can never totally represent to it which carries in it a plain Contradiction This will be plainer if we consider Infinity in Numbers The Infinity of Numbers to the end of whose addition every one perceives there is no approach easily appears to any one that reflects on it But how clear soever this Idea of the Infinity of Number be there is nothing yet more evident than the Absurdity of the actual Idea of Infinite Number CHAP. XVIII Of other Simple Modes THE Mind has several distinct Ideas of Sliding Rolling Walking Creeping c. which are all but the different modifications of Motion Swift and Slow are two different Ideas of Motion the measures whereof are made out of the distances of Time and Space put together The like variety we have in Sounds Every articulate word is a different modification of Sound as are also Notes of different length put together which make that Complex Idea called Tune The Modes of Colours might be also very various some of which we take notice of as the different degrees or as they are termed Shades of the same Colour But since we seldom make assemblages of Colours without taking in Figure also as in Painting c. Those which are taken notice of do most commonly belong to mixed Modes as Beauty Rainbow c. All compounded Tastes and Smells are also Modes made up of the Simple Ideas of those Senses But they being such as generally we have no Names for cannot be set down in writing but must be left to the Thoughts and Experience of the Reader CHAP. XIX Of the Modes of Thinking WHen the Mind turns its view inwards upon its self Thinking is the first Idea that occurs wherein it observes a great variety of Modifications and thereof frames to it self distinct Ideas Thus the Perception annex'd to any impression on the Body made by an external Object is call'd Sensation When an Idea recurs without the presence of the Object it is called Remembrance When sought after by the Mind and brought again in view it is Recollection When held there long under attentive consideration it is Contemplation When Ideas float in the Mind without Regard or Reflection 't is called in French Resvery our Language has scarce a name for it When the Ideas are taken notice of and as it were Registred in the Memory it is Attention When the Mind fixes its view on any one Idea and considers it on all sides it is Intention and Study Sleep without Dreaming is Rest from all these And Dreaming is the Perception of Ideas in the Mind not suggested by any external Objects or known occasions nor under any choice or conduct of the Understanding Of these various modes of Thinking the Mind forms as distinct Ideas as it does of White and Red a Square or a Circle CHAP. XX. Of the Modes of Pleasure and Pain PLeasure and Pain are Simple Ideas which we receive both from Sensation and Reflection There are Thoughts of the Mind as well as Sensations accompanied with Pleasure or Pain Their Causes are termed Good or Evil. For things are esteemed Good or Evil only in reference to Pleasure or Pain That we call Good which is apt to cause or increase Pleasure or diminish Pain in us to procure or preserve the possession of any Good or absence of any Evil And on the contrary that we call Evil which is apt to produce or increase any Pain or diminish any Pleasure in us or else to procure us any Evil or deprive us of any Good By Pleasure and Pain I would be understood to mean of Body or Mind as they are commonly distinguished thô in Truth they are only different constitutions of the Mind sometimes occasion'd by disorder in the Body sometimes by thoughts of the Mind Pleasure and Pain and their causes Good and Evil are the Hinges upon which our Passions turn by reflecting on the various Modifications or Tempers of Mind and the internal Sensations which Pleasure and Pain Good and Evil produce in us we may thence form to our selves the Ideas of our Passions Thus by reflecting upon the Thought we have of the Delight which any thing is apt to produce in us we have an Idea we call Love and on the contrary the thought of the Pain which any thing present or absent produces in us is what we call Hatred Desire is that uneasiness which a Man finds in himself upon the absence of any thing the present enjoyment of which carries the Idea of Delight with it Joy is a Delight of the Mind arising from the present or assur'd approaching possession of a Good Sorrow is an uneasiness of the Mind upon the thought of a Good lost or the Sense of a present Evil. Hope is a pleasure in the Mind upon the thought of a probable future Enjoyment of a thing which is apt to delight Fear is an uneasiness of the Mind upon the thought of a future Evil likely to befall us Anger is a discomposure of Mind upon the receipt of Injury with a present purpose of Revenge Despair is the thought of the unattainableness of any Good Envy is an uneasiness of Mind caused by the consideration of a Good we desire obtained by one we think should not have had it before us It is to be considered that in reference to the Passions the Removal or Lessening of a Pain is considered and operates as a Pleasure and the loss or diminishing of a Pleasure as a Pain And farther that the Passions in most Persons operate on the Body and cause various Changes in it But these being not always sensible do not make a necessary part of the Idea of each Passion Besides these modes of Pleasure and Pain which result from the various considerations of Good and Evil there are many others I might have instanced in as the pain of Hunger and Thirst and the pleasure of Eating and Drinking and of Musick c. but I rather chose to instance in the Passions as being of much more concernment to us CHAP. XXI Of Power THE Mind being every day informed by the Senses of the alteration of those Simple Ideas it observes in things without reflecting also on what passes within it self and observing a constant Change of its Ideas sometimes by the impressions of outward Objects upon the Senses and sometimes by the Determination of its own Choice and concluding from what it has so constantly observed to have been that the like changes will for the future be made in the same things by the same Agents and by the like ways considers in one thing the possibility of having any of its Simple Ideas changed and in another the possibility of making that Change and so comes by that Idea which we call Power Thus we say Fire has a power to melt Gold and make it fluid and Gold has a power to be melted Power thus considered is Twofold viz. as able to make or able to receive any change the one may be called Active the
