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A51655 Malebranch's search after truth, or, A treatise of the nature of the humane mind and of its management for avoiding error in the sciences : vol I : done out of French from the last edition.; Recherche de la vérité. English Malebranche, Nicolas, 1638-1715. 1694 (1694) Wing M315; ESTC R4432 349,306 512

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that they do not help us to the Knowledge of Things but in respect to the preservation of our Body and not according to what they are in themselves is exactly true in this case since we have a more exact Knowledge of the Motion or Rest of Bodies in proportion to their nearness and which we cou'd examine by the Senses than when they are so distant That the Relation they have to our Bodies ceases as when they are five or six hundred Paces from us if they are of an ordinary bigness and even nearer than that if they are less or in fine farther off if they are greater CHAP. X. Of Errors about Sensible Qualities I. A distinction of Soul and Body II. An Explication of the Organs of the Senses III. To what part of the Body the Soul is immediately Vnited IV. How Objects act upon Bodies V. How upon the Soul with Reasons why the Soul does not perceive the Motions of the Fibres of the Body VI. Four things which are Confounded in every Sensation WE have seen in the preceding Chapters that the Judgments we form by these means of our Eyes about Extension Figure and Motion are never exactly true yet we must confess they are not absolutely false they include at least this Truth That Extension Figure and Motion whatever they are are without us It 's true we often see things which are not and which never were and we ought not to conclude that a thing is without us from hence only that we see it without us there is no necessary connexion between an Idea that is presented to the Mind of Man and the Existence of a thing which this Idea represents That which happens to those who sleep or are delirious sufficiently proves this however we can ordinarily be assur'd that Extension Figures and Motions which we see are without us These are not meer imaginary things they are real and we are not deceiv'd if we believe they have a real Existence and which is independant of our Mind though it 's very * See the Explanations difficult to prove it It is then evident that the Judgments we make about the Extension Figures and Motions of Bodies contain some Truth but the same cannot be said of those things that belong to Light Colours Sapors Odours and all other sensible Qualities for Truth is never to be found there as we have shown before We do not here distinguish Light from Colours because we believe they are not very different nor can be separately explain'd We shall be oblig'd to speak of other sensible Qualities in General at the same time that we treat of these two because they might be explain'd from the same Principles We ought to be very attentive to the things that follow for they are of the most important Consequence and much more useful than those things we have yet spoken of I suppose first Distinction of the Soul and Body that the Reader has made some Reflexion upon the two * I here cast Idea every thing that is the immediate Object of the Mind Idea's which are found in our Soul one which represents the Body to us and the other the Mind that he is able to distinguish them by the positive Attributes which they include in a word that he be well persuaded that Extention is different from Thought Or else I suppose him to have Read and Consider'd some Places of St. Augustin as the 10th Chapt. of the 10th Book of the Trinity the 4th and 14th Chap. of the Book of the Quantity of the Soul or the Meditations of Descartes especially that which respects the Distinction of the Soul and Body Or lastly the Sixth Discourse of M. de Cordemoy du discernement de l'ame du Corps I suppose also II. Explication of the Organs of the Senses that he knows the Anatomy of the Organs of the Senses and that they are compos'd of small Branches which have their Original in the middle of the Brain whence they disperse themselves through all the Members of Sensation and that at last without any interruption terminate at the Extreme parts of the Body That whilst we are Awake or in Health one of their Extremities cannot be mov'd but the other is also mov'd because of their perpetual Intension just as an extended Cord cannot be mov'd in one part without communicating motion to another The Reader must also know that these little Strings or Branches may be affected after two ways either at the end which is at the extremity of the Body or at that which is in the Brain If these little Strings are shaken by the Action of External Bodies upon them and this Motion is not communicated to the Brain as it often happens in sleep then the Mind receives no new Sensation by that Action but if these Strings are mov'd in the Brain by the Course of the Animal Spirits or by some other Cause the Soul perceives something although the parts of these Strings which are out of the Brain and which are dispers'd through all the parts of our Bodies be in perfect rest as it often happens in sleep It is not amiss to observe here by the by III. The Soul is immediately united to that part of the Brain where the Strings of the Organs of the Senses meet how Experience teaches us that we do sometimes feel pain in such parts of our Bodies as have been cut off because the Strings of the Brain which belong to those respective parts being shaken after the same manner as if they were effectually hurt the Soul feels a very real Pain in these Imaginary Parts Now all these things shew visibly that the Soul immediately resides in that part of the Brain where all the Organs of Sense meet I mean it perceives all the Changes which pass there by means of Objects which Cause or have been accustom'd to Cause them and perceives nothing that passes out of this part but by the interposition of the Fibres which terminate there This Position being well conceiv'd it will not be very difficult to shew how Sensation is made which must be explain'd by some Example When I thrust the Point of a Needle into my Hand IV. An Example how Objects affect Bodies this Point removes and separates the Fibres of the Flesh the Fibres are continued from this place to the Brain and when one sleeps they are extended enough not to be shaken unless those of the Brain be also shaken it follows then that the Extremities of these Fibres which are in the Brain are also moved If the Motion of the Fibres in my Hand is moderate that of the Fibres of the Brain will be so also and if the Motion is violent to break something upon my Hand it will be much stronger and more violent in the Brain Thus also if I come near the Fire the small parts of Wood which it continually in great number and with much violence disperses as may be prov'd by
as to that which is in the Hand or in the Fire Now this Judgment is Natural or rather it is a Compounded Sensation But this Sensation or this Natural Judgment is almost always follow'd by another free Judgment which the Soul is so accustom'd to that it can scarce refrain from it These four things are very different as may be shewed however Men do not carefully distinguish them but are inclin'd to confound them by reason of the strict union betwixt the Soul and Body which hinders us from separating the Properties of Matter from those of the Mind Yet it is easie for any Man to know that of these four things which pass in us when we perceive some Object the two first are proper to the Body and the two last to the Soul provided he consider a little the Nature of the Soul and Body as he ought to do which I have suppos'd But these things must be explain'd in Particulars CHAP. XI I. Of the Error we are subject to in respect of the Action of Objects upon the External Fibres of our Senses II. The Cause of that Error III. An Objection and Answer IN this and the three following Chapters we shall Treat of these Four Things which are confounded and taken for pure Sensation and shall only in general explain the Errors we are subject to because if we should enter into particulars it would be endless Yet I do not doubt but I may so assist the Mind of such as will seriously Meditate upon what shall be said as to make them capable of discovering with great facility all the Errors that are caused from our Senses but it will be requisite then that they shou'd think with fome application both upon the preceding and following Chapters The first of these things which we confound in all our Sensations I. Of the Erro we are ju●ject to in respect to the Objects acting upon the Fibres of our Serses is the Action of Objects upon the External Fibres of our Body It is most certain that there is hardly any distinction made between the Sensation of the Soul and this Action of the Objects of which there needs no proof for Example almost all Men imagine that the heat they feel is in the Fire which causes it that Light is in the Air and Colours upon Coloured Objects they have no thoughts upon the Motions of fome imperceptible Bodies which cause these Sensations It is true II. The Cause of the Error that they do not imagine that pain is in the Needle that pricks them as they judge heat to be in the Fire the reason is because the Needle and its Action are visible but the Particles of the Wood which go out from the Fire and their Motion against our Hands are not seen so that seeing nothing that strikes our Hands when we warm our selves and feeling heat we naturally judge this heat to be in the Fire because we see nothing else there So that 't is commonly true that we attribute our Sensations to Objects when the Causes of these Sensations are unknown to us and because Pain and Tititation are produced by sensible Bodies as with a Needle a Feather which we see and touch and therefre we do not judge that there is any thing like to these Sentiments in those Objects that cause them in us It is certain indeed III. Objection that we do not imagine that the burning is in the Fire but only in the Hand although it is caused by Particles of the Wood as well as the Heat which we always attribute to the Fire But the reason of it is the burning is a kind of Pain and having many times judged that Pain is not in the External Body which Causes it we are induced also to make the same Judgment of Burning What further persuades us to judge after this manner is that Pain or Burning does strongly apply our Soul to the affected parts of our Bodies and that diverts us from thinking on other things Thus the Mind unites the Sensation of burning to that Object that is nearest to it And because we soon after perceive that the burning hath left fome visible Marks in that part where we felt the Pain this confirms us in the Judgment we have made that the burning is in the Hand But this must not hinder us from receiving this general Rule that we use to attribute our Sensations to Objects every time they act upon us by the Motion of fome invisible Particle This is the reason that we generally believe that Colours Light Odours Taste Sound and fome other Sensations are in the Air or in the External Objects which cause them because all Sensations are produced in us by the Motion of fome Imperceptible Bodies CHAP. XII I. Of the Errors concerning the Motions of the Fibres of our Senses II. That either we perceive not these Motions or else confound them with our Sensations III. Experience which proves it IV. Three sorts of Sensations V. The Errors which accompany them THE second thing that may be observed in each of our Sensations I. Errors concerning the motions or shaking of the Fibres of our Senses II. That we confound them with the Sensa●on of our Soul and sometime again do not perceive them is the shaking of the Fibres of our Nerves which is communicated unto the Brain and we deceive our selves in this that we confound this shaking with the Sensation of the Soul and judge there is none when we perceive it not by the Senses We confound for instance the Motion that the Fire excites in the Fibres of our Hands with the Sensation of Heat and we say that the Heat is in our Hand But because we feel not the shaking that visible Objects produce in the Optick Nerve which is in the bottom of the Eye we think that this Nerve is not shaken and that it is not cover'd with the Colours that appear to us on the contrary we judge that 't is only external Objects upon which these Colours are dispersed yet we may see by the following Experiment that Colours are almost as strong and lively in the bottom of the Optick Nerve as upon visible Objects Take the Eye of an Ox that is newly killed III. Experience which proves it and strip the Skins from it that are opposite to the Apple of of the Eye in the place where the Optick Nerve is and put in their room a little bit of Paper that is very thin and place this Eye in the hole of a Window so that the Apple be in the Air and the back part of the Eye be in the Chamber which must be shut close so that it may be very dark and then all the Colours of the Objects which are without the Chamber will appear upon the bottom of the Eye but represented upside down And if these Colours shou'd happen not to be very lively if the Objects which are painted at the bottom of the Eye are too near the
MALEBRANCH's SEARCH AFTER TRUTH OR A Treatise of the Nature OF THE Humane Mind AND Of its Management for avoiding Error in the Sciences VOL. I. Done out of French from the last Edition LONDON Printed for I. Dunton at the Raven in the Poultrey and S. Manship at the Ship in Cornhil 1694. TO THE Marquess of NORMANBY My LORD THis Learned Treatise of the Famous Malebranch begs the Favour of your Lordships Patronage and if any thing could do so would almost deserve it All great Genius's are nearly related to one another at least there is a sort of Sympathy between them and the Wits of France have never fail'd of a kind Reception from those in England which the most Cruel Wars cannot hinder nor does Love to our Country forbid us from doing Justice to theirs The Translation of good French Books into our Tongue is a Reprisal on their Nation who have taken the same way by such Writings as are Famous in Antiquity doing all that was in their Power for an Universal Language perhaps to make way for Universal Empire So that Translation from them again is only a Countermining them and Fencing with them at their own Weapons And this perhaps might succeed as well in our Language as any in Europe since 't is much fuller and stronger and consequently capable of mending an Original and indeed nothing can hinder it but want of Encouragement from Men in Power or Weakness in the Performance For the First there is no one that can justly complain of it who has the Ambition of placing the Name of Normanby before his Writings it gives him a new Soul and he ought neither to think or write meanly when he considers at whose Altars his Labours are offer'd For the Second I have as little to say for it as I could wish our Criticks may have to say against it The Errors that have escap'd the Press in the Original the Difficulty of the Subject the Confinement of Language for fear of spoiling the Philosopher to gratifie the Gentleman my own necessary Avocations and the very little time I did it in cannot promise so correct a Translation as perhaps it otherwise might have been yet I am willing to believe it may in some measure be useful to such as can read it without Prejudice and it being design'd by the Author only for such as are willing to know the Errors of their Senses and Imagination and the Weakness of the Humane Mind in order to discover Truth and Happiness I cannot be very uneasie about anticipating its Fate amongst others especially under your Lordships Protection Indeed I may very well be Ambitious and Proud of such a Protection when the Government begins to be so very Sensible of the Happy Influences of your great Abilities and Interest 'T is a rare Happiness to have Prudence in Council joyn'd with Bravery in Action Nay the same Man may be a Politick-General and Master of much Personal Valour yet be far enough from an Accomplish'd Statesman But to think coolly yet act warmly to seize and improve every Advantage and yet pierce into the Depths of Futurity and disintangle intricate and distant Causes and Effects are only Accomplishments for such a King as ours and such a Minister of State as your Lordship Nor are your great Abilities to serve the Publick Good without particular Instances of your Personal Hazards and Signal Zeal for its Preservation in the late Dutch Wars when your Lordship was pleased to Command the Royal Catherine a Post that was the greatest Evidence of your Lordships Loyalty and Bravery The highest Military and Civil Honours which require great Application hinder not your Lordship from excelling in the less Severe Studies a great Genius will do best upon whatever Employment it fixes it self witness your Lordships Essay on Poetry and that admirable Product of your Youth the Temple of Death with several other Miscellany Pieces of your Lordships which like our great Roscommon's Works have a particular noble Air that is not only the Effect of a great Genius but also of a Genteel and Happy Education and therefore unimitable by our best Wits who can only plead the former Qualification Nor is it any Wonder that so great a Master should Patronize others who have excell'd in the same Divine Art which requires that force of Spirit and fineness of Thought that are necessary to all that even in Prose shall do any thing extraordinary or worthy the Perusal of such Judges as your Lordship this Malebranch is allow'd by all to have in his Native Language and therefore if he gives your Lordship no Entertainment the Defect must be in the Translation not the Original the very Faults of this great Man have something in them extreamly Beautiful and the Jewel is so dazling that the flaws are scarce discern'd The inscribing these Papers to your Lordships most honorable Patronage is the occasion of this Address wherein I have the Honor to testifie both to your Lordship and the World with how profound a Deference and Respect I am My LORD Your Lordships most Humble and most Obedient Servant Richard Sault THE PREFACE THE Mind of Man is by its Nature as it were situated between its Creator and Corporeal Creatures since according to * Nihil est potentius illâ Creaturâ quae mens dicitur rationalis nihil est sublimius Quidquid supra illam est jam Creator est Tr. 23. upon St. John St. Austin there is nothing above it but God alone and nothing below it but Bodies But as the great Elevation it has above all Material things does not hinder it from being united to them and from depending in some measure upon a Portion of Matter so the infinite distance that is between the Sovereign Being and the Mind of Man does not hinder it from being immediately and in a very strict manner united to him This last Vnion raises it above all things it gives it Life Light and all its Felicity and * Quod rationali animâ melius est omnibus consentientibus Deus est Aug. St. Austin speaks of this Vnion in many Passages of his Works as of that which is the most Natural and the most Essential to the Mind On the contrary the Vnion of the Mind with the Body debases Man exceedingly and is the Principal Cause of all our Errors and Miseries I do not wonder that the common sort of Men or that the Heathen Philosophers should only consider in the Soul its Retation and Vnion with the Body without distinguishing its Relation and Vnion with God But I am surprised that Christian Philosophers who should prefer the Mind of God to the Mind of Man Moses to Aristotle St. Austin to some wretched Commentator upon a Heathen Philosopher should look upon the Soul rather as the Form of the Body than as being made after the Image and for the Image of God that is according to * Ad ipsam similitudinem non omnia facta sunt sed
9 Chap. 3. I. That Philosophers dissipate their Mind by applying it to Subjects which include too many Relations and which depend upon too many things without keeping any Order in their Studies II. An Example drawn from Aristotle III. That Geometricians on the contrary proceed well in an Enquiry after Truth especially those who make use of Algebra IV. That their method increases the power of the Mind and that Aristotle's Logick weakens it V. Another defect of studious Persons p. 15 Chap. 4. I. The Mind cannot long apply it self to any Object which neither relates to it self nor to Infinity II. The Inconstancy and consequently the Error of the Will proceeds from this Defect of Application III. Our Sensations affect us more than the Pure Idea's of the Mind IV. What is the Original Cause of the Corruption of Manners V. And the Ignorance of the Generality of Mankind p. 20 The Second Part of the Pure Understanding Of the Nature of IDEA'S Chap. 1. I. WHat is meant by Idea's That they truly Exist and that they are necessary to perceive all material Objects II. A division of all the Modes by which External Objects may be seen p. 29 Chap. 2. That material Objects do not emit Species which resemble them p. 33 Chap. 3. That the Soul has no power of producing Idea's The Cause of Mens Error in reference to this Subject p. 35 Chap. 4. That we do not sie Objects by the means of Idea's which were created with us And that God does not produce them in us so often as we have occasion for them p. 41 Chap. 5 That the Mind neither sees the Essence nor Existence of Objects in considering its own Perfections That none but God sees them in that manner p. 44 Chap. 6. That we see all things in God p. 46 Chap. 7. I. Four different ways of seeing things II. How we know God III. How we know Bodies IV. How we know our Soul V. How we know the Souls of other Men and pure Spirits p. 55 Chap. 8. I. The Intimate Presence of the Wandering Idea of Being in General is the Cause of all the Irregular Abstractions of the Mind and of the greatest part of the Chimera's of common Philosophy which hinder many Philosophers from discovering the Solidity of the True Principles of Moral Philosophy II. Example concerning the Essence of Matter p. 6● Chap. 9. I. The last General Cause of our Errors II. That the Idea's of things are not always present to the Mind as soon as 't is desir'd III. That all Finite Minds are liable to Error and why IV. We ought not to judge that there are only Bodies or Spirits nor that God is a Spirit as we conceive Spirits p. 71 Chap. 10. Examples of some Physical Errors into which Men fall because they suppose that things which differ in their Nature Qualities Extension Duration and Proportion are alike in all things p. 77 Chap. 11. Examples of some Errors of Morality which depend on the same Principle p. 87 The Conclusion of the Foree first Books p. 91 BOOK IV. Of the Inclinations and Natural Motions of the Mind Chap. 1. I. IT 's necessary the Mind have Inclinations as well as the Body Motions II. God acts the Humane Mind only for himself III. Mens Minds are only inclin'd to Particular Good through the Motion they have to Good in General IV. The Origine of the Chief Natural Inclinations which will make up the Division of this Fourth Book p. 1 Chap. 2. I. The Inclination for Good in General is the Principle of the Disquiet of our Will II. And consequently of our Negligence and Ignorance III. First Example Morality little known to many Men. IV. Second Example The Immortality of the Soul disputed by some Men. V. That our Ignorance is exceeding great in respect of abstracted things or such as have but little Relation to us p. 7 Chap. 3. I. Curiosity is natural and necessary II. Three Rules to moderate it III. Explanation of the first of these Rules p. 20 Chap. 4. A Continuation of the same Subject I. Explanation of the Second Rule of Curiosity II. Explanation of the Third p. 27 Chap. 5. I. Of the Second Natural Inclination or of Self-Love II. It is divided into the Love of Being and Well-Being or of Greatness and Pleasure p. 31 Chap. 6. I. Of the Inclination we have for every thing that raises us above other Persons II. Of the false Judgments of some Pious Persons III. Of the false Judgments of the Superstitious and Hypocrites IV. Of Voetius an Enemy to Monsieur Descartes p. 35 Chap. 7. Of the desire of Science and of the Judgments of pretenders to Learning p. 42 Chap. 8. I. Of the Desire of being thought Learned II. Of the Conversation of pretenders to Learning III. Of their Works p. 48 Chap. 9. How the Inclination we have for Honours and Riches lead us to Error p. 56 Chap. 10. Of the Love of Pleasure in relation to Morality I. We must shun Pleasure though it make us Happy II. It must not incline us to the Love of Sensible Delights p. 58 Chap. 11. Of the Love of Pleasure in relation to Speculative Sciences I. How it hinders us from discovering Truth II. Some Examples p. 65 Chap. 12. Of the Effects which the thought of Future Bliss and Sufferings is capable of producing in the Mind p. 79 Chap. 13. I. Of the Third Natural Inclination which is the Friendship we have for other Men. II. It induces us to approve our Friends Thoughts and to deceive them by False Praises p. 85 A SEARCH AFTER TRUTH BOOK I. Of the Errors of the Senses CHAP. I. I. Of the Nature and Properties of the UNDERSTANDING II. Of the Nature and Properties of the WILL and wherein its Liberty consists ERROR is the Cause of Man's Misery the corrupt Principle that has produc'd Evil in the World 't is this which begets and cherishes in our Souls all the Evils that afflict us and we can never expect a true and solid Happiness but by a serious Endeavour to avoid it Holy Scripture teaches us that Men are miserable only because they are Sinners and Criminals and they would be neither if they did not make themselves the Slaves of Sin by assenting to Error If it be true then that Error is the Origin of Men's Misery how very just is it that they should endeavour their Deliverance from it and certainly an Effort towards it would not be vain and unrewarded though perhaps it might not have all the effect that could be desired admit we could not arrive at Infallibility and accomplish an absolute Victory yet we should be less deceiv'd and subject to fewer Evils We are not to expect an entire Felicity in this Life because we cannot pretend to Infallibility but our Endeavours to avoid Error must be as continual as are our Aversions for Misery In a word as we earnestly desire Happiness without Hopes of attaining it here so we must vigorously pursue
