his leg the instrument of motion The Sun by his warmth makes the dunghill stink of which stink that that warmth is not the cause appears in that the very same influence draws forth a fragrant savour from a bed of Roses That the dunghill smells is from the Suns drawing forth the vapourâ— but that it smells ill is from the condition of the matter The upper-wheel of a Clock though by its motion it draws along with it an under-wheel that is irregular in its motion yet it is not the cause of that irregularity When a dexterous Pen-man writes upon sinking paper he makes pothooks as we say of children that begin to learn the art of writing blots rather than letters which yet is not his fault but the Papers Twisse Vind. Gr. l. 2. p. 1 a. p. 26. Reply 4. There must needs be a separation and therefore 't is possible to be between actions and the evil of them upon Mr. Howe 's own Hypothesis viz. That God does predetermine to all good actions which in the present state are but imperfectly good Here he must distinguish between the efficiency of God and man as to the same action and ascribe the action and grace of it to God and the evil that adheres to that action to man unless he will ascribe all to God Absit blasphemia verbo If Mr. Howe can extricate himself and not us with the same Answer or rather if he can excogitate any other Answer than by this exsibilated distinction erit mihi magnus Apollo and without an Irony sapientum octavus Reply 2. To the connexion I Answer That it infolds a twofold contradiction 1. For it supposes some actions to be intrinsecally evil and yet by our Hypothesis to be determined i. e. compell'd if Mr. Howe may be admitted our Interpreter whereas that is not sin which is not spontaneous neither is that spontaneous which is necessary i. e. violent or compell'd For violence is a Physical action upon the Patient in which sort of actions vertue or vice hath no place for the will is the principle of moral actions So the learned Camero de Scand p. 98. where note that I presume Camero denies not original sin imputed to be suo modo i. e. in its kind voluntary and so truly sin according to St. Austins sentiments nos omnes eramus ille unus homo i.e. we were all that one man Adam and so sinned in him This to prevent any misapprehension 2. It supposes sin to have an efficient cause whereas 't is a known Rule in Divinity Peccatum qua tale essentialiter est effectus moralis non habet causam Physicam i. e. Sin as such and essentially is a moral effect and hath no Physical cause Reply 3. Having given an Answer to Mr. Howe 's Antecedent and Connexion we shall now proceed to raze the foundation of his Hypothesis by proving that there are no actions of free agents evil in themselves or that no moral evil is positive but only privative which latter are the common terms of Philosophers and Divines in enquiring into the nature of moral evil And I shall borrow one Argument which will be instead of all from the most learned Dr. Barlow the now Renowned Bishop of Lincoln Arg. Every real and positive Being is from God the author and first cause of all Being But moral evil formally taken is not from God the author and first cause of all Being Ergo moral evil formally taken is not a real and positive Being The Minor is evident and acknowledged by the very Heathens in the appellation of Optimus the Best which they apply to their Jupiter together with Maximus the Greatest And will no doubt be owned by Mr. Howe who eo nomine for that very reason rejects Predestination of evil actions because in his apprehension it makes God the author of moral evil The Major let us hear the learned Bishop prove and the rather because it will much confirm our first Argument for Predetermination of all actions as such Proof Because it is impossible that there should be any finite and created Being which does not depend and hath its Being from an infinite and uncreated Being viz. God for it must needs be if there be any Being not caused by God that that Being be independent upon God as the first cause and consequently God shall not be the first cause in respect of that Being whence follow many absurdities c. whereof I shall only take the sum as himself hath given it us with an application to moral evil If moral evil i.e. any sin or breach of Divine Law be a real Being then 1. God shall not be the cause of that Being for of so deformed a birth divine goodness cannot be the Parent 2. This granted it will follow 1. That there is a secondary Being and a Being by participation such as every finite Being is supposed to be which does not partake of or receive its being from the first Being 2. That there is a finite Being independent upon God both as to production and conservation All which things we know and believe are contrary not only to Philosophy but Divinity Thus far the most acute Philosopher and Divine Exercit. metaph 2 a. de natura mali ad calcem Scheib met p. 32 33. Let us take notice of the instances of those sins which are supposed to be evil in themselves or positive Obj. 1. Sins of commission which are evil ex genere objecto whereof two are specially insisted on Adams eating of the forbidden fruit and by Mr. Howe the hatred of God are in themselves evil Answ 1. In general If all sins subsist in some actual motion of the soul body or both