amounteth to as much as to be lyable to destruction since the diuision of the partes that do essentially compose any thing is the destruction of it And the origidall difference of bodies is that some are more subiect to such diuision that is are more easily diuided others with greater difficulty which resulteth meerely out of the partes being grosser or subtiler So that seeing the very essence of a body is to be a collection of such partes It is euident that what can not be performed by such partes is beyond the orbe of sole and meere bodies and cannot be atchieued by them It is trew that in all the first treatise which is of the nature of Bodies I haue neither established nor made any mention of this Principle but haue reserued it to the second where I make vse of what is settled in the former to discouer the nature of the soule And the reason why I haue done so is because the slight mocke-Philosophy of this Age not reaching to comprehend the true difference betweene a body and a spirit easily swalloweth spirituall qualities in bodies and as familiarly attributeth corporeall proprieties to spirits And therefore I was obliged to runne briefely ouer the nature of all bodies and to shew how all their operations euen the most refined ones and that sauour most of a spirituall nature may be performed by the meere disposition of grosse and subtile partes there by to preuent the obiections that might be made me from such corporeall actions as vulgar Philosophy dispatcheth like spirituall ones And I thought is not sufficient for a iuditious readers satisfaction to do this onely by bare casting a composition in the ayre as Monsieur des Cartes some others haue very ingeniously attempted to do but I haue endeauoured to strengthen the proofes rising from the force of discourse by accompanying them with such further obseruations as do clearely euince that whither or no I hitt right on all the particular lines that I trace out for the performance of those actions yet it can not be doubted but that their causes are comprised vnder those heads I haue there established and that the wayes by which they are brought to effect are not vnlike if not the very same to those that I haue pitched vpon This being the â—â—orke of the first treatise The second looketh into the operations of a rationall soule And hauing discouered their nature it sheweth that they can not be performed by the meere disposition and ordering of grosse and subtile partes of quantity or of a body and by consequence that they proceede from an immateriall and spirâ—â—tuall substance Now here vse is made of the former principle for it being made euident that nothing but corporeity and diuisibility is the cause of corruption and of subiecting the thinges where they reside to the seruitude of Mortality it followeth indefectibly that the spirituall substance which we call a soule can not be mortall and corruptible This is the whole scope and discourse of that booke out of which for the reasons I haue already touched I will here select onely three of the proofes contained in the latter treatise to shew that our soule is a spirit voyde of all quantity and materiality THE THIRD CHAPTER The Immateriality of the soule proved out of the Nature of vniuersall termes or Prâ—â—posiâ—â—ions THE first of them is drawne out of the nature of vniuersall termes or Propositions Logicians do define an Vniuersall terme or Notion To be that which being the same may be affâ—â—rmed of many Metaphysicians define it to be Somewhat that is the same in many But to speake more familiarly to common sense we may say That it is somewhat which is any of mâ—â—ny For when we say Peter is a man Iohn is a man and Paul is a man If Peter and man be not the same thing the saying is false And the like is of euery one of the other two to witt if Iohn or Paul be not a man Againe seeing that one man is not two men If when I say Peter is a man the thing which I say of Peter were the same thing which is Iohn Such my saying would also be false for Peter would be Peter and Iohn too by being the man which is both Peter and Iohn The notion therefore of Man which is truly reported both of Peter and of Iohn is not both Peter and Iohn but either Peter or Iohn And this is that which we call an vniuersall This being hitherto euident the demonstration proceedeth thus We see that the thing which we call Peter or Iohn doth gett by being in the soule to be a thing that is either Peter or Iohn But this condition or quality to be either this or that or to be a thing that is either this or that can not be had or gotten by the nature of a body or by the disposition of subtile and grosse partes Therefore the souleâ—â— in and by which it getteth this condition is of a different nature from Bodies If here any one should answere me that howsoeuer our wordes may seeme vnto him who shall sticke and criticise vpon them to import that there is a notion in our minde when we speake them correspondent to those wordes which notion is no one of the subiects it is affirmed of and yet is common to them all Neuerthelesse if he looke carefully into his minde he shall finde that in truth there is no nature of Vniuersality there For if he examine what picture he hath in his braine when he reflecteth vpon the notion of a man which he calleth an Vniversall he shall finde there the image of some particular and determinate man and no such thing as a man in common To such a person as should say thus I might reply that to endeauour satisfying him with a long discourse might seeme as ill placed paines as if I should go about