Reason though our Sight fails us in it shake these Fibres and communicate a part of their Motion If this Motion I say is moderate that of the extremity of the Fibres of the Brain which answer to the Hand will be moderate but if this Motion is violent enough in the Hand to separate some parts as it happens when a Man burns the Motion of the Internal Fibres of the Brain will be proportionably more violent This is what happens to our Body when Objects Act upon it We must now consider what happens to the Soul It resides principally V. The effect th●● Objects have upon the Soul● and Reasans why the Soul d●● n●t perceive the Motions of the Fibre of the Bod. if I may be permitted to say so in this part of the Brain where all the Strings of our Nerves meet together 't is placed there to cherish and conserve all the parts of our Body and consequently it 's necessary that it be advertis'd of all the Changes which happen thereto and that it can distinguish those which are Conformable to the Constitution of its Body from the others because it would be very useless to know 'em absolutely and without any relation to its Body Since therefore all these Changes of our Fibres which have no other real Existence but in the Motions which commonly differ only as to the more or less it 's necessary that the Soul look upon 'em as Changes essentially different for although in themselves they differ but little This ●●●fu● 〈…〉 〈◊〉 is only a Compos'd Sensation yet we must always consider 'em as essentially different in respect of the preservation of the Body Motion for Example which causes Pain very often differs but a little from that which causes Titillation it is not necessary that there be an Essential difference between these two Motions but it 's necessary that there be an Essential difference between Titillation and Pain which these two Motions cause in the Soul for the shaking of the Fibres which accompanies Titillation 〈…〉 I 〈…〉 of Natural Judgments in ● 1. Lib. 1. informs the Soul of the good Constitution of it's Body that there is power enough to resist the impression of the Object and that it must not apprehend it self hurt but the Motion which accompanies Pain being a little more violent is capable of breaking fome Fibre of the Body and the Soul must be advertis'd by fome disagreeable Sensation to take care thereof Thus although the Motions which pass in the Body differ only as to more or less between themselves yet if they are consider'd in respect to the preservation of our Life it may be said that they differ essentially Hence our Soul is sensible only of the Action of Objects upon the Fibres of our Flesh it would be of no use at all to it to know them nor could it receive from them sufficient light to judge whether the things about us were capable of destroying or cherishing the Oeconony of our Body but it perceives it self touch'd by these Sensations which differ essentially and precisely observing the Qualities of Objects as they stand related to the Body they make it to perceive very distinctly whether or no these Objects are capable of hurting it Besides this we must consider that if the Soul only perceives that which passes in its Hand when burnt if it only sees the Motion and Separation of fome Fibres it would not be at all concern'd and it might even sometimes out of Fancy and Caprice take a satisfaction in it like those Madmen that divert themselves by breaking every thing to pieces in their Fury Or else even as a Prisoner would not be uneasie to see one demolish the Walls that confin'd him but would even rejoyce in hopes of being deliver'd very soon so if we only perceive the separation of the parts of our Body when we are burnt or receive any hurt we should soon be persuaded that our Happiness is not confin'd in the Body which rather obstructs it and therefore we should be very glad to see it destroy'd Hence it is observable that the Author of the Union of our Soul and Body hath with great Wisdom ordain'd that we should be sensible of pain when there happens a change to the Body which is capable of hurting it as when a Needle pierces the Flesh or Fire separates fome parts thereof and that we should be sensible of Titillation or an agreeable Heat when these Motions are moderated without perceiving either the truth of what passes in our Body or the Motions of these Fibres of which we have already spoke First Because in perceiving Pain and Pleasure which differ otherwise than in the more and less we more easily distinguish Objects which are the occasion of them Secondly because this way of informing us whether we ought to unite or separate from Bodies which are about us is more short and does less imploy the Capacity of the Mind which was made for God Lastly Because Pain and Pleasure being Modifications of the Soul which it perceives by means of its Body and which affect more than the knowledge of Motion or fome Fibres which belong thereto this obliges the Mind to be much concern'd and strengthens the Union betwixt the Soul and Body of Man From all this it is evident that our Senses were not given us to teach us truth but for the preservation of our Body What we have said of Titillation and of Pain must be generally understood of all other Sensations as will be better seen hereafter We began with these two Sensations rather than with others because they are more lively and help us to conceive more sensibly what was to be said It is now very easily shewn how we fall into an Infinity of Errors about Light and Colours and generally about all sensible Qualities Cold. Heat Odours Sapors Sound Pain Titillation c. And if I would stay to particularize every one belonging to every Object of the Senses whole years would not suffice to enumerate them because they are almost infinite I shall therefore content my self to speak of 'em in General In almost all Sensations there are four different things which are confounded VI. Four things which are confounded in every Sensation because they are done all together and as it were in an Instant and this is the Principle of all the other Errors of our Senses The first is the Action of the Object that is in Heat for Example the Impulsion or Agitation of the Particles of Wood against the Fibres of the Hand The second is the Passion of the Organ of Sense that is the Agitation of the Fibres of the Hand caus'd by that of the Particles of Fire which Agitation is communicated to the Brain because otherwise the Soul would perceive nothing The third is the Passion Sensation or Perception of the Soul that is what every one feels who is near the Fire The fourth is the Judgment that the Soul makes
the chief Fibres of all the Muscles which is the Heart that they encompass its Orifices Auricles and Arteries that they spread themselves even in the substance of the Lungs and so by their different motions produce very considerable changes in the Blood For the Nerves which are dispersed through the Fibres of the Heart cause it somerimes to extend and then again to contract with too much force and precipitancy pushing with much violence a great quantity of Blood towards the Head and all the external parts of the Body yet sometimes these Nerves produce an effect directly contrary And the Nerves which encompass the Orifices Auricles and Arteries of the Heart cause very near the same effect with those Spiracles or breathing Holes with which the Chymists moderate the heat of their Furnaces and as the Spouts do which are made use of in Fountains to diminish or encrease the force of the stream For the use of these Nerves is diversly to contract or dilate the Orifices of the Heart and so to hasten or retard the filling and evacuation of the Blood and thereby to augment of diminish its heat Thus the Nerves which are dispersed through the Lungs have also the same use for the Lungs are compos'd only of the branches of the Wind-pipe of the Venous Artery and Arterious Vein interwoven one with another it is visible that the Nerves which are extended throughout the whole substance by contracting of them hinders the Air from passing with so much liberty through the branches of the Wind-pipe and likewise impedes the motion of the Blood through the Venous Artery into the Arterious Vein and so into the Heart Thus these Nerves according to their different agitation still augment and diminish the heat and motion of the Blood In all our Passions we have very sensible Experiments of these different degrees of heat in our Heart Sometimes we feel it manifestly encrease and diminish all of a sudden and as we falsely judge that our Sensations are in the parts of our Bodies and so by that means excite our Soul as it was explained in the first Book so almost all our Philosophers have imagined that the Heart was the principal seat of the Passions of the Soul and this is still the most commonly received Opinion Now because the faculty of Imagining receives great changes by what happens to the Animal Spirits and that the Animal Spirits differ very much according to the different fermentation of the Blood which is made in the Heart it is very easie to discover why passionate Persons imagine things quite after another manner from those who consider them in cold Blood The other Cause which contributes very much either to the augmenting or diminishing these extraordinary fermentations of the Blood in the Heart consists in the action of many other branches of the Nerves which we have already spoke of These branches spread themselves in the Liver II. Of the change of the Spirits caus'd by the Nerves which go to the Liver to the Spleen and the rest of the Bowels which contains the most subtile part of the Blood or what is commonly called the Bile and in the Spleen which contains the more gross or Melancholy in the Pancreas which contains an acid Juice very proper for fermentation In the Stomach Bowels and other parts which contain the Chyle And indeed they are dispersed through every place which can contribute any thing to the varying the fermentation of the Blood in the Heart Also the Arteries and Veins are united to these Nerves as Willis has discovered of the lower Trunk of the great Artery which is ty'd to them near the Heart of the Axillary Artery on the right side the Emulgent Vein and of some others Thus the use of the Nerves being diversly to act those parts to which they are join'd it is easie to conceive how the Nerve which environs the Liver may in contracting it cause a great quantity of Bile to run into the Veins and into the Duct of the Bile which being mingled with the Blood in the Veins and with the Chyle enters into the Heart through the Duct of the Bile and there produces a more violent heat than ordinary Thus when we are mov'd with certain Passions the Blood boils in the Arteries and Veins and this heat spreads it self through the whole Body the Head is inflamed and filled with so great a number of Animal Spirits which being too brisk and too much agitated by their impetuous course hinder the Imagination from representing any other things than those whose Images they form in the Brain that is from thinking of any other Objects besides those of the Passion which Rules It is the same of the little Nerves that go to the Spleen or to other parts which contain a thicker Matter and less susceptible of Heat and Motion it renders the Imagination altogether languishing and dull in causing some gross Matter and such as is difficult to be put in Motion to run into the Blood As for those Nerves which environ the Arteries and Veins their use is to hinder the Blood from passing and by contracting them compel it to run into such places as it finds the freest passage to So that part of the great Artery which supplies all the parts above the Heart with Blood being connected and compressed by these Nerves the Blood must necessarily enter into the Head in great quantities and this way produce a change in the Animal Spirits and by consequence in the Imagination But it must be well observed III. That these Judgments happen without the concurrence of our Will by the order of Providence that all this is performed meerly by Mechanism I mean that all the different Motions of these Nerves in all the different Passions are not produced by the Command of the Will but on the contrary are made without nay even contrary to its Orders So that a Body whose Soul is not so well disposed as that of a healthful Man shall be capable of all the Motions which accompany our Passions Thus even Beasts may have the like altho' they should be only pure Machines And indeed this ought to make us admire the incomprehensible Wisdom of him who hath so well ordered all these Springs that it is sufficient for an Object to move the Optick Nerve after such and such a manner to produce so many different Motions in the Heart the other parts of the Body and even in the Face it self for it hath lately been discovered that the same Nerve which extends some of its branches into the Heart and into the other interior parts also communicates some of its branches to the Eye to the Mouth and to the other parts of the Face So that it cannot raise any Passion within us but it also appears outwardly because there can no motion happen to the branches which go to the Heart but it also communicates it self to some one of those which are dispersed through the Face The
Noli putare teipsam esse lucem Aus in Psal Reason we expresly advise them not to rely upon what we think of them for we judge it no small Crime for a Man to compare himself to God by thus usurping Authority over the Mind The chief reason that we have for desiring those who shall read this Work to apply themselves seriously to it is That we are willing to be made sensible of the Faults we may have committed in it for we do not pretend to Infallibility The Mind has so strict a relation to the Body and has so great a Dependance on it that we may reasonably fear we have not always clearly distinguish'd the confused Noise of the Imagination from the pure Voice of Truth which speaks to the Mind Did God only speak and did we only judge according to what we hear we might perhaps use these words of Jesus Christ * Sicut audio sic judico jucicium meum justum est quia non quaero voluntatem meam Joan. Ch. 5.30 I Judge according to what I hear and my Judgment is Just and True But we have a Body which speaks lowder than God himself and that Body never speaks Truth We have Self-love which corrupts the Words of him who always speaks Truth And we have Pride which inspires us with Boldness to judge without hearkning to the Words of Truth according to which only we ought to judge For the principal Cause of our Errors is That our Judgments extend themselves further than the clear prospect of our Mind Therefore I desire those to whom God shall discover my Mistakes to make me sensible of them that this Work which I only give as an Essay whose subject is very worthy of Mens App●ication may be perfected by degrees I had only undertaken it at first with a design to instruct my self but some Persons having thought that it might be useful for the Publick I willingly consented to publish it the rather because one of the chief reasons they gave me for it did suit with the desire I had to be useful to my self The real way said they to be instructed in any Matter is to propose our Sentiments about it to some Learned Men. It excites our Attention and theirs Sometimes they have Truths which are unknown to us and sometimes they go through certain Discoveries which we have neglected out of Inadvertency or have abandon'd for want of Courage and Power It was vpon this Prospect of my particular Benefit and that of some others I venture to be an Author but that my hopes may not prove vain I give this Advice that Men should not be disgusted at first if they find things that contradict the common Opinions that are generally approv'd of by all Men and in all Ages The Errors I endeavour to destroy are those that are most general If Men were very much enlighten'd Vniversal Approbation would be a reason but 't is quite contrary Therefore let it be well remembred that Reason only ought to preside in the Judgment of all Humane Opinions which have no relation to Faith which God only instructs us in after a very different manner from that by which he discovers natural things to us Let Men look within themselves and draw near unto the Light which shines there continually that their Reason may be the more illuminated Let them carefully avoid the Sensations which are too lively and all the Emotions of the Soul which take up the Capacity of the Mind For the least Noise the least Appearance of Light often dissipates the sight of the Mind It is good to avoid all those things though it is not absolutely necessary And if in using our utmost * Qui hoc videre non potest oret agat ut possemereatur nec ad hominem disputatorem pulset ut quod non legit legat sed ad Deum Salvatorem ut quod non valet veleat Ep. 112. c. 12. Suplexque illi qui lumen mentis accendit attendat ut intelligat Cont. Ep. Fund c. 33. Endeavours we cannot resist the continual Impressions which our Bodies and the Prejudices of our Infancy make upon our Imagination we must have recourse to Prayer to receive that from God which we cannot have by our own Power but still without ceasing to resist our Senses for that ought to be the continual Employment of those who in Imitation of St. Austin have a great Love for Truth The CONTENTS BOOK I. Of the Errors of the Senses Chap. 1. I. OF the Nature and Properties of the Vnderstanding II. Of the Nature and Properties of the Will and wherein its Liberty consists Page 1 Chap. 2. I. Of Judgments and Reasonings II. That they depend upon the Will III. What use must be made of its Liberty in respect of them IV. Two General Rules to avoid Error and Sin V. Necessary Reflections upon these Rules p. 9 Chap. 3. I. Answers to some Objections II. Remarks upon what hath been said about the necessity of Evidence p. 16 Chap. 4. I. Of the Occasional Causes of Error and that of these there are Five Principal ones II. The General Design of the whole Work and the particular Design of the first Book p. 22 Chap. 5. Of the Senses I. Two ways of Explaining how they are corrupted by Sin II. That 't is not our Senses but our Liberty which is the true Cause of our Errors III. A Rule not to be deceiv'd in the Vse of our Senses p. 25 Chap. 6. I. Of the Errors of the Sight in respect of Extension consider'd in it self II. An Enumeration of these Errors as to invisible Objects III. Of the Errors of the Sight concerning relative Extension p. 33 Chap. 7. I. Of the Errors of Sight in respect of Figures II. We have no Knowledge of the least things III. The Knowledge we have of the greatest things is not exact IV. An Explication of certain Natural Judgments which keep us from being deceiv'd V. That these very Judgments deceive us in particular Occurrences p. 44 Chap. 8. I. That our Eyes do not inform us of the greatness or swiftness of Motion consider'd in it self II. That Duration which is necessary to be understood to know what Motion is is unknown III. Examples of the Errors of Sight in respect of Motion and Rest p. 49 Chap. 9. A Continuation of the same Subject I. A General Proof of the Errors of our Sight about Motion II. That it's necessary to know the distance of Objects to judge of the swiftness of their Motion III. An Examination of Means to know their distances p. 54 Chap. 10. Of Errors about Sensible Qualities I. A distinction of Soul and Body II. An Explication of the Organs of the Senses III. To what part of the Body the Soul is immediately united IV. How Objects act upon Bodies V. How upon the Soul with Reasons why the Soul does not perceive the Motions of the Fibres of the Body VI. Four things which are Confounded in every
great Images upon the bottom of the Eye as those Faces which are nearer as the Senses only Perceive but never Judge to speak properly 'T is certain that this Judgment is nothing but a compounded Sensation which consequently may be sometimes false However V. That these Judgments deceive us in some particular Occurrences that which is nothing else but Sensation in us may be consider'd in respect of the Author of Nature who excites it in us as a kind of Judgment I speak sometimes of Sensations as of Natural Judgments because this way of speaking serves to give a reason of Things as may be seen here in the Ninth Chapter towards the end and in many other places Altho' these Judgments which I have spoke of are useful to correct our Senses very many ways and that without them we should very frequently be deceiv'd yet they are also occasions of Error For Instance If it happens that we see the top of a high Steeple behind a great Wall or a Mountain it will appear very near to us and very little but if afterwards we should see it at the same distance yet with many Fields and Houses betwixt it would doubtless appear the greater and at a farther distance altho' in each Station the Projection of the Rays of the Spire or its Image which is Painted at the bottom of our Eyes would be altogether the same Now it may be said that we see it greater because of a Judgment that we Naturally make viz. that since there is so much Land betwixt us and the Steeple it must be further and consequently greater But on the contrary if we saw no Fields betwixt us and the Steeple altho' we even knew there were many and that it was a great way off which is very remarkable it would always appear very near and very little as I have said And it may also be suppos'd that this is done by a Natural Judgment of our Soul which thus sees this Spire because it Judges it about five or six hundred paces distant for commonly our Imagination does not represent a greater distance between Objects and us if it be not assisted by a Sensible view of other interjacent Objects beyond which it can yet imagine farther 'T is for this cause See the 9th Chapter towards the end that when the Moon Rises or Sets we see it greater than when it is elevated above the Horizon for when it is very high we see no Objects betwixt it and us whose greatness we know to Judge of that of the Moon by comparing them together but when it is near Setting we see betwixt it and us many Fields whose breadth we know very near and so we Judge it at a greater distance because we see it at a greater It 's observable that when the Moon is Risen above our Heads altho' our reason assures us that it is at a very great distance yet it seems to us to be very little and very near for indeed these Natural Judgments of Sight are only built upon the Perceptions of the same Sight and Reason cannot correct them So that they very often deceive us in causing us to form free Judgments which perfectly agree with them for when we Judge by our Senses we are always deceiv'd but we are never deceiv'd when we conceive for a Body only Instructs as a Body but God always teaches us Truth as I shall show hereafter These false Judgments deceive us not only as to the distance and bigness of Bodies but also in making us see their Figure other than it is We see for Example the Sun and Moon and other Spherical Bodies very distant as if they were Plains and Circles because at this great distance we cannot distinguish whether the opposite part is nearer to us than the others and because of this we Judge it at an equal distance 'T is for the same reason we Judge that all the Stars and the blue which appears in the Heaven are at the same distance and as it were a perfectly Convex Vault because our Mind supposes an Equality where it sees no Inequality altho' it ought not positively to conclude but where it sees evidently I shall not tarry here to Explain at large the Errors of the Sight as to the Figures of Bodies because any Book of Optics will save me that Labour This Science indeed does only show how the Eyes are deceiv'd and all its direction consists but in helping us to make those Natural Judgments we have spoke of at such time as we ought not to make them and this may be done after so many ways that there is not one Figure in the World which may not be Painted after a thousand different manners so as that the Sight will Infallibly be deceiv'd thereby But this is not a place to Explain these things thorowly what has been said is sufficient to show that we must not trust to our Eyes when they represent the Figure of Bodies to us altho' we are not so subject to be deceiv'd by Figures as other things CHAP. VIII I. That our Eyes do not inform us of the greatness or swiftness of Motion consider'd in it self II. That duration which is necessary to be understood to know what Motion is is unknown III. Examples of the Errors of Sight in respect of Motion and Rest WE have discover'd the principal and most general Errors of the Sight about the Extension of Figures we must now correct those in which it deceives us about the Motion of Matter and this will not be a very difficult performance after what we have said about Extension for there is so great a relation betwixt these two things that if we are deceiv'd about the bigness of Bodies we must unavoidably be deceiv'd in their Motion But to offer nothing except what is clear and distinct we must first take away the Equivocation of the word Motion for this Term commonly signifies two things the first is a certain power that is imagin'd in a mov'd Body which is the Cause of its Motion the second is a continual removal of a Body that is departing from or approaching to another that is consider'd as in a State of Rest When we say for Instance that a Bowle hath communicated its Motion to another the word Motion is here taken in the first signification but if it be said simply that a Boul is in Motion it is taken in the second Sense And indeed this term Motion signifies both the Cause and Effect together which yet are in themselves two different things They seem to me to be in the grossest and most dangerous Error concerning force who attribute to it Motion and the transportation of Bodies these fine terms of Nature and impressed Qualities seem to me to be only a proper Subterfuge for the Ignorance of the falsly Learn'd See the 3d Chapter of the Second Part 6. l. and impious Libertines as may be very easily proved but this is not a fit place to
distinct from others but also all Objects lying betwixt us and that which we consider When for Example we look upon a distant Steeple we commonly see at the same time many interjacent Fields and Houses and because we judge of the distance of these Fields and Houses and see the Steeple is beyond them we judge also that it is very distant and also greater than if we saw it alone However the Image thereof which is traced at the bottom of our Eye is always of an equal bigness whether there are Fields and Houses betwixt us or not provided we see it at an equal distance which is suppos'd Thus we judge of the bigness of Objects by their imagin'd distance and the Bodies betwixt us and the Object do much assist our Imagination in it even as we judge of Duration or the length of Time after some Action done by the remembrance of a confess'd Series of Things which we have done or of Thoughts which we have successively had after this Action for 't is all these Thoughts and Actions which have succeeded one another that assist our Mind in judging of the length or duration of some Time or rather a confus'd remembrance of all the successive Thoughts about the same thing is nothing else but our Judgment of Duration even as a confus'd sight of the Fields which are betwixt us and the Steeple is the same thing as our Judgment of the distance thereof Hence 't is easie to know the true Reason why the Moon appears greater when it rises than when it is much elevated above the Horizon for when it rises it appears many Leagues distant from us and even beyond the Sensible Horizon or the Earth which terminates our sight whereas we judge it to be but about half a League from us or seven or eight times as high as our Houses when it is most elevated above the Horizon Thus we judge it much greater when it is near the Horizon than when it is very distant from it because we imagine it much more distant from us when it rises than when is it very high It 's true there are a great many Philosophers who attribute what I have said to the Vapours which rise out of the Earth I agree with them that Vapours refracting the Rays of Objects make them appear the greater I know there are more Vapours betwixt us and the Moon when it rises than when it is risen very high and consequently it must appear something greater than if it were always equally distant from us However it cannot be said that this refraction of the Rays of the Moon is the cause of these apparent Changes of its greatness for this refraction hinders not but that the Image which is traced in the bottom of our Eyes at the rising of the Moon is not less than that which is form'd there when it has been risen a considerable time Astronomers which Measure the Diameters of the Planets observe that that of the Moon grows larger in proportion to its distance from the Horizon and consequently in proportion to its appearing less to us so that the Diameter of the Image Painted at the bottom of our Eyes is lesser when we see it greater Indeed when the Moon arises it 's more distant from us by the Semi-diameter of the Earth than when it is perpendicularly over our Head which is the reason that its Diameter is greater than when it arises above the Horizon because then it approaches to us That then which is the cause of our seeing it greater when it rises is not the refraction of its Rays made by the Vapours coming out of the Earth since the Image which is form'd by these Rays is then less but it is the Natural Judgment that we make of its distance because it appears beyond the Earth which we see very distant from us as was explain'd before and I 'm surpriz'd that Philosophers should look upon the reason of this appearance and deceit of our Eyes to be more difficult to find out than the greatest Equations of Algebra This means of Judging of the distance of any Object by the Knowledge of the distance of Things lying betwixt us and it is of great use to us when the other ways which I have spoken of fail us for by this we can Judge that certain Objects are distant from us many Leagues which we cannot by any of the others however if we Examine we shall find many defects in it For first this way serves only to Judge of Objects which are upon the Earth and but very rarely and for the most very unprofitably of Things that are in the Air or in the Heavens Secondly we can't make use of it upon the Earth but in things that are a very few Leagues distant from us And thirdly we must be assur'd that there are betwixt us and the Object neither Vallies Mountains or any such thing which hinders us from making use of this means Lastly I believe there are none who have not had Experience enough in this subject to be perswaded that it is extreamly difficult to make a certain Judgment of the distance of Objects by a sensible view of Things placed betwixt them and the Object But I have enlarg'd too much already upon this head These are the Means by which we Judge of the distance of Objects we have observ'd considerable defects in them and may conclude that the Judgments which are form'd upon them must be very uncertain Hence I can easily show the Truth of the Propositions which I have advanced I have suppos'd the Object at * See the preceding Figure C considerable distant from A then it may by many steps advance towards D or B without my knowing it since I have no certain means to judge of its distance it may even be suppos'd to recede towards D when 't is imagin'd to approach towards B because the Image of the Object is sometimes Painted greater upon the Optic Nerves whether because the Air which is betwixt the Object and the Eye causes a greater refraction one time than another or whether it happens sometimes from the little tremblings of this Nerve or lastly whether the Impression which the imperfect uniting of the Rays upon the Optic Nerve are dispers'd and communicated to the parts which ought not to be affected with them for it may happen from many different Causes Thus the Image of the same Objects being enlarg'd on these occasions inclines the Soul to believe the Object is near Suppose as much be said about the other Propositions Before I conclude this Chapter I must observe that it much concerns us for the preservation of our Life to know well the Motion and Rest of Bodies in proportion to their nearness to us and that it signifies little to have an exact Knowledge of the Truth of these Things when they are remov'd to a great distance from us This will evidently show that what I have advanc'd in general about all the Senses as