and this motion abstractively considered be the material part of every actual sin and hath God for the prime cause in whom we live and move and have our being then no sin can be assigned wherein this material part may not be found So the Learned Davevant sometime Bishop of Sarisbury Animadv on Hoard p. 174 175. Answ 2. As to the instances The first in eating the forbidden fruit the material part of the sin in regard of the Soul was the appetition thereof in regard of the body the mastication chewing and manducation eating and other bodily acts Separate these from the formal part which is modus appetendi the manner of desiring and containeth a repugnancy to Gods command and God was the prime author thereof The act of desiring and eating must of necessity be reduced to God without whom there neither is nor can be any motion of body or soul but the disorderly manner of desiring and eating contrary to the Law of God this is reducible as being a defect only to the defective will of man Davenant ibid. p. 175. As to the second instance hatred of God That the act terminated upon that object in complexo is evil and cannot be otherwise we deny not but then that is true of acts and undue
DE CAVSA DEI OR A VINDICATION Of the Common Doctrine of Protestant DIVINES Concerning Predetermination i. e. The Interest of God as the first Cause in all the Actions as such of all Rational Creatures From the invidious Consequences with which it is burdened by Mr. JOHN HOWE In a late Letter and Postscript of GOD'S PRESCIENCE By T. D. LONDON Printed for R. Roberts and are to be sold by Walter Davis at his House in Amen-Corner 1678. To the Reverend Mr. JOHN HOWE Author of the late Letter and Postscript of God's Prescience SIR WHen I had read the Title-page of your late Letter to the Honourable Mr. Boyle and thereby understood its design and withal observed the smallness of the Bulk I promised my self that it would be Pagella hoc solo nomine redarguenda quod sit tota Gemmea For else I thought it would not be worthy of so great a Moecenas a Master of all sort of Learning and so whose nobility is not only in Parchment as Charron speaks nor of the Author for I was aware of him though he had concealed his name whose parts I well knew and have always had the candor upon all fit occasions to acknowledge were not of the lower size nor yet of so excellent a subject and so needful in these dregs of time which verge so much toward Socinianism And in the perusal of the Letter it self for some time I pleased my self with an apprehension that I had not imposed upon my self nor had my affection to the Author seduced my judgment Fancy and Reason were in so happy a conjunction that I hoped they would never be parted thoroughout the whole Discourse But alas too soon I found my hopes shamefully baffled For beside a corrupt gloss upon Act. 4.28 pag. 28. which I could not digest and divers passages in the process of your after-Discourse not unexceptionable from pag. 32 to 50 to speak my sense freely I found pro thesauro carbones i.e. Coals instead of Treasure shining indeed but black and smutty politeness of stile I mean continued but the series of well-digested thoughts broken and dissevered jejune Answers to Arguments full of sense old Popish Arguments dressed up A-la-mode and many of which militate as much against your assertions as ours and a great deal of good eloquence put to a very ill use and a far worse than it would be to play at Duck and Drake with broad pieces in the Thames and sometimes degenerate eloquence which like painted glass though it was an ornament yet impeded the transmission of the light and which is worst of all the whole design of those Pages I found to be an averment of the old Popish Calumny that by the Protestant Doctrine God is made the Author of sin which I must needs profess was a strange surprisal to me and so much the more because I could not conceive what should induce you aâ— Protestant Divine to make affidavit of a Pontificial accusation nor why in this Discourse For if the end you assigned your self in doing it was the vindication of the blessed God from the imputation of being the cause of moral evil you have certainly lurcht the Reader of his expectation by offering nothing toward it but what he can easily see through viz. that God is not the cause universally of natural good or at least as remote as the Grand-father is of the Grand-child See your own words Let. p. 36. Two causes which might seem probable of your doing it in this Discourse your self has removed out of your Readers way It was not the request of the Honourable Person to whom your Letter is directed but for ought I can collect as the defending God's Predeterminative concourse unto sinful actions was an unenjoined task Let. p. 150. So was the overthrowing it too Nor was it the connexion between Prescience and Predetermination as it lies in the Divine Decree and is the only true ground of the certainty of Divine Prescience for that was not your design to demonstrate Gods Prescience of all whatsoever futurities and consequently of the sins of men but supposing it to shew its reconcileableness with what it seemed not so well to agree as you since tell us Postsc p. 4. which I did easily apprehend before For all the mediums you use for the eviction of this