to proue with learned arguments that there are such bodies in the world as men call fire water earth and the like For euery mans senses of seeing and feeling that are not depraued and corrupted do assure him that they are and that he continually is conuersant with them In like manner it is as euident to euery man who hath common sense and reason and who reflecteth vpon what passeth in his vnderstanding when he speaketh sucâ—â— propositions or considereth such termes as we haue euen now insisted vpon That indeed there is an Vniuersality in them And therefore if he be so vnhappy and short sighted as not to discerne in his owne minde that which common and continuall experience enforceth euery rationall man who looketh into the nature of vnderstanding and discourse to owne and confesse he should in speculations of this nature content himselfe with belieuing the multitudes of others who are capable of iudging of them as blind men ought to relye vpon those whose eyes are not vitiated in matter of colours and not hazard his actions and his aeternall wellfare which
and of Operation that in bodies are separated And so is both her Being an her worke And consequently she knoweth and vnderstandeth which is her proper operation when she is seuered from the body and hath no more fantasmes to worke by But it is a kind of standing or fixed state of knowing if so I may say and immanent in her selfe as the shining or glowing of a fire coale seemeth to vs to be not att all accompanyed kith motion as is her gaining of wnowledge in this life Which will be better vnderstood if we consider how her first obiect is Being and that her first operation or vnderstanding is to be Being as whose essence is nothing else but a capacity of knowlege or of a new manner of being Being and that all the rest of her vnderstandinges are nothing else but to know other things to be or for her to be the Being of other thinges that is to identify them with her selfe by this imbibition of Being that sinketh the obiects into her And therefore when a soule is once completly become all thinges that is that she knoweth all thinges which she becometh it the very instant of her separation and indeede by her separation from the body It is euident she needeth no further action to gaine any thing or to better her selfe For she hath then all that she is capable of hauingâ—â— and is att the periode she was made for And consequently Pomponatius his argument is of no force since after the bodies death the soule may continue that operation of knowing which she is made for And noâ—â— onely continue it but haue it infinitly exalted and refined ouer what it was in the body By my answere to this obiection I am led to obserue how a separated soule must necessarily retaine knowledge of whatsoeuer she knew in the body For since her knowledge of any thing is her very Being the thing she knoweth It followeth that as long as she conserueth her owne Being the knowledge of that thing must remaine with her But doth her knowledge reste here Hath she acquired by this second birth no addition to the stocke she had bin toylesomely traffiking for in this life A child in his mothers wombe hath no other cognition then such a dull and limited one as his sense of touching or feeling could afford him but as soone as he is borne into this worldes light he receiueth impressions by his eyes of the colors figures magnitudes and other qualities of all kindes of bodies that enuiron him And shall a soule borne into that bright day of intellectuall light see then no more then she saw here in her darke prison She shall certainely And not onely see more but see so much more that it euen dazeleth our eyes to looke vpon the excesse of her seing Lett vs proceede by steppes and consider how the ordering of a few notions begetteth new knowledges and conclusions that he who was imbued with those notions neuer dreamed of till he had marshalled and ranked them in such order And by new ordering and weauing those new conclusions among themselues and with his former notions he further acquireth new knowledges Which the more numerous they grow the higher and larger is their multiplication like numbers which by euery addition of a new figure do encrease their valewes tenne folde Thus sciences do grow from a few plaine obuious principles to the vastenesse we admire So the science of Mathematikes by enterweauing a few axiomes and definitions sprooteth out into an vnbelieuable progeny of subtility and variety Likewise the science of Metaphysikes by ordering such notions as occurre to euery man of common sense runneth ouer the whole machine and extent of all that is And not content with the whole world of bodies and of what is measured by time soareth with a bold wing and piercing eye into a new world of Intellectuall inhabitants where finding them settled by their nature in a state of aeternity she perceiueth time that deuoureth all thinges beneath their orbe flide weakely vnder them into an abysse of nothing without being able to giue the least attainte to their sublimed nature All this is done meerely by orderly disposing those notions that by our senses we acquire And if these in a man whose grosse allay of a body so cloggeth and benummeth the vigour of his subtile inhabitant do grow vp to so incredidible a bulke and height what will their extent be in a separated soule that is all actiuity Her nature is to be an orderer or rather to be an order it selfe for whatsoeuer procedeth from her is orderly which it would not be if order were not first in her Order then being in her it must be