle the effect which is the production of the Monster is besides the intention of the second cause or as they speak it of Nature natured that is to say of the person that begets or brings it forth but it is not besides the intention of the first Cause or of Nature naturing that is Almighty God Therefore although the Magistrate in the making of a Law hath no explicit intention of obliging the Consciences yet by instituting the Law he doth institute that which by the intention ordination of God hath an implicit force of obliging them which necessarily is conjoyned to him And this may suffice to be spoken of the obligation of Humane Laws in general I will shortly proceed to the Questions or particular doubtful Cases if God shall permit and my health be more constant to me THE SIXTH LECTURE Of the Obligation of Humane Laws in reference to their material Cause PROV 8. 15. Per me reges regnant et Legum conditores justa decernunt By me Kings reign and the makers of Laws do decree Justice I Have reduced to two general Questions or to two heads what I have propounded to be spoken concerning the obligation of humane Laws The first is whether humane Laws do oblige the Consciences of Subjects Concerning which in the former Lecture I have expounded to you what was my Judgment of it The other Question is How they oblige To which question I have told you there belongeth the deâ—â—ding of some Cases and Doubts which meeâ— in this â—ubject And because they are 〈◊〉 few noâ— of one kind therefore to avoid Confusion and that we may proceed in some Order and Method to that which is to be spoken I have thought is not impertinent to give you a rough Representative of the whole Treatise now in hand And that Method which most of you do remember I observed in those my former exercitations concerning the obligation of an oath I here conceive it very necessary for me to use again that those things may all of them be reduced to the four kind of Causes which I conceive may commodiously be referred to them But because I do find many things to remain which cannot easily be included in those bounds we will assigne them their several â—lasses And they are chiefly two the first of Persons who are under the obligation of those Laws and the other in the comparing of the obligatory Vertue which is in Humane Laws with that which ariseth from the Judgement of the Conscience by Vowes Oaths Promises Contracts and from the Law of Scandal or if there be any thing else which elsewhere obligatory for these two obligations do seem to be in a contestation and justling for precedency to strive which of them should give place unto 〈…〉 To add the third Classis for some certain species of Laws which seem to contain in themselvs somthing singular to themselvs such as are Ecclesiastical Laws Penal Laws the local statuâ—es of Colleges and lesse societies will not peradventure be very necessary seeing in some manner they may be reduced to somthing in the four kinds of Causes and though not so aptly as to satisfy the curious yet so fully as to serve our present purpose for whilst our hearers understand what it is we speak of we have never taken any great care in what method we have gone We will in the first place therefore if God shall grant life health and opportunity to accomplish what we have propounded speak of the obligation of the Laws as to the four kinds of Causes In the second place of the persons who are obliged to the observation of those Laws And lastly of the comparison of the obligations which quarrel amongst themselves giving you before-hand one or two distinctions which will be of great concernment in the whole management of this discourse II. We must understand therefore in the first place Seeing that to the end of Political Government and order there is a two-fold power in those who are invested with Soveraign Authority A directive power by which the Subjects may understand what they have to do and a Power Coactive or Coercitive for by reason of the Analogy it is better so to call it than Coercive by which the Subjects may be compelled to the performance of those things that are commanded if of their own accords they shall refuse to give obedience to them both which are so contained in the Laws that the one consisteth most in precepts and the other is most to be seen in punishments there ariseth from this double power of the Magistrate a double duty of the Subject which answereth to that double power The duty of Obedience in reference to the Directive power and the duty of Subjection in reference to the power Coercitive I here understand subjection as it is properly so called by an appellation Generical which as elsewhere it often comes to passe is restrained to one certain Species For obedience also is a Species of Subjection largely taken The Apostle comprehends both those duties Heb. 13. 17. and signifies them in those two words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Obey them that have the oversight of you and submit your selves The first whereof pertaineth to the Duty of obedience or of performing that which is commanded by a lawful Superior the other to the Duty of Subjection or of induring what by him shall be inflicted Furthermore As from a double Power there ariseth a double
be the better or the worse As if a man should partake of the Supper of the Lord to that end to put himself in remembrance of the death of Christ the more entirely that he applyes the mind to the remembrance of his death the better he performes the duty of a true Communicant Again if a man should slander his neighbour intending the ruine of him by how much the more violently he intends it by so much the worse is his Act of Calumnation The quantity therefore of a good or an evil Act is correspondent to the quantity of the goodnesse or the evilnesse of the Intention and is commensurate with it if the Intention be understood according to the Act of intending and not as to the thing intended But the intention taken either way doth not suffice to prove this that any Act which otherwise is evil should be made good V. This conclusion is proved by many and most strong arguments first by the words of the sacred Text in the third Chapter of the Romans where the Apostle not without indignation doth detest that grievous slander by which it was said to be taught That evil may be done that good should come thereof That the sence the scope and the force of this place may be the better understood that St. Paul amongst all the Apostles was abundantly the most copious in asserting every where the mercy of God by Grace making a Covenant of grace with sinfull men and faithfully fulfilling the Evangellical promises notwithstanding all that unrighteousnesse and unbelief of men which lyeth within their hearts and openly and abundantly doth declare it self in their dayly lives and conversations which he professeth to be so far from making these promises of God by Grace to be in vain that on the contrary they do render the glory of his grace and truth to be far more illustrious Rom. 5. 