this Melitus of impiety for should I by begging and intreating endeavour to induce ye to absolve me and by fawning words as it were compell ye so strictly bound by Oath truly I should convince you to be of opinion that there are no Gods and while I defend my self from that false accusation effectually accuse my self to be guilty thereof as if I thought there are no Gods Whereas truly I am far from being of that absurd opinion for I hold Athenians more certainly than any of my accusers that there are Gods and to you and to God I freely leave the issue of my judgment that he may determine of me as may be both for my good and yours A new Speech after his Condemnation That I may with the less regret and disquiet of mind bear this my disaster He comforts himself both with his prevision of the event of his judgement and with the paucity of Votes condemning him namely that I am by your Votes condemned very many things concur to afford me help and consolation among the rest this chiefly that this hath not hapned to me otherwise than I believed and expected but the number of Votes given on both sides I more admire For I thought I should have been condemned not by so small but a much greater excess of Balls now it appears that if only thirty Balls had been otherwise cast I should have been absolved From the accusation of Melitus therefore if I be not mistaken I am free and clear nor only that but this likewise is evident to all that if Anytus and Lycon had not risen up with a new supplement to accuse me he had been fined in the sum of a thousand dragms By the Athenian law a man condemned to capital punishment might chose either exile or perpetual imprisonment or a pecuniary mulct which was called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a substitution or commutation of punishment This Socrates refuseth and resolves rather to die as Xenophon also recordeth of him Yet briefly recounting his own merits he affirms himself to deserve from the Athenians not punishment but some ample reward answerable to his age and office in particular a pension for his life from the State for that he had not on his side so much as a fifth part of the Votes He then hath my life for a Mulct Let it be so And with what punishment shall I on the other side think it equal to be mulct'd my self Athenians 't is clear with that whereof I am worthy What then what have I deserved to suffer or pay because in my whole life I have not by idle silence concealed what I knew but contemned the pursuit of those things that others with all possible contention of mind covet and hunt after riches and great estates military commands public assemblies and other dignities and sodalities confirmed by oaths factions also and parties which are frequently made in the City conceiving my self destined to nobler studies than that flying to the helps and defenses of those uncertain things I should from hence draw the hopes of conserving my self in fine I applied not my self to the attainment of such things which if I had attained I should have reaped from them nothing of utility either to my self or to you but made it my chief business and constant labour by addressing to every one to oblige all by the greatest and noblest of benefits namely by perswading everyman of you to make it his first care to become virtuous and prudent to the last degree nor to take greater care about affairs belonging to the City than the City it self and that by the same reason care was to be taken of other matters in the same manner What therefore is it that I being such a man have deserved to suffer Some great good certainly Athenians if ye estimate things according to the dignity verity and nature of them and return a just reward And in truth there is due to me such a good as may be suitable and convenient to my person And what is convenient to a man poor and benefic who gives himself wholly up to admonishing and urging you on to virtue and therefore hath need to be exempted from other businesses that he may freely and without distractions attend that good work Nothing doubtless is more convenient Athenians than that he be nourished in the * The public Granary or Storehouse of Corn in Athens Prytaneum and this certainly with greater reason than if any of ye had in the Olympic games brought home Victory either from the Horse-race or Chariots whether of two or four Horses apiece For he can but make ye to appear happy but I to be really so and he wants not a relief of aliments or food but I do If then as equity and justice require a due reward be to be defined and assignd to me this truly will be my reward to be fed at the charge of the State in the Prytaneum For this his freedom of claiming a maintenance from the City he gives this reason that he cannot assent to an act of injustice though done against himself While I say this perhaps I seem to speak as vainly as I was thought to speak arrogantly and obstinately afore when I declared against that way of moving Judges to commiseration by prayers and supplications But this Athenians is not so but rather thus My constant perswasion and resolve is not to do injury willingly and knowingly to any man living but I prevail not upon ye to believe this my profession for the time we speak together is but short When if ye had among ye a Law such as is in force among other Nations concerning giving sentence of death that the space of not only one but very many daies should intercede betwixt the hearing of the cause and pronouncing of Judgment in causes capital doubtless ye would approve of my reasons and plea but now in so short a time 't is not possible to wash off the accusations of so great crimes Now being fixed in this resolution Reasons why he chooseth neither exile nor imprisonment nor fine but death not to do injury to any I am very far from doing it to my self that is from pronouncing my self guilty of this evil and assigning to my self some other punishment in lieu thereof What shall I as if I feared to suffer the punishment to which Melitus adjudgeth me which I profess not to know whether it be good or evil choose instead thereof that which I certainly know to be evil adjudg and condemn my self to suffer it Imprisonment To what end should I live in prison perpetually in slavery to the will and command of the Eleven A pecuniary mulct and remain in prison until I have paid it But as I even now told ye I have not mony wherewith to pay a fine Shall I suffer Exile for to this punishment ye will perhaps addict me Certainly I were much in love with life Athenians were I so
