their Identicals And the same may be said of other Qualities that affect our Senses very distinctly as Heat Cold Moist Dry c. Note that in such as these if it be too laborious to arrive at their Definitions by dividing the Common Genus as it often happens when the Dividing Members are more than Two and are not Contradictory to one another then we may frame our Definitions of them by observing the carriage of the Vulgar towards them or their Sayings concerning them For such Qualities being sensible ones are the Objects of the Senses of Mankind and do imprint Lively and Distinct Notions of themselves in all men Wherefore their Sayings being the Effect of the true Notions they have of them they if enow of them be collected must give us the true Notion of them or which is all one of what they mean by the Word that expresses them which is equivalent in Sense to a perfect Definition For example when they speak of those Qualities we call Dry and Moist we shall observe that they are sollicitous lest Moist things should squander and run about and therefore they are careful themselves to put such things in some Receptacle or Vessel that may keep them from doing so or they bid their Servants do it On the Contrary they bid them set Dry things on the Cupboard or on a Shelf and never put them in a Vessel or be at the needless labour of pounding them into a Pot or Tub out of fear they should squander about Which sayings and behaviour of theirs gives us the Definitions of both those Qualities viz. that Moist is that which difficultly keeps its own bounds or Figure and is easily accommodated to the bounds of another thing and Dry is that which easily retains its own bounds or Figure and is Difficulty accommodated to the bounds of another which are the very Definitions which that great Observer of Nature Aristotle gives us of those two Qualities Note II. Whence we may with a humble Acknowledgment and Thanks reflect on the Infinite Goodness of the God of Truth who unenviously bestows knowledge on all who will dispose themselves to receive it that where-ever Art by reason of our Shortness is at a plunge he supplies it by Practical Self-evidence or the naturally instill'd Knowledge of the Vulgar whence it is a high Pride in the greatest Men of Art to conceit that they are above being still the Children of Nature whereas 't is the best Title they have to True and Solid Learning Sus Minervam 8. All Conclusions are virtually in the Premisses For since the Premisses by Means of the Middle Term and the right Placing of it have in them the whole force of the Consequence and the Consequence cannot be of nothing but must be of some Determinate Proposition which can be nothing but the Conclusion it follows that all Conclusions are virtually in the Premisses Again since before we Conclude Determinately and Expresly we must know what to Conclude and we know what to Conclude by knowing the Premisses and the Conclusion is that Proposition which is to be Concluded it follows evidently that since we know the Conclusion e'er we Actually Inferr and Express it to be in the Premisses it is there virtually 9. All Deduced Truths are virtually in one another For since all Deduced Truths are Conclusions and the Conclusions are virtually in the Premisses and the same reason holds for all the following Conclusions as for the first or for one single one it follows that let there be never so many orderly-succeeding Syllogisms necessary to prove any point the Conclusions are still in the Premisses and the following ones in those that went before them 10. All Truths are virtually in the Identical Propositions and consequently in the Definitions For since all Truths are taken from the Nature of the Things and from their Metaphysical verity and consequently are in the Nature of the Thing fundamentally and This is Contain'd and Exprest in the whole by Identical Propositions and in all its parts by the Definitions it follows that all Truths are Virtually contain'd in Identical Propositions and consequently in the Definitions 11. From what 's lately said 't is evinced that if a Middle Term be taken which is a Proper Cause or Proper Effect the Conclusion is seen to be in the Premisses For though the Proper Causes and Effects be not the very Essence of the Thing yet since an Effect is a Participation of the Cause and so is apt to manifest the Nature of the Proper Cause that produced it and the Operation of a Proper Cause is nothing but the Existence of such a Cause which is sutable to its Essence imprinted upon the Patient hence such Mediums do Demonstrably and Mutually inferr one another and therefore nothing hinders but that the Conclusions may be seen to be in the Premisses as well in such Syllogisms as in those which have an Essential Notion for their Middle Term. 12. Hence all Natural Truths and this throughout the whole Course of Nature from the very Creation are virtually in one another For since as will be more clearly seen hereafter all those Natural Effects were Demonstrative of their Proper Causes and those Causes Demonstrative of their proper Effects and this from the First starting of Nature into Motion and so were apt to Inferr one another all along that is new Conclusions were still apt to spring from such Middle Terms Connected with the two Extremes in the Premisses and consequently the Truth of those Conclusions were all along Virtually in those several Premisses it follows that all Natural Truths are in one another and this throughout the whole Series or Course of Nature from the very Creation 13. Hence had we liv'd in every Place and in every part of Time where and when those several Causes wrought those several Effects and had been endowed with Capacity Sufficient for such a performance and not been diverted with other thoughts from Application to that work we might have actually Demonstrated those Effects by their Proper Causes or those Causes by their Proper Effects through the whole Series or Course of the World from the beginning to the end except Miracle had alter'd that Natural Course For in that case all those Subjects had afforded us Matter or fit Mediums for Demonstration as well as any single Subject does now Wherefore if we had had wit enough to demonstrate as aforesaid and that wit sufficiently apply'd in every circumstance it had been done 14. Hence every Soul separated from the Body that knows any one Natural Truth knows all Nature and this all at once at the first Instant of her Separation For since all Nature is carry'd on by Proper Causes and Proper Effects and those Mutually inferr one another that is the Truth grounded on the one is seen to be in the Truth grounded on the other as being Virtually in one another and we experience that the Capacity of the Soul to know Truths is not
casually upon something in the dark or run against it tho' we neither see or know what that thing is or when we see a thing a far off we know that that thing is tho' as yet we know not what it is The Course of Nature is carry'd on by Efficient Cauâ—es and Effects For since a First Cause being suppos'd who is Infinitely Wise he Administâ—rs his workmanship the World after the wisest and best manner which is that the contexture of the whole be not loose and slack but perfectly Coherent nor can this be done among an infinit variety of Bodies by any other means so as to make up the Course of Nature but by making Effects necessarily follow from their Causes since if that were not the Course of Nature would be at a stand and need the Artificers hand at every turn to make it go on which argues an Imperfection in the Workmanship it self it follows that the Course of Nature must be carry'd on by Efficient Causes and Effects 4. The Course of Nature must be câ—â—ry'd on by such Efficient Causes and Effects as 〈◊〉 â—roper to one another For were â—ot â—â—ese â—auses and Effects Proper to one anotheâ— any 〈◊〉 might do any thing or suffâ—r from any thing v. g. Fire might both heat and cool and mâ—iâ—ten and Water might be as combustible as dry Wood and so of all the rest In whiâ—h case no man could tell how to Order his Actions or what Efficient Cause or what Matter rather than another he is to make use of to produce any Effect nor consequentlâ— sinâ—e â—uch Essences are ordain'd for such and such Ends could the Essences or Natures of things be Known or Distinguisht more than in Outward Appearance 5. Hence follows immediately that every such Proper Efficient Cause put to be Actually Causing must most necessarily produce 〈◊〉 Proper Effect For since to Causâ— is 〈◊〉 do and to do nothing is not to do what 〈◊〉 Actually causing must cause something or proâ—uce some Effect Anâ— this Effect must be a Proper one as has been prov'd § 4. 6. All the Efficient Causes in Nature are Actually causing For since the Virtue or Power of working is in the Efficient Cause it self as being nothing but it's Existence and the Matter to be wrought upon is Quantitative that is of it 's own nature either Perfectly or Imperfectly Divisible and Variable innumerable Manners of ways according to it's Qualities nor can it have an Infinite Power of resisting the Efficiency of the least Cause hence it is apt to have an Impression made upon it to some degree by any Quantitative Agent provided there be but Immediate Application of the Agent to the Patient and that it is prâ—st upon it But there being no vacuum immediate Application of one Natural Body to another must needs be throughout all Nature and the Course of Nature consisting in Moâ—ion one Body must necessarily press upon that which is next it From all which it follows evidently that all the Efficient Causes in Nature are Actually Causing 7. From these Discourses 't is evident that we can Demonstrate Proper Effects from Proper Efficient Causes which we call Demonstrating â priori and Proper Efficient Causes from Proper Effects which is call'd Demonstrating à posteriori For since a Cause and a Reason do onely differ in this that the word Cause speaks the thing as it is in Nature and Reason the same thing as 't is in our understanding and Proper Causes and Effects in Nature are necessarily connected to one another and consequently do Infer one another naturally it follows that those Causes and for the same reason Effects as they are in our Vnderstanding must be the Reason why one infers the other in our Understanding Whence follows that thoâ—e Causes and Effects can be uâ—'d as Proper Middle Terms to Infer or Conclude one another And that Proofs made by such Mediums are Demonstrative is clear for no Proof can be more Clear than that which is Grounded on those Notions or Natures being connected Naturally and so Connected that it is Impossible it should be otherwise as 't is shown these are § § 5. and 6. 8. This is farther confirm'd because Two Bodies that are Immediate do Act and Re-act or are in some respect mutually Causes and Effects to one another For since their Existences which is their Power of Acting are immediately Apply'd and by the Course of Nature consisting in Motion prest upon one another and no Natural Agent is of Infinite Power nor consequently can it subdue all the Resistence of the Patient in an Instant it follows that till one of them be by degrees totally subdu'd the Resisting Body must necessarily for the reason given Re-act upon it whence they will be to some degree or in some respect Mutual Causes and Effects in regard of each other Corol. I. The carrying on this Connected Course of Natural Causes is called Providence and as joyn'd with a Course of Supernatural ones Interiour and Exteriour perfecting and streâ—gthening the Will all along to the very end and ripening Souls for Bliss which we call Grace is that which is truly meant by Predestinatioâ— which sounds so terribly and is such â—â—ugbeaâ— to those that mis-understand it Corâ—â— â—I Every Step of this Order of Causes has Entity or Goodness in it For it is manifestly the Causing of Something by Something Corol. â—â—I Therefore 't is directly against the 〈◊〉 of â—â—e First Cause to cause or lay any 〈◊〉 for Sin For Sin formally as such has no kind of Entity or Goodness in it either â—etaphysical Physical or Moral but is formally a meer Privation of some Entity or Goodness which ought to be in an Intelligent Creature whence it comes that by falling-short here in using the Means that Creature falls short hereafter of attaining the End which is only attainable by such Means To explicate which high Points fully is left to Solid Divines I mean such as do not guide themselves by meer Words but by Reason and Good Sense Corol. IV. Hence follows also that were all the Efficient Causes that produce any Effect known to us we could have no Accidental Predications nor consequently any Opinions but the Effect would still be equally Demonstâ—able from the Complexion of those Causes as it is now from some one single Efficient as was hinted formerly Corol. V. Hence to one that comprehends the Complexion of all Causes there could be no Chance nor could such a Man have any Ground for such a Notion For Chance as the common use of the word tells us signifies an Vnseen or Vnforeseen Cause whereas no Cause is Vnseen to him who sees Demonstratively how all Natural Effects follow all along from the Causes and that they cannot but follow from such Causes Corol. VI. Hence tho' we know not particularly the Quid est of this Exact Order of the World or the Course of Nature because we Comprehend not all Causes nor know what Cause or Causes did
less Divisible or rather 't is not so properly Quantity as is the other because it has no Vnity to distinguish it from a mere Confused Multitude of Ones but by means of the Understanding conceiving it to be so many Units terminated by the last yet because Plurality and Paucity are More and Less of any one Determinate Number and that there is a Ground in Nature for our Understanding to consider many Scatter'd Ones and comprehend or bind them together into one Notion and that such Notions are useful or necessary to Mankind therefore this Order'd Multitude of discrete or shatter'd Ones call'd Number is rightly placed in the Predicament of Quantity For t is to be noted that when 't is said Quantity is Divisibilis in semper Divisibilia it was not meant of Quantity in Common or all Quantity but only of that Species of Quantity call'd Continued 4. The Unity proper to Extended Quantity is Continuity of its parts For if the parts of this sort of Quantity be Discontinu'd either Nothing or vacuum comes between them and then they are still Continu'd against the Supposition for Nothing can do nothing and therefore cannot discontinue the Parts of Quantity Or else some Body comes between them and Discontinues them and then since all Bodies bring their own Quantities along with them however the Bodies A. and B. are distanced by C's coming between them because every Body has its determinate bounds and Limits yet the Quantity of those three Bodies precisely consider'd has none but goes on Smoothly in the self same tenour thro' the whole Mass of Body whether those Bodies be Different or the Same without Notches or Nicks butting and bounding it here and there or in the least diversifying it what ever Variety is found in the Figure Colour Hardness Softness or in any other consideration belonging to those Bodies Again since this Species of Quantity has its peculiar Notion Nature or Essence it must have some kind of Vnity too peculiar to it self But none is imaginable except Continuity nor does any so directly subsume under the notion of Quantity which is Divisibility or Vnity of its potential parts or sute so exactly with it Nay were the parts of Quantity discontinu'd quantitatively they would be divided quantitatively that is not Divisible or One that is none or Not-Quantity against the Supposition Therefore the Vnity proper to this Species of Quantity is Continuity of its parts Cor. I. Therefore the Quantity