was are they who change our temperatures by their art of Physick Therefore the soule which is the essence of a living-creature cannot be the temperature Neither is the Soule a quality of the body For the qualities of every body are subject to sense But the soule is not subject to sense but to understanding onely and therefore it is not a Quality Wee know that this good temper of blood and spirits accompanied with flesh and sinewes and such other things is strength And that the good temperature of hot and cold dry and moist things is health And that the measurable proportion of the members with a fresh colour is cause of the beauty which is in the Body Now if the soul be a certaine harmony of health and strength and beauty It must needs follow that Man as long as he hath a Soule in him can neither be sick nor weake nor deformed But wee see by often experience that even while the living-soule continueth in them many men are deprived not only of one but of all these good temperatures insomuch that the very same man is deformed and weak and sick all at once Therefore the soule is not the good temperature of the Bodie Some will aske perhaps how it comes to passe if the soule be not the temperature of the body that men are vitious or vertuous according to their naturall constitutions and complexions and they may demand also whether these things proceed not frō the tēperature We answer that they doe indeed proceed from the bodily temperature For as there bee some naturally healthfull or sickly by reason of their constitution So othersome naturally abounding in bitter choller are froward and some other cowardly or leacherous more or lesse according to their complexions But there bee some who overcome these naturall inclinations and by getting the victory over them doe evidently manifest that these temperatures may bee suppressed Now that which overcommeth is one thing and that which is overcome is another thing Therefore the temperature is also one thing and the soule which is the vanquisher and orderer of inclinations proceeding from the temperature is another thing and not the same The body being an instrument which the soule useth if it bee well fitted for the same is a helper unto the soule and she the better useth it to her own contentment But if it be not every way framed and tempered for the soule 's use it becommeth her hinderance and much adoe hath she to strive against the unfitnesse of her instrument Yea so much that if shee bee not very wary and diligent in rectifying the same she her selfe is perverted aswell as the instrument even as a musitian misseth of true musick when his harp is out of tune The soule therefore must be carefull of the body and make it a fit instrument for her selfe which may be done by ordering it according to Reason and by accustoming the same to good manners as in Harmony otherwhile slackning and sometime winding up according as necessity requires By the neglect whereof shee her selfe may else as it often happeneth become as faultie and as perverse as her Instrument SECT 4. I. The SOVL is not a perpetuall motion as Aristotle affirmes Hee shewes what 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is and the defects of Aristoles judgement concerning the SOVL. II. The Body hath not in it selfe a possibility to live before the SOVL commeth unto it as Aristole hath also affirmed III. The SOVL is neither unmovable of it selfe nor accidentally moved nor bred in the Body as the fore said Philosopher hath delivered ARistotle affirming that the Soule is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a perpetuall motion is neverthelesse to bee accounted among them who say that the SOUL is a quality But first let me make it appeare what Aristotle meaneth by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is to say a perpetuall motion He divideth a substance into three parts The first is matter which is as it were the subject and this matter is in it selfe nothing but a generating power out of which another thing may bee formed The second part of the Essence is forme or speciall kinde by which the matter is brought unto a certaine forme The third part consisteth both of matter and forme united together and endued with life The matter being a thing in possibility only and the forme an actuall thing considerable two wayes That is to say either as you consider of a science or of a contemplation according to the science as a habit or as working by that habit It is considerable as a science because in the very substance of the Soule there is a kinde as wee may call it both of sleepe and of waking This waking is analogically answerable unto contemplation and sleepe represents the having of this habit without any working thereby The Science is before working according to that science and Aristotle calls the forme it selfe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is the first continued motion The working according to this forme he names 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the second continued motion As for example The eye consisteth of a materiall subject and of a certaine forme This materiall subject is in the eye it selfe even that which containeth the sight I meane the matter of the eye and this matter is equivocally called the eye But the forme and continuall motion of the eye is the operation wherby it seeth A whelp before he can see though he hath neither of the two motions aforementioned hath yet an aptnesse to receive such a motion Even in such maner we must conceive of it in the SOUL When sight commeth to the welp it perfects the eye and when the SOUL commeth unto the Body it perfects the living-creature So then in a perfect living-creature neither can the SOUL bee at any time without the Bodie neither the Body without the Soul For the SOUL is not the Body it selfe but it is the SOUL of the BODY and therefore it is in the Body yea and in such a kinde of body for it hath not an existence by it self Aristotle first calls the possible inferiour part of the soul by the Name of the soul severing the Reasonable-part from it wheras hee should have taken the whole soul of Man together and not have given his judgement of the whole by a part much lesse by the weakest part there of Aristotle hath affirmed also that the body hath an aptnesse to live even before the soul commeth unto it For he saith that the body hath in it selfe a possibility to live Now the body which hath in it self a possibility to live must first be actually a body before it receives that form For such a body is a matter void of all qualities Therefore it is impossible that the thing which is not actually it self should have in it an aptnesse whereby another thing may be made of it If it be a bodie and hath in it self no other being but in possibility only how can that which
lifelesse-body there may bee a perfect union For the possibility of this thing appeareth somewhat doubtfull and it is much the more doubtfull it Man consist not of these two parts onely but of understanding also as a distinct thing which is the opinion of some But the greatest doubt of all ariseth in this respect that all those things which concurre unto the making of one essence are joyned all together in the making of that one seeing all such things as are united to the making up of another thing are usually so altered that they remaine not the same they were before as it shall plainly be declared in our Treatie of the four Elements How then can the BODIE being united unto the SOUL remaine still a Bodie or how can the SOUL being incorporeall and having a substance of his owne be united with the BODIE and become a part of the Living-creature preserving still his owne proper substance without corruption and confusion It seemes to be no way else possible but that the Soul and the Body must by their union one with other either become altered one with the other or corrupted with each other as the Elements are or else to avoid those absurdities that they should not be truly united but be so joyned onely as Dauncers are in their daunce or lie one by the other as Counters in a summe or at best be so mixed as wine and water But we have already declared in my Treatise upon the SOUL that the Soul cannot be laid as it were along by the Bodie because if it should be so that part onely of the body should have life in it which joyneth neare unto the soule and that the part which the soule toucheth not should be without life Moreover wee cannot say that two sundry things placed one beside the other as two pieces of timber two iron wedges or such like are one and the same thing And as for such a mixture as is made of wine and water wee know it corrupts both the one and the other for there doth remaine neither pure water nor pure wine after such a mixture Yet this mixture of wine and water is but as it were a laying of them one beside another though our senses be not able to apprehend the same because they are hindred from perceiving it by the thinnesse of the parts of those things which are mixed For the wine and water may be separated againe the one from the other by a sponge dipped in oyle or by paper either of which will suck away the pare water from the wine But indeed it is utterly impossible to separate sensibly one frō the other those things which are exactly united If therefore the parts of MAN be neither united nor placed one beside the other nor mixed together as aforesaid what reason should move us to say that one Living creature is made of these two parts a Soul and a bodie It was the consideration hereof which partly moved Plato to imagine that this living-creature did not consist of Soule and Body but that he was a Soule having the use of the Body and to whom the Body served as a garment But even in affirming that he occasioned as much doubting for how can the Soul bee one with what is but his garment seeing a Coat is not all one with him that wears it But Amonius who was master to Plotinus thus dissolved this question even by affirming that intelligible things have such a nature as may both bee united unto such things as are capable of them and after the manner of such things as are corrupted together in their uniting and yet remaine as truly without confusion or corruption when they bee united as those things do which are but laid along one by another It is true that Bodily-things being perfectly united together must of necessity suffer alterations by their union and be changed in every one of those parts which concurre thereunto because they are thereby changed into other Bodies as are the Elements making compound bodies or as nourishment being changed into blood or as the blood when it is converted into Flesh and other parts of the Bodie But things intelligible may bee united and yet no alteration of the substance thereupon ensue For it is not agreeable to the nature of intelligible-things to bee altered in substance but either it departeth away or is brought to nothing and so can admit no alteration The SOUL is immortall and therefore cannot bee corrupted or brought to nothing for then it could not be immortall It is also life it selfe and therefore cannot be changed in the mixture For if it should be changed in the union it should be altered from being life any more and what should the SOUL profit the Body if it gave not life thereunto All these arguments considered it must be concluded that the soul is not altered by being united unto the Body Having thus proved that the substance of intelligible-things cannot be altered it followes necessarily therupon that as they are not corrupted by their union with other things so likewise the things whereunto they are united remaine uncorrupted and that in the union of the SOVL and Body there is neither