is not contrary to the number Three It is not truly Therefore not only contrary Species admit not the accession of one to another mutually but some other contraries also abhor and are incapable to suffer that mutual accession You speak with great probability saith Cebes Will you then saith he that if we be able we define of what quality these things are With all my heart saith he Will they not be such Cebes which so conform whatsoever they possess as not only to force it to retain its own Species of form but also suffer it not to admit and put on the Species or form of any Contrary whatsoever How say you to this saith Cebes As we said a little before for you know it to be necessary that that which contains the Species of Three is not only Three but also Odd. Right For this reason we said that the Species contrary to that form which makes this can never be induced By no means Hath the Species of Odd perfected that form Certainly And is the Species of Even contrary to the Species of Odd. It is Therefore the species of Even shall never force it self upon Three Never Are Three then free from she ration of Even Free Therefore tste number Three is odd Certainly What therefore I undertook to define I have now defined namely * He repeateth what he had above distinctly applicated viz. that contrary qualities cannot be together in the same subject but one of necessity expelleth the other But the subjects themselves admit contraries successively that of what sort those things are which being contrary to none yet admit not a Contrary as now the number Three is not at all contrary to Even and yet is nevertheless incapable thereof For the number Two alwaies infers a contrary to Odd and Fire a Contrary to Cold and the like of very many others But consider whether you agree that the matter ought to be defined thus That a Contrary doth not only not receive its contrary but that also which may adfer any contrary to that to which it self may come namely that which adfers it doth never admit a form contrary to the form of that which is adferred But again rub up your memory for 't is no incommodity to hear the same again The number Five never admits the ration of Even nor the number of Ten the duple of five the ration of Odd. This therfore being it self contrary to another will yet never admit the ration of Odd. Nor will that number and half that number or half a number admit the ration of the whole nor a third part c. at least if you comprehend my meaning and assent unto me I both understand your sense saith he and assent without the least doubt or scruple * Here recomodating his precedent Suppositions and treating of second Causes he first evinceth this that we are to seek not remote but proxime causes not as his Interpreters speak Accidentary but substantial ones as he teaches by the Examples alleged But tell me again reflecting upon our precedent positions yet I would not have you answer to the questions I ask expresly and in the same prints of words as before For besides that certain way of answering of which I have treated before I find another naturally arising from the things said by us just now and this certain and firm for example if you ask me what that is which if it be in a body the body will be hot I will not give that gross and ignorant answer that it is Heat but a more elegant and polite one from our last conclusions namely that it is fire Nor if you ask what that is which if it invade the body the body will be sick will I answer that it is a disease but more precisely that it is a Feaver and if you ask me what is that which if it intervene to a number the number will be Odd I will not say it is imparity or Oddness but Vnity and of others in the same manner But look if you sufficiently understand me Very clearly saith he Answer me then what is that which if it be in the body * First Theorem the Soul is the proxim cause of life in man the body will be alive The Soul saith he And is not that alwaies so Why not saith he The Soul therefore alwaies brings life to the Body it embraceth whatsoever the Body be It doth alwaies bring life saith he Is any thing contrary to Life or not Yes saith he * Second Theorem death is contrary to life and therefore contrary to the Soul which is the cause of life and conclusion therefore the Soul admits not death from the conceded supposition that one Contrary never admits of another What Death The Soul therefore shall never receive the contrary to that which it self alwaies induceth as hath been granted from our late conclusions True saith Cebes What then That which admits not the Species or ration of Even by what name do we now call it Odd saith he And what do we call that which admits not Justice or Music That we call Vnjust this Immusical * Consummation of that Conclusion from adjuncts the Soul receives not death therefore it is immortal What do we call that which is incapable of Death Immortal saith he Is not the Soul capable of Death No. Therefore the Soul is a thing immortal It is immortal Well then saith he shall we acknowledg this to be thus demonstrated or what think you of it Demonstrated perfectly Socrates saith he * Another Theorem of the same Conclusion If what is Immortal be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 exempt from destruction then certainly the Soul is also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 exempt from destruction because proved to be Immortal What therefore saith he if it were necessary that Odd be free and exempt from all destruction would not Three also be free and exempt from all destruction Why not Therefore if it were necessary that that which is wholly void of Heat be likewise free and exempt from all destruction when a man should induce Hot upon Snow would the Snow go out safe and unmelted for it would not then perish when it had once admitted and received heat You say true quoth he In the same manner I opine if that which is void of Cold were free from all destruction when any cold thing should be brought to fire it would not be destroyed or perish but go away safe and intire Of necessity saith he We are therefore by necessity obliged to conclude the same of an Immortal For if what is immortal be free and exempt from all destruction 't is impossible the Soul should perish when death comes to it For from our late Positions it will not suffer or undergo death and so not dye as a Ternary will never as we have said be Even nor will Odd be by any means Even nor Fire be Cold nor the Heat which is in
Philosopher to take from them all excuse of Ignorance Since besides that natural knowledge which God hath engraven upon the minds of all men there appeared in a most populous City and the noblest School of Learning this eminent witness endowed with this peculiar Gift that he would rowz up men sleeping profoundly in vain opinion of themselves and shew them their ignorance wherein they were shamefully involved the knowledge of this matter also being at length disseminated not only through all Greece but through the whole world by this writing of Plato This therefore is the Theme and this the Oeconomy or Method of this Oration THE ORATION HOw your minds His Exordium wherein he weakneth the credit of his Accusers by charging them with manifold falshoods Athenians are affected and inclined by the harangue of my Accusers I know not but I my self am so sensibly touched with it that I have almost forgot my self So fitly and advantagiously for the gaining of belief and perswasion have they spoken tho to comprehend all in one word they have spoken nothing of truth But among many falshoods they alleaged I chiefly admire this one that they have admonished you diligently to beware lest you be seduced by me as if I were singularly powerfull in the faculty of speaking and that they have not blusht to urge that wherein they will soon be found guilty of palpable lying when first I shall be found unfit to speak to you this seems to me the most impudent of all Unless perhaps their meaning be He renounces all eloquence but truth to engage the benevolence and attention of the Judges that he is powerfull in the art of speaking who speaks truely For if this be their sense I profess my self to be an Orator but not according to their opinion