very little We shall clearly see that 't is a fault to imagine so great differences in the Objects of our Senses But I must here mention by the by that there 's nothing to be objected against these Terms Form and Essential difference Hony is certainly Hony by its form and 't is thus that it essentially differs from Salt but this form or this essential difference consists only in the different Configuration of its parts 't is this different Configuration which causes Hony to be Hony and Salt Salt And altho' its only accidental to Matter in general to have the Configuration of the parts of Hony or Salt and so to have the form of Hony or Salt it may nevertheless be said that it is essential to Hony or Salt to be what they are to have such or such a Configuration of Parts Even as Sensations of Cold Heat Pleasure and Pain are not essential to the Soul as a Soul but because it is by these Sensations that it 's said to be sensible of Heat Cold Pleasure and Pain CHAP. XVII I. Another Example drawn from Morals which shows that our Senses only offer us false Goods II. That 't is God only who is our true Good III. The Origine of the Errors of the Epicureans and Stoics IT has been sufficiently proved in my Opinion that this Prejudice Our Sensations are in Objects is a very fruitful Principle of Error in Physics it must now be shown from Reasons drawn from Morals that the same Prejudice join'd with this That Objects are the only and true Causes of our Sensations is also very dangerous There 's nothing so common in the World I. An Example drawn from Morals that our Senses only offer us false Goods as to see Men who are Wedded to Sensible Goods Some love Musick others good Eating and others are passionate for other things Now thus they reason to perswade themselves that all these Objects are Goods viz. All these agreeable Tastes which please us in Banquets these Sounds which affect the Ear and these other Pleasures which we perceive upon other occasions are certainly included in Sensible Objects or at least 't is these Objects that are the occasion of them or in sine we cannot have Sensations without them Now 't is impossible to doubt whether Pleasure be Good whether Pain be Evil we are inwardly convinc'd thereof and consequently the Objects of our Senses are very real Goods which we ought to enjoy that we may be happy This is the Reasoning that we ordinarily I shall explain in the last Book in what sense Objects work upon Bodies and inconsiderately make and this is that which inclines us to believe that our Sensations are in Objects that Objects have in themselves the power of making us Sensible that we look upon things as our Goods which are infinitely below us which can only act upon our Bodies by producing some Motions in their Fibres but can never act upon our Souls or make us sensible of Pleasure or Pain Certainly if it is not the Soul which acts upon it self upon occasion of what passes in the Body nothing else but God can do it and if it is not the Soul which causes Pleasure or Pain according to the different shaking of the Fibres of its Body as it 's very likely it does not since it often perceives Pleasure and Pain without its consent I know no other Hand that is powerful enough to produce this Sensation in it but that of the Author of Nature Indeed there 's none but God that is our true Good II. That 't is God only who is our Good and that all Sensible Objects can't make us sensible of Pleasure 't is he only that can affect us with all these Pleasures we are capable of and who in his Knowledge and Love ha●● Decreed to excite them in us And these Pleasures which he hath link'd to the Motions which pass in our Body to make us careful of our own Preservation are very little very weak and very short altho' we are enslav'd to them in this State whereinto Sin has reduc'd us but the Pleasures which he will excite in his Elect in Heaven are infinitely greater since he made us to know and love him for according to the Order of Nature greater Goods affect us with greater Pleasure and since God is infinitely above all things the Pleasure of those that shall enjoy him will certainly surpass all Pleasures What we have said of the Cause of our Errors III. The Original of the Errors of the Epicureans and Sto●es in reference to Good does sufficiently inform us of the falsness of the Opinions of the Stoics and Epicureans about the Supream Good The Epicureans placed it in Pleasure and because they felt it as well in Vice as in Vertue and even more commonly in the first than the second they gave themselves up to all sorts of Voluptuousness Now the first Cause of their Error was that Judging falsely there was something agreeable in the Objects of their Senses or that they were the true Causes of the Pleasures they felt and being besides this convinc'd by an inward Sensation which they had in themselves that Pleasure was a Good for them or at least for the time they enjoy'd it they gave themselves up to the Government of all the Passions which they apprehended would not incommode them afterwards whereas they ought to have consider'd that the Pleasure which is felt in Sensible Things cannot be in these things as their true Causes nor after any other manner and consequently that Sensible Goods cannot be such in respect of our Soul They should also have consider'd the other Things which we have explain'd The Stoics on the contrary being perswaded that Sensible Pleasures were only in the Body and for the Body and that the Soul ought to have its particular Good placed its Happiness in Vertue Now this is the Origine of their Errors they believ'd that Sensible Pain and Pleasures were not in the Soul but only in the Body they made use of this false Judgment as a Principle for other false Conclusions as that Pain is not an Evil nor Pleasure a Good That the Pleasures of Sense are not good in themselves but that they are common to Men and Beasts And nevertheless it is easie to show that altho' the Epicureans and Stoics were deceiv'd in many things yet they were in the right in some for the happiness of the Happy consists in an accomplish'd Vertue I would say in the Knowledge and Love of God and is a very great Pleasure which continually attends them Let us then well remember that external Objects include nothing neither agreeable nor disagreeable that they are not the Causes of our Pleasures and that we have no reason either to fear or love them but that God only is to be fear'd and lov'd because he only is able to Punish or Reward us to make us Sensible of Pain or Pleasure In fine 't
as Judges because that by their Meditation they have acquir'd to themselves such a Right of judging of the Merit or Demerit of the Cause that it cannot but in Justice be submitted to them CHAP. XX. The Conclusion of this first Book I. That our Senses are only given us for our Bodys II. That we must doubt of their Testimony III. That it is not an inconsiderable thing to doubt as we ought to do WE have in my Opinion I. That our Senses are only given us for the preservation of our Body sufficiently discover'd the General Errors into which our Senses betray us both in respect of their proper Objects as also of those things which are not perceiv'd but by the Understanding I believe there is no Error we are subject to upon their occasion whose Cause may not be discover'd in some of those things which have been already mention'd if they be well examin'd We have also seen that our Senses are very faithful and exact to Instruct in the Relations which all Bodies that are about us have to one another but that they are incapable of informing us what Bodies are in themselves that a right use of them tends only to the Preservation of our Health and Life that we cannot sufficiently despise them when they arrogate Dominion over the Mind This is the thief thing which I wish may be well remembred in all this first Book viz. That we conceive well that our Senses are only given us for the preservation of our Body that we six this Thought in our Mind and that to be deliver'd from the Ignorance we are now involv'd in we seek for other assistances besides those which our Senses afford ●s But if there are some Persons as certainly there will be too many who are not perswaded of there last Propositions from what I have here advanc'd II. We must distrust the Testimony of our Senses I would at least desire this of them That they would only learn a little to distrust their Senses and if they will not wholly reject their Testimony as false and deceitful that they will not refuse to doubt of it And indeed it appears to me that enough has been said to create at least some scruple in the Mind of reasonable Persons and consequently to excite them to make use of their Liberty otherwise than they have yet done For if they begin to doubt whether the Testimony of their Senses are true they will more easily refrain their assent and so keep themselves out of those Errors unto which they have hitherto been subject Especially if they well remember that Rule in the beginning of this Treatise Never to give an entire assent but to things intirely evident and to which they cannot refrain consenting without knowing certain● that they should make an ill use of their Liberty if they did not consent Besides III. Th●● it is not an inconsiderable thing to doubt as one ought to do let no one imagine that he has made but a small advancement if he has only learn'd to doubt To doubt with Judgment and Reason is not so small a thing as People imagine for here it may be said that there 's a great difference betwixt doubting and doubting we doubt through Passion and Brutality through Blindness and Malice and lastly through Fancy and only because we would doubt But we doubt also with Prudence and Caution with Wisdom and Penetration of Mind Academics and Atheists doubt upon the first grounds true Philosophers on the second The first doubt is a doubt of darkness which does not conduct us into light but always removes us from it The second doubt is begot of Light and assists us in some manner to produce it in its proper place Those who doubt only after the first manner do not apprehend what it is to doubt with Judgment they laugh at what Defeartes teaches us about doubting in the first of his Metaphysical Meditations because it appears to them that he would only have them doubt out of fancy that he would only have them say in general that our Nature is infirm our Mind is full of blindness that we must take great care to deface these prejudices and other like things It is not sufficient to say the Mind is weak we must be sensible of its weaknesses It is not enough to say it is subject to Error we must discover in what our Errors consist This is what I believe has been begun in this first Book by explaining the Nature and Errors of our Senses I shall in the second prosecute the same design by explaining the Nature and Errors of our Imagination The End of the first Book A SEARCH AFTER TRUTH BOOK II. Of the Imagination The First Part. CHAP. I. I. A general Idea of the Imagination II. That it includes two faculties the one Active and the other Passive III. The general Cause of the changes which happen to the Imagination of Man and the design of this second Book IN the preceeding Book we have treated of the Senses and have endeavoured to explain their Nature precisely observing what use ought to be made of them We have discovered the chief and most general Errors which they make us subject to and have attempted so to limit their power that we may expect much and fear nothing from them if they are always kept within these limits we have prescribed In this second Book we shall treat of the Imagination Natural Order obliging us to it for there being so great a Relation between the Senses and the Imagination we ought not to separate them It will afterwards appear that these two Powers differ amongst themselves only as to more or lest This is the order we shall observe in this following Treatise It is divided into three Parts In the first we shall explain the Physical Causes of the disorder and Errors of the Imagination In the second we shall make some application of these Causes to the most general Errors of the Imagination and shall also speak of what may be call'd the Moral Causes of these Errors In the third we shall speak of the contagious Communication of strong Imaginations If the generality of those things that are contain'd in this Treatise are not so New as what has been already said in explaining the Errors of the Senses they will not however be of less use Thinking Persons are sensible enough both of the Errors and even of the Causes of the Errors whereof I treat but very few make a sufficient reflexion thereon I pretend not to instruct all the World 't is the Ignorant I wou'd teach and only inform others or rather I endeavour here both to instruct and inform my self We have said in the first Book I. A general Idea of the Imagination that the Organs of our Senses were composed of little Fibres which on one side terminate in the outward parts of the body and skin and on the other at the middle of the Brain Now these
little Fibres may be moved two ways either by beginning at the ends which terminate in the Brain or those that terminate in the Exterior parts of the body The agitation of these Fibres cannot be communicated unto the Brain but the Soul must perceive something If this Motion begins by an impression that the objects make upon the extremity of the Fibres of our Nerves is so communicated to the Brain then the Soul perceives and judges that what it * By a Natural judgment which I 〈◊〉 before judge of in many places feels is without that is it perceives an object as present But if it is only the inward Fibres which are agitated by the course of the 〈◊〉 of Spirit or by some other way the Soul imagines and judges that what it imagines is not without but within the Brain that is it perceives an object as absent This is the difference there is between Sensation and Imagination But it is requisite to observe that the Fibres of the Brain are much more agitated by the impression of Objects than by the course of the Spirits and that that is the reason why the Soul is made more sensible by external Objects which it looks upon as present and as it were capable of making it immediately feel either pleasure or pain than by the course of the Animal Spirits Nevertheless it sometimes happens in Persons who have their Animal Spirits very much agitated by Fasting Watching a high Fever or by some violent Passion that these Spirits move the internal Fibres of the Brain with as much force as outward objects could do so that these Persons perceive what they ought only to imagine and think they see those objects before their Eyes which are only in their Imagination From whence it plainly appears that in respect to what passes in the Body the Senses and Imagination differ only as to More or Less as I have before advanced But to give a more particular and distinct Idea of Imagination we must know that every time there happens any change in that part of the Brain where the Nerves meet there likewise happens some change in the Soul that is as we have already explain'd if in this part there is any Motion that changes the order of its Fibres there also happens some New perception in the Soul and it feels or imagines some New thing and the Soul can never perceive or imagine any thing anew except there be some change in the Fibres of this same part of the Brain So that the faculty of Imagining or the Imagination consists only in the power that the Soul has of forming to its self Images of objects in producing a change in the Fibres of this part of the Brain which may be called the principal part since it answers to all the parts of our bodies and is the place where our Soul immediately resides if we may be permitted to say so That shews us very evidently that this power which the Soul hath of forming Images includes two things the one depending upon the Soul it self and the other upon the Body II. Two faculties in the imagination one Active and the other Passive The first is Action and the Command of the Will The second is the Obedience that is given to it by the Animal Spirits which trace these Images and to the Fibres of the Brain upon which they must be imprinted In this discourse the name of Imagination is indifferently given to either of these two things nor are they distinguished by the words Active and Passive which might be given to them because by the sense of what we shall speak may easily be understood which of the two we mean whether it be of the active imagination of the Soul or passive imagination of the Body We have not yet determined in particular what that principal part is which we have just spoke of First because we believe it very unnecessary Secondly because we have not a certain knowledge of it And in fine we think it better to be silent in a matter whose truth cannot here be demonstrated to others altho it were manifest to us what that principal part is Let it be then according to the opinion of Willis that common Sense resides in those two Corpuscles he calls Corpora Striata Let the sinuosity of the Brain preserve the Species of the Memory and let the Callous body be the seat of the Imagination or following the Opinion of Fernellius let us suppose it in the Pia Mater which involves the substance of the Brain or with D'Cartes in the Glandula Pinealis or in fine let it be in some other part hitherto unknown that our Soul exercises its principal functions 't will will be very indifferent to me It suffices that there is a principal part Nay it is absolutely necessary there shou'd be such an one as also that the foundation of D'Cartes system should subsist for it ought to be well observed that althô he were deceived when he assures us that the Soul is immediately united to the Glandula Pinealis that ought not nevertheless to injure the foundation of his System from which we shall always gather all the usefulness that can be expected from Truth to improve our selves in the knowledge of Man Since then the Imagination consists only in the power that the Soul has of forming to it self Images of Objects by imprinting them if we may so say III. The general cause of the Changes that happen in the Imagination and the design of the 2d Book in the Fibres of its Brain the more distinct and larger the footsteps of these Animal Spirits be which are the traces of these Images the more strongly and distinctly the Soul will imagine these Objects Now even as breadth depth and clearness of the traces of any Graving depend upon the force wherewith the Instrument is acted and on the Obedience that the Copper renders to the Workman so the depth and clearness of the Impressions made on the Imagination depend upon the force of the Animal Spirits and the Constitution of the Fibres of the Brain 't is the variety that is found in both these which makes almost all this great difference that we observe in Persons Minds For 't is no difficult thing to give a reason for all the different Characters which we meet with in the Mind of Man On the one side through Abundance and Want Agitation and Slowness or largeness and smalness of the Animal Spirits and on the other side through the Delicateness and Courseness Humidity and Dryness Flexibility or Inflexibility of the Fibres of the Brain and in fine through the relation that these Animal Spirits may have with these Fibres And it would be very reasonable for every one first to endeavour to represent to himself the different Combinations of these things and to apply them to all the different Dispositions they meet with because it is always more useful nay even more agreeable to make
admiration in his tenth Book of Confessions We shall not explain these things more fully because 't will be more proper for every one to examine them himself with some application of Mind because such things as we discover by this Method are always more agreeable and make a deeper impression on us than what we learn from others In order to explain Habits II Of the Habits it is necessary to know the manner how we believe the Soul moves those parts of the Bodies to which it is united According to all appearance there is always in certain places of the Brain be they where they will a great number of Animal Spirits much agitated by the heat of the Heart from whence they come and are ready to run into those places into which they find free passage All the Nerves end in the receptacle of these Spirits and the Soul hath the * I explain elsewhere in what this power consists power of determining their Motion and conducting them by these Nerves into all the Muscles of the Body these Spiri●s being entered there they swell them up and by consequence contract them Thus they move those parts to which the Muscles are united We shall not find it so difficult to be perswaded that the Soul moves the Body after the same manner already explained if we observe that when we have been a long time without Eating and are willing to give certain motions to our Bodies we cannot essect it and even feel it very troublesome to stand upon our feet But if we find the means to make any thing that is very spiritous run into our Heart as Wine or some other like Nourishment we are loon sensible that the body obeys with much more facility and moves it self after what manner we desire For this Experiment alone makes it seem very plain to me That the Soul could not give Motion to the Body through the defect of Animal Spirits and that 't is by their means that it hath recovered its Empire over it Now the infiations of the Muscles are so visible and so sensible in the agitation of our Arms and all the parts of our Body and it is so reasonable to believe that these Muscles cannot be blown up but because some body enters into them even as a Foot-ball cannot grow big and turgid except by the Admission of Air or some such like thing It seems I say that there can remain no doubt but that the Animal Spirits are pushed from the Brain through the Nerves into the Muscles to blow them up and to produce there all the Motions that we can wish for a Muscle being full it is necessarily shorter then if it was empty so it draws and moves the part to which it is united as we may see more at large in D'Cartes Book of the Passions We don't give this Explanation as perfectly demonstrated in all its parts For to make it entirely evident there are still many things to be wish'd which 't is almost impossible to explain But it is also useful enough in our subject to know them for whether this Explanation be true or false it remains however equally useful to discover the Nature of Habits Because if the Soul does not move the Body after this manner it necessarily moves it some other way which is very like it from whence we may draw such consequences as we shall make use of But in order to the pursuing our Explanation it must be observed that the Spirits do not always find the ways so open and free by which they should pass and that makes us for example sometimes have so much difficulty in the moving our Fingers so quick as is necessary for the playing upon Msiucal Instruments or the Muscles that serve for pronounciation to pronounce the word of a strange tongue But by little and little the Animal Spirits by their continual course open and clear these passages so that in time one finds no longer resistance Now Habits consist in this facility that the Animal Spirits have to pass through the Members of our Bodies It is very casie according to this Explanation to resolve an infinite Number of questions which respect Habits As for Example why Children are more capable of acquiring new Habits then older Persons are Why it is so difficult to break our selves of long habits Why Men by much speaking have acquired so great a facility to it that they pronounce their words with an incredible swiftness and even without thinking thereof As it too often happens to those that say the Prayers which they have been accustomed to many years and yet to pronounce one word only many Muscles must move together in a certain time and order as those of the Tongue the Lips Throat and Diaphragme But one cannot with a little Meditation satisfie ones self about these questions and many others very curious and useful but it is not necessary to insist upon these things here It is visible from what has been said that there is much relation between the Memory and Habits and that in one sense the Memory may pass for a kind of Habit. For even as Corporeal Habits consist in the facility that the Spirits have acquired to pass through certain places of our Bodies so the Memory consists in the traces that the same Spirits have impressed on the Brain which are the causes of the facility we have in recalling things again to our Mind That if there were no perceptions that depended upon the Course of the Animal Spirits nor on these traces there would be no difference between the Memory and the other Habits It is not also more difficult to conceive that Beasts although without a Soul and incapable of any perception after their manner remember such things as have made an impression in their Brain then to conceive they are capable of acquiring different Habits See the Explanations upon Memory and Spiritual H●bits And after what I have said of Habits I don't see much more difficulty in representing to our selves how the Members of their Bodies may by degrees acquire different Habits then in conceiving how a Machine first made is not so fitly disposed for Action as after it has been used for some time CHAP. VI. I. That the Fibres of the Brain are not subject to such quick Changes as the Spirits are II. Three different Changes in the three different Ages ALL the Parts of Living Bodies are in continual Motion both the Solid and Fluid parts the Flesh as well as the Blood there is only this difference between their Motions that that of the parts of the Blood is visible and sensible and that of the Fibres of our Flesh is wholly imperceptible There is then this difference between the Animal Spirits and the substance of the Brain that the Animal Spirits are very much agitated and very fluid and the substance of the Brain hath some Solidity and Consistence so that the Spirits divide themselves into little parts and in a few