can think and move several parts of our Bodies at Pleasure and observing the effects that natural Bodies produce in one another by both these ways we get the Idea of Power Succession is another Idea suggested by our Senses and by Reflection on what passes in our Minds For if we look into our selves we shall find our Ideas always whilst we are awake or have any Thought passing in train one going and another coming without intermission CHAP. VIII Some farther Considerations concerning Simple Ideas WHatsoever is able by affecting our Senses to cause any perception in the Mind doth thereby produce in the Understanding a Simple Idea which whatsoever be the cause of it is look'd upon as a real positive Idea in the Understanding Thus the Ideas of Heat and Cold Light and Darkness Motion and Rest c. are equally Positive in the Mind thô some of their Causes may be meer Privations An enquiry into their Causes concerns not the Ideas as in the Understanding but the nature of the things existing without us Thus a Painter has distinct Ideas of White and Black as well as the Philosopher who tells us what kind of Particles and how rang'd in the surface occasion'd those colours That a Privative Cause may produce a Positive Idea appears from shadows which thô nothing but the absence of Light are discernible and cause clear and positive Ideas The natural reason of which may be this viz. That since Sensation is produced only by different degrees and modes of Motion in our animal Spirits variously agitated by external Objects the abatement of any former Motion must as necessarily produce a new Sensation as the increase and variation of it and thereby introduce a new Idea We have some negative Names which stand for no positive Ideas but consist wholly in negation of some certain Ideas as Silence Invisible these signify not any Ideas in the Mind but their Absence It will be useful to distinguish Ideas as they are Perceptions in our Minds from what they are in the Bodies that cause such Perceptions in us for we are not to think the former exact Images and Resemblances of something inherent in the subject Most of those of Sensation being in the mind no more the likeness of something existing without us than the names that stand for them are the likeness of our Ideas which yet upon hearing they are apt to excite in us Whatsoever the Mind perceives in it self or is the immediate object of Perception Thought or Understanding that I call an Idea and the power to produce any Idea in our Mind I call the quality of the subject wherein that power is thus a Snow-ball having the power to produce in us the Ideas of White Cold and Round those powers as they are in the Snow-ball I call Qualities and as they are Sensations or Perceptions in our Understandings I call them Ideas which Ideas if I speak of sometimes as in the things themselves I would be understood to mean those Qualities in the Objects which produce them in us These Qualities are of Two sorts First Original or Primary such are Solidity Extention Motion or Rest Number and Figure These are inseparable from Body and such as it constantly keeps in all its changes and alterations Thus take a grain of Wheat divide it into Two Parts each Part has still Solidity Extension Figure Mobility Divide it again and it still retains the same Qualities and will do so still thô you divide it on till the Parts become insensible The next thing to be consider'd is How Bodies operate upon one another and that is manifestly by Impulse and nothing else For Body cannot operate on what it does not touch nor when it does touch any other way than by Motion If so then when external Objects which are not united to our Minds produce Ideas in us 't is evident that some Motion must be thence continued by our Nerves or animal Spirits to the Brains or seat of Sensation And since Extension Figure Motion c. may be perceived at a distance by the Sight t is evident that some Bodies must come from them to the Eyes and thereby convey to the Brain some Motion which produces those Ideas we have in us Secondly Secondary Qualities such as Colours Smells Tasts Sounds c which whatever Reality we by mistake may attribute to them are in truth nothing in the Objects themselves but Powers to produce various Sensations in us and depend on the Qualities before-mentioned The Ideas of Primary Qualities of Bodies are resemblances of them and their patterns really exist in Bodies themselves But the Ideas produced in us by Secundary Qualities have no resemblance of them at all And what is Sweet Blue or Warm in the Idea is but the certain Bulk Figure and Motion of the insensible parts in the Bodies themselves which we call so Thus we see that Fire at one distance produces in us the sensation of Warmth which at a nearer approach causes the sensation of Pain Now what reason have we to say that the Idea of Warmth is actually in the Fire but that of Pain not in the Fire which the same Fire produces in us the same way The Bulk Number Figure and Motion of the Parts of Fire are really in it whether we perceive them or no and therefore may be call'd Real Qualities because they really exist in that Body But Light and Heat are no more really in it than Sickness or Pain take away the Sensation of them let not the Eyes see Light or Colours nor the Ear hear Sounds let the Palate not Taste or the Nose Smell and all Colours Tasts Odours and Sounds as they are such particular Ideas vanish and cease and are reduced to their Causes that is Bulk Motion Figure c. of Parts These Secondary Qualities are of Two sorts first immediately perceiveable which by immediately operating on our Bodies produce several different Ideas in us Secondly mediately perceivable which by operating on other Bodies change their primary Qualities so as to render them capable of producing Ideas in us different from what they did before These last are Powers in Bodies which proceed from the particular constitution of those Primary and Original Qualities to make such a change in the Bulk Figure Texture c. of another Body as to make it operate on our Senses different from what it did before as in Fire to make Lead fluid these two last being nothing but Powers relating to other Bodies and resulting from the different Modifications of the Original Qualities are yet otherwise thought of the former being esteemed Real Qualities but the later barely Powers The reason of this mistake seems to be this That our Ideas of sensible Qualities containing nothing in them of Bulk Figure c. we cannot think them the effect of those primary Qualities which appear not to our Senses to operate in their productions and with which they have not any apparent congruity or conceivable connexion
nor can Reason shew how Bodies by their Bulk Figure c. should produce in the Mind the Ideas of Warm Yellow c. But in the other case when Bodies operate upon one another we plainly see that the Quality produced hath commonly no resemblance with any thing in the thing producing it and therefore we look upon it as the effect of Power But our Senses not being able to discover any unlikeness between the Idea produced in us and the quality of the Object producing it we imagine that our Ideas are resemblances of something in the Objects and not in the Effects of certain Powers placed in the modification of the primary Qualities with which primary Qualities the Ideas produced in us have no resemblance This little exeursion into Natural Philosophy was necessary in our present Enquiry to distinguish the primary and real Qualities of Bodies which are always in them from those secundary and imputed Qualities which are but the Powers of several combinations of those Primary ones when they operate without being distinctly discern'd whereby we learn to know what Ideas are and what are not Resemblances of something really existing in the Bodies we denominate from them CHAP. IX Of Perception PErception is the first Idea we receive from Reflection it is by some called Thinking in general thô Thinking in the propriety of the English Tongue signifies that sort of operation of the Mind about its Ideas wherein the Mind is active where it considers any thing with some degree of voluntary attention for in bare Perception the Mind is for the most part only Passive and what it perceives it cannot avoid perceiving What this is we cannot otherwise know than by Reflecting on what passes in our Minds when we See Feel Hear c. Impressions made on the outward Parts if they are not taken notice