the other whereby he may see by another mans eye Again that which we are to see is either in artificio rei or not in artificio rei so that all things are seeable but not to be seen with one mans eye but by many This word artificiale teacheth us these things first there is no artificial argument but you shall see it in fabrica rei therefore belongs to some Art because Art delivers the frame of the thing therefore there is no axiom that consisteth of artificial arguments but it belongs to some Art Now though we hear no arguments in Arts but the causes and properties yet notwithstanding we have all arguments indeed for there is no quality but is proton in some general thing as heat in fire cold in water now this gives us great light yet effects must be there if they be proper and the effect belongs to that rule where the property is taught and dissentanies belong to Art too as nature is constans or inconstans argumentum est artificiale aut inartificiale so that there are no axioms affirmed or denyed true or false but we shall find them in some Art either as a first rule or a deduct by consequence necessary so that hence is the greatest light that can be to a Scholler to analyse his example and bring every thing to his Art where he shall see it in causa so that if one would make a common place book let him make the Rules of Arts his heads and let him take any example and see whether argument is more special and so carry the axiom to that Art and to that rule of the Art whether it belongs As homo est justus homo belongs to nature justitia to moral Philosophy ergo this axiom belongs to the doctrine of justice so that moral Philosophy boâ—rows man from nature to deliver it self The use of this is unspeakable I cannot deliver it unto you the use it self will better testifie it for thus may a man try every thing whatsoever yea though it be a contingent axiom as audentes fortuna juvat audacia belongs to Ethicks fortuna to Logick and in audacia we shall find this for it is that which thrusteth a man desperately and here we may see what a true predicament is not the predicaments but the Arts are the store-houses for whatsoever is in artificio rei we may see there not onely genus species c. but all other arguments for they are too narrow and false too for that distribution substantia est creata or increata will not fail in any Art and the three first predicaments as we heard before are nothing but practises of method Now if it be objected we must not have those things before we see them no we must first see them that we may lay them up in store We have our eye first and then things appointed for us to see Artificiale est quod ex sese arguit Now here is that affection that is in this kind of arguments that glue that was before is here quod ex se so that this makes that more special which before was more general so that we shall still see what our eye of reason sees we heard before that we see the thing as it is an argument here we see it as it is affectioned to argue ex se Ex se what is that as if he should say look into the artificium of the thing there shall you see his artificial arguing ex se that is it argues natura or it is causa natura of its arguing so that these arguments concurre for the being of the thing So wood is affected to argue a chest ex se that is it is in the artificio of wood to argue a chest made of wood ex se so then this artificial argument ariseth from nature from a vis ingenita that is in artificio rei so the efficient argues ex se as if I should say if there were not that cunning in the efficient of a chest to make it it would not be one So that it is thus defined quodex sese arguit Argumentum was the next genus and he doth not express it but understand it here because we heard of it so lately before then again he hath it here but after another manner because he could not deliver the form of it without the genus for arguit is not here taken for act but for potentia as we say animal vidit though he doth not actually see but have the faculty of it so we say Does he eat or drink meaning can he eat or drink For if it were taken for the act of arguing then it should not be no where but in judgement so that quod arguit is as much as argumentum and ex se is the form if he had said artificiale est argumentum ex sese he had said the same that ex sese arguit but it had not been so plain to a young Schollar and he had also newly done with argumentum before so that this is the second thing that our eye of reason is to look at namely an artificial argument which can ex sese arguere Now fallaces may be in every rule In the first as if any abuse it to deceive and abuse reason for the second if any go about to judge before he see the invention it is a fallace and a preposterous course So argumentum is artificiale or inartificiale they break this rule that will give testimony of a thing whose artificial arguments they have not seen so do the Papists in their implicite faith when they beleive as the Church beleives not knowing what the Church beleiveth So Schollers that take any thing that their Authors deliver them without any examination at all of the things they read Kiekerman saith an inartificial argument may be received before an artificial I do not deny it but yet you must examine it afterward Gods testimonies onely are undeniable because he cannot lye but no mans Artificiale est primum aut ortum We are farther to look at this glue whereby a thing is put to another thing in artificio rei it is there firstly or secondly this affection or going to the act is there at the first hand or at the second hand now it is the same still but is looked at as it is originally or as it is arising from the first as to make up me there goes a soul and a body and of the formes of the four elements is the form of my body made and of their matter the matter of my body made now the elements are firstly there as making my body and secondly my body is in me as a part in me so a man is first consisting of body and soul and then is animal now this wisdom of God is wonderful to consider how he makes things first of causes effects c. and then ranketh them under a general head And if we go to the Creation we shall see them evidently first
parts distributed Objection But in a distribution we should have but two species Answer Why is it not requisite that there should always be a decotomie for indeed if we could find it out every thing is decotomised but the Lord hath not revealed it unto men but hath kept it secret to himself Objection Singulars have no differences but are distinct onely by a conflux of common accidents Answer Then singulars should not differ in essence ergo I should be the same with you and you with me the first matter indeed was imperfect but every thing else is an effect ergo hath all the causes ergo the form If they ask me what it is I answer them that my soul is my form as they hold or else thus as my members are not another mans members so my form arising from the parts of my body is not another mans form but is really distinct from it Objection But say they the reasonable soul is generall to all men Answer There indeed may be some scruple but when we consider that the forms of the body and the soul make up the form of a man we shall see every man to have a distinct form by which we shal know them each from other Sic animal genus hominis bestiae dicimus He means that genus is a generall totum and comprehendeth the species under it for as a Hen covereth her chickens with her wings so genus covereth the species with his essence then again make an axiome as homo est animal and you shall see the species to be the subject more often than the genus ergo he saith subjecta Genus est generalissimum aut subalternum Here he distributes genus unto us shewing us that there are two kinds thereof the one is generalissimum for so indeed every genus is general and hath his subsistencie onely in singularibus and because all genera do subsist in singularibus ergo all but singularia are genera hence it is that they say in Schooles ens and unum confunduntur Species sub alterna aut specialissima Genus generalissimum cujus nullum est genus Generalissimum is so called because it is most genus because that can be nothing but genus Subalternum genus is genus but not onely genus nor alwayes genus Cujus nullum est genus There must needs be an end for as there is a lowest whereat we must begin so there must be an highest above which we cannot go for there cannot be an infinitus motus in creatures so the Lord hath in great wisdom ranged things in their order So the common Logicians have made ten predicaments or genera generalissima but the first four have Logicks use in them the rest are arguments but if we would know the genera generalissima every Art will tell us them best now we may ascend to ens too so that ens is the definitum indeed God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so in Logick argumentum is genus generalissimum vox in Grammar c. and all these are species of ens Nullum genus Here he denies any genus to stay our reason that so we may not go too far for since genus ariseth from the matter we shall at last come to that which is no genus but a matter onely ergo we must distribute this into his matter and form Subalternum genus ut subalternaitem species quod species hujus illius autem genus est Subalternum genus may also be subalterna species so that these being one and the same onely differing in respect therefore one definition may serve for them both