her nature since all is nature and substance in that thing which is indiuisible It is cleare then that whatsoeuer is ordered by an agent whose nature is order it must needes be ordered to the vtmost aduantage that by ordering it is capable of And consequently seeing that new knowledge springeth out of the well ordering of precedent notions It followeth that whatsoeuer is knowable out of those notions and principles is fully knowne by a separated soule But when we consider the connexion that all thinges haue one with an other seeing that all the thinges in the world are but like linkes of a chaine forged by an all knowing Architect who doth all his workes by the rules of perfect order and wisedome we can not doubt but that a separated soule by ordering those knowledges she hath acquired in the body and by reflecting vpon them with her vnlimited actiuity and energy she being then entirely a pure Act must needes attaine to the knowledge of all that is And if we examine wherein this connexion consistethâ—â— as it is in our soule we shall find that it is placed in this that the thing which hath one notion is the same which hath an other Whereby we find that the first notion we haue of any thing doth by the nature of our vnderstanding comprehend all other notions and that it can not be perfectly vnderstood vnlesse all others be knowne Wherefore we may conclude that a separated soule doth either comprehend no one thing or else that shee must needes comprehend all thinges As for example If she know her selfe she knoweth that she was the forme of a body not onely of a body in generall but of one so composed so rempered so formed and all other particulars belonging to the body that she is separated froÌ„ From hence she gathereth that this compound of soule and body must necessarily haue a father and a mother and by the indiuiduall proprieties of her body she inferreth the indiduall proprieties of her father and of her mother Whose being such requireth further such and such other causes and circumstances whereon they depend And euery one of them require such and such others that haue caused them And so proceeding on from one to an other she discouereth not onely the first but
which concerneth the true good And that although the â—â—urâ—â—ent of materiall spirits which was â—â—ont to foment this Iudgement be now gone yet the effect of their stroakes that very same effect which remained in her when soeuer she had truce from their actuall assaultes remaineth after death in the separated soule and if it be the stronger will of it selfe still presse her on to the same materiall good that the spirits which begott it recommended to her For by the stroke of death the soule looseth nothing of what she had purchased in the body But all that she had or rather that she was there is enlarged and heighthened by this second birth of hers And she becometh such a thing as the precedent moulding of her settled her in a capacity to proue like as the seuerall parcels of warme mudde vpon the bankes of Nilus do become such various liuing creatures by the last action of the enliuening sunne working vpon them as by their precedeâ—â—t dispositions and circumstances they were designed to be Adde to this that there is no formall opposition betweene two such Iudgements in a man Lett the one of them be for example that it is good for him to go to a feast to satisfy and please his appetite The other that it is better for him to go to the Church to pray And it is euident that the truth of this latter doth not contradict the truth of the other but both of them are consistent together If then he dyeth with his soule fraught with these two Iudgements death will leaue them both in his soule each of them stretched out â—â—n such sort as belongeth to a separated soule but still in such proportion as it found them in her â—â—hen it came to deliuer her out of her body So that if it found them â—â—n such a proportion that the Iudgement of good in going to a feast did clearely ouerbeare the Iudgement of good in going to the Church the desire of feasting in the next world will likewise ouerbeare in â—â—er the desire of that good for the obtaining whereof she was to go to â—â—he Church to pray And although â—â—ll the circumstances and possibility of going to a feast be taken â—â—way with the taking away of the body yet the desire of feasting which dependeth not of considerations to be made in the next world but onely of those which were made in the body remaineth as fresh and as quicke as it was when the Man settled his last Iudgement and resolution in this world Nor doth it import that a separated soule hath no tast to be pleased with meate or with drinke For as all her desires were framed in the body so are they such as belong to a whole complete man and not to a naked soule And therefore she desireth to be built vp againe an entire man and to wallow againe in such sensuall pleasures as then prouayled with her To which I may adde that although a separated soule haue not a tast to relish meate yet she hath a will to wish for it And this will is now to her of a like nature as to vs in this world the wish of Beaâ—â—iâ—â—de which dependeth of no other consideration nor is referred to any furtheâ—â— End But is of it selfe the last End as being desired for its owne sake and not vnder the reglement or to serue for obtaining of any thing else more desired then it Nor doth it preiâ—â—dice what I haue here determined to consider that a separated soule is a pure spirit deliuered from that impugner of Reason her flesh which vsed to draw her from