Body that are formed and they have very little consistence in Infants while they are in the Womb And it must be observed that if this Mother had determined the Motion of these Spirits to any other part of her Body by some violent titilation her Child would not have had his Bones broken but that part which had answer'd to that to which the Mother determined these Spirits had been much hurt as I have already said The Reasons of this accident may serve to explain in general how Women who during their being with Child upon seeing Persons with certain Marks in their Faces imprint the same on their Children and in the same part of the Body And from thence we may judge that advice very reasonable which bids 'em touch some hidden part of the Body when they perceive any thing which surprizes 'em and when they are agitated with any violent Passion for that may cause the Marks to be traced rather upon these hidden parts than upon the Face of their Infants We should often have instances like to what I have now related if Infants could live after having received such great Wounds but generally it causes Abortions For we may conclude that almost all Infants who dye before they are born except they be sick have no other cause of their Death than a fright some ardent desire or some other violent passion of their Mothers Here is also another very particular instance 'T is not above a Year since that a Woman having with too much application consider'd the Picture of Saint Pius when the Feast of his Canonization was celebrated was brought to bed of a Child which was perfectly like the Representation of this Saint He had the Face of an Old Man as much as it was possible in an Infant that has no Beard his Arms were crossed upon his Breast his Eyes turned towards Heaven and he had a very low Forehead because the Image of this Saint being raised towards the Vault of the Church and looking towards Heaven had almost no Forehead likewise He had a kind of a confused Miter upon his Shoulders with many round marks in the places where Miters are covered with Stones And indeed this Child very much resembled the Picture by which his Mother had formed him through the power of her Imagination 'T is a thing that all Paris might have seen as well as I because 't was a long time preserved in Spirits of Wine This instance is the more particular because there was not the sight of a Man living and agitated with some passion who moved the Spirits and Blood of the Mother to produce so strange an effect but only the sight of a Picture which yet was very sensible and accompanied with a great emotion of Spirits caused either through the Zeal and application of the Mother or through the agitation that the noise of the Feast had produc'd in her This Mother therefore looking upon this Picture with some application and emotion of Spirits the Child according to the first supposition saw it as she did with the same application and emotion of Spirits The Mother being lively affected imitated him at leaft in the Posture according to the second Supposition for her body being entirely formed and the Fibres of her Flesh hard enough to resist the course of the Spirits she could not imitate or make her self like to him in all things but the Fibres of the Infant 's Flesh being extreamly soft and consequently susceptible of all sorts of impressions the violent course of the Spirits produced in his Flesh whatsoever was necessary to make him entirely like the Image that he saw and the imitation to which Children are much more disposed perfected it as much as possible but this imitation having given to the body of this Child a figure so very extraordinary it was also the cause of its Death There are many other Examples in Authors of the power of the Imagination of Mothers and there is nothing so fantastical but has caused Abortions sometimes For they not only make Children deformed but also marked with such Fruits as they have longed for as Plumbs Pears Grapes and such like things For instance some Mothers having a strong Inclination to eat Pears the Children imagine and desire them with the same ardour and the course of the Spirits excited by the image of this desired fruit disposing it self through the little body is able to change its sigure because of its sostness So that these poor Children become like those things they wish'd for with so much ardour But the Mothers suffer no Injury because their bodies are not soft enough to take the figure of such things as they imagine Thus they cannot imitate them or render themselves entirely like ' em Now it must not be imagined that this Correspondence that I have explained and which is sometimes the cause of such great disorder is useless or ill ordered by Nature for on the contrary it seems very useful in the Propagation of Humane Bodies or in the formation of the Foetus and it is absolutely necessary to the transmitting certain dispositions of the Brain which ought to be different at different times and in different Countrys For instance it is requisite in some Countrys that Lambs should have their Brains to disposed as to fly at the sight of a Wolf because there are many of 'em there and they have a great deal to fear from them 'T is true that this Communication of the Mothers Brain with her Infants has sometimes ill consequences when the Mothers suffer themselves to be surprized by any violent passion Yet it seems to me that without this Communication Women and Animals could not easily beget young ones of the same kind for although some reason might be given of the formation of the Foetus in general as D'Cartes has happily enough attempted However 't is very difficult without this Communication of the Mothers Brain with the Childs to explain how a Mare should not beget an Ox or an Hen lay an Egg which contains a little Partridge or some Foul of a new kind I believe those that have considered the sormation of the Foetus will be of this opinion The most reasonable thought and that which is most conformable to experience about this difficule question of the formation of the Foetus is that Children are perfectly formed even before the action by which they are conceived and that their Mothers only contribute to their growth whilst they continue in the Womb. However this Communication of Animal Spirits and of the Mothers Brain with the Spirits and Brain of the Child seems still serviceable to regulate this growth and determine the parts which serve for its Nourishment and by little and little to dispose the Child like the Mother or else like some of the same Species This appears plain enough by the accidents which happen when the Imagination of the Mother is disordered and the Natural Disposition of her Brain is changed
Of Old Men. with more Reason ought to be understood of Old Men because the Fibres of their Brain are still more inflexible and that for want of Animal Spirits to trace out new Footsteps their Imagination becomes altogether languishing And because the Fibres of their Brain are usually intermixt with many superfluous Humours therefore they loose by little and little the memory of things past and fall into Infirmities that are common to Children So that in their decrepit Age they have those Defects which depend upon the Constitution of the Fibres of the Brain which are to be met with both in Children and grown Men though it may be said that they are Wiser than either because they are no longer so subject to their Passions which proceed from the vehement Agitation of the Animal Spirits We shall not undertake any farther Explanation of these things because it is easie to make a judgment of this Age by the others that we have spoken of before and to conclude from thence that Old Men with much more difficulty conceive what is said to 'em than those that are younger that they are more obstinately tied to their Prejudices and long receiv'd Opinions and consequently that they are more harden'd and confirm'd in their Errors and Ill Habits Though this ought to be observed that the State of Old Age does not happen precisely at Sixty or Seventy years that all Old Men do not doat nor are all those who are past Sixty always free from the Passions of young People and that we should proceed too far to draw General Consequences from Establish'd Principles CHAP. II. That the Animal Spirits usually observe the Traces of Idea's which are most familiar to us which is the Reason that we never make a sound Judgment of things I Suppose I have sufficiently explain'd in the foregoing Chapters the various alterations that are to be met with in the Animal Spirits and in the Constitution of the Fibres of the Brain according to the several Ages of Man So that but a little Meditation upon what has been said will help us to a distinct Knowledge of the Imagination and of the most common Natural Causes of the Differences that are to be observ'd among Wits since all the Alterations that befall the Imagination and the Mind are but Consequences of those in the Animal Spirits and in the Fibres of which the Brain is compos'd But there are several Particular Moral Causes of the Alterations that befall the Imagination of Man viz. their different Conditions Employments and manner of Living to the Consideration of which we must oblige our selves since these sorts of Alterations are the Causes of almost an infinite number of Errors every one judging of Things according to the relation they have to his Condition We do not think it necessary to spend time in Explaining the Effects of some indifferent Causes as great Sicknesses surprising Misfortunes and other unexpected Accidents which make most violent impressions upon the Brain and extreamly disturb it because these things but rarely happen and for that the Errors into which such sort of Persons fall are so palpable that they are no way contageous seeing they are so easily found out and rejected by all the World Now for the more perfect apprehending all the Alterations which Different Conditions produce in the Imagination 't is absolutely necessary to remember that we never imagine Objects but by first forming Images of 'em and that these Images are nothing else but the Traces which the Animal Spirits delineate in the Brain that we imagine things so much the more strongly the deeper and more plainly these Traces are impress'd and the oftner and more violently the Animal Spirits have past through them and that when the Spirits have past through several times they enter in more easily than into other parts adjoining through which they never past or at least not so often This is the most usual Cause of the Confusion and Falshood of our Idea's For the Animal Spirits that are directed by the Action of External Objects or else by the Orders of the Soul to produce certain Traces in the Brain many times produce others which in truth resemble 'em in something but which are not altogether the Traces of the same Objects nor those which the Soul desired to represent to it self for that the Animal Spirits finding some Resistance in those parts of the Brain through which they ought to have past readily turn aside and croud into the deeper Traces of those Idea's which are more familiar to us And here we shall produce very manifest and sensible Examples of these Things When they who are not extreamly short sighted behold the Moon they see two Eyes a Nose and a Mouth in a word it seems to them as if they saw a Face Nevertheless there is nothing at all in the Moon of what they imagine there Many Persons behold there quite another Thing And they who take the Moon to be such as she seems to be to them may be easily undeceived if they look upon her with a small Prospective Glass or if they consult the Descriptions which Hevelius Riccioli and others have publish'd Now the Reason why Men generally behold a Face in the Moon and not the Irregular Spots which are there is this because the Traces of the Face which are in the Brain are very deep for that we frequently and with great Attention look upon Faces So that the Animal Spirits finding some Resistance in other parts of the Brain easily turn aside from the Direction which the Light of the Moon imprints and enter into those Traces to which the Idea's of a Face are naturally affixt Besides that the Appearing Bigness of the Moon not being much different from the largeness of an ordinary Head at a certain distance the Impression of it forms those Traces which have a great Affinity with those that represent a Nose a Mouth and Eyes and by that means determines the Spirits to take their Course in the Traces of a Face Some there are who see a Man a Horseback in the Moon or any thing else which is not a Face because their Imagination having been strongly affected by certain Objects the same Traces are open'd by the least things to which they have any Relation For the same Reason it is that we imagine we behold Chariots Men Lions and other Animals in the Clouds when there is the least resemblance between those Creatures and their Figures and that all Men but chiefly they who are accustomed to Designing and Drawing many times see Heads of Men upon the Walls where there are several Irregular Spots 'T is for this Reason also that the Spirits of Wine entring without any direction of the Will into Traces most familiar to us help to discover Secrets of the greatest Importance and that in our sleep we most commonly dream of those Objects which we have seen in the day time and which had form'd the largest Traces in the
by Conversion to the Phantasmes or Traces of the Brain So soon as the Soul would have the Arm to move the Arm is moved tho' it does not so much as know what it ought to do to make it move and so soon as the Animal Spirits are agitated the Soul finds it self mov'd tho' it does not so much as know there are Animal Spirits in the Body When I come to treat of the Passions I shall speak of the Connexion between the Traces of the Brain and the Motions of the Spirits and of that between the Idea's and Emotions of the Soul for that all the Passions depend upon it My business here is only to treat of the affinity between Idea's and Traces and the Connexion of the Traces one with another There are three very considerable Causes of the Connexion of the Idea's with the Traces Three considerable Causes of the union between the Idea's and Traces the first and most general is the Identity of Time For frequently it suffices that we had certain Thoughts at such time as some new Traces came into our Brain so that those Traces cannot be produced again without renewing the same Thoughts If the Idea of God present it self to my Mind at the same time that my Brain was struck with the sight of these three Characters Iah or with the sound of the Word it self 't is enough if the Traces which those Characters have produc'd be excited to make me think of God And I cannot think of God but there will be produc'd in my Brain some confused Traces of the Characters or Sounds which accompany'd the Thought which I had of God for the Brain being never without Phantasmes there are always such as have some Relation to what we think tho' many times these Phantasmes are very imperfect and very confus'd The second Cause of the Connexion of the Idea's with the Traces and which always supposes the first is the Will of Man This Will 〈◊〉 necessary that this connexion of the Idea's with the Traces may be regulated and proper for Use For if Men had not Naturally an Inclination to agree between themselves to affix their Idea's to Sensible Signs not only this Connexion of Idea's wou'd be absolutely unprofitable for Society but it would be also very Irregular and Imperfect First because Idea's are never strongly united with the Traces but when the Spirits being agitated they render those Traces deep and durable So that the Spirits being never agitated but by the Passions if Men had no such Union to communicate their Sentiments and participate of those of others 't is evident that the exact Union of their Idea's with certain Traces would be very weak because they do not subject themselves to those Exact and Regular Connexions but to render themselves Intelligible Secondly the Repetition of the Meeting of the same Idea's with the same Traces being necessary to form a Connexion that may be of long continuance since the meeting unless it be accompany'd with a violent Motion of the Animal Spirits suffices not to make strong Connexions 't is clear that if Men should refuse to assent it would be the greatest Chance in the World if the same Traces and Idea's should meet together so that the Will of Man is necessary to regulate the Connexion of the same Idea's with the same Traces tho' this Will of Agreement be not so much an effect of their Choice and Reason as an Impression of the Author of Nature who has made us altogether one for another and with a strong Inclination to unite in Mind as well as in Body The third Cause of the Connexion of the Idea's with the Traces is the Constant and Immutable Nature or Will of the Creator For example There is a Natural Connexion and which depends not upon our Will between the Traces produc'd by a Tree or Mountain which we behold and the Idea's of a Tree or Mountain between the Traces which the Cries of a Man or Beast that suffer Pain beget in our Brain the Air of one who threatens us or of whom we stand in fear and the Idea's of Grief of Strength or Weakness as also between the Sentiments of Compassion of Fear and Courage which are excitedin us These Natural Bands are the strongest of all they are generally alike in all Men and they are absolutely necessary for the Preservation of Life For which reason it is that they depend not upon our Will for if the Band or Connexion of Idea's with certain Sounds and Characters be but feeble and very different in several Countries 't is because it depends upon the weak and changeable Will of Men. And the reason why it depends upon it is because this Connexion is not absolutely necessary for Life but only for living like Men that are to form among themselves a Rational Society Here we must observe that the Connexion of Idea's that represent to us Spiritual Things and such as are distinct from us with the Traces of our Brain is not nor can be Natural and by consequence it is or may be different in all Men for that it has no other Cause than their Will and the Identity of Time of which I have spoken before On the other side the Connexion of the Idea's of all Material Things with certain particular Traces is Natural and hence there are certain Traces that stir up the same Idea in all Men. For Example there is no question but that all Men have the Idea of a Square upon the sight of a Square because that Connexion is Natural but 't is to be doubted whither all Men have that Idea when they hear the Word Square pronounced because that Connexion is entirely voluntary The same thing may also be thought of all Traces that are tyed to the Idea's of Spiritual Things But because the Traces which have a Natural Connexion with Idea's do affect the Mind and consequently render it attentive the greatest part of Men do easily enough comprehend and retain Sensible Truths that is the mutual Relations that are between Bodies On the other side because the Traces that have no other Connexion with the Idea's then what is voluntary do never vigorously strike the Mind 't is not without a great deal of trouble that all Men Comprehend and with much more difficulty retain abstracted Truths that is the mutual Relations between things that fall not under the Imagination But when these Relations are never so little compounded they appear absolutely Incomprehensible especially to those that are not accustomed to them in regard they have not fortify'd the Connexion of those abstracted Idea's with their Traces by continual Meditation and tho' others have perfectly comprehended them they forget them in a short time because this Connexion is seldom or never so strong as the Natural one It is so true that all the trouble Men have to comprehend and retain Spiritual and Abstracted Things proceeds from the difficulty of fortifying the Connexion of their Idea's
accompanied with the Emotions of the Spirits because all things which we see do not appear to us always either Good or Evil. These Connexions also may alter and break off because not being always requisite for the Preservation of Life they ought not always to be the same But there are Traces in our Brains that are Naturally united one with another as also with certain Emotions of the Spirits because such a Connexion is necessary for the Preservation of Life and their Connexion cannot be broken off or at least not very easily because it 's convenient that it should be always the same For Example the Trace of a Precipice which a Man sees under himself and from which he is in danger of falling or of some great Body which is ready to fall upon us and crush us to Death is Naturally join'd to the Trace which represents Death as also to an Emotion of the Spirits which disposes us to fly or desire an Escape This Connexion of Traces never changes because it is necessary that it should be always the same and it consists in a Disposition of the Fibres of the Brain which we have from our Birth All those Connexions which are not Natural may and ought to be broken because the various Circumstances of Time and Place ought to alter them so that they may be useful to the Preservation of Life 'T is convenient for Example that Partridges should fly from Men with Birding-Pieces in their Hands especially at such times and in such places where Men are accustomed to Hunt after them but it is not necessary that they should fly at other times and in other places Thus for the Preservation of all Creatures 't is necessary that there should be certain Connexions of Traces which may be easily form'd and destroy'd and that there should be others which may not be broken without great difficulty And lastly others which are never to be broken 'T is very useful to enquire carefully into the different Effects which these different Connexions are capable of producing for they are very numerous and of great importance for the Understanding of Man and of all things between him and which there is any Relation We shall find in the sequel of this Discourse that these Things are the Principal Cause of our Errors But 't is time to return to what we promis'd to treat of and to explain the different Changes that befal the Imagination of Men by reason of their various Manner of Living CHAP. IV. I. That Studious Men are the most subject to Error II. The Reasons why they rather choose to follow Authothority than make use of their Judgment THE Differences that are in the various Manners of Mens Living are almost Infinite There are a great Number of different Conditions Employments and Societies These Differences are the reason that almost all Men pursue different Designs and argue upon different Principles It would be very difficult to meet with several Persons who have absolutely the same Prospects in one and the same Community wherein particular Persons ought to be all of the same Spirit and have the same Designs Their different Employs and Conversation do necessarily give a different Turn and Humour in the way of Managing the Execution of those Things in which they agree This shews that it would be an impossible Undertaking to particularize the Moral Causes of Error But besides it would be of no use to do it here 't is our business only to speak of such Manners of Living as betray Men into the greatest Number of Errors and to such as are of the highest Importance When we shall have Explained those we shall have open'd a Way sufficient to enable the Mind to proceed farther and every body may be able to Survey at once and very easily the most bidden Causes of several particular Errors which cannot be explain'd but with a great deal of Time and Labour When the Mind sees clearly it delights it self with pursuing Truth which it does with an inexpressible swiftness I. That Studicus Persons are the mst subject to Error The Employment which seems most necessary to be treated of in this place because it produces the most considerable changes in the Imagination of Men and which lead us most into Error is the Employment of Studious Persons who make more use of their Memory than Wit For Experience always shews us that they who apply themselves most eagerly to the Reading of Books and to Search after Truth are those who have lead us into the greatest number of Errors 'T is the same thing with those that Study as with those that Travel When a Traveller by misfortune has taken the wrong Road the farther he advances the more remote he is from the Place whither he designs to go and the more diligent and hasty he is to arrive to the end of his Journey the more he wanders out of the way In like manner those ardent desires which Men have for Truth cause 'em to precipitate themselves into the Reading of Books where they think to find it or to frame to themselves a Chimerical Systeme of things which they desire to know for which they have a strong fancy and which they endeavour by the vain Efforts of Wit to make others relish to the end they may receive the Honour which is usually due to the Inventors of Systemes Now let us explain these two Defects 'T is a difficult thing to apprehend how it comes to pass that Men of Sense should rather choose to make use of other Persons Judgment in the Search of Truth than of that which God has bestow'd upon ' em Without doubt there is infinitely much more pleasure and honour for a Man to guide himself with his own than other Men's Eyes nor does any Man who has good Eyes ever dream of shutting 'em or of putting 'em out in hopes of one to guide him nevertheless 't is the same thing with the use of Judgment as with the use of the Eyes for as the Judgment is ●●●nitely above the Eyes the use of it is accompanied with satisfactions far more solid and which content it after another manner than Light and Colours do the Sight However Men always make use of their own Eyes to be their Guides but they seldom or never make use of their own Judgment to discover the Truth But there are several Causes which contribute to this same Perturbation of the Mind II. Reasons why they rather choose to follow Authority than make use of their own Judgement First the Natural Sloath of Men that will not give themselves the Trouble of Meditation Secondly Their Inability of Meditating into which they are fallen for want of applying themselves to it in their Youth as has been shew'd in the Ninth Chapter In the third place the little Love Men have for Abstracted Truths which are the foundation of every thing that is to be known here below In the fourth place the Satisfaction that Men
