Selected quad for the lemma: cause_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
cause_n	bring_v	effect_n	good_a	1,532	5	3.6660	3	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A63764	A discourse of natural and moral impotency by Joseph Truman, B.D., late minister near Nottingham.	Truman, Joseph, 1631-1671.	1675 (1675)	Wing T3139; ESTC R37908	117,738	238

he brings this Instance to shew in what sense they are voluntary When a man hath brought a Disease on himself by Intemperance he may be said to be sick of a voluntary Disease though he would fain be freed from it and cannot Any one may see that if the case was so you could not call them vitious habits formaliter and voluntary formaliter and properly but only sinful and voluntary figuratively originally effectivè as every punishment of sin is because voluntary sins were the cause of them If a man should say I would not at all be Covetous and chuse the world for my chief good but I do chuse it Would it not be a Contradiction And if such a thing was possible would it not be far from being sin and punishable You may see by this that such habits are only this Moral Impotency the wilfulness it self under another consideration If any should yet be unsatisfied and think Vitious habits are not Elicited but Imperated Let him reduce them to what notion he will and it will come all to one for Argument for he must then say of them as of all other Imperate things that they are subject to the will wholly or so far as they are not they are sinless and that God doth not require us to put them off If you will have them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and meerly sensitive inclinations then they are not Vitious any more than they are consented to or not enough disliked As suppose you should call a great Thirst brought upon a man by excessive drinking Drunkenness And again either they take away the Natural power of Willing i.e. make him no Rational Creature and then they would excuse or they cause that a man cannot Will good if he would pardon this Contradiction for I speak it docendi causa and this would excuse indeed A thing impossible cannot be a Moral fault Or they only hinder the effects of the Will the Imperate acts and then they so excuse that God would accept his Will without those Imperate acts But these would be irrational notions of Moral habits for let any man consider and he may easily see I think that they are not different specie from volitions that is inclinations of the Will but comprehend in their notion some kind of radication and continuance of volition that we cannot well understand Doubtless they are not a kin to other habits which only enable the subject facily and dextrously to do the act for a good man could as facily and dextrously commit a sin as another man but will not Now to let you see further a necessity of thus distinguishing consider how the Ancients were for want of this distinguishing puzled to answer the fallacious arguments for the Pelagian 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or perfection in this life while yet the Orthodox Fathers held in the main as we ordinarily do as may be made fully apparent Pelagius maintained amongst his other errours this That a man in this life can keep the Law perfectly and meant it Morally in the sense wherein I oppose it his Arguments were these * Epistle Pelag. ad Demetriadem Duplici ignorantia accusamus Deum c. Tom 4. Hieron It is Pelagius his Epistle though through the Ignorance of former times placed with and read amongst Jerom's as B. Vsher and others observe which prove it only Naturally possible viz. To deny a mans power to keep the Law perfectly is to accuse God of a double Ignorance in not knowing our weakness or in not knowing what he commands us or it is to accuse him of Injustice in commanding what man cannot do Or thus as * Hierom lib. 1. advers Pelag Aut possibilia mandata D us dedit aut impossibilia Si possibilia in nostra potestate est ea facere Si impossibilia nec in hoc r●i sumus si non facimus quod non possumus Ac per hoc sive possibilia sive impossibilia D●us dedit mandata potest homo sine peccato esse Critobulus by which feign'd name Jerom represents Pelagius as by Atticus himself formes the Argument Either God hath given possible or unpossible commands If possible it is in our power to keep them if unpossible we sin not in not-doing them since we cannot And so it follows that whether God have given commands possible or impossible a man can live without sin Augustin Lib. 2. de peccat merit remiss cap. 6. endeavours to answer this difficulty and affirmed it as undoubted that God commandeth no man any thing which he cannot do Therefore he saith in Answer that a man can live without sin through Grace and by Gods help But this doth not answer the difficulty at all unless he will affirm that no man doth sin except God give him this Grace that is except God by his Grace make him that he doth not transgress the Law which is in effect to say Man doth not sin except God make him actually not to sin which would be to come to Pelagius at the back-door and to go beyond Pelagius and hold That it is impossible any man should sin at all Jerom endeavours to answer this but more palpably spoyls all for want of distinguishing He also maintains as undoubted amongst all Christians That God commandeth nothing but what man can do and yet maintaineth that no man can perfectly keep all the Commandements which is good sense if we distinguish but without distinguishing an express contradiction But he trusts to this weak Evasion to salve it Lib. 1. adversus Pelag Vides quod Deus possibilia jusserit tamen nullum posse c. His commands are possible saith he going on because some men can keep one part and some another of the commands but yet none can keep all and adds therefore it is not the duty of single men to keep them all and so God commands nothing but what we can do But Augustine is express against this of Jerom Serm. 191. de Tempore † Execramur eliaw blasphemiam eorum qui dicunt Impossibile aliquid homini a Deo esse praeceptum mandata Dei non a singulis sed ab omnibus in comuni posse servari and calls it Blasphemy to say that God commands any thing that men in particular cannot do but only men in general Neither is there I think to be found one of the Ancients accounted Orthodox that doth maintain in the strict sense opposed that God commandeth men what they cannot do but all abhorred it as an opinion laying an high Accusation on God till many hundred years after this age of Augustin But at last * Who lived 700 years after this Serm. 2. in vigil Rom. Bernard being pressed with this difficulty doth yet any one may see unwillingly fly to this that God may command what man cannot do and doth mean it of a Natural power But he doth it in these words God may command nimis too much And in giving his reason for