Species specialissima quae est individua in species alias ut materia forma singulares Species as before signifies firstly a singular thing and other species are called species at the second hand but individua are properly cald species quae speciuntur Now he saith specialissima that is indeed and properly as generalissimum had no genus above it so species specialissima hath no species under it individua is here an adjunct to species specialissima now he saith individua because he speaks of division ergo here he tels us that we can go no further to find any inferiour species we may onely divide it into members if we will Genus vero species notae sunt causarum effectorum He doth commorari here because the Schools have not commonly received that genus contains the matter and common form of the species but we know a perfect definition layes out the quiddity of a thing that is the matter and the form now the form is there but where is the matter why the genus contains the quiddity the essence the causes ergo it is an argument unswerable that the genus contains the matter Hinc universale est insigne ac praestabile quia causam declarat The common Logicians never lookt after any distribution but of the integrum into the members and of the genus into the species now integrum is commonly a singular ergo in opposition to it they called genus an universal then again the integrum is made of the matter and form of the members now they are singulars ergo there can arise nothing from them but that which is singular Now the genus is common to the species therefore by reason thereof it comes to be universal and we must apprehend it in our minds Object It is a great question whether universalia be realia or onely intentionalia Answ True it is that every universal is subsistent in singularibus so that there is truly animal but we must look for him in individuis for genus is totum partibus essentiale but if we make an abstraction of it from the singulars then it is not real but here is a fallace for the universal still remains a thing though I thus consider it in my mind for I would dispute with them thus If it be but a phantasme then can it give no essence Again when we define do we not lay out the thing ergo if genus were onely mental it could not give essence so causa effectum and all other arguments are things real in nature howsoever my Logick takes hold of them Insigne True it is that every whole is general because it is totum but genus is universale insigne ac praestabile and so it appears for because it gives esse not onely in a distribution but also in a definition ergo it is of great use even set in the fore-front of the Aristotelians quia causam declarat and our knowledge is e causis Distributio generis in species valde quidem excellit sed difficilis est rara inventu Valde excellit that is in use sed difficilis est rara inventu the reason is this the genus is totum universale and gives matter and form to the species now the form is hard to be found so that in common Authors we find this definition seldom but in Arts it
of the causes CHAP. IX De effectis Effectum est quod e causis existit siveigitur gignatur sive c. NOw we come to see a thing made up it is worth the consideration to see how we begin at the farthest thing and at the first There are four esses distinct which we must look at distinctly and orderly if we â—ill see things aâ—ight First the efficients then the matters c. now then let us see effectum Effectum for the name it seems to be nominated onely from the efficient for it comes of efficior which comes oâ— efficio whence efficiens comes and howbeit it might be denominated materiatum formatum or finitum yet he rather names it of the efficient but we are to understand that it hath reference to all the causes even materiatum formatum finitum Object Why should there not be as many several kinds of effects as there are of causes Answ Because no one cause alone can make an effect for it is existent from them all the causes are distinct in nature and their forces are their own ergo their doctrine must be distinct but because essectum must be made of the composition of the four esses ergo it can be but one so that I cannot say effectum efficientis effectum materiae effectum formae or effectum finis ergo we must see effectum alone in one lump as it is in nature Now because it hath all the esses of the causes ergo good reason that the efficient that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and worketh generally quite through with every other cause matter form and end should have the effect denominated from it so that this child brought forth by the four causes is denominated from the efficient Est All things are effects but God alone ergo effectum est therefore whereas all things are made lyable to our eye of reason it is requisite that as we see the causes that make up the thing so the effect which is a quinta essentia arising from them Quod. He means argumentum absolute consentancum now we see plainly how the causes are absolutely agreeing to the effect but how is the effect absolutely a-agreeing to them yes for if the effect be from them it will vouchsafe to acknowledge it self to be from them and we see in nature that if an effect be then all the causes are contra again that we may see it plainly if we take away the efficient the effect will be imperfect so put the effect and we put the matter and form substantially and the esses of the other so take away the effect and you take away them Now if the efficient be rotten yet it is an effect as this Logick is Ramus his effect though he be dead and rotten for here we respect not time but the esse Again he puts efficiens generally a qua materia ex qua forma per quam finis cujus gratia and here effectum quod the reason why he used quod so often is because he would tell us that Logick is general to every thing Existit Esse is of any one cause existere is a compound of them all not that existere hath respect of time and place as some teach true it is time and place attend every thing when it doth existere but they are not of the esse of the thing but are onely complemental est is a causa qualibet existere ex omnibus subsistere ex modo quodam consentaneis Existere comes of ex and sto now it doth stand upon its feet and doth estare out from all the causes being a fift thing from them Ecausis Here e is as much as a ex per and gratia ecausis that is ab efficiente ex materi per formam gratia finis Causis not causa and therefore it is that all four causes must absolutely concurre or else the thing cannot existere as the first matter did not ergo if Angels do existere they must have all the causes so the soules of men after they be out of the body they cannot per se existere without they have all the causes for if any one cause be wanting they will be incomplete Sive igitur gignatur sive corrumpatur Ramus doth here commorari upon this doctrine of effectum because the common Aristotelians referre the doctrine of motus not to Logick but to natural Philosophy but Ramus teacheth it here in Logick in the doctrine of effectum sive igitur gignatur sive corrumpatur c whether it be made or corrupted sive modo quodam moveatur quidlibet that is whether it be augmented or diminished c. generatio and corruptio are substantial motus augmentatio and diminutio quantitatis alteratio and loci mutatio qualitatis and all these are effects then again whereas the Aristotelians teach that distruens causa is not causa Ramus teacheth that it is for whether a man doth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the same rule he doth both ergo both of them are motus of his act to the opus ergo causa distruens is a motus and a cause as well as opus destructum is an effect and privations though they be privations in respect of their habits yet they are effects in respect of their causes ergo they are causes both alike they teach as if a man had done nothing when he did sin whereas he spoiles the Image of God in him ergo whilst they are more nice than wise they become foolish If the Lord should bring to nothing that which he hath done it would be his effect at least the corruption of nothing Now the effect is double motus and res motu facta every thing is made motu God onely is sine motu and doth not move when he works for else he should not be primus movens but motus but if we resolve all things it must needs bring us in the end to that which is immoveable for so Aristotle found out most things by motus now again there are those that sever motus and res motu facta as the Aristotelians which makes Ramus to commorari they say somethings rest motu onely without a res motu facta but that is not so for there is nothing that God hath made which doth movere but there is a res motu facta of that motus they conceit that some Arts motion hath no opus post se relictum as when one playes on the Virginals they say there is nothing left behind Answ What care I for that Logick looks not to that but as there is playing so there is something playd which is res motu facta and as there is writing so there is something written These namely motus and res motu facta are never distinct asunder one without another but onely in that the one is not the other Hujus loci sunt laudes vituperationes As if Ramus should say if you would commend
