no one has opposed a distinct Treatise of these two Faculties of the Soul although they are naturally inseparable In fine the Senses and Imagination don't differ any more from the pure Understanding than the Passions do from the Inclinations so that we must distinguish these two last Faculties as it has been usual to do with the three first that we may be better able to discern what the Soul receives from its Author by means of the Body from that which it has from him independant of the Body The only inconvenience that will naturally result from the distinction of these two things thus naturally united will be as it happens upon like occasions a necessity of repeating some things which have been already said Man is one although composed of many parts and the union of these parts is so strict that it can't be touch'd in one place without affecting the whole all his Faculties have such a mutual dependance upon one another and are so subordinate that 't is impossible to explain any one of 'em without speaking something of the other Thus by endeavouring to avoid confusion I am obliged 10 repetition but 't is better to repeat than confound because my business is to write as clear as I can and in this necessity of repetition I can only endeavour so to repeat as not to be troublesom to my Reader The Passions of the Soul are Impressions of the Author of Nature which incline us to love out Body and whatever may be useful to its preservation as the Natural Inclinations are the Impressions of the same Author which chiefly incline us to love him as the Soverain Good The natural or occasional Cause of these Impressions is the motion of the Animal Spirits to beget and cherish an agreeable disposition to the Object which is perceived so that the Mind and Body are mutually assistant on this occasion For 't is the Order of God that the Motions of our Body which are proper to execute the Order of our Will should follow it and that the Motions of our Body which are mechanically excited in us at the sight of any Object should be accompanied with a passion of our Soul which inclines us to will that which appears useful to the Body 't is this continual impression of the Will of God upon us which so strictly unites us to a portion of Matter and if this impression of his Will should but cease for one moment we should from that moment be freed from the dependance we have upon all the changes which happen to our Body I can't comprehend how some persons imagine that there is an absolutely necessary connection between the Motions of the Spirit and Blood and the Emotions of the Soul some little particles of Choler are violently mov'd in the Brain therefore the Soul must necessarily be agitated with some Passion and this Passion must rather be Anger than Love What relation can be conceived betwixt the Idea of an Enemies Imperfection a Passion of Contempt or Hatred and betwixt the Corporeal Motion of some Particles of Blood which beat against some parts of the Brain How can a Man perswade himself of such a dependance and that the Union or Alliance of two things so different and incompatible as Mind and Matter can be caused and preserved after any other manner than by the continual and Almighty and Omnipotent Will of the Author of Nature Those who think that Bodies do necessarily and of themselves communicate Motion in the moment of their Concourse think something like truth for indeed this prejudice has some foundation Bodies seem to have an essential relation to Bodies but the Mind and Body are two kinds of Beings so opposite that those who think the Emotions of the Soul do necessarily follow the Motions of the Spirits and Blood think something that has not the least appearance of truth certainly 't is only our own Consciousness of the Union of those two Beings and our Ignorance of the continual Operations of God upon his Creatures which makes us imagine another Cause of the Union of our Soul and Body besides the Will of God It is difficult to determine whether this relation or connexion of the thoughts of Mans Mind with the Motion of his Body is the Punishment of Sin or the Gift of Nature and some Persons believe it would be rashness to decide either way 't is well known that Man before Sin was no Slave but absolate Master of his Passions and by his Will did easily stay the agitation of the Blood which caused them But I should be hardly perswaded that the Body did not sollicite the Soul of the first Man to an enquiry after things which were proper for the preservation of his Life or that Adam before his Fall was insensible that Fruits were agreeable to his sight and pleasant to his taste especially if I may believe the Scripture and that this so just so marvellous an Oeconomy of his Senses and Passions for the preservation of his Body was a Corruption of Nature rather than the first Institution Doubtless Nature is now corrupted the Body acts with too much power upon the Mind instead of submissively representing to it its necessities it tyrannizes over it and ravishes it from God to whom it ought to be inseparably united and continually prompts it to a pursuit of such sensible things as may be proper for its conservation the Mind is become as it were immaterial and earthy by Sin that relation and Essential Union which it has with God is lost I mean God has withdrawn himself from it as much as possible without destroying or annihilating it Innumerable disorders have followed the absence or estrangement of him who kept it in order and without making a longer enumeration of our Miseries Man is by the fall throughly corrupted in all his parts But this fall has not destroyed the Work of God that which God gave to the first Man is always sound in him the immutable Will of God which constitutes the Nature of every thing was not changed by the levity and inconstancy of Adam s Will every thing that God did Will he yet Wills and because his Will is efficacious he effects whatever he Wills Mans Sin was indeed the occasion that the Divine Will did not constitute the Order of Grace but Grace is not contrary to Nature the one destroys not the other Because God fights not against himself he never repents and his Wisdom having no limits his Works will have no end The Will of God which constitutes the Order of Grace is joined to that Will which effects the Order of Nature not to change it but to repair it There are only two General Wills in God and whatever is well regulated in the World depends upon one of these The Passions are very well ordered if they are only considered in order to the Bodies preservation although they sometimes deceive us in few and particular Cases which the Universal Cause has not
God only because they freely and falsly judge that he is Evil For they cannot hate Good considered as such So that 't is by the same motion of love that God imprints on them to Good that they Hate him Now they judge that God is not Good because they make not that use as they ought of their liberty Not being convinced by an undoubted evidence that God is not Good they ought not to believe him Evil nor consequently Hate him We must distinguish two things in Hatred the Sensation of the Soul and motion of the Will The Sensation cannot be bad For 't is a modification of the Soul which Morally speaking has neither Good nor Ill in it For the motion it is not ill neither since it is not distinct from that of Love For external Evil being only a privation of Good it is evident that to fly Evil is to fly the privation of Good that is to incline towards Good So that whatever there is of real and positive in the Hatred even of God hath nothing bad in it And the Sinner cannot hate God but by making an abominable abuse of the action that God continually gives him to induce him to love himself God causes whatever we have that is real in the Sensations of Concupiscence This Explanation relates to the fifth Chapter of the first Book of the Search after Truth and yet he is not the Author of our Concupiscence As the difficulties that are raised about Concupiscence have much relation to those things I have explained it will be proper for me here to show that God is not the Author of Concupiscence altho' he performs all things in us and 't is only he who produces even sensible Pleasures in us It seems undoubted to me that we ought to grant for the Reasons I have given in the fifth Chapter of the first Book of the Search after Truth and elsewhere that following the Natural Laws of the union of the Soul and Body Man even before Sin was carried by a foresight of Pleasure to the use of sensible Goods and that every time that certain traces were formed in the chief part of his Brain certain thoughts were produced in his Mind Now these Laws were very just for the Reasons brought in the same Chapter This supposed as before the Fall all things were perfectly well regulated so Man had necessarily a power over his Body that he cou'd hinder the formation of these traces when he wou'd for order requires that the Mind shou'd govern the Body Now this power of Mans Mind over his Body consisted strictly in that according to his desires and different applicacations he could stop the communication of the Motions which were produced in his Body by those Objects that were about him over which his Will had not an immediate and direct power as it had over his own Body I dont see how we can conceive that after any other manner he coud hinder the traces from being formed in his Brain Thus the Will of God or general Law of Nature which is the true cause of the communication of Motion wou'd on certain occasions depend upon Adams Will for God had this respect for him that he produced not new Motions in his Body if he consented not to them or at least in the chief part of it to which the Soul is immediately united Such was the Institution of Nature before Sin Order requires it so and consequently he whose Will is ever conformable to Order Now this Will continuing always the same the Sin of the first Man has overturn'd the Order of Nature because the first Man having Sinned Order woud not permit him absolutely to rule over any thing In the Objection of the 7th Article of the Explanation of the 7th Cap. of the 2d l. I explain what I speak here in general of the loss that Man sustain'd as to the power he had over his Body It is not just that the Sinner shoud suspend the communication of Motions that the Will of God shou'd be accommodated to his and that in favour of him there shoud be exceptions in the Law of Nature So that Man is subject to Concupiscence his Mind depends upon his Body he feels in himself indeliberate Pleasures and involuntary and rebellious Motions in consequence of his most Just Law who united both parts of which he is composed Thus formal Concupiscence as well as formal Sin is nothing real It is in Man only the loss of that power he had of suspending the communication of Motions on certain occasions We must not admit in God a positive Will of producing it This loss that Man has sustained is not a Natural consequence of the Will of God which is ever conformable to order and always the same 't is a consequence of Sin which has made Man unworthy of an advantage due only to his Innocence and Justice So that we must say that God is not the cause of Concupiscence but only Sin Yet whatever is real and positive in the Sensations and Motions of Concupiscence is performed by God Aug. against the two Epistles of the Pel. l. 1. cap. 15 c. for God effects whatever is done but that is no Evil 'T is by the General Law of Nature 't is by the Will of God that sensible Objects produce certain Motions in the Body of Man and that these Motions excite certain Sensations in the Soul useful for the preservation of the Body or propagation of the Species who dares then say that these things are not good in themselves I know very well that we say Sin is the cause of certain Pleasures we say it but do we know it Can we think that Sin which is nothing shou'd actually produce something Can we conceive nothing to be a Cause However we say it but it may be the reason is because we will not take pains enough to think seriously upon what we say or else it is because we will begin an Explication which is contrary to what we have heard persons say who it may be spoke with more Gravity and Assurance than Reflexion and Understanding Sin is the cause of Concupiscence but it is not the cause of Pleasure as Free-will is the cause of Sin without being the cause of the Natural Motion of the Soul The pleasure of the Soul is good as well as its motion or love and there is nothing good that God does not The rebellion of the Body and malignity of Pleasure proceeds from Sin as the inclination of the Soul to or its acquiescence in a particular good comes from the Sinner But these are only privations and nothings that the Creature is capable of All Pleasure is good and even in some manner makes him happy that enjoys it at least whilest he enjoys it But we may say that Pleasure is Evil because instead of raising the Mind to him that causes it it happens through the errour of our Mind and corruption of our Heart that it
freezes the Water in Rivers We must say that the Air dryes the Earth because it agitates and sucks up the Water which is tempered with it And that the Air or subtle Matter freezes Rivers in Winter because it does not then communicate motion enough to the parts of which the Water is composed In a word we must if we can give the Natural and Particular Cause of the Effects produced But as the action of these Causes consist only in the Moving Power which acts them and that this Moving Power is nothing else but the Will of God who creates them or successively preserves them in different places we must not say that they have in themselves a Strength or Power to produce any Effects And when in Reasoning we are at last come to a general Effect whose Cause we seek 't would be a very ill way of Philosophizing to imagine any other besides the general one And to feign a Certain Nature a First Moveable an Vniversal Soul or some such like Chimera of which we have no clear and distinct Idea would be to argue like the Heathen Philosophers For instance When we are ask't whence it comes that some Bodies are in Motion or how the Air when agitated communicates its Motion to the Water or rather from whence it proceeds that Bodies impell one another As Motion and its communication is a general Effect whereupon all others depend it is necessary I dont say to be a good Christian but to be a Philosopher to recur to God who is the Universal Cause since 't is his Will which is the Moving Power of Bodies and which also regulates the communication of their Motions If he had Will'd there should be no new production in the World he would not have put the parts of it in Motion And if he should hereafter Will the incorruptibility of any of the Beings he has Created he would cease to Will certain communications of Motions in respect to these Beings The Third Proof All Labour would be useless 't would be un necessary to water and to give certain preparatory dispositions to Bodies to fit them for what we desire of them For God has no need of preparing the subjects upon which he acts ANSWER Suarez in the same place To which I Reply That God can absolutely do what he pleases without finding any dispositions in the subjects he works upon But he cannot do it without a Miracle or by Natural wayes that is according to the general Laws of the communication of the Motions he has established and according to which he generally acts God never multiplies his Wills without Reason but alwayes acts by the most simple wayes and therefore he makes use of the meeting of Bodies in giving them Motion not as their shock is absolutely necessary to move them as our Senses tell us but because that being the occasion of the communication of Motion there needs only a few Natural Laws to produce all the admirable Effects that we see For by this means we can reduce all the Laws of the communication of Motion to one only which is That Bodies which shock each other being look'd upon but as one in the moment of their contact or shock the Moving Power is at their separation divided between them according to the proportion of their magnitude But as concuring Bodies are incompassed with an infinite number of other Bodies which act upon them by vertue and efficacy of this Law how constant and uniform soever it may be it produces an infinite number of different communications because it acts upon infinite Bodies which all relate to one another See the last Chap. of the Search after Truth It is necessary to water a Plant to make it grow because according to the Laws of the communication of Motions there is scarce any other but watery Particles which by their Motion and Figure can insinuate themselves and enter the Fibres of the Plants and by various uniting themselves together take the Figure necessary for their Nourishment The subtle matter which the Sun continually diffuses may by agitating the Water draw it up into the Plants but it has not Motion enough to raise gross Particles of Earth However the Earth and even the Air are necessary to the growth of Plants The Earth to preserve the Water at their Root and the Air to excite a moderate fermentation in the same Water But the action of the Sun Air and Water consist only in the Motion of their parts and to speak properly none but God can act For as I have just said there is only he who by the efficacy of his Will and infinite extent of his Knowledge can produce and regulate the infinite communications or Motions which are made every moment and according to an infinite exact and regular proportion The Fourth Proof Can God oppose or resist himself Bodies meet shock and resist one another therefore God acts not in them except by his concurrence For if he only produced and preserved Motion in Bodies he would divert them before their meeting since he knows very well that they are impenetrable Why should Bodies be impelled to be thrown back again or made to advance that they may recoil Or wherefore are useless Motions produced and preserved Is it not extravagant to say that God fights against himself and destroys his own works when a Bull opposes a Lion or a Wolf devours a Sheep and a Sheep eats the Grass which he gave growth to Therefore there are Second Causes ANSWER Then Second Causes do every thing and God does nothing at all For God cannot act against himself and to concur is to act Concurring to contrary actions is giving contrary concourses and consequently a performing contrary actions To concur with the action of the Creatures which resist one another is to act against himself and to concur to useless Motions is to act unusefully Now God does nothing in vain he performs no actions contrary to one another Therefore he concurs not in the action of the Creatures who often destroy one another and make useless actions and motions Hither 't is that this Proof of Second Causes conducts us but let us examine what Reason teaches us about it God does all in every thing and nothing resists him He performs all things since 't is by his Wills that all Motions are produced and regulated and nothing resists him because whatever he wills is effected And thus it ought to be conceived He having resolved to produce by the most simple wayes as the most conformable to order this infinite variety of Creatures that we admire he determined Bodies to move in a right line because this line is the most simple But Bodies being impenetrable and their Motions inclining to opposite lines or such as intersect they must necessarily meet one another and consequently cease to move in the same manner God foresaw this and nevertheless positively willed the meeting or opposition of Bodies not because he was pleased
Wills of Spirits For First According to the General Laws of the Communication of Motions the invisible Bodies which surround the visible ones by their divers Motions produce all these various Effects the Cause of which does not appear to us Secondly According to the Laws of the Union of the Soul and Body when Bodies which are about us Act upon ours they produce in our Souls an infinite variety of Sensations Ideas and Passions Thirdly Our Mind produces by its Wills a great many different Ideas in it self For it is our Wills which apply and modifie our Minds as Natural Causes whose Efficacy nevertheless proceeds from the Laws which God has Established Lastly When our Mind Acts upon our Body many Changes are therein produced by vertue of the Laws of its Union with it And by the means of our Body it also produces in those about it a great Number of Changes by vertue of the Laws of the Communication of Motions Thus all Natural Effects have no other Natural or Occasional Cause than the Motions of Bodies and Wills of Spirits which will easily be granted by any who will use but a little application supposing he is not already prepossessed by such as know not what they say who instantly imagine Beings which they have no clear Idea of and pretend to explain Things they understand not by what is absolutely incomprehensible So that God executing by his Concourse or rather by his Efficacious Will whatever the Motions of Bodies or Determinations of Spirits perform as Natural or Occasional Causes it 's plain God does every Thing by the same Action of the Creature Not that Creatures of themselves have any Efficacious Action but because the Power of God is in some sort communicated to them by the Natural Laws which God has Established in their favour This is all that I can say to reconcile my Thoughts with the Opinion of those Divines who maintain the necessity of immediate Concourse and that God does All in all Things by the same Action as that of the Creatures For as to the rest of the Divines I believe their Opinions are indesensible every way and chiefly that of Durandus See Durand in 2. Dist 1. Qu. 5. Dist 37. de Genesi ad Litteram l. 5. c. 20. and some Ancients whom St. Austin refutes who absolutely denyed the necessity of Concourse and would have Second Causes do every Thing by a Power which God had given them at the Creation For although this Opinion be less perplexed than that of the other Divines yet it appears to me so opposite to Scripture and conformable to Prejudices to say no more that I believe it cannot be maintained I confess that the Schoolmen In 4. Sent. Dist 1. q. De aliaco ibid. who say the immediate Concourse of God is the same Action as that of the Creatures do not absolutely understand it according to my Explanation And except Biel and Cardinal D' Ailly all those I have read think that the Efficacy which produces Effects proceeds from the Second Cause as well as the First But as I determined with my self not to say any thing but what I conceive clearly and always take that Side which best agrees with Religion I believe it will not be taken amiss if I forsake an Opinion which to many persons appears so much the more intricate as they endeavour more assiduously to apprehend it And since I have established another which agrees perfectly not only with Reason but also with the Holiness of Religion and Christian Morality 'T is a Truth I have already proved in the Chapter upon which I make these Reflection but it will be very proper for me to offer yet something more fully to Justifie what I have already said upon the present Question Reason and Religion convinces us than God would be loved and rever'd by his Creatures Loved as good and Rever'd as powerful Which is a Truth we cannot doubt of without impiety and folly To love God as he requires and deserves to be loved we must according to the First Command both of the Law and Gospel and even of Reason as I have elsewhere shown do it with all our strength or according to the utmost Capacity we have of Loving It is not enough to prefer him to all Things but we must also love him in all Things Else is not our Love so perfect as it ought to be l. 4. ch 1. nor do we give to God all the Love he has impressed upon us and that only for himself since all his Actions center in himself Likewise to render to God all the Reverence due to him it is not enough to adore him as the Soveraign Power and fear him more than any of his Creatures We must also fear and adore him in all his Creatures and all our Actions must tend towards him for Honour and Glory are due only to him Which is what God has commanded us in these Words Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo ex tota anima tua Deut. 6. ex tota fortitudine tua And in these Dominum Deum tuum timebis illi soli servies Thus the Philosophy which teaches us That the Efficacy of Second Causes is a Fiction of the Mind that the Nature of Aristotle and some other Philosophers is a Chimera that God only is strong and powerful enough not only to Act in our Souls but also to give the least Motion to Matter This Philosophy I say agrees perfectly with Religion the design of which is to unite us to God after the strictest manner We commonly love such Things only as are capable of doing us some good This Philosophy therefore only Authorises the Love of God and absolutely condemns the Love of every Thing else We ought to fear Nothing but what is able to do us some Evil This Philosophy therefore only permits us to fear God and positively forbids our fearing any Thing else So that it Justifies all the Motions of the Soul which are Just and Reasonable and condemns all those that are contrary to Reason and Religion For this Philosophy will never Justifie the Love of Riches the Desire of Greatness nor the Extravagance of Debauchery since the Love of the Body appears mad and ridiculous to the Principles established by this Philosophy 'T is an Undoubted Truth a Natural Opinion and even a common Notion that we ought to love the Cause of our Pleasure and love it in proportion to the Felicity it does or can make us enjoy It is not only Just but it is also very Necessary that the Cause of our Happiness should be the Object of our Love Thus following the Principles of this Philosophy we ought only to love God for it tells us that He alone is the True Cause of our Happiness that the Bodies which are about us cannot Act upon that which we Animate consequently much less upon our Minds 'T is not the Sun which enlightens us