2. for where that the offence abounded there it is manifest that Grace superabounded From hence the Sophisters and Imposters took on one side to themselves an advantage to slander and to diminish if they could the authority of the Apostle On the other side the Hypocrites and profane did take an occasion to live more licentiously and to sin more securely For if that be true said they which is preached by Paul that the sins of men do redound to the greater glory of God there is no reason that God should punish sins or be angry with sinners There is no reason that a man or woman should abstain from sinning nay they should sin more abundantly that God might receive the more abundant glory and evil things are altogether to be done that good things may come thereby The other objections the Apostle confuteth but to this let us do evil that good may come of it he doth not vouchsafe any answer at all he only cryeth out that it is a manifest slander and near of kin unto blasphemy and unless they repent the just judgment of God is threatened to such importunate slanderers as if this Sophism was of that kind of arguments which Aristotle adjudged not to deserve an answer but rather a reproof It is hence manifest and all Interpreters do acknowledge it that the Apostle most constantly denyeth that any evil ought to be done for any intention be it never so good It much availeth saith St. Augustine to consider what Aug. contra meudaciam what end what intention such a thing is done but those things which are manifest sins ought not to be done under any pretence of a good cause or a good end or of a good Intention This is the first argument VI. The second it is taken from the nature of evil or of sin which of its own nature is not first to be chosen 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Hiercl pag. 78. neither is it secondly ordinate to a good end neither is it thirdly apt of it self to produce any good first it is not eligible or it is not to be chosen by reason of its own nature qua tale as it is of such a nature for there is nothing eligible which is not also Expitible and all things that are desired are desired under the account of good Neither is evil of its own nature ordinable to any good end for if it were it were also to be desired for the appetite in Philosophy is not only carryed to the end propounded by the Agent but to those things also which seem to conduce for the obtaining of that end If you object God doth dispose of our evils into a good end of his own and therefore it is not against the nature of evil to be ordinated to a good end I answer in the first place that the ways of Almighty God who is the Lord of Nature and according to his good pleasure can produce good out of evil are farre different from ours who have not the same right or the same power neither is it for us either too curiously to enquire or too magisterially to pronounce any thing of the Providence of God concerning evil In the second place I answer that God indeed is able and accustomed to make use of our sins to serve his Glory Grace and Providence and that it is lawfull for us also as opportunity shall serve to follow his example and to make use of the sins of other men for our spirituall or temporall advantage Notwithstanding as God although he maketh use of the evil of others and produceth Good out of it yet he never doth evil himself that from thence he might abstract good so neither is it lawfull for us to do evil that good might proceed from it It is one thing to make use of the evil of others and turn it into good and another thing to do evil with an intent of good Thirdly I answer a thing may be said to be ordinated in a twofold respect either improperly in the same manner as a thing which way soever it is made use of by the Agent doth notwithstanding tend to its end being so done by the wisdome and power of the supremer Agent contrary to the will and intention of him that did it or it is taken more restrictly and properly and so that only is said to be ordinated to its end which antecedently is chosen by the Agent as a medium that by the nature of it is convenient and conducible to such an end In the first sence that is to be understood when we say that God doth ordinate and dispose of evil to a good end that is when God Non coâ—venire homo viro Vitiis uti Quint 6. Instit 1. out of his infinite mercy and power either abstracts good from evil or turneth evil into good But we must above all things take heed that these expressions be not understood in the latter and proper sence as if God antecedently did well approve or make choice of any evil as a medium convenient by the nature of it to the assecution of
it it seemeth that the goodnesse of the Act doth altogether depend on the goodness of the Intention that adaequately so that what power an evil intention hath to corrupt an Act although otherwise good the same power a good intention hath to approve and to render an Act good which otherwise is evil for a good or a single eye is as efficatious to inlighten the whole body as an evil eye is to infuse darkness on it To adde more strength to this opinion much may be alledged from the Fathers and other Divines of this nature is that in the Glosse As much good as you do intend so much you do perform And that verse in the mouth of every Scool-boy Quicquid agunt homines Intentio judicat illud It is th' Intention judgeth true Of whatsoever things we do XI But in the way of answer as to that place in the 6 of St. Mat. I am not ignorant in the first place that some learned men of this age do give an interpretation to it far different from that of the antient Fathers and not consonant to that we have now in hand But in reverence to those antient Doctors be it granted that those words of our Saviour had a proper