ergo perfectissima I have thought also that the Ark was made for all the world like a man and there was the proportion of length proportionable to a mans breadth and the heighth proportionable to a mans thickness Now for the wanting of parts it is not so for Angels may be divided though their parts be simular so are the elements parts and as some write the wicked spirits may be struck and so the Sun light but it will too quickly return into it self and as the light may be divided so may they And whereas they say anima is tota in toto and tota in qualibet parte they wrong God and the creature for what is the reason God can have no parts ergo no causes other things whatsoever must needs have causes ergo must have membra ergo we cannot say they are all in every part Yes the reasonable soul is in my little finger Content but is that very portion of it that is in my head also in my little finger There is a discontinuance and the same thing should be here and not there which is flat contradiction but God is not in this or that finger but also between them The Papists absurdity appears notably in this in that they will have Christs body to be really in the Sacrament in the bread and in heaven also and yet not in the air but make a discontinuance ergo it is in the bread and not in the bread in heaven and not in heaven for if it is in heaven there it is shut up and so in the bread Sic Geometrae locum locique differentias in rebus geometricis That is above and below angle and base c. At prius ignotum ferro quum scindimus aequor c. Here he appoints several places to several things and here locus is but subjectum and they adjuncta Sensilia sensuum res virtutibus ac vitiis propositae subjecta vitiorum virtutum hoc modo nominantur Here are objecta as the common Schools teach because the sense is cast upon them so vertues and vices though they have their subjects themselves in one kind yet here they are adjuncts rebus virtutibus ac vitiis propositae Now it is a fallace of non subjectum when we give that to subjectum which is not subjectum As Tully jested with Piso his little son and said who hath hanged my son to yonder sword Ejusmodi subjecto Cicero 2. Agrar. disputat inter Campanos nullam contentionem esse qui nullus sit honor Non gloriae cupiditate ait afferebantur c. Honour is the subject of ambition the Campani had no honour among them ergo no ambition where there is no honour there is no ambition but inter Campanos there is no honour ergo no ambition Here the proposition contains the subject and adjunct and by removing the subject he removes the adjunct Eodem argumento a Propertio dictum est Navita de ventis de tauris narrat Arator c. The Mariner he tels of the winds whereabout he is occupied and vulnera are adjuncts to Souldiers yet here as he talks of them he is adjunctum and thus have we heard of the first complement of a thing namely to be a subject or to have a subject CHAP. XI De adjuncto Adjunctum est cui aliquid subjicitur quod argumentum etsi subjecto est levius attamen est copiosius frequentius NOw we come to adjuncts which are after subjectum and because subjectum and adjunctum have divers natures ergo they must be taught distinctly and in distinct Chapters now therefore we come to adjunctum which is the outmost thing and it is called adjunctum because it is adjoyned to the thing and it is put to another thing after it hath its being Now there is nothing in the world but may be a cause an effect a subject or adjunct and therefore Logick is general of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but in that he tels us that it is but adjoyned he tels us that it doth agree but quodam modo that is conditionally but many adjuncts be removed from their subjects sith their causes are in them Answ Sure there may be an alteration of them by the hinderance of the act of the form upon the matter or the act externally So the Adamant stone if we put but the juyce of garlick upon it it will not draw iron unto it Again the causes may be altered in the subject ergo the adjunct may be removed ergo it is but argumentum modo quodam consentaneum and not absolute requisitum Cui Because any thing whatsoever may have the respect of an adjunct as any thing may be a cause Aliquid That is that that is propounded or that which we are to argue or that that is argued so that that which the adjunct is adjoyned to is subjectum subjicitur Adjunctum doth presently tell me that there is some thing cui aliquid adjungitur he rather sayes subjicitur than adjungitur because adjunctum hath reference to subjectum and it is better to define them from the relation between them then a comparatis because relats are mutual causes one of another Now here he shews that the adjunct is that that is builded upon the subject and as the subject did presuppose a thing already made but must support another thing so adjunctum tels me it is a thing already made but must lye upon the subject subjectum signifies a supporter or a suppository as it were adjunctum that is more common than subjectum and subjectum lyes alway under but adjunctum it may either lye over or under or be tacked to either side yet it will fall off unless it be nailed or adjoyned to the subject Now that which tacks it to the subject is that affection which it hath to subjectum every thing will not be an adjunct to every thing nor every thing a subject to every thing Salomon saith if we bray a fool in a morter as wheat is brayed he will not be wise the reason is for that his spirits are so dry dull and earthy Now wisdom hath so fine a hand as that she cannot take hold of such hard things but they will hurt it so that it cannot be subjectum or adjunctum to any thing and this shews that Logick is in the things in nature and not in mans brain onely So this rule wils us to look how subjectum is able to support the adjunct and when he sees how God hath done them for him to use them to his turn Again this rule is of great use to see how things are tacked together in nature so as the one being taken away the other will remain entire then again though the adjunct in nature cannot be severed from the subject yet by my eye of Logick I can sever them Quod argumento etsi sub est levius attamen est copiosius frequentius Our Author doth commorari and tels us with very good
quality in man proceeding from such causes but as it doth notifie the thing whereof it is vox So our eye of reason as it is a part of man and faculty of the soul belongeth to Physicks as vox doth but as it doth act for that Eupraxie for which it was made so it belongeth to Logick In that he calls it nota we see it is another thing than the thing it self whereof it is a note and vox is nota i. e. a notifying and making known the apprehension of mans mind even as wax having the picture of the seal is to the seal it self and 〈◊〉 was man to name things And here is a fallacy very useful to say this or that is a true speech when it is not the speech in property but the Logick clothed in the speech that is true or false Vnumquodque For Grammer is a general Art Ergo ens is his subject more remote so that here he doth but specialize ens so that vox is but the subject of Grammer more special unumquodque more general and as affectio is to argumentum so is vocatio to the thing called so also that which was the aliquid in argumentum as Grammer takes his notion of it is unumquodque And that definition of nomen of a thing that may be seen felt heard or understood is erroneous for I can see feel or understand a thing and yet name it not But doth res belong to Grammer No but things attending ens for otherwise ars in general is about ens and words are terms given unto things so their doctrine must be general So that every thing hath its name which notatio in Logick sheweth Again Here we may see that verbs adverbs and conjunctions are voces and hence we may see the definition of a Noune to be too general and secondly their errour in calling nomen not vox Vocatur Here I am told how this nota is used which is for the calling of a thing and the naming of it hence when we are asked what part of Speech such a thing is we are to know that the thing is no part of speech but the name of it so it is fallacia divisionis when they ask what part of Speech a whole Speech is It is a great question which Scaliger in his Book De causts linguae Latinae whether words be ex thesi or ad placitum But for Compound words they are ex thesi as first words also in propriety of speech for we know that speech is the creature of God yea and that words signifie this or that thing it is also from the providence of God so God taught Adam to name the Creatures and so God wrought the Confusion of Tongues Now man was to name them and God by man because that speech was to be the carrier betwixt man and man Again Man was to be the Lords Steward over his Creatures and therefore he must know their names and Adam did name things with reason and according to his apprehension which we may see by men now adayes that name things so as according to their apprehension they can give a reason thereof So that words are given with respect to the thing named and the reason of the things named is in the thing so that words are not ad placitum so we give to little things little names so in English things that are glib have their names run much upon l or other semi-vowels if greater things then their names run upon grosser letters Now the Art of Speech is ars bexe sermocinandi for that is general both to Grammer and Rhetorick And the wisdom of God concerning Speech is double pure and ornate and these are in the things which Rhetorick shewes in that there is reason in every Trope and figura teacheth us to figurate the Speech as the thing is