necessity of sending Dragoons into the Monasteries and Societies and to an infinite number of honest Men to cause them to abjure the Errours of the Cartesian Philosophy So true is it that Devotees do not always see the fatal Consequences of an Advice which impetuous Zeal dictates to those that are in Authority Monsieur Regis well known by the Philosophy he has Published having undertaken to oppose some Sentiments of F. Malebranch this Father neglected at first to Answer his new Adversary but when Monsieur Regis would have drawn an advantage from the silence of a Man who plainly perceived himself unfairly attack'd Father Malbranche published the last Year a short Answer to Monsieur Regis The name of Monsieur Arnaud was made use of in this Contestation which occasioned him to appear again upon the stage In the Journal des Scavans at Paris he Printed two Letters addrest to F. Malebranch who soon answered him and gave two Letters to the Journalist that were also Printed Monsieur Cousin left off his Correspondence with Monsieur Arnaud and refused to put in his Journal other Letters which M. Arnaud had written a little before his Death we shall doubtless see them in his Posthumous works for it is not probable that they will rob the Publick of the Remains of so great a man We shall be gainers thereby two wayes F. Malbranche will break that silence which he seems to have condemned himself to and we shall have new Explanations upon some important Difficult ties which M. Arnaud may have found in the VVorks of so hard an Adversary I have but one thing more to say of F. Malebranch It is that his Heart agrees perfectly with his Vnderstanding There is as much Vprightness in the one as Justness in the other He is a Christian Philosopher who acts as he thinks Never did any Man more perfectly regulate his Manners and Actions upon the Principles of his Philosophy Being perswaded that God is the only cause which acts truly upon our Body and in our Soul F. Malebranch accustoms himself upon every Sensation upon every Perception to elevate himself always towards the Supreme Being to humble himself in his Presence and to praise him continually VVith what assurance does not he as often as it 's possible approach to the Throne of Grace of the Eternal High Priest who continually intercedes for us VVith what fervour does he not beg to be admitted as a Living Stone in the Structure of the Mysterious Temple which this Divine Architect builds up to the Glory of his Father He is in a continual watchfulness and attention over himself to divert the Impressions which sensible Objects may make upon his Body and to stop whatever is capable of exciting the Passions He is the most sober and temperate Man in the World And if F. Malebranch so exactly observes his Duties towards God and himself he is not less regular in those which respect his Neighbour He is tender and compassionate to the unhappy courteous and affable to all the VVorld preventing and sincere in respect of his Friends good and indulgent to all those who injure him Being perswaded that the Love of his Neighbour ought to have for its principal end that Eternal Society to which we are called by the Gospel He endeavours to inspire all those who come near him with Sentiments of Piety and Religion to procure as much as he can their Eternal Happiness which he earnestly desires day and night In a word F. Malebranch has drawn his own Pourtraiture in his Treatise of Morality To compose the greatest part of which he had no need of long and new Reflexions upon the Duties of Man He hath told us without thinking of it what he exactly practiced after he had applied himself to the regulation of his Manners upon the Truths he had so attentively Meditated and so happily Explained A SEARCH AFTER TRUTH BOOK V. of the Passions CHAP. I. Of the Nature and Original of the Passions in general THE Mind of Man has two essential or necessary relations which are very different the one to God and the other to its Body as it is a pure Spirit it is essentially united to the Word of God to the Eternal Wisdom and Truth for 't is only by this Union that it is capable of thinking as has been shewn in the 3d Book as an humane Spirit it has an essential relation to its Body and because of this union it is sensible and imagines as has been explained in the First and Second Books I call that sense or imagination of the Mind when the Body is the natural or occasional cause of its thoughts and that understanding when it acts of it self or rather when God acts in it or when his light enlightens it after many different manners independantly of any thing whatever that passes in its Body 'T is the same in respect of the humane Will as a Will it essentially depends upon the Love which God bears to himself upon the Eternal Law in a word upon the Will of God 'T is only because God loves himself that we love any thing and if God did not love himself or if he did not continually imprint upon the Soul of Man a Love like to his I mean that motion of Love which we receive for good in general we should love nothing we should will nothing and consequently we should be without any will since the will is nothing else but the impression of Nature which carries towards good in general as we have often said before Book I. Ch. I. and elsewhere But the Will as it is an humane Will essentially depends upon the Body for 't is only from the motions of the Blood and Spirits that it perceives it self agitated with all sensible Emotions I therefore give the name of Natural Inclinations to all the motions of the Soul which are common to us with pure Intelligences and some of those in which the Body has a great share but whereof it is only indirectly the Cause and the End as I have explained in the preceding Book and here I design by the word Passions all the Emotions which the Soul naturally feels by means of the extraordinary Motions of the Animal Spirits and Blood These are the sensible Emotions which shall be the Subject of this Book Although the Passions are inseparable from the Inclinations and Men were no farther capable of sensible love or hatred than as they are capable of the mental yet I thought it would not be amiss to treat distinctly of 'em to avoid confusion Those that consider the Passions are much more strong and lively than the Natural Inclinations for other Objects and which are always produced from other Causes will acknowledge that 't is not without reason that I have separated things that are inseparable in their nature Men are only capable of Sensations and Imaginations as they are capable of pure Intellections the Senses and Imagination being inseparable from the Mind however
difference between not feeling Pleasure or being deprived of the sensation of it and actually suffering Pain so that all Evil is not such precisely because it deprives us of good but only as I have shewn the Evil which is External and which is not a manner of being that is in us Nevertheless as by Goods and Evils we generally mean things Good and Evil and not the Sensation of Pleasure and Pain which are rather Natural Marks whereby the Soul distinguishes Good from Evil it seems that we may say without equivocation that Evil is only a privation of Good and that the Natural motion of the Soul which drives us from Evil is the same with that which inclines us to Good For all Natural Motion being an impression of the Author of Nature who acts only for himself and can only incline us towards himself The true Motion of the Soul is always an essential love of good and but an accidenttal aversion to evil It is true that Pain may be considered as an Evil and in this sense the Motions of the Passions that it excites is not real for we do not will Pain and if we will positively that Pain should not be it is because we would positively preserve or perfect our Being The third thing that we may observe in every Passion is the Sensation which accompanies them for the Sensation of Love Aversion Desire Joy Sorrow are always different in different Passions The fourth is a new determination of the course of the Spirits and Blood towards the External parts of the Body and towards the Internal ones before the sight of the Object that moves the Passion the Animal Spirits were dispersed through all the Body to preserve all the parts of it in general but at the presence of this new Object the whole Oeconomy is troubled the greatest past of the Spirits are pushed into the Muscles of the Arms Legs Face and all the External parts of the Body to put them in a proper disposition for the Passion that Rules and to give it the necessary posture and motion for the acquisition of good or to fly the evil that presents it self but if its own Forces are not sufficient to answer its occasions these same Spirits are so distributed that they Mechanically make it utter certain words and cries which diffuse over the Face and the rest of the Body such an Air as is capable of agitating others with the same Passion it self is moved with For as Men and Animals are united together by the Eyes and Ears when any one of them is agitated he necessarily moves all those that look upon him and hear him and naturally makes an impression upon their imagination which interests them in his preservation As for the rest of the Animal Spirits they violently descend into the Lungs Liver Spleen and the rest of the Bowels to demand Contributions from all those parts and hasten them in a little time to furnish necessary Spirits to preserve the Body in the extraordinary action it must be in The fifth is the sensible emotion of the Soul which feels it self agitated by the unexpected overflowing of the Spirits This always accompanies the motion of the Spirits so that it interests it self in whatever affects the Body even as the motion of the Spirits are excited in the Body as soon as the Soul is carried toward any Object the Soul and Body being mutually united their motions are reciprocal The sixth are the different Sensations of Love Aversion Joy Sorrow Desire caused not by the intellectual fight of good or evil as those we have already spoke of but by the different shakings that the Animal Spirits cause in the Brain The seventh is a certain Sensation of Joy or rather of inward Complacency which stops the Soul in its passion and assures it that 't is in the condition that is proper for it in relation to the Object it considers This internal Complacency generally accompanies all the Passions those which proceed from the prospect of an Evil as well as those that proceed from the prospect of a Good Sorrow as well as Joy 'T is this Complacency that renders all our Passions agreeable and which inclines us to consent and abandon our selves to them In short 't is this Complacency that must be overcome by the delight of Grace the joy of Faith and Reason For as the joy of the Mind always results from the certain or evident knowledge that we are in the best estate we can be in relation to the things we perceive so the Complacency of the Passions is a Natural Consequence of the confused Sensations we have that we are in the best condition we can be in relation to the things we feel Now by the joy of the Mind and delights of Grace we must conquer the false Complacency of our Passions which makes us slaves to sensible goods All these things we have spoke of occur in every Passion when they are excited by confused Sensations and that the Mind perceives neither the good nor evil which can cause them for then 't is plain the three first things are not concerned in them We likewise see that all those things are not free that they are in us without our consent and even against it since the Fall and that there is only the consent of our Will which truly depends upon us But it seems necessary to explain all these things more at large and to render them more sensible by some Examples Let us suppose then that a Man has actually received some affront or that being naturally of a very lively and quick imagination he has been agitated by some accident as a disease a melancholy retirement or the like and imagines to himself in his Closet that such a Person who does not so much as think upon him is willing and prepared to hurt him The sensible prospect or imagination of the relation which is betwixt the actions of his Enemy and his own Designs will be the first cause of his Passion It is not even absolutely necessary that this Man should receive or imagine he received some affront for the motion of his Will to receive some new determination It is enough that he think it in his Mind only without the Body's having any part in it But as this new determination wou'd not be a determination of Passion but a pure inclination very weak and languishing we shou'd suppose that this Man actually suffers some great opposition in his designs or that he strongly imagines that he shall do so rather than make another supposition wherein the Senses and Imagination have little or no share The second thing we may consider in the Passion of this Man is an increase of the motion of his Will towards the good the possession whereof his real or imaginary Enemy would hinder him and the increase is so much the greater as the opposition that would be made appears stronger to him He first hates his Enemy only because he loves
of the Mind from God and the uniting the Mind to something inferior to it like the Body since only this union can make it imperfect and unhappy Thus to be acquainted with Truth to know things that are the most agreeable or consonant to the Rules of Virtue is to know God himself The Mind is as it were placed between God and the Body Good and Evil between what instructs and blinds it regulates and disorders it what can make it perfect and happy and what can make it imperfect and miserable When it discovers any Truth or sees things as they are in themselves it sees them in the Idea's of God that is by a clear and distinct view of what it is in God that represents them For as I have before intimated the Mind of Man does not in it self include the Perfections or Idea's of all the Beings it is capable of considering 'T is not the Universal Being and therefore does not see in it self such things as are distinct from it by consulting it self it is neither capable of enlightening or instructing it self for 't is neither its own Perfection nor Light it stands in need of the immense Light of Truth by which it is united to and possesses God in some manner But we cannot only say that the Mind which is acquainted with Truth does in some manner know God who includes it but we may likewise add That in part it knows things as God himself knows them for the Mind knows their true Relations and God knows them also the Mind discovers them by viewing the Perfections of God who represents them God sees them likewise by the same means For in short God neither sees nor imagines but perceives in himself as he is the Intellectual World the Material and Sensible one which he has created It is the same with the Mind in its knowledge of Truth it perceives it not by Sensation and Imagination Sensations and Phantoms only represent false Relations to the Mind and whoever discovers the Truth can only see it in the Intellectual World to which 't is united and in which God himself sees it for this Material and Sensible World is not intelligible of it self The Mind then sees in the Light of God what e'er it sees clearly thô it sees them but imperfectly and in that respect very differently from what God sees them So that when the Mind discovers the Truth it is not only united to God but possesses and beholds him and in one sense sees the Truth as God himself does Likewise when our Love is regulated by Virtue we love God for when we love according to these Rules the impression of love that God continually produces in our hearts inclines us towards him and is neither diverted by Free-will nor changed into Self-love The Mind then does only with the greatest freedom follow this impression that God gives it and the Almighty never giving it any impression but what tends towards him since he only acts for himself It is evident that when we love according to the Rules of Virtue we love God But 't is not only to love God 't is also to love as God does who only loves himself and his Works because they relate to his Perfections and loves these Works proportionably to the relation they have to these Perfections And indeed 't is the same love whereby God loves himself and whatever he has created To love according to the Rules of Virtue is to love God only and to love God in every thing is to love every thing so far as it partakes of his Goodness and Perfection since that is to love them in proportion to their Amiableness In short 't is to love by the impression of the same love whereby God loves himself for 't is that love by which God loves himself and whatever relates to him which animates us when we love as we ought to do And therefore we then love as God loves It is then evident that the knowledge of Truth and regulated love of Virtue produces all our Perfections since they are commonly the consequences of our Union with God and even lead us to the enjoyment of him as much as we are capable in this life And on the contrary the blindness of our Minds and irregularity of our Inclinations are the cause of all our imperfections being the Natural effects of the union of our Mind with our Body as I have before proved in shewing that we never discover the Truth nor love the true Good when we follow the impressions of our Senses Imaginations and Passions Tho' these things are so evident yet Men who ardently desire to perfect their Being take very little pains to encrease their union with God but continually endeavour to strengthen and enlarge that they have with Sensible things The cause of this strange irregularity cannot be too fully explain'd The possession of Good must naturally produce these two effects in him that enjoys it it makes him more perfect and at the same time more happy Yet it does not always happen so I confess 't is impossible that the Mind shou'd actually possess any good and not be actually more perfect but it may actually enjoy a good without being made more happy by it Those who are best acquainted with the Truth and have the greatest love for the most amiable good are always actually more perfect than those that are still subjected to blindness and disorder yet are they not always actually more happy It is the same thing in respect to Evil it makes men both imperfect and unhappy at the same times yet tho' it always renders them more imperfect it does not always make them more unhappy or at least it does not make them unhappy in proportion to the imperfection it gives them Virtue is often unpleasant and bitter and Vice sweet and agreeable so that 't is chiefly through Faith and Hope that good Men are truly happy whilst the Wicked actually enjoy Pleasure and Delights It ought not to be thus 't is true but so it is Sin having caused this disorder as I have shew'd in the preceding Chapter and 't is this disorder that is the chief cause not only of all the irregularities of our Hearts but also of the blindness and ignorance of our Minds Our Imagination is by this disorder perswaded that the Body may be the good of the Mind for Pleasure as I have many times intimated is the Character or Sensible Mark of Good and the most sensible Earthly enjoyments are those which we imagine we receive from the Body Wherefore without much reflexion we judge that Bodies may be and even truly are our Good And 't is so difficult to oppose the Instinct of Nature and to resist the Proofs of Sensation that we never so much as think of it We reflect not upon the disorders that Sin has produced and consider not that Bodies can only act upon the Mind as occasional Causes That the Mind cannot immediately or of it self
to the carnal and most ignorant That he might instruct them by that which caused their blindness and encline them to love him and loose them from sensible Objects by the same things that had captivated them For when he had to do with Fools he made use of a kind of simplicity to make them wise so that the most Religious and Faithful have not always the greatest Understanding They may know God by Faith and love him through the assistance of his Grace without discerning him to be their All after the same manner as Philosophers do and without reflecting that the abstracted knowledge of Truth is a kind of union with him We must not therefore be surprized if there are but few Persons who endeavour to strengthen their Natural Union they have with God by seeking after the Truth since to this end it would be necessary constantly to oppose the impression of the Senses and Passions after a very different manner from that which is familiar to the most Virtuous Persons for most good Men are not always perswaded that the Senses and Passions deceive us after the manner we have explained in the precedent Books Those Sensations and Thoughts wherein the Body has any share are the true and immediate cause of our Passions because 't is only the shaking of the Fibres of the Brain that excites any particular emotion in the Animal Spirits so that only our Sensations can sensibly convince us that we depend on certain things which they excite us to love But we feel not the Natural Union we have with God when we discover the Truth nor so much as think upon him for he is within us and operates after such a secret and insensible manner that we perceive him not Our Natural Union with him therefore does not excite us to love him But our Union with Sensible Things is quite different All our Sensations declare this Union and Bodies present themselves to our Eyes when they act in us nor is any thing they do concealed Even our own Body is more present to us than our Mind and we consider it as the best part of our selves Thus the Union we have with our Body and through that with all sensible Objects excites a violent love in us which increases this Union and makes us depend upon things that are infinitely below us CHAP. VI. Of the most general Errors of the Passions Some particular Examples of them IT 's the part of Moral Philosophy to enquire into all the particular Errors wherein our Passions engage us concerning good to oppose the irregularities of Love to establish the sincerity of the Heart and regulate the Manners But our chief intent here is to give Rules for the Mind and to discover the causes of our Errors in respect of Truth so that we shall pursue no further those things already mentioned which relate only to the love of the true Good We will then proceed to the Mind but shall not pass by tne Heart because it has the greatest influence over the Mind We will enquire after the Truth in it self and without thinking on the relation it has to us only so far as this relation is the occasion that Self-love disguises and conceals it from us for we judging of all things according to our Passions deceive our selves in all things the Judgments of the Passions never agreeing with the Judgments of the Truth 'T is what we may learn from these admirable words of St. Bernard * Amor sicut nec odium veritatis judicium nescit Vis judicium veritatis audire Joan 5.30 Sicut audio sic judico Non sicut odi non sicut amo non sicut timeo Est judicium odii ut illud Nos legem habemus secundum legem Nostram debet mori Joan 19.7 Est timoris ut illud si dimittimus eum sic venient Romani tollent Nostrum locum gentem Joan 11.48 Judicium vero amoris ut David de filiô parricidâ Parcite inquit puero Absalom 2 Reg. 18.5 St. Bern. de grad humilitatis Neither love nor hatred says he know how to judge according to truth But if you will hear a true Judgment I judge according to what I hear not as I hate love or fear This is a Judgment of hatred We have a law and according to our law he ought to die This is a Judgment of fear If we let him alone the Romans will come and take away our Place and Nation This is a Judgment of love as David speaks of his parricide son Spare the young Man Absalom Our Love Hatred and Fear cause us to make false Judgments only and nothing but the pure Light of Truth can enlighten our Mind 'T is only the distinct Voice of our common Master that instructs us to make solid Judgments and he will infallibly do it provided we only judge of what he says and according to what he says Sicut audio sic judico As I hear I judge But let us see after what manner our Passions seduce us that we may the more easily resist them The Passions have so great a relation to the Senses that 't will not be difficult to discover after what manner they engage us in Error if we but remember what has been said in the First Book For the general Causes of the Errors of our Passions are entirely like those of the Errors of our Senses The most general cause of the Errors of our Senses is as we have shewn in the First Book our attributing to our Body or to External Objects those Sensations which belong to our Soul affixing Colours to the Surfaces of Bodies diffusing of Light Sounds Odours in the Air and assigning Pain and Pleasure to those parts of our Body which receive any change by the motion of other Bodies which meet them The same thing may be said of our Passions we imprudently attribute to those Objects which cause or seem to cause them all the dispositions of our Heart Goodness Meekness Malice Ill-nature and all the other Qualities of our Mind Whatever Object produces any Passion in us in some manner seems to include in it self what it stirs up in us when we think upon it Even as sensible Objects appear to us to include the Sensations their presence excites When we love any Person we are naturally inclined to believe they love us and 't would be difficult for us to imagine that they had either any design to hurt us or to oppose our desires But if hatred succeeds love we cannot believe that they design us any good we interpret all their actions in the worst sense and are always suspicious and upon our guard although perhaps they think not of us or else intend to do us some service In short we unjustly attribute all the dispositions of our Heart to those Persons who excite any Passion in us even as we imprudently ascribe all the qualities of our Mind to sensible Objects Moreover by the same