relation to the Intentions of men I make answer that the intention when it is a motion of the Will tending to some ends by certain mediums is taken into a twofold consideration first whether it be for the intention of that good into which the Will is finally and precisely carryed being taken from all consideration of the mediums to attain it As if a man should say he intends the glory of God or his own profit and pleasure or secondly whether it be for an entire ordination of the whole progresse of the work from the beginning of the work unto the end including also the mediums or the means to attain it As if a man should say that he intends the glory of God by building a Temple or staining an Idolater or that he intends his own profit by getting riches by his honest labour or by theft and plunder And as he may be said that he intends a journey to Rome who only thinks of going thither and hath not yet resolved with himself which way or upon what accounts he will go as well as he who hath resolved with himself when to go which way and upon what occasions We speak in this whole discourse of the Intention taken the first way viz. on the intention which looks altogether upon the end and not on the means which is so taken in the common use of speaking but those words of the Fathers and other Divines which seem by the intention alone to measure the goodness or the badnesse of mens actions and which are grounded on those words of our Saviour in relation to a single eye and to an eye that is evil do receive their intention in the latter signification as they include the means with the end observable is that of St Bernard That the eye saith he be single two things are necessary viz. that truth be in the election and Charity in the intention That is that our intention be absolutely right both are required that so we may not propound unto our selves such an end which is averse unto the love of God and of our neighbour and that we make not choice of any means that are not joyned with honesty righteousness In every work therefore we must not only look to propound unto our selves a good end but we must withall endeavour to the end so propounded by apt lawful honest means for seeing that the election of the means or the mediums do arise from the intention of the end is so necessarily joyned to it that in the respect thereof it hath the place of an accident inseperable or a necessary circumstance Animum laudô Consilium reprehendâ—â— Cic. 9. ad Attic 11. the School-men do almost all of them conclude that an evil election doth corrupt an intention that is otherwise good by rendring that evil which before was good in the very same manner as evil circumstances do corrupt those Actions to which they are retayners XII The fourth argument is taken from the perfection and obligation of the Law of God For there is a Law propounded from God to men a most perfect Law which commandeth things to be done and forbiddeth those things which are not to be done It hath shewed unto thee O man what is good what the Lord requireth of thee Mich. 6. 8. This is the Law which we must obey if we will fulfil our duties by this Law we are commanded as the Scriptures every where do declare to do good and to eschew evil But if we on the contrary without the least regard to the law of God shall measure out unto our selves things to be avoyded or performed according to our own profit and as we shall think good and shall either omit those good things which God commandeth to be done for the fear of some following evil or shall commit those evil things which God forbiddeth for the vain hope of some good to come what is this but worms as we are to preferre our own Counsels above the expresse will of Almighty God and the wisdome of the flesh above the Authority of the most holy Spirit Farre otherwise did that holy man David By thy precepts saith he have I gotten understanding therefore have I hated all unjust wayes Psal 119. 104. As if he should say being instructed by thy Law which both night and day is in my heart my mouth before mine eyes I do plainly understand what I have to do and what I have to eschew wherefore I do not only decline but hate every way which is not consentaneous to thy Law whither soever it may seem to lead me Therefore since every sin is forbidden by the Law of God and that Law of his containeth not the least exception of any good Intention or Event and we ought not to distinguish where the Law maketh no distinction nor to except where the Law maketh no exception it is most manifest that he whosoever he is who for what Intention or what cause soever it be doth knowingly and willingly do that which is evil he doth sin against the Law of God XIII The fifth argument followeth drawn from the examples of those who under the pretence of a good end being so bold as to disobey the express Commandment of God have satisfied his anger by the just punishment of their rashness and disobedience The Prophet Samuel being sent to Saul the King of Israel who saved some of the cattle of the Amalekites which God had commanded should be totally destroyed for no other end as he pretended than by the bulk and fatness of his sacrifice to make it the more acceptable the said Prophet did lay before his eyes the grievousness of his sin and for the punishment of so great a disobedience did prophesy
and proceed XXIII The fourth argument is taken from the end and proper use of examples for we must duely confesse that examples in themselves are of great use both for the institution of our manners and for the amendment of our lives And certainly otherwise so many precepts had not been left us in the word of God for whatsoever is there written is written for our instruction 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Rom 15 4. And for our admonition 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 neither would the Apostles otherwise have so constantly inclucated them My brothers take the Prophets for an example of patience you have heard of the patience of Job Elias prayed James 5. 19 11. 17. Again Be you followers of me as I am of Christ 1 Cor. 11. 1. What you have heard and seen in me do those things Philip. 4. 9. Observe those who so do walk as you have us for an example Phil. 3. 