But they as I said have delivered nothing of truth from me on the contrary you shall receive nothing of falshood And yet I swear by Jove you shall not from me hear a formal Oration composed of the elegances of words and Ornaments of sentences as theirs was but plain truths expressed in unstudied language and vulgar phrases But the things I am going to speak I believe to be equitable and just nor let any among you expect other from me For it is not fit that I should at these years come to you like a boy with fiction and Romances This one thing I earnestly beg and require of you 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Pre-ocupation where in he excuseth his plain and familiar way of pleading by his being inconversant in Forensian controversies and by his custom which is equivalent to Law as also by this that a Judge ought to consider not the elegancy but truth of a defence that if you O Athenians hear me making my defence in the same way of speech and manner of reasoning I have used both in the Forum and at the Tables of the Bankers in which and other places most of you have seen me you neither wonder thereat nor raise a tumult thereupon For the truth of the matter is this is the first time I appear at your Tribunal being now more than 60 years of age so that I may well be a stranger in this way of pleading causes Allow me therefore the same favour as if I really were a stranger seeing I shall use both the same words and the same form of speech wherein I have been educated This also I beg of you and it seems most equitable you should grant it to me that you consider not the manner of my pleading whether it be rude or convenient but diligently examine and with all possible attention of mind perpend whether the matter or substance of it be just or unjust For this is the virtue of a Judge as the virtue of an Orator is to deliver truths The Partition of his plea according to the diversity of his accusations First then O ye Athenians I am obliged to answer to those lyes that are in the first place objected to me and so to my first Accusers then to my last accusations and my last Adversaries For many have accused me to you and long since in the space of many years yet have they never delivered a word of truth in all their charges and these indeed I more fear than I do Anitus and his fellows though they likewise press me with the weight of their enmity and malicious combination Yet the others truly are more pressing and more powerful who have even from your tender age O men perswaded you that the accusations are true which they objected against me falsly namely that there is one Socrates a wise man forsooth and one who searcheth into the nature of sublime things and enquireth into all things under the earth who can by his Sophistical way of speaking make a bad speech pass current with the hearers for a good one These men O Athenians having spread abroad this rumor concerning me these I say are vehement and prevalent accusers For they who give ear to these scandals presently entertain a belief that such persons as they represent me to be conversant and curious in the study of Natural Causes hold that there are no Gods Besides this the number of my accusers of this sort is great and their accusations are of a long date insinuated and ingraffed into your minds in that age which is credulous and easie to admit any perswasions when most of you were boys or rather little children so that they accused me behind my back and while I had no compurgator no advocate to vindicate me and what is extremely unjust and unreasonable I was not permitted either to know or to produce the names of my accusers Only there was a confused whisper a darksom muttering in the general that it was a certain Comical Poet. And they who by envy and calumny traduce me to you and breed in your minds an odium against me have so strongly possessed themselves with the crimes objected to me that they draw others also into the same perswasion but those no where appear in the light For I can by no means obtain that any one of them should be brought hither to confront me that I might have the liberty and opportunity to confute him but am forced while I make my defence against them and endeavour to convince them of forgery to combate as it were in the dark no man appearing in the Lists to answer me Know this therefore and consider with your selves that I have two sorts of accusers some who have but even now accused me others again who have been long versed in this clandestine practise of whom I speak and think that I am obliged to make answer to those in the first place Let it be so then that I must form a defence for my self and do my utmost devoir in this short time allowed me to remove and extirpate that sinister opinion which hath for a long time remained deeply rooted in your minds to my
that shameless boldness either to accuse me or oppose any witness to me as if I had exacted or asked a reward from any one at any time And of this truth I might bring my poverty as a competent and I think a convincing witness Now it may perhaps seem absurd that I running to and fro to several men and with extreme diligence busying my self should give counsel to each one apart but not dare to address my self in public to the people to give the same advises to the City The reason why he had not addressed his Counsels to the City in general but only to particular men viz. that he was forbidden to meddle with the public by his Daemonium vide Apuleium de Socratis Daemonio The cause of this is what most of ye have heard from me oftentimes in various places I have something Divine and a Daemonium a certain Voice at which Melitus indeed in his accusation railed expresly This began with me from a Boy namely a certain voice which when it hath been perceptible alwaies recals me from that thing I was going to do but never impells me to undertake any thing this is that which forbids me to interest my self in matters of the State or of public concernment to the City And indeed it seems with admirable prudence to oppose me therein For Athenians That he might decline the danger impendent over all good men who interest themselves in the administration of State affairs and so the longer perform his duty in reprehending men if in times past I had taken upon me the administration of Civil affairs truly I had long since perished so that I could not have been any way useful either to you or to my self Be not inflamed with indignation against me speaking the truth for there is no man who if he shall ingeniously and boldly oppose either you or any other people and hinder the doing of many acts of injustice and impiety in a City can ever be preserved in safety and whoever sincerely contends for the maintenance of Justice must be obliged if he desire to live any the least time in peace and safety to lead a private life without interessing himself in the administration of public businesses Hereof I will give you very strong arguments not words but what ye more value realities and matters of fact He artesteth his constant adherence to Equity and Justice even when he thereby incurred present danger of death and that by many instances yet fresh in the memory of some of his Judges Hear therefore what hapned to me that ye may understand that I have in no respect yeilded to any in the defence of what is just for fear of death no not when I seemed to