her greater good For we must not vnderstandâ—â— her being a pure spirit to signify her being aâ—â— vntainted spirit for she is wholy defiled by her habitation in the body But she is called pure by negation of conjunction to any body which hindereth not but that she may haue in her substance the spirituall effects and contaminations of a corrupted body For whiles she and her body were but one thing both of them subsisting by one Existence the agents that wrought vpon her body did build and qualify her according to what she was to be when she was to be seuered from her body and to Exist by her selfe Now if these agents were peruerse ones they hammered out such effects in her as made her become a spirituall monster of many heads which are the reluctant and incompossible Principles that raigne in her each of them drawing and tearing her a different way from the rest as in the next Chapter I shall more amply declare And although she erreth not in prosecuting her iudgements and desires supposing the principles from whence they spring which are now naturall to her yet all her operations flowing out of those principles are strangely defectiue vgly and monstruous And the reason why her Iudgements and affections in this state of separation are naturall to her and vnalterable whereas before they were but accidentall is this Whilest she was in the body there was no thought or Iudgement so deepely settled in her but by reason of her bodies subiection to externe agents might be weakened by the much importunity of other thoughts occurring to her and pressing vpon her and by litle and litle might be worne away and forgotten And therefore her nature that was thus flexible and changeable in her Iudgements and desires resided purely in the common inclination to Good in abstract or in generall the which was common to all kindes of desires and so onely the desire of Good in generall was naturall to her All particular desires being but accidentall to her and such as might be remoued by extrinsecall causes and agents But when all this subiection of her to such agents by meanes of her body shall be remooued by death and that no causes shall afterwardes be able to worke vpon her and that she herselfe shall be nothing else but a Being or a substance left out of these impressions the stamping of which is now att an end Those desires which formerly were but accidentall are now become naturall to her And whatsoeuer she loueth for it selfe remaineth settled and riuetted in her as a supreme principle ouer which none other hath any authority or preualence and against which nothing can be vrged to infeeble it And in the meane time all other iudgements and desires that are lesse preualent then these do keepe their inferior rankes and beings without loosing ought of the clearenesse of euidence that accompanyeth them vntill an other change do come by the reioyning of her bodie to her By all which discourse it appeareth how a separated soule that is badly and vnequally built vp is free from error and falshood in her Iudgements though her misseplaced affections and the improportioned composure of her will do make her neglect her true good for inferior and vnworthy goods THE VIII CHAPTER Of the Misery of a disordered soule after it is separated from the body HAuing cleared as I conceiue
creature and so aboue our reach that we are not able to iudge positiuely of her by looking singly on her selfe in her owne nature How great the pleasures of sense are is but too easie to apprehend Mankinde is continually too conuersant with them to be ignorant of them And so powerfull they are that we dayly see men of excellentest partes sacrifice their whole liues to the purchasing and enioying of them But if we compare them with the pleasures of the minde euen in this world we shall find that in respect of them they are flatt meane brutall and inconsiderable We see dayly examples of persons that hauing bin deepest immersed in those and therefore can not be suspected to want the skill of gusting them as soone as they haue come to relish the superior delightes that are afforded by Intellectual goods for euery tast is not presently fitted for them being depraued by preoccupation of the others they grow to despise the entertainements and obiects that formerly were the Idols of their affections and do acknowledge that one houre of contemplation of some noble truth outweigheth in the scale of pleasure yeares of such delightes as belong to sense But I must not content myselfe with producing examples or authorities to your Lordship Such arguments are to be vsed onely to those that can not penetrate into the natures and causes of thinges You will expect from me that I should lay the groundes why Intellectuall pleasures do of their owne nature affect a man more then corporeall ones This is easily and presently done if we but consider what it is in Man that is affected with pleasure euen with sensuall pleasure And as before in point of paine so here vpon the same principles we shall finde that it is not the body but the soule that is affected with pleasure and that the body and senses do but serue to conuey the outward obiects or motions to the tribunall of the minde who onely sauoureth and embraceth them vnder the notion of delightfull If she be distraught an other way with some strong thought that carrieth her from the present obiects and company be the man att other times neuer so much affected with musike for example or with pictures and statues or with parfumes or with pleasant wines or with like entertainements of the senses All these may