17. And the like in many places But the use and end of examples are not to be rules unto us for good liveing but only as helps and as it were spurs to shake off our dulness and to rouze our sloth when we are more heavy and dull in the performance of our duties than indeed we ought to be For humane frailty especially upon some great temptations and violent suggestions of the Devil and the World is commonly attended with many murmurings and complaints against the security of the Law of God and the difficulty of giving obedience to it nay oftentimes it is heard to cry out that there are Lyons in our way and that there are snares and stumbling blocks laid under our feet to cause us to trip and fall that we must endure injuries contumelies and calumnies the plundring of our goods the sequestering of our Estates the loss of our dear parents and of those dearer pledges our Wives and Children and that with the losse of our friends that we must lose our Countrey nay even life it self and become a hatred even to those who most of all are obliged to love us How unpleasing are these discourses How unsupportable is the burden of this oppression As often as these thoughts and the like do invade our minds so that we even begin to despond all hope and even to abandon the care of all our duties as of things impossible which in vain we do endeavour to perform our languishing spirits are revived and raysed by the seasonable authority of examples Tuâ—â—iter desperatur quicquid fieri potest Quint. 1. Instit 10. cum quid difficile videtur difficiliora alios obeuntes reâ—â—â— amus Tert. 1. ad uxor â— and are by degrees encouraged and armed to despise all difficulties overcome all temptations and to endure all contumelies whatsoever when I say we seriously thus do consider that pious godly men and obnoxious to the same troubles and temptations with us being assisted by the grace of God which will not be wanting unto us if we wholy depend upon it and faithfully adde our endeavours thereunto have performed and endured all those things which by the help of God are to be performed and to be endured by us our spirits will begin to return and our brests grow warm with a godly emulation the fire will burn within ns as we are musing and in the fulnesse of the heart these or the like expressions will break forth Behold Lord I am ready to perform what thou commandest and to undergo what thou layest upon me The same cloud of witnesses that which way soever we look doth every where surround us will perswade us also that all revenge distemper of spirit being cast away as also the importunity of sin which as it doth closely embrace us so if we use our best endeavours by the grace of God will with no great difficulty abandon us we couragiously constantly and patiently do run the race that is set before us XXIV St. James the Apostle in his fifth Chapter doth exhort us to a fervency in prayer after the example of Elias who by the importunity of his prayer did as it were at his pleasure lock and unlock the Gates of Heaven And that no man might conceive that it was to be imputed rather to the sanctity and the merits of Elias than to the promise of God to the prayers of the faithfull by the Covenant of Grace The Apostle in the very begining of this narration doth take away all occasion of suspition Elias saith he was a man the same passions with us verse 17. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 He was a man not a God or an Angell nor made of better clay but out of the same masse out of which all other men are fashioned This here urged is the most proper the most profitable use of examples we ought therefore to bear in our minds that examples are not the rule it self neither do they carry with them the weight or estimation of a rule nay if any doubt be made of the uprightness or the pravity of the act they are themselves to be brought and diligently to be examined by the Rule 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saith St. James in his fifth Chapter and the 〈◊〉 verse where I know not well if that word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth carry with it a special force of signification Certainly it seemeth unto me to imply that the acts of the holy Prophets are no◠〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the principal coppy and example which is to be observed by us but as it were the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or the second example which is not of authority of it self or for it self but so far to be believed and received as it agreeeth with the original From what hitherto hath been spoken it may be now made manifest that it doth not suffice to prove the goodness of any humane act that it is comformable to the example of some good and holy man and therefore no mans Conscience can securely and safely acquiesse therein unless the example it self be comformable to the rule XXV Again that we may now come to the other part of our proposition The account is almost the same of another mans judgment as of his example and that almost for the same Causes so that we need not to make many words to enlarge our selves upon this Subject I will therefore run it over in as few as I can And in the first place all men though godly and learned are no less lyable unto errours than they are to sins nay peradventure much more and therefore we ought to have a more acute investigation of the mind to discover the difference betwixt Truth and Falshood then betwixt Good and Evil First by reason of that natural ignorance with which our minds are darkened and vaild as with a cloud Secondly by reason of our education which fashione and formeth our minds as yet but tender and doth imprint certain notions on them which it is no easy task to expunge Thirdly by reason of