any corruption or confusion of the one or of the other That they are neverthelesse perfectly united is manifested by this that either of them partaketh of that which chanceth to the whole living-creature For the whole man grieveth as one creature if any cause of griefe happen to the one part or the other to the SOUL or to the Body And it is as plaine that they remaine united without confusion in that the soule being separated after a sort from the Body when wee bee asleepe and leaving the body lying in maner of a dead Corps and only breathing into the same as it were certaine vapours of life least it should utterly perish doth worke by it selfe in dreames whilest the Body sleepeth foreseeing things to come and exercising it selfe meerely in things intelligible The like hapneth when the minde is very seriously occupied in cōtēplation enters into the consideration of intellectuall-things For even then the soule endeavours by all possible meanes to bee separated from the body and to bee alone by it selfe that it may thereby ascend to the knowledge of things For being without body it separates it self from the whole body as things which are therewithall corrupted and yet remaineth uncorrupted as those things also doe wherein there is no confusion And keeping it selfe one and alone changeth that wherein it abideth by the life which is contained in it selfe and yet is not changed by the same For as the Sun so soon as it appeareth changes the ayre into light so making it light some and so diffusing it selfe with the ayre that it is united with the same and yet not confoūded therewith Even so the soul being united with the Body remaines without confusion therwith differing in this onely that the Sunne being a Body and circumscribed within
altered and the sense discernes this alteration Now many times the name of the sense and of the seats of the sense are confounded But sense is an apprehending of those things which are subject to sense Yet this seemeth not to bee the definition of sense it selfe but of the workings of the sense And therefore some define it thus Sense is a certaine intellectual spirit extended from the principall part of the minde unto the bodily instruments It is thus also defined Sense is a power of the soule which taketh hold of sensible things and the seat of the sense is the instrument whereby it layeth hold on such things as are sensible Plato sayes thus Sense is that wherein the Soule and the body communicate together concerning outward things For the very power it selfe belongs unto the soule but the instrument pertaines to the body and both together take hold of such outward things as may bee offered to imagination Some things in the soul were ordained to serve and be commanded othersome to rule and bear sway The part which hath in it understanding and knowledge was ordained to rule Those which appertaine to sense and to the motions by appetite as also our ability of speaking are made to serve and bee at command For our voice and our motion by appetite are obedient to reaon most speedily and almost in a momēt of time For wee Will and are moved together and at once so that we need no time to come betweene our Will and our motion as we may see in the moving of our fingers Some naturall things are placed under the command of Reason as those which wee call perturbations CAP. 7. SECT 1. I. Of the sense of sight and the opinions of Hipparchus of the Geometricians of Epicurus and Aristotle concerning the same II. The opinions of Plato and of Galen touching the same sense and of the cause of seeing III. The opinion of Porphyrie also touching that sense WE finde that this word fight hath a divers signification for sometime it signifieth the seat of the sight and some time the power of the sense it selfe Hipparchus affirmes that the beams being shot forth from the eyes take hold as it were of outward things with the farthest ends of them even as if a man should lay his hand on them and presents or yeelds those things whereof they have so taken hold to our sight But the Geometricians describe unto us Figures which are called Cones broad at the first and growing to a narrow top made by the meeting of the eye-beames in one point And they hold opinion that the beames of the right-eye being darted forth to the left-side and the beames of the left-eye toward the right-side the Figure CONOS is made by the uniting of them in one and that thereby it comes to passe that the sight comprehends many visible things together at one view and then more exactly perceives them when the beames are met closely one with another And this is the cause that oftentimes when we looke upon the pavement we see not a piece of money lying plainly visible thereupon though wee settle our eyes upon the same with diligence For untill it so fall out that the beames meet in that very place where the money lyeth wee still overlooke the same but then wee presently attaine the sight of it as if that had beene the beginning of our looking for it in that place The Epicures think that the shapes of such things as appeare unto us are brought to our eyes Aristotle is of opinion that it is not a bodily shape which appeares but a certaine quality rather conveyed from things visible unto the sight by an alteration of the aire which is round about Plato sayes that the sight is caused by the meeting of all the severall brightnesses together that is to say partly by the light of the eyes which flowing out some part of the way into the aire which is of like nature with it selfe partly by that which is retorted back againe from the bodies which are seene and partly by the force of that which is extended out together with the fierynesse of the eye affecting the aire which comes betweene them and easily spreading every way or turning to any side Galen agreeing with Plato speaketh of the sight here and there in some places of his seventh booke of the agreement of parts much to this purpose If saith hee any part or power or quality of bodies that are visible should come unto the eye wee could not know the quantity of the thing seen For if a very great mountaine were the object it were quite contrary to reason to imagine that the shape of so huge a thing should enter wholly into our eyes yea and the spirit belonging to the sight being darted forth could not bee able to collect together so much vigour as would bee requisite to comprehend the whole visible object It remaines therefore that the aire wherewith we are encompassed is after a sort such an instrument unto us when we see as the nerve which belongeth unto the sight is to the body and some such thing seemeth to happen to the aire which encloseth us round For the bright shining Sun having touched the upper limits of the aire distributes his power into the whole aire And the splendor which is caried through the sinewes called the optick nerves which belong unto the sight hath his essence of the nature of the spirits This falling into the aire which is dilated round about us makes an alteration even at the very first injection and shootes forth very farre yet so that it containes it self undispersed untill it happen upon a reflecting body For the aire is such an instrument unto the eye to discerne visible objects as the sinew is unto the braine and look in what case the braine is in respect of his sinew in like case is the eye in respect of the aire after it is quickned by the bright shining of the Sun Now that it is the nature of the aire to become like unto those things which enter into it appeares manifest by this that whensoever any bright thing be it red or blew or of the colour of silver shall bee conveyed through the aire when it is light the colour of the aire will bee changed according to that thing which is caried through the same But Porphyrie in his book which hee wrote of the senses affirms that neither the making of the Figure Conos neither any shape nor any other thing is cause of our seeing but only this that the soul her selfe meeting with such objects as are visible doth perceive and know that all those things which are seene be contained in her selfe because it is she only which holds them together to their preservation For as he saith whatsoever is in the world is nothing else but the soul holding together divers bodies And it were not untruly said that the soul commeth to the knowledge of it selfe by
doe or possesse are therefore offended at this opinion and not without cause But some there be having more acutenesse who bringing this text of Scripture to refute us namely The wayes of man are not in his own hand say thus unto us Good friends how is the will of man free seeing his way is not in his owne hands and seeing the thoughts of men are so vaine that they cannot bring to effect those things which they have devised Many such like things they object not knowing in what sense wee speake of freewill For we affirm not that it is in our power to be rich or poore or alwayes in health or of a strong constitution of nature or to rule or generally to have those good things which wee count as instruments to worke things by or such as are called the gifts of fortune neither doe wee account those to be at our dispose which have their event from Providence But wee affirme those actions onely to be in our power which are according to vice or vertue as also our motions or choice of things or else such things whereof wee may doe the contrary aswell as the things themselves For a certaine will or choice goeth before every action and not onely the deed but the affection also is condemned as may plainly appeare in that place of the Gospell which saith He who lookes upon a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery already w th her in his heart And we read that Iob sacrificed unto God for such offēces as his children might commit in thought For indeed the beginning either of sin or of doing uprightly is in our will whereas the doing of the thing it selfe is otherwhile permitted by Providence and otherwhile hindered For seeing there are some things in our power and a Providence beside it is necessary that such things as are done should bee done by them both Because if they were done by either of them alone the other should be to no purpose Therefore in regard all actions are mixt it will sometime happen that they shall be in our power another while that they shall bee as providence alone directeth and sometimes againe both according to Providence and as wee would also And whereas likewise there is sometimes a generall and sometimes a particular Providence it is necessary that the same should fall out in particular things as it doth in things generall For if the aire about us bee dry our bodies are dryed also though not all alike And if a mother be given to riotous fare or a distempered dyet even thereby shall her children become distempered in body and perverse in such things as they attempt It is plaine therefore by what hath beene said that men may fall into a distempered estate of body either by the generall distēperature of the aire or by the dyet of parents or when they spoil themselves by their owne voluptuousnesse and that they may be distempered sometime by such occasions as take their beginnings from themselves in such maner that Providence shall not altogether bee the cause of such things If then the Soul shall yeeld her selfe to be overswayed by the temperature of the body and give place to wrath or lust or bee pressed downe by outward things as poverty or lifted up by riches or the like if any evill commeth to the same thereby it so hapned thereunto by the selfe-will of that Soul Seeing if shee had not voluntarily yeelded her selfe to those distemperatures she might have overcome them and beene in