reconcileableness borrow no strength from the denial of Predetermination Sometime after your Letter succeeded a Postscript in the view of which I was more astonished than before obstupui steteruntque comae For whereas I might have hoped that your second thoughts would be better they proved a great deal worse I had such an opinion of your modesty that at least you would recall the hard words you gave the Arguments urged for Predetermination to sinful actions Thin Sophistry Collusive ambiguity Let. p. 41. Vain attempts 38. Dismal conclusions 36. the effects of a Sophistical wit against sense and more against the sense of our souls and most of all against the entire sum and substance of all Morality and Religion at once p. 39 40. and overturning and mingling heaven and earth p. 50. And that reflexion you make upon those who have used the distinction of voluntas signi Beneplaciti that they have only rather concealed a good meaning than expresed by it a bad one p. 106. For take all together and I see not that they amount to a less guilt than of â—rampling upon that venerable dust which was sometimes animated by truly Heroick Souls and bore the names of Zuinglius Calvin Bâ—za Perkins Pemble Davenant Twisse Ames c. than which no cause hath had nor needs greater Patrons But instead of recalling you have avowed them by the addition of others of the same sort a contagion a deadly thing Postsc p. 15. An ill coloured opinion Postsc p. 51. Fearful consequences of that rejected opinion vanity of the subterfuges whereby its assertors think to hide the malignity of it p. 50. Nor was this enough but as if you were Animal gloriae as was said of the Philosophers an animal that lived by the air of vain glory and applause and thought your self another Goliah you cry out I defie the armies of Israel this day give me a man that we may fight together What other interpretation are these words capable of Now I perceive that some persons who had formerly entertained that strange opinion of Gods Predeterminative concurrence to the wickedest actions and not purged their minds of it have been offended with that Letter for not expressing more respect unto it and yet offered nothing themselves which to me seems exceeding strange for the solving of that great difficulty and incumbrance which it infers upon our Religion Postsc p. 7. Or these If I find my self obliged any way further to intermeddle in this matter I reckon the time I have to spend in this world can never be spent to better purpose than in discovering c. the inefficacy of the Arguments brought for it
that might at her pleasure do what she would Durandus seemeth to incline to this opinion supposing that second Causes do bring forth their actions and operations by and of themselves and that God no otherwise concurreth actually to the production of the same but in that he preserveth the second Causes in that being and power of working which first he gave them Thus far the most Learned Dr. Field of the Church B. 3. Ch. 23. pag. 121 122. And yet he adds his dislike of Durandus opinion in these words But they that are of sounder judgment resolve that as the light enlightneth the air and with the air all other inferiour things so God not only giveth being and power of working to the second Causes and preserveth them in the same but together with them hath an immediate influence into the things that are to be effected by them c. Ibid. p. 122. 3. What account can be given of his exploding our distinction between the material and formal part of sin approved of above by Dr. Field Most of his way viz. Mr. Gales mince the business and say the concurrence is only to the action which is sinful not as sinful so Mr. Howe 's Postsc p. 33. Answ Except it were affirmed that it implied a contradiction for God to make such a creature there is no imaginable pretence why it should not be admitted he hath done it Let. p. 37. and subjoins soon after I must confess a greater disposition to wonder that ever such a thing should be disputed than dispute so plain a case p. 38. Reply That it is affirmed Mr. Howe cannot surely be ignorant nay he frees himself from that blame I am not altogether ignorant what attempts have been made to prove it impossible p. 38. but in the interim he incurs another of contradicting himself This Argument ab absurdo from the implication of Gods making a creature independent upon himself is urged against those that deny immediate concurrence and so by just consequence conservation and Predetermination 1. As to mediate concurrence 't is urged for it by Durandus That there is no repugnuncy nor contradiction for God to make a creature that should be able to act without his help otherwise that is than by conserving its being and powers To this is Answered Involvere repugnantiam quod creaturae sit potens c. That it involves a repugnancy and contradiction that the creature should be able to act independently upon the Creator as well in respect of the created cause it self which hath necessarily a power of acting commensurate and proportionable to its own being as in respect of the action or effect flowing from it for seeing they are Beings by participation they essentially depend upon the first Being Wherefore as the Divine power cannot produce a Being independent upon him in its Being