is accompanied with a greater number of Accessory Ideas or that the Good or Evil are more Circumstantiated in respect to us If we remember what has been said of the connexion of Ideas and that in all great Passions the Animal Spirits being extreamly agitated stir up in the Brain all the Traces which have any relation with the Object which affects us we shall find that there are an infinite number of different Passions which have no particular name and which we can no way explain but must confess they are inexplicable If the Original Passions which compose the rest were not capable of more or less we should have no difficulty in determining the number of all the Passions but the number of those Passions which are produced by the complication of others must necessarily be infinite because the same Passion having infinite degrees it may by joining it self with others be infinitely complicated So that perhaps two Men were never moved by the same Passion if by the same Passion we understand the collecting together of all equal Motions and like Sensations which at the presence of any Object is stirred up in us But as the more or less do not alter the Species so we may say that the number of Passions is not infinite because the Circumstances which accompany the Good or Evil may be limited But let us explain our Passions in particular When we see any thing the first time or when we have many time seen it attended with certain Circumstances we are surprized and admire at it if we afterwards see it appear in another manner Thus a new Idea or a new Connexion of old Ideas begets in us an imperfect Passion which is the first of all and which I name Admiration I call this Passion imperfect because it is neither excited by the Idea nor Sensation of Good The Brain being then shaken in certain places which never were before affected or after a manner that is perfectly new the Soul is sensibly touched with it and consequently strongly applies it self to whatever it finds new in that object for the same reason as a simple tickling at the Soles of the Feet excites a most lively and moving Sensation in the Soul rather through the novelty than the force of the impression There is yet other Reasons for the Souls applying it self to Novelties but I have explained them where I spoke of Natural Inclinations We here consider the Soul in relation to the Body and according to this relation 't is the emotion of the Spirits which is the Natural Cause of its application to new things In Admiration strictly taken we consider things only as they are in themselves or according to their appearances and not as they relate to us or as they are good or bad And therefore the Spirits diffuse not themselves through the Muscles to give a proper disposition to the Body to pursue good or avoid evil nor agitate the Nerves which goes to the Heart and to the rest of the Bowels to hasten or delay the fermentation and motion of the Blood as it happens in the rest of the Passions All the Spirits go towards the Brain there to trace a lively and distinct image of the surprizing object that the Soul may consider and know it again But the rest of the Body continues in the same posture and as if it were immoveable For there being no emotion in the Soul there is also no motion in the Body If what we admire appears great the admiration is always followed with Esteem and sometimes with Veneration But on the contrary it is always accompanied with Contempt and sometimes Disdain when it appears little The Idea of Greatness produces a great motion of Spirits in the Brain and the trace that represents it is preserved a long time A great motion of Spirits likewise excites the Idea of Greatness in the Soul and strongly fixes the Mind on the consideration of this Idea But the Idea of Littleness creates in the Brain but an inconsiderable motion of the Spirits and the trace which represents it does not continue long Also when the Spirits are but little moved they cause in the Soul an Idea of Meanness and stays the Mind but a very little in the consideration of this Idea These things deserve to be well observed When we consider our selves or any thing which is united to us our Admiration is always attended with some Passion which moves us But this agitation is only in the Soul and in the Spirits which go to the Heart because there being no good that it makes us seek after nor evil that it makes us shun the Spirits are not dispersed through the Muscles to dispose the Body to any action The thoughts of the perfection of our Being or of any thing belonging to it naturally produces Pride the esteem of our Selves contempt of others Joy and some other Passions The prospect of Grandeur produces Haughtiness that of Power Generosity or Boldness and the sight of any other advantagious quality naturally produces some other Passion which will be always a kind of Pride On the contrary the foresight of some Imperfection of our Being or of any thing which belongs to it will naturally produce Humility contempt of our selves respect for others sorrow and some other Passions The prospect of Poverty creates meanness of Spirit that of weakness Timerousness and thus the sight of any disadvantageous quality naturally produces a Passion which will be a kind of Humility But this Humility as well as that Pride is properly neither a Virtue nor a Vice They are both of 'em only Passions or involuntary Motions which are nevertheless very useful to civil Society and even absolutely necessary in some occurrences for the preservation of the Life or Goods of those who are actuacted by them It is necessary for instance to be humble and timerous and even outwardly to testifie the disposition of our Minds by a respectful and modest Air when we are in the presence of a Person of Quality or of a proud and powerful Man For 't is commonly advantagious for the Good of the Body that the imagination should submit at the sight of sensible Grandeur and that it should give it external Marks of its Humility and inward Veneration But this is Naturally and Mechanically performed without the Will 's having any share in it and often even notwithstanding all its Resistance Even Bruits themselves have need of it as Dogs to prevail with those they live with have their Machine composed after such a manner that they assume such an Air as they ought to have in relation to those about 'em as is absolutely necessary for their preservation And if Birds or any other Animals have not a fit disposition of Body to give 'em this Air 't is because they have no occasion to asswage those the effects of whose Anger they can avoid by flight and without whose help they can preserve their lives It cannot be too much considered
viz. Joy Desire and Sorrow For we have Joy when a Good is present or an Evil past We feel Sorrow when Good is past and Evil present and are agitated with Desire when Good and Evil are to come The Passions which regard Good are particular determinations of the motion which God gives us towards Good in general and therefore their object is real But others who have not God for the cause of their motion terminate only in nothingness CHAP. X. Of the Passions in particular the manner of explaining them in general and of discovering the Errors of which they are the cause IF we consider how compound the Passions are we shall plainly discover that their number cannot be determined and that there are many more of them than we have terms to express The Passions do not only draw their differences from the various Combinations of the three first for then there wou'd be but a few of them but their difference proceeds likewise from the different Perceptions and different Judgments which cause or accompany them The different Judgments which the Soul makes of Good and Evil cause different Motions in the Animal Spirits to dispose the Body in relation to the Object and consequently create such Sensations in the Soul as are not absolutely alike Thus they are the cause as we have observed of the difference between certain Passions whose emotions resemble each other However the emotion of the Soul being the chief thing which occurs in each of our Passions it is much better to refer them all to the three Original ones in which these emotions are very different than to treat of them confusedly and without order in relation to the different perceptions that we may have of the Good and Evil which causes them for we may have so many different perceptions of Objects in relation to time to our selves to what belongs to us in relation to Persons or Things to which we are united either by Nature or the choice of our Will that it is absolutely impossible to make an exact enumeration of them When the Soul perceives a Good which she may enjoy we may perhaps say she hopes for it altho' she desires it not But it is plain this Hope is not a Passion but a simple Judgment So that 't is the emotion which accompanies the Idea of Good the possession of which we judge to be possible which makes this Hope to be a true Passion When Hope is changed into Security 't is still the same thing it is not a Passion only because of the emotion of Joy which is then mixt with that of Desire for the Judgment of the Soul which considers a Good as not being likely to fail of it is a Passion only because the foresight of Good agitates us In short when Hope diminishes and Despair succeeds it it is also plain that this Despair is a Passion only because of the emotion of Sorrow which is then mixt with this Desire for the Judgment of the Soul which considers a Good as not being able to happen is not a Passion except this Judgment agitates us But because the Soul never considers Good or Evil without some emotion and even without some change happen in the Body we often give the Name of Passion to the Judgment which produces this Passion because we confound whatsoever passes in the Soul and Body at the sight of any Good or Evil for the words Hope Fear Rashness Shame Impudence Anger Pity Derision Regret in short the Names we commonly give to all the other Passions are short expressions whereby we can expalain in particular whatever the Passions include By the word Passion we understand the view of the relation that any thing has with us the emotion and sensation of the Soul the shaking of the Brain and motion of the Spirits a new emotion and new sensation of the Soul and in fine a sensation of Complacency which always attends the Passions and makes them agreeable All these things we mean by it But sometimes by the Name of Passion we only understand either the Judgment that excites it or the emotion of the Soul or the motion of the Spirits and Blood or something else which attends the emotion of the Soul To abridge Idea's and their expressions is a very useful thing in the knowledge of Truth yet it is often the cause of some great Error when these Idea's are abridged through Popular Custom for we must never abridge our Idea's but when we have made them clear and distinct by a great application of Mind and not as we commonly do by the Passions and all sensible Things when once we have made them famillar by Sensations and the meer action of the Imagination which deceives the Mind There is a great deal of difference between the pure Idea's of the Mind and the sensations or emotions of the Soul The pure Idea's of the Mind are clear and distinct but difficultly made familiar whereas on the contrary the sensations and emotions of the Soul are very famillar but impossible to be discern'd clearly and distinctly Numbers extension and their Properties we clearly know but before we have made them sensible by some Characters which express them 't is difficult to present them for whatever is abstracted affects us not Sensations and the emotions of the Soul on the contrary are easily represented to the Mind altho' we only know them after a very confused and imperfect manner and all the terms which excite them strongly agitate the Soul and render it attentive From whence it happens that we often imagine we very well apprehend such Discourses as are absolutely incomprehensible and when we read certain descriptions of the Sensations and Passions of the Soul we perswade our selves that we understand them perfectly because we are livelily touched with them for all the words we read agitate the Soul We have no sooner pronounced the words Shame Despair Impudence but it as soon stirs up in our Minds a certain confused Idea and obscure Sensation which strongly applies us and because this Sensation is very familiar and represented to us without any trouble or effort of the Mind we perswade our selves that it is clear and distinct Yet these words are the Names of compounded Passions and consequently the abridged expressions that vulgar Custom has made of many confused and obscure Idea's As we are obliged to make use of such terms as are approved by Custom so we must not be surprised to find obscurity and sometimes a kind of contradiction in our words And if we reflected that the sensations and emotions of the Soul which answered to the terms we make use of in the like Discourses are not perfectly the same in all Men because of their difference dispositions of Mind we shou'd not so easily condemn others when they are not of our Opinions I don't say this so much to prevent the Objections which may be made against me as to make the Nature of the Passions be
Spirits desire as we may think of Devils or some other Spirits who merit this Punishment we cannot say in this case that God communicates his Power to them since they can do nothing that they would do Yet the Wills of these Spirits would be the Natural Causes of whatever Effects should be produced as such Bodies should be moved to the Right Hand because these Spirits would have them moved to the Left and the desire of these Spirits would determine the Will of God to act as our Wills to move the parts of our Bodies determine the first Cause to move them So that the Wills of Spirits are only occasional Causes Yet if after all these Reasons we will still maintain that the Will of an Angel which moves any body should be a true Cause and not an occasional one it is plain that this same Angel might be the true Cause of the Creation and Annihilation of all things For God could as well communicate to him his Prower of Creating and Destroying Bodies as that of moving them if he will'd that things should be created and annihilated In a word If he will'd that all things should happen as the Angel wishes them even as he Wills Bodies should move as the Angel pleases If it be said that an Angel or a Man would be the true movers because God moves Bodies when they wish it it may also be said that a Man and an Angel may be true Creators since God can create Beings when they will it Nay perhaps it might be said that the molt Vile Animals or Matter of it self should be the effective Cause of the Creation of any Substance if we supposed as the Philosophers do that God produces substantial Forms whenever the Disposition of Matter requires it In fine Because God has resolved from all Eternity in certain times to create such or such things we might also say that these times should be the Causes of the Creation of these Beings as reasonably as to pretend that a Bowl which meets another is the true cause of the motion it communicates to it Because God has determined by his general Will which constituted the Order of Nature that when two Bodies should meet there should be such and such a Communication of Motion There is then but one only true God and he the one only true Cause And we must not imagine that which precedes an Effect to be the true Cause of it God cannot even communicate his Power to the Creatures if we follow the Light of Reason he cannot make them true Causes because he cannot make them Gods Bodies Spirits pure Intelligences can all do nothing 'T is he who hath made these Spirits that illuminates and acts them 'T is he who has created the Heavens and the Earth which regulates the Motions thereof In short 't is the Author of our Being that executes our Wills semel jussit semper paret He even moves our Arms when we make use of them against his Orders for he complains by his Prophets that we make him serve our unjust and criminal Desires All these little Heathen Divinities and all these particular Causes of the Philosophers are only Chymera's that the wicked Spirit endeavours to establish to ruin the Worship of the true God It is not the Philosophy they have received from Adam which teaches these things 't is that they have received from the Serpent for since the Fall the Mind of Man is perfectly Heathenish 'T is this Philosophy which joyned to the Errors of the Senses has made them adore the Sun and which is fall at this Day the universal Cause of the Irregularity of the Mind and Corruption of the Heart of Man By their Actions and sometimes by their Words why say they should we not love the Body since the Body is capable of affording us all Pleasures And why do we laugh at the Israelites which regretted the Loss of the Garlick and Onyons of Egypt since in Effect they were unhappy by being deprived of what in some Measure could make them happy But the new Philosophy which they represent as a dismal thing to affrighten weak Minds that is despised and condemned without being understood The new Philosophy I say since they are pleased to call it so destroys all the Arguments of the Libertines by the Establishment of the chiefest of its Principles which perfectly agrees with the * Haec est Religio Christiana fratres mei quae praedicatur per universum mundum horrentibus inimieis ubi vincuntur murmurantibus ubi praevalent saevientibus haec est Religie Christiana ut Colatur unus Deus non Dii qui facit Animam Beatum nisi unus Deus Aug. tr 23. in Joan. first Principle of the Christian Religion that we must love and fear but one God since there is only one God who can make us happy For if Religion teaches us that there is but one true God this Philosophy shews us there is but one true Cause If Religion informs us that all the Divinities of the Heathens are only Stones and Metals without Life and Motion This Philosophy discovers to us also that all second Causes or all the Divinities of their Philosophy are only Matter and inefficacious Wills In short if Religion teaches us that we must not bow our Knees to false Gods This Philosophy also tells us that our Imaginations and Minds ought not to be prostituted to the Imaginary Greatness and Power of Causes which are not true Causes That we must neither love nor fear them nor busie our selves about them but think upon God only see him adore him fear and love him in all things But this agrees not with the Inclination of some Philosophers They will neither see nor think upon God For since the Fall there is a secret Opposition between God and Man Men take Pleasure in erecting Gods after their own Fancy they voluntarily love and fear the Fictions of their own Imagination as they Heathens did the Works of their own Hands They are like Children who tremble at their Companions after they have daubed their Faces Or if they will have a more Noble Comparison although perhaps it be not so just they resemble those famous Romans who had some Fear and Respect for the Fictions of their own Minds and foolishly adored their Emperors after they had let loose the Eagle when they deified them CHAP. IV. An Explanation of the Second Part of the general Rule That Philosophers neglect it but Mr. Descartes has very exactly observed it WE have already shewed unto what Errors we are subject when we reason upon the false and confused Idea's of the Senses and upon the rambling and indeterminate Idea's of pure Logick We have sufficiently discovered that to preserve Evidence in our Perceptions it is absolutely necessary exactly to observe the Rule that we have prescribed if our Idea's are clear and distinct and then to reason according to these Idea's In this same general Rule which respects the Subject
only upon the false and confused Idea's of the Senses since this Rule which preserves Light and Evidence in all just and solid Arguments only breeds Confusion in their Discourses It is not possible to expose the Fantasticalness and Extravagances of the Explanations that Aristotle gives of all sorts of Matters when the Subjects he treats of are simple and easie his Errors are simple and very easily discovered but when he pretends to explain compounded things and such as depend upon many Causes his Errors are at least as compounded as the Subjects he treats on and it is impossible to take them in Pieces so as to discover them all to others This great Genius which they pretend has done so well in his Rules for Definitions did not so much as know what things were necessary to be defined Because putting no Distinction between a clear and distinct knowledge and a Sensible one he imagined he was able to know and explain things to others which he had no distinct Idea of himself Definitions must explain both the Nature of Things and the Terms which compose them and stir up in the Mind distinct and clear Idea's of them But 't is impossible after this manner to define the Sensible Qualities of Heat Cold Colour Taste c. when we confound the Cause with the Effect and the Motion of Bodies with the Sensation which accompanies it because Sensations being Modifications of the Soul which we know not by clear Idea's but only by an inward Sensation as I have explained in the third Book it is impossible to affix Words to Idea's we have not As we have clear and distinct Idea's of a Circle a Square a Triangle and so distinctly know the Nature of them we may give good Definitions thereof We can even deduce the Idea's we have of these Figures all their Properties and explain them to others by Terms to which these Idea's are affixed but we cannot define either Heat or Cold being only Sensible Qualities for we know them neither distinctly nor by Idea but only by Conscience or Internal Sensation Nor must we define Heat which is external by any Effects For if we substitute in its Place the Definition that we shall give it we shall soon see that this Definition will only deceive us If for instance we define Heat to be what assembles things of the same kind without saying any thing more we may in following this Definition take such things for Heat as have no Relation to it We may say that the Loadstone assembles the Filings of Iron and separates them from those of Silver because it is hot that a Pigeon eats Hemp-Seed and leaves other Grain because she is hot That a Covetous Man separates his Gold from his Silver because he is hot In fine there is no Extravagancy that this Definition will not engage us in if we were stupid enough to follow it This Definition then does not explain the Nature of Heat nor can we make use of it to deduce all its Properties since if we keep precisely to its Terms we conclude Impertinences and if we put it in the Place of the thing defined we shall have a strange Piece of Nonsence Yet if we carefully distinguish Heat from the Cause of it although we cannot define it since it is a Modification of the Soul whereof we have no Idea we may define the Cause of it since we have a distinct Idea of Motion But Care must be had that Heat taken for such a Motion does not always cause the Sensation of Heat in us For Water for instance is hot since its Parts are fluid and in Motion and 't is apparent that Fish feel it warm at least warmer than Ice whose Parts are more in Rest but it is cold in relation to us because it has less Motion than the Parts of our Bodies For what hath less Motion than another Body is in some manner in rest in respect to that Body So that 't is not in Relation to the Motion of the Fibres of our Bodies that we must define the Cause of Heat or the Motion which excites it We must if we can define this Motion absolutely and in it self and then the Definitions we shall give may serve to discover the Nature and Properties of Heat I do not think my self obliged to examine the Philosophy of Aristotle any further and to unravel the extreamly confused and perplext Errors of this Author It seems to me that I have already shewn that he does not prove his four Elements and that he defines them ill That his Elementary Qualities are not such as he pretends that he knows not the Nature of them and that all second Qualities are not compounded of them And lastly although we should grant him that all Bodies were composed of four Elements as second Qualities of the first his whole System would be useless in a Search after Truth since his Idea's are not clear enough always to preserve Evidence in our Ratiotinations If 't is doubted that I have not related the true Opinions of Aristotle it may easily be seen by examining the Books he has writ of the Heavens of Generation and Corruption for 't is from them that I have taken almost all that I have said I had no Design to relate any thing of his Eight Books of Physicks because there is some learned Men who pretend that 't is only a Discourse of Logick And 't is very probable since we find there many indetermined and trifling Words As Atistotle often contradicts himself and as we may maintain almost any manner of Opinion from some Passages taken out of him I doubt not but we may prove by Aristotle even some Opinions contrary to those I have attributed to him but I am not afraid of it it is sufficient that I have the Book by me I cited him from to prove what I have said Nay I shall not give my self any great Trouble to examine whether these Books are Aristotle's or not I take them as for such and as they are commonly received For we ought not to disquiet our selves to know the true Genealogy of things for which we have no Esteem CHAP. VI. Some general Advices which are necessary to conduct us regularly in a Search after Truth and in a Choice of the Sciences THAT it may not be said I only destroy without establishing any thing certain and indisputable in this Work It will be proper to shew in a few Words the Order we ought to keep in our Studies to avoid being deceived and that I even note some most necessary Truths and Sciences in which we may meet with such Evidence as we cannot hinder our selves from consenting to them without suffering the secret Reproaches of our Reason I shall not explain these Truths and Sciences at large because 't is already done I do not pretend to make a new Impression of other Persons Works but content my self with referring to them I will only shew the Order we ought to