of within cause no Perception as we see in those whose Minds are intently busied in the contemplation of certain Objects A sufficient impulse there may be upon the organs of Sensation but if it reach not the observation of the Mind there follows no Perception so that wherever there is Sense or Perception there some Idea is actually produced and present in the Understanding We may observe that the Ideas we receive from Sensation are often in grown People alter'd by the judgment without our taking notice of it Thus a Globe of any uniform Colour as of Gold or Jet being set before our Eyes the Idea thereby imprinted is of a flat circle variously shadowed But being accustomed to perceive what kind of appearances convex Bodies are wont to make in us the Judgment alters the appearances into their Causes and from that variety of Shadow or Colour frames to it self the Perception of a convex Figure of one uniform Colour This in many cases by a settl'd habit is perform'd so readily that we take that for the perception of our Sensation which is but an Idea formed by the Judgment so that one serves only to excite the other and is scarce taken notice of itself As a Man who reads and hears with attention takes little notice of the Characters or Sounds but of the Ideas that are excited in him by them Thus habits come at last to produce actions in us which often scape our observation The faculty of Perception seems to be that which puts the distinction between the animal Kingdom and the inferior parts of Nature Since Vegetables have some degrees of Motion and upon the different application of other Bodies to them do very briskly alter their Figutes and Motions and thence have obtain'd the name of Sensitive Plants which yet is I suppose but bare Mechanism and no otherwise produced than the shortning of a Rope by the affusion of Water But Perception I believe is in some degree in all sorts of Animals thô I think we may from the make of an Oister or Cockle reasonably conclude that it has not so many nor so quick Senses as a Man or several other Animals Perception is also the first step and degree towards Knowledge and the Inlet of all the materials of it so that the fewer Senses any Man has and the duller the impressions that are made by them are the more remote he is from that Knowledge which is to be found in other Men. CHAP. X. Of Retention THE next Faculty of the Mind whereby it makes a farther progress towards Knowledge I call Retention which is the keeping of those Ideas it has receiv'd which is done two ways First By keeping the Idea which is brought into the Mind for some time actuactually in view which is called Contemplation Secondly By reviving those Ideas in our Minds which have disappeared and have been as it were laid out of sight and this is Memory which is as it were the Store-house of our Ideas for the narrow Mind of Man not being capable of having many Ideas under view at once it was necessary to have a Repository to lay up those Ideas which at another time it may have use of But our Ideas being nothing but actual Perceptions in the Mind which cease to be any thing when there is no perception of them this laying up of our Ideas in the Repository of the Memory signifies no more but this That the Mind has a power in many cases to revive Perceptions it has once had with this additional Perception annex'd to them that it has had them before And it is by the assistance of this Faculty that we are said to have all those Ideas in our Understandings which we can bring in sight and make the object of our Thoughts without the help of those sensible Qualities which first imprinted them there Attention and Repetition help much to the fixing Ideas in our Memories but those which make the deepest and most lasting impressions are those which are accompanied with Pleasure and Pain Ideas but once taken in and never again repeated are soon lost as those of Colours in such as lost their Sight when very young The Memory in some Men is tenacious even to a miracle but yet there seems to be a constant decay of all our Ideas even of those which are struck deepest and in Minds the most retentive so that if they be not sometimes renewed the Print wears out and at last there remains nothing to be seen Those Ideas that are often refresh'd by a frequent return of the Objects or Actions that produce them fix themselves best in the Memory and remain longest there Such are the Original qualities of Bodies viz. Solidity Extension Figure Motion c. and those that almost constantly affect us as Heat and Cold and those that are the Affections of all kinds of Beings as Existence Duration Number these and the like are seldom quite lost while the Mind retains any Ideas at all In memory the Mind is oftentimes more than barely passive for it often sets it self on work to search some hidden Ideas sometimes they start of their own accord
Relation may be the same in those Men who have far different Ideas of the things that are Related Thus those who have different Ideas of Man may agree in that of a Father There is no Idea of any kind which is not capable of an almost infinite number of Considerations in reference to other things and therefore this makes no small part of Men's Words and Thoughts Thus one single Man may at once sustain the Relations of Father Brother Son Husband Friend Subject General European Englishman Islander Master Servant Bigger Less c. to an almost infinite number he being capable of as many Relations as there can be occasions of comparing him to other things in any manner of Agreement Disagreement or Respect whatsoever The Ideas of Relations are much clearer and more distinct than of the Things related because the Knowledge of one Simple Idea is oftentimes sufficient to give me the notion of a Relation but to the knowing of any substantial Being an accurate collection of sundry Ideas is necessary CHAP. XXVI Of Cause and Effect and other Relations THE Ideas of Cause and Effect we get from our observation of the vicissitude of Things while we perceive some Qualities or Substances begin to exist and that they receive their existence from the due application and operation of other Beings that which produces is the Cause that which is produced the Effect Thus Fluidity in Wax is the Effect of a certain degree of Heat which we observe to be constantly produced by the application of such Heat We distinguish the Originals of things into two sorts First When the thing is wholly made new so that no part thereof did ever exist before as when a new Particle of Matter doth begin to exist which had bâ—fore no Being 't is caâ—led Creation Secondly When a thing is made up of Particles which did all of them before exist but the thing so constituted of pre-existing Particles which altogether make up such a collection of simple Ideas had not any Existence before as this Man this Egg this Rose c. when produced in the ordinary course of Nature by an Internal Principle but set on work by some External Agent and working by insensible ways which we perceive not 't is called Generation When the Cause is Extrinsical and the Effect introduced by a sensible Separation or Juxta-position of discernible Parts we call it Making and such are all Artificial Things When any simple Idea is produced which was not in that Subject before we call it Alteration The Denominations of Things taken from Time are for the most part only Relations Thus when it is said that Queen Elizabeth lived Sixty nine and Reigned Forty five Years no more is meant than that the duration