they cannot be joined to the rest Oderunt hilarem tristes tristemque jocosi Sedatum celeres agilem gnavumque remissi It requires a larger Portion of Vertue than Men are aware of not to break with those that no way sympathize with our Passions but whose Sentiments are in all things contrary to ours Nor is it altogether without Reason For when a Man has good cause to be Sad or Joyful 't is in some measure an Affront not to correspond with him in his Sentiments If he be Sad 't is not proper to appear before him with a brisk and jolly Air which argues Gladness and which strongly imprints the Motions of it in his Imagination for this is to put him out of that Condition which is most convenient and pleasing to him Sadness being the most delightful of all the Passions to a Man in Misery All Men therefore have a certain Disposition of the Brain Two Principal Causes that increase our Inclination to imitate one another which naturally inclines 'em to be affected after the same manner as some of those with whom they Converse Now there are two Principal Causes that foment and increase this Disposition the first is in the Soul the second in the Body The first consists in the Natural Propensity of Men to Grandeur and Advancement This Propensity it is which imperceptibly excites us to imitate Persons of Quality in their manner of Speaking Walking Dress and Outward Air. This is the Original of New Modes of the Instability of living Languages and of certain general Corruptions of Manners This is the chief Origine of all Extravagant and Fantastick Novelties which are not supported by Reason but Human Fancy and Pleasure The other Cause which much incline to imitate others and which we ought chiefly to Discourse of here consists in a certain Impression which Persons of a Strong Imagination make upon Feeble Minds and upon Tender and Delicate Brains What a Strong Imagination is I understand by a Strong and Vigorous Imagination that Constitution of the Brain which makes it capable of Traces extreamly deep and fill the Receptacle of the Mind in such a manner that it cannot attend to other things than such as the Images themselves represent to it There are two sorts of Persons who have a Strong Imagination in this Sense Two sorts of it The first receive these deep Traces by an Unvoluntary and Irregular Impression of the Animal Spirits and the others of whom we intend principally to Discourse here receive 'em from a certain Disposition which is observ'd in the Substance of the Brains 'T is visible that the first are absolute Mad Men seeing they are constrain'd by the Natural Connexion which is between their Idea's and their Traces to think upon things not thought of by others with whom they Converse which renders 'em incapable of speaking to the purpose and answering directly to Questions that are ask'd ' em There are an infinite number of this sort of People who only differ in the more or the less and it may be said that all such as are agitated with some violent Passion are of their number since at the time of their Emotion the Animal Spirits so forcibly imprint the Traces and Images of their Passion that they are incapable of thinking upon any thing else But 't is to be observ'd that all these sort of Persons are not capable of corrupting the Imagination of any Man let his Mind be never so weak and his Brain never so soft and delicate and this for two Reasons The first Because they are not able to answer conformably to the Idea's of others they can perswade 'em to nothing And secondly Because the Disturbance of their Mind being altogether manifest whatever they say is hearken'd to with contempt Nevertheless 't is true that Passionate Persons put us into Passions and make Impressions in our Imagination like those with which they themselves are affected But in regard their Transports are manifestly visible we resist those Impressions and get rid of 'em soon after They rub out of themselves when they are not fomented by the Cause that produc'd 'em that is to say when the Transported Persons are departed out of our presence and when the sensible sight of the Characters which Passion form'd in the Countenance produces no farther Alteration in the Fibres of our Brain nor any Agitation in our Animal Spirits I only Examine here that sort of Strong and Vigorous Imagination which consists in a Disposition of the Brain proper to receive very deep Traces of more feeble and less active Objects 'T is no defect to have a Brain proper for a Strong Imagination of Things and for the Reception of the most distinct and lively Images of the most inconsiderable Objects provided that the Mind be always Mistress of the Imagination that these Images be imprinted by her Orders and that they may be defac'd when she pleases for hence arises sagacity and strength of Wit But when the Imagination over-rules the Soul and these Traces form themselves by the Disposition of the Brain and by the Activity of the Objects and Spirits without expecting the Orders of the Will this is a most Mischievous Vice and a kind of Madness We shall therefore endeavour to set forth the Character of those who have a Strong Imagination of this sort To that purpose it behoves us to remember that the Receptacle of the Mind is confin'd to narrow limits 2. That it is fill'd with no Object more easily than with the Sensations of the Mind and generally with the Perceptions of Objects that affect us very much 3. That the deep Traces of the Brain are always accompanied with Sensations or other Perceptions that vigorously affect us For thereby 't is easie to know the Genuine Characters of their Wit who have a Strong Imagination The first is Two considerable Defects in those who have a Strong Imagination that these Persons are not capable of giving a sound Judgment of things that are a little difficult and perplext because the Receptacle of the Mind being fill'd with Idea's that are by Nature connex'd with those very deep Traces they have not the Liberty to think of several things at the same time But in Compound Questions 't is requisite that the Mind should survey with one quick and suddain motion the Idea's of many things and discover at one single view the Correspondencies and Connexions that are necessary for the resolving of those Questions All Men know by their own Experience that they are not capable of applying themselves to the Search of any Truth at such time as they are afflicted with any violent Pain because then there are in the Brain those deep Traces which take up the Capacity of the Mind Thus those Persons of whom we speak having deeper Traces of the same Objects as we suppose they cannot have so great an Extension of Mind nor comprehend so many things together as the others The first Defect of
Fruitful and Inexhaustible Sources of our Errors and Illusions but the Mind acting of it self is not so subject to Error We were troubled to finish the two preceding Treatises and we are uneasie to begin this it is not because the Nature or Properties of the Mind is a barren Subject but because we enquire not so much here into its Properties as Weaknesses Let no one be Surprised if this Treatise is not so large nor discovers so many Errors as the preceding Books nor let any one complain if the Subject is a little dry ab●●r●cted and difficult The Senses and Imagination ●●●●ot always be moved nor is it necessary they should When a Subject is abstracted he that would ren●●● it Sensible will obscure it it 's enough to make it Intelligible There is nothing so Unjust as the common Complaints of those who would know every thing but would apply their Mind to nothing they are angry if we desire them to become Attentive they would always have us Affect and Flatter their Senses and Passions But why We know we cannot satisfie them Those who make Romances and Comedies are oblig'd to please and captivate the Attention 't is enough for us to instruct those who endeavour to become Attentive The Errors of the Senses and Imagination depend upon the Nature and Constitution of the Body and are discover'd by considering the Power they have over the Soul but the Errors of the Pure Understanding cannot be discover'd but by considering the Nature of the Mind it self and of the Idea's which are necessary to it in order to know Objects So that to penetrate into the Causes of the Errors of the Pure Understanding it will be necessary for us to insist in this Book upon the Consideration of the Nature of the Mind and of Intellectual Idea's We shall first speak of the Mind as it is in it self and without any relation to the Body to which it is united So that what we shall say of it might be said of Pure Intelligences ●nd with greater Reason because we here call it the Pure Understanding By the word Pure Vnderstanding we pretend not to design that Faculty which the Mind has of knowing Objects without us without framing Corporeal Images of them in the Brain to represent them We shall afterwards treat of Intellectual Idea's by whose means the Pure Understanding perceives Objects without us I do not believe that after having thought Seriously I. Thought only is Essential to the Mind To Think and Imagine are only its Modifications we can doubt that the Essence of the Mind consists only in Thought even as the Essence of Matter consists in Extension And that according to the different Modifications of Thinking the Mind can now Will then Imagine and lastly Participate of many other particular Forms so that according to the different Modifications of Extension Matter is now Water then Fire and is capable of infinite other particular Forms By the word Thought By the Essence of a thing I understand that which is first conceived in a thing upon which all the Modifications observed in that thing depend I do not here understand particular Modifications of the Soul that is Such or such a Thought but a Thought that is capable of all kinds of Modifications or Thoughts even as by Extension I do not understand such or such a sort of Extension as Round Square c. but an Extension capable of all sorts of Modifications or Figures And there was no need of this Comparison but because we have not so clear an Idea of Thought as of Extension for Thought is only known by an interior Sentiment or by Conscience as shall hereafter be explained I do not believe it possible * Second Part of the Pure Mind Chap. 7. to conceive a Mind which cannot Think although it 's easie to conceive one which neither Thinks Imagines nor Wills even as it 's impossible to conceive Matter that is not extended though one may easily conceive it to be neither Earth Metal Square Round and even without Motion Hence we may conclude That as there may be Matter which is neither Earth Metal Square Round or without Motion so there may also be a Mind which is neither Sensible of Heat or Cold which neither Rejoyces is Sad Imagines or Wills any thing So that all these Modifications are not Essential to it Thought only is of the Essence of the Mind as Extension only is of the Essence of Matter But even as if Matter or Extension were without Motion it would be wholly useless and incapable of this Variety of Forms for which it was design'd And as it would be impossible to conceive an Intelligent Being to Will such a Creation that is Matter without Motion or incapable of Form so if the Mind or Thought were without Will it 's evident that it would be wholly useless since it would be sometimes carried towards the Objects of its Perceptions and would not love the Good for which it was made so that it is impossible to conceive that an Intelligent Being would create it in this Estate Nevertheless as Motion is not Essential to Matter as Extension is so to Will is not Essential to the Mind since Willing supposes Perception Therefore Thought only is properly Constitutive of the Essence of the Mind and the different Manners of Thinking as Perceiving and Imagining are only the Modifications of which it is capable and with which it is not always modified But to Will is a Property which always accompanies it whether it be united to or separated from the Body which nevertheless is not Essential to it since it supposes Thought and we may conceive a Mind without Will even as a Body without Motion The Power of Willing is always Inseparable from the Mind although it is not Essential to it for even as it is impossible to conceive Matter that cannot be moved so it is impossible to conceive a Mind which cannot Will or which is incapable of any Natural Inclination but as we conceive Matter can exist without Motion so we can conceive a Mind to exist without any Impression from the Author of Nature towards Good and consequently without Will for the Will is nothing else but an Impression of the Author of Nature II. We do not know all the Modifications of which our Soul is capable which carries us towards Good in general as we have more largely explain'd in the first Chapter of the Treatise upon the Senses What we said before in the Treatise upon the Senses and what we have just now said of the Nature of the Mind does not suppose that we know all the Modifications whereof it is capable we do not suppose such things but rather believe that there is in the Mind of Man a Capacity of receiving Successively an infinite Number of different Modifications which the Mind it self is Ignorant of The least Portion of Matter can receive a Figure of three six ten or Ten
Thousand sides or a Circular or Ecliptick Figure which may be consider'd as made up of an Infinity of Angles and Sides There is an infinite number of different Species of each of these Figures an infinite number of Triangles of different kinds besides other Figures of four six ten or Ten Thousand sides and infinite Poligons For the Circle the Ellipsis and generally every regular or irregular curve-lin'd Figure may be consider'd as an infinite Poligone The Ellipsis for example as an infinite Poligone but whose Angles or sides are unequal being greater towards the lesser Diameter than the other And thus of infinite other Poligones more compounded and irregular A simple piece of Wax is capable of infinite or rather infinitely infinite different Modifications which no Mind can comprehend What reason then is there to imagine that the Soul which is more noble than the Body is not capable of more Modifications besides those which it has yet receiv'd If we had never felt Pain nor Pleasure if we had never seen Colour or Light or if we had been as Blind or Deaf in relation to Colours and Sounds ought we thence to conclude that we were incapable of all the Sensations which we now have of Objects since these Sensations are only Modifications of our Soul as we have proved in the Treatise of the Senses We must then grant that the Capacity which the Soul has of receiving different Modifications is probably greater than the Capacity which it has of conceiving I mean as the Mind cannot draw out or conceive all the Figures whereof Matter is capable so it cannot comprehend all the different Modifications which the powerful Hand of God can produce in the Soul even though we should as distinctly know the Capacity of the Soul as that of Matter Which is Absurd from the Reasons brought in the Seventh Chapter of the Second Part of this Book Our Soul therefore receives very few Modifications here because it is united to the Body upon which it depends All its Sensations carry it to its Body and whereas it cannot enjoy God it can have no other Modifications besides what the other Enjoyments produce Matter which our Body is composed of is capable of very few Modifications in this Life this Matter cannot be resolv'd into Earth and Vapour till after Death it cannot now become Air Fire Diamond Metal it cannot be Square Round Triangular it must be Flesh and have the Figure of Man that the Soul may be united to it It is even so with our Soul it is necessary that it have Sensations of Heat Cold Colour Light Sounds Odours Sapors and many other Modifications that it may be united to its Body All these Sensations engage it to the Preservation of its Machine they agitate it and terrifie it so soon as the least Spring is loosed or broken And thus the Soul must be subject thereto as long as the Body shall be subject to Corruption but as soon as it shall be invested with Immortality and there shall be no farther Fear of a Dissolution of its Parts it 's reasonable to believe that it will no longer be affected with these Incommodious Sensations which we unwillingly feel but with an Infinity of all other different Things of which we have now no Idea which shall surpass all our Thoughts and be worthy of the Greatness and Goodness of God whom we shall enjoy 'T is therefore against all Reason that Men imagine to penetrate so into the Nature of the Soul as to be well assur'd that it 's only capable of Knowing and Loving This indeed might be maintain'd by those who attribute their Sensations to External Objects or to their own Body or who pretend that their Passions are in their Heart For indeed if we retrench from the Soul all its Passions and Sensations whatever can be known in that which is left behind is only a Chain of Knowledge and Love But I cannot apprehend how those who have taken their leave of the Illusions of their Senses can be perswaded that all our Sensations and Passions are only Knowledge and Love I mean the confused kinds of Judgments which the Soul draws from Objects relating to the Body which it Animates I do not apprehend how it may be said That Light Colours Odours c. are Judgments of the Soul for on the contrary it seems to me that Colours Odours and other Sensations are Modifications very different from Judgments Let us choose some of the quickest Sensations which most affect the Mind and let us see what these Men can say of Colour or of Pleasure They think according to many very Famous * St. Aug. Book 6. De Musica Descartes dans son homme c. Authors that these Sensations are only Consequences of the Faculty which we have of Knowing and Willing and that Pain for Example is nothing else but a certain Sollicitude Repugnancy and Aversion of the Will against things which it knows to be Hurtful to its Dear Body But it 's evident to me that this is to confound Pain with Sadness and make Pain a Consequence of the Knowledge and Action of the Will whereas on the contrary it precedes both For Example If a hot Coal was put into the Hand of a Person that was asleep or should hold his Hands behind his Back no one I believe with any probability of Truth would affirm that this Person would forthwith know that there were some Motions in his Hands contrary to a good Constitution of Body that afterwards his Will would oppose it and that this Pain would be a Consequence of this Knowledge of his Mind and this Opposition of his Will But rather on the contrary the first thing that this Person would conceive when the Coal touch'd his Hand would be Pain and this Knowledge of the Mind and Opposition of the Will would be only Consequences of Pain though indeed they were the Cause of Sadness which followed the Pains But there is much difference between the Pain and the Sadness which it produces Pain is the first thing which the Soul feels it precedes Knowledge and can never be agreeable in it self But on the contrary Sadness is the last thing which the Soul feels Knowledge always precedes it and it is always pleasant in it self This is evident from the Pleasure we perceive at the Lamentable Representations of Tragedies for this Pleasure increases with the Sadness but Pleasure never increases with Pain Comedians who study the Art of Pleasing know well that the Stage is not to be imbru'd with Slaughter because the Image of a Murder is rather Terrible than Pleasant But they are not afraid to affect the Spectators with too great a Sadness because indeed Sadness is always agreeable when there is a proper Subject of Sadness there is then an Essential Difference betwixt Sadness and Pain and one cannot say that Pain is only a Knowledge of the Mind joyn'd to an Opposition of the Will As for other Sensations such as
's easie to conclude that we must not at first apply our selves to an Enquiry into hidden Truths whose knowledge depends upon too many things and whereof some are not familiar enough to us For we ought to Study methodically and make use of what we know distinctly to apprehend what we know not or what we know but confusedly However the greatest part of those who Study do not take this Course they make no Essay upon their own Strength they consult not themselves to know what they are capable of 'T is a secret Vanity and an irregular desire of knowing and not Reason which rules their Studies They begin inconsiderately to enquire into the most secret and impenetrable Truths and to resolve Questions which depend upon so great number of Relations that the most quick and penetrating Mind cannot discover them with any absolute certainty but after many Ages and almost an infinity of Experiments There are a great number of Questions of this Nature in Physicks and Morality All Sciences of Bodies and their Qualities as of Animals Plants Metals and of their respective Qualities are Sciences which can never be sufficiently evident nor certain especially if they be not manag'd after another Method than heretofore or if we begin not by the most Simple and least compounded Sciences upon which they depend But studious Persons will not give themselves the trouble of Philosophizing in Order they do not agree upon the Certainty of Physical Principles they know not the Nature of Bodies in General nor their Qualities but confess it themselves However they imagin they can give a reason why for Example the Hairs of Old Men wax White and yet their Teeth grow Black which depends upon so many Causes that it 's impossible to give any certain reason for it To know this it 's necessary to understand in what consists the Whiteness of Hairs in particular the Humours with which they are nourished the Philtres through which these Humours pass the Conformation and the Root of the Hairs or the Skin through which they pass and the difference of all these things in a Young and an Old Man which it 's absolutely impossible or at least very difficult to know Aristotle II. An example of want of Order in Aristotle for example hath pretended to know the Cause of this Whiteness which happens to Old Mens Hairs he hath given many reasons in different places of his Books But because he is the Genius of Nature he stays not there he enquires deeper He hath discover'd that the Cause which makes Old Mens Hairs White was the same which made some Persons and some Horses have one Eye Blew and the other of another Colour These are his words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This is sufficiently Surprising Book V. De Gener. Anim. C. 1. but there is nothing hid from this great Man and he gives reasons of so great a Number of things in almost all places of his Physicks which the sharpest Persons of this Age believe Impenetrable that it was deservedly said of him That God gave him to us that we might be Ignorant of nothing that was to be known Aristotelis Doctrina est Summa Veritas quoniam ejus intellectus fuit finis Humani Intellectus Quare bene dicitur de illo quod ipse fuit creatus datus nobis Divina Providentia ut non ignoremus possibilia Sciri Averroes ought to have added That Divine Providence gave us Aristotle to teach us what was impossible to be known For it 's true that this Philosopher does not only teach us things which may be known but if since he must be believ'd upon his word his Doctrine be the Soveraign Truth Summa Veritas he also teaches us those things which are impossible to be known Certainly one must have much Faith thus to believe Aristotle when he gives us only Logical Reasons and only explains the Effects of Nature by the Confus'd Notions of the Senses especially since he boldly decides Questions which will never be resolv'd by other Men. Thus Aristotle takes a particular Care to inform us that we must believe him upon his word for 't is an incontestable Axiom with this Author that the Disciple must believe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It is true that Disciples are sometimes oblig'd to believe their Master but their Faith ought to be extended only to Experiments and Matter of Fact for if they intend to become true Philosophers they must examine the Reasons of their Masters and then receive them only when they discover the Evidence of them by their own Judgment But to be a Peripatetick it is absolutely necessary to believe and to retain and the same Disposition of Mind ought to be had at the reading of that Philosophy as at the reading of an History for if any one takes the Liberty of making use of his Judgment and Reason he must not expect ever to be a great Philosopher 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But the reason why Aristetle and many other Philosophers have pretended to know what can never be known is That they have never known the difference betwixt Knowing and Knowing betwixt having a certain and evident Knowledge and having but a probable one And the reason why they never understood this difference is That the Subjects to which they applied themselves being beyond the perfect reach of their Mind they saw but a part of them without being able to comprehend them all together which indeed is enough to discover many Probabilities but not to discover Truth evidently Besides they seeking after Science meerly out of Vanity and probabilities being more apt to gain the Esteem of Men than Truth it self because they are more proportionated to the common reach of the Mind they have neglected to seek after necessary Means to increase the Capacity of the Mind and to give it more Extension than it has so that they have not been able to penetrate the bottom of Truths that are but a little hidden Geometricians have well known how little Extension the Mind has Geometricians behave themselves well in their Search after Truth at least they behaved themselves in their Studies after such way as shews they know it perfectly especially those that have made use of Algebra which Vieta and Descartes have renewed and improv'd in this Age. What I say appears from this That those Persons have not undertaken the Resolution of very compound Difficulties before they knew clearly the more Simple on which they depend They did not apply themselves to the Consideration of Lines as Conick Sections until they were Masters of common Geometry But that which is particular to Algebraists IV. Their Method inlarges the Capacity of the Mind that of Aristotle contractsit is That they see their Mind cannot be at the same time applied to many Figures they cannot imagine Solicts that have more than three Dimensions although it 's often necessary to conceive they may have more they make use of Common and very