beate att their dores and yet he be so farre from being then delighted with them that he will not so much as haue taken notice of them If then it be the soule onely that tasteth pleasure she onely being capable of cognition and able to make reflexion which are necessary circumstances to the enioying of pleasure It followeth necessarily that in a well composed man those delights must affect him most that are most agreable and proportionable to that part of him by which he is delighted He who feeleth not this truth experimentally within himselfe may be said to haue the complexion of his soule spoyled like those ill gouerned maydes who by feeding on trash of bad nourishement do gett the greene sickenesse and then do loath meates of wholesome iuices For the truth is though it fall not within the compasse of this discourse that humane nature hath bin corrupted in its very source like a child that sucketh contagion from an infected nurse and is deliuered ouer to ill affections and to ignorance of what is good for it Now the proper businesse of the soule is the enriching her selfe with knowledge and her satisfaction and contentement is the contemplation of truth If the doing that in the lowest and meanest subiect of knowledge qnantity which is but the accident and attendant of bodyes out of the consideration of which Geometry hath its birth and whose verities haue no reall existence in nature but may seeme in respect of solide substances to be but fine cobbewebbes spunne in the ayre If that I say do oftentimes carry men of strongest partes and iudgement by the delight and pleasure they find therein to the neglect of all sensuall pleasures and euen of their life it selfe How great may we thinke must the delight be of him that should haue the solide knowledge of whole Nature it selfe and of all her reall and numerous progeny If the contemplation of a few lines Angles and figures whose Existence is no were considerable but in the braine and fansy of him that playeth with them for they are but like sport and exercise to the minde to gett her an appetite to meate of solider nourishement can carry away with the delightfullnesse of it such a man as Archimedes one of the greatest wits that euer were so farre as rather to part with his life then with so pleasing a thought What pleasure must there be in considering the whole machine of the Vniuerse and of all the bodies that are contained in it to behold the beautifull proportion and symmetry that is in euery part of it the admirable connexion that is betweene each one of them the nature of euery one in particular and the long chaine of causes and effects that runneth trough them all and comprehendeth them all But when from hence we raise our selues aboue all this and discouer a new world infinitely greater then all this of pure intellectuall creatures that haue no allay of quantity or of bodilinesse that are not measured by time that are not comprised in place that are stored with infinite knowledge and that enioy all possible blisse and happinesse all at once And that this all att once shall be stretched out to a neuer ending Eternity what wordes can expresse how this thought muâ—â— needes affect him that penetraterâ—â— duely into it But when to all this he addeth that these are not barâ—â— truths which are onely pleasant tâ—â— looke vpon and do not concernâ—â— him in his owne particular but thaâ—â— indeed whiles he contemplateth their nature he informeth himselfe of his owne And that he doth not study this mappe like a scholler that is learning Geography but like an Emperor an Alexander that is prouiding to make himselfe master of the whole region he seeth there abridged before him for to such a state his soule will arriue when she shall be out of the body What soule-rauishing pleasure can we conceiue he then enioyeth How litle must he sett by all the fond toyes that vulgar people busy themselues about And how contemptible and base must he iudge all those pleasures that affect the senses in respect of this that now filleth swelleth and enlargeth his soule Yet all this is but a shaddow nay it is not so much it is nothing in respect of the pleasure of a separated soule that during her habitation in the body cultiuated these thoughtes Which we shall the better discerne â—f we examine the differences that are betweene the cognitions from whence spring the pleasures of an embodyed and of a separated soule When a man knoweth any thing his soule speculateth the fantasmes that are in his braine and by reflexion
vpon his knowledge he is delighted with it and the more present he maketh it to himselfe by close reflection the more is his delight But the knowledge of a separated soule is alwayes essentially present to her it is her very selfe her owne very Essence substance which can not choose but affect her more vigourously and liuely then what is but knocking att her dore Next a man can thinke of but one single thing att a time and att that present be delighted with that onely which is because his soule not being able to worke whiles iâ—â— is in the body but by meanes of the fantasmes in the braine and they being materiall obiects and residing in a materiall place the onâ—â— of them shouldereth out his fellowes whenfoeuer he cometh to the narrow window by which he is to shew himselfe and to giue an account of himselfe to the soule But a separated soule shall in the same indiuisible of time reflect vpon all and euery least circumstance that she knoweth which is all that she gained knowledge of during her whole abode in the body and all that can be deduced