of her Existence was equal to Sixty nine and of her Government to Forty five Annual Revolutions of the Sun and so are all words answering How long Young and Old and other words of Time that are thought to stand for positive Ideas are indeed Relative and intimate a Relation to a certain length of Duration whereof we have the Idea in our Minds Thus we call a Man Young or Old that has lived little or much of that time that Men usually attain to This is evident from our application of these Names to other things for a Man is called Young at Twenty but a Horse Old c. The Sun and Stars we call not Old at all Because we know not what period God has set to that sort of Beings There are other Ideas that are truly Relative which we signify by names that are thought Positive and Absolute such as Great and Little Strong and Weak The things thus denominated are referred to some Standards with which we compare them Thus we call an Apple Great that is bigger than the ordinary sort of those we have been used to And a Man Weak that has not so much Strength or Power to move as Men usually have or those of his own size CHAP. XXVII Of Identity and Diversity ANother occasion the Mind takes of comparing is the very Being of Things when considering a Thing as existing at any certain time or place and comparing it with it self as existing at any other time c. we form the Ideas of Identity and Diversity When we see any thing in any certain time and place we are sure it is that very thing and can be no other how like soever it may be in all other Respects We conceiving it impossible that two Things of the same kind should exist together in the same place we conclude that whatever exists any where at the same time excludes all of the same kind and is there it self alone When therefore we demand whether any thing be the same or no it refers always to something that existed such a time in such a place which it was certain at that instant was the same with it self and no other We have Ideas of Three sorts of Substances First God Secondly Finite Intelligence Thirdly Bodies First God being Eternal Unalterable and every where concerning his Identity there can be no doubt Secondly Finite Spirits having had their determinate time and place of beginning to exist the Relation to that time and place will always determine to each its Identity as long as it exists Thirdly The same will hold of every Particle of Matter to which no Addition or Substraction is made These three exclude not one another out of the same place yet each exclude those of the same kind out of the same place The Identity and Diversity of Modes and Relations are determined after the same manner that Substances are only the actions of Finite Beings as Motion and Thought consisting in Succession they they cannot exist in different times and places as permanent Beings For no Motion or Thought considered as at different times can be the same each part thereof having a different beginning of Existence From whence it is plain that Existence it self is the Principium Individuationis which determins a Being to a particular time and place incommunicable to two Beings of the same kind Thus suppose an Atom existing in a determin'd time and place it is evident that considered in any instant it is the same with it self and will be so as long as its exstence continues The same may be said of Two or more or any number of Particles whilst they continue together The Mass will be the same however jumbled but if one Atom be taken away it is not the same Mass. In Vegetables the Identity depends not on the same Mass and is not applied to the same thing The reason of this is the difference between an animate Body and mass of Matter This being only the Cohesion of Particles any how united The other such a disposition and organization of Parts as is sit to receive and distribute nourishment So as to continue and frame the Wood Bark Leaves c. of an Oak for instance in which consists the
far it may extend This part depending on our Sagacity in finding intermediate Ideas that may shew the Habitudes and Relations of Ideas It is an hard matter to tell when we are at an end of such Discoveries They that are ignorant of Algebra cannot imagine the Wonders in this kind are to be done by it and what farther Improvements and Helps advantageous to other parts of Knowledge the Sagacious Mind of Man may yet find out it is not easy to determine This at least I believe that the Ideas of Quantity are not those alone that are capable of Demonstration and Knowledge and that other and perhaps more useful parts of Contemplation would afford us Certainty if Vices Passions and domineering Interests did not oppose or menace Endeavours of this kind The Idea of a Supream Being Infinite in Power Goodness and Wisdom whose Workmanship we are and on whom we depend and the Idea of our Selves as understanding rational Creatures would I suppose if duly considered afford such Foundations of our Duty and Rules of Action as might place Morality among the Sciences capable of Demonstration wherein I doubt not but from Principles as Incontestable as those of the Mathematicks by necessary Consequences the measure of Right and Wrong might be made out to any one that will apply himself with the same Indifferency and Attention to the One as he does to the Other of these Sciences The Relations of other Modes may certainly be perceived as well as those of Number and Extension Where there is no Property there is no Injustice is a Proposition as certain as any Demonstration in Euclid for the Idea of Property being a right to any thing and the Idea of Injustice being the invasion or violation of that Right it is evident that these Ideas being thus established and these Names annexed to them I can as certainly know this Proposition to be true as that a Triangle has three Angles equal to Two right ones Again No Government allows absolute Liberty The Idea of Government being the establishment of Society upon certain Rules or Laws which require Conformity to them and the Idea of Absolute Liberty being for any one to do whatever he pleases I am as capable of being certain of the Truth of this Proposition as of any in Mathematicks What has given the advantage to the Ideas of Quantity and made them thought more capable of Certainty and Demonstration is First That they can be represented by sensible Marks which have a nearer Correspondence with them than any Words or Sounds Diagrams drawn on Paper are Copies of the Ideas and not liable to the uncertainty that Words carry in their Signification But we have no sensible Marks that resemble our Moral Ideas and nothing but Words to express them by which thô when written they remain the same yet the Ideas they stand for may change in the same Man and it is very seldom that they are not different in different Persons Secondly Moral Ideas are commonly more Complex than Figures whence these two Inconveniencies follow First That their Names are of more uncertain Signification the precise collection of Simple Ideas they stand for not being so easily agreed on and so the sign that is used for them in Communication always and in Thinking often does not steadily carry with it the same Idea Secondly The Mind cannot easily retain those precise Combinations so exactly and perfectly as is necessary in the examination of the Habitudes and Correspondencies Agreements or Disagreements of several of them one with another especially where it is to be judged of by long Deductions and the intervention of several other