of the whole World is One Vninterrupted Continuity and the World it self speaking of Quantitative Unity One Great Continuum 5. Quantity according to its precise Notion cannot be Essential to Body because it can neither be the Genus of it nor the Intrinsecal Difference that constitutes it as is prov'd above 6. Yet Quantity Materially consider'd and not according to its precise and formal notion of Divisibility may as it were per accidens contribute to the Essence of Individual Bodies For since nothing is truly and perfectly Ens or Capable of Existence but Individuals nor since Thing in common cannot exist can any thing be Capable of Existing but by being ultimately Determinated and thence compleatly fitted to be This or That and this Determination distinguishing one Individuum from all others is perform'd by means of such a particular Complexion of Accidents as fits them for their Primary Operation for which Nature ordain'd them and this Complexion of Accidents is either of Quantity or else as is shewn in Physicks of different modifications of Quantity it follows that Quantity materially consider'd and not according to its Formal notion of Divisibility may as it were by Accident contribute to the Essence of Individual Bodies 7. The Intrinsecal Differences of Quantity are more and less of the Notion of Quantity This is prov'd formerly when we treated of the Division of Substance and the reason given there holds equally here 8. The Proper Species of Quantity mathematically consider'd or as it abstracts from Motion are Longitude Latitude and Profundity otherwise call'd Linea Superficies and Corpus For it is evident that Latitude is another sort of Quantity and has more of that Notion in it than Longitude has and that Profundity is a different sort of Quantity and has in it more of Quantity thus consider'd than either of the other as containing in it self all the three Dimensions 9. Therefore the Intrinsecal Differences of each of these continued Quantities consider'd Mathematically as abstracted from all Order to Motion are Divisibility into greater or into lesser determinate parts For since the Notion of Quantity is Divisibility and Divisibility respects the Parts into which it may be divided and this respect cannot be to Indeterminate parts into which it may be divided they being as Euclid has demonstrated Infinit as well in the greatest as the least Quantities so that they cannot have any differences thus considered wherefore Divisibility into Greater and Lesser parts being the Intrinsecal Differences of all such Quantities in regard that the Greater have more of the Immediate Generical Notion or of that kind of Quantity in them the smaller less of it and Divisibility into parts which are Determinate may bear the Notion of Greater or lesser Divisibility which Divisibility into Potential parts as was said cannot it follows that Divisibility into Greater and Lesser Determinate parts are the Intrinsecal Differences of this kind of Quantity Mathematically consider'd Besides Greater and Lesser bear in their Notions some Proportion between those parts which cannot be conceiv'd unless those Parts be Determinate 10. The Proper and Intrinsecal Differences of Continued Quantity consider'd Physically or in Order to Motion that is Affecting it's subject as apt to be wrought upon by Natural Causes are more or less Divisible or capable to be wrought upon and divided by those Causes This is evident from the very same Reason supposing Intrinsecal Differences to be onely more or less of the immediate common Notion or of the Genus they are to divide 11. The More and Less Divisibility of Continu'd Quantity thus consider'd is to be more easily or less easily wrought upon or divided by Natural Agents For since Quantity thus consider'd does not respect the Parts it contains or may be divided into but the Causes in Nature and their Operation upon its Subject Body it follows that the Notion of its being more or less Divisible as thus consider'd can only mean more or less susceptive of the Efficiency of Natural Causes that is more easily or less easily Divisible by the said Causes which is to be Rare and Dense 12. The Division of Continu'd Quantity into Permanent and Successive is made by Accidental Differences and not by Essential ones as were the former Divisions of it For since to move and to stand still are Accidental to Quantity and have no respect to that Generical Notion as more and less of it as had the other Differences above mentioned it follows that these Differences are Accidental to their Generical
't is evident that Rarefaction and Condensation import no more in their Notion but the altering the Subject according to some Quality whereas Division imports directly the taking away the Vnity of the Thing and consequently its Entity Again meer Rarefaction does not change the Substance but the Degree of it when it comes to great height and every Body admits Rarefaction a long time without losing its former Essence whereas Division consists in an Indivisible so that the Divisum esse is esse aliud or esse duo ex uno whereas the Rarefactum esse may be without any such Effect following it 5. Rarefaction and Condensation are the next Actions in Dignity For since as was proved above Rarity and Density are the First Intrinsecal Differences of Quantity as it affects Body in order to natural Action and Passion it follows that those natural Actions that cause Rarity or Density are the next in dignity to Division which works more upon Divisibility their Genus 6. These three sorts of Action take up the whole Head of Natural Action For since the Genus and its two Differences must needs comprehend all under any common Head as being Adequate to it and Division answers to Divisibility the Genus and Rarefaction and Condensation to the Intrinsecal Differences of more or less thus Divisible it follows that these three sorts of Action do take up all that Head so that there cannot be any kind of Natural Action which is not reducible to some of these or not comprehended under them Besides all the First and Second Passible Qualities which generally are the Immediate Objects of Natural Actions are comprehended in or spring out of Rarity and Density as will be seen in Physicks 7. The Formal Virtue of Acting or working any Effect which we call its Causality is the Agent 's being what it is or its very Existence apply'd by Motion to the Patient and Communicated to it or as it were imprinted on it For since no particular Agent in Nature can do every thing whatever the reason why such particular Causes work such particular Effects must spring hence that the Effect has something in its Nature that is like the Cause comes from it and is Communicated to the Patient or partak'd by it Whence come those Vulgar Axioms Operari sequitur esse Every thing acts as it is An Effect is a participation of the immediate Caâ—se c. Thus the Cause or Reason why Water moistens is because it is moist in it self and imparts that Quality to another thing The reason why a Seal makes such an Impression is because it self is of such a stamp The reason why God Creates or is the Cause of Being is because Being is Essential to him Corol. II. Hence Motion is only requisit to apply the Virtue or Existence of the Agent to the Matter or Patient but the Substance of the Effect springs from the Cause's being what it is Whence it happens that the Effect from the same Causes is more or less perfect according as the Existence of a Cause which is of such a Nature or Essence or more or fewer parts of it are apply'd better or worse to the Patient or to more or fewer parts of it by a feebler or smarter Motion 8. It follows from this discourse that there must be Four Sorts of Causes necessarily belonging to every Effect in Nature viz. There must be an Acter which we call the Efficient Cause a Subject for the Acter to work upon called the Material Cause The Effect wrought in that Matter or Receiv'd in it which makes it otherwise than it was before and therefore has the Notion of some Form newly accruing to it which constitutes the Formal Cause And since Corporeal Action is Motion and no Body can move it self and therefore all Motion in Nature must be caus'd either Mediately or Immediately by something that is not a Body that is by a Spiritual or Intelligent Being and such Agents do design or act for an End therefore there must also be a Final Cause to make those Agents to move Bodies and make them act as they do in every particular Action tho' never so minute which grounds our Notion of Providence adequately Governing the World even as to the least circumstance of it Wherefore there are to every Action in Nature Four Causes necessarily requisit which will afford Reflecters ample occasion for Speculation and Contemplation For example When I write a Letter the Efficient Cause is my Self the Material Cause Paper which receives the Effect of my Writing The Formal Cause the Characters received in the Paper the Final Cause to gratify my Friend treat of Business or acquaint him with News 9. There is no Fifth Cause call'd an Idea as Plato affirms For either that Idea is conceiv'd as introduced in the matter and Receiv'd there and then 't is clearly a Formal Cause or as 't is in the Mind of the Artificer and then it concurrs to make him an Efficient Cause for without such an Idea he could not produce such an Artificial Effect 10. Operation has not the same Notion with Action but is Indifferent to Action and Passion or rather a kind of Neutral Notion made up of both For example Notions or Simple Apprehensions are said to be the First Operation of our Understanding tho' the Soul in having them is purely Passive So also my Acts of Discoursing Willing c. are call'd Operations tho' they be both perform'd by my Soul and Receiv'd in it Whence they have a kind of Neutral Notion such as have Curro ardeo and such-like taking such words not in a Grammatical but in a Philosophical and Natural Sense Of which kind are all Immanent Actions or Acts And therefore these are not so properly call'd Actions as Operations in order to what they have of Effective in them or else Acts because they Actuate or Inform the Subject in which they are as well Received as they are Produced by it Whence Action in the Proper and Obvious Sense signifies the Efficience of a Natural Cause which has a Transitive Notion and inferrs Passion and consequently some Effect in the Extrinsecal Subject it lights on Note That since Action inferrs Passion and referrs to it hence whatever is discoursed here of Action may by turning the Tables as it were or considering Motion in order to its other Term be understood likewise of Passion for which reason we treat of both those Heads in the same Discourse LESSON IX Of the Common Head of Ubi or Where 1. UBI or Where signifying in what Place the Notion of Place must first be rightly understood e're we can have a right Notion of the Common Head call'd Ubi And the word Place being no Artificial Term but a Natural one and us'd by all Mankind we are to learn the true and proper meaning of it from the Users of it that is we must take the Notion of Place not from men of Art or Speculaters but from the Vulgar
but must be made so by Proof Yet since all Deduction or Proof is made by Connexion of Notions and those Notions or what corresponds to them must be Connected in the Thing e're they can be so in our Understanding and Properties are more nearly ally'd to the Essence than other Accidents as resulting necessarily from it or being immediately Connected with it hence they are by consequence most easily Proveable to belong truly to the Thing and therefore very fit to be made use of in Demonstrations 14. Of this sort are all Propositions whose Predicates are Proper Causes and Effects and more immediately the Powers or Virtues by which they Act on others or Suffer from others as will be seen when we come to treat of Demonstration 15. Propositions whose Predicates belong to the last Predicable are utterly Inevident and as such not easily Evidenceable For since as was shewn above such Predicates do belong to the Subject but by chance or as their very name imports by Accident and Chance signifies a Cause which we do not see or know it follows that the Connexion of such Predicates with the Subject can never be known by Reason or prov'd that they must belong to it because we can never know alâ— the Causes that concur'd to make them belong to it Wherefore such Propositions are utterly Inevident nor as they are Accidents or Unconnected with the Essence easily Evidenceable by way of Reason that they must belong to them however they may be known to belong actually to them hic nunc by Sense or Experience Such Predicates are mostly those of the six last Predicaments and many Quantities Qualities and Relations 16. Notwithstanding those Propositions which have such Accidental Predicates were all the Causes by which they hap to belong to the Subject perfectly known might be perfectly Evident and Demonstrable For as we can Demonstrate one Effect that needs but one Cause to put it from that single Cause so did we know all the Causes that concur'd to any Effect which is brought about by many Causes we could certainly conclude and know such an Effect would follow in which case the Predicate would be no longer an Accident but the Proper Effect of that Complex of Causes nor would the Proposition it self be any longer meerly Accidental Corol. VI. Hence there is nothing Contingent or Accidental to God but all Events tho' never so minute or so odd are Equally Certain to him as the most Immediate Effect of the most Proper and most Necessary Causes because he lays and comprehends the whole Series of Causes that concur to bring about every least Effect LESSON IV. Of the Generating of Knowledge in us and of the Method how this is perform'd HItherto of Knowledges or Judgments according to their Dependence on one another and their being Resolv'd Artificially into First Principles Our next task is to consider them according to the Order they are instill'd into us Naturally 1. The Soul or the Understanding is at first void of all kind of Knowledge or Rasa Tabula For since the Author of Nature does nothing in vain nor acts needlesly he puts no Effects immediately or without Second Causes when there are Causes laid by him to produce them and since we experience that Causes are laid by Him apt to imprint Notions in us and that the Nature of our Soul being evidently Comparative we can compare those Notions and can see how they Agree or Disagree which is to know Hence in case the Soul had any Notions or Knowledges infus'd into her otherwisâ— than by those Causes it would frustrate and make void that Course of natural Agents which is apt to beget Knowledge in us and make Nature contradict her self Again since we experience that we know no more than we have Notions of and that we can compare those Notions and can know all things we have Notions of and do thus rightly Compare and that both those effects do follow naturally from the Impressions of Objects and from the nature of the Soul it falls into the same Absurdity to affirm that those Causes do only Excite and not Beget Knowledge in us Lastly the contrary Opinion supposes the Soul to be an Ens before the Body or at least distinct from it and then 't is both Unconceivable and Inexplicable how they can ever come to be Vnited so as to compound one Ens. For this cannot be done Quantitatively as is evident nor by their Acting together as the Cartesians hold both because all Action presupposes the Being of a thing whence they must be one Ens before they can Act as one Ens as also because the Line or predicament of Action is distinct from that of Ens and Extrinsecal to it and so cannot Intrinsecally constitute those Joynt-Acters One Ens or Thing Nor can it be conceiv'd that the Body if it be not one Ens with the Soul can act with it otherwise than as its Instrument and it would be most Absurd to say that my Hand and Pen are oâ—e thing because they jointly concurr in their different ways to the Action of Writing Wherefore the Soul has no Antecedent Knowledge but is a Rasa Tabula capable to receive such Impressions as beget Knowledge in her 2. The First Judgment in order of Nature the Soul has is that its self or the Man exists For since as was shewn the First Notions the Soul has are of the Man himself and of his Existence and all Judgmenâ—s are made by Compounding or Comparing of Notions it follows that the most Obvious most Easie most Natural and consequently the First Judgment in priority of Nature that a Man has when he is ripe to judge is that Himselâ— is or I am 3. The next Judgment is that He is struck or affected by some Object without him for since the Course of Nature is Motion and therefore Objects are continually moving where the Man is and so do light and act on his Senses that is do work Experimental Knowledge in him that he is acted upon or struck by them it follows that he must after he comes to frame Judgments necessarily and frequently know and consequently Judge he is struck Nor can this be the first Judgment both for the Reason lately given Sect. 2. as also because in this Proposition I am struck the Proposition I am is most Simple and manifestly antecedes I am struck the Notion of struck being clearly superadded to it 4. The next Knowledge or next Judgment to the former in order of Nature is I am struck thus or Affected after such a manner For the Notion of I am struck is more Simple and so antecedes I am struck thus which superadds to it Whence this proposition is prov'd by the same reason that was brought for the third Section 5. These Judgments had we are furnish'd by Nature with Means of Knowing in some measure the Distinct Natures of all things that affect us For since we get all our Notions