good case For through well ordering the affections of the minde by a convenient dyet and a good conversation she might have altered that temperature rather then have beene perverted thereby This is manifest by the example of such as are in a good condition and that all such as are not in a good estate doe sin voluntarily and not by constraint And that it is in our power either to consent and yeeld our selves unto our bodily distemperatures or to resist and overcome them Neverthelesse there be many who pretend these distemperatures to bee the cause why we doe such or such things and so impute their wickednesse not unto their owne will but to necessity And therefore they cōclude though very absurdly that the vertues also are not in our power CAP. 41. I. Of the cause why man was made with free will and that if it had been otherwise he had neither beene capable of the contemplative nor practike faculty nor been a reasonable creature II. Of the mutability of men and Angels and of the causes thereof and of some inferences thereupon proving freewill III. It is not through any naturall defect that men are vicious but by their owne will And it is here shewne also that man without freewill could neither have any vice nor vertue SOmewhat remaines to be declared wherby it may bee manifest why man had freewill bestowed upon him We affirme that immediately together with reason this freewill entered into us and that together with nature there is ingraffed into created things a mutability and alteration especially in those things which are a subject made of matter For there is a mutation even in the very beginning of every thing which is made and all making proceedeth from an alteration of the materiall subject This is evident to any man who considerately beholds the plants and living-creatures which have their abiding either in the earth in the water or in the aire For there is in all those a continuall mutability Moreover that our freewill enters into us together with reason hath beene made plain enough by those things which we have said to prove that some thing is in our power as will appeare to them who have heeded what was delivered to that purpose But because the sequell of this treatise doth for some respects require the same perhaps it will not be impertinent to repeat some part of that which was formerly declared Our reason is divided into contemplation and practise Contemplative reason is that which concerneth universally the nature of things as they bee really and active reason is that whereby wee deliberate of things and sets downe the right way of putting them into execution The contemplative part is called the minde or the principall part of the soule and the active part is termed reason The one is likewise called wisdome and the other prudence Now every one that deliberates doth for this cause deliberate even for that the choice of such things as are to be done is in his power and to the intent that hee might by deliberation make choice of that which is most worthy and that after he hath so chosen he might execute the same It is therefore necessary that he which deliberates should have power over his owne deeds for if he have not power over his owne actions his consultation will be fruitlesse also unto him And if these things be so it will follow by a necessary consequence that wheresoever reason is
Beasts to Beasts and from men to men and in so saying hee hath not only conjectured very well of Platoes opinion but of the Truth it selfe By these last words Nemesius hath seemed to justifie the opinion both of Iamblicus Plato touching Transmigration of Soules Now this clause I have understood as if it said thus rather And in so saying hee hath not only well guessed but in my judgement expressed the very truth of Platoes opinion Let the learned judge whether the Greek words will not well enough beare this Version though not in a strict Grammaticall sense especially since the context proves his opinion concerning the Soule to be the same which is generally beleeved among Christians for my part till I see more cause to suspect the contrary I shall alway so conceive of it That which is mentioned by another concerning his opinion touching the Soules preexistence before the Bodie is not a matter of faith or so precisely decided as that he or we are for ought I know obliged to be peremptorily for it or against it and therefore I my self have not yet so much thought upon it as to resolve which way to encline or what to answer for him If any man can assure me whether part is without errour that will I embrace and I am perswaded so would Nemesius have done if any man could have proved unto him that his opinion was erroneous in that point which if others beleeve of him as they have no just cause to the contrary no more needes to be spoken of this matter If any be offended that hee argues philosophically rather then by proofs of Scripture and citeth Moses not as a Divine Prophet but a Wiseman Let them consider that hee had such to contest withall as neither beleeved the Scriptures nor ascribed more unto Moses or any other then the Reasonablenesse of their affections seemed to deserve The alledging of Scripture therefore to such men had been to cast pearles to swine and more to the derision then to the honour of his cause This course was practiced by the Apostles themselves To the Iewes and beleeving Gentiles they brought the testimony of the Prophets but to Unbeleevers they cited their owne Poets or convinced them by Reason Had our Author argued with Christians the holy Scriptures onely should have been Judges of their Controversies For he himselfe saith Cap. 2. Sect. 7. To us the Doctrine of the divine Scriptures are al-sufficient c. but against those who embrace not the Scriptures as wee Christians doe we must prove by Demonstration c. In these times there be many who though they deny not the letter of the Scriptures yet they doe as bad or worse rather for they deny the true sense of them and make interpretations according to their owne lusts and fancies To these also the holy Scriptures are impertinent proofs till by some reasonable Demonstrations we can make them understand and confesse their true meaning And some of these have so long and so violently professed against Reason as unusefull in the consideration of the Divine mysteries that there is little hope either to work upon them by a rationall dispute or to convince them by divine Authority till GOD shall forgive their deniall and abuse of his common graces upon true repentance for the same and restore the Vnderstanding which is worthily darkned by that sinne and for enlightning whereof this Treatise may perhaps become helpfull Other things might bee here declared to prevent prejudice and to shew forth the use and profitablenesse of this Booke but lest they make this Preface over-large I wil here conclude and commit all to Gods blessing Geo Wither PErcurri Librum bunc Denaturâ hominis in quo nihil reperio sanae fidei aut bonis moribus contrarium THO WEEKES R. P. Episc Lond. Cap. domest NEMESIVS of the Nature of MAN CAP. 1. SECT 1. I. The Definition of MAN A quaere touching the Understanding and the opinions of Plotinus Apollinarius Aristotle Plato concerning the SOVL BODY of MAN II. MAN partaking in somewhat with every Creature is a medium knitting together the whole Creation a manifestation of the Unity of the CREATOR of all things III. The Agreement and comely order of GOD'S Works of all which MAN is the true Epitome GOod men and of those not a few have defined Man to consist of an Vnderstanding Soul and a Body and so true is this Definition that it may seeme he could not otherwise be well defined Yet when wee terme him an Vnderstanding soul it may appeare doubtfull to some whether the Vnderstanding comming to the soul as one distinct thing comes to another did beget Vnderstanding in the Soul Or whether the Soul doth naturally contain in it self this understanding as the most excellent part thereof and as being the same to the Soul which the Eie is to the Body There be some and of this opinion is Plotinus who thinking the Soul to be one thing and the Body another doe therfore affirme that MAN is composed of these three a Soul a Body and Vnderstanding Of this mind also was Apollinarius Bishop of Laodicea For having laid this as the Foundation of his own opinion he made the rest of his Building agreeable to the same Groundwork Others there are who divide not the Vnderstanding from the Soul in this manner but suppose rather that the Vnderstanding is a principall of the Soules essence Aristotle conjectures that a certain potentiall understanding was made together with MAN which might become actuall in time and that the understanding which commeth to us from without and whereby we acquire an actuall knowledge pertains not to the naturall Essence of the Soul but assisteth in the knowledge and speculation of things By which means it comes to passe that very few or none but men addicted to the study of wisdome are thought capable of this Actuall understanding PLATO seems to affirm that MAN consists not of a double essence that is to say joyntly of a Soul and a Body but rather that he is a soul using as it were Instrumentally such a Body and perhaps by fixing the mind upon that only which is the most excellent part of Man he seeks to draw us to such a serious consideration of our selves and of the divine nature as might win us the better to pursue vertue godlinesse and such good things as are in the Soul or else by perswading that we are essentially nothing else but soul hee would peradventure allure us to renounce the desires of the Body as things not primarily pertinent to MAN as MAN but chiefely belonging to him as he is a living creature and so by consequence appertaining to him as he is a Man in regard Man is a living-creature And it is indeed confessed not much otherwise of all men that the soul is far more to be esteemed then the body and that the body is but as it were an Instrument moved by the soul as is evident