Complex Ideas to shew the Agreement ' or Disagreement of two remote ones One part of these Disadvantages in Moral Ideas which has made them be thought not capable of Demonstration may in a good measure be remedied by Definitions setting down that collection of Simple Ideas which every Term shall stand for and then using the Terms steadily and constantly for that precise Collection As to the Fourth sort of Knowledge viz. of the real actual existence of Things we have an Intuitive Knowledge of our own Existence a Demonstrative Knowledge of the Existence of God and a Sensitive Knowledge of the Objects that present themselves to our Senses From what has been said we may discover the Causes of our Ignorance which are chiefly these Three First want of Ideas Secondly Want of a discoverable Connexion between the Ideas we have Thirdly Want of tracing and examining our Ideas First There are some things we are ignorant of for want of Ideas All the Simple Ideas we have are confined to the observation of our Senses and the operations of our own Minds that we are conscious of in our Selves What other Ideas it is possible other Creatures may have by the assistance of other Senses and Faculties more or perfecter than we have or different from ours it is not for us to determine but to say or think there are no such because we conceive nothing of them is no better an Argument than if a blind Man should be positive in it that there was no such thing as Sight and Colours because he had no manner of Idea of any such thing What Faculties therefore other species of Creatures have to penetrate into the Nature and inmost constitutions of Things we know not This we know and certainly find that we want other views of them besides those we have to make discoveries of them more perfect The Intellectual and Sensible World are in this perfectly alike that the parts which we see of either of them hold no proportion with that we see not and whatsoever we can reach with our Eyes or our Thoughts of either of them is but a point almost nothing in comparison of the rest Another great cause of Ignorance is the want of Ideas that we are capable of This keeps us in ignorance of Things we conceive capable of being known Bulk Figure and Motion we have Ideas of yet not knowing what is the particular Bulk Motion and Figure of the greatest part of the Bodies of the Universe we are ignorant of the several Powers Efficacies and ways of Operation whereby the effects we daily see are produced These are hid from us in some things by being too Remote in others by being too Minute When we consider the vast distance of the known and visible parts of the World and the reasons we have to think that what lies within our Ken is but a small part of the immense Universe we shall then discover an huge abyss of Ignorance What are the particular Fabricks of the great Masses of Matter which make up the whole stupendous frame of corporeal Beings how far they are extended and what is their motion and how continued and what influence they have upon one another are contemplations that at first glimpse our Thoughts lose themselves in If we confine our Thoughts to this little Canton I mean this System of
our Sun and the grosser Masses of Matter that visibly move about it What several sorts of Vegetables Animals and Intellectual corporeal Beings infinitely different from those of our little spot of Earth may probably be in other Planets to the knowledge of which even of their outward Figures and Parts we can no way attain whilst we are confined to this Earth there being no natural means either by Sensation or Reflection to convey their certain Ideas into our Minds There are other Bodies in the Universe no less concealed from us by their Minuteness These insensible Corpuscles being the active parts of Matter and the great instruments of Nature on which depend all their Secundary Qualities and Operations our want of precise distinct Ideas and their Primary Qualities keeps us in incurable Ignorance of what we desire to know about them Did we know the Mechanical Affections of Rhubarb or Opium we might as easily account for their Operations of Purging and causing Sleep as a Watch-maker can for the Motions of his Watch. The dissolving of Silver in Aqua fortis or Gold in Aqua Regia and not Vice versâ would be then perhaps no more difficult to know than it is to a Smith to understand why the turning of one Key will open a Lock and not the turning of another But whilst we are destitute of Senses acute enough to discover the minute Particles of Bodies and to give us Ideas of their Mechanical Affections we must be content to be ignorant of their Properties and Operations nor can we be assured about them any farther than some few Trials we make are able to reach but whether they will succeed again another time we cannot be certain This hinders our certain Knowledge of Universal Truths concerning Natural Bodies and our Reason carries us herein very little beyond particular Matter of Fact And therefore I am apt to doubt that how far soever Humane Industry may advance useful and Experimental Philosophy in Physical Things yet Scientifical will still be out of our reach because we want perfect and adequate Ideas of those very Bodies which are nearest to us and most under our Command This at first sight shews us how disproportionate our Knowledge is to the whole extent even of Material Beings to which if we add the Consideration of that infinite number of Spirits that may be and probably are which are yet more remote from our Knowledge whereof we have no cognizance we shall find this cause of Ignorance conceal from us in an impenetrable Obscurity almost the whole Intellectual World a greater Certainly and more beautiful World than the material For bating some very few Ideas of Spirit we get from our own Mind by Reflection and from thence the best we can collect of the Father of all Spirits the Author of them and us and all Things we have no certain Information so much as of the Existence of other Spirits but by Revelation much less have we distinct Ideas of their different Natures States Powers and several Constitutions wherein they agree or differ one from another and from us And therefore in what concerns their different Species and Properties we are under an absolute Ignorance The Second cause of Ignorance is the want of discoverable Connexion between those Ideas we have where we want that we are utterly incapable of Universal and Certain Knowledge and are as in the former case left only to Observation and Experiment Thus the Mechanical Affections of Bodies having no affinity at all with the Ideas they produce in us we can have no distinct Knowledge of such operations beyond our Experience and can reason no otherwise about them than as the effects or appointment of an Infinitly Wise Agent which perfectly surpass our Comprehensions The operation of our Minds upon our Bodies is as unconceivable How any Thought should produce a Motion in Body is as remote from the nature of our Ideas as how any Body should produce any Thought in the Mind That it is so if Experience did not convince us the consideration of the Things themselves would never be able in the least to discover to us In some of our Ideas there are certain Relations Habitudes and Connexions so visibly included in the nature of the Ideas themselves that we cannot conceive them separable from them by any Power whatsoever In these only we are capable of Certain and Universal Knowledge Thus the Ideas of a right lined Triangle