fill'd by knowing many Truths but is Enlarged and Enabled to know still more and being clear of the Body she is not distracted by Objects working upon the Senses and the Fancy but intimately and necessarily present to her self and consequently to what is in her self and so is Addicted Apply'd and Naturally Necessitated to know the Nature of her Body and consequently of her self as being the Form of that Body and fitted for it and by her self to know all the Truths Connected with the Knowledge of her self that is as was shown all Nature and this not Successively one Truth after another as she did when she was in the Body and needed the Fancy and so accommodated her manner of working to its slow pace but being now a Pure Spirit and Indivisible and so not commensurable to Time or to before and after which are the Differences of Time she is to know all she could know in the first instant she was a Pure Spirit that is at the Instant of her Separation These things being evidently so it follows that every Soul separated from the Body that knew any one Natural Truth knows all Nature and this all at once in the first instant of her Separation But of this more hereafter Corol. I. Hence we may frame some imperfect Conception how our Science differs from that of Angels and how Angels must know things Intuitively For since they have no Senses they can have no Abstracted Notions by different Impressions from the Objects on the Senses nor consequently can they Compound any two Notions to frame a Proposition much less can they Discourse or Compare Two Notions to a Third and so deduce thence New Knowledges call'd Conclusions It is left therefore that they must a tone view comprehend entirely the Metaphysical verity of the whole Thing and all that is in it which we express by an Identical Proposition Whence this Knowledge or Intuition of theirs abating the Composition found in an Identical Proposition which too is the least that is Imaginable is the nearest a-kin to that which we have of these Identicals By which we see that the Supremum Infimi in respect of an Angel's and Man's manner of Knowledge is as the Order of Entities requires contiguous as it were to that which is Superiour to it Corol. II. Hence also is seen how a Separated Soul knows all things after a different manner than Angels do For though the Substance of a Separated Soul's Operation be Intuitive as is the Angels yet because her natural Genius led and forced her here to dâ—scourse and gather one Truth by another that is to see one Truth in another hence she retains a modification or a kind of tang of the Discoursiveness she had here though she cannot in that State exercise it and that though she cannot then actually deduce new Truths yet she sees all Truths as Deducible from one another or following one another by Consequence We may frame some imperfect conception how this passes by this course Similitude When we look upon a Picture call'd a Prospective all the parts of it are equally near our Eye in themselves and we see them too all at once yet they appear to us as if one of them were farther of than another even to a vast distance observing still a perfect Order and decorum in their greater Propinquity or Remoteness according as those parts are more or less Shadowed or Luminous So the Soul knows all at once whatever is Knowable by her and they are equally near the Eye of her understanding yet because of her acquiring them here by way of Discourse that is by proceeding from more-Clear to less Clear Truths she sees them as following one another or as it were beyond one another because they were not to her in this state so clear as the other in themselves but depending on the others for their Evidence LESSON V. Of other Mediums for Demonstration taken from the Four Causes 1. THere must necessarily be Four Causes concurring to every Effect in Nature For since Nothing can do Nothing it follows that Nothing can be Done unless there be something that Does or Acts that is unless there be an Efficient Cause Which Efficient must act upon something or some Patient which is the Matter on which it works or the Material Cause And it must work something in that Matter which being Received in it must be some Form either Substantial or Accidental which must consequently concurr to that Action Formally or be the Formal Cause of it And since the Orderer of all Nature or the First Cause is an Intelligent Being and not Blind Chance for whà t's Blind can Order nothing and this First Cause is the Adequate Governour of the World and being an Intelligent Being acts Seeingly or with design that is with prospect of some End in every thing that is done how great or minute soever and eâ—ery Intelligent Creature that administers the World in their several Stations under him whâ—â—her they be Angels or Men do for the same reason act Designingly too that is do propose to themselves some end Good Reason or Moâ—ive for which they Act and without â—hich 't is against their Nature to Act and since Metaphysicks do clearly Demonstrate that the Immediate action of the First Cause is only to give Being and * the Oeconomy of the World is administred Immediately by other Intelligent Beings under him hence there must be a Final cause too for every Effect that is done in the World how small and inconsiderable soever it may seem Wherefore there must necessarily be Four Causes concurring to evâ—ry Effect in Nature viz. The Efficient Maâ—â—rial Formal and Final For Example in my Action of Writing a Letter the Efficient Cause is my self the Material Cause is the Paper the Formal the Characters drawn in the Paper and the Final to gratify my friend acquaint him with News c. 2. Hence we can demonstrate the An est of those Four Causes in the whole Mass of Corporeal Nature how Remote soever it is from us and that they must concur to every Effect tho' we do not know the Quid est of them The first part of our Thesis is proved For since the An est of all those Causes or that there must be such four Causes necessarily concurring to every Effect follows out of the nature of Action from the Subjectâ—s being Quantitative and consequently variable Substantially or Accidentally and from the Supreme Agent 's being Intelligent and these are equally found in all parts of the Universe how Remote soever they be or in the whole Mass of Bodies it follows that the same Causes do concur to every Effect all over the World as they do in those Bodies near us and with whose Operations we are acquainted The Second part is evident since the knowledg of the An est or that there is something may it be known by Experience tho' we know not what that thing is as we experience when we hit
a stand or non-plust to find a Reason for the thing it admires whence it inferrs demonstratively a Power of Reasoning capable to act or exercise it self in other things Of this kind are all Passive Properties which are quarto modo as the Schools Phrase is or properly such For these springing necessarily or immediatly out of the Essence are by consequence Naturally Connected with it and the Essence with them whence they are Proper Mediums to inferr demonstratively such an Essence à Posteriori and the Essence a fit Medium to demonstrate them à priori 12. That Demonstrations may be taken from the Formal Cause or from the Subject as 't is Formally and Essentially such has been shewn above Lesson 3. §§ 7. and 8. where it was manifested that the Middle Notions in the Gradual Line giving us the parts that were included in the Definition are Proper Middle Terms to connect demonstratively the Inferiour and Superiour Notions 13. The Causality of the Final cause consiststing in this that it moves the Efficient to act this Cause can have no place but in Intelligent Beings This is Evident because only such can know an End or consequently aim at it or work for it Corol. II. Wherefore when 't is said that such an Effect v. g. the following of water in a Pump happens in Nature ne detur vacuum that Nature flies from or abhors vacuum that as Aristotle acutely speculated Entia nolunt malè gubernari and such like the true Meaning of those Sayings can only be this that 't is highly against the Nature of the First Intelligent Being who created the World and of the Inferior ones Angels who manage it under him that Ground should be laid in Nature for a Contradiction to be True or that the Course of Nature should be contriv'd in a bad method or carry'd on after an absurd manner Corol. XII Hence these sayings thus rightly understood have in them the force of a Nobler and more Solid Demonstration from the Final Cause than can be taken from any Corporeal Efficients and Effects though they be never so Proper to one another For these Sayings engage the Nature of the Supreme Cause and of the Noblest causes under him and which had they not Rectitude in their Understandings Wills and Operations all Nature would be wrong and ground or beget in us nothing but Error The Demonstration stands thus The Immediate End of those Causes is that the World should be Order'd Wisely that is so as that thâ— Things should be a Ground for Truth therefore 't is most highly Impossible there can be any Ground for a Contradiction in Things which the First Cause did make and the others do manage But were there a vacuum there would be Ground for a Contradiction Ergo c. Corol. XIII Hence we may with pity remark the Ignorance Folly or rather Phrenzy of those gross Speculators who by allowing nothing but the Course of Nature are forcâ—d by their Impious and Foolish Tenet to speak of Insensible things as if they were Intelligent 'T is something pardonable in Lovers when they speak to Trees Rivers and Mountains to vent the Passion that be-mads them but 't is shameful in Pretenders to Philosophy who are to reduce Natural Effects to their Causes and to speak of both literally as they are Yet such and so apply'd must be the Common language of meer Naturalists who look no higher than Matter and talk of Great Nature or the Soul of the World and such windy whimsies Ordering things thus and thus that is Designing an End Hating and Abhorring this thing Affecting another Which yet all the while they deny to be Intelligent things lest they should grant a First Being making Nature and Spiritual Second Causes carrying on the Course of it and Moving it regularly Nor Matters it that we had now and than to use the same Language for we do acknowledge it to be Improper and can reduce it to a Litteral Sense agreeing to the Natures of those things manag'd by such Governors which these Men cannot 14. There can be no Final Cause in respect to GOD. For End and Good being the same and GOD being Infinitely Perfect and Infinitely Happy in Himself there can no Good accrue to him from any thing out of himself or from Creatures and so they cannot have the Notion of an End in respect to him Wherefore when it is said that GOD aims at the Good of his Creatures or that to Govern the World wisely is his End the meaning of these words is only this that he acts as becomes his Wisdom or his Wisdom being his Essence he acts as he is 15. Speaking of Mankind we can demonstrate some Acts of his Will from the Final Cause supposed and a Final Cause from the supposed Acts of his Will For since the Will is a Power and all Powers are specify'd or have their particular Essence from the respect they have to such or such Objects and the Object of the Will is an Appearing Good it follows that it is Essential to the Will to act for an Appearing Good Wherefore if we can demonstrate as we may often that such a particular Object must all things consider'd appear a Good to a Man in such circumstances it will both follow â priori that if his Will acts it is for an Appearing Good and also â posteriori that if there be an Appearing Good there will follow an Act of his Will The Proof of both is plain For since the Will is a Power to Act for an Appearing Good if it did not in due circumstance act for it it would follow that the Will is not a Will or else it must follow that an Appearing Good is not the Object of the Will Whence since it can have no other Object Imaginable it would follow again that the Will is no Power and consequently no Will. Nor does this take away the Liberty of the Will which is exercis'd in Chusing one out of many but establisheth the Essence of it Corol. 14. Hence the most easie and most connaturall way to manage or treat with Mankind is to make that which you would bring them to do appear to be their Good for then they will be sure to obey And if either thro' Perversness or Delusion by others they will not be brought to see that which is for the Common Good to be their own there is no way left but to Over-awe them with fear that so at least it may appear to them a Good to avoid Punishment LESSON VI. Several Instances of Demonstration 1. THE Method of Demonstrating is two-fold the One Is perform'd by Exact Syllogisms in right Mood and Figure The other by laying first certain Maxims Axioms or Pestulatums and then proving the Theses by the Concatenation of many Propositions orderly succeeding one another which is the way Euclid takes For this later way may be full as solid as the other tho' it looks not so Artificially provided it's several Consequences