incur present danger of destruction by refusing to yield I will tell ye things Offensive and pertinent to this way of pleading causes in Court yet true For I Athenians never bore Office in the Common-wealth yet attained to the dignity of Senator and our Tribe Antiochis obtained the Lieutenancy of the Supream power when ye censured ten Military Officers to be condemned to death for not burying the slain in a Naval fight and this against Law as ye after judged Then I being one of the Council of Athens opposed you that ye might not give a judgment contrary to Law and made a decree contrary to yours the Orators then ready to call me to the Bar and appoint a day for my Trial ye also senting and by acclamations approving their Indictment yet I chose rather to be in danger with Law and Justice than assent to your unjust votes notwithstanding the terror of imprisonment or death And these things fell out at that time when the City was governed by equal Democracy but when it afterward fell under the domination of a Few the thirty Tyrants sent me the fifth man to Tholus that we should bring from Salomine Leontes Salaminius to be put to death as they commanded many others also to the end they might derive the envy of their own many crimes upon the heads of many others Then I not by words but actions demonstrated that the fear of death that I may speak a little roughly and clownishly touched me not and that my grand care and concernment was that I might commit nothing unjust and impious Nor truly did the command and government of those Tyrants however violent and cruel so terrifie me as to make me do any unjust act But after we departed from Tholus four of the Embassadors went on to Salamine and brought away Leontes and I went home and perhaps I should for this cause have been put to death had not that Tyranny been soon after subverted and destroyed and of these traverses I have many witnesses Now whether do ye think that I could have continued safe so many years together if I had imployed my self in matters belonging to the State and so deporting my self as became a good man had vindicated and maintained just causes and thereunto seriously and studiously devoted all my devoirs It had been impossible Athenians nor any men else But truly through the whole course of my life both publickly if I acted any thing and privatly I still have kept to the same rule never to yeild to any man neither to other nor to any one of these whom my accusers individuously call my Disciples in any thing contrary to right and equity Nor have I ever been Preceptor to any man but if any were desirous to hear my discourses whether he were young or old I never denied him this nor do I dispute to get money or if mony be wanting less but with equal freedom offer my self to be interrogated to the rich and to the poor and whosoever pleases hears my answers If by these my answers and conferences any man hath become either sober and of good and honest conversation or debaucht and vitious t is not just that I should bear the blame thereof seeing I neither taught nor promised to teach any man And if any shall say he hath learned or heard from me in private any thing that all might not with equal freedom hear be ye most assured he speaks most untruly But the reason why some are delighted with frequent and long conversation ye have heard Athenians 'T is wholly this as I declared that those who are admitted to my conferences are much pleased to hear such who think themselves to be wise but are not so examined and refuted for this is not unpleasant And that I should thus confute such I affirm to be a duty imposed upon me by God both by Vaticinations and by Dreams and all other waies whereby Oracles are wont to deliver commands These things Athenians are both true and such as may be easily proved For if I now of late corrupt some young men and have long since corrupted others He appeals to the testimony of some present who had often heard his moral discourses whether he had ever
sufficiently efficacious nor honest but the best most honorable and easiest way is this not to hinder others but to render your selves virtuous to the highest degree Having then thus prophesied to those who have condemned me I leave them But to ye who have absolved me To his Friends he avows his confidence of happiness in his death and the presignification th reof by his Daemonium I shal gladly speak of what hath just now hapned while the Magistrates stay here imployed in other affairs and I have a short respit before I depart to the place where I must die and for so short a time do ye Athenians expect me for nothing hinders but we may speak together while we have the liberty To you who are my Friends I will declare what is the signification of this my disaster For Judges and in calling ye Judges I do ye but right there hath hapned to me an accident well worthy admiration That presaging and prophetie Voice of my Daemonium frequent to me at several times of my life past was wont to check and countermand me even in things of the least moment if I were about to enterprise any affair imprudently but now these Occurrents which ye see have hapned unto me which any one might imagine to be evils in extremity and yet that sign of God hath not contradicted me neither in the morning when I came forth nor when I ascended into the Pulpit or pleading chair nor in my speech whatsoever I was delivering In other speeches it did often interrupt me but now in this action it no waies opposed me in any thing I said or did And what do I conceive to be the reason of this I will explain it to ye This event of my condemnation is very happy to me We are not just Estimators of things whoever of us think death to be an evil Hereof this hath been to me a great argument for doubtless that usual sign would have resisted me if I had gone about any thing but what was truly good Thus we may with certain judgment determine of the matter That to good men there can be nothing of evil in death he proves by this Dilemma Either all sense is extinguished by death or mens Souls remain after death If there be no sense there must be eternal quiet if the Soul survive then there must be a state of extreme felicity to the Souls of good men in the society of the Blessed Hence Seneca seems to have borrowed that two edged argument against fear of death Mors nos aut consumit aut emittit emissis meliora restant onere detracto consamptis nihil restat Epist 24. A strong hope possesses me 't is happy for me that I am sent to death for one of these two is absolutely necessary Either death utterly deprives us of all sense or by death we pass from hence to another place Wherefore whether all sense be extinguished and death be like that sleep which sometimes brings most calm quiet without the deluding phantasms of Dreams good Gods what advantage it is to die for I think if any man were obliged to take particular notice of and set apart that night in which he slept so profoundly and quietly as not to be sensible of any the least disturbance from dreams and then comparing it with all other nights yea and daies too of his whole life past would observe which of all those nights or daies he had passed more sweetly and pleasantly I am of opinion that not only a man of private and humble condition but even the greatest of Kings would find such nights to be easily numerable in comparison of other whether daies or