and if it be great we give it a great name if little we give it a little name And hence do arise the three stiles of Tully That for a lofty thing we have a lofty stile for a mean thing a mean stile for a little thing a low stile and that with good reason for Speech is the garment of Reason and therefore ought not to be too little or too great for it And for their Rules these Arts are eternal though changed by man which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and distinguisheth things by their names and Rhetorick is the same to all the world And so for Grammer the Rule for variation is eternal though the variation of words be according to the variation of men and this consists either in single words or in construction of more words where alwayes note that as the word governed doth depend upon the word that governeth it so do the things Vox constat syllabâ syllaba constat literâ litera est ex sono individuo For sonus is the material cause of it the form is from the figuration of it with the instruments of the mouth For the word litera some think it cometh from litteratura and therefore write it with a double it whereas it should be with a single t some think it comes of lineatura and so of linea from the matter some think it comes of litura a blot which Scaliger believeth not because it is from the destruction of it but this reason is more witty than sound for man is called mortalis of his death but I think it comes of litura a blot because when we set black upon white we do as it were blot the white paper and so sometime bloting and writing are confounded Linea comes of linum linen made of flax because thread was the first thing that was considered for a line and not of lino which signifieth to blot out so as delinere is the same with delere Litera est vocalis aut consona The reason in nature is because there are two principal sorts of the position of the mouth the first is when we make a sound without any more ado the second is where there is a more special kind of the use of the Organs in the mouth which letters either make a complete sound in themselves or an incompleat and even as in nature the first matter was incomplete yet makes things which are complete so the Consonants which in themselves are incomplete with vowels make syllables which are complete This word vocalis signifieth vocal i. e. sounding of himself for he needeth no other though he be joyned with another Now for vocalis they usually define it litera quae per se syllabam potest efficere this is à priore but not generally true for in our English tongue our w oo ee never make a complete sound neither in Hebrew and yet there they make a complete sound though they be not without a consonant Now for my own part I would define a vowel to be litera quae completum sonum edit or quae plenè sonat or rather quae constat sono completo but in
Now true it is that this as also the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 proceed from the thing in nature yet Logick is more general than any of the rest in regard of his use for it is in it self in speech in quantity c. so that look where any art is there Logick is but it doth not follow that where Logick is there Arithmetick Geometry c. should be Again it pleased the Lord to make man his Steward under him over all the Creatures ergo in this respect it is necessary he should behold all the creatures to the imployment of the use of the principal Lord therefore he must first see them therefore must be prepared with such a faculty that he may see all things by it Now this is omnium 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That there is such an Art I shew it thus If there be reason then there is an art of it because reason is ens a primo and it is for an end therefore there must be that art that is of reasons act For the proposition I proved it before for reason was for an end for the Assumption none will deny but that there is reason if they will acknowledge themselves to be but men Our Author cals this art Dialectica which comes of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifying secerno separo seligo as for example if there were many things together I would sever them and this name fitteth reasons act very well for Logick is like a fire among the Chimists for as fire will congregare homogenia and segregare heterogenia so Logick is the fire of all Arts severing in the same act that fire doth Logick from Grammar and Rhetorick from both c. and then it congregates to Logick that which is congreans to it to Grammar that which is homogenie to it c. so that when it invents it picks out homogenies it disposeth them and layes them in several places therefore this name Dialectica is very fitly given to this art that works this wonderful effect Wonderful I may call it for the Chimists can do great effects but the Logicians can do greater for they can see Gods Logick in the things and had not man faln he might have come to have seen all the wisdom of God in the Creatures Now if Logick doth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is congregare homogenia and segregare heterogenia by the same effect it may fitly be so called now this art is so called saith Diog enes Laertius first by Plato if he were the Author he was more ancient than Aristotle and antiquity should have honour with good reason if we have any reason nay Geometry is so called from its subject rather not metiri from antiquity but Zenophon in his fourth book of remembrances saith that Socrates was Platoes School-master and he never writ any thing but Plato alwayes so that Socrates might read it and Zenophon hear it for he was his Schollar for Zenophon Plato fuere aequales and Diogenes Laertius might read it in Plato as he had noted it from Socrates and the Oracle witnesseth that Socrates was the wisest man in his time and he was more wise than Aristotle for Plato that was Socrates Schollar was his Master so that for this name we see how fitly it agrees to this art and also the confirmation of it from antiquity Now Aristotle cals it Logick I do not deny but the name is good but it is later as Laertius witnesseth that Aristotle gave it first but it is from the subject â—eason as the names of most arts are Arithmetick of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 numerus Geometry of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 terra c. but it doth not so lively name this art as Dialectica doth which names the life and delivers the quintessence of Logick so that Logica as it is conjugate of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 names it well but doth not set it out with that vigour that Dialectica doth So thus we see the reason of the name Est Ars. What art is we have heard before this it is every thing hath an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which is accomplished by many petty 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which causes the precepts of art to be answerable thereunto so that Logicks main end is bene disserere bene invenire and bene judicare are the petty acts of it Now if Logica and Dialectica shew the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and frame of mans reason and direct it to the chief end its happiness where the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 esteth then it is ars at ergo Est ars bene disserendi First disserendi for the explanation of the word dissero comes of dis and sero sero signifies first to sow and dis a sunder or dissero that makes disserui to sow asunder whether it be so used I find not I for my part ever read it in this Logical signification and that which I told you of concerning dialectica is true 〈◊〉 his that as there was things to be sown and a satiâ— secernendorum and a sowing them asunder so there are first semina which are arguments in invention Secondly a satio of them that is a disposing of them Axiomatically and syllogistically and lastly a disserio that is a disposing of them according to true method and order so that in this disserere we have the nature of reason quite through as we had in Dialectica So that this name delivers also to us very fitly the very soul of Logick for as in mans body there is a soul or a form per quam res est id quod est a caeteris rebus distinguitur so there is of this art or rather of the subject of it reason and as in other things the Lord hath wrought so cunningly that we cannot see their forms but onely the next acts to the formes so here our Author desireth to give to us the form of reason which because he cannot do therefore he delivers it by the final cause the next act to the form so that when he saith dialectica est ars bene disserendi he means it is such an art that hath such a form that doth bene disserere therefore I conclude thus if this be the happiness the act and soul of reason then it is defined fitly Ars bene disserendi at ergo Bene. Here it is an adverb for Grammar here doth declare some controversie and an adverb is a part of speech joyned to the verb to shew his signification therefore bene is here added to make perfect the act of this disserere ergo bene disserere is not two things but one thing and this is a commendation in defining arts to break the forms of them as little as we can because the form is but one argument and if we put two or more words into the form we break it into so many peices Now for the reason of bene in a Art this it is Art is the rule of