Saints in Heaven love God but God in them loves God Thirdly He cannot pray that God would make the Gospel prevail effectually in the world Destruunt orationes quas facit ecclesia sive pro infidelibus Doctrinae Dei resistentibus ut convertantur ad Deum Sive pro fidelibus ut augeatur ' eis fides preseverent in ea Aug. Haeres 88. Si fides est tantummodo liberi arbitrij nec daturà Deo propter quod pro iis qui nolunt credere oramus ut credant Quod prorsus faceremus inaniter nisi rectissime crederemus etiam perversas fidei contrarias voluntates Omnipotentem Deum ad credendum posse convertere Aug. lib. de grat lib. Arb. or in his Congregation if a Minister he cannot pray after his Preaching when he hath Sown and Planted and Watered that God would give the increase nor can he Pray for such things for his Relations but must mean no more than this that God would give them that free VVill which they have already and all men besides even the Natural powers and that they may be able to obey the Gospel if they will And by the way neither can they pray very earnestly for this power or ability to obey the Gospel which it is granted they may pray as earnestly for as a man may pray that God would not deprive him of the right Natural use of his faculties of understanding and will to be given or continued to themselves or others since they viz. that maintain this power is al that the Grace of the Holy Ghost gives hold they cannot sin or be guilty or inexcusable in not obeying the Gospel without this power and so could not be condemned for not obeying the Gospel if God denyed it them especially also considering they must hold consequently to this principle that God is bound in Natural justice ether to give this power whether they Pray or Pray not for it or not to condemn them for not obeying the Gospel because God will not do unjustly whether men Pray or Pray not Yea further since it may well be questioned whether it be lawful to Pray God to do that which he is bound by Natural equity and justice to do though I confess it is otherwise when only bound by promise or not to do that which he is bound by Natural justice not to do It is therefore questionable whether it can be maintained lawful according to the principles of those that hold that the only effect of Grace in dispute is giving that power without which men could not sin or which is all one be inexcusable in not obeying the Gospel to Pray God to give themselves or others that which they hold is the only effect of this Grace viz. this power of obeying the Gospel for this end viz. for this That they may not be condemned for disobeying it since he could not as they say in justice so condemn them if he gave them not this power And further Such as hold that the only effect of this comonly called the Grace of the Holy Spirit or commonly called subjective and internal Grace different from the objective and external Grace consisting in giving and promulgating the Gospel and external providences prosperous or afflictive objectively fitted and suited to cause Obedience to the Gospel concerning which objective take notice I do not speak nor move any Controversy is only the giving that power to obey the Gospel without which they could not be too blame or inexcusable or condemned for not obeying it I say such as these can give but very cold and heartless thanks for Grace causing them to obey the Gospel comparatively to the thanks they of other apprehensions can give But this on the By for I am now only professedly speaking of these things in the sense wherein they cannot as not pray at all so neither praise God at all for them which now I return to again Secondly He cannot praise God for such things named before as being done by God if he hold they are not he cannot say Cordially what the Pharisse is represented speaking with his lips God I thank thee I am not as other men are Extortioners Vnjust Adulterers or even as this Publican I would not wrong any I mean he cannot say this * Prorsus non gratias Deo agimus sed nos agere fingimus si unde alli gratias agimus ipsum facere non puta●●us Aug. Epist 107. adlem heartily except he mean no more than this I thank thee thou didst as much for me as for these men but that I differ from them in these respects I had the power indeed from thee as they had but that I used it better than they I owe to my self free Will Whereas using this common Grace is surely the chief prime matter Oh but he received this power from God to use it It is true but yet a man that knoweth he hath done some good thing or avoided Evil more than others if he be of this opinion he accounts it was not therefore done by him as because he received more from God than others in the same circumstances with him but holds that he owes nothing here for any special Grace or help from God for though that which God did for him was the cause according to his Hypothesis of his goodness differing taken absolutely yet not at all taken comparatively in the sense now in hand it was no cause of the difference taken as a difference take this instance Two men had equal great stocks given them one increaseth his estate the other prodigallizeth all away if the reason be asked absolutely How one of them cometh to such a great Estate far greater than the other the Stock given was a cause and so thanks are due to him that gave it but if the reason be asked comparatively why he differeth from the other he ows that to himself and his good Husbandry and not to him that gave him the Stock no thanks is due here at all in this sense for this was no cause of and so no thanks due for his differing taken comparatively and not absolutely in which sence I am now speaking And then if God did afterward do great things for a man give him subsequent Grace be it what it will it was not from any peculiar favour or good pleasure without respect to any thing in him but because he used the preventing general Grace be it what it will rightly which others had in as great a measure as he and did not So if a man have fearfully declined from his wonted integrity and is after recovered he cannot thank God for this as coming from any special Grace if he hold that God doth not because he cannot without unjust 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 give imparia paribus but holds God did no more to recover him than to others going yet on in such degeneracy whereas others can say if they were more noble like the Beraeans Acts