Indivisible added to Another can make Quantity but la All Infinit Number of Indivisibles Consists of or is One Indivisible added to Another Therefore rent-No Infinit Number of Indivisibles can make Quantity 10. The Minor is Evident for all Number tho' Infinit consists of Ones that is of One added to another Add that 't is demonstrated above that all Infinit Number is Impossible Proposition III. If any two parts of Quantity be Actually distinct All the parts must be Actually distinct also Bar-What ever springs out of the precise nature of Quantity must be equally found where ever there is Quantity or throughout all the parts of Quantity by Axiom 3 d. But ba-All Actual Distinction of the parts of Quantity if put in any two springs out of the precise Notion of Quantity therefore ra-All Actual Distinction of the parts of Quantity if put in any two must be equally found wherever there is Quantity or throughout all the parts of Quantity 11. The Minor is proved for all Unity and Distinction in any Line follows out of the Entity to which it is peculiar that is in our case out of the Entity or Essence of Quantity Again this Actual Distinction of Quantitative parts cannot spring from Substance for this has no Distinction of parts but that of Matter and Form Nor out of any other Line for all those do presuppose Quantity and spring from it as the Primary Affection of Body therefore if any two parts of Quantity be actually Distinct that Distinction must proceed from the Nature of Quantity it self 12. Now that all the parts of Quantity should be Actually Distinct destroys the Nature of Quantity and is Contradictory is thus proved Da-Whatever makes Quantity consist of Infinit Indivisibles contradicts the Nature of Quantity But ri-That Position which makes all the parts of Quantity Actually Distinct makes Quantity consist of Infinit Indivisibles therefore i-That Position which makes all the parts of Quantity actually Distinct contradicts the nature of Quantity 13. The Minor is Evident For those things which are Actually Distinct quantitatively may be Divided quantitatively or rather are already so as those which are Actually Distinct in the Line of Substance are Distinct Substances or Distinct things in that Line Wherefore since the Nature of such a Subject as they put Quantity to be does bear it let us suppose Quantity divided into all it's Actual parts it can be divided into that is into All they being all of them suppos'd Actually Distinct it is manifest there could remain only Infinit Indivisibles They must be Indivisible because it is supposed to be Divided into all it could be Divided into and they must be Infinit for Divisibility that is but Finite would contradict Euclid's Clear and most Approved Demonstration Besides it would follow hence that if all the parts of Quantity were Actually Distinct each of them must be Determinate in the line of Quantity Wherefore they being also Infinit in Number for a Finite Number of parts makes Quantity not to be Divisible Infinitly against Euclid's Demonstration it would follow that each least Quantity would be of Infinit Extension for the least Determinate Quantity Infinit times repeated makes an Infinit Extension 14. Hence is evinced our Main Demonstration that since Continu'd Quantity is neither compounded of a Finit nor of an Infinit Number of Indivisibles nor of Actual parts it is made up of Potential parts that is there is but One Actual Whole in the Line of Quantity and this Whole is Divisible without end Corol. I. Hence is farther demonstrated the Unity of the whole World as to it's Quantity or which is the same the Continuity of the whole imaginable Mass of Body Corol. II. Hence is demonstrated likewise that all Vacuum and Epicurus's Scheme of Plenum and Vacuum are Contradictory As likewise that there cannot possibly be more Worlds than One the very Nature of Quantity being but One whole Divisible still into its Potential parts or parts still farther Divisible Thesis III. 15. Successive Quantity or Motion and consequently the Course of Nature could not have been ab Aeterno but must have had a Beginning Demonstration IV. Bar-All Infinit Motion or Time is Impossible but ba-All Duration of Motion ab Aeterno must have been for an Infinit Time therefore ra-All Duration of Motion ab aeterno is Impossible The Minor is Self-evident The Major is thus prov'd Bar-All Infinit Time must be an Infinit Number of Determinate Parts of Time v. g. Infinit Hours but ba-All Infinit Number of the Determinate parts of Time is Impossible Therefore ra-All Infinit Time is Impossible 16. The Major is clearly Evident for were the Number of the Determinate parts of Time Finite then all the Parts which are equivalent to the Whole being Finite the Whole must likewise be Finite The Minor is prov'd above Demonstration 1. and 2. where it was demonstrated that all Infinit Number is Impossible 17. Whence is Demonstrated our main Thesis that Time Motion or the Course of Nature had a beginning Whence many useful Conclusions may be drawn against Heathens and Atheists Note that 't is the same as to our Argument whether there be an Infinit Number of parts of Time which are Actually Determin'd and Measur'd or no 't is sufficient the Subject Infinit Motion or Infinit Time bears the having such a Determination made by having that in it which corresponds to all those Infinit Determinate parts for this necessarily induces and enforces a Contradiction Thesis IV. There are Spiritual Beings which we call Angels Demonstration V. Axiom 1. What acts is 2. Every thing acts as it is and à fortiori cannot act directly contrary to what it is especially as an Immediate Agent 3. Motion is Change 4. There are no Created Beings but either Divisible or Indivisible ones that is Body or Spirit 5. The First Being is Essentially Vnchangeable Da-Whatever must be the Immediate Cause of some Effect acts and consequently is but ri-An Angel must be the Immediate Cause of some Effect viz. of the First Motion in Nature therefore i-An Angel acts and consequently is The Minor is thus prov'd Da-Every Effect that can neither be caused Immediatâ—ly by the First Cause noâ— by a Body must have been caus'd immediatly by a Created Spirit or an Angel But ri-The First Motion in Nature is an Effect which could not have been caus'd Immediatly by the First Cause nor by a Body Therefore i-The first Motion in Nature must have been caus'd Immediatly by an Angel and consequently an Angel acts is The former part of thâ— Minor viz. that the first Motion could not be caus'd immediately by the First Cause is thus demonstrated 19. Fe-No being that is Essentially Vnchangeable and whose Nature is directly contrary to the Nature of Change can be the Immediate Cause o Change or Motion nor consequently of the First Motion in Nature but ri-The First Being is Essentially Vnchangeable and his Nature is directly
contrary to the Nature of Change or Motion therefore i-The First Being cannot be the Immediate Cause of Motion or Change nor consequently of the First Motion in Nature 20. The latter part of the former Minor viz. that a Body could not have been the Immediate Cause of the First Motion in Nature is thus prov'd Ce-Nothing that antecedently to the First Motion was not-Moving or in Rest could have been the Immediate Cause of the First Motion in Nature but la-Every Body antecedently to the First Motion in Nature was not-Moving or in Rest therefore rent-No Body could have been the Immediate Cause of the First Motion in Nature Note that this Demonstration supposes a First Motion in Nature which was prov'd Demonstration 4. LESSON VII Other Instances of Demonstration Thesis V. THere is a First Self-Existent Being or a Deity Demonstration VI. Proposition I. The Notion or Nature of Ens and of Existent in Creatures and consequently of Essence and Existence are Distinct. Da-Every Notion of which Existent and not-existent may be truly predicated is Different from the Notion of Existent But ri-The Notion of Ens in its First and Proper Signification taken for an Individual Substance is a Notion of which Existent and not-existent may be predicated therefore i The Notion of Ens thus understood is dâ—fferent from the Notion of Existent and consequently the Notions of Essence and Existence are also Distinct. 2. The Minor is Evident For we can truly say that Petrus est while he is Living and as truly say of the same Peter that Fuit or non-est when he is Dead 3. The Major is no less Evident For when we say Petrus est or Peter is Existent were the notion of the Predicate Existent the same with Peter the Subject the Proposition would be in sense formally Identical and the same as 't is to say what 's Existent is Existent Wherefore when we say Petrus non est or Peter is not-Existent Peter Signifying the same as Existent it would be the same as if we said what 's Existent is not Existent which is a Contradiction Proposition II. 4. The Notion of Ens Abstracts from Existence or is Indifferent to it and to Non-existence This needs no farther Proof For in the two Propositions lately mention'd Existent and not Existent are truly predicated of the same Ens viz. Peter which could not be unless the Subject Peter did Abstract from both or were Indifferent to both Besides all the Words which we use to express the Notions or Natures of any Created Ens whatever do so perfectly Abstract from Existence that it is neither Exprest Imply'd nor in the least Hinted in them as appears in the words Lapis Quercus Bucephalus Petrus Raphael which give us not the least light or intimation that they are Existent or not-Existent Proposition III. 5. Were there any Inclination in Created Entities to one more than to the other it seems to be rather to Not-being than to Being For since Peter even tho' possest of Actual Being is still no less capable of Not-being it seems as if he had a particular Natural Tendency to Not-being because tho' supported Formally as it were by it's Opposit Actual Existence he is notwithstanding no less a Capacity of Not-existing his Original nothingness being so radicated in his Nature as he is a Creature that it sticks to it and inclines him to it even while he is Proposition IV. 6. Existence is no ways Intrinsical to any Created Ens either Essentially or as an Affection springing out of it's Essence This has been demonstrated Prop. 2 d. and 3 d. Because Every nature requires all it's Intrinsicals and what follows out of them or is Connected with them and is not Indifferent to have them or not have them as Ens is to have or not have Existence Proposition V. 7. All Created things have their Existence from something that is Extrinsical to them For whatever has any thing and not from it's self or from it's own Intrinsical Nature must have it from Another or from something that is Extrinsical to it there being no Third sort of Cause imaginable which is neither Intrinsical nor Extrinsical that is which is neither it's self nor Another Proposition VI. 8. No Created Ens can give Existence to another For tho' as was shown formerly the virtue by which the Ens operates be the Existence of that Ens yet it can work no otherwise than as the Thing it self is or according to the Nature of the Thing which has that Existence whose Nature it actually Imprints as it were on the Subject as we find in Fire heating in Water moistning and in the whole Line of Universal Causality Again since the whole Line of Causality also bears that no Cause can act unless it be first Determin'd and as it were Appropriated to work such an Effect whence come those establisht Maxims that the Course of Nature is carry'd on by Proper Causes to Proper Effects and Ex indifferente nihil sequitur Therefore seeing Prop. 2. The Created Ens to which such an Existence belongs and consequently the Nature or Essence of that Ens Abstracts from all Existence and is perfectly Indifferent even to it 's own and much more to the Existence of any other Ens it follows demonstratively that no Created Ens can give Existence to another or be the Proper Cause of it Therefore Proposition VII 9. There must be some Vncreated Cause that gives Existence to all Created Entities This is already Evident since no Created Entity can have it's Existence either from it's own Intrinsical Nature or from any other Creature Proposition VIII 10. This Vncreated Cause of all Existence must be Self-Existent that is his Essence must be his Existence For were his Essence Indifferent to Existence or Existence Accidental to him and not Essential he would need Another Cause to give him Existence for the same reason Creatures do and so He would not be Vncreated Therefore there is a First Self-existent Being or a DEITY Corol. III. Hence it is seen that all that Created Causes operate upon Entities grown to maturity is to dispose to the not being of the things they work upon by Altering the Matter so that out of those Alterations brought to such a point the Body ceases to be any longer of such a Nature or Kind and consequently loses it's Existence At which Instant the Providence of the First Being so Orders his World that those Determinations of Matter which were Inconsistent with the Former Ens should be Proper for the New Ens that is to succeed to which in the very First Instant the other ceases to be and this new one is Ultimately Determin'd to be this He by his Bountiful and Steady Emanation of Being gives it such a peculiar Existence as is Commensurated and Proper to it's Essence Thesis VI. An Angel cannot undergo any Change after the First Instant of it's Being Demonstration VII Axiom 1. If Agent and Patient be perfectly fitted
nor in what their more than Adamantin Hardness consists nor how the Potential parts of these Atomes do come to have such an insuperably-Firm Coherence Nor yet does Cartesius explicate to us of what Nature his First Mass of Matter is what Degree of Consistency or Density it has and if any as it must have some or oâ—her why it was to be of that Density or in what that Density consists Which shows that neither of them regarded or minded the Intrinsecal Nature of their First Matter tho' this must needs have had great Influence on the Oeconomy of the World and have afforded us much Light to know the Constitution and Temper of Natural Bodies and consequently of their Proper Causes and Effects as also of many Intrinsecal Modifications of them highly conducing to give account of and explicate the Operations of Natural Agents The only thing they seem to have regarded was the Extension of their First Matter and the Motion Figure and Situation of it's parts which are Extrinsical or Common Considerations but to give any account of what Intrinsecal or Essential Nature that Matter was they are perfectly silent They suppose it to be but they do not so much as Suppose it to be of such or such an Intrinsical Nature which yet they must be bound to do since all Extrinsical respects came by Motion which was not yet begun Or if Epicurus does by making his Atomes Infractil 't is both said gratis and besides he gives us no Account in what that Quality of Indissoluble Hardness consists or how it is to be Explicated 11. Hence the Peripateticks alledge that however the Authors of those Sects are men of Great Wits and strong Brains for 't is not a Task for Ordinary Capacities to undertake a Design that fathoms and comprehends all Nature yet they can never begin with Evident Categorical Propositions and First Principles or carry on their Discourses so as to bear the Test of True Logick but either their Principles must be far from Self-evident and must need Proof which is against the nature of First Principles or else their Consequences must be Loose and Slack And the only way to refute this Objection is for some of their School to put it to the Trial by laying their Principles and proceeding forwards to draw all along Evident Conclusions without intermingling their own Suppositions But the Peripateticks are very Confident they neither can do this nor will ever Attempt it I mean so as to carry it along with Connexion and Evidence in which Spinoza tho' perhaps the best Writer of the Cartesian School falls very short and pieces out his Discourse with many unprov'd Suppositions as is hinted above in my Preface 12. And hence it is that the Corpuscularians being forced by their Cause to decline such a severe Method strive to avail themselves and uphold their Cause by Witty Discourses Smooth Language Clear Expressions Apt Similitudes Ingenious Experiments that bear a Semblance of Agreeing with their Doctrin and such like Stratagems to make a Plausible Show of Science But their Chief Reliance is on the Facil and Familiar Appearances to Fancy with which they court that