nights If then death be but like such a sound and undisturbed sleep I call it gain or advantage for all time seems to be nothing more than one night But if it be true as wise men have affirmed and taught that death is a passing hence into those places or regions which the deceased inhabit 't is more happy for thee when thou shalt have escaped from those who will have themselves to be accounted Judges to come to those who are rightly called Judges and who are said there to sit in judgment Minos and Radamanthus and Aeacus and Triptolemus and all other Demi-gods who lived justly and with faith Is such a change such a migration as this to be valued at nothing Then to converse with Orpheus and Musaeus and Hesiod and Homer who of us would not prefer such a state of life to that of this For my part I would die if it were possible many times over to find the satisfactions I speak of How much shall I be delighted when I shall meet with Palamedes with Ajax the Son of Telamon and others circumvented by judgment of unjust men and compare their cases with my own This I think will not be unpleasant but this will be most pleasant there also to find one who examines and tries every one who is wise and who thinks himself wise but is not so how much rather Judges will a man find out him who brought a numerous Army against Troy or Vlisses or Sysiphus or very many others both men and Women with whom freely to talk and converse to compare opinions and make inquiries is a thing of vast and infinite wisdom And yet they who are there are not put to death for so doing and are in many other respects far happier than these our Citizens and for ever after immortal if at least those things that are said of the state of the Soul after death be true But it becomes you also This he saith not from doubt but from the supposition of the people with whom he had then to do For as to his own perswasion he held nothing so firm and certain as the immortality of mens minds or souls With the same caution Seneca also saith fortasse simodo sapient on vera sama est recipita nos locus aliquis quem putamne perisse premissas est Epist 63. O ye Judges to conceive noble hopes of death and to be fully perswaded in your minds of the verity of this that nothing of evill can ever come to a good man neither living nor dead and that his concerns are never neglected by the Gods Nor have these things hapned to me by chance but certain and evident it is to me that to die and to be freed from businesses is better and more conducible to me And for this reason that Divine sign hath not at all averted me Nor am I angry either with my Judges who condemned me or with my Accusers though they condemned and accused me not with design to render my condition more happy and tranquill but thinking thereby to bring some great incommodity or calamity upon me wherein I have just cause to complain of them But this only I begg of them In fine he recommends to his Judges the tuition of his Sons with this request that they might
same manner Perceiving clearly the corruptions of these and observing the contingents both in the Heavens and on the Earth I at length thought my self to be so unfit for these contemplations that nothing can be more unfit Whereof I will bring a just and convenient argument So far was I amused and blinded by this way of considering that what things I had before clearly and certainly as I my self and others also thought known that was I obliged to unlearn and forget and to doubt of very many others also and chiefly of this why a man grows and increases in stature and strength for this I before thought to be evident to every one that he was nourished because he eat and drank and that so he came to be increased in bulk and stature and when from meats particularly from flesh there comes an addition of flesh and bones are added to bones and so in the same manner to all other parts their own proper nourishment is brought and assimilated I thought that by this means a man was increased from a little tiny infant to his full stature These were my thoughts then and do you think them reasonable and satisfactory To me saith Cebes they seem to be so Now consider also what remains I also thought the matter to be sufficiently evident when a great man stood by a little man that he was greater by the head and one Horse greater than another and what 's yet more evident that ten were more than eight because two had been added to eight and that two cubits were more than one because of double the length And now saith Cebes what think you of these things Far by Jove saith he very far I am from thinking that I understood the cause of them so that now I cannot satisfie my self whether if one be added to one the first one be two or whether that which hath been added and that to which it is added be made two by the addition of one to the other for I wonder if when each of them was single and apart both were one and not two but after their growing neerer one to the other that very coming together hath been the cause why they were made one Nor if a man by cutting divide one into two can I yet understand how this cutting asunder of one thing hath been the cause why they are two for that cause is then contrary to their being two for then when they were placed neerer together and one was put to the other and now when they are removed and separated one from the other I cannot perswade my self that I know that one is made Nor do I know any thing else to speak all in a word why it is or why it ceaseth to be or whether things be made in that manner and order that Natural History hath delivered but I lightly mix therewith some other mode and this I in no sort embrace * Here accomodating his last discourse concerning the unreasonablenes of acquiessing in secondary and remote Causes to his present subject he reprehends Anaxagoras first for that putting a certain Universal Mind as he called it for the First Cause of all things he had notwithstanding by searching more curiously into second Causes and ascribing more to them than was fit destroyed that First Cause or Mind by himself supposed then for that in assigning second Causes he had sixed upon Remote ones such as could not shew what was Best that is what is proper and peculiar to every things But when on a time I heard one reading and relaving out of a certain Book as he said of Anaxagoras that there is a certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Mind that disposeth and governeth all things in order and is the cause of all things I was much delighted with the Universal Cause and thought it to be in some degree rightly comparated namely that a Mind is the cause of all things and I thus determined with my self that if there be such a Mind that governs and disposes all things then certainly it doth dispose all things to the best advantage and place every thing where it is most convenient it should be placed I added that if any man would desire to investigate the causes of singular things how they are made and how they perish he would be obliged to enquire also by what reason and in what manner it hath been best for them to be or to suffer or act any thing and that from this reason nothing is to be understood by man both concerning himself and of other things but what is best and most excellent and in fine that it is necessary also that he understand what is Worst * 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 