the material Cause of which we do now discourse if the Law doth command any thing that is base dishonest or any wayes unlawful the said Law is unjust for the defect of that Justice which is called Universal which requireth a due rectitude in every Action And this alone is so far from obliging the Subject to obedience that it doth altogether oblige him to render no obedience to it XV. It is demanded in the fifth place What Justice is required and how much of it will suffice as to this that a Law may be said to be just and esteemed obligatory For answer I say in the first place It is not necessarily required that what by the Law is commanded should be just positively which the Philosophers call Honest that is that it may be an Act of some Virtue but it doth suffice if it be just negatively that is if it be not unjust or shameful as are the Acts of all Vices Otherwise there could no Laws be made of things of a middle nature or of things indifferent which notwithstanding as by and by shall be manifest are the most apt matter of Laws I say in the second place Grant that some Law be unjust in regard of the Cause efficient or the final or the formal Cause in any of those respects newly mentioned yet if there be no defect of Justice in respect of the material Cause that is If by the force power of the Law the Act to be performed by the Subject be such that he may put it in Execution without any sin of his own that Justice of it is sufficient to induce the obligation XXVI But lest the Subject too licentiously to withdraw himself from the yoak of the Law should give some pretence for his disobedience as it is a wonder to see how many men do suffer themselves to be deceived by this paralogism and should allege that the Law doth seem too unjust unto him and which with a good Conscience he cannot obey therefore ought not to obey for this they say were to obey with a doubting Conscience which cannot be without Sin as the Apostle teacheth Rom. 14. 23. For whatsoever is not of Faith is Sin It is necessary therefore in the sixth place to inquire farther and to demand What certainty is required to know whether any Law be unjust or not that so a Subject may be secure in his Conscience whether he be bound or not bound to the observation of it I answer in the first place If the Law be manifestly notoriously unjust it is certain that the Subject is not bound to the observation of it which is also to be affirmed if by any moral certainty after some due diligence in searching out the Truth he judgeth it to be simply unjust I say in the second place If out of any confirmed Error of his Judgement which it is not easy for him to leave he thinks the Law to be unjust when indeed it is not yet for all that Error in his mind the obligation of the Law doth still remain insomuch that he is guilty of Sin if he doth not obey it but should Sin more grievously if that Error not yet left off he should obey it Of this Case we shall have a greater opportunity to speak when if God shall permit we shall come to the Comparison of both the sorts of obligations I say in the third place If out of some light doubt or scruple he suspects it may be so that the Law is unjust that scruple is to be contemned the Law altogether to be obeyed And no man under the pretence of his tender Conscience is to excuse him self from the necessity of giving obedience to it XVII I say in the fourth place And I would to God that those whose Custom it is to defend their grosse disobedience under the pretence of their tender Consciences would give due attention to it If because of some probable Reasons appearing on both sides the Subject cannot easily determine with himself whether the Law be right or not insomuch that his mind is in a great incertainty and knows not which way to incline he is bound in this case actually to obey it so that he sinneth if he obeyeth it not and doth not sin if he obeyeth it My reason is First Becaâ—se by the Rule of Equity In dubiis potior est conditioâ—â—ossidentis In doubtful things the Condition of the Possessor is the better Therefore when there is a Case at Law betwixt the Law-maker and the Citizen unlesse there be some apparent reason to the contrary it is presumed alwayes to be on the side of the Law-maker against the Citizen as being in the Possession of Right But if there appears any sound reason to the contrary the Case is altered because it is against the supposition of Reason for we then suppose that they contend in Law one having as much Right as the other The second Reason ariseth from another Rule of Law In re dubia tutior pars est eligenda In a doubtful Case the safer part is to be chosen And its safer to obey the Conscience doubting than the Conscience doubting not to obey Because it is safer in the honor due unto Superiors to exceed in the mode that is due unto them than to be defective in it The third Reason proceedeth from the same Rule for generally it is safer for a Man to suppose himself to be obliged when he is free than to suppose himself free when he is indeed obliged For seeing by the inbred depravation of the Heart of Man we sin oftner by too much Boldnesse than by too much Fear and are more prone than it becomes us to the licentiousnesse of the Flesh and lesse patient to bear the burthen unlesse we were throughly before hand resolved to obey those Laws which are not apparently unjust the Wisdom of the flesh the Craft of the old Serpent would suggest unto us excuses enough which would retard and hinder us from the performance of our Duties And so much of the fourth doubt XVIII The fifth followeth Of the permissive Law of Evil Wether it be lawful and how far lawful And whether it be obligatory and how far obliging Where in the first place we are to observe That an evil thing may three wayes be admitted by the Law that is to say privatively negatively and positively Privatively to be permitted is the very same which is pretermitted by the Lawgiver And in this sense all those things are permitted concerning the forbidding of which or the Punishing of which the Laws do determine nothing That negatively is permitted the excercise whereof the Lawes do define and limit with certain bounds within which those are safe and without fault who do contain themselves but those who do exceed them are to be punished by the Law And in this sense the Laws of most Nations do permit of Usury Thirdly that is permitted positively the excercise whereof is tolerated under a