Delusive and easily Deluded Faculty And to this end they gratifie it with such Proposals as are apt to sink into it most pleasingly such as are Particles of Matter whose Variety of Imaginary Figures and the Diverse Positions of them they without Study quickly apprehend And conceiting that all is done when they have thus Fancy'd or Apprehended them they argue thus If these Pores and Parts will do the business what need is there of those Abstruse and Metaphysical Speculations of Formal Composition and Mutation and those many Intrinsical Changes of which Fancy can frame no Idea's or Shapes And indeed such high Points seem to that Superficial Faculty Mysterious Whimsies they disgust it with the Laboriousness of comprehending them and persuade men of Fancy 't is Impossible to explicate Nature by such Principles because they are rais'd beyond it's reach And indeed if Nature could be solidly explicated by a kind of Contessellation of Particles Fancy would have as it never has Some Reason But if upon Examination we come to find that such Schemes go no deeper than the Surface of the Essences of Things that they can never reach to the Bottom-Principles of Nature nor give Solid Satisfaction of the true Intrinsical Natures of any thing to the Judgment attending to Maxims of Evident Reason and to true Logick then we must be forc'd to follow the Aristotelian Doctrin and have Recourse to Intrinsical and Formal Mutation especially if the Necessiâ—y of Allowing it shall happen to be Demonstated 13. To do which being our present Work we will begin with Epicurus a Scholar of the First Class in the School of Democritus This Philosopher if we may call him so puts Innumerable Atomes or rather contrary to a Clear Demonstration an Actually Infinit Number of them and of an Infinit Number of Figures descending in an Infinit Imaginary Space or Vacuity some of them downwards some of them overthwart according as his Hypothesis had occasion that so they might overtake their fellow-Atomes With which clinging together by virtue of their meer Figures they compound several Worlds and every particular Body in each of those Worlds That Natural Bodies become Rare or Dense according as they have in them more or fewer of those Atomes or as they call it Plenum in proportion to the Vacuum Thus much in common of his Hypothesis which were the circumstance proper it were easie to show besides it being Vnprov'd be a Hotch-potch of the most Refined Nonsense in every particular Sentence and almost in every word notwithstanding the Explications and Patronage which Gassendus Lucretius and our Dr. Charleton have lent him While I am speaking of his Tenet I note here by the way that by the Indivisibility of his Atomes he means Insuperable Hardness or Absolute Infractilness and not that they consist in a Point or want Extension as he is understood by Mr. Le Grand in his Entire Body of Phylosophy Part 4. c. 4. § 6. For to think that since he makes them of several Figures there should want room or space to admit Division could not be meant by such men as Epicurus or Gassendus But to return to our business what concerns us at present is this that let him contrive his Scheme as he pleases for in such Fantastick Philosophy all is as pleases Fancy the Painter yet he must be forced to grant Intrinsecal and FORMAL MUTATION even while he most industriously strives to avoid it At least tho' perhaps his Followers will not own the Conclusion yet they must allow the Grounds of it or the Principles that ought to inferr it 14. To show which we ask Are all his Atomes of the same Matter He must grant it for he allows no difference between them but that of Figure Again each of those Atomes must be granted to be
Motion which was not in that Instant begun Or if they mean only it's Potential parts or which is the same that One Actual Whole not to pose them by what virtue those Potential parts do formally cohere which without making Divisibility which is Quantitative Vnity or Continuity the Essence of Quantity is impossible to explicate the Question returns and we demand how Firmly those parts do cling together that is how Dense that Whole was and in what it's Density consisted which we affirm must have been either in it's Intrinsical Nature or such a degree of Consistency which is in it's being to such a degree more or less Divisible by Natural Causes or in Nothing Again if Density consisted in the Rest of it's Parts and there was most perfect Rest before there was any Motion then the Density of it must have surpassed all Degrees and therefore it must have been of the Nature of Epicurus his Atomes that is Insuperably and Essentially Incapable of being Divided which they must not say who make their Elements made by the Rubbing of some parts of the Matter against the others Besides in thaâ— supposition GOD as the Author of Nature had offer'd Violence to his own Creation by Dividing it immediately at first Lastly that Matter was of it's own nature Indifferent to be Mov'd or not-Mov'd that is Indifferent to Rest or Motion for Being and Extension abstract from both whereas in our case Density and the same may be said had it been Rare being Natural to it and not Adventitious or Accidental by the Operation of External Causes it could not have been Indifferent to it since every thing necessarily Requires what is Natural to it self Nor is a Thing meerly by it's being in Rest of another Nature To understand this more clearly let us consider this Proposition That Thing call'd the First Matter is in Rest 't is about the Essence or Nature or Intrinsecal Quality of the Subject of this Proposition we are Enquiring to which supervenes that Accidental Predicate of being in Rest. Wherefore to be in Rest does not alter the Intrinsecals of their First Matter but presupposes them and therefore all it's Intrinsecals must have belong'd to it of it's own nature whether it had happen'd to be in Rest or in Motion 22. Density then in their First Matter cannot be explicated by Rest nor consequently Rarity by Motion Let us search then farther in what we can conceive it to consist or how it may be Explicated Now we are to note that all Particular Natures or Notions are to be Explicated by more Common and General ones if we go to work like Philosophers for all Grounds and Principles are made up of such Notions as are Common or Vniversal ones and to Explicate Particulars by other Particulars is the way of Proceeding by Similitudes which may serve sometimes to Elucidate but never to Prove or to Resolve any thing or Notion into its Formal Cause which belongs properly to Philosophers We find then abstracting fâ—om Rest and Motion which are Accidental to that Matter no Notion or Nature in it that can be Superiour to Density and Rarity but the Essence of it that is that Thing it Self call'd the First Matter and its Quantity And Quantity may be consider'd two ways Either as affecting the Body meerly in order to its Self or else in order to the Causes that may work upon it The Former we call Extension the latter Divisibility physically consider'd Now Density cannot any way be Explicated by Extension as that in which it consists as is most Evident in regard a Body may be Equally Extended whether it be Rare or Dense nor is any thing therefore Rarer or Denser because it is Longer or Shorter Let us apply then our Consideration to Divisibility taken in the sense spoken off lately viz. as making its Subject apt to be wrought upon or Divided by Natural Causes and the Proper and Intrinsecal Differences of every Common Notion being More and Less and it being also Evident from the very Notions and from the Consent of Mankind that we call those Bodies Dense which are Less Easy to be Divided or Less Dâ—visible and those Rare which are more Divisible or more Easy to be Divided we are in a fair way to find out clearly what Rarity and Density do consist in viz. Rarity in an Excess or greater Proportion of Quantity thus consider'd to the Matter or Subject of it and Density in a Lesser Proportion of the same Quantity to the Matter that is to the Subject of it according to the Notion of it as Matter Nor does this more strain our Reason to conceive this various participation of the same Accident Quantity than it does to conceive a Thing to partake the Quality of Whiteness Vnequally and be More or Less White For that Maxim of Quantitas non suscipit magis minus is meant Evidently of Extension in regard that the least imaginable Extension being Added or Abstracted from the former must necessarily vary the Species 23. That we may bear up more directly to our main Thesis Since Rarity or else Density must necessarily be in their First Matter for it is impossible to conceive it to be at all Divisible by Natural Causes but it must be either Easily or Hardly Divisible by them if we joyn to this that Contraria according to the Maxim sunt circa idem subjectum it will and must follow that the same Matter whether theirs or ours that had a Power in it to be Less Divisible or Dense had also a Power in it to be More Divisible or Rare and this not only in the First Matter it self but also in every particular Body in Nature made of it and which has the nature of that Matter in it whence results this Conclusion that Rare Bodies are Transmutable into Dense and Dense into Rare and that therefore there is Formal Mutation in Bodies according to these two Primary Qualities and consequently according to all Secondary Qualities too which as will be demonstrated in Physicks are made up of those Primary ones So that most of the Effects in Nature are carry'd on by Formal Mutation nor consequently can Nature be ever rightly Explicated by the Deniers of such a Formal Change 24. Let it be well noted that I speak not in this last Discourse of Contradictories which have no Middle between them and therefore cannot have the same Matter or Subject or make it Changeable from one to the other as because Body is Divisible it does not follow that the same Subject can be Chang'd to Indivisible What I discourse of and from whence in part I drew my Argument was from the nature of Contraries which are two Extremes under the same kind of Quality and therefore have Middling Qualities between both by passing through which as by Degrees or Steps the Body is Transmutable from one of them into the other And the reason is because neither Extreme is Infinitely such and therefore
has necessarily some Mixture of the Opposit Quality anâ— is as it were Allay'd by it so that it comes to be Finite under that Notion Whence the Subject which has one of those Extreme Qualities becomes a Capacity of Admitting the other Extreme And therefore Epicurus seems to go to work more like a Philosopher in this point than the Cartesians by supposing his Atoms Essentially that is Infinitely Dense or Incapable to be Broken or Divided tho' in most other things he falls very much short of Cartesius his Clear Wit by his building in a manner wholly on Suppositions and those too the most Extravagant ones an ill-grounded Judgment could stumble into 25. They will ask how or by what means can a Dense body be chang'd into a Rare one or a Rare into a Dense or what Causes do we find in Nature Proper to produce such an Effect And it must be confest the Question is very Pertinent For to put the Operations of Rarefaction and Condensation without any Proper Agents to cause those Operations is a thing unbecoming a Philosopher We answer then that all Compressive and Divulsive Agents which we experience are Frequent and almost continually working in Nature are as Proper to work upon Quantity as such and to make the Subject of it Rarer or Denser as Dealbation is to work upon a Subject as 't is Colourable or Combustion upon a thing as 't is Combustible or any other Action to produce or inferr it's Proper Effects or to cause the Passions that correspond to it Nor can there be any Notion or Consideration found in a Body on which those two Actions of Compression and Divulsion can be conceiv'd to work properly and precisely but on it's Quantity or Divisibility in order to make the same Matter have more or less Quantity in it or to make a Body that is Compressed or Drawn several wayes to be Formally Chang'd in those respects So that we must either say that those two Common Words importing Natural Actions and us'd by all Mankind to have no sense in them or they must allow them their Proper Effects which are to Shrink or Dilate the Quantity of the thing which is to make it Rarer or Denser Granting them that sometimes and even very often those Effects are perform'd by the Intromission and Extrusion of subtil particles of other Bodies which as the very Terms show are improperly call'd Rarefaction and Condensation whenever any Natural Body is Prest or Stretched on all sides by other Bodies closely besieging it if Quantity be capable of those Effects as is demonstrated above § 15. it is the Proper Effects of such kinds of Operations must ensue and the Body enclos'd will be to some degree Condens'd or Rarefy'd 26. Now had Cartesius put these two First Qualities in the Matter Created by God in the Beginning so that some parts of it had been Created Dense some Rare Nature had been furnisht with Immediate Causes to made Division or Motion connaturally supposing them set on work or mov'd first by some Superiour Agent in regard Dense Bodies are naturally apt to Divide Rare ones and Rare ones naturally apt to be Divided by those which are Dense Nor had he then needed to assign to Essential Being whose Nature is Unchangeable and in which there is no Transmutatio aut Vicissitudinis obumbratio that is neither Change nor Shadow of Change a Drudgery so Mis-becoming his Essence as to be the Immediate Cause of Motion or Change Hence I argue Since neither to be Easily nor Hardly Divisible is the Essence of that First Matter in regard it was Compleat in the line of Ens and terminated the Action of Creation and so could have subsisted whether it had been Rare or Dense or tho' it had not been Divided at all there is manifestly a Divisibility between the Essence of that Matter and its Rarity or Density and therefore by the same argument we brought formerly against Epicurus that Matter might have been Chang'd according to either of those Qualities and not according to its Essence and yet no Contradiction ensue which demonstrates it to be Possible Again that Matter being Indifferent to either Rarity or Density had GOD Created some part of it Rare some Dense the course of Nature as was lately shown had gone on more connaturally Wherefore since GOD as the Author of Nature and abstracting from Miracle does always act most connaturally or agreeably to the Nature of Things it follows that he did actually order that some parts of the First Matter of which the World was to be Form'd should be Rarer and some Denser than Others and not of an Uniform or homogeneous Nature And accordingly we are taught by Holy Writt that in the Beginning there was Earth Water and Air. And if the Cartesians will needs make their First Matter Uniform and that GOD must move it immediately 't is justly Requir'd of them to show this Tenet of theirs most Agreeable to the Natures of the Things I mean to the nature of GOD whom they put to be the Immediate Cause of the First Motition and to the Nature of Matter the Patient and not overleap and slide over the Proof of both these main Points and suppose them and this not because they can even pretend that those suppositions do suit best with the Natures of the Things themselves but meerly because it best serves to introduce and carry on the Scheme of Doctrin they had resolv'd on 27. From Essential Mutation of Things in Nature or their losing their Substantial Form we come now to demonstrate that there is moreover Mutation in them according to those Forms which are Accidâ—ntâ—l In order to which we will premise this Consideration taught us by daily Experience that No Body becomes Another Thing in an Instant but is Alter'd or Dispos'd before hand ere it comes to Suffer an Essential Change For example A piece of Wood ere it comes by perfect Division to be made two Things of One is first Alter'd according to its Figure that is Cleft or Nick'd Before the same Wood is turn'd into Fire it is first Heated that is it has that Accidental Form call'd the Quality of Heat first introduced into it and so in all the rest respectively Which Changes not being Essential ones in regard they antecede the Change of the Eâ—tity as Dispositions to it they must be Accidental ones and this according to Quantity Quality or Relation which are all the Accidental Notions we have of the Thing that are Intrinsecal to it Now if we admit those Previous Alterations and Dispositions we cannot avoid the admitting Mutation of the Subject according to those Forms Wax by melting is Rarifi'd that is Chang'd as to its former Density A Man or Horse loses a Limb and consequently their former Quantity and Figure too and yet they are the same Individual Man and Horse A Husband loses that Relation when his Wife dies and yet is the same Man he was So