There is the same Science of them for that of contrary things there is the same Knowledg When I considered this Doctrine I with very great pleasure thought that now I had found a Master who would according to my own hearts desire teach me the causes of things Anaxagoras and that he would explain to me first whether the Earth were flat and broad or round and then would adjoyn also a more copious explication of that first Cause and of Necessity that is what is Best for every singular nature and why that should be best Wherefore if he should affirm the Earth to be placed in the middle he would more-over give Reasons why it was best for it to have that position And if he should have sufficiently explained these things to me I had resolved with my self to lay down no other Theory or Form of Causes And now I had prepared my self to enquire of him concerning both the Sun and the Moon and the rest of the Planets and Stars namely of their celerity and conversions and mutual respects and other Affections and Apparences how far it was most commodious for every one of them to do and to suffer what they did and suffered For I did not think that he who taught that all things are composed and governed by a Mind would allege any other cause of them than this that it was Best for them to be as they are And so when he attributed and assigned a cause to every thing in particular and in common to all things I conceived he would not assign that for a cause to every thing in particular namely what was properly and peculiarly best for each particular thing and to all in general what was their common and universal Good Thus my hopes were great and I pleased my self with mighty expectations such as I would not have parted with for a very great sum of money and with earnest study I took those Books into my hands and with as much speed as I could I read them quite through that I might quickly understand the Best and the Worst But believe me I soon fell from that lofty hope for when I had made some progress in reading those Books I perceived the man to use neither mind nor judgment nor to assign any
Causes to the composition and order of things with conveniency but putting certain Aerial and Ethererial influences and many other absurd Chimera's for the true Causes of things * An Example fitly remonstrating the folly of assigning Second Causes And me thinks the same fortune befalls him that belongs to any other who should say Whatsoever Socrates doth he doth with a Mind and with judgment and then designing to explicate the causes of the particular actions I do should further say first that I sit here because my Body consists of bones and nerves and that my bones are solid and firm and have their differences and intervals of joynts betwixt them and that my nerves are so contrived and formed that they may be extended and relaxed again and environ and bind the bones together with the flesh and skin which contains and invests them When therefore the bones are raised up in their joynts the sinews which are one while upon the stretch and by and by relaxed cause me to have the faculty of moving bowing and extending my limbs and that by this cause I come to sit bowed forwards in this posture And that he might explicate the causes of this my conference with you should affirm them to be certain words or voices formed of aire and hearing and infinite others equally remote but should neglect the true and certain cause namely that the Athenians having been pleased by giving their suffrages to condemn me I am likewise pleased to sit here and it seems more just that I should suffer the punishment they have doomed me to suffer Since by the * This Oath was familiar not only to Socrates but to Zeno also Witness Diogen Laertius in vit Soc. and Serranus in his Annotations on this place Dogg-starr those bones of mine had long ago been carried as I think among the Megarensians or Baeotians * Here Socrates is made to reflect upon and occasionally justifie his refusal to fly to the Megarensians or to the Beotians when Crito would have perswaded him to escape and assisted him therein as at large is recorded by Plato in his Dialogue intitled Crito by order of that Best if I had not judged it more just and honorable to undergo and patiently endure the punishment which the City hath decreed for me than to live a fugitive or exile in another Country But to call these things Causes is extremely impertinent Whereas if one should say that unless I had both bones and sinews I could not do what actions I had a mind to do he would indeed speak truth And yet notwithstanding if any man should affirm that by reason of my bones and nerves I do the actions I do and that I so far do them with understanding and a Mind but not upon choice of the Best truly he would reason but negligently and supinely For this in truth is not to be able to distinguish and discern that really there is another cause and another something without which a cause is not a cause In which error they seem to me to be involved and amused who groping as it were in the dark and abusing the propriety of that name call that Second a Cause Some therefore while they place about the Earth a great gulph of Waters beneath the Heavens will have it that the Earth come thereby to consist and remain firm others prop up the Aire its fundament as with a bâ—â—d Kneading-tubb But that virtue or power which hath been able to constitute things themselves in the best manner what it is and how it doth consist this I say they enquire not nor conceive it to have a Divine force and Energy but imagine they have found a new Atlas stronger than the first and by a kind of immortality much more lasting and more comprehensive of all things and think that that Good and Beautiful Being doth bind together and contain and support nothing For my part I would gladly learn from any man the nature and proprieties of that Cause whatsoever they be But since I have not been able either of my self to find it or to understand from any other what it is are you Cebes willing I should give you an account of the Second Voyage I with exquisite study designed and attempted for the finding of that Cause I vehemently desire to hear it saith he When my mind was grown weary and faint with considering things intently I perceived my self obliged to beware lest that might befal me which usually happens to those who gaze upon the Sun in an Eclipse For their faculty of seeing would be taken from them unless they beheld the image of the Sun in Water or in some other the like Diaphanous and Specular body Something like this came into my mind and I feared lest my understanding might be wholly blinded if I looked upon things themselves with my eyes and attempted to touch them with my senses * What way Socrates took in his re-searches of the First cause coming to knowledg thereof by certain degrees viz. by Reasons and Discourses which yet he saith were efficacious and powerful lest we might conceive some imaginary knowledg to be thereby signified Plato therfore affirms that as God is the most potent cause of all things so he is also the sole and most certain Cause of the Soul Which fundament is to be laid down as necessary to this disquisition before we come to other reasons nearer to us I held it therefore very well worth my labour to have recourse to Reason or at least to that discourse which retains