in a threefold consideration And first of all the worship of God properly so called and the chiefest is that inward wordship of the mind which consisteth in the exercise of inward Vertues as of Faith Hope Love Invocation Confidence c. Secondly those outward Acts by which that inward worship of the mind is partly expressed and partly helped and fostered such as are publick Prayers Singing of Psalms the Hearing of the word and the participation of the Sacraments c. may reducibly and lesse properly be called and oftentimes are called the worship of God as they are the outward Testimonies and Helps of that worship which so properly is called Thirdly Seeing it is impossible that any outward action especially if it be a solemn one should be performed without some Circumstances either more or lesse of Time Place and Gesture from whence it comes to passe that the very same Circumstances which if established by Laws or Customes are called also Rites do sometimes receive the appellation of worship although very improperly and only for that Concomitancy which they have to that outward worship which it self also is improperly called a worship It is therefore to be affirmed That the inward primary worship properly so called doth only so acknowledge God to be the only Author of it that it is not lawful for any man either to institute a new worship or being instituted by God to exhibit it to any other besides God himself We are to affirm also That the outward worship according to its substantials is instituted only by God but there is a far different account to be made of the circumstances which are accessary to this outward worship and those which do accompany it If there be any who will Honor them also with the Name of worship For seeing that the outward worship of God cannot be performed without Circumstances and God in the Gospel hath not given any certain particular Circumstances perpetually to be observed in sacred Assemblyes but only hath lay'd down some Generals as may conduce to Order Honesty and Edification it must necessarily follow that the Determination of the said Circumstances which are but Accidental to the worship it self and mutable according to the respect of Times Places and Occasions must pertain unto those who under Christ have a Right and Power of Governing the Churches which that they may be imposed by those who in the several Churches are invested with publick Authority and being imposed may Religiously be observed by all the Members of the said Churches the nature of Holy worship doth not forbid but Solemnity rather Decency doth require We observe also that even those Men themselves who so Lordly bitterly do inveigh against the Canons and Ecclesiastical Constitutions yet as often as they please do use those Rites in the outward worship of God no where prescribed by Christ or his Apostles as the lifting up of their hands in the taking of an Oath the uncovering of the Head in the Holy Conventions and many other things which because we dayly observe to be done it is unnecessary to rehearse them XXX In the fourth place they object that Moses the pattern of the old that is of the Jewish Church who was given by God to the people of the Jews to be their Lawgiver did not only by his Law define the Substantials of the Jewish worship but according to that fidelity which was in him he omitted not the least Circumstances and in building the Tabernacle which was to be a Type of the Christian Church he most compleatly and perfectly finished all things according to the Idaea of the Example which was propounded to him in the Mount And now if Christ the-Lawgiver of the new Testament should not have prescribed all things and every thing even to the least Circumstances which are to be performed in the Ecclesiastical worship it may justly be believed to suspect which is near to Blasphemy that he was lesse faithful in the House of God than Moses and thereupon there is a remarkable injury and contumely done unto Christ if any new Rites never instituted by him should by humane Authority be brought into the Church or be received by the Christian common people But they who do object these things ought in the first place to have considered that by this Argument all humane political Laws are no lesse everted than Eclesiastical for Moses by the commandement of God did give unto the people of Israel a certain and a defined Law not only of those Rites which belonged to the worship of God but also of those Decrees and Judgments which belonged to the Administration of Civil Government XXXI In the second place it is a wonder moreover that they observed not that by this comparison of that fidelity which was in both Law-givers Moses and Christ that they could not more importunately have alleged any thing that could bring a greater dammage to their own Cause or more strongly have confirmed ours For as from that that Moses both in rituals and judicials did give many Laws unto the people of the Jews we do truly collect it was the will of God that the people of the Jews should be so restrained in their duties under that paedagogy and Mosaick Discipline as under a Yoak of servitude so that very few things should be free unto them so from that also that Christ the most faithful Interpreter of his Fathers Will did give unto the Christian Church but a very few Laws of Ceremonies we do truly collect that it is the will of God that the Magistrates and Christian people should be permitted in those things to their own Liberty so that it is now free for any private Man of his own accord no command or prohibition of a superior intervening to do as shall seem in his own Judgement to be most expedient and to the several Churches and their Governors to prescribe those things which according to the condition of the time and place shall seem to them to be most subservient to Order Honesty Edification and Peace XXXII Moreover Those who do make use of this Argument ought in the third place to have considered that under that Paedagogy of Moses the Jews themselves had not all the Liberty of Rites in things pertaining to the worship of God so take away that it was not lawful for them by their own Authority to observe and to institute those things which it is manifest were never commanded either by God himself or by Moses his Servant Of many take these few instances First the solemn feast of the Passover which by the Law of Moses was commanded should be observed but seaven dayes was by a special Law of Hezekias who received a singular testimony of his piety from God himself and by the consent of the people continued seaven dayes longer The History is extant 2. Chron. 30. Secondly Esther and Mordecay did institute that the seast of Purim should be yearly celebrated in memory of