so nor produce an Agent independent upon him in acting Suarez Met. T. 1. D. 22. n. 16. One egg is not more like another than Durandus Argument to Mr. Howe 's nor can a more solid Answer be given thereto no though Mr. Howe should acknowledg immediate concurrence as in his Postsc he does of which in his whole Letter there is altum silentium and deny only Predetermination for this Answer is a shoo that will fit either foot as will appear in its place 2. As to conservation the no necessity of Gods continual influx to that end seems colourably affirmed upon this ground too That it is not repugnant to Omnipotency to produce such creatures as when once made may continue their Being though the operation of the Agent cease by which they were produced To this Argument Suarez also fits a rational reply Ad amplitudinem divinae potentiae spectat c. It belongs to the amplitude of the Divine Power that nothing is nor can be a moment after its production without its influence and also that it have full dominion over all his creatures and an intrinsick power of annihilating them by the suspension or withholding of his influence Suarez Met. T. 1. D. 21. n. 2 17. 3. Which is directly to our case upon Mr. Howe 's explication of his mind that he does really believe Gods immediate concourse to all actions of his creatures both immediatione virtutis suppositi yet not determinative to wicked actions Postsc p. 28. we shall adventure a demonstration that it implies a contradiction for God to make a creature that can act without Predetermination i. e. applying it to action and to one rather than another action and 't is this that such a creature would be but ens secundarium a second being not causa secunda a second cause or which is all one God should be but ens primum not causa prima the first Being not the first Cause which I prove thus Arg. 1. If God does concur only by simultaneous concourse and not by Predetermination or previous motion then God cannot be the cause of the actions of the creatures as they proceed from them But the consequent is absurd and Mr. Howe I presume will not own it Therefore so is the Antecedent The Consequence is proved thus God is not by concourse the cause of the actions of the creatures as those actions proceed from them because then concourse must be before the action of the creature for every Physical cause is before the effect but the very name concourse imports a joyning together in the same action as the Master and Scholar whose hand is guided in shaping the same letter And all consent in concourse neither does God act before the creature nor the creature before God but both together and at once Arg. 2. To make good the English Proverb He is twice killed that is killed with his own weapon I shall retort Mr. Howe 's two concessions upon him 1. If there be an immediate concourse then there is a Predetermination or putting the creature upon action before it acts or else the creature is the first mover of it self to action The consequence is plausible enough as depending on this ground that by concourse alone we have no account given us how God and the creature join in one individual action rather than another As for instance in the state of innocency when man was incircled with a variety of trees of the Garden all good and fit for food whence was it that he will'd to eat of one rather than another The concourse of God with Adam's will in the election of one suppose that in the midst of the Garden before the prohibition passed upon it could not determine it to that rather than to any of the rest as is plain in external actions Two men lanching a wherry-boat concur to the same effect but the one does not determine the other by lending common assistance to that act There must be therefore a Predetermination in order of nature though not of time to that act of Adam's will supposed of eating that tree instanced in to which God
concurred This may be illustrated by the example of a Writing-Master and his Scholar wherein there is a concurrence to the action of writing and its effect the letter written and also a Predetermination a putting the Scholar upon the action of writing not morally for that influence is discerned in commanding a Scholar to write by himself but Physically by putting his hand on the Scholars to write and to write one letter rather than another An account how the particular action of any rational creatures will comes to be determined upon the exclusion of Predetermination I know none can be given Not by chance upon the occasional sudden presentation of an object because the action is Gods who is not liable to any such impressions as well as the creatures not by the creatures self-determining power for that as such is indeterminate as to the acts to which we conceive it must be some way or other determined And these two Propositions are so evident that concurrence immediate does not determine the will and that yet it must be determined that Baronius himself who is an Antipredeterminant does acknowledg both Met. 7 8. Disp 3. n. 66. and he does suggest a reason against any necessity laid upon a thing by Divine Prescience which we will accept of for a necessity of Divine Predetermination to the acts of the will Illud solum imponit necessitatem alicui rei quod est prima ratio cur illa res