out of that which as I haue formerly shewed is all that is or euer was in the world or euer shall or can be And she shall haue perfect knowledge not onely of euery one in particular and of all the causes effects conformities contrarieties and such other circumstances as immediatly belong to euery one of them But shall also see the connexion that euery one hath with euery one how the seuerall linkes of this admirable chaine that containeth all that is in the world from highest to lowest are so fitted to one an other that if any one of them were but broken or in disorder all would fall in pieces and withall are made with such powerfull art that euery one of them is a support and a strengthning to all the rest So that the whole empire of nature must be destroyed before there can be the least failing in any of the meanest of them In the third place lett vs consider how an embodyed soules knowledge is but a kind of passion or impression from outward obiects and in all her operations is dulled by her heauy and resistent copartner But a separated soule is a pure actiuity a subsistent forme no potentiality or resistance belonging to it So that nothing among bodies can expresse the nature and manner of its working It were too litle farre to say that her operations are like the soddainenesse of the sunnes illuminating the whole hemisphere or like the quicke violence of lightening when in the twinkle of an eye it reacheth from East to West and teareth vast trees 〈◊〉 by the rootes and ouerturneth solidest buildinges for betweene such and the weake creeping of a snaile there is some proportion but betweene the other none att all In the fourth place lett vs consider how the pleasures of this life consist in succession When one part of them is the other partes of it are not Or rather no part of them is present For you can not assigne not so much as with your thought any present moment but whiles you are thinking of it it vanisheth If the Now which you would pitch vpon be more then an indiuisible instant part of it is past and the other part not yet come what you graspe art to stay it from sliding by you is such an indiuisible as may be called nothing and yet that nothing whiles you are but thinking Here it is is flowne as much out of your reach as the first houre the world was created in On the other side the pleasures of a separated soule are stretched out as farreias Eternity extendeth it selfe by an vninterrupted succession of continuall enioying without any diuisibility or subsequent or precedent partes of its durance And do comprehend all sucession all time were it multiplyed by the sandes of the sea vpon millions of yeares and infinitely beyond all that not in one permanent and standing Now of actuall comprehension of them by Existence which belongeth onely to God but in an assurance and euident certainty that her present happy coÌ„dition is lyable to no change to no vicissitude to no diminution to no ebbing and flowing The pleasures that would require millions of yeares to tast them all and infinitely more are here by a strange Alchymy distilled and exalted into a quintessence of one minute which minute is fixed for euer from fleeting is permanent can neuer fade or the pleasures of it relent in the least degree And in the last place let vs consider how great an allay to all the pleasures of this life is the casuality of themâ—â— the thought that they may betaken from him who enioyeth them or he from them and that griefes and sorrowes may succeede to the happiest humane condition that can be imagined is enough to sower it all But a separated soule is secure that she can neuer haue her state changed She knoweth that for all aeternity it will euer be the fame Her pleasure being the result of her knowledge she seeth clearely that there are but three gates by which any change can come in vpon it And if all these be safely barred fenced she is out of danger or any mutation These three are either her selfe who is the knower or the obiects which she knoweth or the knowledge that she hath of them As for her selfe her Indiuisibility and her immateriality do exempt her both from any inward principles of fayling within her selfe and from the power of any outward Agents working to her preiudice And therefore on that side she is immutable As for the obiects she knoweth there can arriue no change in them in regard of her for though some of them be subiect to the empire of time and consequently are alwayes in a fleeting and changing condition yet those changes she is aware of they are all present to her so that if they did not change according to the law setled for their change which she is fully acquinted with there would be a change in them in respect of her Lastly her knowledge can admitt no change since nothing of what she knoweth can euer be lost by her it being all as indefectible as her selfe and indeed her very selfe â—â— Neyther can she purchase any new knowledge to contradict or weaken what she already knoweth since she already knoweth all that is knowable And thus it is euident that her pleasure being built vpon these indefectible and vnchangeable foundations is immutable and will last in the same height for all 〈◊〉 And of this she is most certaine and consequently enioyeth her happinesse with all security Lett vs now summe vp the account we haâ—â—e bin making of a happy soules ioyes and we shall finde the product â—â—o great as will amaze vs We haue found how the pleasure of the soule consiâ—â—teth in knowledge or at least is a result of knowledge And to preuent that sensuall men may not thinke