Democraty the chief and Soveraign power consisteth in many Magistraâ—es yearly chosen by popular Suffrages or by certain other Intervalls of time and this heretofore was the state of the people of Rome when they were governed by Consulls Praetors Tribunes of the people Aedils and other yearly Magistrates and from hence proceed those Expressions which oftentimes we find in Tully Populi Romani Majestas laesa populi Majestas Visum est Senatui populoque Romano The Majesty of the Romane people The injured Majesty of the people it seemed good to the Senate and the people of Rome c. In a state Aristocratical the same Majesty resideth amongst some of the Lords and Nobles whom in some places they call Illustrissimoes in others the Peers of the Land and in other places again they receive other titles and appellations according to the custom of the Nation Amongst whom although peradventure but one as in the Common-wealth of Venice or more of them may have a preheminence of place and dignity above the rest being as it were a certain Primacy of Order which heretofore was the Honour of the Bishops of Rome and some Patriarchs in their Councils yet no man was so superiour above the rest in power that by his own authority he could judge any one of them neither could he himself be judged unlesse it were by all of them altogether Some form of this Government is still retained by our Mayors and Aldermen in our Cities and by the Heads and Fellows of Colleges in our Universities and although as it were but in a shadow yet in some manner they do represent it to us But in a Monarchial Government as the Name it self implies the chief Power is resident in the Person of the King alone whereupon St. Peter a most excellent Interpreter of St. Paul doth admonish the Christian People to obey the King as their superior that no man might any more doubt of whom St. Paul speaketh when he maketh mention of the higher Powers Ro. 1. 3. 1. Samuel also the Prophet of God doth so propound unto the people the fulness of the Kingly Power to be considered of by them 1 Sam. 8. That if a King the supreme in his Kingdom should act all those things which in that Chapter it is manifest that it is lawful for him to do upon no just Cause but upon the meer desire of Domination and to show himself a Tyrant and not a King although he wanted not Sin before God yet he ought not to have any force to be put upon him by the People nevertheless he may justly be said to have abused his Power but his own Power Amongst us English what more certainly or more cleerly can appear unless at noon we choose rather to be blind than open our eyes than that the supreme Power of the three Kingdoms doth intirely appertain to the Kings most excellent Majesty whom we are accustomed to render more remarkable by the title of Majesty not only according to the common use of speaking but in our solemn Ordinances and in all our forms actions of Law in the taking of an oath laying our hands upon the Gospel of the eternal God we acknowledg him the supreme yea the only supreme Governour of all persons and Causes in his Kingdoms VIII In the fourth place we are to understand That when we say the Power of making Lawes is in the King alone It is not so to be understood as if we meant that whatsoever the King is pleased to command shall immediatly obtain the force of a Law for by and by I will show unto you that some Consent of the People themselves and many other things are required to the Constitution of Law but this is that which I would hold forth unto you that the Counsels of the People Senate and other Demands of the Peers People or any whomsoever doe not oblige the Subjects nor do carry with them the Power of a Law unlesse they are strengthened and established by the Authority of the King to which being maturely and duely prepared as soon as the Consent of the King accedeth they immediatly receive the Name the Form and Authority of a Law and forthwith begin as soon as they are published to oblige the Subjects Therefore seeing that only is to be esteemed to be the Principal and the efficient Cause of any thing which by it self and immediatly produceth and into a prepared matter introduceth that Form which giveth to that Thing both the Name and the Being although other things ought to concurre to the production of that Effect or to go before it as so many praevious dispositions that so the matter may be rendred more apt to receive the Form intended by the Agent It is most manifest whatsoever those things are which antecedently are required to the Constitution of a Law yet the will of the Prince from whose Arbitration and Command alone all Rogations of Lawes are either established or made void is the only adaequate and efficient Cause of Publick Laws IX These things being premised The Position is confirmed by many Arguments And first by the Testimony of Holy Scripture First Gen. 49. 10. in that remarkable Testament of the Patriarch Jacob being about to dye The Scepter shall not be taken away from Judah nor a Law-giver from his Thigh is a Prophecy of the future Royal Dignity of that Tribe which the holy old man doth periphrastically describe and to the Confirmation of it he mentioned the Scepter the most remarkable witnesse of Kingly Authority and the Legislative Power the chiefest Perogative of it Secondly Deut. 33. 4 5. Moses was said to be a King in Israel because having gathered together all the Tribes of the People he gave them a Law to observe Thirdly Psal 60. 7. Judah is my Law-giver that is King And the vulgar Interpretation reads it Judah is my King In the Text now in hand Prov. 8. 15. By me Kings reign and the makers of Laws do decree just things where which is usual with Solomon in the whole Book of the Proverbs that the latter part of the verse doth contain an Amplification or Antithesis the very same Persons who in the beginning of the verse are called Kings in the latter part by way of Amplification are called Makers of Lawes Fiftly In the new Testament St. James also maketh mention 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the Royal Law X. Secondly It is confirmed by the Testimonies of Philosophers and Historians and by the Authority of the Civil Laws and the municipal Laws of our Nation The thing being so manifest we shall be content to give you but few Examples Aristotle Plutarch and almost an infinit Number of other Authors of great Estimation do all affirm that we must have a Law and the Law of the Prince But that of Ulpian is very remarkable which he hath in his Book of the Roman Laws Quod principi placuit Legis vigorem habet What pleaseth the Prince hath the