the same thing homo is primae intentionis at the first hand genus of the second but genus doth not signifie the same that homo doth again genus hath his signification as well as homo that appears thus because it hath a distinct definition from homo therefore they are distinct re so that genus is primae intentionis to the thing it names as homo is primae to that thing it names Again are there not termes of Art as well in Grammar c. as in Logick why then doth he bring it in here as homo est nomen here nomen is the name of the thing not the thing it self ergo homo and nomen are not voces primae secundae intentionis for they are divers things so argumentum is concretum that is it is evermore with the thing not that it is the thing as homo is argumentum and it doth arguere which is an adjunct to the thing for so every Logical notion is an adjunct to the thing it self but here it is because we cannot sever the Logical notion from the thing because it is never but in re that is the reason why argumentum is alwayes in the concrete whereas 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 may be severed from the thing but this rule bids us onely find but tels us not what as yet so that it runs most orderly We have heard the first part of Logick to be called Invention in respect we are set to seek out the simples in the work of God De inveniendis argumentis because there is never a rule here but it is a blood-hound to find a Deer Again we heard it was an argument that was to be hunted not the thing but the argument the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the thing for the thing doth not belong to Logick but to every Art and Logick doth look at the thing by the logismos as the outward eye beholds bodies by light and colour and this is called argumentum a concrete because Logick is never severed from the thing nor the thing from Logick for we cannot see the thing but by reason therefore because these are inseparably together for that cause the subject of invention is argumentum so that in argumentum we are to consider two things first the thing as it is the subject of Art in genere and of the general Arts and then that same bird-lime that is in the thing whereby it may cleave to another thing which bird-lime is the Logical notion as when I say a chest is made of wood in Greek they have two names for it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the arguing the abstract as it were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the argument but our Author rather keeps the concrete because it is alwayes with the thing and cannot be severed from it then the subject of invention is ens at the first hand but argumentum at the second The tearm argumentum as we heard is from Law as the Greek names also be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is concione concionare and thus we see how farre Logicks rule reacheth this same argumentum was used at the first for that which we call praedicatum a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a barbarous word made first by Boetius but it is more general as we may see by the third argument in a syllogisme which may be an antecedent in the proposition or assumption as well as the consequent Kickerman saith vox is the subject of this first part and he hath many distinctions of it as it is abstracta or concreta this is nothing but a distribution of nomen into substantivum and adjectivum quatenus voces and therefore the old Grammarians did so teach it if they look at the thing they belong to conjugates in Logick and there we shall see them to signifie the same thing one absolutely the other as it hath respect to another and they are there not quatenus they are words nor quatenus they signifie if we go no farther but quatenus they contain symbolize the nature of first arguments Again he saith vox is univoca or aequivoca alas there is vox univoca in the world as homo his example is vox aequivoca if we call a painted man a man as we may call tropically but this belongs to a distribution and is but an example thereof not a rule as canus is sidus or animal terrestre or mâ—rinum is a distribution ex adjunctis so that to make a precept of an example is great confusion and the definition of a thing will take away the ambiguity of the word More distinctions he hath which all are nothing but several sorts of aequivocation as if he should say there may be aequivocation of Grammar and there may be aequivocation in Rhetorick c. he tels us further that a word must be certa absoluta c. what hath Logick to do with this let Grammar look to that for it breaks the definition of vox est nota qua c. if it name not the thing fitly as if vox should say vox est vota qua unumquodque vocatur will you call a man a spade then he brings in predicament and praedicables The world of Logicians doth imagine that Architas Tarentinus was the first inventor of them and taught them to his Scholler Pythagoras now the reason that brought them in was this that they might be furnished with matter to work about Logick So that they were store-houses for them to lay up things one way or other either analogice or a latere Kickerman approves that purpose of them for saith he things do not belong to Logick now the Logick in a predicament is this the order of things being placed one before another and so he saith the predicaments are of great use for the finding of simples Secondly they conduce for terminus complexus because we see what may be a subject and a predicate in a proposition then another use of them he sayes is for discursus for when we know what is above and below we may quickly know what is in the middest and they are also of use for method For the first Invention of them they are not store-houses for there is nothing but hath an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 therefore belongs to some Art so that the Arts are the true store-houses of things so that his table of substantia is nothing but a draught of natural Philosophy but I must tell you untowardly and that of quantity nothing but a draught of the Mathematicks that of quality nothing but a draught of natural and moral Philosophy Other things he brings in which are not so as he makes ubi to be a genus of intus and foras ad aliquid comes under relates Quando belongs to adjunctum c. but because Logicks use is there they think they belong to Logick by the same argument let them bring all Arts in Logick but saith he the things themselves belong to the special Arts but for
you shall see a composed form so that the Logician doth not look at the outward face of a thing but at the inward essence here he is fain to deliver the form by many other arguments and indeed it is a description of forma Est in secessu longo locus ensula portum c. Here he hath by the position of the parts of the haven told us the form of it CHAP. VIII De fine Finis est causa cujus gratia res est VVE have gone through the esse of a thing we have but heard of three when the fourth comes that makes up the perfection of the thing namely finis Finis for the name it is borrowed from Geometry for that that is terminus there is here called finis and it is brought hither to signifie that final cause that serveth to make up the effect so that it is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 if we keep the proportion of the esses but it is not the last part and member thereof as they make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the last member of some whole as Method is the last member of Logick Finis is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the esse of a thing not of the members of it Now it is called finis because it limits the thing for his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and for his essence and it is the last thing that limits it ergo it is called finis Est causa Because with force thereof the thing is and the end though it do not enter into the essence of the effect by it own essence yet by it vertue it doth efficere as doth the efficient Cujus gratia Therefore the final cause is that that graceth the effect and thence hath the thing his commendation cujus gratia for whose grace for gratia here signifieth not onely for whose sake but for whose grace as if the final cause were that which doth grace the effect and so indeed it doth For as bonum quo communius eo melius so communior finis hath more grace than finis specialio◠for that cause that which is next the chiefest end is more noble and excellent then that which is more remote Hence man is more excellent than any other creature because he is made immediately for God So then the end graceth it evermore and the more excellent the end is the more excellent is that effect This then is the esse that the final cause doth give to the effect namely that which is good for that effect so that the goodness of a thing is that vis in the effect that it hath from the end As in a knife the efficient may be a slave the matter likewise naught the form though that be something yet were it not for the end neither the efficient matter or form would move ergo the final cause is said to be the happiness of the thing so that a thing is not to be accounted happy till it be serviceable to that end for which it was made A garment well made as touching the skill of the efficient and of good stuffe for the matter and fit for a garment and so of a good form yet not fitting him for whom it was made it wanteth his end or happiness and so is not perfect Again this shews the difference between the formal cause and the end for the form may be as we see and not the end Again we know there are many