only try to know a Relation which is sufficiently rambling and indetermined It is plain 1. That to resolve Questions of the first Kind and perfectly to know all the exact Relations of Magnitude and Quality that is between two or many things we must have distinct Idea's which perfectly represent them and compare these things all possible ways We may for instance resolve all Questions which tend to discover the exact Relations which are between 2 and 8 because 2 and 8 being exactly known we may compare them together in all necessary manners to discover their exact Relations of Magnitude or Quality We may know that 8 is Quadruple of 2 that 8 and 2 are even Numbers and that 8 and 2 are not Squares It is clear in the second place That to resolve Questions of the second Kind and exactly to discover any Relation of Magnitude or Quality which is between two or many things it is necessary and it will be sufficient to know very distinctly the Superficies of them according to which we must compare them to discover the Relation we seek For instance To resolve any Question which tends to the discovering some exact Relation between 4 and 16 as that 4 and 16 are even Numbers and Squares it is sufficient to know exactly that 4 and 16 may be divided into half without a Fraction and that both are the Product of a Number multiplied by it self and it is useless to examine what their true Magnitude is For 't is evident To know the exact Relation of Quality which is between things it is sufficient to have a very distinct Idea of their Quality without thinking any thing of their Magnitude and that to know their exact Relations of Magnitude it sufficies to know exactly their Magnitude without enquiring after their true Quality It is plain in the third place That to resolve Questions of the third Kind and to know any Relation that is almost exact between two or more things it is sufficient to know pretty near the Superficies or sides thereof according to which we must compare them to discover the approaching Relation that we seek whether it be of Magnitude or Quality For instance I can evidently know that √ 8 is greater than 2 because I can know very near the true Magnitude of the √ 8. But I cannot know how much the √ 8 exceeds 2 because I cannot exactly know the true Magnitude of √ 8. Lastly It is plain That to resolve Questions of the fourth kind and discover their trifling and undetermined Relations it suffices to know things after a manner proportionate to the need we have of comparing them to discover the Relations we seek So that to resolve all sorts of Questions 't is not always necessary to have very distinct Idea's of their Terms or to know perfectly the things their Terms signifie But it is requisire to know them so much the more exactly as the Relations we endeavour to discover are more exact and in greater Number For as we have already shewed in imperfect Questions it is enough to have imperfect Idea's of the things that we consider to resolve these Questions perfectly or according to what they contain And we likewise resolve Questions very well although we have no distinct Idea of the Terms which express them for when it is demanded if Fire is capable of melting Salt hardening Dirt and evaporating Lead and a thousand other like things we understand these Questions perfectly and can very well resolve them although we have no distinct Idea of Fire Salt Dirt c. because those who make these demands would only know if we have had any sensible Experience that Fire has produced these Effects Wherefore according to the Discoveries we have made by our Senses we can answer them in such a manner as may be capable of satisfying them CHAP. VIII An Application of the other Rules to particular Questions THere are Questions of two sorts Simple and Compound The Resolution of the first depends alone upon the Attention of the Mind to the clear Idea's of the Terms which express them The others cannot be resolved but by the Comparison of a third or many other Idea's we cannot discover the unknown Relations which are expressed by the Terms of the Question by immediately comparing the Idea's of these Terms for they cannot be joyned or compared We must therefore have one or many mean Idea's to be able to make necessary Comparisons to discover these Relations and exactly observe that these mean Idea's are clear and distinct in proportion as the Relations we endeavour to discover are more exact and in greater Number This Rule is only a Consequence of the first and is of equal Importance For if it is necessary to know exactly the Relations we compare to have clear and distinctly Idea's of them For the same reason it is necessary to know well the mean Idea's by which we pretend to make these Comparisons since we must distinctly know the Relation of Measure with each of the things that we measure to discover the Relations of them For instance When we suffer a little light Vessel to swim freely with a Loadstone in it if we turn towards the North Pole of this Loadstone another Loadstone that we hold in our Hands we shall immediately see the first Loadstone retire as if it were compelled by some violent Wind. And if we desire to know the Cause of this Effect It is plain That to give a Reason for the Motion of this Loadstone it is not enough to know the Relations it has with the other for although we should even perfectly know all we could not comprehend how these two Bodies could thrust one another without meeting We must therefore examine what things we know distinctly to be capable according to the Order of Nature of moving Bodies since the Question is to discover the Natural Cause of the Motion of the Loadstone which is certainly a Body To that end we must not have recourse to any Quality Form or Entity or even of any Intelligence that we do not clearly know to be capable of moving Bodies For we cannot certainly know that Intelligences are the common Causes of the Natural Motions of Bodies nor even whether or no they can produce Motion We know evidently That 't is a Law of Nature that Bodies should move each other when they meet We must then endeavour to explain the Motion of the Loadstone by the means of any body which meets it It is true that it may be something else besides a Body which moves it but if we have no distinct Idea of this thing we must not make use of it as a fit Mean to discover what we seek nor to explain it to others For 't is not giving a Reason of an Effect to ascribe something as a Cause of it which no body conceives clearly We must not then trouble our selves too much whether there is any other Natural Cause of the Motion of Bodies than their
much the harder as they are more solid and have fewer Pores the Question now is to know how the parts of a Column composed of a Matter which has no Pore can be strongly joyned together and compose a very hard Body for we cannot say that the parts of this Column is held by little Links since being without Pores they have no particular Figure I find my self yet extreamly inclined to say that this Column is naturally hard or else that the little Links whereof hard Bodies are composed are Atoms whose parts cannot be divided as being the essential and utmost parts of Bodies which are essentially crooked or branched or of some perplex'd Figure But I freely confess that this is not to explain the Difficulty and that quitting the Prejudices and Illusions of my Senses I should be in the wrong to recur to an abstracted Form and embrace a Logical Phantom for the cause I seek I mean I should be in the wrong to conceive as something real and distinct a rambling Idea of the Nature of Essence which expresses only what we know And thus to take an abstracted and universal Form as a Physical Cause of a real Effect For there are two things which I cannot too much distrust the first is The Impression of my Senses and the other The Facility I have to receive abstracted Natures and general Logical Idea's for those which are Real and Particular I remember I have been many times seduced by these two Principal Errors But to return to the Difficulty It is not possible for me to conceive how these little Links should be indivisible by their Nature and Essence nor consequently how they should be Inflexible since on the contrary I conceive them very Divisible and necessarily divisible by their Nature and Essence For the part A is most certainly a Substance as well as B and consequently it is clear that A can exist without B since Substances can exist one without another because otherwise they would not be Substances We cannot say that A is not a Substance for it is plain it is not a bare Mode and all Beings are either Modes or Substances So since A is not a Mode 't is a Substance then it may exist without B and much more may the part A exist separately from B. So that this Link is divisible in A and in B. Moreover If this Link was Indivisible or crooked by Nature and Essence it would be quite contrary to what we Experience for then we could not break any body Let us suppose as before that a piece of Iron is composed of many Links which is intermix'd one in another whereof A a and B b are two of them I say that we cannot unlink them and consequently that we could not break this Iron For to break it we must bend the Links that compose it which are nevertheless supposed naturally and essentially inflexible And if we do not suppose them inflexible but only indivisible by their Nature the Supposition will be of no use to resolve the Question For then the Difficulty would be to know why these little Links do not obey our Efforts when we try to bend a Bar of Iron Yet if we suppose them not Inflexible we must not suppose them Indivisible for if the parts of these Links can change their Situation one in respect to another it is plain that they may be separated since there is no reason why if one part could remove it self a little from the other it could not be absolutely done Then whether we suppose these Links Inflexible or Indivisible we cannot by this means resolve the Question For if we suppose them only Indivisible we must without trouble break a bit of Iron And if we suppose them Inflexible it will be impossible to break them since the little Links which compose the Iron being embarrassed one in another it will be impossible to unlink them Let us try then to resolve the Difficulty by clear and undoubted Principles and to find the reason why this little Link hath these two parts A and B so firmly united I see evidently that it is necessary to divide the Subject of my Meditation into parts that I may examine it more exactly and with less Intention of Mind since I have not been able immediately with one simple view and all the Attention I am capable of to discover what I would find And 't is what I might have done from the beginning for when the Subjects that we consider are a little intricate 't is alwayes the best way to examine them in parts and not fatigue our selves unusefully upon false Hopes of meeting luckily with the Truth What I enquire after is the cause of the strict Union that is between the little Particles which compose the Link A B. Now there is only three things that I distinctly conceive capable of being the cause which I seek viz. The parts of this little Link the Will of the Author of Nature or lastly the Invisible Bodies which surround these little Links I might yet bring for the Cause of these things the Form of Bodies the Qualities of Hardness or some occult one the Simpathy which would be between the Particles of the same kind c. but because I have not a distinct Idea of these fine things I neither ought nor can maintain my Arguments from them so that if I find not the Cause I seek in things that I have a distinct Idea of I will not uselessy fatigue my self in the Contemplation of these rambling and general Logical Idea's and will cease from speaking of what I understand not But let us examine the first of these things which may be the Cause how the Particles of this little Link are so strictly united viz. the little Parts it is composed of When I consider only the Parts whereof hare Bodies are composed I find my self inclined to believe That we cannot imagine any Cement which unites the Parts of this Link besides themselves and their own Rest For of what Nature could it be It would not be a thing which subsists of it self for all these little Particles being Substances for what Reason should they be united by other Substances than by themselves Neither will it be a different Quality from Rest because there is no Quality more contrary to Motion which might separate these Parts than Rest But besides Substances and their Qualities we know of no other kind of Beings It is very true Defc Prin. 1. Art 55. p 2. the Parts of hard Bodies continue united whilst they are in Rest one with another and when they are once in Rest they continue so of themselves as long as they can But this is not what I seek I know not how I came to mistake the Subject I endeavour here to discover why the Particles of hard Bodies have Power to continue in Rest one by another and how they resist the Efforts we make to move them I might then answer my self Descartes
designed either to maintain the Efficacy of Second Causes or the Nature of Aristotle For although they often spoke after such a manner as favoured Prejudices and the Judgments of the Senses Omnia quippe portenta contra Naturam dicimus esse sed non sunt quomodo enim est contra Naturam quod Dei fit voluntate Cum volantes tanti utique conditorio conditae rei cujusque Natura sit Portentum ergo fit non contra Naturam sed contra quam est nota Natura St. Aug. de Civitate Dei l. 21. c. 8. they sometimes so explained themselves as sufficiently discovered the disposition of their Mind and Heart St. Austin for instance believed the Will of God to be the Power or Nature of every thing as he declares when he speaks thus We are wont to say that Prodigies are against Nature but 't is not true For the Will of the Creator being the Nature of all Creatures how can what is performed by the Will of God be contrary to Nature Miracles or Prodigies therefore are not against Nature but only against what we know of Nature 'T is true St. Austin speaks in many places according to Prejudices But I affirm that proves nothing since we ought to explain literally only such passages as are opposite to Prejudices for the Reasons I have already given If St. Austin in all his Works had never said any thing against the Efficacy of Second Causes but had alwayes favoured this Opinion we might perhaps make use of his Authority to establish it Yet if it does not appear that he ever seriously examined this Question we should alwayes have had Reason to think that his Judgment was not determined upon this Subject and that 't was not impossible but he might be drawn by the impression of his Senses without Reflection to have believed a thing which appeared undoubted until it was carefully examined It is certain for instance that St. Austin alwayes spoke of Beasts as if they had a Soul I don't say a Corporeal one for that Holy Father too well knew the distinction between the Soul and Body to believe there were Corporeal Souls I say a Spiritual Soul for Matter is incapable of Sensation Yet I believe it more reasonable to make use of his Authority to prove that Beasts have no Souls than to prove they have any For from the Principles he has carefully examined and strongly establish'd it manifestly follows they have none Some of St. Austins Principles are these That what has not sinned can never suffer evil Now according to him Pain is the greatest evil and Beasts suffer it That the most noble cannot have the least noble for its end But with him the Soul of Beasts is Spiritual and more noble than the Body and yet has no other end than the Body That what is Spiritual is Immortal and the Soul of Beasts that 's Spiritual is subject to Death There are many such like Principles in the Works of St. Austin from whence it may be concluded that Beasts have no such Spiritual Soul as he admits in them See c. 22 23. de Anima ejus origine as is shown by Ambrose Victor in his Sixth Volume of Christian Philosophy But the Sentiment that Beasts have a Soul or feel Pain when they are beaten being agreeable to Prejudices for there 's no Child who does not believe it we have alwayes reason to think that St. Austin speaks upon this matter according to the general Opinion and never seriously examined the Question and that if he had but begun to doubt and make any reflection upon it he would not have said a thing which is so contrary to his Principles Thus although the Fathers should alwayes have favoured the Efficacy of Second Causes perhaps we should not have been obliged to have had any regard to their Opinion if it had appeared that they had not carefully examined the matter And that what they should have said had been only a Consequence of the Language which is formed and established upon Prejudice But 't is certainly the contrary For the Fathers the most Pious Persons and those who have been best instructed in Religion have commonly snown by some places of their Works what was the disposition of theis Mind and Heart in respect to this matter The most Learned and also the greatest number of Divines seeing on one side that the Holy Scripture was contrary to the Efficacy of Second Causes and on the other that the impression of the Causes publick Laws and chiefly the Philosophy of Aristotle established it For Aristotle thought that God did not concern himself in Sublunary Affairs because it was unworthy his grandeur And that Nature which he supposed in all Bodies was sufficient to produce what happened here below The Divines I say have found this Medium to reconcile Faith with the Heathen Philosophy and Reason with the Senses that Second Causes do nothing except God concurs with them But because this immediate concourse whereby God acts with Second Causes includes great difficulties some Philosophers have rejected it pretending that in order to their acting 't was enough if God preserved them with the same vertue he at first created them And because this Opinion is absolutely conformable to Prejudice and because the operation of God in Second Causes is not sensible it is therefore commonly received by the Vulgar and by those who apply themselves more to the Physicks of the Antients than to Divinity and the Meditation of the Truth The generality of the World believe that God at first Created all things and gave them all the necessary qualities or faculties for their preservation That he has for instance given the first Motions to Matter and afterwards left it to it self to produce by the Communication of its Motions this variety of admirable forms We commonly suppose that Bodies can move one another and even attribute this Opinion to Des Cartes although he expresly speaks against it in the 36th and 37th Articles of the Second Part of his Philosophical Principles Though Man cannot hinder himself from acknowledging that the Creatures depend upon God yet he lessens this dependence as much as possible either through a secret aversion to God or a wretched stupidity and insensibility in respect to his operation But as this Sentiment is chiefly received by those who have not much studied Religion and who often rather follow their Senses and the Authority of Aristotle than their Reason and that of the Holy Scriptures we have not so much reason to fear its establishment in the Minds of those who have any love for Truth and Religion For a little Application in the Examination of this Opinion will easily discover its falsity But that Notion of the immediate concourse of God to each action of Second Causes seems to agree with those passages of Scripture which often attribute the same effect both to God and the Creatures We must consider then that there are
of which it is proper to change all the motions of the Passion suddenly determine the course of the Animal Spirits to the Nerves which encompass these Arteries that by their contraction they may shut up the passage whereby the Blood ascends into the Brain and by their dilating lay open that which disperses it self through all the other parts of the Body These Arteries which carry the Blood to the Brain being free and all those which disperse it through the rest of the Body being strongly tied by these Nerves the Head will be filled with Blood and the Face coloured with it But any circumstance changing the shaking of the Brain which caused this disposition in these Nerves the Arteries that were contracted are unloosed and the others on the contrary are strongly contracted Thus the Head is void of Blood a paleness diffused over the Face and the little Blood which goes out of the Heart and which the Nerves we spoke of admit into it to maintain life descend mostly into the lower part of the Body the Brain is defective of Animal Spirits and all the rest of the Body is seized with a weakness and trembling To explain and particularly prove what we have already said it would be necessary to give a general knowledge of Physics and a particular one of Human Bodies But these two Sciences are also too imperfect to be treated of with all the exactness I could wish besides if I should push this matter farther it would soon carry me from my subject and therefore I shall only give a general and gross Idea of the Passions and am satisfied provided this Idea be not false These Shakings of the Brain and Motions of the Blood and Spirits are the fourth thing that is found in each of our Passions and they produce the fifth which is the sensible Emotion of the Soul In the same time that the Animal Spirits are pushed from the Brain into the rest of the Body there to produce the Motions that 's proper to maintain the Passion the Soul is carried towards the good that it perceives and that so much the more violently as the Spirits go out of the Brain with the more force because it is the same shaking of the Brain which acts the Soul and Animal Spirits The Motion of the Soul towards good is so much the greater as the sight of good is more sensible and the Motion of the Spirits which proceed from the Brain to disperse themselves into the rest of the Body is so much the more violent as the shaking of the Fibres of the Brain caused by the impression of the Object or Imagination is stronger so this same shaking of the Brain rendring the sight of the good more sensible it is necessary that the Emotions of the Soul in the Passions should augment in the same proportion as the Motion of the Spirits do These Emotions of the Soul differ not from those which immediately follow the intellectual sight of the good we have spoke of They are only stronger and more lively because of the union of the Soul and Body and the sensibility of the sight which produces them The sixth thing which occurs is the Sensation of Passion the Sensation of Love Aversion Desire Joy Sorrow c. This Sensation is not different from that we have already spoke of it is only more quick because the Body hath a great share in it But it is always followed with a certain Sensation of Sweetness which renders all our Passions agreeable to us and is the last thing observed in every one of our Passions as has been already said The cause of this last Sensation is thus At the sight of the Object of the Passion or any new Circumstance some of the Animal Spirits are pushed from the Head to the extream parts of the Body to put it into the gesture the Passion requires and others forcibly descend into the Heart Lungs and Bowels from thence to draw necessary assistances which has already been explained Now it never happens that the Body is in the condition it ought to be but the Soul receives much satisfaction from it whereas if the Body is in an estate contrary to its good and preservation the Soul suffers much pain Thus when we follow the Motions of our Passions and stop not the course of the Spirits which the sight of the Object of the Passion causes in our Body to put it in the condition it ought to be in relation to this Object The Soul will by the Laws of Nature receive this Sensation of delight and inward satisfaction because the Body is in the state it ought to be in On the contrary when the Soul following the Rules of Reason stops the course of the Spirits and resists these Passions it suffers pain proportionably to the evil which might from thence happen to the Body For even as the reflexion that the Soul makes upon it self is necessarily accompanied with the Joy or Sorrow of the Mind and afterwards with the Joy or Sorrow of the Senses when doing its duty and submitting to the order of God it would discover that in a proper condition or abandoning it self to its Passions it is touched with remorse which teaches it that 't is in an ill disposition Thus the course of the Spirits excited by the good of the Body is accompanied with a sensible Joy or Sorrow and afterwards with a Spiritual one according as the course of the Animal spirits is hindered or favoured by the Will But there is this remarkable difference between the Intellectual Joy that accompanies the clear knowledge of the good estate of the Soul and the sensible Pleasure which accompanies the confused Sensation of the good disposition of the Body that the Intellectual Joy is solid without remorse and as immutable as the truth which causes it whereas sensible Joy is generally accompanied with Sorrow of the Mind or remorse of Conscience whence it is unquiet and as inconstant as the Passion or Agitation of the Blood which causes it In fine the first is almost always accompanied with a great Joy of the Senses when it is a consequence of the knowledge of a great good that the Soul possesses and the other is seldom accompanied with any Joy of the Mind although it be a consequence of a great good which only happens to the Body if it is contrary to the good of the Soul It is therefore true that without the Grace of JESVS CHRIST the satisfaction the Soul tastes in abandoning it self to its Passions is more agreeable than that it feels in following the Rules of Reason and it is this Satisfaction which is the cause of all the Disorders that have followed Original Sin and it would make us all Slaves to our Passions if the Son of God did not deliver us from their servitude by the delights of his Grace For indeed what I have said on the behalf of the Joy of the Mind against the Joy of the Senses is
that all the Passions which are excited in us at the sight of some external object does Mechanically imprint upon the face of those that are struck with it a suitable Air that is an Air that Mechanically disposes all those who see it to such Passions and Motions as are useful to the good of Society nay Admiration it self when it is only caused in us by the fight of something External and which others may consider as well as we diffuses through our Face an Air which Mechanically imprints Admiration in others and which even acts upon their Brain after so regulated a manner that the Spirits which are contained in it are impelled into the Muscles of their Face to form there an Air like ours This Communication of the Passions of the Soul and Motions of the Animal Spirits to unite Men together in relation to good and evil and to make 'em resemble each other not only by the disposition of their Minds but also by that of their Body is so much the greater and more observable as the Passions are more violent because then the Animal Spirits are agitated with more force Now this is necessary because the Evils being greater or more present we must apply our selves the more and be strongly united amongst our selves to shun or to discover them But when the Passions are very moderate as Admiration commonly is they don't sensibly communicate themselves nor produce such an Air by which they are accustomed to do it For since there 's no extraordinary occasion 't would be unnecessary to put any force upon the imagination of others or to divert them from their employments on which perhaps 't is more requisite they should be engag'd than in considering the Causes of these Passions There is nothing more surprising than this Oeconomy of our Passions and disposition of our Body in relation to those objects which encompass us Whatsoever is Machinally performed in us is most worthy the Wisdom of him who Created us And as God has made us capable Of all the Passions which act in us chiefly to unite us to all sensible things for the preservation of Society and of our own Bodies and his design is so faithfully executed by the construction of his work so we cannot but admire the Springs and curiosity thereof Yet our Passions and all these imperceptible Bands by which we are united to whatever is about us often prove through our faults very considerable Causes of our Errors and Irregularities For we make not that use we ought of our Passions we permit them every thing and do not so much as know the limits that should be prescribed to their Power Thus even these Passions which like Admiration are but weak and agitate us the least have yet power enough to lead us into Error Of which here follows some instances When Men and chiefly those who have a vigorous Imagination consider themselves on the best side they are commonly very well satisfied with themselves and their inward satisfaction never fails of encreasing when they compare themselves with such as are more dull and heavy than they Besides there is many Persons that admire 'em too and very few who oppose them with any success or applause for Reason is scarcely ever applauded in opposition to a strong and lively imagination and in short such a sensible Air of submission and respect is form'd upon the Face of all their Hearers who have likewise such lively traces of admiration at every new word they speak that they also admire themselves and their Imagination swells them up with all these advantages and makes 'em extreamly satisfied in their own Abilities For if we cannot see a Passionate Man without receiving some impression from his Passion or in some measure engaging our selves in his Sentiments how could it be possible for those who are surrounded with a great number of Admirers to give no reception to a Passion which so agreeably flatters Self-Love Now this high esteem that Persons of a strong and lively Imagination have of themselves and their good Qualities swell 'em up with Pride and makes them assume a Majestic and Decisive Air They hear others with Contempt answer 'em in Raillery and only think in relation to themselves Looking upon the attention of the Mind as a kind of Servitude even where 't is necessary to discover the Truth they become wholly Indocible Pride Ignorance and Blindness are always Companions The Mighty Wits or rather the Proud and Vain-glorious ones will never be Disciples of the Truth They never retire within themselves but to admire and applaud their own Acquirements So that he who resists the Proud shines in the midst of their darkness without dissipating it There is on the contrary a certain disposition in the Blood and Animal Spirits which gives us too mean an opinion of our selves Their scarcity heaviness and fineness joined to the grossness of the Fibres of the Brain make our Imagination weak and languishing And the Sight or rather confused Sensation of this weakness and languor of our Imaginations creates such a vicious humility in us as we may call meanness of Spirit All Men are capable of the Truth but do not apply themselves to him who is only able to teach them The Proud depend upon themselves and hearken to none else And these mistaken humble ones address themselves to the Proud and submit to all their Decisions Thus both listen only to Man The Mind of the Proud obeys the fermentation of their own Blood that is their own Imagination And that of the mean spirited submits to the commanding Air of the Proud so that both are subjected to Vanity and Lyes The Proud are like a rich and powerful Man who having a great Equipage measures his own greatness by the number of his Followers and his strength by that of his Horses which draw his Coach These mistaken humble ones having the same Spirit and same Principles resemble a poor miserable languishing wretch who imagines himself almost nothing because he possesses nothing Yet our Equipage is not our selves and so far is the abundance of the Blood and Spirits vigour and impetuosity of the Imagination from leading us to Truth that on the contrary there is nothing which diverts us more from it It is the dull if I may call them so the cold and sedate Minds which are most capable of discovering the most solid and intricate Troths In the silence of their Passions they may hearken to that Truth which teaches them in the most secret recesses of their Reason but unhappily they think not of applying themselves to its word because it speaks without a sensible lustre and in a low voice and nothing affects them but a noise Nothing convinces them but what seems sparkling great and magnificent to the Judgment of the Senses they are not pleased without they are dazled and choose rather to hearken to those Philosopbers who relate their Visions and Dreams to them and who with the false