should still retain the Lands and Houses upon such a condition bequeathed to her in the Will and should not restore them to the Heir The reason of both the examples is the same because in both of them the obligation was not pure simple and absolute but only conditinal For always a condition of its own nature doth suspend the obligation so that the condition being kept the obligation immediately as if the Bonds were loosed doth fall to the Ground The Case is the very same in Laws that are purely penal as to the manner and measure of obliging which they will easily understand who have the will and the leisure to compare these considerations amongst themselves so that we need not any longer to insist in the explication of them XX. But peradventure some one may yet instance that no man can be obliged to the Punishment but he must be obliged to the Fault also for a Penalty cannot justly be imposed on any unless for some antecedent Fault according to that of St. Augustin Omnis poena si justa est peccati poena est Every punishment if it be just is the punishment of some sin The second objection is derived from the Nature of the Law they urge which is to command something therfore that Law which we have said is purely penal hath not the Nature of a Law if it commands nothing or if implicitly at least it containeth some Command it must also oblige unto the Fault for a fault is nothing else but a Transgression or a Violation of a just Command XXI To the first objection we may answer several ways For in the first place it may truly be said that indeed eternal Punishment as it is under the absolute Notion of Punishment and cannot otherwise be considered but in the true Nature of Punishment must therfore necessarily suppose some antecedent fault which hath deserved it and for which without any other respect whatsoever he who is guilty of that Fault is afflicted with the Punishment but there is not the same consideration in all spiritual Punishments much more in temporal Punishments For although both of them as it is a Punishment doth suppose some precedent fault worthy of such a Punishment for otherwise it would not be just yet because they may be otherwise considered than under the bare notion of a punishment viz. In respect to the End â—ntended by the party punishing that is not so much as ordinated to revenge a fault past as to prevent a fault to come it comes thereupon to passe that neither God himself when he afflicts a man either with a spiritual or a temporal punishment neither man when he inflicts upon a man a temporal punishment doth always precisely respect their Sins or offences but very often they do propound other ends unto themselves To this purpose belongeth that answer of our Saviour when his Disciples asked him concerning the blind man whether it were for his Sins or his Fathers that he was born blind Joh. 9. 3. His answer was that neither his Sins nor his Fathers were the occasion of his blindnesse but that the works of God might be manifested in him The reason is because in morals the Estimation of things and the Denomination of them is taken rather from the final than from the efficient and meritorious Cause XXII Secondly it may be said that the relation of a temporal punishment to a Sin doth properly consist only in that punishment which relatively is opposed to the Sin and not in that punishment which only contrarily is opposed to it which is the looser and more improper signification of the word We have heretofore made use of this distinction and explained it in the second Praecognisance to this Doubt therefore there needs no repetition of it It may suffice to put you in mind that the punishment affixed to the Law that is purely penal is not called a punishment strictly and properly but improperly and more largely as it signifies another kind of Evil diverse from the Evil of the Fault which kind of punishment may be infflicted on a person without any legal injustice and for a profitable end as to avoid some publick Inconvenience without the delinquency of the person suffering for the word punishment so taken doth contain all losses mâ—â—fortunes or adversities or whatsoever befalls a man which he desireth might never have to come to pass XXIII If these things shall not satisfie the Reader yet this will be very remarkable which here in the third place I shall propound unto you and which will quite remove all this Doubt and very aptly meet with another objection which is that the Intent of a penal Law of which we now speak being to oblige the Subject and yet but conditionally to oblige him may be considered two or three ways First precisely as to that to which it intendeth to oblige under such a condition to be done Secondly as precisely to the condition it self by which it intendeth to oblige the one whereof containeth the ordination of the Law and the other the punishment annexed to it Thirdly as to the whole aggregate that is the whole Law it self which at once consisteth of the complexion of them both This distinction being laid down I say in the first place that that part of the Law which containeth only the condition or the punishment doth not of it self oblige unto the fault for a bare condition is of no prevalence as all do grant and it is manifest of it self He doth not therefore transgress nay rather he very well performs his office who avoids the penalty of the Law provided he performeth that which the Law ordaineth Secondly I affirm that that part of the Law which contains the ordination doth not of it self oblige unto the fault for no Law obligeth beyond the intention of the Law-giver certain it is that the Legislator by that part of the Law did not intend per se or by it self to oblige the Subject to the fault for then it had intended to have obliged him simply â—r that part taken precisely and by it self doth contain no condition in it but by the condition of the Law added in the other part it is manifest that he did not intend simply to oblige to the doing of that which the Law ordaineth but under a condition in that Law expressed I say thirdly that a penal Law taken wholy and joyntly doth oblige to the Fault in this sense that he is guilty of the Fault and sinneth against the Law who when he ought to observe both parts performeth neither For as amongst Logicians the truth of a disjunctive proposition depends upon the truth of some one part of it so that it is all of it true if either of the parts of it be true and not false unless both parts of it be false So in morals he observeth a disjunctive Law and every Law purely penal is disjunctive or formally or equivalently who performeth one of the two parts