non potuit non evenire i. e. That alone imposes necessity upon any thing which is the first reason or cause why that thing could not but fall out Baron Met. 7 12. D. 2. n. 59. which necessity that it excludes not the liberty of mans will shall be cleared in due time 2. Again from the necessity conceded by Mr. Howe of immediate concourse and Predetermination to the production of good actions we shall infer the necessity of both to all actions This necessity must take its rise either from something common to all actions or peculiar to good actions The removing the latter will be the fixing the former in its due place In order hereunto we must consider that grace is an habit seated in the natural faculties and fitting them for good actions which as it was concreated with them in innocency so in the lapsed estate it is re-created or created again by infusion which infusion is not Predetermination for this latter still presupposes the former There must be grace in habit before it can be acted Now then the Query is whether the terminus of Predetermination be the habit or the faculties not the habit for that is a Quality that meliorates the faculties and so the actions in genere morali and cannot be put upon action or one rather than another but mediante potentia by the intervention of the power or faculty in which the gracious habit resides It must then be the faculties the will for instance for of that is the grand inquiry for otherwise supposing what has been owned that holy habits fit the will for holy volitions and nolitions in what degree the habits are confirmed in that the will may act without Predetermination and produce sincerely good actions as it please as long as these good actions are done by a power derived originally from it which is Mr. Howe 's Hypothesis and judged by him sufficient to salve the rights and priviledge of the first cause with reference to forbidden actions Let. p. 36. and I see not why not as well with reference to commanded actions The result of this ratiocination will be that if it be the indetermination of the powers to individual actions that makes an excitation of them to one rather than another necessary and the possibility of action contained in the powers that makes the reducing of that possibility to action no less necessary to good actions then the consequence seems immovable that Predetermination in its two Branches is alike necessary to all actions even when they flow from a will tainted with vicious habits and inclinations Quod erat demonstrandum And to me this Argument seems to carry along with it triumphant evidence to borrow one of Mr. Howe 's lofty Epithetes Let. p. 62. my fancy labours under so despicable poverty as to be unable to supply me with any evasion As for Mr. Howe 's phrase of impelling by which he intends compelling we shall refer the word and thing to the Head where it will most properly fall under examination In the interim let us attend to what he subjoins Answ I confess a disposition to wonder that a matter whereupon all moral Government depends both humane and divine should not have been determined at the first sight Let. p. 38. Reply These words imply that all moral Government c. is rendred ludicrous and a meer Pageantry by the Doctrine of Predetermination but upon what Mr. Howe magisterially enough takes for granted but does not once make an offer of proving that the will is hindered by Gods own irresistible counter-action p. 37. from yielding obedience to such Government But if I live till that be proved my age will certainly exceed Methuselahs Answ But Mr. Howe adds The notion of the goodness and righteousness of God methinks should stick so close to our minds and create such a sense in our souls as should be infinitely dearer to us than all our senses and powers And that we should rather chuse to have our sight hearing and motive power and what not besides disputed or even torn from us than ever suffer our selves to be disputed into a belief that the Holy and Good God should irresistibly determine the wills of men to and punish the same thing Let. p. 19. Reply The sum of the Argument though accompanied with a long train of fine words is that Predetermination to sinful actions crosses the natural notions of mankind concerning Gods Goodness and Holiness To which we return 1. That there is not the least colour for any such consequence from our Doctrine but upon supposition of two things which Mr. Howe would fasten upon us but we disown 1. That God predetermines to sinful actions in concreto i e. to the natural action and the sinfulness of it which we constantly deny for though we own it a hâ—rd province to answer all objections that may be started against this partition made between the one and the other as to Gods influence which we affirm as to the former the action and deny as to the latter the sinfulness of it yet ' we doubt not in its season to evince these two things that God is the Author and consequently the Predeterminer of all the actions of rational creatures for as to irrational though we include them yet the Question not being of them we shall not intermeddle with them and that God is not the Author of the sinfulness and so not the Predeterminer thereof And then as to the modus or manner of Gods influence so as to separate these that