because all things being made for MAN it was most convenient that all such things ought first to bee provided which were necessarily pertinent to his use and that he who was to have the use of them should afterward be created But in respect both intellectuall and visible substances were created it seemed also convenient that One should be made by whom those two Natures should be so united together that the whole World might become ONE and be in it owne selfe so agreeable that the same might not bee at variance or estranged from it selfe Even to this end was MAN made such a living-creature as might joyne together both Natures and to summe up all in a word therein was manifested the admirable wisdome of the universall CREATOR Now MAN being placed as it were in the Bounds betweene the Reasonable-nature and that which is Irrationall if he incline to the Bodie setling the maine part of his affectioÌ„ upon corporal things he chuseth and embraceth the life of unreasonable-creatures and for that cause shall be numbred among them and be called as Saint Paul terms him An earthly MAN to whom it shall be thus said Earth thou art and to Earth thou shalt returne yea by this meanes he becomes as the Psalmist affirms like the Beast which hath no understanding But if he incline rather to the Reasonable part and contemning Bodily lusts and pleasures shall make choice to follow that blessed and divine life which is most agreeable unto MAN he shall then be accounted a Heavenly MAN according to that saying Such as the earth is such are they that are earthly such as the heavenly are such are they that are heavenly and indeed that which principally pertaineth unto the Reasonable-Nature is to avoid and oppose Evill and love and follow that which is Good Of Good things some are common both to the Soul and to the Body of which sort the Vertues are and these have a relation unto the Soul in respect of the use which it maketh of the Body being joyned thereunto Some good things pertaine to the soul only by it self so that it should not need the help of the body as godlinesse and the Contemplation of the nature of things and therefore so many as are desirous to live the life of MAN as he is a MAN and not onely in that he is a living creature do apply themselves to Vertue and Piety But we will anon shew distinctly what things pertain to Vertue and what to Piety when we come to discourse of the Soul and of the Body For seeing wee doe not yet know what our Soul is in respect of the substance thereof it is not yet convenient for us to treat here of those things that are wrought by it The Hebrewes affirme that MAN was made from the beginning neither altogether mortall neither wholly immortall but as it were in a state betweene both those natures to the end that if he did follow the affections of the body he should be liable to such alterations as belong to the bodie But if he did prefer such good things as pertaine to the soul he should then be honoured with Immortalitie For if GOD had made MAN absolutely mortall from the beginning he would not have condemned him to die after he had offended because it had beene a thing needlesse to make him mortall by condemnation who was mortall before And on the other side if he had made Man absolutely immortall hee would not have caused him to stand in need of nourishment for nothing that is immortall needeth bodily nourishment Moreover it is not to be beleeved that God would so hastily have repented himself and made Him to be forthwith mortall who was created absolutely immortall For it is evident that he did not so in the Angels that sinned but according to the nature which they obtained from the beginning they remained immortall undergoing for their offences not the penalty of Death but of some other punishment It is better therefore either to be of the first mentioned opinion touching this matter or else thus to think that MAN was indeed created mortall but yet in such wise that if hee were perfected by a vertuous and pious progression he might become immortall that is to say he was made such a One as had in him a potentiall abilitie to become immortall SECT 3. I. Our Author sheweth why the Tree of Knowledge of good and evill was forbidden that it was at first expedient for MAN to be ignorant of his owne Nature II. MAN by the Transgression attained that knowledge of himselfe which diverted him from the way of perfection and Immortalitie III. The Elementarie câ—mposition and nourishment of Mans bodie The reasons also why it needed feeding clothing curing c. and why MAN was made a Creature sensible and capable of Arts and Sciences c. IT being inexpedient rather then any way helpful for MAN to know his own nature before he came to his perfection GOD forbad him to taste the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evill For there were and doubtlesse as yet there are very great vertues in Plants but at the first in respect it was in the beginning of the worlds Creation their vertues being before the curse pure and void of all mixture had in them a strong operation and it is not therefore strange that there should be by Gods providence the taste of a certain Tree that should have a power given to ingender in our first parents the knowledge of their own nature The cause why God would not have MAN to know his owne nature before hee had attained to perfection was this lest he knowing himself to stand in need of many things should as by the sequell we find it manifest labour only to supply the wants of his Body and utterly cast away the care of his Soul and for this cause did God forbid him to tast of the fruit of knowledge of good and evill By disobeying this Commandement MAN attained to the knowledge of Himself but thereby fell from the state of growing to perfection and busied himself in taking care for such things as the body needed For according to the words of Moses as soone as he had eaten He knew that he was naked and immediately sought about to get a covering for his nakednesse whereas till then God kept him as it were in a Traunce and in such case that hee knew not himself When hee fell away from the state of growing to perfection hee fell also from his immortalitie which by the mercy of his Creator he shall recover againe at the last In the meane time it was granted him that hee should eat flesh whereas before his fall God willed him to bee content with such things only as grew out of the earth all which hee had provided for him in Paradise yea the first meanes of growing to perfection being become desperate it was permitted him to feed as hee would Now seeing Man consisteth of a Bodie as of
indued with Reason to bee delivered by Repentance from the accusation and guiltinesse of all those things wherein he hath formerly transgressed Yea this Grace is given to MAN onely to all men and ever to man during the continuance of his life in this world and no longer for after Death there is no more Forgivenesse Some there bee who give a reason why the Angels could no more obtaine pardon by repentance after they had fallen and it is this that followes The Fall of Angels was as they affirme a kind of Death unto them and God vouchsafed them the tender of a pardon before their utter falling away when like account was to bee made of them as is made of Men during this life But because they accepted not the grace offered they received afterward as a just reward punishment everlasting without pardon And hereby it plainly appeares that such as refuse Repentance doe reject that which is a speciall good gift of God and peculiar to MAN This also is one of the things proper and peculiar unto MAN that of all other living creatures only the body of MAN should arise againe after Death and aspire to Immortalitie This priviledge the body gaineth in respect of the immortalitie of the soule as likewise the soule obtaineth the other that is to say pardon after Repentance in respect that the Body is weake and troubled with many passions It is a thing proper also to MAN only to learn Arts and Sciences and to worke according unto such Arts For which cause they who define him say thus MAN is a living Creature induced with Reason mortall capable of Consideration and Science He is tearmed a living-creature in that he is a substance having life indued with sense for that is the definition of a living-creature He is said to be indued with Reason that hee may be distinguished from unreasonable-creatures He is called mortall to make a difference betwixt him and the Reasonable-creatures that are immortall And this clause capable of Consideration Science is added thereunto because wee come to Arts and Sciences by learning of them having in us naturally a certaine potentiall ability to receive both understanding and Arts but not actually attaining them save by study and practise There be some who say that this last clause was lately added to the Definition and that it had beene good enough without the same were it not that some bring in their Nymphes and other petty Deities of those kinds who are said to live long and yet not to be immortall And to distinguish MAN from those these words Capable of consideration and science were judged needfull because none of that sort are thought to learne any thing but to know naturally whatsoever they are said to know The Iewes are of opinion on that the whole World was made for MAN even immediately for his sake as Oxen with other beasts for tillage or to bear burthens and as grasse was made for the Beasts For some things were made for their owne sakes and some for the sakes of others All reasonable-creatures were made for their owne sakes Vnreasonable-creatures and things without life were ordained for others not for themselves Now if such things were made in respect of others let us consider for whom they were indeed created Shall wee think they were made for the Angels Doubtlesse no wise man will say that they were made for their sakes because the things made for the respect or sake of another must concern either the making or the continuance or the recreation of those things for which they were made For they are made either in respect of the propagation and succession of their kinde or of their nourishment or to cover them or to cure them or for their better welfare and rest Now the Angels need no such things for they neither have any succession of their kind neither want clothing bodily nourishment nor any thing else And if Angels have no need of such things it is then evident that no other nature having place above the Angels can have need of them because by how much higher the place of it is so much the lesse need hath it of supply or assistance from another This being so we must seek out a Nature which is indued with Reason and yet needeth such things as are aforementioned and what other nature can be found of that sort if MAN be passed over Surely none And if no other can be discovered it followeth by good reason that both things void of life and unreasonable-creatures were made for the sake of MAN and if they were ordained for him as it is evident they were then that was likewise the cause why he was constituted the Governor also of those creatures Now it is the duty of a Governour to use those things which are put under his government in such manner and measure as need and conveniencie shall require and not to abuse them untemperately or to serve voluptuously his owne delicate Appetite Neither ought he to bear himself tyrannously or ungently towards those whom he governes For they that so doe yea and they that use not mercifully their unreasonable-cattell are therein great Offenders neither performing the part of a Governour nor of a just man according to that which is written The just man hath compassion upon the life of his Beast SECT 5. I. It is here proved that neither things without-life nor the unreasonable creatures were made for themselves First by arguments taken from the consideratiō of the nature and use of things without life II. It is proved also by considering those creatures which are void of reason and which are for the most part very serviceable to MAN III. And lastly it is proved by considering those things which seeme to be rather harmfull then profitable to Mankind BUt some perhaps will say that nothing was made inrespect of another but every thing in respect of it selfe Therefore distinguishing first between things inanimate and those that have life let us observe whether things void of life are likely to have beene created onely for their owne sake For if those things were made in respect of themselves how or upon what should living-creatures feed wee see that Nature out of the earth produceth food both of fruits and of plants to every living-creature some few excepted whose feeding is upon flesh yea and those creatures which are nourished by eating flesh doe feed on such beasts as are sustained by eating the fruits of the earth For Lions and Wolves feed on Lambes Goats Harts and Swine Aegles also and all sorts of Hawkes devoure Partridges Doves Hares and such like which are fed with what springeth out of the ground Moreover the nature of those Fishes which devoure one another doth not so extend it self to all fishes that they do generally devoure the flesh of one another but it breaketh off in such as eate weeds and such other things as grow in the water For if all sorts of fishes had