Familiar Letters to express and abridge their Idea's Thus the mind not being embarrassed nor imploy'd upon any Representation which it would be oblig'd to make upon many Figures and Lines it may perceive at one view all that it is capable of seeing otherwise And thus the Mind can penetrate deeper and extend it self much farther when its Capacity is well manag'd The Art of rendring the Mind more penetrating and Extensive consists as we have elsewhere explain'd in a good Management of its Powers and Capacity not in imploying it to no purpose upon things which are not necessary to discover the Truth it seeks after which ought to be well observ'd Book VI. The Second Part of Method For this only shows that common Logicks are fitter to lessen the Capacity of the Mind than to inlarge it because it is evident That if in a Search after any Truth we use the Rules they prescribe us the Capacity of the Mind is divided so that it will be unfit to be attentive and to apprehend all the Extension of the Subject it examines It is therefore sufficiently evident from what I have said That the greatest part of Men make but little Reflection upon the Nature of the Mind whilst they apply themselves to a Search after Truth for indeed they have never been well convinc'd of its little Extension and the necessity there is of well managing and enlarging it And this is one of the most considerable Causes of their Errors and from hence it is that they have so unhappily perfected their Studies But we do not pretend that there were ever any Men which were not conscious of their own Limitation and their little Capacity and Extension of Mind all the World confesses it but the Generality of them only know it confusedly and confess it only with their Mouths The Method they take in their Study gives the Lye to their Confession since they act as if they truly thought their Mind bad no Limits and they would penetrate into things that depend upon a great many Causes whereof generally they do not know one There is also another Defect which is very common in these Studious Men V. Another Defect in Studious Men. which is the applying themselves to too many Sciences at once and if they Study but six Hours in a day they will sometimes study six different things 'T is plain this Defect proceeds from the same Cause as the rest that I have before mention'd For 't is very probable that if those that study after this manner know certainly that it was not agreeable to the Capacity of their Minds and that it was more likely to fill them with Errors and Confusion than with true Science they would not suffer themselves to be hurried away by the irregular Motions of their Passions and Vanity for indeed that is not the way to satisfie the Mind since 't is not the proper Means to know any thing CHAP. IV. I. The Mind cannot long apply it self to any Object which neither relates to it self nor to Infinity II. The Inconstancy and consequently the Error of the Will proceeds from this Defect of Application III. Our Sensations affect us more than the Pure Idea's of the Mind IV. What is the Original Cause of the Corruption of Manners V. And the Ignorance of the Generality of Mankind THE Mind of Man is not only subject to Error because it is Finite or more limited than the Objects they consider as has been explained in the two precedent Chapters but also because it is Inconstant and has no Firmness in whatsoever it does and cannot keep it self fix'd long enough upon any Subject to examine it entirely To conceive the Cause of this Inconstancy and Levity of our Minds it is necessary to know that its Action is directed by the Will which applies it to such Objects as it loves and is of it self continually Inconstant and unsettled of which this is the Cause We cannot doubt but God is the Author of all things that he hath made them for himself and has inclined the Heart of Man towards him by a Natural and Invincible Impression that he continually imprints upon him God cannot Will the Existence of any Mind which cannot love him or which should love him less than any other Good if any other besides himself could be found because he cannot Will that any Mind should not love that which is most Amiable or love it more than that which is less Amiable Thus it is requisite that a Natural Love should carry us to God since it comes from him and that there is nothing that can stop the Motions of it only God himself who imprinted them Every bodies Will therefore necessarily follows the Motions of this Love The Righteous and Wicked the Happy and the Damned Love God with this Love for the Natural Love which we have for God being the same thing as the Natural Inclination that carries us to Good in General to the Infinite and Soveraign Good it is evident that all Minds Love God with this Love since he only is the Universal Infinite and Soveraign Good For indeed all Spirits and even the Devils have an Ardent Desire to be Happy and to possess the Chief Good And they desire it without Choice without Deliberation without Liberty and by a Necessity of their Nature Being therefore made for God for an Infinite Good for a Good which comprehends all others in it our Hearts can never be satisfied but by the Possession of this Good Thus our Will always labouring under an eager Thirst always agitated with Desires Anxieties II. The Inconstancy of the Will Causes the Defect of our Application and consequently causes our Error and full of Inquietudes for the Good that it does not possess cannot without much Pain suffer the Mind for any time to stop at abstracted Truths which affect it not and which it judges uncapable of making it Happy Thus she Incessantly pushes it forward to search after other Objects and when in this Agitation which the Will communicates to it it meets with any Object that has the Appearance of a Good I mean such as makes the Soul Sensible of any Pleasure or inward Satisfaction at its approach then this Thirst is excited anew these Desires these wishes and these Ardours take new Life and the Mind being oblig'd to obey them engages it self only to that Object which causes or seems to cause them to draw it nearer to the Soul which tasts it and feeds on it for some time But the Emptiness of Creatures cannot fill the Infinite Capacity of Man's Mind these little Pleasures irritate its Thirst rather than allay it and give the Soul a vain sort of a Hope of being satisfied in the Multiplicity of the Pleasures of this Life which also produces an Inconstancy and an inconceivable Levity in the Mind which was to discover to it all these Goods It 's true that when the Mind accidentally meets with any Object which is
that External Objects emit the Species or Images which represent them And 't is only upon this Foundation that they multiply their Faculties and defend their active intellect So that this Foundation having no Solidity as shall soon be shewn it will be unnecessary to spend any time to overturn the Superstructure We are assur'd then that it is improbable that Objects should emit their Images or Species which represent them for these reasons 1. From the impenetrability of Objects All Objects as the Sun Stars and all such as are near the Eyes cannot emit Species which are different from their respective Natures Wherefore Philosophers commonly say that these Species are Gross and Material in which they differ from express'd Species which are Spiritualised These impress'd Species of Objects then are little Bodies they cannot therefore be penetrated nor all the Spaces which are betwixt the Earth and the Heaven which must be full of them Whence it 's easie to conclude they must be bruis'd and broken in moving every way and thus they cannot render Objects visible Moreover one may see from the same place or point a great number of Objects in the Heavens and on the Earth therefore the Species of these Objects can be reduc'd into a Point But they are impenetrable since they are extended Therefore c. But one may not only see a multitude of very great and vast Objects There is no Point in all the great Spaces of the World from whence we cannot discover an almost infinite number of Objects and even Objects as large as the Sun Moon and the Heavens there is therefore no Point in all the World where the Species of all these things ought not to meet which is against all appearance of Truth The Second Reason is taken from the Change which happens in the Species Such as would know how all impressions of Visible Objects however epposite may be communicatedwithout being weaken'd may read Monsicur Descartes his Dioptricks it 's evident that the nearer any Object is the greater its Species ought to be since we see the Object 's greater But what is yet more difficult to conceive according to their Opinion is That if we look upon this Object with a Telescope or a Microscope the Species immediately becomes Six Hundred times as great as it was before for 't is yet more difficultly conceiv'd from what Parts it can grow so great in an instant The Third Reason is when we look upon a perfect Cube all the Species of its Sides are unequal nevertheless we see all the Sides equally Square So when we consider Ellipses and Parallelograms in a Picture which cannot but emit like Species yet we see Circles and Squares This manifestly shews that it is not necessary that the Object beheld should emit Species like it self that it may be seen In fine it cannot be conceiv'd how it can be that a Body which does not sensibly diminish should always emit Species on every Side which should continually fill all the great Spaces about it and that with an inconceivable swiftness For an Object that was hidden in that Instant that it discovers it self may be seen many Millions of Leagues on all Sides and what appears yet more strange is that Bodies in great Motion as Air and some others have not that power of pushing outwards these Images which resemble them as the more gross and quiescent Bodies such as the Earth Stones and generally all hard Bodies have But I shall not stay any longer to enumerate all the contrary Reasons to their Opinion there would be no end a very ordinary Judgment would raise innumerable Objections Those that we have brought are sufficient though they were not so necessary after what has been said upon the Subject of the First Book where the Errors of the Senses were explain'd But there are so great a number of Philosophers wedded to this Opinion that we believe it will be necessary to say something to encline them to reflect upon their own Thoughts CHAP. III. That the Soul has no power of producing Idea's The Cause of Mens Error in reference to this Subject THe Second Opinion is that of those who believe our Souls have any power of producing the Idea's of such things as they will think upon and they are excited to produce them by the Impressions which Objects make upon Bodies although these Impressions are not Images like the Objects which cause them they believe that 't is in this that Man is made after the Image of God and participates of his Power That even as God Created all things out of nothing and can reduce them to nothing again and then Create them anew so Man can Create and Annihilate the Idea's of all things as he pleases But there is great Reasons to distrust all these Opinions which extol a Man these are the Common Thoughts which arise from a vain and proud Original and which the Father of Light hath not inspir'd This participation of the power of God which Men boast of having to represent Objects and of doing many other particular actions is a participation which seems to relate to something of independance as independance is commonly explain'd it is also a Chimerical Participation which Mens Ignorance and Vanity make them to imagine They depend much more than they think upon the Goodness and Mercy of God But this is not a place to explain these things It 's enough if we endeavour to shew that Men have not the Power of forming the Idea's of things which they perceive No one can doubt that Idea's are real Beings since they have real Properties since they differ from one another and represent all different things Nor can we reasonably doubt that they are Spiritual and very different from the Bodies which they represent But it seems reasonable to doubt whether Idea's by whose means we see Bodies are not more Noble than the Bodies themselves for indeed the Intelligible World must be more perfect than the Material and Earthly as we shall see hereafter Thus when we affirm that we have the Power of Forming such Idea's as we please we shall be in danger of perswading our selves to make more Noble and Perfect Beings than the World which God hath Created However some do not reflect upon it because they imagin that an Idea is Nothing since it is not to be felt or else if they look upon it as a Being 't is a very mean contemptible one because they imagin it to be annihilated as soon as it is no longer present to the Mind But supposing it true that Idea's were only little contemptible Beings yet they are Beings and Spiritual Ones and Men not having the power of Believing it follows that they cannot produce them for the production of Idea's after the manner before explain'd is a true Creation and although Men endeavour to palliate and mollifie the hardness of this Opinion by saying that the production of Idea's presupposes something else but Creation
nothing yet the difficulty is not solv'd by this Subterfuge For we ought to consider that it is not more difficult to produce something out of nothing than to produce one thing out of another which cannot at all contribute to its Production For example it is not more difficult to Create an Angel than to produce him from a Stone because a Stone being of another sort of Being wholly different it cannot in the least be useful to the Production of an Angel But it may contribute to the Production of Bread Gold c. for a Stone Gold and Bread are but the same thing differently configur'd and are all Material It is even more difficult to produce an Angel of a Stone than to pronuce him out of nothing because to make an Angel out of a Stone so far as it can be done the Stone must be annihilated and afterwards the Angel Created But simply to Create an Angel nothing is to be annihilated If therefore the Mind produces its Idea's from the material Impressions which the Brain receives from Objects it must always do the same thing or a thing as difficult or even more difficult than if it Created them since Idea's being Spiritual they cannot be produc'd of material Images which have no proportion with them But if it be said that an Idea is not a Substance I consent to it yet it is always something that is Spiritual and as it is impossible to make a Square of a Spirit although a Square be not a Substance so it is also impossible to Form a Material Substance from a Spiritual Idea although an Idea was no Substance But although we should grant to the Mind of Man a Soveraign Power to Annihilate and Create the Idea's of things yet it would never make use of that Power to produce them for even as a Painter how skilful soever he be could not represent an Animal which he had never seen and of which he never had any Idea So that the Picture which he should make should be like to this unknown Animal Thus a Man cannot form the Idea of an Object if he knew it not before that is if he has not already had some Idea of it which does not depend upon his Will and if he already had an Idea of it he certainly knows this Object and it would be unnecessary for him to Form it anew It is therefore in vain to attribute to the Mind of Man the Power of producing his Idea's It might be said perhaps that the Mind of Man hath general and confused Idea's which it does not produce and that those which it produces are particular more clear and distinct but it is always the same thing For even as a Painter cannot draw the Picture of a particular Person so as to be sure that he hath perfected it if he had had no distinct Idea of him and even if the Person had not been present Thus the Mind for example which could only have the Idea of a Being or an Animal in general could not represent to its self a Horse nor Form a distinct Idea of one and be assured that it is perfectly like a Horse if it had not already the first Idea with which it might compare this second Now if it had a first it is unuseful to Form a second and the Question respects this first Therefore c. It 's true that when we conceive a Square by pure Intellection we can also imagin it that is perceive it in our selves by tracing an Image of it in the Brain yet it must be first observ'd that we are not the true nor principal Cause of this Image But it will be too long to explain it here Secondly So far is the second Idea which accompanies this Image from being more distinct and more exact than the other that on the contrary it is not so Exact because it resembles the first which was only a pattern for the second For indeed we must not believe that the Imagination and Senses represent Objects more distinctly to us than the pure Understanding but only that they apply them more to the Mind for the Idea's of the Senses and Imagination are not distinct but only so far as they are conformable to the pure Intellection The Image of a Square for example which the Imagination Traces in the Brain is not exact and perfect but only so far as it resembles the Idea of the Square which we conceive by pure Intellection It is this Idea which regulates this Image 't is the Mind which Conducts the Imagination and which Obliges it if we may so say to behold from time to time whether the Image it Paints be a Figure of four right and equal Lines whose Angles are alike In a word whether what it Imagins is like to what it Conceives After what has been said Tanto meliora esse judico qua oculis cerno quanto pro sui natura viciniora sunt iisquae animointelligo Aug. 63. de Vera Religione I do not believe it can be doubted but those are deceived who affirm the Mind is able to Form the Idea's of Objects since they attribute the Power of Creation to the Mind and even of Creating with Wisdom and Order although it has no knowledge of what it does for that is not Conceivable But the cause of their Error is that Men always Judge that a thing is the Cause of some Effect when both are joined together supposing the true Cause of this Effect be unknown to them That makes all the World conclude that a Bowl put in Motion and meeting another is the true and principal Cause of the Motion that it communicates to it as the Will of the Soul is the true and principal Cause of the Motion of the Arm and other the like prejudices because it always happens that a Bowl is shaken when it is met by another that runs against it As our Arms are moved almost always when we Will and we do not see any other apparent Cause of this Motion But when an Effect does not so often follow something which is not the Cause of it there is nevertheless a great many Men who believe this thing is the Cause of the Effect which happens yet every Body is not guilty of the same Error For instance if a Comet appears and after this Comet a Prince Dies Some Stones lie exposed to the Moon and they are eaten with Worms The Sun is joined with Mars at the Nativity of a Child and something extraordinary happens to this Child All this is enough to perswade a great many Men that the Comet the Moon and the Conjunction of the Sun with Mars are the Causes of these Effects and others like them and the reason why all the World does not believe it is that they do not always see these Effects follow these Causes But all Men having commonly the Idea's of Objects present to their Minds as soon as they wish it and it happening many
times in a day almost all conclude that the Will which accompanies the production or rather the presence of Idea's is truly the Cause of them Because they see nothing in the same time that they can attribute it to and they imagin the Idea's no longer Exist when the Mind sees them no longer and that they revive again anew when they are again represented to the Mind 'T is for these Reasons some Judge that External Objects emit Images which resemble them as we have mention'd in the precedent Chapter For it being impossible to see Objects by themselves but only by their Idea's they judge the Object produces the Idea because as soon as it is present they see it and as soon as absent they see it no longer and because the presence of the Object almost always accompanies the Idea which represents it to us Yet if Men were not prejudiced in their Judgments from this that the Idea's of things are present to their Mind as soon as they Will them they should only conclude that according to the Order of Nature their Will is commonly necessary for them to have those Idea's Not that the Will is the true and principal Cause which presents them to the Mind and much less that the Will produces them from nothing or after the manner they explain it Nor ought they to conclude that Objects emit Species resembling them because the Soul commonly perceives them only when they are present but only that the Object is for the most part necessary in order to the Idea's being present to the Mind And lastly that a Bowl put into Motion is the principal and true Cause of the shaking of another Bowl that it meets in the way since the first had not the power of Motion in its self They can only determin that the meeting of two Bowls is an occasion to the Author of the Motion of Matter to execute the Decree of his Will which is the Universal Cause of all things See Ch. 3. Of the Second Part of Method in communicating to the other Bowl a part of the Motion of the first that is to speak more clearly in willing that the last should acquire so much more Motion as the first lost for the moving force of Bodies can proceed only from the Will of him who preserves them as we shall shew elsewhere CHAP. IV. That we do not see Objects by the Means of Idea's which were created with us And that God does not produce them in us so often as we have occasion for them THE Third Opinion is That of those who say all Idea's are created with us To discover the Improbability of this Opinion it will be necessary to consider that there is many different things in the World of which we have Idea's But to speak only of simple Figures it is certain that the Number of them is Infinite Nay even if we consider but one only as the Ellipsis we cannot doubt but the Mind conceives an infinite Number of different Kinds of them when it considers that one of the Diameters may be lengthened out to Infinity and the other always continue the same So the heighth of a Triangle may be augmented or diminished infinitely the base being always the same we may conceive there is an infinite Number of different Kinds of them And also which I desire may be consider'd here The Mind in some manner perceives this infinite Number although we can imagine but very few of them and that we can at the same time have particular and distinct Idea's of many Triangles of different Kinds But what must chiefly be observed is That this general Idea that the Mind has of this Number of Triangles of different Kinds is sufficient to prove That if we do not conceive each of these different Triangles by particular Idea's And in short If we comprehend not their Infinity 't is not the Defect of the Idea's or that Infinity is not represented to us but only the Defect of the Capacity and Extension of the Mind If a Man should apply himself to consider the Properties of all the diverse Kinds of Triangles although he should eternally continue this sort of Study he would never want new and particular Idea's but his Mind would be unprofitably fatigued What I have said of Triangles may be applied to five six a hundred a thousand or ten thousand sided Figures and so on ad infinitum Now if the sides of a Triangle which have infinite relations one with the other make Triangles of infinite Kinds it is plain that four five or a thousand sided Figures are capable of admitting much greater Differences since they are capable of a greater Number of Relations and Combinations of their sides than simple Triangles are The Mind then sees all these things it hath Idea's of them and these Idea's would never fail it although it should employ infinite Ages in the Consideration of one Figure only And if it perceived not these infinite Figures all of a sudden or comprehended not their Infinity 't is only because its Extension is very much limited It hath then an infinite Number of Idea's Do I say an infinite Number It hath as many infinite Numbers of Idea's as there are different Figures to be consider'd So that since there is an infinite Number of different Figures it 's necessary that to know the Figures the Mind have an infinitely infinite Number of Idea's Now I ask If it 's probable that God should Create so many things with the Mind of Man For my part it does not appear so to me chiefly since that might be made in a more simple and easie manner as we shall soon see For as God always acts by the most simple ways it does not seem reasonable to explain how we know Objects by admitting the Creation of an infinite Number of Beings since we can resolve this Difficulty in a more Easie and Natural way But although the Mind should have a Magazine of all the Idea's which are necessary for it to see things it would be yet more difficult to explain how the Soul should make choice of them to represent them For instance how it can represent the Sun to it self whilst it is present to the Eyes of its Body For whereas the Image which the Sun imprints in the Brain resembles not the Idea we have thereof as has been elsewhere proved and since the Soul perceives not the Motion that the Sun produces in the bottom of the Eyes and in the Brain it 's inconceivable how it should exactly guess amongst these infinite Number of Idea's that it has which it must represent to it self to imagine or to see the Sun We cannot therefore say That the Idea's of things were created with us it is sufficient that we see the Objects that are about us Nor can we say that God produces as many of them every Moment as we perceive different things this has been sufficiently refuted from what has been said in this