necessarily carries with it an Equality of its Angles to two right ones But the coherence and continuity of the Parts of Matter the production of Sensation in us of Colours and Sounds c. by Impulse and Motion being such wherein we can discover no natural Connexion with any Ideas we have we cannot but ascribe them to the arbitrary Will and good Pleasure of the wise Architect The Things that we observe constantly to proceed regularly we may conclude do act by a Law set them but yet by a Law that we know not whereby thô Causes work steadily and effects constantly flow from them yet their Connexions and Dependencies being not discoverable in our Ideas we can have but an experimental Knowledge of them Several Effects come every day within the notice of our Senses of which we have so far Sensitive Knowledge But the Causes Manner and Certainty of their Production we must for the foregoing reasons be content to be ignorant of In these we can go no farther than particular Experience informs us of matter of Fact and by Analogy guess what Effects the like Bodies are upon other Tryals like to produce But as to perfect Science of Natural Bodies not to mention Spiritual Beings we are I think so far from being capable of any such thing that I conclude it lost labour to seek after it The Third cause of Ignorance is our Want of tracing those Ideas we have or may have and finding out those intermediate Ideas which may shew us what Habitude of Agreement or Disagreement they may have one with another and thus many are ignorant of Mathematical Truths for want of application in enquiring examining and by due ways comparing those Ideas Hitherto we have examined the Extent of our Knowledge in respect of the several sorts of Beings that are There is another Extent of it in respect of Universality which will also deserve to be considered and in this regard our Knowledge follows the Nature of our Ideas If the Ideas are Abstract whose Agreement or Disagreement we perceive our Knowledge is Universal For what is known of such general Ideas will be true of every particular thing in which that Essence that is that Abstract Idea is to be found And what is once known of such Ideas will be perpetually and for ever true So that as to all general Knowledge we must search and find it only in our own Minds and it is only the examining of our own Ideas that furnishes us with the Truths belonging to Essences of Things that
of the Relation Sixthly Contrary Testimonies The Mind before it rationally Assents or Dissents to any probable Proposition ought to examine all the Grounds of Probality and see how they make more or less for or against it and upon a due balancing of the whole reject or receive it with a more or less firm Assent according to the Preponderancy of the greater Grounds of Probability on one side or the other CHAP. XVI Of the Degrees of Assent THE Grounds of Probability laid down in the foregoing Chapter as they are the foundations on which our Assent is built so are they also the measure whereby its several Degrees are or ought to be regulated Only we are to take notice that no grounds of Probability operate any farther on the Mind which searches after Truth and endeavours to judge right than they appear at least in the first Judgment or Search that the Mind makes It is indeed in many cases impossible and in most very hard even for those who have admirable Memories to retain all the proofs which upon a due Examination made them embrace that side of the Question It suffices that they have once with Care and Fairness sifted the matter as far as they could and having once found on which side the Probability appeared to them they lay up the Conclusion in their Memories as a Truth they have discovered and for the future remain satisfied with the testimony of their Memories that this is the Opinion that by the proofs they have once seen of it deserves such a Degree of their Assent as they assord it It is unavoidable then that the Memory be relied on in this case and that Men be perswaded of several Opinions whereof the proofs are not actually in their Thoughts nay which perhaps they are not able actually to recall without this the greatest part of Men must be either Scepticks or change every Moment when any one offers them Arguments which for want of Memory they are not presently able to Answer It must be owned that Men's sticking to past Judgments is often the cause of a great Obstinacy in error and mistake But the fault is not that they relye on their Memories for what they have before well judged but because they judged before they had well examined Who almost is there that hath the Leisure Patience and Means to collect together all the proofs concerning most of the Opinions he has so as safely to conclude that he has a clear and full view and that there is no more to be alledged for his better information and yet we are forced to determine our selves on one fide or other The conduct of our Lives and the management of our great Concerns will not bear delay For those depend for the most part on the determination of our Judgment in points wherein we are not capable of certain Knowledge and wherein it is necessary for us to embrace one side or the other The Propositions we receive upon Inducements of Probability are of Two sorts First Concerning some particular Existence or matter of Fact which falling under Observation is capable of Humane Testimony Secondly Concerning Things which being beyond the discovery of our Senses are not capable of Humane Testimony Concerning the First of these viz. Particular matter of Faâ—t First Where any particular Thing consonant to the constant Observation of our selves and others in the like case comes attested with the concurrent Reports of all that mention it we receive it as easily and build as firmly upon it as if it were certain Knowledge Thus if all Englishmen who have occasion to mention it should report that it Froze in England last Winter or the like I think a Man would as little doubt of it as that Seven and four are eleven The First and highest Degree of Probability then is when the general consent of all Men in all Ages as far as can be known concurs with a Man 's own constant Experience in the like cases to confirm the Truth of any particular matter of Fact attested by fair Witnesses Such are the stated Constitutions and Properties of Bodies and the regular proceedings of Causes and Effects in the ordinary course of Nature this we call an Argument from the nature of Things themselves For what we and others always observe to be after the same manner we conclude with Reason to be the Effects of steddy and regular Causes thô they come not within the reach of our Knowledge As that Fire warmed a Man or made Lead fluid that Iron sunk in Water swam in Quick-silver A Relation affirming any such thing to have been or a Predication that it will happen again in the same manner is received without doubt or hesitation and our Belief thus grounded rises to Assurance Secondly The next degree of Probability is when by my own Experience and the Agreement of all others that mention it a Thing is found to be for the most part so and that the particular Instance of it is attested by many and undoubted Witnesses Thus History giving us such an account of Men in all Ages and my own Experience confirming it that most Men prefer their own private Advantage to the Publick If all Historians that write of Tiberius say that he did so it is extreamly probable And in this case our Assent rises to a Degree which we may