into one and as it were to hold them fast united And this we say is done by the SOUL Now if the SOUL be corporeall let it be what Body you please yea though it be a body consisting of the most thin and subtile parts what will you say holds that together as that knitteth the Bodie in One For as we declared before every Bodily thing hath need of some other thing to fasten the parts of it together yea the Bodie of this SOUL that knits together our visible BODIE if we should grant the same to be a corporeall SOUL and the next to that also infinitely it would still have need of some other thing to knit and fasten its own parts together untill an incorporeall-essence were found out If they answer as the Stoicks doe that there is a certaine motion pertaining unto Bodies extending both to the inward and outward parts of the Body That the motion tending outward effects the quantity and the qualities of the Body and that the motion tending inward is cause both of uniting the body and of the essence thereof wee will then aske them seeing every motion doth proceed from some power what kinde of power it is which that motion hath in what consisteth it and what gives essence thereunto If this power bee a certaine matter which the Greekes call Hylen wee will use the same reasons against them which wee objected before If they say it is not matter but a materiall thing for matter and materiall things thus differ That which hath matter in it is called a materiall thing wee then aske them whether that which hath matter in it be likewise matter or void of matter If they say it is matter we demand how it can be both materiall and matter If they answer that it is not matter then they must grant it to be void of matter and if it be void of matter wee will easily prove it to be no Body because every body hath matter in it If they alleage that Bodies have the three Dimensions in them and that the SOUL extending it selfe through the whole Body hath in it also the three Dimensions and therefore must necessarily be a Body wee will then thus answer them It is true that all BODIE' 's have in them the three Dimensions but every thing having the three Dimensions is not a BODY For place and Quality which in themselves have no Body have accidentally a Quantity if they bee in such things as have magnitude In like maner the SOUL in respect of it selfe is utterly void of the Dimensions but accidentally it hath Dimensions because the Body in which it is having in it the three Dimensions wee so conceive it together with the Body as though the Soule also had in it the three Dimensions We argue further and say thus Every Body hath his motion either from without it selfe or from within If the motion bee from without it selfe it must then be void of life if it be from within it selfe it must be indued with life now it is absurd to say that the SOUL is either indued with life or without life one of which must necessarily be affirmed if the Soule bee a corporeall substance therefore the soule cannot be a corporeal Essence Againe the SOUL if it be nourished it is nourished by that which is void of Body for knowledge is the nourishment thereof but no corporeal essence is norished by things bodiless therefore the SOUL cannot be a Body Xenocrates thus concluded this argument If said hee the SOUL be not nourished it cannot be a corporeal-substance because the Body of every living-creature must be nourished Thus much in generall in confutation of all those who generally affirm that the SOUL is a bodily thing Now we will treate particularly against them who are of opinion that the SOUL is either Blood or Breath because when either Blood or Breath is taken away the living-creature dyeth Wee will not say as some well accounted of have written that part of the SOUL falleth away when any part of the blood faileth if the SOUL be the Blood for that were but a slender answer In those things which have every part of like nature with the whole the part remaining is the same with the whole Whether the water bee much or little it is every way perfect water In like maner gold silver and every other thing whose parts do not essentially differ from each other are still the same as is afore said And even so that part of blood which remaineth of what quantity soever may be called the SOUL aswell as the whole quantity if the blood be the SOUL We therfore will rather answer them thus If that be rightly accounted the SOUL upon whose taking away the death of the living creature ensues then should it needs bee that flegme and the two choller 's must be also the SOUL seeing if any one of these faileth it brings the living-creature to his death The like falleth out in the Liver in the Braine in the Heart in the Stomach the Reines the Entrails and in many other parts whereof if you bereave a living-creature it will immediatly perish Moreover there are many things without blood which have life in them neverthelesse as some smooth and gristly fishes some also of a softer kind to wit Sepiae Teuthides and Smyli as the Greekes call them and Lobsters Crabs Oysters and all shel-fish whether they have hard or soft shells Now if these things have a living-Soule in them as we know they have and yet are void of blood then it plainely followes that blood cannot bee the SOUL Against those who say that water is the Soule many things may bee said to disprove their opinion though water helps to quicken and nourish all things and though it bee as they say impossible to live without water Wee cannot live without nourishment and therefore if their assertion bee true wee may aswell affirme that all nourishment in generall and every particular nourishment is the SOUL And whereas they have said that no living-creature can live without water wee finde the contrary to bee probable for it is written of some Aegles and of Partridges that they live without drinke And why should water be the SOUL rather then ayre Seeing it is possible to abstaine from water very long whereas wee can hardly live a moment without breathing the Aire And yet neither is Aire the SOUL For there are many creatures which live without breathing the Aire as all Insectae riveted creatures such as Bees Wasps and Ants as also all bloodlesse creatures all those which live in the waters and such as have no Lungs For none of those things that are without Lungs can breath Aire The proposition is true also if it be converted There is no creature having Lungs which doth not breath aire SECT 2. I. The arguments of Cleanthes the Stoick affirming the SOUL to bee corporeall are here confuted logically and by demonstration II. Chrysippus intending to
is a bodie but in possibility have a possibility of life in it self Though in other things it is possible that a man should have somewhat which he never useth yet in the soul it is impossible For the soul doth not cease to worke even in them that are asleep but a man even in sleeping is nourished groweth and seeth visions and breathes which is the chiefest symptome of life It is hereby very plain that a Thing cannot have the possibility to live but it must needs have life actually in it For indeed it is nothing else but life which doth principally form the Soul it is planted together with the Soul and it is in the bodie by participation If therefore any man shall affirme that Health answereth proportionably to Life we will reply that in saying so he tal keth not of the life of the SOUL but of the body and so useth a sophisticall reasoning For the corporeall-substance doth receive contraries one after another but in the substance which is the forme that cannot be possible Because if the difference which is the Form should be altered the living creature would be altered also It is not therefore the substantiall forme which receiveth contraries but the substance which is the subject that is to say the bodily-substance And therefore also the Soul cannot be by any means the continued motion of the bodie but must be a substance all perfect within it selfe and incorporeall for that it receiveth contraries one after another as vice and vertue whereof the very Forme by it self is not capable Furthermore Aristotle saith that the Soul being a continued-motion unmoveable of it self is moved accidentally and that it is not unlikely wee should be moved by an immoveable thing because we see by common experience that beautie being a thing unmoveable doth neverthelesse move us But though Beautie which is unmoveable in it self may move us as hee saith yet the Beautie so moving us is a thing by nature apt enough to be moved not such a thing as is altogether unmoveable Therefore if the body had any selfe-motion it had not been any absurdity to say it should be moved of that which was immoveable But it is impossible that a thing of it self immoveable should be moved of that which is also immoveable How then should the body attain unto motion except it receive it from the soul seeing it cannot have any motion from it self It appeares therefore that when Aristotle went about to declare the first breeding of Motion hee shewed us not the first but the second For if he had moved that which of it self is not moved he had then made the first-motion But if otherwise he move that which is moved of it self hee discourseth how the second-motion commeth From whence then is the first motion procured to the bodie If he say the Elements are moved of themselvess in regard some of them are naturally light some heavy It is not so For if levity weightinesse were kinds of motion then light and heavy things would never leave moving But they cease from moving when they have attained their proper place Therefore lightnesse and heavinesse are not causes of the first-motion but qualities of the Elements If it were granted that lightnesse and heavinesse were causes of the first-motion how can the Qualities of Reasoning of Judging and of holding Opinion be wrought by heavinesse and lightnesse If they be not effects of these neither are they effects of the Elements and if not of the Elements then also not of the Bodies Beside if the soul be moved accidentally and the bodie of it self then should the bodie be moved of it self although it had no soul and if that were possible then it might be a living-creature without a soul But these things are absurd and absurd therefore is the former opinion Moreover it is likewise untruely affirmed that every thing which is moved naturally is moved also violently and that whatsoever is moved violently is moved by nature For the World being moved naturally is not moved violently Neither is it true that such things as are moved naturally doe rest naturally also For the World and the Sunne and the Moone are naturally moved and yet cannot rest naturally In like manner being naturally inclined to a perpetuall motion they cannot rest naturally For Rest is the destruction of the Soul of every thing which is given to perpetuall-motion It is herewith considerable also that there is as yet no solution made unto that which was objected in the beginning of this Chapter viz. how the bodie whose nature is to be easily dispersed can be knit together if it be not by an Incorporeall-substance SECT 5. I. The SOUL is not a Number according to the opinion of Pythagoras nor as Xenocrates understands it II. The error of Eunomius in adding to his definition of the Soul these words created or ingendred in the Bodie and the absurdity thereupon insuing III. The difference betweene the Workes of Creation Providence c. and the error of Apollinarius touching the generation of Soules PYthagoras whose custome it was by a certaine kind of Comparison to liken God and all other things to NUMBERS defined the soul also to be a number moving it self Him Xenocrates imitated not as though the soul were number but for that it is in things numbred and in such as are multiplyed and for that it is the soul which discernes things and because likewise it putteth as it were upon every thing certaine formes and distinctions For it is the SOVLE that separates one form from another and shewes how they differ both by the diversity of their Formes and by the multitude of their number thereby causing things to be contained in number And therefore betweene the soul and numbers there is some affinity He himselfe hath born witnesse of the soule that it is moved of it selfe And that it is not a number wee may thus prove Number is in the predicament of quantity But the soul is not in the predicament of quantity but in the predicament of substance Therfore the soul is not a number Yea though they would never so faine that number should bee a substance accounted among things comprehended in understanding it will bee proved otherwise as it shall hereafter bee declared Againe the SOUL hath all his parts continued one to another but so hath not number Therefore the SOUL is not a Number Againe a number is increased by putting more and more unto it but the Soul taketh no such increase Againe a number is either even or odd but the SOUL can neither bee termed even nor odd Againe the SOUL hath motion of it selfe but a number is undoubtedly unmoveable Againe a number remaining one and the same in nature is able to alter no quality that belongeth unto numbers But the Soul remaining one and the same in substance doth change his qualities altering from ignorance to knowledge and from vice to vertue therefore all these