things that have not their perfection but by growth and yet have all the causes yet notwithstanding the end presently follows after the form so man was made by God here God is the efficient earth the matter reason the form yet here is not his end namely fitness to serve God And thus we have heard the doctrine of the causes which are the foundations whereon the effect is builded Physicis rebus finis homo propositas est homini Deus Of natural things man is the end the grace of man is God and God makes him good not as an efficient but as an end Omnium artium est aliquod summom bonum finis extremus That is that end which they reach unto but that is not the summum bonum of all things for Logicks end is bene disserere Grammars bene loqui c. these are the furthest ends of Logick and Grammar but not the furthest end of all they are indeed the proper end of them but not the summum bonum so that he means by summum bonum the outmost or farthest end of them and the end of Logick lies in the precepts of it as they act bene disserere This is the difference between the end and the effect A house is made to dwell in though it never be dwelt in so for a garment to be worn is one thing and to be fit to wear another So if I go forth to speak with one and he be gone yet I obtain my end they commonly say he was frustrate of his end but not frustrate of finis quatenus finis but quatenus effectum Juno primo Aeneidos connubii finem assumit cum Aeolo Deiopeiam pollicetur solatii scilicet prolisque gratia Sunt mihi his septem praestanti corpore Nymphae c. Here Juno perswades Eolus to let his wind out and she would give him one of her Nymphs which she presseth upon him by final causes first that she may spend all her years with him and secondly that she may make him the father of a fair off-spring In defensione Ligarii Cicero Tuberonem accusatorem urget c. Et certe ait contra ipsum Caesarem est congressus armatus c. As if he should say Tubero thou hadst thy sword drawn at the battle of Pharsalio thou didst strike his side mark the variety of the phrases and so of the ends What meant thy sword what was thy mind here was the propositum What meantst thou to have done even to have killed Caesar So that the final cause is not accidental to the thing but even substantial and therefore we have it so often in the definition of Arts used for the form and that for this reason because it is the next argument to it and presupposeth the form so that this is the use of the final cause in the definition of Arts. As Dialectica est ars bene disserendi here bene disserere is the end and it is as if he should say Dialectica hath such a soul as that it is able to perform and execute this or that thing for which it was made So 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the end of all Arts I but what 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in general why 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the effect of all Arts Answ But as every thing is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is the end of it ergo if a man will do any Logicum opus he must 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and thus we have heard the doctrine
a thing indeed let it be from the effect we may commend one from his fair building but that is beggerly as Tully saith or a woman for her beauty but this is childish for the true commendation is from the effect so man is here to be dispraysed from his sin so the Lord is to be praised from his effects Quarum pleni sunt libri sacri prophani Why in Scripture because Divinity stands in action not in Theorie and therefore we have them so often commended that have done well contra Aenei 6. facta variorum populorum c. Excudent alii spirantia mollius aera c. The Romans are commended from their effects first regere imperio populos again parcere subjectis c. these are compared with the acts of other people and they are made minora to the effects of the Romans Excudent alii spirantia c. As the Corinthians will carve you any thing Orabant causas melius as the Orators among the Athenians Coelique meatus c. as the Caldeans and Egyptians will do Huc dicta scriptaque referenda sunt That is dicta and scripta in respect of Authors but if we look at the things written or spoken so they are testimonies So Pericles and Hortensius are famous for speaking well Demosthenes and Tully for both Ad hunc locum referuntur consilia deliberationes c. Counsels and deliberations are effects of them that consult and deliberate etiam si omnio ad exitum perductae non fuerint And this appears evidently in that Parmenio and Philotas were put to death being suspected of conspiracie against Alexander So also were Lentulus and Cethegus and other companions of Cataline Sunt etiam effecta virtutum vitiorum Quid non ebrietas designat operta recludit c. Now it is a common conceit that nothing is an effect but that which is substantial but accidental causes as I may call them may have accidental effects As drunkenness first operta recludit secondly in praelia trudit inermem it makes a man go to warre leaving his weapons behind him it will make a man think himself as good as my Lord Maior Faecundae calices here are cups for drink and drink for drunkenness quem non fecere desertum that is a dizard he meanes a Logician contracta quem non c. it makes a man in poverty a brave minded fellow CHAP. X. De subjecto Argumentum modo quodam consentaneum succedit ut subjectum adjunctum c. VVE have heard of the essential parts of a thing and so have seen the thing in his essence and we see how Logick doth direct the eye of our reason to see the most inmost thing in it Now we come to see the complemental things that belong to a thing not belonging or concurring to the existere of it so that the causes were as it were the simular parts these are as it were the blood in the sinews c. to make them full and complemental Modo quodam consentaneum as if he should say the causes were required ad esse rei these are but required ad bene esse rei so that the causes looked at the inside of the thing and now we come to look at the outside of it Argumentum modo quodam c. This is an imperfect transition containing onely the proposition of that which follows modo quodam as if he should say if they be there it is well notwithstanding if they be wanting it is no prejudice to the essence of the thing for they are but circumstances whereas argumenta absolute consentanea are penetralia again argumenta modo quodam consentanea come after the being of the thing for accidens inseparabilis as homini risus aequo hinnitus are but acts of the soul working in the bodies of their subjects Succedit Why because they are after those that agree absolutely we have heard that the effect ariseth from all the causes and cannot existere without them ergo it must be a thing of necessity before it be subject or adjunct or before it can have a subject or adjunct for that which hath adjuncts is a subject contra Vt subjectum adjunctum A subject is by nature before an adjunct and a thing is first a subject before it be an adjunct and there must be a thing subjected to an adjunct before a thing can be adjoyned to a subject again the subject is more general than the adjunct not that there are more subjects to one adjunct for it is quite contrary for there may be twenty adjuncts to one subject but I mean it is more in use and argues more strongly than the adjunct doth As when I say the King is there ergo the Guard is there is stronger than to say the Guard is there therefore the King and here we see as before priority and posteriority Now our reason is to behold things according to the course of God for whatsoever we see it was first in God and when he hath made a thing then it is a subject and it is capable of adjuncts before it have them ergo subjectum is before adjunctum in the practise of God and also of man Now subjectum as it is first so must it be taught first The name subjectum tels me it is a thing laid undermost in regard of the adjunct and it doth support it and yet it is not of the essence of it but onely laid under it and adjunctum is to ride on it as a pack-horse now as the efficient was most inmost then the other three or the effect so is subjectum here ergo it is by nature before adjunctum Subjectum est cui aliquid adjungitur He omits the genus and the reason why he doth not teach the genus namely argumentum modo quodam consentaneum is because it is a definition it self as absolute consentaneum was for there is no definition of a definition but if he had defined it he had brought a definition to a definition he wanted a word to name the thing and therefore gives me a description instead thereof cui aliquid this aliquid is that ens we heard of in Art so that this aliquid is any thing not simply but quatenus it hath an affection to be joyned A thing being an effect is fit to receive outward things and subjectum is defined by his relate adjunctum for it is cui aliquid adjungitur and whatsoever is subjected to another thing is his adjunct as whiteness is an adjunct to a wall that is white Adjungitur Adjungitur so that subjectum is the argument and adjunctum the aliquid adjungitur so that here he tels us that the adjunct is adjoyned to the subject th at which is must needs be after the thing to which it is tyed ergo subjectum is before adjunctum he saith it is but adjunctio not entring into the essence of it but that it may be taken away so that