Creatures but all Creatures only subsist by him The last Proof which perhaps will be a Demonstration to those that are used to abstracted Arguments is this It is impossible that God should have any other principal End of his Actions but himself It is a Notion that is common to all Men that are capable of any Reflection and Holy Writ does not allow us to doubt but that God has made every thing for himself Therefore it is necessary that not only our Natural Love I mean the Motion he produces in our Mind should tend towards him But moreover That the Knowledge and the Light which he bestows upon it should make us know any thing that is in him for whatever comes from God can only be for God Should God Create a Spirit and give it for an Idea or for the immediate Object of its knowledge the Sun In my Opinion God would Create that Spirit and the Idea of that Spirit for the Sun and not for him God cannot therefore Create a Spirit to know his Works unless that Spirit sees God in some measure by beholding his Works So that we may say that unless we do see God in some measure we should see nothing In like manner unless we do Love God I mean unless God did continually Imprint in us the Love of Good in general we should Love nothing For that Love being our Will we can Love nothing nor Will any thing without him since we cannot Love particular Goods without determining towards those Goods the motion of Love which God gives us towards him So that as we Love nothing but by the necessary Love we have for God so we see nothing but by the Natural Knowledge we have of God And all the particular Idea's we have of Creatures are only Limitations of the Idea of the Creator as all the Motions of the Will for the Creatures are only determinations of the motion for the Creator I believe there are no Divines but what will grant that the Impious Love God with that Natural Love I speak of And St. Austin and some other Fathers affirm as an undeniable thing That the Impious behold in God the Rule of Manners and Eternal Truths So that the Opinion I explain ought not to trouble any Body Thus St. Austin speaks L. 14. de Trin. c. 3. Ab illa incommutabili luce veritatis etiam impius dum ab ea avertitur quodammodo tangitur Hinc est quod etiam impii cogitant aeternitatem multa rectè riprehendunt rectéque laudant in hominum moribus Quibus ea tandem regulis judicant nisi in quibus vident quemadmodum quisque vivere debeat etiam si nec ipsi eodem modo vivant Vbi autem eas vident Neque enim in sua natura Nam cùm procul dubio mente ista videantur corumque mentes constet esse mutabiles has vero regula● immutabiles videat quisquis in eis hoc videre potuerit ubinam ergo sunt istae regulae Scriptae nisi in libro lucis illius quae veritas dicitur unde lex omnis justa describitur inqua videt quid operandum sit etiam qui operatur injustitiam ipse est qui ab illa luce avertitur à qua tamen tangitur There are many passages in St. Austin like unto this by which he proves that we see God even in this Life by the knowledge we have of Eternal Truths Truth is uncreated Immutable Immense Eternal above all things It is true by it self It derives its Perfection from nothing It makes Creatures more perfect and all Spirits naturally endeavour to know it Nothing but God can have all those Perfections Therefore Truth is God We see some of those Immutable Eternal Truths Therefore we see God These are St. Austin's Reasons ours differ a little from them and we are unwilling to use the Authority of so great a Man unjustly to second our Sentiment We believe that Truths even those that are Eternal as that twice two are four are not so much as absolute Beings So far are we from believing that they are in God For it is visible that that Truth only consists in a relation of Equality which is between twice Two and Four Therefore we do not say that we see God in seeing Truths as St. Austin says but in seeing the Idea's of those Truths For Idea's are real but the Equality between the Idea's which is Truth has no reality When for example Men say that the Cloth they measure contains Three Yards the Cloth and the Yards are real But the Equality between Three Yards and the Cloth is not a real Being it is only a relation that is between the Three Yards and the Cloth When we say that twice Two are Four the Idea's of the Numbers are real but the Equality there is between them is only a Relation Thus according to our Sentiment we see God when we see Eternal Truths not that those Eternal Truths are God but because the Idea's on which those Truths depend are in God perhaps St. Austin understood it so We also believe that we know in God Changeable and Corrubtible things although St. Austin only speaks of Immutable and Incorruptible things because it is not necessary for that to place any Imperfection in God since it suffices as we have already said that God should shew us what there is in him that has a Relation to these things But though I say we see in God the things that are Material and Sensible it must be observ'd that I do not say we have a Sensation of them in God but only that it is from God who Acts in us for God Knows sensible things but he does not Feel them When we perceive any thing that is sensible Sensation and pure Idea is in our Perception Sensation is a Modification of our Soul and it is God that Causes it in us And he may Cause it though he has it not because he sees in the Idea he has of our Soul that it is capable of it As for the Idea which is joyn'd to Sensation it is in God we see it because it is his pleasure to discover it to us And God joins Sensation to the Idea when Objects are present to the end that we may believe them as they are and that we may have such Sensations and Passions as we ought to have in relation to them Lastly We believe that all Spirits see the Eternal Laws as well as other things in God but with some difference They know the Eternal Order and Eternal Truths and even the Beings which God has made according to those Truths or according to the Order by the Union which those Spirits have necessarily with the Word or Wisdom of God which directs them as we have shewn But 't is by the Impression they receive continually from the Will of God which inclines them to him and endeavours as it were to render their Will absolutely like unto his that they know
I hate Evil and Pain I would be Happy and I am not mistaken in believing that Men Angels and even Devils have these Inclinations I know moreover that God will never Create any Spirits but what will desire to be Happy or that can ever desire to be Unhappy But I know it with Evidence and Certainty because God tells me so For who but God could give a Knowledge of the Designs and Will of God But when the Body has any Share in what passes within me I am for the most part mistaken in judging of others by my self I feel Heat I see such a Magnitude such a Colour I relish such a Taste at the approach of certain Bodies I am deceiv'd when I judge of others by my self I am subject to certain Passions I have a Kindness or Aversion for such or such things and I fancy that others are like me my Conjecture is often False Thus the Knowledge we have of other Men is very liable to Error when we judge of them by the Sensations we have of our selves If there be any Beings different from God from our selves from Bodies and from Pure Spirits it is unknown to us We have much ado to perswade our selves that there are any such And after having examin'd the Reasons of certain Philosophers who pretend the contrary we have found them False which has confirm'd us in our former Opinion that being all Men of the same Nature we had all the same Idea's because it behoves us all to know the same things CHAP. VIII I. The Intimate Presence of the Wandering Idea of Being in General is the Cause of all the Irregular Abstractions of the Mind and of the greatest part of the Chimera's of common Philosophy which hinder many Philosophers from discovering the Solidity of the True Principles of Moral Philosophy II. Example concerning the Essence of Matter THE clear intimate necessary Presence of God I mean the Unlimited Infinite and General Being with the Mind of Man acts with more Force upon it than the Presence of all Finite Objects It is impossible that it should absolutely lay aside that general Idea of Being because it cannot subsist out of God Perhaps some might urge that it may wander from it because it may think on those particular Beings but they would be mistaken For when the Mind considers any Being in particular it is not so far from removing from God that it rather draws near if I may so speak to some of his Perfections in removing from all others However it removes from them in such a manner that it never wholly loses the sight of them and it is for the most part in a Condition to seek them out and to draw near to them They are always present to the Mind but the Mind only perceives them in an inexplicable Confusion because of its smallness and the greatness of its Idea of Being We may chance sometimes not to think on our selves but I believe we cannot subsist one Moment without thinking on Being and even at that very time when we fancy we think on nothing we are of necessity full of the wandering and general Idea of Being But whereas those things that are very usual in us and which do not concern us do not excite the Mind with any force nor oblige it to make any Reflection upon them this Idea of Being so Great so Vast so Real and so Positive as it is is yet familiar to us and touches us so little that we almost believe we do not see it that we do not reflect upon it that we afterwards judge there is but little Reality in it and that it is only form'd by the confus'd mixture of all particular Idea's Though on the contrary it is in that alone and by that alone that we perceive all Beings in particular Although that Idea which we receive by the immediate Union we have with the Word of God does never deceive us in it self like those which we receive from it by means of the Union we have with our Body which represent things to us different from what they are Yet I am not afraid to say that we make so ill a use of the best things that the indelible Presence of that Idea is one of the principal Causes of all the Irregular Abstractions of the Mind and consequently of that Abstracted and Chimerical Philosophy which explains all Natural Effects by general Terms of Act Power Cause Effect Sustantial Forms Faculties occult Qualities Sympathy Antipathy c. for it is certain that all those Terms and many others never excite any Idea's in the Mind but such as are Wandering and General that is of those Idea's which present themselves to the Mind of their own accord without Pain or any Application on our part Let Men read with all Attention imaginable all the Definitions and Explications which are given of Substantial Forms Let them carefully inquire wherein the Essence of all those Entities does consist which Philosophers fancy as they please and in so great a Number that they are oblig'd to make several Divisions and Sub-divisions of them and I am confident that they will never stir up any other Idea's in their Mind of all those things than that of Being and of Cause in General For this is what commonly happens to Philosophers They see some new Effect they immediately imagine a new Being to produce it Fire warms therefore there is some Being in the Fire which produces that Effect that is different from the matter which composes the Fire And whereas Fire is capable of several different Effects as of separating Bodies of reducing them to Ashes and into Earth of drying them hardning them softning them dilating them purifying them c. they liberally allow Fire as many Faculties or real Qualities as it is capable of producing different Effects But those that reflect on the Definitions they give of those Faculties will easily discover that they are only Logical Definitions and that they excite no other Idea's than that of Being and of Cause in General which the Mind compares with the Effect which is produced So that Men are not the more Learned after having studied them very much for all they get by that kind of Study is that they imagine they know better than others what they notwithstanding do not know near so well not only because they admit many Beings which never were but also because being prejudiced they make themselves incapable of conceiving how it can be possible that matter alone as that of Fire being moved against Bodies differently disposed should produce all the different Effects which we see Fire does produce It is Notorious to all those that have read a little that most of the Books of Sciences particularly those that treat of Natural Philosophy Physick Chymistry and all the particular things of Nature are full of Arguments grounded upon Elementary Qualities Second Causes as Attractive Retentive Digestive Expulsive and such like upon others they call occult
not disposed to conceive Neither must obscure and uncertain Explanations of the Mysteries of Faith serve us as a Rule and Principle to reason in Philosophy in which nothing but Evidence ought to perswade us We must not change the clear and distinct Idea's of Extension Figure and Local Motion for these general and confuse Idea's of Principles or of the Subject of Extension of Form and of Quiddities of real Qualities and of all those Motions of Generation of Corruption of Alteration and the like which differ from Local Motion Real Idea's produce a Real Science but the general Idea's of Logick will never produce any thing but a rambling superficial and barren Science Therefore it behoves us to consider attentively those distinct and particular Idea's of things in order to discover the Proprieties they include and thus to study Nature instead of losing our selves in Chimera's which only exist in the Opinion of some Philosophers CHAP. IX I. The last General Cause of our Errors II. That the Idea's of things are not always present to the Mind as soon as 't is desir'd III. That all Finite Minds are liable to Error and why IV. We ought not to judge that there are only Bodies or Spirits nor that God is a Spirit as we conceive Spirits WE have hitherto spoken of Errors I. The last General Cause of our Errors for which we can assign some occasional Cause in the Nature of the Pure Understanding or of the Mind consider'd as acting of it self and in the Nature of Idea's that is in the manner how the Mind perceives External Objects There now remains only to explain a Cause which may be call'd a Universal and General Cause of all our Errors because we conceive no Error but what depends in some measure on it That Cause is That Nothing having no Idea to represent it the Mind is induc'd to believe that things it has no Idea of do not Exist It is certain that the general Source of our Errors as we have already often declar'd is because our Judgments have more Extension than our Perceptions For when we consider some Object we commonly behold it only on one side and we are not contented with judging of so much as we have consider'd but we also judge of the whole Object Therefore it often happens that we are deceiv'd because though the thing be true on that part we have examin'd it it commonly proves false on the other and that which we believe to be true only proves likely Moreover it is evident that we should not judge absolutely of things as we do if we did not think we had consider'd them on all sides or if we did not suppose them answerable to those we have examin'd Therefore the general Cause of our Errors is That having no Idea of the other sides of our Object or of their difference from that which is present to our Mind we fancy that those other sides are not or at least we suppose that they have no particular difference This manner of proceeding seems pretty reasonable to us For Nothing forming no Idea's in the Mind we have some reason to believe that those things which form no Idea's in the Mind while they are examin'd resemble Nothing And that which confirms us in this Opinion is That we are perswaded by a kind of Instinct that the Idea's of things are due to our Nature and that they are submitted to the Mind in such a manner that they ought to present themselves before it as soon as it desires it Nevertheless if we did but reflect on the present State of our Nature II. The Idea's of things are not present to the Mind as soon as 't is desir'd we should not be so ready to believe that we have all the Idea's of things as soon as we desire them Man as I may say is only Flesh and Blood since the Fall The least Impression of his Senses and of his Passions breaks the strongest Attention of his Mind and the Course of the Spirits and of the Blood draws it away and drives it continually towards Sensible Objects It often strives in vain against the Torrent which drives it along and 't is but seldom that it makes any Opposition for there is too much Delight in following it and too much Fatigue to oppose it Therefore the Mind is disgusted and sinks as soon as it makes the least Effort to take hold of and to six upon some Truth It is absolutely False in the State in which we are that the Idea's of things are present to our Mind whenever we have a Mind to consider them Therefore we ought not to judge that things are not only because we have no Idea's of them But though we should suppose Man to be absolure Master of his Mind and of his Idea's III. All Etnite Minds are liable to Error he would nevertheless be subject to Error by his Nature For the Mind of Man is limited and a Mind that is limited is Naturally liable to Error The reason of it is the least things have many Relations among themselves and nothing but an Infinite Mind can apprehend them Therefore a limited Mind not being able to imbrace or to apprehend all those Relations whatever Effort it makes is induc'd to believe that those which it perceives not do not exist particularly when we do not reflect on the Weakness and Limitation of our Mind which is very usual Thus the Limitation of the Mind alone infers a Capability of falling into Error Nevertheless if Men even in the State of Weakness and Depravations in which they are did always make a good use of their Liberty they would never be deceiv'd And therefore all Men that fall into Error are justly blam'd and deserve to be punish'd For if we would not be deceiv'd we must only judge of what we see and never make entire Judgments but on such things which we are sure we have examin'd in all their parts which we can do But they had rather submit to Error than to the Rule of Truth They will decide without much difficulty and Examination Therefore we need not wonder if they fall into many Errors and very often make uncertain Judgments Men for Example IV. We ought not to judge that there are only Bodies and Spirits created nor that God is a Spirit as we conceive Spirits have no other Idea's of Substance than that of the Mind and Body that is Of a Substance that Thinks and of a Substance that is Extended And from thence they pretend to have a Right to conclude that whatever Exists is Body or Spirit Not that I pretend to affirm that there is any Substance that is neither Body nor Spirit For we ought never to affirm that things Exist which we have no Knowledge of since it is to be thought that God who does not conceal his Works from us would have given us some Idea's of them Nevertheless I am of Opinion that we ought not to
the Water is converted into Wine That as between Three and Four there can be no Number since true Unity is Indivisible so it is necessary that the Water be Converted into the Nature and Essence of the Wine or that the Wine lose its Nature That as all Quaternary Numbers are perfectly alike so the Essence of the Water is perfectly alike in all Waters That as the Number of Three differs Essentially from the Number of Two and that it cannot have the same Proprieties as that has so two Bodies of different Species differ Essentially and in such a manner that they have never the same Proprieties which proceed from Entity and other like things Nevertheless if Men would consider the true Idea's of things with some Attention they would soon discover that all Bodies being Extended their Nature or Essence has nothing resembling Numbers and that it cannot consist in an Indivisible Men do not only suppose Identity Resemblance or Proportion in the Nature Number and Essential Differences of Substances they also suppose them in all things they see Most Men Judge that all the fix'd Stars are fastened to the Heavens as to a Roof at an Equal Distance from the Earth Astronomers did pretend for a long while that the Planets moved in perfect Circles and they have invented a great number of them as Concentriques Excentriques Epicycles c. to Explain the Phoenomena which contradicted their Opinions It is true that in these later Ages the most Learned have Corrected the Errors of the Ancients and believe that the Planets describe Ellipses by their Motion But if they pretend that the Ellipses are Regular as People are inclin'd to believe because the Mind supposes Regularity where it sees no Irregularity they fall into an Error which is more difficult to be Corrected because the Observations that can be made on the Course of the Planets cannot be so Exact and so Just as to shew the Irregularity of their Motions Nothing but Natural Philosophy can Correct that Error for it is infinitely less remarkable than that which we find in the System of perfect Circles But something particular has happened about the Distance and Motion of the Planets For Astronomers not having been able to find an Arithmetical or Geometrical Proportion in the same that being absolutely repugnant to Observations some imagin'd that they observ'd a kind of Proportion which is called Harmonical in their Distances and Motions From thence it is that an * Riccioli Vol. Astronomer of this Age in his New Almageste begins the Section which is Entitled De Systemate Mundi Harmonico with these words There is no Astronomer Neme est paulo eruditior in Astronomicis qui Coelorum ordinem contemplatus non agnoscat harmoniam quamdam in Planetarum intervallis motibus though never so little acquainted in what relates to Astronomy but acknowledges a kind of Harmony in the Motions and Intervals of Planets if he considers the Order of the Heavens Attentively Nor is this the only Author that is of this Opinion For Observations have made him sufficiently sensible of the Extravagancies of that Imaginary Harmony which has nevertheless been admir'd by several Ancient and Modern Authors whose Opinions Father Riccioli Relates and Refutes Moreover some affirm Pythagoras and his Followers to have believ'd that the Heavens by their Regular Motions made a most Wonderful Concert which Men do not hear because they are used to it just like those that Inhabit near the Fall of the Waters of Nile do not hear the Noise of it But I only relate that particular Opinion of the Harmonical Proportion of the Distances and Motions of the Planets to shew that the Mind is delighted with Proportions and that it often Fancies them where they are not The Mind also supposes Uniformity in the duration of things and imagins they are not liable to Change and Instability when it is not in some measure forced by the Relation of the Senses to Judge otherwise All Material Things being Extended are capable of Division and consequently of Corruption Those who reflect on the Nature of Bodies discover Visibly that they are Corruptible Yet there has been a great number of Philosophers who fancied that the Heavens though Material were Incorruptible The Heavens are at too great a Distance from us to discover the Revolutions that happen there and 't is very rare that any happen there so great as to be discovered here That alone has been sufficient to perswade many that they were really Incorruptible And which has the more Confirm'd their Opinion is that they attribute to the Contrariety of Qualities the Corruption to which Sublunary Bodies are subject For as they have never been in the Heavens to see what passes there so they have had no Experience that this Contrariety of Qualities is there which has induced them to believe that there is really no such thing there Therefore they have concluded that the Heavens were free from Corruption because that which Corrupts all Bodies here below according to their Opinion is not above It is Visible that this Argument has no Solidity for I cannot see why there should be no other Cause of Corruption than those Contrarieties of Qualities which they imagin nor upon what Foundation they can affirm That there is neither Heat nor Cold nor Drought nor Moisture in the Heavens That the Sun is not Hot and that Saturn is not Cold. There is some appearance of Reason to say that very hard Stones Glass and other Bodies of that Nature do not Corrupt since we see they subsist long in the same State and though we are near enough to see the Alterations that should happen to them But being at so great a distance as we are from the Heavens it is directly contrary to Reason to conclude that they do not Corrupt because we feel no contrary Qualities in them nor see that they Corrupt Nevertheless some not only say that they Corrupt not but they affirm absolutely that they are Unalterable and Incorruptible And the Peripateticks want but little of saying that the Celestial Bodies are so many Divinities as Aristotle their Master did believe of them The Beauty of the Universe does not consist in the Incorruptibility of its Parts but in the Variety that is found in them And this great Work of the World would not be so admirable without that Vicissitude of things which we observe in it Matter infinitely Extended without Motion and consequently without Form and Corruption would indeed discover the Infinite Power of its Author but it would give no Idea of his Wisdom This is the reason that all Corporeal Things are Corruptible and that there is no Body but what receives some Change which Alters and Corrupts it in Time God Forms even in the Bosom of Stones and Glass Animals more perfect and admirable than all the Works of Men. Those Bodies though very hard and dry are Corrupted in time The Air and Sun to which they are
of Well-being Now the Love of Well-being is so Powerful that it sometimes proves Stronger than the Love of Being and Self-Love makes us sometimes desire not to be because we have not a Well-being This is the Case of all the Damned who according to the Word of Jesus Christ had better not to be than to be so Unhappy as they are because these Wretches being declar'd Enemies to him in whom all Goodness Centers and who is the Sole Cause of Pleasure and of Pain which we are capable of it is impossible they should enjoy any Satisfaction they are and will be Eternally Unhappy because their Will will ever remain in the same Disposition and in the same Irregularity So that Self-Love includes two Loves the Love of Greatness of Power of Independence and generality of all things which seem to be proper for the Preservation of our Being and the Love of Pleasure and of all things that are necessary for our Well-being that is To be Happy and Satisfied Those two Loves may be divided several ways Whether because we are composed of two different parts of Soul and Body according to which they may be divided or because they may be distinguish'd or specified by the different Objects that are useful for our Preservation However we will not inlarge upon that because as we do not design to make a Treatise of Morality it is not necessary to make an Inquiry into and an exact Division of all the things we look upon as our Felicities It was only necessary to make this Division to relate the cause of our Errors in some order Therefore we shall first speak of those Errors which are caused by our Inclination for Greatness and for all those things that makes our Being Independant of others And afterwards we shall treat of those which proceed from the Inclination we have for Pleasure and for all those things which render our Being the best it can be for us or that contents us most CHAP. VI. I. Of the Inclination we have for every thing that raises us above other Persons II. Of the false Judgments of some Pious Persons III. Of the false Judgments of the Superstitious and Hypocrites IV. Of Voetius an Enemy to Monsieur Descartes WHatever raises us above others by making us more Perfect as Science and Virtue I. Of the Inclination we have for all that raises us above other Persons or that gives us an Authority over them by making us more Powerful as Dignities and Riches seem in some measure to make us Independent All those that are beneath us have a Respect for us and fear us they are always ready to do what pleases us for our Preservation and they dare neither Prejudice us nor oppose our Desires Therefore Men constantly endeavour to possess those Advantages which raise them above others For they never consider that both their Being and Well-being in Truth only depend on God above and not on Men and that the true Greatness which will make them Eternally Happy does not consist in that Rank which they hold in the Imagination of other Men as Weak and as Miserable as themselves but in an humble Submission to the Will of God who being Just will not fail to reward those who remain within the Order he hath prescribed But Men do not only desire Effectively to possess Learning and Vertue Dignities and Riches they also use their utmost Efforts in order to persuade others that they do really possess them And if it may be said that they endeavour less to appear Rich than to be really so it may also be said that they often take less care to be Virtuous than to appear so For as the Author of the Book Entituled Reflectiones Morales fays agreeably Virtue would not go far unless it were accompanied with Vanity The Reputation of being Rich Learned and Virtuous produces in the Imagination of those that are about us or that are more nearly related to us very convenient Dispositions for us It makes them fall at our Feet it makes them act in our Favour it Inspires them with all the Motions that tend to the Preservation of our Being and to the Increase of our Grandeur Thus Men preserve their Reputation as a Good which is necessary for them to Live with Ease in the World All Men then have an Inclination for Virtue Learning Dignities and Riches and for the Reputation of possessing those Advantages We will now endeavour to show by some Examples how those Inclinations may engage them into Error Let us begin by the Inclination that Men have for Virtue or for the Appearance of Virtue Those who apply themselves Seriously to become Virtuous commonly imploy their Mind and Time to understand Religion and to exercise themselves in good Works They only desire with St. Paul to be acquainted with Jesus Christ Crucified to find out a Remedy for the Distemper and Corruption of their Nature They desire no other Knowledge than that which is necessary for them to live Christianly and to know their Duty after which they apply themselves to fulfil them with Zeal and Exactness And therefore they seldom trouble themselves about Sciences which appear Vain and Barren in respect to their Salvation No Fault can be found with that Conduct it is Infinitely to be valued II. Of the false Judgments of some Pious Persons Men would Esteem themselves Happy to observe it exactly and they often repent their not having followed it more But this is unapprovable that since it is certain that there are Sciences absolutely Humane very Certain and Useful which disingage the Mind from Sensible Things and use it by degrees to relish the Truths of the Gospel some Pious Persons without having examin'd them condemn them too freely either as being Useless or Uncertain It is true that most Sciences are very uncertain and very useless Men are partly in the right to believe that they only contain Truths which are of little use No body is oblig'd to study them and it is better to despise them than to suffer ones self to be deceiv'd or blinded by them Nevertheless we may affirm That it is very necessary to know some Metaphysical Truths The Universal Knowledge or the Existence of a God is absolutely necessary since even the Certainty of Faith depends on the Knowledge which Reason gives of the Existence of a God It is necessary to know that it is his Will which makes and which regulates Nature That the Force or Power of Natural Causes is only his Will In a word That all things whatever depend on God It is also necessary to know what Truth is the means to distinguish it from Error the Distinction between the Mind and Body the Consequences that may be drawn from it as the Immortality of the Soul and several other things of that kind which may be known with certainty The Knowledge of Man or of ones self is a Science that cannot be reasonably despis'd it contains a World of