the compasse of Place is not himselfe in every place where his light is but as fire in the wood or as the flame in a candle is confined to a certaine place It is not so with the soul For being void of all Body and not contained within the limits of any place it passeth all and whole through it own whole light and through the whole Body wherein it is neither is any part of it illuminated thereby wherein it is not fully and wholly present Neither is it in the body as in some bottle or other vessell nor compassed in by the same but the Body is rather in the soule and is thereby held in and fastned together For intelligible things such as the soul is are not hindred by bodily things but enter and pierce and passe through every corporeall thing and cannot possibly bee contained within the circumference of a bodily-place Things intellectuall have their being in places also intelligible yea they are either in themselves or else in such intellectuall things as are above themselves The soul is otherwhile in it selfe as when it reasoneth or considereth of things and otherwhile in the understanding as when it conceiveth any thing And when it is said to bee in the body it is not said to be there as in place but to be as it were in a certaine relation to the body and to bee present with it in such a sense as God is said to be in us For wee say that the soul is bound as it were by a certaine disposition and inclination as the lover is to his beloved not bound in place or as bodies are bound but by the habituall bands of affection And indeed seeing it hath neither magnitude nor massinesse nor parts how can it be enclosed by a speciall place Or within what place can that bee contained which hath no parts Where place is there must needs bee a massinesse because place is the Bound which compasseth another thing and hath it being in respect of that which it encloseth Now if any man shall thereupon conclude that his soule is in Alexandria and in Rome and in every place let him know that even in so saying hee includeth a Place For to be in Alexandria or generally to be here or there or any where pertaineth unto a place whereas the soul is no where no not in the body as in a place but habitually because as is aforesaid it cannot be contained within a place For this cause when things intellectuall have any habituall inclination to a place or to such things as are in place wee turne the word from his proper use and say abusively that such a thing is there or there by reason of the operation which it there hath taking the name of place for the inclination or working in a place And whereas we should rather say it there worketh we say There it is SECT 2. I. Of the union of the Godhead with the Man-hood how far forth it hath any similitude with the union of the Soule and Body and wherein it is unlike thereunto II. Arguments taken from Porphyrie confuting himselfe and others who deny the possibility of an union betweene the Godhead and the Man-hood and a disproofe of the opinion of the Eunomians concerning that union III. He proceeds to treat of the union of the soule and body and shewes that as it was meerely of Gods good pleasure to unite the Godhead to the Man-hood So it was also agreeable to the Nature of God that this union should be without mixture or confusion THat which is last aforesaid agrees more plainly and in more speciall manner to that union which is betweene GOD the WORD and the Man-hood by which union the two Natures being united remained neverthelesse without confusion and so also that the divinity was not comprehended by the Humanity And yet this uniting is not altogether such as is betweene the soul and the body For the soul being in the number of multiplied things suffers after a sort with the Body in such things as happen thereunto and by reason of their mutuall necessities and conversation together both holds it in and is also held in by the same But GOD the Word being himselfe nothing altered by that union which unites the divinity and humanity together nor by that communion which the soule and body have with each other imparts his God-head unto them without participating of their frailties and becommeth one with them still remaining in himselfe the same thing which hee was before such an uniting This is a strange and mysterious temperature uniting For Hee is tempered with them and yet he himselfe continues utterly without mixion without confusion without corruption and without change Neither suffering any thing with them but only helping and furthering them nor being corrupted nor altered by them but greatly encreasing them without any diminution in himselfe because hee is altogether without mutation without confusion and without possibility of changing Hereof may Porphyrie himselfe beare witnesse who hath moved his tongue against CHRIST for the testimonies of our Adversaries are the most undeniable proofes which may be brought against themselves This Porphyrie in the second Booke of his mixt questions uses these words It is not then saith he to be judged a thing impossible that some ESSENCE should be assumed to the perfiting of another ESSENCE and be part of that ESSENCE perfecting also the same and yet remaine still in it owne NATVRE both being ONE with that other thing and yet preserving the VNITY of it selfe yea and which is more then this changing those things wherein it is by the presence thereof and making it so to worke as it selfe worketh and yet nothing altered in it SELFE Now Porphyrie spake these things of the uniting of the SOUL and body and if his reason hold good in the SOUL in regard it is an incorporeall substance it holds true much rather in GOD the Word who is verily without bodie and also utterly void of composition And this doth mafestly shut the mouthes of them who endeavour to contradict the uniting of the God-head and the Man-hood as many of the Grecians have done Jeasting and deriding at it as impossible improbable and absurd that the Divine-nature should be joyned in a temperature and an unity with our mortall-nature for it is here discovered that they may be opposed in this argument by the testimony of such as are in most esteeme among themselves The opinion of some especially of the Eunomians is this that GOD the Word is united to the body not in substance but by the powers of either Nature For it is not say these their substances which are united and tempered together but the powers of the BODY are tempered with the Divine powers Now they affirme according to Aristotle that the Senses are the powers of the body meaning of all the body as it containes the instruments thereof and therefore in their judgement the Divine powers being tempered with the
Senses is cause of that uniting But wee shall never be perswaded to grant unto them that the Senses are certaine powers of the body For wee have already manifestly declared what things belong properly to the Body what things to the SOUL only and what to the SOUL and body both together And we therupon concluded that the Senses which worke by the instruments of the Body are to bee reckoned among those things which are proper to the SOUL and bodie joyned in One These things confidered it is most agreeable to reason wee should affirme according to the nature of incorporeall-things and as is aforesaid that these Essences of the soule and Body are united without confusion and in such maner that the more Divine nature is nothing impaired by the inferiour nature but that onely the inferiour nature is profited by that which is Divine For a nature which is purely incorporeall can passe without stop thorow all things whereas nothing hath passage thorow that By passing through all things it is united and in regard nothing passes through the same it remaines void of mixture and without confusion It is not rightly affirmed therefore though many excellent men be of this opinion that no reason else can be given why the union whereof wee have treated should bee after such a manner but onely because it pleased God it should so be For the very nature of the things is cause thereof We may justly say that it came to passe meerely by GOD's good pleasure and choise that the SON should take a Bodie unto himselfe But it commeth not meerely of the good pleasure of GOD though it be also his good pleasure it should be so but of the proper nature of the Godhead that when it is united it should not bee confounded with the Man-hood Wee will speake nothing of the degrees of soules nor of their ascending and descending mentioned by Origen For we finde in holy Scriptures nothing warranting the same neither are they agreeable to the doctrines commonly received among Christians CAP. 4. SECT 1. I. Of the Body and of the mediate and immediate composition thereof II. Of those parts of a living-creature every portion wherof taketh the name of the whole and of those parts which take not the name of the whole III. MAN only hath every part belonging to the Body of a perfect LIVING-CREATVRE whereas all others are defective in some of the parts and many in the Situation of them RIghtly may we affirme that every corporeall Essence is a composition proceeding from the foure Elements and made up of them The bodies of living-creatures having blood in them are cōpacted immediatly of the four humors Blood flegm Choller Melancholy But the Bodies of such as are without blood are made of the other three humours and of somewhat in them answering proportionably unto blood We call that immediately when any thing is made of the selfe-same things without any other thing comming between them As the foure humours are made of the foure Elements and those things are compounded of the foure humours which consist of like parts and are parts also of the body that is things having such parts every part of which parts may bee called by the same name which is given unto the whole as when every part of the flesh is called flesh Melancholy is likned to Earth Flegme to water Blood to Ayre Choller to Fire and every thing which is compounded of the Elements is either a Masse or Moisture or Spirits Aristotle thought that the bodies of living-creatures were made immediately of Blood onely because the seed is