have an Entitative Union but by being join'd together as Act and Power that is as Matter and Form which are the Potential Parts of an Ens and therefore are apt to compound One Ens in regard neither of them is a Thing Actually 32. And indeed if we look more narrowly into the Doctrin of the Deniers of Formal Mutation the Antiperipateticks we shall find that they have Perplex't and render'd Obscure the most Common Easie Obvious Useful and Necessary Notion which Mankind has or can have viz. the Notion of a Thing For I cannot discern that they make their First Mass of Matter to be One Natural Thing unless they fancy it to be a kind of Idea Platonica of Body existing Indeterminately or in Common For they put the Form of it to be Extension and they make this Extension to be Indeterminate that is not-Particular that is to be Extension in Common Nor can we learn of them what kind of Thing it is more than that it is barely thus Extended Which tells us indeed that it has Quantity but gives us no light of it's Intrinsecal Nature or Entity that is they never explicate to us of what nature that thing is which is Extended And what man living can conceive a Body which has neither Figure or Colour Density or Rarity Heat or Cold Hardness or Softness in it but meerly Extension Again I cannot see that they put those little Particles made by Motion out of that Matter to be Natural Things tho' they do Actually and Distinctly exist in Nature because they make them Principia or Elementa Rerum Naturalium and the Elements of which Things are made can no more with good Sense be called Things than Letters which are the Elements of Words can be said to be Words The Compound made up of those Particles they do indeed expresly own to be a Thing but by making it consist of Many Things I mean those Particles each of which has a peculiar Actual Existence of its own and which are not United or made One according to the Notion of Ens but only according to the Notion of some Accident which is Extrinsecal to the Notion of Ens and differs from it toto genere they cannot with any show of Reason call such a Compound A Thing or One Thing Whence according to their Hypothesis we can have no Clear Light what is to be called a Thing or what the word Thing means As for our Four Elements which perhaps they will object they either are found Pure and out of the Compound and then having an Actual Existence of their own they are truly Things Or they do not and then they are Potential parts of the Compound in which they are which and only which Exists by One Actual Existence which shows it to be One Thing and not by Many as their Compound does which makes it Many Things at least such Things as they will allow those Elements or Particles to be 33. But to give them what Satisfaction we may without Injury to Truth and withal to Clear the true Aristotelian doctrin from the prejudices taken from the bad speculations of those School-men who make Accidents so many little Entities distinct from Substances we will confess that many of those Forms we call Qualities are Effluiums or Particles sent out from other Bodies which while they transiently affect that Body on which they light they retain their own Distinct Entities and are call'd the Particles or Vertue of the Emittent Body affecting another Body that is Passive from them But when they gain a Permanency there and by Continuity of Quantity or Similitude of Nature or any other Cause they come to be naturally Vnited to it and assist it in its Proper Operation they lose their Actual Entity and Unity which they had formerly and become a Potential Part of the Subject that was Passive from them and Exist and Subsist in it And because the Notion of Form is to be Receiv'd in the Subject or Matter and those Particles advene to it already Existing they are hence call'd Accidental Forms of it and either give it such an Alterableness as is agreeable to their nature as is seen in Passible Qualities or sometimes if they suit with the Primogenial Constitution of that Body they strengthen and belong to some Habit Disposition Power or Property of it and piece out as it were those Qualities and in some degree or other denominate the Subject thus or thus Qualify'd 34. But to make it yet more manifest how industriously the Cartesians do wave the giving any account of their First Matter of which notwithstanding they hold all their three Elements and consequently all Nature was made we will take notice of one prevarication of theirs more which does evidently bewray at what a plunge they are about it by omitting that Consideration which even by their own Doctrin was the Chiefest and most Necessary They affirm that Matter of theirs to have been Divided first by God into greater parts which again being moved or jumbled one against another did shave or wear off every small particles of several sorts of which their First Element was made Division then was the first and Principal Physical Action and that which most conduced to frame all Nature Nay in case there be no Vacuum as they grant there is not it is manifest that the First Motion and which was exercis'd Immediately upon their Matter as also all the following Motions exercis'd upon the said Matter was Division Now Divisibility of the Matter being the Proper Power that answers to the Act of Division or which is the same to Motion and withal directly speaking the nature of their Matter as apt to be wrought upon by those Causes how was it possible they should slip over that and regard only the Extension of it Divisibility is a Natural Notion and imports an Order to Natural Action whereas Extension is a dull sluggish Notion and meerly Mathematical that is it does Abstract from Action and Motion both For an Extended thing is never the more or less Extended whether it Moves or stands still but its whole Nature and Notion is taken up in affecting its own Subject or Extending it equally and all one whether it Acts or not acts But the reason of this willful neglect is this that tho' they grant it to have been Divided yet should they tell us it was thus Divisible Common Reason would lead us to pose them with asking whether it were Easily or Hardly Divisible that is Rare or Dense of which Qualities in their Matter antecedently to Motion and the Contexture of the particles made by that Motion their Principles can give no kind of account nor possibly explicate them 35. I am apt to think that they foresaw this Rub in their way which hindred the Currency of all their Doctrin of Physicks and seeing they could not remove it they very fairly let it alone Yet for a show they take notice of the Word but they
Sublunary Motions must bear a proportion to it and be measur'd by it being perform'd while such a proportionable part of it was Flowing and Mankind is forced to need and make use of such a Measure to Adjust Proportion and Design all their Motions or Actions by and to know the determinate distance of them from known and notorious Periods hence there must be a Common Head of the time When those Motions were perform'd which we call Quando If the Extrinsecal application be conceiv'd to be made to the Subject or thing in Rest then either that Extrinsecal thing is conceiv'd to be barely apply'd to the whole that is to be Immediate to it or meerly to Contain it which grounds the Notion and answers to the Question Where or Ubi Or it denotes some certain determinate Manners how it is apply'd to the whole or to some parts of it and then either the whole or at least some Parts of the Subject or thing must be conceiv'd to be ply'd and accommodated to the parts of the Extrinsecal thing and 't is call'd its Site or Situation or else the Extrinsecal thing or its parts are conceiv'd to be Fitted Ply'd or Accommodated to the Subject or Thing and then 't is call'd Habit. 20. These ten Common Heads are call'd Predicaments that is Common Receptacles which Contain and whence we may draw all our Predicates for the Common Subject Thing which we may briefly exemplifie thus Peter 1 tho' but a yard2 and half high yet a Ualiant3 Subject4 fought5 and was wounded6 yesterday7 in8 the Field standing9 upon his guard armed10 21. All these Notions under whatever Head if they be Corporeal ones are Natural and Common to all Mankind For since they are made by Impressions on the Senses which are Common to all Mankind it follows that the Notions which are the Effects of those Impressions must be such also since the same Causes upon the same-natur'd Subjects must work the same Effects 22. Our Soul has in it a Power of Compounding those several Notions together of Considering them diverse ways of Reflecting on its own Thoughts and Affections and lastly of joyning a Negative to its Natural Notions if there be occasion such as are the Notions of Indivisible Immaterial Incorruptible Unactive Insignificant c. which particularly happens when we would strive to frame Notions of spiritual Things All which is manifest by plain Experience if we reflect never so little on what passes in our own Interiour 23. No Notions can be imagin'd that do not arise from one of these Heads For Corporeal Notions are imprinted directâ—y Spiritual Notions by Reflexion on our Mind and on its Operations or Affections or else by joyning a Negative to our Positive natural Notions And Mix'd or Compound Notions are framed by joyning our former simple Notions Wherefore since there can be nothing imagin'd which is not either Corporeal Spiritual or Mix'd or Compounded of Former Notions 't is manifest that all the Notions we have or can have do arise from one of those Heads 24. Wherefore 't is hence farther shewn that there is no necessity at all of making some Notions to be Innate and consequently that Conceit of the Cartesians is Groundless who affirm That by a Motion made on the Senses the Soul by an unknown Vertue peculiar to its self Excites or awakens such and such an Innate Idea which till then lay dormant in it because they find that that Notion is nothing like to the Idea it excites For first how do they prove that only Motion is communicated to the Brain from the Object or that that Motion does not carry along with it different-natur'd Particles or Effluviums of these several Bodies which are as it were little Models of their Nature It is certain this passes thus in the grosser Senses and no more is requisite to do it in the subtiler but that the Particles emitted be more subtil which cannot shock the Fancy or Reason of a Natural Philosopher who knows well into what almost-infinite smallness Body is Divisible And of all Men in the World the Cartesians should not be startled at it whose Principles do allow lesser Particles than those Effluviums and to pass thro' far lesser Pores than those within the Nerves or even than such as are in the substance of the Nerves themselves Now this being granted the whole contexture of this Doctrine of ours has a clear Coherence For such Particles bearing the nature of the thing along with them are apt when they are carried to the Seat of Knowledge to breed in the Mind or convey into it the Nature or an Intellectual Notion of the Thing it self To do which there can need no more than that every thing according to the Maxim be receiv'd according to the Nature or Manner of the Receiver viz. that those Effluviums by affecting the Body Corporeally do affect the Soul Intellectually Secondly How is it conceivable or any way Explicable that a Motion which they confess is utterly Unlike the Idea in the Mind should be the Proper Exciter of such an Idea Indeed were those Motions of the Nature of our Signs that are voluntarily agreed on and fore-known to the Users of them they might have a Power to make such a peculiar Excitation of those Ideas as our Words do now or as any odd and disagreeing Things are made use of by us when we practise the Art of Memory But here things are quite otherwise for we have no Fore-knowledge either by Agreement nor by our voluntary Designation that such Motions shall excite such Idea's or Notions nor as is confess'd are they Naturally alike wherefore it is altogether inexplicable how they should ever come to excite such particular Idea's Add That this hidden Virtue in the Soul to make such a particular Idea start up as soon as that Motion is made in the Nerve is both said gratis and is as Obscure as an Occult Quality and so far from Explicable that even themselves as far as I can learn have not so much as attempted to explain it but it seems to be in part taken up gratis to make good their Doctrine of innate Idea's as the Tenet of such Idea's is to prove the Soul is a distinct Thing from the Body Lastly Their Argument drawn from Experience that the Idea in the Mind is quite different from that Impression in the Senses or any Bodily Faculty is shewn to be Inconclusive by alledging as was said lately that the Nature of the Object found in those emitted Particles and the Nature of it found in the Soul Intellectually or as standing under Notion are the self-same and not so Vnlike as they imagin Add That their Argument faulters in this too that the makers of it did not duly reflect when they advanced it on that ' foresaid Axiom Quicquid recipitur recipitur ad modum recipientis For had they done this they could not have wonder'd that an Affection of the Body which is imprinted directly and an