call Confidence Thirdly In matters happening indifferently as that a Bird should fly this or that way when any particular matter of Fact comes attested by the concurrent Testimony of unsuspected Witnesses there our Assent is also unavoidable Thus that there is in Italy such a City as Rome that about One thousand and seven hundred Years ago there lived such a Man in it as Julius Caesar c. A Man can as little doubt of this and the like as he does of the Being and Actions of his own Acquaintance whereof he himself is a witness Probability on these grounds carries so much Evidence with it that it leaves us as little liberty to Believe or Disbelieve as Demonstration does whether we will know or be ignorant But the difficulty is when Testimonies contradict common Experience and the Reports of Witnesses clash with the ordinary course of Nature or with one another Here Diligence Attention and Exactness is required to form a Right Judgment and to proportion the Assent to the Evidence and Probability of the Thing which rises and falls according as the two Foundations of Credibility Favour or contradict it These are liable to such variety of contrary Observations Circumstances Reports Tempers Designs Over sights c. of Reporters that it is impossible to reduce to precise Rules the various Degrees wherein Men give their Assent This in general may be said That as the Proofs upon due Examination shall to any one appear in a greater or less Degree to Preponderate on either side so they are fitted to produce in the Mind such different Entertainments as are called Belief Conjecture Guess
Doubt Wavering Distrust Disbelief c. It is a Rule generally approved that any Testimony the farther off it is removed from the Original Truth the less Force it has and in Traditional Truths each Remove weakens the force of the Proof There is a Rule quite contrary to this advanced by some Men who look Opinions to gain Force by growing Older Upon this ground Propositions evidently false or doubtful in their first beginning come by an inverted Rule of Probability to pass for Authentick Truths and those which deserved little Credit from the Mouths of their first Relators are thought to grow venerable by Age and are urged as undeniable But certain it is that no Probability can rise above its First Original What has no other Evidence than the single Testimony of one Witness must stand or fall by his only Testimony thô afterwards cited by Hundreds of others and is so far from receiving any Strength thereby that it becomes the weaker Because Passion Interest Inadvertency Mistake of his Meaning and a thousand odd Reasons or Caprichois Mens Minds are acted by may make one Man quote another's Words or Meaning wrong This is certain that what in one Age was affirmed upon slight grounds can never after come to be more valid in future Ages by being often repeated The Second sort of Probability is concerning Things not falling under the reach of our Senses and therefore not capable of Testimony And such are First The Existence Nature and Operations of Finite Immaterial Beings without us as Spirits Angels c. or the Existence of material Beings such as for their smallness or remoteness our Senses cannot take notice of As whether there be any Plants Animals c. in the Planets and other Mansions of the vast Universe Secondly Concerning the manner of Operation in most parts of the works of Nature wherein thô we see the sensible Effects yet their Causes are unknown and we perceive not the ways and manner how they are produced We see Animals are generated nourished and move the Loadstone draws Iron c. but the Causes that operate and the manner they are produced in we can only guess and probably conjecture In these matters Analogy is the only help we have and it is from that alone we draw all our grounds of Probability Thus observing that the bare rubbing of two Bodies violently upon one another produces Heat and very often Fire we have reason to think that what we call Heat and Fire consists in a certain violent agitation of the imperceptible minute Parts of the burning Matter This sort of Probability which is the best conduct of rational Experiments and the rise of Hypotheses has also its use and influence And a wary reasoning from Analogy leads us often into the discovery of Truths and useful Deductions which would otherwise lie concealed Thô the common Experience and the ordinary course of Things have a mighty influence on the Minds of Men to make them give or refuse Credit to any thing proposed to their Belief yet there is one case wherein the strangeness of the Fact lessens not the Assent to a fair Testimony given of it For where such supernatural Events are suitable to Ends aimed at by him who has the power to change the course of Nature there under such Circumstances they may be the fitter to procure Belief by how much the more they are beyond or contrary to ordinary Observation This is the proper case of Miracles which well attested do not only find Credit themselves but give it also to other Truths There are Propositions that challenge the highest degree of our Assent upon bare Testimony whether the Thing proposed Agree or Disagree with common Experience and the ordinary course of Things or no The reason whereof is because the Testimony is of such an one as cannot deceive nor be deceived and that is God himself This carries with it Certainty beyond Doubt Evidence beyond Exception This is called by a peculiar Name Revelation and our Assent to it Faith which has as much Certainty in it as our Knowledge it self and we may as well doubt of our own Being as we can whether any Revelation from God be True So that Faith is a settled and sure Principle of Assent and Assurance and leaves no manner of room for Doubt or Hesitation only we must be sure that it be a Divine Revelation and that we understand it right else we shall expose our selves to all the extravagancy of Enthusiasm and all the error of wrong Principles if we have Faith and Assurance in what is not Divine Revelation CHAP. XVII Of Reason THE word Reason in English has different Significations Sometimes it is taken for True and Clear Principles Sometimes for Clear and Fair Deductions from those Principles Sometimes for the Cause and particularly for the Final Cause but the Consideration I shall have of it here is as it stands for a Faculty whereby Man is supposed to be distinguished from Beasts and wherein it is evident he much surpasses them Reason is necessary both for the enlargement of our Knowledge and regulating our Assent for it hath to do both in Knowledge and Opinion and is necessary and assisting to all our other Intellectual Faculties and indeed contains Two of them viz. First Sagacity whereby it finds intermediate Ideas Secondly Illation whereby it so orders and disposes of them as to discover what connexion there is in each link of the Chain whereby the Extremes are held together and thereby as it were to draw into view the Truth sought for which is that we call Illation or Inference and consists in nothing but the Perception of the Connexion there is between the Ideas in each step of the Deduction whereby the Mind comes to see either the Certain Agreement or Disagreement of any two Ideas as in Demonstration in which it arrives at Knowledge or their probable Connexion on which it gives or with-holds its Assent as in Opinion Sense and Intuition reach but a little way the greatest part of our Knowledge depends upon Deductions and intermediate Ideas In those Cases where we must take Propositions for true without being certain of their being so we have need to find out examine and compare the grounds of their Probability In both Cases the Faculty which finds out the Means and rightly applies them to discover Certainty in the one and Probability in the other is that which we call Reason So that in reason we may consider these Four Degrees First The discovering and finding out of Proofs Secondly The regular and methodical Disposition of them and laying them in such order as their Connexion may be plainly perceived Thirdly The perceiving their Connexion Fourthly The making a right Conclusion There is one thing more which I shall desire to be considered concerning Reason and that is whether Syllogism as is generally thought be the proper instrument of it ant the usefullest way of exercising this Faculty The Causes I have to doubt of