ingendred of blood and all the parts of a living-creature nourished thereby But because it seemed somewhat absurd to imagine that both hardest bones and the tenderest flesh and fatnesse should proceed all of one thing It pleased Hippocrates to affirme that the bodies of living-creatures were immediately compacted of the foure Elements the thicke and sollid parts of the more earthly Elements and the soft parts of such Elements as are softest Oftentimes all the foure humours are found in the blood whereof wee have experience in Phlebotomy For sometime a certaine flegme like whey doth abound in it otherwhile Melancholy and sometime againe Choller Whereupon it commeth to passe that all men seem in some sort to agree with one another Now of the parts of living-creatures some parts there be every portion of which parts hath the same name which is given unto the whole part Othersome there are which cannot bee called by the same name whereby the whole is called As for example Every part of the Braine is called Braine In like maner of the sinewes of the marrow of the bones of the teeth of the grissells of the nayles of the thin muscles that binde the Ioynts together of all the skins throughout the body of the strings which are in the bloody flesh of the haires of the flesh of the veines of the arteries of the pores of the fat and of those foure which are in maner of Elemēts yeelding matter out of which the things aforesaid are immediately made pure Blood Flegme Melancholy and Choller Except from these the Muscle which is compounded of those thinner Muscles which knit our joynts together and of the strings which are of the nature of sinewes The parts of the body consisting of portions whereof every one taketh not the name of the whole are these that follow viz. the head the breast the hands the feet and such other members of Mans body For if you divide the head into severall parts every part of it is not called a Head but if you divide a sinew into severall portions every portion of it shall have the denomination of a sinew and so shall it be likewise if you divide or subdivide a veine or flesh Every whole thing whose severall parts have not the same name with the whole is made of such things as impart the name of the whole to the parts when they are compounded together as the head is made of sinewes and flesh and bone and such like which are called the instrumentall parts The definition therefore of such things as the Greeks call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is things which consist of like parts is thus made They are things whose parts are like both to the whole and to each other as flesh braine c. and by the word like in this place we meane the same with the whole for a piece of a mans flesh is as truly flesh as the whole masse Now every living-creature hath not all the parts of a body but some of them are defective in one part and some in others for some lack feet as fishes and Serpents Some have no head as Crabs and Lobsters and certaine other water-creatures and because they want a head the seat of their sense is in the breast Some living-creatures have no Lungs namely all such as breath no Ayre some are without a bladder as birds and all such as
thereof HEre is one division of the powers of the soul together with which there are some parts of the body likewise divided whereunto is added another division and after another maner For the reasonable-part of the soule is divided into reason which is unexpressed in us and that which is uttered by our speech The reason unexpressed or setled in us is a motion of the soule engendred in that part of the minde wherein consisteth our discourse of reason without any utterance by voice Thereby oftentimes although wee say nothing wee throughly resolve and set downe with our selves the whole reason of a thing and otherwhile discourse in our dreames And it is chiefly in respect thereof that we are called reasonable-creatures yea much rather in this respect then for that which is uttered by our speech For albeit some are deafe and dumbe from their births or lose their voices by sicknesse and diseases yet reasonable-creatures they are neverthelesse The utterance of reason is by the voice in the variety of tongues and the instruments used in the voice are many namely the muscles which are in the middle of the sides the breast it selfe the lungs the winde-pipe the throat and in all these those parts especially which are grisly the returning sinews the cover of the wind-pipe yea and all the muscles which move these parts are instruments of our speech The instruments of our various utterance are the mouth for therein the speech is moulded and fashioned and the tongue and the wesil-pipe which are there in stead of that wherewith wee smite the strings of a Lute or such like instrument the roofe of the mouth also which is as the belly of the Lute that receives and gives back the sound The teeth and the various openings of the mouth doe stand in stead of strings yea and the nose also doth somewhat further the plainenesse and the pleasingness of speech as appeares in those that sing CAP. 15. I. Another division of the soule being threefold II. An eightfold division thereof according to Zeno. III. A fivefold and twofold division of the soul also according to Aristotle VNto those aforegoing there is added yet another division of the soule into the powers the kindes and parts thereof namely into a vegitative power which is the same wherby plants and such like doe grow and this is called also a nourishing or passive power secondly into a sensible power and thirdly into that whereby it exerciseth reason Zeno the Stoick assignes unto the soule eight parts the reasonable part is the first and principall the five senses make up sixe the faculty of speech the seaventh and the eighth hee affirmes to bee that power whereby things are ingendred one of another But Panetine the philosopher contradicting this opinion affirmes that the uttering of our speech is a part of the motion which is in our appetite and that the power of ingendring is a part of nature not of the soule wherein hee hath said very truly Aristotle in his Physicks hath divided the Soule into to five parts namely that which is vegitative sensitive movable in place that which belongs to appetite and that which is intellective He calls that vegitative which nourisheth encreaseth breedeth maketh and formeth bodies for under the name of vegitative he comprehends the intire faculty of growing calling the whole after the name of that part thereof which is the chiefest therein and from whence all the other parts of the growing power have their essence This is Aristotles opinion in his Physicks but in his Ethicks he makes but a twofold division of the Soule that is to say into parts rationall and irrationall Of the reasonable-part I have already treated now therfore I will speak of that which is unreasonable CAP. 16. I. Of that unreasonable part of the soule which containes the appetite of concupiscence also of anger and of their severall instruments II. Of the divers acceptations of this word affection and the definition of an affection and of an operation or act III. The difference betweene an operation and an affection or passion c. SOme hold opinion that irrationality or to be voide of reason is an intire thing by it self as though there were a soule void of reason which were not a part of the rationall soule and for these causes they thinke so First for that it is found alone by it selfe in unreasonable living creatures For thereby it seemes unto them to be perfect of it selfe and no part of the reasonable soule Secondly they so imagine because it appeares unto them one of the greatest absurdities which may be to affirme that a power void of reason should be part of a Soule indued with reason However Aristotle affirmes it to be both a part and a faculty of the reasonable soule dividing it in to two parts as I said before and calls those two by this one cōmon name the appetitive-faculty To which belongs also the motion of our appetite for appetite is the beginning of motion as appeares in every living creature having a desire to something for their desire causes them to move forward according to their appetite This unreasonable part of the soule doth either disobey or obey reason And that part which is obedient unto reason is divided into two parts concupiscence and anger The instrument of the concupiscence by which it commeth into sense is the Liver But the instrument of anger is the heart which being a hard part receives a strong motion and is ordained for a hard service and for great resistances whereas the Liver being a tender entrail is made the instrument of tender concupiscence These things are said to be obedient unto reason because nature hath ordained them to obey reason and to bee moved as reason commandeth in all such men as live answerable to that which nature originally requires And these are certaine affections which constitute our Essence as it hath life in it For life cannot bee maintained without these But whereas this word affection hath divers acceptations wee must first distinguish the variety of significations which it hath for either it pertaineth to the body as when it is sick or ulcerated in which cases we say it is so or so affected or else it belongs to the soul of which we now speake and wherunto concupiscence and anger doe pertaine But universally and generally in respect of the intire living creature consisting of both parts it is called an affection and followeth either in griefe or pleasure For griefe doth follow our affection but the very passion or affection it selfe is not griefe for if that were true then wheresoever passion were found there should be griefe also but things void of life may be patients and suffer yet feele no griefe Therefore it is not necessarily consequent that whensoever wee are affected unto a thing we should also bee grieved but then onely when wee feele the thing which hapneth unto us Yea and that which falleth unto us must bee a thing