Nothing more obstructs the way to Natural Science than the doctrin of Vulgar Philosophers That Qualities are certain Kinds of little Entities which of themselves have a diminutive sort of Being and are able to produce such and such Effects For example Ask them how a Bell works that effect upon my Ear which we call Sound they 'll tell you there is a Quality in the Bell call'd Sonoreity whose nature it is to make a Sound Ask how a Green thing makes such a pleasing Impression on my Eye they 'll answer There is a certain Quality in it call'd Greenness whose nature 't is to work such an Effect and so of the rest Which ridiculous Method explicates nothing but makes the Silliest old wife as good a Philosopher as the most Learned Naturalist if she can but name the Word that Signifies that Quality Next it makes Learners rest easily contented and well appay'd with a meer Word whence they will grow Negligent and Careless to take pains to look into the Natures of the Things or else if they have any wit in them to despair of all knowledge of Nature by seeing their Masters so profoundly Ignorant and so Superficially Learned And lastly it hinders Learners from Seeing or even endeavouring to see the Natural Proportion and Alliance between Proper Causes and their Effects and inclines them to take purely upon trust the whole Administration of Nature and all Consequence of one thing from another which renders all natural Science precarious For 't is not Science unless we use our own Eyes and see the point Demonstrated Jurare in verba is in such cases the Fool 's Oath and is in plain terms to swear the Devoting or giving up our Reason to a Slothful Contentedness never to grow Wiser LESSON VII Of the Common Head of Relation 1. THE Notion of Relation being what one Individual Thing is if compar'd to another there must be some Real Ground of it in the thing Referr'd which is the Reason of our Referring it and by which formally we do thus Refer it For otherwise Relation would be a Chimerical and Fictitious Notion and not a Real or Natural one common to all Mankind and held by them to be such which yet we experience by our daily Converse with them it is 2. This Ground cannot be their having Disparate or Disagreeing Notions in them or their being of Disparate Orders which have nothing to do with one another For we find that we cannot Refer or compare Green and Hard Youthful and Transparent Hot and Triangular nor any other disparate Notions nor yet a Writer and a Plough-share a Father and a Mill-stone a Brother and a Handsaw c. because they are in Disparate Orders and have no Respect to one another grounding our Referring them or Comparing them together as have a Writer and a Writing a Father and a Son a Baker and Bread c. 3. Wherefore the Ground of Relation must either be some Notion agreeing to both the things related that is found to belong to both either Intrinsecally or Extrinsecally or else their having Communication with one another by way of natural Action and Passion This is prov'd by the former Section and is evident because there can be no other Considerations by which they can be order'd to one another or be of the same Order but their having some Intrinsecal Notion common to both or else their Acting and Suffering upon and from one another which is an Extrinsecal Consideration 4. Relations of the first sort which have one and the same Notion in them are of as many kinds as there are Heads of Notions since all these have a kind of Nature or Notion in them and so some kind of Transcendent Unity Thus if they have the same Nature or Essence in them which belongs to the Common Head of Substance the Relation between them is call'd Identity which is their being of one and the same kind of Entity If of one and the same Notion of Quantity 't is call'd Equality which is their being of one and the same Quantity If of Quality 't is call'd Likeness if of Action singly consider'd they are call'd Co-actors as Fellow-Souldiers Fellow-Servants c. If of Passion singly consider'd Fellow-Sufferers Fellow-Martyrs c. If of Place or Vbi Bed-fellows Chamber-fellows Townsmen Country-men c. If of Time Contemporaries Co-eve or born at the same time If of Habit Fellow-Mourners Fellow-Curassiers Fellow-Souldiers of the Blew or Grey Regiment If of Situation Fellow-Assessors or Sitters tho' such as this seldom occur Nay there may be a Relation grounded on having the same notion even of Relation in them as Parents or Fellow-begetters 5. Of the second sort grounded on Action and Passion not singly consider'd but with an Order to one another or as Inferring one another are such as these viz. Father and Son Master and Servant Prince and Subject Tutor and Pupil which are grounded on the Actions and Passions of Begetting and being Begotten Commanding and being Commanded Governing and being Governed Teaching and being Taught c. 6. In both these sorts of Relations the things Referr'd must have their Correlates that is there must be a mutual Relation on both sides In the former of them because there is the selfsame Ground or Reason of Referring in one as in the other viz. that one same Notion Common or Belonging to Both to wit the same Essence same Quantity same Quality same Relation same Place same Time same sort of Action and Passion same Situation and the same Habit. 7. This Agreeing and Corresponding of the two things thus Related in those of the former kind of Relation must be meant to be their Agreeing in the same Abstracted and Common or Specifical Notion and not in the same Individual one For otherwise two Men could not have Identity in their Individual Essence since then they would be the same and not the same that is Vnum and Non-unum And for the same reason Intrinsecal Accidents being Identify'd with the Subjects in which they inhere and having no Entity but theirs they can have no Individuality but by them and so the same Individual Intrinsecal Accident cannot be Common to two Subjects or Substances but must be Individually Two as They are Whence the Relations grounded on them must be upon their being the same in Species or Kind and not Individually Which reason holds equally for those Relations that are grounded on Action Passion and Situation and the rest For two things cannot be in one Individual place that is in a place capable to hold but one Individual thing without Penetration of Bodies Nor is it possible in the course of Natural Causes that two should be born or dye at the same precise Time that is in such a portion of Time as is terminated by the same Instants Nor can Two wear the same Individual Arms c. at once Wherefore it must be meant that the Notion common to both must be an abstracted or specifical Notion and
as to the nature of Agent and Patient there needs no more to begin the Effect actually but Application 2. If Agent and Patient be perfectly fitted as to the nature of Agent and Patient and the Effect be Indivisible there needs no more to begin and end that is to Compleat the Effect at once but Application 3. An Indivisible Effect cannot be perform'd by piecemeal or by parts 4. Every thing operates as it is 5. No Change can be made without the Operation of some Cause 6. A Pure Spirit is not Quantitative a Body is Proposition I. No Corporeal Operation is without Local Motion For since Ax. 4. Every thing operates as it is what is Quantitative operates Quantitatively but nothing can operate Quantitatively or exercise 't is Quantity when it perfectly rests according to it's Quantity that is moves not according to it's Quantity It follows then that to Operate Quantitatively is to move according to Quantity Wherefore since nothing can move according to it's Quantity but either Intrinsically by having it's Quantity made greater or less or Extrinsically that is by having it's Quantity unmov'd as to it 's own parts or it's self mov'd towards Another and both these do evidently require some kind of Local Motion 't is Evident likewise that No Câ—â—poreal Operation is without Local Motion Proposition II. 13. That an Angel is not susceptible of Local Motion For since Motion is Mutation and consequently Local Motion Mutation or Change according to Place and Change of Place does necessarily require some Space and Space is Quantity it follows that Local Motion cannot be made in a Subject which has no Quantity But Angels they being Pure Spirits are not Quantitative therefore they are not Susceptible of Local Motion or capable of having Local Motion made in them Proposition III. 15. That no Body can cause a Change in an Angel For since no Operation of Body is without Local Motion and an Angel it being a Pure Spirit is not susceptible of Local Motion it follows that neither is it Susceptible of the Operation of Body But No Cause can change any thing unless that Cause operates upon it Therefore no Body can cause any Change in an Angel Proposition IV. 16. That an Angel cannot change it self after the First Instant For since a Cause the self same in all respects if the Patient be likewise the self same and the Application also the self same produces the self-same Effect equally in any time assignable that is sufficient for such an Effect and an Angel put to act upon it self or change it self after the first Instant is put to be the self-same as to its being a Cause in every Instant before it acts as likewise to be the self-same Patient in all respects and the Application of it self to its self cannot but be Equal it follows that in any time sufficient for the same Effect it will produce the same Effect that is act upon it self or change it self Wherefore since an Effect in an Indivisible subject is Indivisible that is Impossible not to be all at once or in one Instant and an Angel being a Pure Spirit is an Indivisible Subject t is Evident that this Effect or the Action of that Spirit upon it self would be equally made in every Instant in case it were not already made that is can only be made in the First Instant Wherefore an Angel cannot change it self after the First Instant Proposition V. 17. If there were only Two Angels Existent one of them could not act upon the other after the very First Instant of their Being Let there be only Two Angels the one whereof can work upon the other and let the Agent be A the Patient B and because they are suppos'd not to act in the First Instant but after some Duration let the Duration assign'd be C the Instant at the end of that Duration in which they first work D. Since neither A. nor B. are able to work upon themselves except in the First Instant and as is suppos'd one works not upon the other till the Instant D they must necessarily remain in all respects the same they were in the First Instant till the Instant D that is for the whole Intermediat Duration C Therefore they are equally fitted in point of Agent and Patient in each nay in the very First Instant of the Duration C as they are in the Instant D But in the Instant D in which they acted they were in all points fitted to act therefore they were also in all points perfectly fitted to act in the very first Instant of the Duration C Wherefore the Effect Begun and the Subject being Indivisible Ended in the very First Instant in case their wanted not Application of the perfectly-ready Agent to the perfectly-dispos'd Patient But there wanted not Application in the very First Instant For since Quantitative Application or Propinquity is not competent to Pure Spirits all the Application they can be imagin'd to have to one another is by Knowledg and Will But they had the same Knowledg and Will for the Whole Duration antecedent because they are suppos'd Vnchang'd and perfectly the same for that whole Duration And tho' they had not had it formerly the Argument returns with the same force that they could not have had this new Knowledg and Will from Themselves in any part of that Duration nor from a Body and therefore they must have had it from anâ—ther Spirit and this in the First Instant because that Other was then perfectly apt to give it This perfectly apt to receive it And consequently If there were only Two Angels Existent one of them could not act upon rhe other after the very First Instant of their Being Proposition VI. 18. Put any multitude of Angels how great soever all that they can work upon one another will be perform'd in the First Instant of their Being For since where there are only Two one must therefore act upon the other in the First Instant or not at all because all the imaginable Concurrents to that Action were then adequately put the rest also where there are more will for the same reason be wrought upon in the same Instant in case the Causes of that Action be then adequately put But they are all Adequately put in the same First Instant For the second Angel that acts either is a perfect Agent and perfectly apply'd by what it has of it self or by what it has from another wherefore since it can never want what it has of it self or by it's self it cannot want any thing to work upon the Third unless it be to be wrought upon by the First and so be fitted to work upon the Third but this is done in the very first Instant wherefore also the Third will for the same reason be wrought upon in the self-same Instant Again since the Third cannot be imagin'd to want any thing to enable it to work
upon the Fourth but to be chang'd by the Second and this was done as was now shown in the First Instant the Causes of changing the Fourth were adequately put in the same Instant too and consequently the Effect And since how far soever we proceed the same reason holds viz. that the Effects are still Indivisible and all the Causes of each immediately succeeding Effect still adequately put in the first Instant it will follow that the Effects will still be put in the same Instant by the same necessity that the Effect of the First up on the Second was put in the First Instant of their Being Therefore all whatever any Multitude of Angels how great soever can work upon one another is perform'd in the First Instant of their Being Proposition VII 19. That 't is Infinitly more Impossible an Angel should be chang'd by God after the first Instant than by any other Spirit For since the Angel is in the same manner capable of Change as far as concerns it's self or it 's own power to be changed whether God or any other Spirit be to change it on that side precisely there is a perfect Equality Wherefore seeing on the other side 't is infinitly more Impossible that GOD should not have Power to change her in the First Instant than that any other Spirit should not have such a Power and Infinitly more Impossible that GOD should not of himself be ultimately dispos'd to act where the nature of the thing is capable of it his Nature being Pure Actuality Also since 't is Infinitly more Impossible that GOD should after some Duration receive any Change in himself fitting him to produce that Effect than that any other Spirit should And lastly since 't is Infinitly more Impossible his Active Power should not be Apply'd to the Patient both in regard he most necessarily and comprehensively knows it and most intimately by himself conserves it in Being Wherefore since from these Considerations or Reasons however Infinitly short in Creatures it is concluded to be Impossible that even any Other Spirit if it should change an Angel at all should not change it in the First Instant and these Considerations or Reasons are found to be in GOD with Infinitly greater Advantage it is Evident that 't is Infinitly more Impossible that GOD if he change an Angel at all should not change it in the first Instant that is should change it in the Intermediate Duration than that any other Spirit should Proposition IX 20. That 't is absolutely Impossible an Angel should be Changed after the First Instant of it's Being For since no Change can be made without â—he working of Some Cause and no Body can work upon an Angel and all that it self or any other Created Spirit can work upon it must necessarily be in the very First Instant of it's Being and 't is much more Impossible GOD should work upon it unless in the First Instant than that any Created Spirit should and there can be no Cause possible or Imaginable besides GOD Created Spirits or Bodies it follows that there can be no Cause at all to work upon an Angel or to Change it after the First Instant of it's Being and therefore it can undergo no Change after that First Instant ADVERTISEMENT 1. THIS last Conclusion may seem a strange Paradox to some Readers whose Reason and Principles have not rais'd them above Fancy But not to insist farther on the Evidence of our Consequences from Undeniable Principles which have forced the Necessity of our Conclusion such men are desirâ—d to reflect that Ens being divided as by it's Proper Differences by Divisible and Indivisible and these Differences being Contradictory to one another it follows that Body and Spirit which are the Species constituted by those Differences do agree in nothing at all but in the Common and Generical notion of Ens or in this that they are both of them Capable of Being Whence 't is Logically demonstrated that they must Differ nay contradictorily disagree in every thing else so that whatever else is Affirm'd literally of the one must be deny'd of the other Wherefore since we can truly and literally Affirm that Body is Quantitative Corruptible in Place mov'd Locally Chang'd by Time or