Prophets of Old affirm the Truth has spoken to them tho' it has not than to give Ear to the Truth it self For above this four thousand years the Pride of Man has without opposition put off lies and falshoods which have been respectfully received and even preserved as Holy and Divine Traditions It seems as if the God of Truth was no longer with them they neither consult nor meditate on him any longer but cover their idleness and neglect with the deceitful appearance of an holy Humility Indeed of our selves we cannot discover the Truth but we may all times do it by the assistance of him who enlightens us altho' we never can do it by the help of all the Men in the World Those even who are best acquainted with it cannot discover it to us if we do not our selves inquire of him who has inform'd them and if he answer not our attention as he has answered theirs We must not therefore receive any thing upon the credit of Man for they are all Liers but because he who cannot deceive us has spoken to us we ought continually to beg his Instruction We must not believe those who speaking to the Ear instruct only the Body or at most act upon the Imagination but we must attentively hearken and faithfully believe him who speaks to the Mind instructs the Reason and who penetrating into the most secret recesses of the inward Man is capable of enlightening and fortifying it against the outward and sensible Man which continually endeavours to seduce and abuse us I so often repeat these things because I think them most worthy of a serious reflexion 'T is God alone that we must Honour since there is none but ha who is able to give us knowledge or make us capable of Pleasure There is sometimes to be observed in the Animal Spirits and the rest of the Body a certain disposition which inclines us to Hunting Dancing Running and to all Exercises in general wherein the strength and agility of the Body are most conspicuous This disposition is commonly in Young men and chiefly in those whose Bodies are not perfectly form'd Children cannot stay long in one place but are always in action when they follow their humour For as their Muscles are not yet strong nor perfectly finish'd God the Author of Nature regulates the pleasures of the Soul in relation to the good of the Body so as to make them find pleasure in these Exercises which help to fortify and confirm the strength of their Bodies Thus whilst the Flesh and Fibres of the Nerves are still soft the little passages through which the Animal Spirits must necessarily flow to produce all sorts of motions are kept open and preserv'd the humours have no time to settle and all Obstructions and causes of Putrefaction are prevented The confused Sensation which Young men have of the disposition of their Bodies make them please themselves in the thoughts of their strength and activity They admire themselves when they know how to measure their motions or are able to make any uncommon ones and even wish to be in company of such persons as may behold and admire them Thus by little and little they strengthen their inclination for all bodily Exercises which is one of the chief causes of the Ignorance and Brutality of Men For besides the time that is lost in these Exercises the little use Men make of their Minds is the cause that the chief part of the Brain whose flexibility produces a strength and vivacity of Mind becomes wholly untractable and the Animal Spirits are not easily dispersed through the Brain after such a manner as to make them capable of thinking of whatever they please This is the reason that most part of the Nobility and such as are trained up to the War are incapable of applying themselves to any thing they argue upon things according to the Proverb A Word and a Blow And if we say any thing to them they have not a mind to hear instead of thinking what answer ought to be made their Animal Spirits insensibly flow into the Muscles by whose assistance they lift up their Arms and answer without any reflexion by a blow or some threatning gesture because their Spirits being agitated by the words they hear they are carried to those places which are most open through habit and exercise and the knowledge they have of the strength of their Bodies confirms them in these insolent behaviours And observing the respectful Air of those who hear them they are puft up with a foolish confidence which makes them utter many fierce and brutish impertinencies believing at the same time that they have spoke many fine things because the fear and prudence of others was favourable to them It is not possible to apply our selves to any Study or actually to make a profession of any Science without it we can be neither Authors nor Doctors without remembring what we are But this alone often naturally produces in the Mind of good men so many Defects that 't would be very advantageous for them if they were without those honourable Titles As they imagine them to be their chief Perfections they always think on them with Pleasure discover them to others with all possible Artifice and even pretend they have given them a right to judge of all things without examination If any Person has Courage enough to oppose them they soon Craftily and with a sweet and obliging Air insinuate what they are and the right they have to decide all things But if afterwards any is so bold as to resist them and they want an answer they will then openly say what they think of themselves and those who oppose them All inward Sensation of any advantage that we possess naturally encreases our Courage A Soldier well Armed and Mounted who wants neither Blood nor Spirits is ready to undertake any thing The disposition he finds himself in makes him bold and daring It is the same with a Learned Man when he believes himself so and when the vanity of his Heart has corrupted his Mind he becomes if we may say so bold and confident against the Truth Sometimes he rashly opposes it without knowing it and sometimes betrays it after he has discovered it and confiding in his false Learning he is always ready to maintain the Negative or Affirmative according as the Spirit of Contradiction possesses him It is very different with those who boast not of their Learning they are not decisive It is rare that they speak if they have not something to say Nay it often happens that they are silent when they ought to speak they have not that reputation nor those external marks of Learning which perswade them to speak they know not what These may safely hold their Tongues but Pretenders to Sciences are affraid to continue silent for they know well they shall be despised if they hold their Tongues although they have nothing material to say and on the contrary they
well apprehended and to teach us what we ought to think of Treatises which are written upon this Subject After all these precautions I believe I may say that all the Passions may be referr'd to the three Primitive ones Desire Joy and Sorrow and that 't is chiefly through the different Judgments the Soul makes of Good and Evil that those which relate to one and the same Primitive Passion differ amongst themselves I may say that Hope Fear and Irresolution which keep the Mean between these two are kinds of desire that Boldness Courage Emulation c. relate more to Hope than to the other two and that Fearfulness Cowardise and Jealousie c. are kinds of Fear I may further say that Cheerfulness and Glory Favour and Acknowledgment are kinds of Joy caused by the sight of the good we discover in our selves or in those to whom we are united as Laughing and Rallery is a sort of Joy which is commonly excited in us at the sight of the Evil which happens to our Enemies Lastly disgust tediousness regret pity and indignation are kinds of sorrow caused at the sight of something which displeases us But besides these Passions and many others which I mention not and which particularly relate to some one of the Primitive Passions The number of the Passions is greater than the number of terms we express 'em by there are also many others whose emotion is almost equally compound either of Desire and Joy as Impudence Anger Revenge or of Desire and Sorrow as Shame Regret and Despight or of all three when we meet with Motives of Joy and Sorrow joined together But altho' these last Passions have not as I know of any particular Name they are nevertheless the most common because in this Life we hardly ever enjoy any Good without the mixture of some Evil and that we scarcely ever suffer any Evil without some hopes of being delivered from it and of possessing some Good And altho' Joy be quite contrary to Sorrow it nevertheless admits it and even with his Passion shares the Souls capacity of Willing as he prospect of Good and Evil divides the Souls capacity of perceiving All the Passions therefore are kinds of Desire Joy and Sorrow and the chief difference to be observed between the Passions of the same kind proceeds from the different Perceptions or different Judgments which cause or accompany them so that it is necessary to enquire into the different Judgments that we make of Good and Evil. But as our chief design here is to search after the cause of our Error we ought not so much to stop at the examining the Judgments which follow them and which the Soul makes of Objects when it is agitated by any Passion for 't is these last Judgments which are the most liable to Error Those Judgments which precede and cause the Passions are commonly false in something for they are generally upheld upon the perceptions of the Soul in as much as it considers things in relation to it self and not according as they are in themselves But those Judgments which follow the Passions are false in every respect for the Judgments which form the Passions are upheld only upon the perceptions the Soul has of Objects in relation to it self or rather in relation to its emotion In those Judgments which precede the Passions both the true and the false are joined together but when the Soul is agitated and Judges of every thing according to the inspiration of the Passion the true is dissipated and the false preserved from whence are drawn so many more false conclusions as the Passion is greater Every Passion justifies it self they continually represent to the Soul that Object which affects it after such a manner as is most proper to preserve and encrease its agitation The Judgment or Perception which causes it is fortified in proportion as the Passion encreases and the Passion encreases ini proportion as the Judgment which produces it is in its turn fortified False Judgments and Passions continually contribute to their mutual preservation So that if the Heart ceased not sometimes to supply such Spirits as are proper to maintain the traces of the Brain and the distributions of the same Spirits which are necessary to preserve the sensation and emotion of the Soul which accompanies the Passions they wou'd continually encrease and we shou'd never discover our Errors But as all our Passions depend upon the fermentation and circulation of the Blood and as the Heart cannot always furnish such Spirits as are requisite for their preservation they must necessarily cease when the Spirits diminish and the Blood cools If it is so very easie to discover the common Judgments of the Passions we ought not to neglect it There are few Subjectys more worthy the application of those who enquire into the Truth and endeavor to deliver themselves from the dominion of their Bodies and who wou'd judge of all things according to the true Idea's of them We may instruct our selves upon this Subject two different ways either by reason only or by the internal sensation that we have of our selves when we are agitated with any Passion For instance we know by our own Experience that we are inclined to judge disadvantageously of those we love not and to discover all the malignity of our hatred by that means to the Object of our Passion We may also by pure Reason discover that hating only what is Evil it is necessary for the preservation of hatred that the Mind shou'd represent its Object on the worst side for indeed it is sufficient to suppose all the Passions justify themselves and that they divert the Imagination and afterwards the Mind in such a manner as is fit to preserve their own emotion that we conclude what those Judgments are which all the Passions cause us to make Those who have a strong and lively Imagination are extreamly sensible and very subject to the Motions of the Passions may perfectly instruct themselves in these things by the sensation they have of what passes within them and even speak of them after a more agreeable manner and sometimes more instructive than those who have more Reason than Imagination For we must not think that such as best discover the Springs of Self-love that penetrate farthest and after a more sensible manner unfold the secrets of Man's heart are always the most Learned 'T is indeed often a mark that they are more lively more imaginative and sometimes more malicious than others But those who without consulting their internal Sensation only make use of their Reason to discover the Nature of their Passions and what they are capable of producing if they are not always as penetrating as others they are always more reasonable and less subject to Error for they judge of things as they are in themselves They see very near what the Passions can perform according as they suppose them more or less moved and they do not judge rashly of
fortifie its emotions that the least suspicion frightens and disturbs the Reason False Zealors think they do God service when they submit to their Passions they blindly follow the secret motions of their Hatred as proceeding from the Internal Truth and stopping with satisfaction at such sensible proofs as justifie their excess they confirm themselves in their errors with an unconquerable obstinacy As for Ignorant and Weak Persons they create to themselves ridiculous and imaginary subjects of fear and like Children who walk in the dark without a guide they imagine frightful Bugbears are disturb'd and cry out as if they were undone light re-assures them if they are ignorant but if Men have weak Minds their imagination is always disturbed The least thing which relates to that frightful Object renews the traces and course of the Spirits which causes the symtom of their fear so that 't is absolutely impossible to cure or appease them for ever But when false Zeal meets with Hatred and Fear in a weak Mind it continually produces such unjust and violent Judgments in it that we cannot think on 'em without horror To change the Mind possessed with these Passions requires a greater Miracle than that which converted St. Paul and to cure it would be absolute impossible if we could set bounds to the Mercy and Power of God Those who walk in the dark rejoyce at the appearance of light but this Man cannot endure it since it hurts him because it resists his Passion His fear being in some manner voluntary because 't is produced by his hatred he loves to be affected by it since we love to be agitated by those Passions which have Evil for their Object when the Evil is imaginary or rather when we know as in Tragedies that the Evil can't hurt us The Phantoms that these form to themselves who walk in the dark vanish at the approach of light But this Man's Phantoms cannot be dissipated by the light of the truth for instead of dissipating the darkness of his Mind it only incenses his imagination so that whilst he applies himself to the Object of his Passion the light reflects and it seems to him as if these Phantoms had real Bodies since they reflect some weak rays of light which strike upon them But if we should suppose in these Persons a sufficient docility and reflection to make 'em listen to and apprehend such Reasons as are capable of dissipating their Errors yet their imagination being disordered through fear and their Hearts corrupted through hatred and false zeal these Reasons how solid soever they might be in themselves would not be able long to stop the impetuous motions of these violent Passions nor hinder them from speedily justifying themselves by sensible and convincing proofs For we must observe that there are some Passions which never return again whereas there are others that are constant and durable Those which are not maintained by the sight of the Mind but only produced and fortified by the sensible view of some Object and the fermentation of the Blood continue not but commonly die immediately after they are produced But those which are attended with the contemplation of the Mind are lasting for the Principle which causes them is not subject to change like the Blood and Humours So that Hatred Fear and all the rest of the Passions which are stirr'd up or preserved by the knowledge of the Mind and not by the sensible sight of some Evil must necessarily subsist long These Passions are therefore more durable violent and unjust but not more lively and sensible as has already been shown The perception of Good and Evil which excite the Passions is produced three several ways by the Senses Imagination and the Mind The perception of Good and Evil by the Senses or Sensation of Good and Evil produces the quickest and most sensible Passions Good and Evil perceived by the Imagination only excites them after a much weaker manner and the perception of Good and Evil by the Mind purely never produces true ones because it is always attended with some motion of the Animal Spirits The Passions are given us only for the good of the Body and by that to unite us to all sensible things for although sensible things can be neither good or bad in respect to the Mind they are so however in relation to the Body to which they are united Thus the Senses discovering much better the relation that sensible Objects have to the Body than the Mind it self can They must excite much more lively Passions than a clear and evident knowledge is able to do But because all our discoveries are attended with some motion of the Spirits a clear and evident knowledge of a great Good and great Evil which is not perceived by the Senses always excites some secret Passion Yet all our clear and evident discoveries of Good and Evil are not followed by some sensible Passion which we perceive and so on the other side all our Passions are not attended with some knowledge of the Mind For if we sometimes think of Good and Evil without feeling our selves moved we often find our selves moved with some Passions without knowing what they are nay sometimes without perceiving the cause of ' em One who breaths in a good Air feels a motion of Joy without knowing from whence it proceeds or what good 't is he possesses which causes this Joy And if there is any invisible Body which mingles with the Blood and hinders its fermentation it will produce sorrow and perhaps he will attribute the cause of his sorrow to any visible thing which occurs in that moment of his Passion Of all the Passions none are more sensible or more quick and consequently less attended with the knowledge of the Mind than horrour and antipathy agreeableness and sympathy It sometimes happens that a Man sleeping under a shady Tree would of a suddain and unexpectedly be waked at the sting of a Gnat or tickling of a Leaf even as if he were bitten with a Serpent The confused Sensation of something as terrible as death frights him without perceiving that he is agitated with a most powerful and violent Passion which is an aversion of desire On the contrary a Man in some necessity by chance discovers a small good the satisfaction of which surprizes him and he applies himself to this trifle as to the greatest good imaginable without making the least reflexion upon it The like also happens in the motions of sympathy and antipathy We sometimes see a certain Person whose habit and external appearance has some secret alliance with the present disposition of our Body we are forthwith touched with a vehement inclination for him and without any reflexion are induced to love and wish him well 'T is this I know not what which agitates us since Reason has no share in it And the contrary happens in respect to those whose Air and Manners excite disgust and horrour in us They have I know not
Truth ought to be very careful to shun as much as possible all strong Sensations as a great Noise too brisk a Light Pleasure Pain c. and continually to stir up the Purity of their Imagination and prevent its making in their Brain such deep Traces as continually disquiet and dissipate the Mind And above all to put a Stop to the Motions of their Passions which cause such powerful Impressions in the Body and Soul that 't is generally impossible the Mind shou'd think of any thing else For although the pure Idea's of Truth are always present to us we cannot consider them when the Capacity we have of thinking is filled with these Modifications which possess us However as it is impossible that the Soul shou'd exist without Passion Sensation or any other particular Modification We must make a Virtue of Necessity and even draw from these Modifications some Helps to render us more attentive Yet must we make use of much Artifice and Circumspection in the applying these Helps to gain some Advantage from them The need we have of them must be well examined and we must only make use of 'em so far as the Necessity of rendring our selves attentive constrains us to CHAP. III. Of the use that may be made of the Passions and Senses to preserve the Attention of the Mind THE Passions which it is necessary for us to make use of to excite us to an Enquiry after Truth are those that give us Strength and Courage enough to surmount all the Trouble we may meet with in endeavouring to render our selves attentive some of which are good and some bad of which the good are a Desire to find the Truth to acquire a sufficient Knowledge to conduct our selves to render us useful to our Neighbour and some others of the like Nature But the bad or dangerous ones are such as a desire to acquire Reputation to make some Establishment of our Fortune to raise our selves above our Neighbours and some others that are yet more irregular of which it is not necessary to speak In the unhappy Estate we now are in it often happens that the most unreasonable Passions do most powerfully excite us to search after the Truth and give us a more agreeable Satisfaction for all the Pains we take in our Pursuit than the most just and reasonable Passions do Vanity for instance excites us much more than the Love of Truth and we every Day see some continually applying themselves to Study when they find Persons to whom they may relate what they have learnt but who intirely abandon their Studies when they have not an Opportunity to discover their Acquirements The confused Prospect of some Glory they gain when they put off their Opinons maintains their Courage in the most barren and tiresome Studies But if by Chance or Necessity of their Affairs they find themselves far distant from their little flock of Admirers their Ardour is soon cooled and even the most solid Studies cannot attract them Disgust Wearisomness and Chagriu seizes them and they quit all Vanity triumphs over their natural Laziness but Laziness in its turn triumphs over the Love of Truth for Vanity sometimes resists Idleness but Idleness is generally victorious over the Love of Truth Yet the Passion for Gloty may be subservient to a good End since we may make use of it for the Glory of God and the Profit of others Some Persons may be permitted on several Occasions to make use of this Passion as an Help to make the Mind more attentive but we must take great Care to use it only when those reasonable Passions we have already mentioned are not sufficient and when our Duty obliges us to apply our selves to such Subjects as we are discouraged from First because this Passion is very dangerous in respect of the Conscience Secondly because it insensibly engages us in unprofitable Studies which have a more tempting Appearance than either Usefulness or Truth in them In fine because this Passion is very difficult to be moderated we are often abused by it and while we believe our Mind is illuminated by it we often strengthen our Concupiscence which not only corrupts the Heart but disperses such a Darkness through the Mind as is morally impossible to be dissipated We ought to consider that this Passion is insensibly encreased fortified and established in the Heart of Man and that when it is too violent instead of assisting the Mind in a Search after Truth it strangely blinds it and makes it believe things even as it wishes them to be Without doubt we shou'd not have met with so many false Inventions and imaginary Discoveries if Men had not suffered their Brains to be disordered by their Zeal of appearing Inventers For the firm and obstinate Perswasion many Men have had that they have found for instance the perpetual Motion the squaring of the Circle and Duplication of the Cube by common Geometry has apparently proceeded from the great Desire they had of appearing to have effected what many Persons had unsuccessfully attempted It is therefore better to excite those Passions in us which are so much the more useful in the Search after Truth as they are more strong and in the Excess of which there is least to be feared as the Desires of making a good use of our Wit of delivering our selves from Prejudices and Errors of acquiring so much Wisdom as will enable us to conduct our selves through whatsoever Condition we are in and other the like Passions which engage us not in unuseful Studies nor incline us to make too precipitate Judgments When we begin to taste the Pleasure that is found in the Exercise of the Mind discover the Advantage that recurs from it destroy those violent Passions and disdainfully reject those sensible Pleasures which whilst we imprudently permit them to tyrannize over our Reason we have no need of any other Passions than those we have before mentioned to make us attentive upon whatsoever Subject we wou'd consider But the Generality of Mankind are not in this Condition They have no good Relish of any thing but only what touches the Senses Their Imagination is corrupted with an almost infinite Number of deep Traces which only stir up false Idea's For they are united to every thing that falls under the Senses and Imagination and judge always according to the Impression they have received from them in Relation to themselves Pride Debauchery Engagements unquiet Desires to raise their Fortune so commonly obscure the Discovery of Truth in the Men of this World that it stifles in them the Sentiments of Piety because they separate them from God who only can enlighten us as he only can govern us For we cannot encrease our Union with sensible things without diminishing that which we have with intellectual Truths Since in the same Time we cannot be so strictly united to things that are so different and opposite Those therefore who have a pure and chaste Imagination I mean