as subjectum doth intimate a thing laid underneath so the adjunct doth intimate a thing laid upon it so that the adjunct doth depend and hang upon the subject as upon a hook or as one thing tyed to another thus have we heard the subjects argument to be so as if his adjunct be removed from him or he from his adjunct yet he stands firm in his causes Now for the manners Anima est subjectum scientiae ignore antiae virtutis vitii quia haec praeter essentiam accedunt Anima is a spiritual thing so are these adjuncts scientia ignorantia c. of the same kind too now these take hold one of another quodam modo ergo if they be removed yet the soul remains intire ergo it is but subjectum of them scientia c. Now are but adjoyned to it the anima his esse is not of their esse aut contra Some are of opinion as Scaliger that the Angels and mens souls esse and agere are the same but then their actus should be perpetual again then they have no adjuncts then no causes then God ergo they have their qualities Again it is a most sound and sure argument that they are creatures not God because they are finite ergo have causes ergo are effects ergo have adjuncts Object But how are these joyned to the soul it hath two faculties reason and will now the faculties of the understanding are the intellectual vertues when it can promptly and readily perform its act as when it is prompt and ready in inventing then it is inteligentia when it is prompt in seeking out truths then it is sciâ—ntia when it is ready in discoursing then it is sapientia c. so that these intellectual vertues are habits of the faculty of reason and lye in the promptness of its act so by vertues he meanes moral veâ—tue not intellectual and that is of the will For when the will can promptly perform the act of bountifulness or justice then it is in like sort liberality or justice and so for the rest and the contrary makes 〈◊〉 ergo these are but adjuncts quia praeter essentiam accident that is these come over and above the essâ—â—ce The soul is tanquam tabula abrasa and these vertues come afterward Corpus sanitatis morbi roboris infirmitatis pulchritudinis deformitatis The soul had his spiritual adjuncts the body hath his proper adjuncts also and this definition of his teacheth us to look at the proper adjuncts of things So sanitas is a proper adjunct to the body for there ariseth an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and thence comes sanitas and morbus robur ariseth principally from the bones and sinews beauty ariseth from the freshness of blood and the analogie and proportion of the parts for if there be comely visage and not blood it is not beauty we call it good favour but not fair but here it is opposed to deformity and contains not onely well favour which stands in the symmetry of the parts one to another which belongs to Physick but colour which belongs to blood Homo subjectum est divitiarum paupertatis honoris infamiae vestitus comitatus Here homo hath his adjuncts general both to soul and body now here we see that subjects and adjuncts are not as the common Schools take them namely onely substances to be subjects and accidents adjuncts for accidents may be subjects contra ergo that distribution of ens into substantia and accidens will not follow in any Art but here and they aâ—e special kinds of subjects and adjuncts Locus est subjectum rei locatae Locus is a modus of subjectum the Schools both ancient and of latter time have maintained locus to belong to natural Philosophy because say they it ariseth from every thing in nature Now first true it is that there is nothing but it is res naturalis even reason speech quantity c. are res naturales and it doth not therefore follow because it is res naturalis ergo it belongs to nature for it is a meer affection and it is taken away if we take away the locatum and as causa may be no causa effectum no effectum so may locus be no locus Again cannot things in Art be in place as well as things in nature are not Angels finite and terminated and locus if we take it properly is nothing but subjectum rei locatae as in causa there was the thing causa as it causeth so there is locus as there is the thing receiving as when I say such a one is in my chamber here I consider my chamber not as it is in his building but as it is receiving him Again if it should not be in Logick it should rather be in Geometry than in Nature for limitation of place is next and immediately from the limitation of quantity and there we hear of locus as there is repletio loci locus here is put for the space of that place by a metonimy of subject for the adjunct Est subjectum Here that which we heard of in adjuncts is res locata because it doth apply that special kind of adjunct that answers to this subject locus Now it is not essential to the thing ergo is but complemental again that which is now in one place may remove to another place ergo is not absolutely consenting to the thing and thus we see it must needs belong to Logick as being but in respect they say onely corpus is in loco descriptive and not spirits they are but in ubi or in loco designatione but what is this but a rule of Geometry where we hear of completio loci by corpus and therefore Aristotle brings locus to quantity Then again they question whether the space that contains a thing be locus or no. Answ Space belongs to nature and is nothing but the measure that doth fill the place and is nothing but that quadrangula sex complent locum or a pint will receive a pint and therefore to receive is to measure the space I confess you may name it in Nature but not define it Sic Philosophi divinis entibus licet parte magnitudine carentibus attribuunt locum So the Philosophers give place to the intelligences whereas he making them to move the heavens saith they are on the superficies of them Licet parte magnitudine carentibus Here he speaks according to the common conceits in Schools but I marvel how he or any other can say so Scaliger saith they are in divine predicament of quantity but not in this gross predicament of quantity and they have a figure In what figure were Angels first created An. In what figure was water first made they can take any figure as water can but I think they were first made in the figure of roundness So Aristotle saith they were made as puncta So is fire round for that is figura capacissima
quidres sit We heard that the arguments arising manifoldly were distribution and definition now definition ariseth as it shall fall out either from agreers or disagreers comparates or orta ergo it arising from more arguments than any of the rest it is requisite that it should be after all the rest though in laying down an Art it will have the first place because if it be a perfect definition it layes out the essence of a thing immediately if it be a description it layes down the quantity c. A definition is as it were a box that layes up all the rules following in the Art even as the body doth the members Definitio For the name we know finis is terminus and belongs to Geometry we heard it borrowed from thence into Logick to signifie a cause here it signifies the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so that definire is to set down the extreme or utmost points of a thing ergo it must be reciprocal with the thing defined else can it not define it for if the definitum be larger than the definitio then it out-reacheth the limits of the thing if it be less then it layeth not out the essence fully Cum explicatur So that definitio doth lay abroad explicatio is a laying abroad the quiddity of a thing In that he saith definitio doth explicare he means all the arguments before were clapt together in the thing confusedly but the definition doth lay them abroad as in this word Dialectica there is a Synopsis of all Logick but when I say it is ars bene disserendi here the definition layes out all more at large the definite is like a Pedlers pack wherein his points pins knives c. are shut up altogether and the definitio is like the laying of them out or shewing of them to the end that he may sell them The one may likewise be compared to a garment folded up the other to a garment spread abroad at large Quid. That is the essence for as in a perfect definition we may gather the other arguments of a thing from the causes so in a description we may gather the causes from other arguments this entity therefore or essence the definition alwayes looks at another difference of the definitum and the definitio is that the definitum is ens and the definitio is essentia Res. That is the ens the subject of the general Arts that is aliquid in the definition of argumentum Eaque vicissim definitio argui potest As the definite called before res may be argued a definitione so contra though the definitio be more often brought to argue the definite than contra ergo it hath the name definition not from definitum but from the definitio Object Kickerman saith Ramus will have definitio both an argument and an axiom Answ No we make it an argument when we speak properly we make it an axiom when we speak Synecdochichos Definitio est perfecta aut imperfecta This distribution is now to good purpose for the Schools have not agreed at any time of any perfect definition as they say homo est animal rationale this is not a perfect definition ergo some do add mortale some capax disciplinae some both so that indeed we cannot give a perfect definition of any thing ergo because it is so hard to find the special form it is requisite to have an imperfect one to grope out the form thereby else we should be undone if we could no