the prints of reason and therein to contemplate the nature and verity of things But perhaps this Simile or Example whereby I have endeavoured to represent this matter will not be exactly fit and consentaneous For I do not fully grant that he who contemplates things in the mirror of reason or discourse doth contemplate them rather in images than in works Nevertheless I took this course and laying for a foundation that reason which I judg to be most valid and most firm what things appear to me to have congruity therewith those I put for true both as to Causes and to all others and on the contrary what have no congruity therewith those I conclude to be untrue Which having thus noted in general I will explain it more fully to you for yet I conceive you understand it not Not very well by Jove saith Cebes Yet replies he I here speak nothing a new but the very same I have both at other times and in my precedent disputation perpetually declared For I am going to shew to you the image of that Cause in the re-search whereof I have thus long been versed and I again return to those 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 renowned Excellencies and from them deduce my beginning laying this down for a principle That there is a something Beautiful Good and Great and every way perfect in and by it self Which if you grant I hope I shall from
those attributes of perfection first shew you an image of that Supreme Cause and then convince you that the Soul is immortal But saith Cebes supposing I grant this your Fundamental there is no need of a longer preface to support your conclusion Consider then saith he what are the consequences of those Perfections if at least your opinion be the same with mine For thus I think if there be any other Beautiful besides that self-beautiful that it is Beautiful no otherwise than as it is participant of the same self-beautiful and the same I affirm of all Do you embrace this Cause I embrace it saith he I therefore saith he again understand no more nor can I comprehend those wise Causes but if any enquire of me why any thing is beautiful or why it hath a florid colour or elegant figure or any other the like fair quality I securely pass by and neglect all other Causes with all which truly I am amused and perplexed and simply and genuinely without any Sophistry and perhaps also foolishly determine with my self that nothing makes that thing beautiful but either the presence or communication of that self-beautiful by what reason or way soever that hath come to it For that I do not yet affirm but this above all things I maintain * An Axiom certain and evident that whatsoever is in the University of Nature hath both its existence and form from God alone who is the first and true Cause of all things And that is the first fundament of the Souls immortality viz. that God hath endowed man with an immortal Soul which was before demonstrated by Socrates who therefore in this place only brings Examples for illustration that by the sole virtue and efficacy of that Beautiful all things are made beautiful for this I take to be the safest answer I can give both to my self and to others and firmly adhering to this truth I believe I shall never be divorced from it and think it safe to answer both to my self and others that by that Beautiful alone all things that are beautiful are made so Do you think so too I do Likewise by Magnitude that those things that are great are made great and those that are greater are made greater and those that are less are made less by smalness Certainly Neither would you admit if any should say that some other is greater by the head and another less by the head but profess that you say nothing else but this that whatever one thing is greater than another comes to be so by no other cause but magnitude and whatever is less comes to be so only by smalness and therefore is less by reason of smalness it self Fearing I think lest if you should have said that such or such a man is greater or less by the head another might contradict you opposing this that a man otherwise little is bigger in the head than another otherwise bigger Besides that you say the greater is greater by t e head which is but a small thing that is some Monstre that you should affirm a thing to be great by that which is little Are you not afraid of this answer Yes saith Cebes smiling Are you then afraid saith he to say that ten are more than eight by two and exceed two by that ration but not by reason of multitude and that two Cubits are greater than one Cubit by the half but not by magnitude for there is the same fear There is saith he And what if one be put to one will you say that that putting or accession is the cause why they are made two or if one be divided are you not afraid to affirm that division to be the cause why one is made two may you not cry out aloud that you are ignorant by what other reason things exist unless so far as every thing is participant of its own proper nature and so you have no other reason why two are made than that I may so speak the participation of Duity or Twoness So that it is necessary that those things which are to become two participate of that Duity and those that are to be one partake of Vnity But as for those cuttings asunder those puttings together and other the like witty trifles you may very well omit them all and leave the honor of answering them to those that are wiser than your self But you fearing your own shadow as they say and diffident of your own ignorance would you certainly adhering to the firmness of that Position in good earnest answer so and if any man should rely upon that same position would you neglect him and not answer until you had considered the consequents whether in your judgment some of them agreed or disagreed with others And when you should be obliged to render a reason thereof would you in like manner laying down another Hypothesis grant those of the premises that seemed best until you should arrive at what is just and fit At the same time you would not confound things themselves as the Contentious use to do disputing both of the principle resolved upon and of the consequents arising naturally from that principle at least if you desired to find out some of those things which truly are for those perhaps have no consideration no care of these things but are endowed with so singular a faculty that they are able by their wisdom to commix and confound all things and yet please themselves at the same time And as for you if you be one of those Philosophers you will I think do what I say You speak very great truths answer Cebes and Simmias Ech. They answered rightly by Jove Phedo for it seems to me that he spake admirably well and perspicuously to the sense and capacity of a man even of a vulgar wit Phe. He did Echecrates and so all that were present judged Ech. We who were not present are of the same judgment hearing only the rehearsal But what were his Discourses afterward Phe. Another Socratic Argument of the Souls immortaiity taken from the proxim reasons of Second Causes from whence follows the same Conclusion after requisite Positions These as neer as I can remember When these things were granted and it was agreed upon among us that single Species or Images are something and that other things which communicate with them do challenge to themselves their Sirname he then proceeds to interrogations Seeing you say so saith he do you not in saying that Simmias is greater than Socrates but less than Phedo imply that in Simmias are both Greatness and Smalness at once I do so But saith he you confess in that that Simmias exceeds Soerates it is not in reality so as it is expressed in words * First Position that in the collation of things the things themselves are not to be considered simply but their Relations or respects one to another For you think not that Simmias is so comparated by nature as he is Simmias