Subject to it Capable of Succession or of Before and After which are the Differences of time c. we must be forced with equal Truth Literally to Deny all these of Pure Spirits or Angels because none of these do belong to the Common Generical Notion of Ens but to that Difference which constitutes that Species call'd Body and therefore the Contradictory to all these and amongst them to be Vnsuccessive in it's Operations must be predicated of the other Species call'd Spirit It will I doubt not be much wonder'd at too that the Devils should be Damn'd in the First Instant of their being which looks as if they were Created in the state of Damnation A thing certainly most Unworthy GOD who is Essentially and Infinitly Good But their wonder will cease if they reflect that those Bad Angels had far more Knowledg and consequently more perfect Deliberation such as they can have in that one Single Instant than We could have had tho' we have been a thousand years Considering and Deliberating e'er we had made our Choice of our last End and fix our Resolution to adhere to it Finally So that it never lay in the power of any Man to have so Clear a Knowledg of his Duty and so perfect and full sight of all the Motives to continue in that Duty as the Devil and his Angels had in that one Instant Whence the Crime of Lucifer and his Adherents was a Sin of pure Malice and not mere Frailty or mixt with Frailty much less of Inadvertence Speculative Ignorance or suggested by the Soul 's deprav'd Companion the Body as are the Sins of the Generality of Mankind some Inconsiderable number of them excepted whose Souls are thorowly poison'd with Spiritual Sin 's peculiar to the Devil such as are Spiritual Pride Malice Envy or such like which wicked Sinners are therefore even while here so many Limbs as it were of the Devil and very difficult to be brought to any Repentance And this is the reason why GOD's Wisdom Goodness and Justice laid so many Miracles of Mercy to save poor weak Mankind and left the Faln Angels in the sad condition in which they had so wilfully and desperately engulft themselves Wisely and Justly placing it in the Order of Causes that that Sin which was so perfectly and in despite of all Motives to the contrary so Wilfully Resolute should be Irretractable whereas on the other side Sins of mere Frailty are not hard to be repented of when the alluring circumstance is past and gone The same Faculty which permitted them to fall leaving them likewise in a Pliableness to reform and retract what their Reason abus'd by Passion had perhaps either by surprize or after much
Gramarical Quibbles and it would do too much honour to them to spend labour to name them being too open of themselves to need Exposing Those which are less discernable and worth Remark are such as this He that says you are an Animal says true but He that says you are an Ass says you are an Animal Therefore He that says you are an Ass says true Where as has been particularly shown above the word Animal is taken in diverse Senses for in this Proposition Peter is an Animal it is restrain'd by the Subject to signify one Individual Animal and of such a kind viz. Rational But in the Proposition An Ass is an Animal it is restrain'd to signify an Animal of Another kind viz. Irrational whence 't is no Syllogism because it has Four Terms 10. Of these Fallacies which are not grounded on the Ambiguity of the Words but are built on the Thing or the Sense the First worth remarking is that call'd the Fallacy ex Accidente which happens when the Middle Term is only Accidentally connected with the Extremes and not per se or out of its own Nature As Bar-Whatever breeds stirs in a Common-Wealth is bad but ba-All Religion breeds stirs in a Common-Wealth therefore ra-All Religion is bad The Common answer is to distinguish the Major and Minor both and to say that what breeds Stirs out of its own Nature is Bad but not that which breeds them Accidentally for otherwise a Sword and Wine must be bad because the one sometimes helps to commit Murther and the other causes Drunkenness But the more Solid way and which bears up best to Logical Grounds is to deny it to be a Syllogism because though the Form of it be Legitimate yet the Matter or the Middle Term is not so For a Syllogism being a Speech contriv'd by True Logicians to Conclude a Third Proposition out of the Premises so as by Connexion of the Medium with the Extremes we may know it to be Certainly True for that which leaves us Vncertain leaves us Ignorant it follows that the Middle Term must be either a Notion Essentially Connected with the Extremes or else as a Proper Cause or Effect of it neither of which it can be if it be but Accidentally belonging to them We may Note here how Accidental Mediums are Common and Remote ones or such as beget Opinion For between Religion and Commotions intervene Perversity of will Disregard of Virtue Irrational Assents upon Opinionative Ground Pride and Faction against Church Governours who would bind them to good Principles and Religious Duties Interest c. All which or some if not most of them are the Proper and Immediate Causes of Dissention at least nearer and more Proper Causes of it than Religion it self the Principles of which do Oblige men to the preservation of Peace and Unity 11. The Second is called Ignoratio Elenchi which in easier Language is the attempting to prove what 's not in question or putting upon our Adversary to hold a Tenet he never own'd nor held as it usually passes among Passionate Discourses and Scolds when they object to others what they neither held nor thought that they may the more easily confute them or render them Odious This is avoided in disputes by Stating the Question right and by Agreeing before-hand in the Signification of the Words in which the Question is conceiv'd as was recommended in the second and third Rule Or if this be not done before the Dispute begins it is answer'd by saying Transeat totum and forcing the Adversary weary with aiming his blows amiss to recur to the true point and to Conclude the Contradictory to the Defendents Tenet which was his only Duty and ought to have been done at first 12. The Third is Begging the Question or Supposing that which should have been Prov'd Which is manifestly faulty For the Premisses must be Clearer than the Conclusion which they cannot be if the Proof in whole or in part is as Unknown and Obscure as is the Conclusion it self as it must be if it is barely Suppos'd and begg'd gratis Of which Fallacy therefore all the whole Body of Hypothetical Philosophy is Guilty as also that Fallacy call'd An Ill Enumeration of the Parts as follows here 13. The Fourth is that of an Imperfect or Incomplete Division which happens wâ—en 't is falsly pretended that the thing in Question must be one of those which are Nominated or that it must be perform'd one of the ways Assign'd when perhaps there is Another way how that thing may be done which was never assign'd but either Unthought of or Neglected As if it should be asserted that Motion must either happen by Atoms descending in an Immense Vacuum or by the Impression of so much Motion in the Mass of Matter at First by GOD and his Continuing it ever since when as a third way may be assign'd viz. that a Created Intelligent Being Causes and all along Continues the Motion of the first-moved Bodies which move the rest This Fallacy is defeated by Denying the Proposition which contains the Enumeration of all those Causes or Manners of Action and by Obliging the Disputant to show his Division to be Adequate 14. The Fifth is called non causa pro causa That is in plain terms the bringing a Medium that does not Conclude or the pretending the Conclusion follows from a Medium that cannot necessarily inferr it This Fallacy if it must be call'd so happens chiefly to Experimental Philosophers who going by meer Induction and laying no Evident or Certain Principles of Nature a priori to guide their Thoughts by but Hypothetical ones only do hence refund all the Effects of Nature into false-pretended Causes whence every man who sets up a new Scheme does still assign new Reasons or Causes according to which he strives to Explicate Nature and into which he endeavours to Resolve all the several Productions and Effects of it But why this should be call'd a Fallacy I cannot comprehend At this rate every Argument that does not Conclude may be call'd a Fallacy For since the Premisses in a Demonstrative Syllogism are the Cause of the Conclusion whoever argues ill argues Fallaciously and assigns a wrong Cause by producing an Incompetent Medium But in case the Disputant puts it upon the Defendent to have made use of such a Ground as he never meant it is then enough to deny it and put him to prove that that was indeed his Ground as was pretended 15. The Fifth is the Arguing from what 's taken in a Divided sense as if it were taken in a Compound sense or conjoyntly or from what 's taken in a compound sense or conjoyntly to infer the same thing in a Divided sense Example of the Former is this He that is actually sitting may Walk Peter is actually sitting therefore Peter actually sitting or while he sits may walk Where the Major is False unless Sitting and Walking be taken Divisively and mean that he who sits
Naturalia that is some Least Size of Bodies which are generally no farther Divisible because there want Natural Causes little enough to pass between their parts and divide them but they say moreover that there is not only Local or Situal which are Extrinsecal but also Intrinsecal or Formal Composition and Division and consequently Formal Mutation in them either in Whole or in Part that is a Change in them according to the Form and not according to the Matter or Subject and they deny that any Solid Discourse or Explication either of Nature or Transnaturals which we call Metaphysicks can possibly be made unless this be admitted 2. The Parts of which they affirm all the Essences or Natures of all those Entities we converse with are Compounded they call Act and Power or Form and Matter whether those be Essential or Accidental And they put the Matter and Essential Form to be necessarily found in every Body and in each of the most minute and insensible Atomes and Particles that can be imagin'd The reason they give for this Assertion is because each of them is a Distinct Ens from the Others in regard it can subsist alone and so is Capable of a Distinct Being whence they conceive there must be Somewhat in every Body and every Atome by which it is Distinguisht from all Others and somewhat in which it Agrees with them That which Distinguishes them they call the Form and that in which they Agree the Matter And they think that however their Adversaries may quarrel the Words yet they must allow the Sense Nature and daily Experience teaching us that One Thing is made of Another which cannot be unless Somewhat of it remains and Somewhat be lost For otherwise one Thing could not truly be said to be made of another but the Former Ens of which Nothing remains would be Annihilated and the Ens or Body newly produced would be made of Nothing that is Created 3. Now when the Peripateticks speak of Matter and Form and that each thing is Compounded of these and consequently that there is some kind of Divisibility or Difference between them the Corpuscularians who fancy nothing but Particles commodiously laid together are presently apt to conceit that those Parts as it were that Compound a Body are meant to be two certain kinds of Things joyn'd together into One and if this be deny'd they are ready to conclude that they are either two Nothings or at least that they leave us in the dark and at a loss how to distinguish Things from Nothings and thence object that this doctrin of Matter and Form cannot explicate any thing or make a man one Jot the wiser And indeed in case the Asserters of them did stay in these Common Expressions and not draw many Clear Consequences from them giving a farther account of them the bare Saying there are such Partâ— so named would be as Insignificant as to talk of Occult Qualities 4. To rectify this Misconceit of theirs sprung from a just Prejudice against meer School-terms the Aristotelians defend themselves by declaring their Meaning to be that One and the same Thing does ground those diverse Notionâ— of it self in us That the Faecundity as it were of the Thing not being Comprehensible at one view by our short Sighted Understanding which knows nothing here but by Impressions on our Senses which are Distinct and of many sorts forces us to frame Inadequate or Partial Conceptions of it And because we cannot Speak of a thing otherwise than as we Conceive it hence we can truly say One of those Notions or Conceptions of the Thing is not the other which yet means no more but that that Thing as thus Conceiv'd is not the same Thing as otherwise Conceiv'd or that the Thing as working by my Sense upon my Understanding thus is not the Thing as working by the same or another Sense upon my Understanding otherwise Whence because what corresponds to both these Conceptions or Notions is found in the same Thing hence they affirm that there is a certain kind of Composition of them both in the Thing it self which is no more in reality but that there is found in that Thing what corresponds to and grounds both these Conceptions 5. Farther they declare that since Nature shows us that the Thing may be Changed according to somewhat in it that answers to One of these Conceptions Notions or Natures and not Chang'd according to what answers to the Other hence we must be forced to grant that there is a kind of Divisibility between them in the Thing answering to the foresaid Composition and consequently a Capacity of Formal Mutation by which the Thing may be Chang'd accordâ—ng to one of them viz. the Form and not Chang'd according to the Matter Whether that Form remains or no after such a Change is Another Point and Extrinsical to our present business 6. For Instance We experience that that Thing we call Wood is Chang'd into Another Thing call'd Fire and therefore unless we will say that Wood is Annihilated and Fire Created in its room which we are forbid to do by the very Notion of its being Chang'd into another there must have been Somewhat in Wood by which it was Actually Such a Thing before the Change was made and which is Lost by its being Chang'd into Fire and also Somewhat in it which remains in the Fire into which 't is Chang'd The Former they call the Form the Later the Matter and thence conclude there must have been a Composition of Matter and Form in the Wood. And since all Mankind agrees that Wood is One Thing and Fire Another Thing hence Essence being the Form that constitutes an Ens or makes it Formally a Thing they do farther affirm that that which was in Fire and made us denominate it such a Thing or Ens is an Essential Form And because the Matter of the Wood had or rather was a Power to have such a Form as made it now to be Wood and also a Power to be afterwards Fire hence they say that that Thing Ens or Substance we call'd Wood did consist of Matter and Form or was Compounded of them that is Wood had truly in it what corresponded to both these Natures or Notions Lastly because Wood was Chang'd according to One of them only viz. the Form hence they conclude there was Formal Mutation made in the Wood which therefore was a Change according to somewhat that was most Intrinsecal to it because it chang'd it's Essence by making it become Another Thing and consequently that Change was an Essential one Thus much of the Doctrin of the Peripateticks concerning Formal Composition and Mutation which is Essential 7. But besides this Formal Composition and the Divisibility of that Essential part call'd the Form from the Matter which we have now spoken of there is moreover say the Peripateticks another sort of Formal Composition and Mutation which is Accidental For even