the skin wherin the infant lieth and ordained for a vessell to receive the superfluities of the childe In all sorts of living-creatures the Female takes the male when shee may conceive and such as are able to conceive at all times as hens doves and women are at all times desirous to accompany the male But women only accept of the males company when they have conceived for all other creatures usually reject the male after conception As for hens they are daily trodden because they do lay almost every day Women as they bee at their own liberty in other things so they are at liberty also to accompany with men after conception whereas living-creatures void of reason are governed not of themselves but by nature admitting such a measure and such times as are dictated unto them by a naturall instinct CAP. 26. This Chapter mentioneth other divisions of the faculties belonging to a living-creature DIvision is made of those faculties which pertain unto a living-creature in another maner For it is affirmed that some faculties are mentall some naturall and some vitall They which are mentall are in our owne choice and election they which are not in our election are naturall and vitall The faculties belonging unto the minde are two the motion of appetite and of sense To the motion of our appetite these faculties are appertaining Progression from place to place the motion of the whole body speech and respiration For it is in our power to doe or to omit these things But the naturall and vitall faculties are not in our power for they goe forward nill we will we as the faculty of nourishing of growing and of propagation all which are naturall faculties and so doth likewise the facultie of the pulses which is vitall As for the instruments of these faculties mentioned by others wee have already treated of them wee will therefore speake of the instruments of those things which belong unto our appetite or choice CAP. 27. I. Of the motion proceeding voluntarily from us of the place where it assumeth beginning and the instruments which it useth II. The wise providence of the Creator in uniting together things naturall mentall c. THe motion which belongeth to our assent or choice and proceedeth voluntarily from us taketh beginning from the braine and from the marrow of the chine which is it selfe a part of the braine The instruments thereof are the sinewes that spring from these the ligaments and muscles The composure of these muscles is flesh and the strings in the blood which are like sinewes and grisles wrapped up together with sinewie-strings And some are of opinion that they are sensible because that sense proceedeth from the sinewes where withall they are folded up The grisly-end of the muscle is compounded both of a ligament and of certaine small sinewes yet this grisly-end differs from a sinew in this that every sinew hath sense in it and is round and somewhat tender and assumeth also his beginning from the braine whereas this grisly end is more hard sometime also flat having likewise his originall from the bone and is in it selfe void of sense The hands are an instrument ordained to lay hold of things and so convenient for the exercise of arts above other members that if the hands or but the fingers only should be taken away wee are made unapt for almost every art And therefore man onely received hands from his Creator because he onely is indued with reason which makes him capable of arts The feet are instruments ordained for going for by them wee remove and passe from place to place And man can sit firmely without a prop because he only makes two right-angles by the bowing of his legs the one inward the other outward Whatsoever things therefore in man are moved by sinewes and muscles belong to the minde and hee hath a free liberty in the use of them Among these as we have already shewed the senses and the voice are to be accounted and therefore this hath beene hitherto a discourse probably setting forth as well those things which are mentall as those which are naturall For the Creator according to his exceeding wise for-sight hath folded up things mentall with such as are naturall and things naturall with such as appertaine unto the minde And whereas the avoiding of superfluities belongs to the expulsive faculty which is counted one of those that is naturall that wee might not behave our selves filthily in avoiding our excrements without regarding the time the place and such other circumstances as are comely he hath appointed the muscles to bee as it were Porters to order our evacuations and of things which were of themselves meerely naturall hee hath made them to be mentall and such as depend upon the rule of the minde And thereupon when wee are provoked unto any evacuations we are able if cause bee to containe them very often and very long Certaine sinewes which bee soft and sensible are sent downe both from the middle-pan and also from the two former pans of the braine Other sinewes which are harder and serve us for motion proceed from that brain-pan which is in the hinder part of the head and from the marrow of the back Among these those are the harder which come from the spinall-marrow and of them those are the hardest of all which proceed from the lowest parts of the marrow of the back For by how much farther the marrow of the chine descendeth from the braine so much the more hard is the chine-marrow of it selfe and the sinews also which doe spring from the same And as we have received the senses double so the sinewes have a twofold springing also from us For every joynt of the chine sends forth a couple of sinewes one issuing toward the rightside and another toward the left yea and almost our whole body is divided also into two parts the one on the right and the other on the left side Thus likewise are our feet our hands the seats of our senses and other parts divided CAP. 28. I. Of respiration of the instrument of the use and of the causes of that faculty II. Of the composure and use of the Lungs and of such other parts as are assisting to respiration III. Of those parts of a living-creature which are made for themselves alone for others and for themselves or altogether for others HERE wee will treat of respiration which is also a worke belonging to the minde For by the muscles the breast is opened which is the principall instrument of respiration Our sighing also and our thick drawing of breath when any great sorow happeneth unto us is an evidence that the operation hereof belongeth unto the minde Moreover the variations and alterings of our breathing whensoever need requires are in our power For if we be grieved in any part serviceable to respiration or in such parts as are moved by the motion of any of these as the midriffe the liver the spleene the stomach the
small-guts or the lowest-gut we then breath short and thick Wee breath short that we may not over-vehemently smite the grieved part we breath also thick that the often breathing may supply what is wanting in the length of our blast When our leg is wounded wee set it forth very leisurely in our going which is done to the same end for which we breath short and therefore as to goe from place to place belongs unto the minde so doth also this operation of respiration But although we should rest and not goe at all it were possible for us to live a long time whereas it were impossible for us to hold our breath the tenth part of an houre without death because the naturall heat which is in us would bee choaked up and quite extinct by a sowltry fume For it is as if a man should cover a fire within a small vessell having no vent which would be immediately stifled and quenched by it owne fume For this cause it is very necessary that when wee are asleepe our soul should worke neverthelesse in this part because if it should be idle therein though for a very small time the living-creature would perish And in this it is againe manifested how the endeavour of the minde and of nature are knit together For the minde exerciseth respiration by an artery which is a naturall instrument and it is alwaies in motion that neither it owne work nor the work of the other arteries may be intermitted This not being perceived by some to wit how the minde and nature joyne together in this worke they supposed respiration to bee onely a naturall faculty Three things cause respiration the use the power and the instruments The use is twofold one for the preservation of our naturall heat and the other for the nourishment of the vitall-spirits The preservation of our naturall heat consisteth both of drawing in and breathing out of aire For the drawing of the breath doth not onely coole but in a mediocrity stirreth up heat also The breathing out of the aire drives away the foggy heat which is about the heart whereas nourishment of the vitall-spirits is respiration onely for the heart is dilated abroad and a certaine portion of aire is attracted thereunto The power which is a cause also of respiration is that which it hath from the soule for it is the minde which moves the instruments of respiration by meanes of the muscles and especially by the breast wherewith our lungs and the sharp arteries which are also a part of the lungs are moved For that part of the sharp artery which is gristly is the instrument of the voice the ligaments thereof which are like skinnes are instruments of respiration and that which is composed of both together which is the forementioned artery is the instrument both of respiration and of the voice The lungs therefore are a composition folded up together and consisting of these foure a sharp artery a smooth artery a veine and of a spumie flesh which flesh doth fill up all the void places of the folded skin as it were a moist bed or the herbe Sleve both of the two arteries and of the veine so that it becommeth both a seat for them and a band keeping them together The flesh of the lungs doth naturally cōcoct the spirits as the liver concocts the humour which commeth from the belly And as the liver with his utmost edges or skirts spreads it selfe about the belly because it needeth heat so the lungs inclose even the very middle of the heart because it needeth some cooling by respiration To the sharp artery the gristle of the winde-pipe is immediately joyned being compounded of three great gristles whereunto the throat is annexed and which are continued unto the mouth and nostrils by both which we draw the aire that is without us From the mouth it ascendeth by a bone like unto a sieve or like a sponge which is full of holes that the braine may not be harmed if there bee any excesse in the qualities of the aire or if too much winde should enter into it at once Here hath also the Creator placed the nose both for smelling and respiration according as hee hath ordained the tongue for the voice for the tasting and for chewing Thus the most principall parts serving both for the very being of the living-creature and for the necessary uses of this life are divided together with the powers of the minde and if any thing hath beene formerly omitted it may bee understood by that which is now expressed Now as it falls out in all other created things that some are made onely for their own sakes some for themselves and others also some onely for the sakes of others and that some things fall out accidentally together with such things as are made Even thus you shall find it to be also in the parts of a living-creature For all the forenamed instruments of those three principall things which governe the living-creature are made for their owne sakes For those things are especially and principally made which are named according to their proper nature and are ingendred in the wōb even of the seed it selfe as the bones are But the yellow choller is made both in respect of it selfe some other thing For it helpeth concoction stirreth up to the avoiding of excrements and in that respect is in some sort one of the parts that serveth for nourishment Moreover it ministreth unto the body a certaine heat as doth our vitall-faculty and in respect of all these things it seemeth to bee made for it owne sake But in that it purgeth our blood it seemeth after a sort to be made in respect of the blood The spleen also helpeth concoction and that not a little For being tart and of a sharp astringent nature it bindeth the belly by powring out into the same the avoidance of a black moisture Yea it strengtheneth it also assisteth concoction and purgeth the liver For which causes that part also seemeth to have beene ordained in respect of the blood The reines likewise are a purgation for the blood and a cause of the desire which we have to carnall copulation For the veines which as we have declared before doe fall down into the cods passe along by the reines and from thence carry with them a certaine sharpnesse which provoketh lust even as a certaine sharp moisture which is under the skin procureth an itch And looke how much the flesh of the stones is tenderer then the other skin of the body by so much the more being tickled by that sharpnesse are they stirred up to the ejaculation of seed These things therefore and such like are made both for their owne sakes and also in respect of other things But the kernels and the flesh are only ordained in respect of other things For the kernells doe serve to cary up and underprop the vessels that they may not be broken when they are lifted up or stretched forth