that is Because they shall be Happy Those that suffer Persecution for Justice are thereby Just Virtuous and Perfect because they are in the Order that God has prescrib'd and Perfection consists in following him but they are not Happy because they Suffer A time will come when they will Suffer no more and then they will be Happy as well as Just and Perfect However I do not deny but that the Righteous may be Happy in some measure even in this Life by the strength of their Hope and Faith which render those future Felicities as it were present to their Mind For it is certain that when the Hope of some Happiness is strong and lively it draws it nearer to the Mind and gives it a taste thereof before-hand And thus it makes us Happy in some measure since it is the taste and possession of Good and of Pleasure which makes us Happy Therefore it is unreasonable to tell Men that sensible Pleasures are not Good and that those that enjoy them are never the Happier since it is not true and at the time of Temptation they discover it to their misfortune We must tell them that those Pleasures are good in themselves and capable to make them Happy in some measure Nevertheless they ought to avoid them for the Reasons beforementioned but they cannot avoid them of themselves Because they desire to be Happy through an Inclination which they cannot overcome and those transitory Pleasures which they ought to avoid satisfie it in some measure Thus they are in a miserable Necessity of losing themselves unless they are assisted It is necessary to tell them these things that they may distinctly know their Weakness and the want they have of a Redeemer We must speak to Men like Jesus Christ and not like the Stoicks who neither understand the Nature nor Distemper of Human Minds They must continually be told that they must hate and despise themselves and not look for an Establishment or Happiness on Earth That they must daily carry their Cross or the Instrument of their suffering and that they must lose their Life at present in order to preserve it Eternally They must be taught that they are oblig'd to act contrary to their desire to make 'em sensible of their inability to good For Men wou'd be invincibly Happy and they cannot be actually so unless they do what they please Perhaps being convinced of their present Evils and knowing their future sufferings they may humble themselves on Earth Perhaps they may invoke the Assistance of Heaven and seek a Mediatour be afraid of sensible Objects and timely abhor whatever flatters their Senses and Concupiscence And it may be they may thus obtain that Spirit of Prayer and Repentance which is so necessary to obtain Grace and without which there is no Power no Health nor no Salvation to be expected We are inwardly convinc'd that Pleasure is Good II. It must not incline us to the Love of sensible Delights and that the inward Conviction thereof is not False for Pleasure is really Good We are Naturally Convinc'd that Pleasure is the Character of Good and that Natural Conviction is certainly true for that which Causes Pleasure is certainly very Good and very Lovely But we are not convinc'd that either sensible Objects or our Souls themselves are capable of producing Pleasure in us for there is no reason to believe it and there are a Thousand against it Therefore sensible Objects are neither Good nor Lovely Were they necessary toward the Preservation of Life we ought to use them But as they are not capable of Acting in us we ought not to Love them The Soul must only Love him that is Good who only is capable to make it Happier and more perfect Therefore it should only Love that which is above it since it can receive its Perfection from nothing that is either below or equal to it But whereas we judge that a Thing is the Cause of some Effect when it always attends it we fancy that they are Sensible Objects which act in us because at their approach we have new Sensations and because we do not see him that produces them really in us We taste a Fruit and we find a Sweetness we impute that Sweetness to that Fruit we conclude that it causes it and even that it contains it We do not see God as we see and as we feel that Fruit we do not so much as think on him nor perhaps on our selves Therefore we do not conclude that God is the real Cause of that Sweetness nor that the said Sweetness is a Modification of our Soul we impute both the Cause and the Effect to that Fruit which we eat What I have said of Sensations which have a relation to the Body is also to be understood of those that have no relation to it as those which are found in pure Intelligences The Mind considers it self it sees that nothing is wanting to its Happiness and Perfection or else it sees that it does not possess what it desires At the sight of its Happiness it feels Joy at the sight of its Misfortunes it endures Sorrow It straight fancies that it is the sight of its Happiness which produces in it self that Sentiment of Joy because the said Sentiment always attends that sight It also imagines that it is the sight of its Misfortune which produces in it self that Sentiment of Grief since the said Sentiment is the Consequence of this sight The real Cause of those Sentiments which is God alone does not appear before it It does not so much as think on God for he acts in us without our knowing it God rewards us with a Sentiment of Joy when we know that we are in the Condition in which we ought to be that we may remain in it that our Disquiet may cease and that we may fully enjoy our Happiness without suffering the Capacity of our Mind to be filled with any thing else But he produces a Sentiment of Grief in us when we are Sensible that we are not in the State in which we ought to be so that we may not remain in it and that we might earnestly seek after the Perfection that is wanting in us For God pushes us continually toward Good when we are Sensible that we do not possess it and he fixes us powerfully upon it when we find that we possess it fully So that it seems evident to me that the Intellectual Sentiments of Joy or of Grief as well as the Sensible ones are no voluntary Productions of the Mind Therefore we ought continually to acknowledge by our Reason that Invisible Hand which fills us with Bliss and which disguises it self to our Mind under Sensible Appearances We must Adore it we must Love it but we must also Fear it for since it fills us with Pleasures it may also overwhelm us with Grief We ought to Love it by a Love of Choice by a Sensible Love by a Love worthy of God when
Sensation p. 64 Chap. 11. I. Of the Error we are subject to in respect of the Action of Objects upon the External Fibres of our Senses II. The Cause of that Error III. An Objection and Answer p. 71 Chap. 12. I. Of the Errors concerning the Motions of the Fibres of our Senses II. That either we perceive not these Motions or else confound them with our Sensations III. Experience which proves it IV. Tor●e sorts of Sensations V. The Errors which accompany them p. 73 Chap. 13. I. Of the Nature of Sensations II. That we know them better than we believe we do III. An Objection and Answer IV. Why we imagine we know nothing of our Sensations V. That we deceive our selves in believing that all Men have the same Sensations of the same Objects VI. Objection and Answer p. 80 Chap. 14. I. Of the false Judgments that accompany our Sensations and which we confound with them II. Reasons of these false Judgments III. That Error is not in our Sensations but only in these Judgments p. 90 Chap. 15. An Explanation of the particular Errors of Sight which may serve us as an Example of the General Errors of our Senses p. 95 Chap. 16. I. That the Errors of our Senses are the most general and fruitful Principles whence we draw all the false Conclusions which in their turns also serve us for Principles II. The Origine of Essential Differences III. Of substantial Forms IV. Of some other Errors in the Philosophy of the Schools p 97 Chap. 17. I. Another Example drawn from Morals which shows that our Senses only offer us false Goods II. That 't is God only who is our true Good III. The Origine of the Errors of the Epicureans and Stolcks p. 102 Chap. 18. I. Our Senses deceive us in things which are not Sensible II. An Example drawn from the Conversation of Men. III. We must not confide in Sensible Habits p. 105 Chap. 19. Two other Examples I. The first of our Errors concerning the Nature of Bodies II. The second of these that relate to the Qualities of these Bodies p. 109 Chap. 20. The Conclusion of this first Book I. That our Senses are only given us for our Bodies II. That we must doubt of their Testimony III. That it is not an inconsiderable thing to doubt as we ought to do p. 113 BOOK II. Of the Imagination The First Part. Chap. 1. I. A General Idea of the Imagination II. That it includes two Faculties the one Active and the other Passive III. The general Cause of the Changes which happen to the Imagination of Man and the design of this second Book p. 117 Chap. 2. I. Of the Animal Spirits and the Changes to which they are subject in general II. That the Chyle goes to the Heart and thereby produces some change in the Spirits III. That Wine has the same effect p. 122 Chap. 3. That the Air one breaths causes likewise some change in the Spirits p. 126 Chap. 4. I. Of the Change wrought in the Animal Spirits by the Nerves that go to the Lungs and Heart II. Of that which is caused by the Nerves that pass from the Liver to the Spleen and so into the Bowels III. That all this is done without the assistance of out Will but cannot be effected with out a Providence p. 128 Chap. 5. I. Of the Memory II. Of Habits p. 134 Chap. 6. I. That the Fibres of the Brain are not subject to such quick Changes as the Spirits are II. Three different Changes in the three different Ages p. 139 Chap. 7. I. Of the Communication which is between the Brain of a Mother and that of her Child II. Of the Communication that is between our Brain and the other parts of our Body which carries us to Imitation and Compassion III. An Explanation of the Generation of Monstrous Children and of the Propagation of the Species IV. Some Irregularities of the Mind and some Inclinations of the will explained V. Of Concupiscence and Original Sin VI. Objections and Answers p. 141 Chap. 8. I. The Changes that happen to the Imagination of a Child after it is Born by the Conversation it has with its Nurse its Mother and other Persons II. Advice how to Educate it well p. 160 The Second Part. Of the Imagination Chap. 1. I. OF the Imagination of Women II. Of that of Men. III. Of that of Old People p. 161 Chap. 2. That the Animal Spirits usually observe the Traces of Idea's which are most Familiar to us which is the Reason that we never make a sound Judgment of things p. 168 Chap. 3. Of the Mutual Connexion between the Idea's of the Mind and the Traces of the Brain and of the Mutual Connexion between Traces and Traces and between Idea's and Idea's p. 172 Chap. 4. I. That Studious Men are the most subject to Error II. The Reason why they rather choose to follow Authority than make use of their Judgment p. 182 Chap. 5. Of the Ill Effects that Reading has upon the Imagination p. 187 Chap. 6. That Studious Persons are usually prejudic'd in favour of some Author so that their Principal Alm is to know whathe believ'd without minding what he ought to believe p. 190 Chap. 7. Of the Prejudices of Commentators p. 196 Chap. 8. I. Of the Inventers of New Systems II. The last Error of Studious Persons p. 204 Chap. 9. I. Of Esseminate Wits II. Of Superficial wits III. Of Persons of Authority IV. Of those that make Experiments p. 209 The Third Part. Of the Contagious Communication of Strong Imaginations Chap. 1. I. OF our Inclination to imitate others in all things which is the Original of the Communication of Errors that depend upon the Power of Imagination II Two Principal Causes that increase this Inclination III. What a Strong Imagination is IV. That there are several sorts of it Of Mad Men and of such who have a Strong Imagination according to the Sense which is here meant V. Two considerable Defects of those that have a Strong Imagination VI. Of the Power they have to Perswa●e and Impose p. 219 Chap. 2 General Examples of the Force of the Imagination p. 232 Chap. 3. I. Of the Force of the Imagination of certain Authors II. Of Tertullian p. 241 Chap. 4. Of Seneca's Imagination p. 244 Chap. 5. Of Montagne's Book p. 253 Chap. 6. I. Of Imaginary Wizards and Lycanthropi or Wolf-Men II. A Conclusion of the Two First Books p. 263 BOOK III. Of the Vnderstanding or Pure Mind Chap. 1. I. THought only is Essential to the Mind Sensation and Imagination are only its Modifications II. We know not all the Modifications our Souls are capable of III. They are different from our Knowledge and Love and are not always the Effects of them p. 1 Chap. 2. I. The Mind being limited cannot comprehend any thing that relates to Infinity II. Its limitation is the Original of many Errors III. And chiefly of Heresies IV. We must submit our Minds to Faith p.
by some violent passion for then as we have already explain'd this communication charges the conformation of the body of the Child and the Mother is so much the more apt to miscarry of the the Foetus as it has more resemblance to the desired Fruits and as the Spirits find less resistance in the Fibres of the Infants body Now it cannot be deny'd but that God without this Communication was able to have disposed all things in so exact and regular a manner as would have been necesary for the Propagation of the Species for insinite Ages that Mothers should never have Miscarried and even that they should always have had Children of the same bigness of the same Colour and that would have resembled in all things For we must not measure the power of God by our weak Imagination and we know not the Reasons he had in the construction of his work We see every day that without the help of this Communication Plants and Trees produce their kinds regularly enough and that Fowls and many other Animals have no need of it to cherish and bring forth other Animals when they sit upon Eggs of different kinds as when a Hen sits on a Partridges Eggs. For although we may reasonably conclude that the Seeds and Eggs contain in themselves the Plants and Birds which proceeds from 'em and that they may produce the little bodies of these Birds having received their Conformation by the Communication we have spoke of and the Plants theirs by another Equivocal Communication yet we cannot be certain of it But although we cannot discover the reasons why God has made every thing as it is we must not conclude from thence that he could make 'em no otherwise If we consider further that Plants who receive their growth by the action of the Female Plant resemble her much more than those which come from the seed as Tuleps for instance which come from the Root are of the same Colour as the Tulep it self and yet those that proceed from the Seed thereof are almost very different we cannot doubt that if the Communication of the Female Plant with the Fruit is not absolutely necessary to form the same kind yet it is always requisite to make the Fruit intirely like her So that although God foresaw that this Communication of the Mothers Brain with that of the Infants would sometimes destroy the Foetus and produce Monsters because of the Irregularity of the Mothers imagination yet this Communication is so admirable and so necessary for the Reasons before-mentioned and for many others that I could yet add that this knowledge that God had of these inconvencies ought not to have hindred him from executing his design We may say in one sense that God never had a design to make Monsters for it appears evident to me that if God should create one Animal only it would not be Monstrous But designing to produce an admirable work by the most simple ways and unite all these Creatures one to another he foresaw certain effects that would necessarily follow from the Order and Nature of things and this hath not diverted him from his design For although a Monster simply considered be an imperfect work yet when it is joyn'd with the rest of the creatures it does not render the World imperfect We have sufficiently explain'd what power the Imagination of a Mother has over the body of her Child let us now examine the power it hath over its Mind and that way discover the first Irregularities of the Mind and Will of Men in his Original For this is our chief design It is evident that the traces of the Brain are accompanied with Sentiments and Ideas of the Soul IV. An Explanation of some irregularities of the Mind and of the inclinations of the Will and that the emotion of the Animal Spirits have no effect in the Body but what the Motions in the Soul answer to and in a word it is certain that all the Sensations and Passions of the Body are accompany'd with true Sentiments and Passions in the Soul Now according to our first supposition Mothers first communicate the traces of their Brain to their Children and afterwards the Motions of their Animal Spirits and so produce the same passion in the mind of their Children with which they themselves are affected and by consequence they cortupt both their affections and reason in several respects If so many Children are observed to bear upon their Faces the Marks and Traces of the Idea that affected their Mother although the Fibres of the skin make much more resistance against the course of the Spirits than the soft parts of the Brain and thô the Spirits are much more agitated in the Brain than towards the Skin we cannot reasonably doubt but that the Animal Spirits of the Mother produce in the Brain of the Infant many traces by their irregular emotions Now the great traces of the Brain and the emotion of the Spirits which answer to them continuing a long time and sometimes all the life it is certain that as there are few Women who have not some weaknesses and who have not been moved with some Passion during their being with Child it cannot be expected but that there will be very few Children who are not ill inclined to something and who have not some predominant passion We have only too much experience of these things and all the World is sensible that there are whole Families who are afflicted with great weakness of Imagination which they have drawn from their Parents but it is not necessary here to give any particular Examples thereof On the contrary 't is more proper for the consolation of some Persons to assure 'em that those weaknesses of the Parents not being Natural or proper to the Nature of Man the traces and impressions of the Brain which are the cause of them may be effaced by time We may yet add here the Example of King James I. of England of whom Sir Kenelm Digby speaks in his Book which he writ of the Sympathetic Powder He tells us that Mary Stuart being with Child of King James some Scotch Lords entred her Chamber and in her presence killed her Secretary who was an Italian altho' she cast her self before him to hinder them that this Princess received some slight hurts by them and the frights she had made so great an impression in her Imagination that she communicated it to the Child in her Womb So that King James cou'd never endure to see a Naked Sword He says that he himself was a witness of it for when he was Knighted this Prince coming to lay the Sword upon his Shoulder run it strait at his Face and had wounded him if some body had not directed it aright where it ought to be There are so many instances of the like Nature that 't would be needless to search Authors for them I believe there is no body that will dispute these things for we see a
great number of Persons that can't suffer the fight of a Rat of a Mouse a Cat a Frog and particularly creeping Animals as Serpents and Adders who know no other cause of these extraordinary aversions but the fear their Mothers had of these several Animals whilst they were with Child of them But what I chiefly desire should be observed is An Explanation of Concupiscence and of Original Sin that there is all possible probabilities that Men retain in their Brain to this day the traces and impressions of our first Parents For as Animals produce their own likeness and with the like traces in their Brain which is the cause that Animals of the same Species have the same Sympathies and Antipathies and that they perform the same actions in the same occurrences Thus our first Parents after their Sin received such great impressions and profound traces of sensible things in their Brain as they might very well communicate to their Children so that this great propensity we have from the Womb to all sensible things and the great distance from God we are in by our present state may in some manner be explained by what has been said For as it is necessary according to the established order of Nature that the thoughts of the Soul should be conformable to the traces that are in the Brain We may say that as soon as we are formed in the Womb we are polluted with Sin and infected with the Corruption of our Parents since from that time we are strongly inclined to the pleasures of our Senses having in our Brain traces resembling those of the Persons who hath given us being it is necessary also that we shou'd have the same thoughts and the same inclinations which have any relation to sensible objects Rom. ch 6.5.12 14. c Thus it is impossible but that we should be born with Concupiscence and Original Sin We must be born with Concupiscence if Concupiscence is only the Natural effort that the traces of the Brain make upon the Mind to engage it to sensible things and we must be born in Original Sin if Original Sin is nothing else but the Dominion of Concupiscence and that these efforts become Victorious and Masters over the Mind and Heart of the Child Now it is very probable that the dominion or victory of Concupiscence is what we call Original Sin in Children and actual in Men. Objections and An ∣ swers This difficulty seems only to recur that contrary to Experience we might conclude from the principles I have established that the Mother would always communicate to her Child Habits and Inclinations resembling her own and a facility of imagining and learning the same things as she knows for all these things depend as has been already said only upon the traces and impressions of the Brain and it is certain that the impressions and traces of the Mothers Brain are communicated to the Child This has been proved by the Examples that has been brought concerning Men and is also confirmed by the Example of Animals whose young ones have their Brains filled with the same impressions which is the reason that all those that are of the same kind have the same Voice the same manner of moving their Members and also the same craft to take their Prey and defend themselves from their Enemies Therefore it must from thence follow that since all the traces of the Mothers Brain are imprinted in that of the Childs that the Children must be born with the same Habits and all the other qualities that the Mothers are possessed of and even commonly so to preserve them all their Lives since the Habits they have from their Infancy are those that are the longest kept which nevertheless is contrary to experience To answer this Objection it is requisite it should be known that there are two sorts of traces in the Brain the one Natural or proper to the Nature of Man the other acquired The Natural are very deep and it is impossible to esface them perfectly but on the contrary the acquired may be easily lost because commonly they are not deep Now although the Natural and acquired differ only as to the More or Less and that often the first have less force than the second since we every day accustom Animals to do things perfectly contrary to what they are inclined by these Natural traces for Example we use a Dog not to touch Bread nor to run after a Partridge although he sees and smells it Yet there i● this difference between these traces that the Natural ones have if we may so say secret alliances with the other parts of the body thus all the Springs of our Machines assist one the other to preserve themselves in their Natural state All the parts of our bodies mutually contribute to all necessary things for the preservation or re-establishment of these Natural traces Thus we cannot wholly efface them and they begin to revive when we believe we have destroyed them On the contrary the acquired Traces although greater more profound and stronger than the Natural are lost by little and little if they are not carefully preserved by a continual application of those things that produced them because the other parts of the body contribute nothing to their preservation but on the contrary continually endeavour to efface and loose them We may compare these traces to the common Wounds of the body they are wounds that our Brains receive which heal of themselves as these wounds of the body do by the admirable construction of the Machine As then there is nothing in all the body which is not conformable to the Natural traces they transmit themselves into Children with all their force So Parrots hatch little ones which have the same or Natural voices with themselves but because acquired traces are only in the Brain and not dispersed through the rest of the body except some few of 'em as when they have been imprinted by the Motions that accompany violent Passions they must not be transmitted into Children Thus a Parrot who gives the good Morrow and good Night to his Master will not make his little ones as Learned as himself and so Wise and able Persons will not have Children which resemble them Thus although it be true that all which passes in the Mothers Brain passes also in the same time into that of the Child and that the Mother can see nothing feel nothing imagine nothing that the Child does not likewise see feel and imagine and that a● the false traces of the Mother corrupt the Imagination of the Child Yet those traces not being Natural in the sense before explained it must not be wonder'd at if they are commonly effaced as soon as the Child is born for then the cause that formed and maintained these traces no longer subsists the Natural Constitution of the ●world● contributes to their destruction and sensible 〈…〉 in their room others that are new deeper 〈…〉 greater Number which efface almost