such whose Brain is not filled with deep Traces which unite them to sensible things may easily be united to God and be made attentive to the Truth which speaks to them The most just and most reasonable Passions will be sufficient to determine such Persons But those that live in the World who are united to too many things and whose Imagination is spoiled by false and obscure Idea's which sensible Objects have excited in them cannot apply themselves to the Truth if they are not born up by some Passion that is strong enough to counterballance the violent Inclination of the Body which draws them aside and to form such Traces in their Brain as may be capable of making a Revulsion in the Animal Spirits But as all Passion of it self can only confound Idea's they ought to make no more use of them than Necessity requires and all Men ought so to study themselves as may enable them to proportion their Passions to their own Weaknesses It is not difficult to find some means of exciting such Passions in our selves as we wish The Knowledge we have given of the Union of the Soul and Body in the preceding Books affords a sufficient means to accomplish it For in a Word 't is enough to think attentively upon such Objects which according to the Institution or Natture are capable of exciting the Passions Thus we may almost always raise such Passions in our Hearts as we have Occasion for But though we can so easily cause them we cannot always so easily extirpate them nor remedy the Disorders that they cause in the Imagination and therefore we ought to use them with great Moderation Above all things we must be cautious that we do not Judge of things by our Passion but only by a clear Sight of Truth which it is almost impossible to observe when the Passions are a little vigorous Passion ought only to serve us to stir up our Attentions but it always produces its own Idea's and it presently obliges the Will to judge of things by these Idea's that affect it rather than by the pure and abstracted Idea's of the Truth which affect it not So that such Judgments are often formed which last no longer than the Passion it self because it is not a clear Sight of the immutable Truth but the Circulation of the Blood which produces them It is certain that Men are strangely obstinate in their Errors and that they generally maintain them all their Lives But either these Errors have often other Causes than the Passions or else they depend upon certain durable Passions which proceed from the Conformation of the Body Interest or some other Cause which continues a long Time Interest for instance indures always it creates a Passion which never dies and the Judgment that these Passions form are very lasting But all other Sentiments of Men which depend upon particular Passions are as inconstant as the Fermentation of their Humours are They speak sometimes after one manner and sometimes after another and What they say is generally conformable to what they think They run from one false Good to another as false by the Motion of their Passion which they again dislike as soon as this Passion ceases So also they run from one false System to another They ardently embrace a false Notion when their Passion renders it probable but this Passion being once extinguisht they abandon it They taste of every Good by their Passions without finding any thing that is really so And by the same Passions they see all Trtuths without discovering any Although whilst the Passion continues what they taste appears to them to be the Sovereign Good and what they see seems to them to be an indisputable Truth The Second Source from whence we may draw any Helps to render the Mind attentive is the Senses Sensations are the proper Modifications of the Soul pure Idea's of the Mind are something different Sensations then stir up our Attention in a much more lively manner than pure Idea's do so that it is plain we may remedy this Defect of the Application of the Mind to Truths that do not affect us in expressing them by sensible things which do Ths is the Reason that Geometers express the Proportions between those Magnitudes they wou'd consider by sensible Lines By drawing Lines upon Paper they trace if I may so say the Idea's upon their Minds which answer them They make them more familiar to them because they see them in the same Time they wou'd conceive them After this manner many things that are difficult enough in themselves might be taught to Children who are not capable of abstracted Truths because of the Tenderness of the Fibres of their Brain They see only with their Eyes Colours Pictures Images but with the Mind they consider not the Idea's which answer to these Sensible Objects A particular Care must be taken not to obscure Objects that we wou'd consider our selves or discover to others with so much Sensibility lest the Mind shou'd be more taken up with it than with the Truth it self which is a very considerable and common Fault We every Day see Orators who apply themselves only to that which affects the Senses and who express themselves after so sensible a manner that the Truth is almost stifled under the Weight of their vain Ornaments and false Eloquence So that those who hear them being much more touched with the Measure of their Periods and Motions of their Figures than by their Arguments suffer themselves to be overcome without either knowing what perswades them or of what they are perswaded Much Care therefore ought to be taken so to moderate the Sensibility of our Expressions that they may only render the Mind more attentive There is nothing so beautiful as the Truth we cannot pretend to render it finer by painting it with some Sensible Colours which have nothing solid in them and can only charm for a little Time Perhaps we might give it some pretty Strokes but we shou'd diminish its Strength we ought not to cloath it so bright and sparkling as to make the Mind more attentive to its Ornaments than to the Truth it self It wou'd be to treat it like certain Persons who load themselves with so much Gold and precious Stones that at last they appear the least considerable thing in the Figure they make Truth ought to be cloathed like the Magistrates of Venice who are obliged to wear such a simple Robe and a Cap as may only distinguish them from other Men that they may look upon them with Attention and Respect rather than their Apparel And indeed Care must be taken not to give it too great a Train of agreeable things that will only serve to dissipate the Mind and hinder it from discovering it lest we shou'd give to something else the Honours that are only due to that As sometimes happens to Princes that we see amongst a great Number of Courtiers which are about them and who partake too
much of that Great and Majestick Air as is only fit for Sovereigns But to give a greater Example I say that Truth must be so manifested by others as it hath manifested it self All Men since the Fall of their first Parents have too weak a Sight to consider Truth in it self therefore the Sovereign Truth has rendred it self sensible by taking upon it our Humanity that it may attract our Thoughts enlighten us and make it self amiable in our Eyes Thus by its Example we may cover With any sensible thing those Truths that we wou'd comprehend our selves or teach to others Co that we may attract the Mind which loves what is sensible and which is not easily taken with any thing that does not flatter the Senses The Eternal Wisdom has made it self Sensible but not Resplendent It is become sensible not to make us acquiesce in sensible things but to raise us to intelligible things It became sensible to condemn and sacrifice in its own Person all sensible things we ought therefore in our Pursuit after the Truth to make use of such sensible things as dazle not too much or stop us at the Sensible Part But such as can only maintain the Presence of our Minds in the Contemplation of Truths purely intelligible Such sensible things we must make use of as we can dissipate annihilate or sacrifice with Pleasure as soon as we shall have discovered those Truths for which we made use of it The Eternal Wisdom has presented â—t self externally in a sensible manner to us not to deâ—ain us abroad but to recall us into our selves and â—hat according to the inward Man we might consider tt after an intelligible manner Thus in an Enquiry after Truth we ought to make use of such sensible things as may not stop us at their external Brightness but cause us to enter within our selves make us attentive and unite us to the eternal Truth which alone presides over the Mind and can instruct it in any Subject whatsoever CHAP. IV. Of the use that may be made of the Imagination to preserve the Attention of the Mind and of the Advantage of Geometry GReat Circumspection must be used in the Choice and Use of such Helps as may be drawn from our Passions and Senses to render us attentive to Truth Because our Passions and Senses too livelily affect us and after such a manner fill the Capacity of the Mind that we often see only our own Sensations when we think we have discovered the things themselves that we sought for but it is not the same with those Advantages that may be drawn from the Imagination They make the Mind become attentive without fruitlessly dividing its Capacity and so wonderfully assist us to perceive Objects clearly and distinctly that 't is for the most part beneficial to make use of them But we shall make this plain by some Instances We know that a Body is moved by two or many different Causes towards two or many different Places that these Forces impel it equally or unequally that they encrease or diminish continually according to such a continued Proportion And it may be demanded what is the Line this Body ought to move in the Place it must be in such a Moment what its Swiftness when arrived to such a Place and other things of the like Nature From the Point A where suppose it to be when this Body begins to move draw the indefinite Lines A B A C which make the Angle B A C is they cut each other for A B and A C are direct and cut not each other when the Motions they express are directly opposite After this manner is distinctly represented to the Imagination or if you will to the Senses the Way that this Body wou'd follow if there was only one of these forces which pushed it towards one of these Sides C or B. 2. If the Force which moves this Body towards B is equal to that which moves it towards C we must divide the Lines A B and A C into the Parts 1 2 3 4 and I II III IV equally distant from A. If the Force which moves it towards B is double to that which moves it towards C then take the Parts in A B double to those that are in A C. If this Force is subduple they must be taken subduple If three times greater or less they must be taken proportionably The Division of these Lines furtheâ— express to the Imagination the Magnitude of the different Powers which move these Bodies and in the same Time the Space they shall cause the Body to run through 3. Through these Divisions draw Parallels upon A B and A C to have the Lines 1 X 2 X 3 X c. equal to A I A II A III c. and I X II X III X equal to A 1 A 2 A 3. which express the Spaces that these Forces are capable of causing this Body to run through and through the Intersection of these Parallels draw the Line A X Y E which represents to the Imagination first the true Magnitude of the compound Motion of this Body that in the same time we conceive to be pushed towards B and towards C by two different Forces according to such or such a Proportion Secondly the Way it ought to keep In fine every Place where it must be in such a determined Time so that this Line serves not only to maintain the Presence of the Mind in the Enquiry after all Truths that we wou'd discover concerning the Question proposed But even represents the Resolution after a very sensible and convincing manner See the first Figures First This Line A X Y E expresses the true Magnitude of the compound Motion for we see sensibly if the Forces that produce it can each make this Body advance a Foot in a Minute its compound Motion shall be two Foot in a Minute if the compounding Motions perfectly agree For in this case it suffices to add A B to A C and if these Motions do not entirely agree the compounded A C shall be greater than one of the compounding A B or A C by the Line Y E. But if these Motions are opposite in any thing the compounded will be less than either of the compounding by the Line Y E and if they are intirely opposite it will be nothing at all Secondly This Line A X Y E represents to the Imagination the Way that this Body ought to follow and sensibly shows according to what Proportion it advances more on one Side than another It is evident also that all the compounded Motions are right when each of the compounding is always the same although they be unequal amongst themselves or else when the compounding are equal amongst themselves altho' they are not always the same In fine it is visible that the Lines which describe these Motions are Curves when the compounding are unequal amongst themselves and are not always the same This Line further represents to the Imagination
of sensible Idea's there is hardly any body who discovers that they are equivocal Aristotle and the ancient Philosophers have not so much as thought of it as will easily be granted if we read any thing of their Works and distinctly know the Cause why these Terms are equivocal For there is nothing more evident than that the Philosophers have received the contrary to what ought to be believed upon this Subject For instance when they say Fire is hot Grass green Sugar sweet c. they think with Children and the Vulgar that the Fire contains what they feel when they Warm themselves that Herbs have the same Colours upon them as they believe they see and that Sugar includes the Sweetness in it that we taste in eating and so of all things which we see or feel It is impossible to doubt of this if we read their Writings They speak of sensible Qualities as of Sensations They take Heat for Motion and thus because of the Equivocation of Terms they confound the Modifications of Bodies with the Modifications of Spirits 'T is only since Descartes that these confused and indetermined Questions whether Fire is hot Herbs green Sugar sweet c. have been answered by distinguishing the Equivocations of sensible Terms which express them If by Heat Colour Taste you mean such or such a Motion of insensible Parts Fire is hot Herbs green Sugar sweet c. But if by Heat and the other Qualities you mean what I feel near the Fire what I see when I look upon Herbs c. Fire is not hot nor Herbs green c. for the Heat that we feel and Colours which we see are only in the Soul as I have proved in the first Part of this Book Now as Men think what they feel is the same thing as what is really in the Object They think they have a Right to judge of the Qualities of Objects by the Sensations they have of them So they speak not two Words without saying something false nor ever speak any thing upon this matter which is not obscure and confused as many following Reasons will evince The first because all Men have not the same Sensations nor one Man at different Times or when he feels the same Objects by different Parts of his Body What seems sweet to this Man is bitter to another what is cold to this the same is hot to another what seems hot to one that is cold seems cold to the same Person when he has warmed himself or if he feels it in different Parts of his Body If Water seems hot to one Hand it often seems cold to the other or to some Part near the Heat if washed therewith Salt seems savoury to the Tongue and sharp to a Wound Sugar seems sweet to the Mouth and Aloes extreamly bitter but nothing is either sweet or bitter to the rest of the of the Senses So that when we say such a thing is cold sweet bitter it determines nothing certainly The second because different Objects may produce the same Sensation Plaister Bread Snow Sugar Salt c. produce the same Sensation of Colour Yet their Whiteness is different if we judge otherwise of them than by the Senses So when we say Flower is white we say nothing distinctly The third because the Qualities of Bodies which cause in us Sensations perfectly different are almost the same and on the contrary those of which we have almost the same Sensations are often very different There is scarcely any Difference in the Qualities of Sweetness and Bitterness that is in Objects and yet the Sensations of them are essentially different The Motions which cause Pain or Titilation differ only as to the more or less and yet the Sensations of Titilation and Pain are essentially different On the contrary the Sharpness of Fruit differs not so much from Bitterness as Sweetness does and yet this Quality is the most distant from Bitterness that can be Since it is requisite that a Fruit which is sharp because it is too green must receive a great Number of Changes before it grows bitter for being too much ripe or rotten When Fruits are too ripe they seem sweet and when they are a little too ripe they seem Bitter Bitterness and Sweetness in Fruits differ then only as to the more or less and that is the reason that some Persons think them sweet when others think them bitter For some there are who think Aloes as sweet as Honey It is the same with all Sensible Idea's The Terms of sweet bitter salt sharp sower c. of red green yellow c. of such and such Smells Tasts Colours c. are therefore all equivocal and stir up no clear and distinct Idea in the Mind Yet School Philosophers and the vulgar judge of all the Sensible Qualities of bodies only by the Sensations they receive from them These Philosophers not only judge of Sensible Qualities by the Sensations they receive of them but of things by a Consequence of the Judgments they have made concerning Sensible Qualities For what Sensations they have essentially different from certain Qualities they believe is owing to a Generation of new Forms which produce these Imaginary Differences of Qualities Corn appears yellow hard c. Flower white soft c. And from thence they conclude from the Relation of their Eyes and Hands that these are Bodies essentially different not considering of the manner whereby Corn is changed into Flower yet Flower is only Corn broken and ground as Fire is only Wood divided and agitated and Ashes the grossest Part of the Wood separated without Agitation and Glass only Ashes whereof each Part is polished and made a little round by the Attrition caused by Fire and so of other Transmutations of Bodies It is then evident that Sensible Terms and Idea's are wholly useless for a just proposing and clear resolving of Questions or the Discovery of Truth Yet is there no Question however perplexed by the Equivocal Terms of the Senses but Aristotle and the greatest Part of the Philosophers pretend in their Books to resolve it without these Distinctions that we have given not considering they are Equivocal through Ignorance and Error For instance if we demand of those who have passed their whole Lives in reading the ancient Philosophers or Physicians and who have intirely espoused their Sentiments whether Water is moist Fire dry Wine hot the Blood of Fishes cold if Water is more crude than Wine Gold more perfect than Quicksilver whether Plants and Beasts have Souls and a thousand other undetermined Questions They will easily answer without consulting any thing but the Impression these Objects have made upon their Senses or what their Memories have retained of their reading They do not perceive that these Terms are equivocal They think it strange that they must define them and are impatient if we endeavour to discover to them that they go a little too fast and that their Senses are deceived They 'll make Distinctions
enough to confound the most evident things and in these Questions where 't is necessary to remove the Equivocation they see nothing to distinguish If we consider that the greatest Part of the Questions of Philosophers and Physicians include some equivocal Terms like those we have spoken of we cannot doubt but that these learned Men who have not been able to define them have delivered nothing Solid in all the great Volumes they have composed and what I have said may suffice to overthrow almost all the Opinions of the Ancients But for Descartes he perfectly knew how to distinguish these things He resolved no Question by Sensible Idea's and if we take the Pains to read him we shall see he explained every thing after a more clear and evident Manner and almost always demonstrated them only by the distinct Idea's of Extension Figure and Motion The other kind of equivocal Terms which Philosophers make use of comprehend all these general Terms of Logick by which it is easie to explain things without having any Knowledge of them Aristotle has made the most use of them all his Books are full of them and some are a mere Logick He proposes and resolves all things by these Specious Words Genus Species Power Nature Form Faculty Quality Causa per se Causa per accidens His Followers have had no small Trouble to apprehend the meaning of these Words which signifie nothing at all nor are they more learned than before when they have heard say that Fire dissolves Metals because it has a Faculty of dissolving them and that a Man digests not because he has a weak Stomach or that his Faculty of Concocting does not perform its Functions well It is true those who have made use of these Terms and general Idea's to explain all things by do not commonly fall into so great a Number of Errors as those who only make use of them to stir up the confused Ideas of the Senses The Philosophers of the Schools are not so subject to Error as certain Dogmatical decisive Physicians who form Systems upon some Experiments which they know not the reason of because they speak so generally that they run no great Hazzard The Fire warms dries hardens and softens because it has such Faculties as produce these Effects Senna purges by its Purgative Quality Bread nourishes by its Nutritive Quality These Proportions are not subject to Error for a Quality is that which denotes a thing by such a Name and we cannot deny it to Aristotle for indeed this Definition is indisputable Such or the like manner of speaking are not false but only in Effect they signifie nothing These indetermined Idea's ingage us not in Error but they are wholy useless in the Discovery of Truth For although we know there is a substantial Form in Fire accompanied with a thousand Faculties like to those of heating dilating melting Gold Silver and all Metals of clearing burning and baking If this Difficulty be proposed to me to be resolved viz. whether Fire can harden Dirt and soften Wax The Idea's of Substantial Form and of those Faculties that produce Heat Ratification Fluidity c. would be of no use to me in resolving the Question for there being no Connexion betwen the Idea's of the Hardness of Dirt and Softness of Wax and those of the Substantial Form of Fire and the Qualities of producing Rarification Fluidity c. It is the same with all general Idea's so they are wholly useless for the Ends designed But if we know that Fire is nothing else but the Parts of Wood put into continal Motion and that 't is only by this Agitation that it excites the Sensation of Heat in us If we knew at the same Time that the Softness of Dirt consists only in a Mixture of Earth and Water as these Idea's are not confused and general but distinct and particular It would not be difficult to see that the Heat of Fire must harden Dirt because one Body can move another being it self in Motion We likewise easily discover that since Heat which is felt near the Fire is caused by the Motion of the invisible Parts of the Wood which strike against the Hands if we expose Dirt to the Heat of the Fire the Watery Parts which are joyned to the Earth being more lose and consequently sooner agitated by the Shock of the little Bodies which go out from the Fire than the gross Particles of the Earth they must separate and leave it dry and hard It would also evidently apppear that Fire cannot harden Wax if we knew that the Particles which compose it are branched and very near of the same Bigness Thus particular Idea's are very useful in an Enquiry after Truth And indeterminate Idea's are hot only useless but on the contrary insensibly lead us into Error These Philosophers content not themselves with making use of general Terms and indetermined Idea's that answer nothing But they will have those Terms signifie certain particular Beings They pretend that there is some Substance distinct from Matter which is the Form of Matter and an infinite Company of little Beings really distinct from Matter and Form of which they suppose as many of them as they have different Sensations of Bodies and they think these Bodies produce different Effects Yet it is plain to any Man that is capable of Attention that all these little Beings distinct from Fire for instance and which we suppose to be contained therein for the Production of Heat Light Hardness Fluidity c are only Fictions of the Imagination which are contrary to Reason For Reason hath no particular Idea which represents these little Beings If we ask the Philosophers what Sort of Entity that Faculty in the Fire is which gives Light they will only answer that 't is a Being which is the Cause why Fire is capable of producing Light So that the Idea they have of the Faculty of Light is not different from the general Idea of the Cause and confused Idea of the Effect which we see They have therefore no clear Idea of what they say when they admit these particular Beings Thus they say what they conceive not and what indeed is impossible to be conceived CHAP. III. Of the most dangerous Error in Philosophy Of the Ancients PHilosophers have not only spoke what they did not conceive when they explained the Effects of Nature by certain Beings which they have no particular Idea of but even establish a Principle from whence may directly be drawn most false and dangerous Consequences For if according to their Opinion we suppose that in Bodies there are some Beings distinct from Matter and not having any distinct Idea of these Entities we might easily imagine that they are the true or principal Causes of the Effects which we see produced 'T is even the common Sentiment of most Philosophers For 't is chiefly to explain these Effects that they make use of Substantial Forms Real Qualities and other the like Entities