certain there are Rewards and Punishments appointed and absolutely necessary for every man here to have his cogitations seriously exercised in the contemplation of them 8. True it is also that the Souls of Good men by Death delivered from the chains of the Body and its Senses go immediatly to a place invisible indeed by Human eyes but of complete felicity where they are conjoyn'd to God for ever while on the contrary the Souls of Wicked men suffer the punishments justly due to their crimes in places convenient 9. Vnreasonable it is and unworthy a Philosopher to pretermit the Principal and Primary Cause God who is in truth not only the most Potent Cause but Cause of all secondary Causes to acquiesce in Second Causes which really are no more but concurrent and instrumental and in second causes themselves to omit the Proxime while he rambles in search of remote namely Constellations and Etherial influences and such like Chimera's as do those injudicious Professors of Judicial Astrology and as did Anaxagoras who held the great Mind of the Vniverse to be utterly void of understanding and judgment as Plato affirms 10. The use of this most excellent Doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul is to induce us to put our selves into the way of Virtue as that which alone leads to Eternal Happiness and to abhor Vice as the direct Road to endless Misery REFLEXIONS Upon the Athenian Laws mentioned in the Apoligie and Dialogue Precedent I. THe Law which Socrates was accused to have Violated and by which he was Condemned yet extant under the first Title of Athenian Laws collected and explained by the Learned Monsieur Petit seems to be this Lex esto antiquissima aeteruaeque auctoritatis in Attica venerandos esse Deos atque Heroas patrios indigenas publice secundum patrias sanctionos privatim vero bonis verhis frugumque primitiis libis annuis pro facultatum modulo By this Law was provided ne quis novos habessit Deo that no man should introduce new Gods and the Transgressor was called into question before the Areopagites whereof we have two eminent Examples one in St. Paul who was hurried to the most severe Tribunal of the Areopagites 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 quod peregrinorum Deornm videretur annunciator esse Act. Apostol cap. 17. vers 18. the other in Diodorus surnamed the Atheist whose Indictment upon the same Statute and convention before the same High Court of Justice are recorded by Diogenes Laertins How came it then that Socrates accused to have both denied the Divinity of the Old Gods of the Athenians and endeavoured the insinuation of new was not likewise tried by the Areopagites but by other Judges contrary to the tenor of this Law I answer with Monsieur Petit Commentar in leges Atticas pag. 3. that perhaps the jurisdiction of the Arcopagites extended not to the Citizens of the Attick Republic such as Socrates was but was limited only to Strangers such as was that ill-conjoyn'd pair St. Paul and Diodorus II. Socpates you may remember in his defense dissolving that part of his Charge which concerned the Corruption of Youth puts his Adversary Melitus in mind of a certain Law whereby he was obliged not to have brought an Impeachment against him to the Magistrates but privately and in a friendly manner admonished him of that his error supposing him to be really guilty thereof not out of malice but incogitancy Now the Law it self where to he then had respect was this Peccantes invite in jus ne rapiuntor sed privatim officii admonentor and the reason of it is obvious Talibus enim non poena opus est sed institutione Which is to be understood of Errors of no great moment nor likely to bring detriment to the Common-wealth such as those objected to Socrates in that article of his Indictment 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Socrates doth contrary to right and equity in that he curiously enquires into things both subterranean and sublime and by his sophistry turns falshood into truth and teaches the same to others For granting him to be guilty hereof the fault was but light and venial In his enim neque sitae erant opes Greciae neque ex iis detrimenti quicquam Respublica capere potuit Wherefore he had right to the favour and indulgence of this Law which his malicious Adversary had by omitting the private admonition thereby required violated III. By the Religion of the Athenians no Deity was held more potent and venerable than Apollo none had so many sacred Buildings erected in their City to his Worship none so many solemn Sacrifices and public Feasts instituted to his Honor as he had and among their Festivals none were celebrated with more ceremonious Joy than that of Inspection mentioned by Plato in Phaedon Concerning which they had this peculiar Law Deliornm festos dies dum Delum itur reditur damnatorum suppliciis ne funestato And the observance of this Law hath been noted both by Xenophon and Plato as the reason why Socrates was detained in Prison thirty daies after his Condemnation before he was put to death the Athenians esteeming it piacular to darken the publick rejoycing and solemnity of that Feast by the death of any condemned however notorious a Malefactor So much was given to the Honor of Apollo Delius whom not only the Grecians but even Foreiners from the remotest parts of the Earth while in Greece were obliged to Worship with Oblations of their First Fruits as appears from the History of Abaris a Scythian who is said to have lived in Greece about the 52 Olympiad and wrote de Oraculis and from the example of the Tyrians alledged by Euripides in Phoenissis whose Verses in the Chorus are worthy the serious remark of Antiquaries as giving much of light to what hath been obscurely delivered by Geographers and Historians concerning the Colonies of the Tyrians in Africa and the neighbouring Islands X. From the same religious respect to Apollo it seems deducible that within the Attic Territories no condemned person suffered death until after the Sun was gone down The Law it self I confess I have not yet found among all those with such vast labour collected by Monsieur Petit but that they had such a Law may be inferred from the Example of Socrates and from what we read in Stobaeus Sermone 1. who saith expresly enough 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Mythological Reflections UPON Some Ancient Rites and Traditions concerning the Soul mentioned by Plato in the precedent Dialogue 1. Of Lustration AMong the ancient Grecians who travelled into Aegypt on purpose to pry into and learn the Sacred Rites and mysterious Ceremonies used by the Priests of that Superstitious Nation Orpheus is celebrated as the first by Diodorus Siculus who Lib. 4. pag. 162. saith thus of him Orpheus in Aegyptum profectus multa ibi didicit ita ut tam Initiationibus Theologia quam Poesi Melodia esset Graecorum praestantissimus c. Now