it are these First Because Syllogism serves our Reason but in one only of the fore-mentioned parts of it and that is to shew the Connexion of the proofs of any one Instance and no more but in this it is of no great use since the Mind can perceive such Connexion where it really is as easily nay perhaps better without it We may observe that there are many Men that reason exceeding clear and rightly who know not how to make a Syllogism and I believe scarce any one makes Syllogisms in reasoning within himself Indeed sometimes they may serve to discover a Fallacy hid in a Rhetorical Flourish or by stripping an absurdity of the cover of Wit and good Language shew it in its naked deformity But the Mind is not taught to reason by these Rules It has a native Faculty to perceive the Coherence or Incoherence of its Ideas and can range them right without any such perplexing Repetitions and I think every one will perceive in Mathematical Demonstrations that the Knowledge gained thereby comes shortest and clearest without Syllogism Secondly Because thò Syllogism serves to shew the force or fallacy of an Argument made use of in the usual way of Discoursing by supplying the absent Proposition and so setting it before the view in a clear Light yet it no less engages the Mind in the perplexity of obscure and equivocal Terms wherewith this artificial way of reasoning always abounds it being adapted more to the attaining of victory in Dispute than the discovery or confirmation of Truth in fair Enquiries But however it be in Knowledge I think it is of far less or no use at all in Probabilities For the Assent there being to be determined by the Preponderancy after a due weighing of all the proofs on both sides nothing is so unfit to assist the Mind in that as Syllogism which running away with one assumed Probability pursues that till it has led the Mind quite out of sight of the Thing under Consideration But let it help us as perhaps may be said in convincing Men of their Errors or Mistakes yet still it fails our Reason in that part which if not its highest perfection is yet certainly its hardest Task and that which we must need its help in and that is The finding out of Proofs and making new Discoveries This way of Reasoning discovers no new proofs but is the Art of Marshalling and Ranging the old ones we have already A Man knows first and then he is able to prove Syllogistically so that Syllogism comes after Knowledge and then a Man has little or no need of it But it is chiefly by the finding out those Ideas that shew the Connexion of distant ones that our stock of Knowledge is increased and that useful Arts and Sciences are advanced Reason Thô of a very large Extent fails us in several Instances as First Where our Ideas fail Secondly It is often at a loss because of the Obscurity Confusion or Imperfection of the Ideas it is employed about Thus having no perfect Idea of the least Extension of Matter nor of Infinity we are at a loss about the Divisibility of Matter Thirdly Our Reason is often at a stand because it perceives not those Ideas which would serve to shew the certain or probable Agreement or Disagreement of any two other Ideas Fourthly Our Reason is often engaged in Absurdities and Difficulties by proceeding upon false Principles which being followed lead Men into Contradictions to themselves and inconsistancy in their own Thoughts Fifthly Dubious Words and uncertain Signs often puzzle Mens Reason and bring them to a Non-plus In Reasoning Men ordinarily use Four sorts of Arguments The First is to alledge the Opinions of Men whose Parts Learning Eminency Power or some other Cause has gained a Name and settled their Reputation in the common Esteem with some kind of Authority This may be called Argumentum ad Verecundiam Secondly Another way is to require the Adversary to admit what they alledge as a proof or to assign a better This I call Argumentum ad Ignorantiam A Third way is to press a Man with Consequences drawn from his own Principles or Concessions This is already known under the name of Argumentum ad hominem Fourthly The using of Proofs drawn from any of the foundations of Knowledge or Probability This I call Argumentum ad Judicium This alone of all the Four brings true Instruction with it and advances us in our way to Knowledge For First It argues not another Man's Opinion to be right because I out of respect or any other consideration but that of Conviction will not contradict him Secondly It proves not another Man to be in the right way nor that I ought to take the same with him because I know not a better Thirdly Nor does it follow that another Man is in the right way because he has shewn me that I am in the wrong This may dispose me perhaps for the reception of Truth but helps me not to it that must come from Proofs and Arguments and Light arising from the nature of Things themselves not from my shame facedness Ignorance or Error By what has been said of Reason we may be able to make some guess at the distinction of Things into those that are according to above and contrary to Reason According to Reason are such Propositions whose Truth we can discover by examining and tracing those Ideas we have from Sensation and Reflection and by natural Deduction find to be true or probable Above Reason are such Propositions whose Truth or Probability we cannot by Reason derive from those Principles Contrary to Reason are such Propositions as are inconsistent with or irreconcilable to our clear and distinct Ideas Thus the Existence of one God is according to Reason the Existence of more than one God contrary to Reason the Resurrection of the Body after Death above Reason Above Reason may be also taken in a double Sense viz. Above Probability or Above Certainty In that large Sense also Contrary to Reason is I suppose sometimes taken There is another use of the word Reason wherein it is opposed to Faith which thô authorized by common use yet is it in it self a very improper way of Speaking For Faith is nothing but a firm Assent of the Mind which if it be regulated as is our Duty cannot be afforded to any thing but upon good Reason and so cannot be opposite to it He that believes without having any Reason for believing may be in love with his own Fancies but neither seeks Truth as he ought nor pays the Obedience due to his Maker who would have him use those discerning Faculties he has given him to keep him out of Mistake and Error But since Reason and Faith are by some Men opposed we will so consider them in the following Chapter CHAP XVIII Of Faith and Reason and their distinct Provinces REason as contra-distinguished to Faith I take to be the discovery of the Certainty or