But when we come to consider attentively the Idea we have of Cause or Power of acting we cannot doubt but that it represents something Divine For the Idea of a Sovereign Power is the Idea of Sovereign Divinity and the Idea of a Subordinate Power is the Idea of an inferiour but a true Divinity at least according to the Opinion of the Heathens if it be the Idea of a Power or true Cause We admit therefore something Divine in all Bodies which encompass us when we admit Forms Faculties Qualities Vertues and real Beings capable of producing certain Effects by the Power of their own Nature And thus they insensibly enter into the Opinions of the Heathens by the Respect they have for their Philosophy Faith indeed works it but it may perhaps be said that if we are Christians in our Hearts we are Heathens in our Minds Moreover it is difficult to perswade our selves that we ought neither to love or fear true Powers and Beings who can act upon us punish us with Pain or recompense us with Pleasure And as Love and Fear are a true Adoration 't is also difficult to perswade our selves that we ought not to adore them For whatever can act upon us as a real and true Cause is necessarily above us according to St. Austin and right Reason The same Father and the same Reason tells us 't is an immutable Law that Inferiour things should submit to superiour And from hence Ego enim ab animâ hoc corpus animari non puto nifi intentione facientis Nec ab isto quicquam illam pati Arbitror sed facere de illo in illo tanquam subjecto divinitus dominationi suae l. 6. mus c. 5. * this great Father concludes that the Body cannot act upon the Soul and that nothing can be above the Soul but God In the Holy Scriptures when God proves to the Israelites that they ought to adore him that is that they ought to fear and love him the chief Reasons he brings are taken from his Power to recompence and punish them He represents to them the Benefits they have received from him the Evils wherewith he hath chastised them and that he has still the same Power He forbids them to adore the Gods of the Heathens because they have no Power over them and can do them neither Good nor Hurt He requires them to honour him only because he only is the true Cause of Good and Evil and that there happens none in their City according to the Prophet which he has not done for Natural Causes are not the true Causes of the Evil that appears to be done to us 'T is God alone that acts in them and 't is he only that we must fear and love Soli Deo Honor Gloria In short this Opinion that we ought to fear and love whatsoever is the true Cause of Good and Evil appears so natural and just that it is impossible to destroy it so that if we suppose this false Opinion of the Philosophers which we endeavour here to confute that Bodies which encompass us are the true Causes of the Pleasures and Evils which we feel Reason seems to justifie a Religion like to that of the Heathens and approves of the universal Irregularity of Manners It is true that Reason does not tell us that we must adore Onyons and Leeks as the Sovereign Divinity because they cannot make us intirely happy when we have of them or intirely unhappy when we want them Nor have the Heathens ever done to them so much Honour as to the great Jupiter upon whom all their Divinities depend or as to the Sun which our Senses represent to us as the universal Cause which gives Life and Motion to all things and which we cannot hinder our selves from regarding as a Sovereign Divinity if with the Heathen Philosophers we suppose it includes in its being the true Causes of whatever it seems to produce not only in our Bodies and Minds but likewise in all Beings which encompass us But if we must not pay a Sovereign Honour to Leeks and Onyons yet we may always render them some particular Adoration I mean we may think of and love them in some manner if it is true that in some sort they can make us happy we must honour them in Proportion to the Good they can do us And certainly Men who give Ear to the Reports of their Senses think that Pulse is capable of doing them good for else the Israelites for instance would not have regretted their Absence in the Defect nor considered it as a Misfortune to be deprived of them if they did not in some manner look upon themselves happy in the Enjoyment of them These are the Irregularities which our Reason engages us in when it is joyned to the Principles of the Heathen Philosophy and follows the Impressons of the Senses That we may longer doubt of the Falseness of this Miserable Philosphy and the Certainty of our Principles and Clearness of the Idea's we make use of It is necessary clearly to establish those Truths which are opposite to the Errors of the ancient Philosophy and to prove in short that there is only one true Cause because there is only one true God That Nature or the Power of every thing proceeds only from the Will of God That all Natural things are not true Causes but only occasional ones and some other Truths which will be the Consequences of these It is evident that all Bodies both great and small have no power of removing themselves A Mountain an House a Stone a grain of Sand and in short the least or biggest Bodies we can conceive have no power of removing themselves We have only two sorts of Idea's that of Bodies and that of Spirits whereas we ought to speak only of those things which we conceive we should reason according to these two Idea's Since therefore the Idea we have of all Bodies shows us that they cannot move themselves it must be concluded that they are moved by Spirits only But when we examine the Idea we have of all finite Minds we do not see the necessary Connexion between their Wills and the Motion of any Body whatsoever it be On the contrary we see that there is none nor can be any whence we ought to conclude if we will argue according to our Knowledge that as no body can be able to move it self so there is no created Spirit can be the true or principal cause of the Motion of any body whatever But when we think of the Idea of God viz. of a Being infinitely Perfect and consequently Almighty we know that there is such a Connexion between his Will and the Motion of all Bodies that 't is impossible to conceive he should Will the Motion of a Body that should not be moved We must then say that his Will only can move Bodies if we will speak things as we conceive them and not as we feel them The moving
force of Bodies therefore is not in the Bodies which move since this power of Motion is nothing else but the Will of God Thus Bodies have no Action and when a Bowl which is moved by meeting it moves another yet it communicates nothing of its own for in it self it hath not the Impression that it communicates to the other Yet a Bowl is the Natural Cause of the motion which it communicates A Natural Cause then is not a real and true Cause but only an occasional one and which determined the Author of Nature to act after such and such a manner in such and such an Occurrence It is certain that 't is by the Motion of visible or invisible Bodies that all things are produced For Experience teaches us that Bodies whose parts are in greatest Motion always act more than others and produce the greatest Change in the World All the Powers of Nature then proceed from the Will of God He has created the World because he willed it Dixit facta sunt He moves all things and so produces all the Effects that we see happen because he has also willed certain Laws according to which Bodies communicate their Motions in their Rencounter and because these Laws are Efficacious they act and Bodies cannot act There is therefore no Force Power or true Cause in the Material and Sensible World nor must we admit of Forms Facilities and real Qualities to produce Effects that Bodies cannot and to divide with God the Force and Power which is Essential to him Not only Bodies cannot be the true Causes of any thing the most noble Spirits also are under a like Impotence They can know nothing it God does not enlighten them nor can they have any Sensation if he does not modifie them They are capable of willing nothing if God moves them not towards him I confess they can determine the Impression that God gives them towards him to other Objects but I know not whether that can called a Power If the Capability of Sinning is a Power it would be a Power which the Almighty has not St. Austin says in some of his Works It Men had in themselves the Power of loving Good we might say they had some Power But can only Love because God Wills they should Love and because his Will is Efficacious They Love only because God continually inclines them to Good in General that is towards himself For God has created them only for himself he never preserves them without turning them towards and inclining them to himself They have no Motion towards Good in general 't is God who moves them they only follow by an entire free Choice this Impression according to the Law of God or determine it towards a false Good after the Law of the Flesh They can only be determined by a Prospect of Good For being able to do only what God makes them they can love nothing but Good But if we should suppose what is true in one Sense that Spirits have in themselves the Power of knowing Truth and loving Good if their Thoughts and Wills produced nothing External we might always say they were able to do nothing Now it appears most certain to me that the Will of Spirits is not capable of moving the least Body in the World For 't is evident there is no necessary Connexion between the Will we have of moving our Arms and the Motion of them It is true they are moved when we please and by that means we are the Natural Cause of their Motion But Natural Causes are not true Causes they are only Occasional ones which act meerly through the Power and Efficacy of God as I have already explained For how can we move our Arms To move them we must have Animal Spirits and convey them by certain Nerves into such and such Muscles to swell and contract them For by this means the Arms move or according to the Opinion of some we know not yet how 't is performed And we see that Men who do not so much as know they have Spirits Nerves and Muscles to move their Arms yet move them with as much Art and Facility as those that understand Anatomy best 'T is then granted that Men Will the Motion of their Arms but 't is only God that can and knows how to remove them If a Man cannot throw down a Tower at least he knows well what must be done in order to it But there is no Man that knows so much as what he must do to move one of his Fingers by the help of his Animal Spirits How then can Men move their Arms These things appear evident to me and to all those that will think of them though perhaps they may be incomprehensible to such as will not consider them But Men only are not the True Causes of the Motions produced in their Bodies it seems even a Contradiction that they should be so A True Cause is such an one as the Mind perceives a necessary Connexion between it and its Effect 't is that I mean Now there is only the Infinitely Perfect Being whose Mind can perceive a necessary Connexion between his Will and the Effects of it 'T is only God then who is the True Cause and who has really the Power of moving Bodies I say moreover 't is not probable that God should communicate either to Men or Angels this Power he has of moving Bodies and those who pretend the Power we have of moving our Arms is a true Power must confess that God can also give to Spirits the Power of creating annihilating and performing all possible things In a word That he can make them Almighty as I shall further shew God has no need of any Instrument to act it is sufficient if he Wills a thing for it to be because it is a Contradiction to suppose he Wills it and that it should not be His Power then is his Will and the communicating of his Power is a Communication of his Will But to communicate his Will to a Man or an Angel can signifie nothing else but Willing some body for instance should be effectively moved when 't is Will'd by a Man or an Angel Now in this case I see two Wills which concur when an Angel would move a Body that of God and that of the Angel and to know which of the two will be the true Cause of the Motion of this Body we must know which it is that is Efficacious There is a necessary Connexion between the Will of God and what he Wills God Wills in this case that a Body should move when it is willed by an Angel There is a necessary Connexion therefore between the. Will of God and the Motion of this Body and consequently 't is God who is the true cause of the Motion of the Body and the Will of the Angel only an occasional one But to shew it yet more clearly let us suppose that God Wills it should happen quite contrary to what some
and undoubted Principles For we have discovered that the Air which encompasses the Loadstone c was driven from between the Loadstones by Bodies which are continually emitted from their Poles ' which find free passage on one side and are stopt on the other And if we would discover near what the Magnitude and Figure of the Pores of this Loadstone are through which these little bodies pass we must yet make other Experiments but they would lead us to subjects which we intend not to treat of Upon these Questions we may consult the Principles of M. Descartes I shall only answer an Objection which immediately offers it self from whence is it that these little bodies cannot re-enter by the same Pores they came out that besides a certain Figure representing the Spiral Chanels of a Screw which we may suppose to be in the Pores producing this Effect the Inflexion of the little Branches which compose these Pores may in one Sense obey the little Bodies which pass a-cross them and in another Sense make them rough and stop their passage So that we need not be too much surprised at the difference of the Poles of the Loadstone for this difference may be accounted for many ways and all the difficulty is amongst several Causes to discover the true one If we had endeavoured to resolve the Question we have just now examined in beginning with the Corpuscles which we suppose to be emitted from the Loadstone C we should have found the same thing And we should likewise have discovered that the Air is composed of an infinite Number of Particles which are in continual Agitation for without it 't would be impossible that the Loadstone c should approach to the Loadstone C. I shall not stay to explain this because 't is not difficult I will give you here a Question more compound than the foregoing in which many Rules must be made use of 't is demanded what can be the Natural and Mechanical Cause of the Motion of our Members The Idea of Natural Cause is clear and distinct if we understand it as I have explained it in the precedent Question but the Term of the Motion of our Members is equivocal and confused for there are many sorts of these Motions some of the Will Natural and Convulsive ones There are likewise different Members in Mans Body So that according to the first Rule I must ask of which of these Motions it is that they would know the Cause But if the Question is left indeterminate so that I may make use of any I shall chuse I would examine the Question after this manner And first consider the Properties of these Motions and because I immediately discover that Voluntary Motions are commonly more readily performed than the Convulsive ones I conclude from thence that their Cause is different Therefore I can and ought to examine the Question by Parts for it would appear to be of too long a Discussion I would oblige my self therefore first to consider Voluntary Motion and because we have many Parts which concur to this Motion I would first consider the Arm as composed of many Muscles which have generally some Action when we lift a Weight up or when we differently move Bodies but I keep only to one supposing the rest to be formed very near after the same manner I instruct my self of its Composition by the Help of some Book of Anatomy or rather by a Sensible Sight of its Fibres and Tendons which I get some able Anatomist to dissect for me to whom I make all the Demands which shall afterwards produce in my Mind some Method for me to find what I seek Considering therefore all things attentively I cannot doubt but the Principle of the Motion of my Arm depends upon the Contraction of the Muscles which compose it And if I have not a mind to perplex my self with too many things I may suppose according to the common Opinion that this Contraction is produced by the Animal Spirits which fill these Muscles and by this means shorten them the whole Question then which respects Voluntary Motion will be reduced to know how the few Animal Spirits which are contained in an Arm can suddenly swell the Muscles according to the Orders of the Will with a sufficient Force to lift a Burden of an Hundred Weight or more When we consider this with any Application the first means that presents it self to the Imagination is commonly that of some violent and quick Fermentation like to that of Gunpowder or certain Liquors filled with Volatile Salt when they are mixed with those that are Acid or full of fixt Salt A little Gunpowder when lighted is capable of raising not only an Hundred Pound Weight but a Tower and even a Mountain Earthquakes which overthrow Towns and shake whole Provinces are also produced by Spirits which are kindled under Ground much like Gunpowder Thus supposing in the Arm such a Cause of the Fermentation and Dilatation of Spirits we may say that it is the Principle of the Power that Men have to perform such quick and violent Motions However as we ought to distrust this means which enters into the Mind only by the Senses and whereof we have no clear and evident Knowledge we must not too easily admit of it For indeed it is not sufficient to give a Reason of the Force and Quickness of our Motions by a Comparison since this Reason is confused and imperfect For we must here explain a Voluntary Motion and Fermentation is not Voluntary The Blood excessively ferments in Feavers and we cannot prevent it The Spirits are inflamed and agitated in the Brain and their Agitation diminishes not according to our Desires When a Man moves his Arm after diverse Ways according to this Explanation he must make a Million of great and small quick and slow Fermentations that begin and which is still more difficult to explain according to this Supposition that end in the same Moment he wills it These Fermentations must not dissipate all their Matter and this Matter must be always ready to take Fire When a Man walks Ten Miles how many Thousand Times must the Muscles which he uses in walking be filled and emptied And what a vast Quantity of Spirits would be required if Fermentation should dissipate and destroy them at every Step. This Reason is therefore imperfect to explain the Motions of our Bodies which entirely depend upon our Will It is evident that the present Question consists in this Mechanical Problem By Pneumatick Machines to find the means of overcoming such or such Force suppose a Hundred Weight by another as small as we will suppose the Weight of an Ounce and that the Application of this little Force shall produce its desired Effect and depend upon the Will Now this Problem is easily resolved and the Demonstration of it is clear We may resolve it by a Vessel which has two Orifices one of which is a little more than 1600. Times greater than the other
in which let there be inserted the Tubes of two equal Bellows and only apply a Force 1600 Times greater than the other to the Mouth of the greater Bellows for then the Force of 1600 Times the less shall overcome the greater The Demonstration of it is clear from Mechanicks since the Powers are not exactly in Reciprocal Proportion with the Orifices and the Relation of the least Force to the least Orifice is greater than the Relation of greater Force to the greater Orifice But to resolve this Problem by a Machine which represents the Effect of the Muscles better than this Instance already mentioned Blow up a Foot-ball and let there be a great Stone of 5 or 6 Hundred Weight laid upon it when half filled with Wind or place the Ball upon a Table with a Board over it and a Stone over that or let some heavy Man sit upon it holding himself by something that he may be able to resist the swelling of the Foot-ball For if one blow in the Foot-ball once only with his Mouth it will raise up the Stone which presses it down or the Man who sits upon it provide a the Orifice by which the Wind enters the Foot-ball have a Sucker to hinder it from going out whilst the Person takes Breath The Reason of this is that the Orifice in the Ball is so small or ought to be supposed so small in Relation to the whole Ball which is compressed by the Stone that a small Force is capable to overpower a great one by this method If we consider also that ones Breath is capable of pushing a Ball of Lead very violently by the means of a long Tube because the Force of the Breath dissipates not but continually renews we may visibly discover that the necessary Proportion between the Orifice and Capacity of the Ball being supposed ones Breath only may easily overcome a very great Force If then we conceive that all the Muscles or each of the Fibres which compose them have like this Foot-ball a Capacity fit to receive the Animal Spirits that the Pores by which the Spirits insinuate themselves are still smaller in Proportion than the Neck of a Bladder or Orifice of a Ball that the Spirits are kept in and pushed forward in the Nerves like Air in Tubes and that the Spirits are more agitated than the Breath of the Lungs and pushed with more Force in the Muscles than in Balls We shall discover that the Motion of the Spirits which are dispersed through the Muscles can overcome the Force of the most weighty Burthens we can bear and that if we cannot carry the heaviest the Defect of the Power proceeds not so much from the Spirits as that of the Fibres and Membranes that compose the Muscles which would break if we made too great an Effort Besides if we observed that by the Laws of the Union of the Soul and Body the Motions of these Spirits as to their Determinations depend upon the Will of Man we should plainly see that the Motions of the Arms must be voluntary It is true we remove our Arms with so much Quickness that at first it seems incredible that the Effusion of the Spirits in the Muscles which compose them should be quick enough to produce such a Motion But we must consider that these Spirits are extreamly agitated always ready to go from one Muscle to another and that there is not need of many to swell them up so little as is necessary to move them only or when we lift any thing that 's very light from the Ground for when we have any thing heavy to lift we cannot do it so speedily Burthens being heavy will much swell and stretch the Muscles To swell them up after this manner requires more Spirits than there is in the adjoyning or opposite Muscles There must therefore be some little Time to collect these Spirits in a Quantity sufficient to resist this Weight So that those which are laden cannot run and those that take any weighty thing from the Ground cannot do it with so much Haste as those who take up a Straw If we further reflect that those that have more Heat or a little Wine in their Heads are much quicker than others as amongst Animals those whose Spirits are more agitated as Birds move more swiftly than they that have their Blood cold like Frogs And that even amongst them there are some as the Camelion the Tortoise and other Infects whose Spirits are so little agitated that their Muscles fill not faster than a little Foot-ball which we should blow up If we well consider all these things it may be we might think the Explanation already given fit to be received But although this Part of the proposed Question which regards Voluntary Motions is sufficiently resolved We must not however affirm that it is wholly so and that there is nothing more in our Bodies which contributes to these Motions than what we have attributed to it for there is probably in our Muscles a thousand Springs which facilitate these Motions and will be eternally unknown to those even who make the strictest Scrutinies into the Works of God The second Part of the Question which must be examined respects Natural Motions or those sort of Motions which have nothing extraordinary as the Convulsive have but that are absolutely necessary to the Preservation of our Machine which consequently depend not entirely upon our Wills I consider then first with all the Attention I am capable what the Motions are which have these Conditions and if they are wholly alike but because I immediately discover that almost all of them differ one from another not to perplex my self with too many things I only insist upon the Motion of the Heart This Part is the most known and its Motions most sensible I then examine its Structure and amongst many others observe two things The first that 't is composed of Fibres like other Muscles the second that there is two very considerable Cavities in it I therefore judge that its Motions may be performed by the Animal Spirits because it is a Muscle and that the Blood there ferments and dilates its self since there are Cavities there The first of these Determinations is founded upon what I have already said and the second because the Heart is much hotter than all the other Parts of the Body as it is that which disperses Heat with the Blood into all our Members that these two Cavities could neither have been formed nor preferved but only by the Dilatation of the Blood and that thus they are serviceable to the Cause which produced them I can then give a sufficient Reason for the Motion of the Heart by the Spirits which agitate it and the Blood which dilates it when this Blood is fermented For although the Cause I bring for its Motion should not perhaps be true yet it appears certain to me that it is sufficient to produce it It 's true that the Principle of the