way look at the essence of things and here by the way we see the quiddity laid out perfectly by a perfect definition and imperfectly by an imperfect definition Illa proprie definitio haec descriptio dicitur Where we may see that perfecta definitio is properly the species of this definition and that the definition before was synecdochichal now that explio catio of the thing is perfect or imperfect the one called definitio the other descriptio the one containing the limitation of the essence the other the limitation of the quantity so that whatsoever hath an essence distinct from it self must be limited ergo may be defined ergo have their perfect definition though we cannot see what their form is Definitio perfecta est definitio constance solis causis essentiam constituentibus The reason is because it stands of more parts namely the genus and form laying out the composition of the thing Ecausis As if he should say they do give existere to the definite Solis Because no other arguments come in a perfect definition Essentiam constituentibus That is materia and forma but materia is included in genere so that definitio is ortum doubly now there are four causes which give esse but two of them onely give essence so that the effect hath his substance from the matter and form not from the other causes Quales causa genere forma comprehenduntur Ramus doth commorari upon this doctrine shewing that a perfect definition doth lay out the substantial quiddity of a thing now the reason why he saith genere and not materia simply but materia as it is in genere is this because the genus containeth not onely the matter but also a portion of the form the general form ergo it must be the next genus that we must bring in a perfect definition for if the genus be more remote then the form of the next genus must be left out but if we take the next genus then we bring in all above it Et forma comprehenduntur That is the special form the reason in nature is this we find that the totum is not subsistent but in singularibus now we find moreover that singulars have that whereby they are singulars beside for else one singular could not be destinct from another ergo every singular must have his peculiar form and also his matter not as it is a first argument but as it is symbolice in genere Vt in aenimali pars formae He means of the general form for anima vegetativa and sensitiva are the forms of vivens and so of animal Totam formam hominis As if the form of man did consist of these as of parts but it is not so the truth is this there is in some things a simple life in some things more lives as anima vegetativa is firstly in planta now animal hath that and somewhat more namely sensitiva and man hath both them and also reason so that one of the species hath nothing but that which the genus hath namely vivens and planta for planta is vivens quae vivit vitam tantum vegetativam and so is vivens onely tantum makes the difference from others Now from this discourse he gathers that a definition is universale symbolum not that singulars cannot be perfectly defined as well as universals but he meanes it is a symbolum containing universally the causes constituting the essence so that the individuum hath
cannot so perfectly see fish Water is most cold and moist by reason of the forms act being more active than the form of earth But how then is it most cold Because though the form act more than the form of earth yet the matter doth so strongly reagere that 't is more sensibly cold because of the greater action and passion even as when a ball or a stone is cast forcibly unto me if I meet it with my hand it doth more sensibly agere than if I take it gent ly in my hand 'T is also moist because it being exceedingly cold is also moist and moisture causeth softness so that softness is a quality arising from moisture and is properly of the air and secondly of the water The earth is most dry because the form of it is so little active cannot extend it ergo to make it fluid and so it makes it dry Fire is more fluid than the earth but not so dry air having heat which doth extend moisture makes it most moist but not dry Again t is cold but not actually as water because the form doth not act so much upon it as the form of water upon water Again hence the earth is most solid and least porous of any of the elements Again the earth is most dark and opake of all the elements the air and water are capable of light and opacitie because the creatures that live in them have a sensible life and should have light and darkness night and day Thus much of the elements simply considered as they are elements now there is not only an apposition of them but a kind of imperfect misture for they cannot give sapor and such other qualities as they have but as they are mista Ergo we shall hear of them again in the meteors as also of the regions of the air and of mare and of other rivers which are meteors Elementarium Elementare est quod ex elementis est Ergo for its matter 't is made immediately of the materiale principium and for the forme of it 't is made proximè ex formis elementorum Obj. But then the forms of things should be composed Answ So they are even as the body is composed of many parts which are composed of many similar parts which contain both matter and form Again Mistio est miscibilium alteratorum unio Ergo 't is mistio that makes a thing unum then must the forms be mista and so composite for that makes the thing unum Now for those that say the forms of things are from the influences I would ask them What it is that unites the matter and form together for in Logick we know there is nothing betwixt the matter and the form Some say that spirit is the vinculum of the soul and body yea but the soul is not the form and again what shall unite them in a stone where there is no such spirit Object 2. Some deny the forms of the elements to be in the mist But if they be not how do they return into the elements again and again 't is granted by all that the qualities are there ergo their forms must be there and the elements are actu in the mist yea and are agents there as we shall hear hereafter in mistione Now the greatest objection I find against this is this say they How can things without life cause things to live There may be a vivens of them because anima vegetiva and sensitiva are nourished by nutriment for spiritus vitalis is the vegetative soul which is nourished by humidum radicale and hath air predominating in it and spirit us animalis is that sensitive soul which is nourished by moisture and heat and hath fire predominating in it and the common people do use to say that these do vanescere in auras and the spiritus animalis is made of the vital spirit and the vital spirit is made of a natural spirit which ariseth from the meat which we eat ergo if these can nourish and keep life they can also cause life If they shall say the vital spirit is not made of the natural then it must be made of nothing and so should be eternal in nature Keckerman saith the elements are corpora incompleta which is most false for they should not exist but in composites but they do in themselves for they are effects I rather chuse this word elementarium than mistum because mistum is but an adjunct to it Elementarium est quod est ex elementis and so the first matter but at the second hand and hence it appears that the elements go into the mistum But the greatest Objection that ever I met with concerning this is that How can things which have not life cause life Yes For life is but an act and a composite act Again life is preserved and maintained by the elements ergo may be caused by them so the animal spirits are made of the vital and the vital of the elements not only as they are acts but also as they are membra for there is no other soul in Plants and Beasts for they are next to the reasonable soul Now if they shall say these spirits vital and animal be not made of the elements but of some other thing I would ask them Of what of the spirits which are in the meat Then the forms of Plants and Beasts must be made of the forms of Herbs and of such things as they feed on if they will say they be made of the influences they are then either accidents which cannot be forms or substances if substances then they should be portions of the matter and forme of the Stars and then the stars should not remain the same thing Mistio they say is alteratorum unio so that in the framing of the forms of things there must be an alteration and another forme distinct from any of these forms from whence it did arise even as in a Chest made of boards I cannot in propriety of speech call them boards but a Chest made of these boards So in the things that are mist I cannot say the elements forms are their forms but t is a mist forme composed of the elements which are incomplete in the mist So that true 't is there is an alteration but a generation also though generation will not serve the turn because there is not a corruption of the elements which make the things neither indeed do generation and corruption go alwayes together for when a chicken is made of an egg there is not a corruption but a perfecting of the egg neither is there acquisitio novae formae but veteris perfectio And the elements are members of the elementaries but a part of fire is not a membrum of fire but part of the matter and form of fire Now here is the chief question How these are in the mist First of all the elements by the mutual action and passion of their matter and forme are holden together