Fermentation or Dilatation of the Liquors probably is not enough known to all that shall read this Book to pretend to have shewn an Effect when we have in general discovered that its Cause is Fermentation but we must not resolve all particular Questions by going back unto the first Causes It is not because we cannot by this demonstrate and discover the true System upon which all particular Effects depend provided we stop only at clear Idea's But that this manner of Philosophizing is neither the most exact nor shortest To explain what I mean we must know there are Questions of two Sorts In the first we try to discover the Nature and Properties of something In the others we only desire to know if such a thing hath or hath not such a Propriety or if we know it has such a Propriety we would only know the Cause of it To resolve Questions of the first Kind we must consider things in their Original and always conceive them produced by the most Simple and most Natural Ways To resolve the rest a very different manner must be taken They must be done by Suppositions and we must examine whether these Suppositions make us guilty of any Absurdity or if they conduce to any Truth clearly known For Instance we would discover what are the Properties of the Cycloid or of some of the Conick Sections These Lines must be considered in their Generation and formed according to the most Simple and least perplext Ways for 't is the best and shortest Method to discover the Nature and Properties of them We easily see that the Subtense of the Cycloid is equal to the Circle which forms it and if we do not easily discover many Properties by this means 't is because the Circular Line which serves to form it is not sufficiently known But for these Lines purely Mathematical or such whose Relations we can know more exactly as Conick Sections we may discover a great Number of their Properties by considering them in their Generation We must only observe that as they may be generated by a Regular Motion several Ways so all Sorts of Generations are not equally proper to enlighten the Mind but the most Simple are the best and that it often happens that certain particular Methods are more proper than others to demonstrate some particular Properties But if the Question is not in general to discover the Properties of a thing but to know if a thing has such a Property Then it must be supposed that it hath it effectively and examine attentively what must follow this Supposition whether it leads to a manifest Absurdity or else to some undoubted Truth which may serve as a means to discover what we enquire after And 't is that Method Geometricians make use of to resolve their Problems They suppose as done what they seek for and examine what must happen from thence and attentively consider the Relations which result from their Suppositions They represent all these Relations which include the Condition of the Problem by Equations and afterwards reduce these Equations according to their Rules so that what is unknown they find equal to one or many things perfectly known If the Question then is in general to discover the Nature of Fire and the different Fermentations which are the most universal Causes of Natural Effects I say that the shortest and most secure Way is to examine it in its Original We must consider the Formation of the most agitated Body the Motion of which is dispersed into those that ferment By clear Idea's and the most Simple Way we must examine what Motion is capable of producing in Matter And because Fire and different Fermentations are very general things and which consequently depend upon few Causes it will not be requisite long to consider what Matter is capable of when it is animated by Motion to discover the Nature of Fermentation is its Principle and at the same time we shall learn many other things absolutely necessary to the Knowledge of Physicks Whereas if in this Question we would reason by Suppositions we should go back to the first Causes to the Laws of Nature according to which all things are formed and suppose many false things which would be of no Use We might soon discover that the Cause of Fermentation is the Motion of an Invisible Matter which communicates its self to the Parts of that which acts it for we know plain enought that Fire and the different Fermentation of Bodies consist in their Agitation and that by the Laws of Nature Bodies immediately receive their Motion only by their meeting with some others more agitated Thus we may discover that there is an Invisible Matter whose Agitation is communicated to Visible Bodies But it would be Morally impossible by way of Supposition to discover how it is done And it is not near so difficult to discover when we examine the Formation of the Elements or some Bodies whereof there 's a great Number of the same Nature as is evident by Mr. Descartes's System The third Part of the Question which is of Convulsive Motions will not be very difficult to resolve provided we suppose in Bodies Animal Spirits capable of some Fermentation and of Humours sufficiently penetrating to insinuate themselves into the Pores of the Nerves by which the Spirits disperse themselves through the Muscles provided also we do not pretend to determine what the true Disposition of the Invisible Parts is which contribute to these Convulsive Motions When we have separated a Muscle from the rest of the Body and hold it by the Extremities we Sensibly perceive that it makes all its Effort to contract it self when we prick it in the Middle It is very probable that this depends upon the Construction of the Imperceptible Parts that compose it which like so many Springs are determined to certain Motions by this Pricking But who can affirm they have found the true Disposition of the Parts which serve to produce this Motion or who can give an undoubted Demonstration of it Certainly it would appear impossible although it may be through the Power of Thought we can imagine a Construction of the Muscles fit to perform all the Motions we see them capable of Yet must we not think to determine what is the true Construction of the Muscles But because we cannot reasonably doubt that there are Spirits Susceptible of some Fermentation by the Mixture of some Subtle Matter and that the sharp and pungent Humours may insinuate themselves into the Nerves we may suppose it To resolve the Question proposed we must first examine how many Sorts of Convulsive Motions there are and because the Number of them appears indetermined we may keep to the chief whose Causes seem to be different We must consider the Parts wherein they are performed the Diseases which precede and follow them If they are produced with or without Pain and particularly how quick and violent they are for some of them are performed very quick
and violent others with Quickness without Violence and some again without Quickness or Violence There are some of them which continually end and being again some which keep the Parts stiff and without Motion for some Time and some again which entirely take away Persons Senses and disâ—igure them All these things considered 't is not difficult in general to explain how the Convulsive Motions may be produced after what we have already said of Natural and Voluntary Motions For if we conceive that there is some Matter capable of fermenting the Spirits mixed with those that are contained in a Muscle this Muscle will be swelled up and shall in this part produce a Convulsive Motion If we can easily resist this Motion it will be a sign that the Nerves are not stopt by any Humour since we can empty the Muscle of the Spirits which are entred there and determine them to swell up the opposite Muscle But if we cannot we must conclude that the sharp and penetrating Humours have at least some share in this Motion It may even sometimes happen that these Humours are the sole Cause of these Convulsive Motions So they may determine the Course of the Spirits to certain Museles by opening the Passages which carry them thither and shutting up some others Besides they may contract the Tendons and Fibers by penetrating their Pores When a very heavy Weight hangs at the bottom of a Cord we can raise it much if we only wet the Cord because the Particles of Water insinuate themselves like so many little Wedges between the Threads that the Cord is composed of and shorten it by making it thicker So the penetrating and sharp Humours insinuate themselves into the Pores of the Nerves contract them stretch the parts which are united to them and produce Convulsive Motions in the Body which are extream slow violent and painful and often for some considerable time leave a very great Distortion in the Part. For the Convulsive Motions which are speedily performed they are caused by the Spirits but 't is not necessary that these Spirits should receive any Fermentation it is enough if the Conduits they pass through are more open on one side than the other When all the parts of the Body are in their Natural Situation the Animal Spirits equally and swiftly disperse themselves every where in respect to the Exigency of the Machine and Faithfully execute the Orders of the Will But when the Humours trouble the Disposition of the Brain and change or diversly move the Openings of the Nerves or by penetrating into the Muscles agitate their Springs the Spirits disperse themselves through the Parts after new manner and produce extraordinary Motions there without the consent of the Will Yet may we sometimes by a powerful Resistance prevent any of these Motions and even by degrees diminish the Traces which produced them when the Habit is perfectly formed Those who take care of them may very easily hinder themselves from making distorted Faces or from assuming an unpleasant Air or indecent Posture if the Body be indisposed These things may be overcome although they are confirmed by a long habit but with much difficulty for they should alwayes be resisted in their original before the course of the Spirits has made a way too difficult to be stopt The Cause of these Motions lies sometimes in the agitated Muscle and is some Humour that pricks or some Spirits which ferment there But we must judge it to be in the Brain chiefly when the Convulsions agitate not only one or two parts of the Body in particular but almost all of it and that in many Distempers which change the Natural Constitution of the Blood and Spirits It is true that one Nerve only having sometimes different Branches which are sufficiently dispersed through the remote parts of the Body as through the Face and Bowels it often happens that the Convulsion having its Cause in one part in which some of these Branches insinuate themselves can communicate it self to them or the other correspondent Branches without the Brains being any cause of it or the Spirits corrupted But when the Convulsive Motions are common to most parts of the Body we must needs say that either the Spirits ferment after an extraordinary manner or that the Order and Disposition of the parts of the Brain is troubled or else that both these things happen together I will stay no longer upon this Question for it becomes so compounded and depends upon so many things when we desecend to Particulars that it cannot easily ferve to explain those Rules we have given There is no Science which furnishes us with more Examples fit to shew the Usefulness of these Rules than Geometry and chiefly Algebra for in these two Sciences they are continually used Geometry clearly shews the necessity there always is of beginning with the most simple things which include the feweset Relations If always examines these Relations by Measures evidently known It takes away whatever is useless in the discovery of them divides the Questions into parts ranks these parts and examines them in order In short The only Defect in this Science is as I have before observed that it has not a very proper Method to abridge the Idea's and Relations we have discovered So that although it regulates the Imagination and makes the Mind become exact it does not much increase its Extension nor render it capable of discovering very compound Truths But Algebra continually teaches us to abridge Idea's and their Relations after the shortest Method in the World and extreamly augments the Capacity of the Mind for we can conceive nothing how Compound soever in the Relations of Magnitude that the Mind cannot in times discover by its assistance when we once know the way we must take The fifth and following Rules which concern the way of abridging Idea's only respect this Science for in other Sciences we have no commodious way of abridging them so that I shall not stay to explain them Those that have a great Inclination for the Mathematicks and will give to their Mind all the Force and Extension it is capable of and thus put themselves into a Condition of discovering without a Tutor an infinite number of known Truths will if they seriously apply themselves to Algebra discover that this Science is so useful in an Enquiry after Truth because it observes the Rules we have prescribed But by Algebra I mean chiefly that which Descartes and some others have made use of Before I conclude I will give an Example on which I shall insist a little longer that we may be the better able to see what use may be drawn from it In this Example I will represent the Advances of a Mind which would examine a very important Question and endeavour to deliver it self from its Prejudices I shall at first make it fall into some Error that it may recollect what I have said elsewhere now its Attention at last conducting it to the
Truth enquired after I make it speak positively like one who pretends to have resolved the Question he has examined CHAP. IX The last Example to shew the Vsefulness of this Work in which the Cause of the Vnion of the Parts of Bodies and also the Rules of the Communication of Motion are examined BOdies are united together after three different ways by Continuity Contiguity and a third way which has no particular name because it rarely happens and which I call by the general Term of Vnion By Continuity or the Cause of it I mean that I know not what which links together the Parts of a Body so strongly that they cannot easily be separated and which we look upon as making altogether but one whole By Contiguity I mean that I know not what which makes me suppose two Bodies touching after such a manner so that there is nothing between them but which I judge not strictly united because I can easily separate them By this third Term Vnion I mean that I know not what which is the cause that wo Glasses or two Marbles whose Surfaces having been polished by rubbing one against another are joyned together in such a manner that although we can very easily separate them by making them slip off one another we shall nevertheless have some trouble to do it by any other Method Now this is not Continuity since these two Glasses or Marbles being united after this manner are not conceived as making but one Body because in one Sense we can separate them so easily Nor is it simply Contiguity although it comes very near it because these two pieces of Glass or Marble are strictly enough united and even much more than the Parts of soft and liquid Bodies as those of Butter and Water These Terms thus explained we must afterwards enquire into the Cause which unites Bodies and the Differences between Continuity Contiguity and the Vnion of Bodies according to the Sense I have determined I first seek the Cause of Continuity or that I know not what which keeps the Parts of a Body so strictly united together that some Force must be used to separate them and which we look upon together as making one whole I hope this Cause being found we shall have no great Difficulty to discover the rest It seems now necessary to me that this I know not what that ties even the smallest Parts of a piece of Iron together which I hold in my Hand should be something very powerful since I must use a great Force to break off one little part of it But I deceive my self May not this Difficulty that I find in breaking the least piece of Iron proceed from my Weakness and not the resistance of the Iron For I remember that I have formerly used more Violence than I do now to break a piece of Iron like that I hold in my Hand and if I fall Sick perhaps I could not even do it by the utmost Power I could use I therefore see plainly I must not absolutely judge of Firmness whereby the parts of Iron are knit together by the Endeavours I make to dis-unite them I must only judge that they keep very strongly together in relation to my Weakness or that they keep more strongly together than the parts of my Flesh since the Sensations of Pain that I have whilst I make too great Efforts advertises me that I shall rather dis-unite the parts of my Body than those of Iron I discover then that as I am not absolutely Strong or Weak Iron or other Bodies are not absolutely hard or flexible but only in relation to the Cause which acts upon them and that the Efforts I make cannot serve me as a Rule to measure the greatness of the Force that must be imployed to overcome the Resistance and Hardness of Iron For Rules ought to be invariable and these Efforts change according to time the abundance of actual Spirits and hardness of my Flesh since I cannot always produce the same Effects by using the same Endeavours This Reflection delivers me from a Prejudice that I had which made me imagine the Links were strong which united the parts of Bodies which Links perhaps are nothing at all and I hope it will not be useless to me in the Consequence for I have a strange Inclination to judge of every thing in relation to my self and to follow the Impressions of my Senses which I would more industriously avoid But to proceed After having thought some time and with some application enquired the cause of this strict Union without having discovered any thing of it I find my self carried by my Negligence and Nature to judge with many others that 't is the Form of Bodies which preserves the Union between their Parts or the Amity and Inclination they have for their likeness for there is nothing more commodious than to suffer our selves sometimes to be seduced and so to become Learned at little Cost But since I will not believe any thing I do not know I must not suffer my self to be thus overcome by my own Idleness nor give my self up to bare Appearances Let us quit therefore these Forms and Inclinations whereof we have no distinct and particular Idea's but only confused and general ones that it may be we form only in relation to our Nature and even in the Existence of which many Persons and perhaps whole Nations agree not It seems to me that I see the Cause of this strict Union of Parts which compose hard Bodies without admitting of any other thing than what all the World grants to be in them or at least all that the World conceives distinctly to be there for every one distinctly conceives that all Bodies are or may be composed of little Particles Thus it may be there are some of them which are crooked and branched and like little Links capable of holding others strongly together or else that they intermix all their Branches so that we cannot easily dis-unite them I have a great Mind to permit my self to espouse this Thought and so much the more as that I see the visible Parts of great Bodies hold and unite themselves together after this manner But I cannot too much distrust my Prejudices and the Impression of my Senses I must therefore yet examine the Matter more closely and see the Reason why the smallest and utmost Parts of Solid Bodies in a word even the Parts of each of these Links hold together for they cannot be united by other Links yet smaller since I suppose them solid Or else If I say they are united after this manner they may reasonably demand what shall unite these others together and so on ad infinitum So that now the Difficulty of the Question is to know how the parts of these little Links or branched parts can be so strictly united together as they are A for instance with B which I suppose parts of a little Link Or else which is the same thing Bodies being so
be in Rest just as in the Creation of the World it is not sufficient that God should will the World should exist but it is necessary that he positively wills the Manner in which it must exist And to annihilate it it must not be God's willing that it should not be because God cannot will nothing by a positive Will it is enough only that God ceases to will that it should exist I do not here consider Motion and Rest according to their Relative Being For 't is plain that Bodies in Rest have as real Relations to those which encompass them as those that are in Motion have I only conceive that Bodies which are in Motion have a moving Power and those that are in Rest have no Power to keep themselves in Rest because the Relation that Bodies moved have to those which encompass them always changing it must be a continual Power which produces these continual Changes For indeed 't is these Changes that cause whatsoever Revolutions we see in Nature But there is no need of Power to do nothing When the Relation of a Body to those that surround it is always the same there is nothing done and the Preservation of this Relation I mean the Action of the Will of God who preserves this Relation is not different from that which preserves the same Body By a Body in a Void I mean one so separated from others as well hard as liquid that there is none which helps or hinders the Communication of Motion If it is true as I conceive that Rest is only a Privation of Motion the least Motion I mean that of the least agitated Body includes more Force or Power than the rest of the greatest Body Thus the least Force or smallest Body that we should conceive moved in a Void against a great and vast Body would be capable of moving it since this great Body being in Rest it will have no Power to resist the little Body which will strike against it so that the Resistance that the Parts of hard Bodies make to hinder their Separation necessarily proceeds from some other Cause than that of Rest But we must demonstrate by Sensile Experiments what we have been proving by abstracted Reasonings to see if our Idee's agree with the Sensations that we receive of Objects For it often happens that such Arguments deceive us or at least cannot convince others and particularly such as are prejudiced on the contrary Side The Authority of Descartes has so much Power over the Reason of some Men that one must prove by all imaginable Ways that this great Man is deceived to be able to disabuse them What I have said will make a deep Impression on the Mind of those that are not prejudiced with the contrary Opinion and I plainly see they will blame me for proving things which appear indisputable to them But the Cartesians very well deserve that I should use my endeavour to satisfie them others may pass over this Discourse if they think it tedious Here then are some Experiments which sensibly prove that Rest has no Power to resist Motion and which consequently discover that the Will of the Author of Nature which gives the Power and Force that each Body has to continue in that State wherein it is respects only Motion and not Rest since Bodies have no Power of themselves Experience shews us that very great vessels which swim in the Water may be agitated by the least Bodies which hit against them From thence I pretend notwithstanding all the Evasions of Descartes and the Cartesians that if these great Bodies were in a Void they might yet be more easily agitated For the Reason why there is some little Difficulty to move a Vessel in Water is because the Water resists the Power of the Motion we impress on it which would not happen in a Void and what manifestly shews us that Water resists the Motion we impress on the Vessel is the Vessels ceasing to be agitated some time after it has been moved for this would not happen if the Vessel did not lose its Motion by communicating it to the Water or if the Water gave way without resisting it or in fine if it partook of its Motion Thus since a Vessel agitated in the Water by little and little ceases to move 't is an undoubted Mark that the Water resists its Motion instead of facilitating it as Descartes pretends and consequently it would yet be infinitely more easie to agitate a great Body in a Void than in Water since there is no Resistance from Bodies about it It is therefore evident that Rest has no Power to resist Motion that the least Motion contains more Power and Force than the grearest Rest Or at least that we ought not to measure the Force of Motion and Rest by the Proportion that is found between great Bodies which are in Motion and in Rest as Descartes has done It is true there is some Reason to believe that a Vessel is agitated as soon as it is in the Water because of the continual Change which happens to the Parts of the Water that encompass it although it seems to us that it does not change its Place It is that which has made Descartes and some others believe that 't is not the Force only of that which impels it that makes it advance in the Water but having already received much Motion from the little Parts of liquid Bodies which surround it and which equally push it on all sides This Motion is only determined by the new Motion of that which pushes it So that that which agitates a Body in Water could not do it in a Void Thus it is that Descartes and those that are of his Opinion defend the Rules of Motion that he has given us For instance let us suppose a Piece of Wood a Foot square in a Liquid Body All the little Parts of the Liquid Body acts upon it and moves against it and because they equally push it on all sides as well towards A as B It cannot advance nearer to one side than another But if I then push another Piece of Wood of half a Foot against the first toward the Side A I shall see it advance And from thence I conclude that it might be moved if in a Void with less Force than that whereby this Piece of Wood pushes it for the Reasons I have already brought But the Persons I speak of deny it and answer that what makes the great Piece of Wood advance as soon as it is pushed by the little one is because the little one which could not move it of it self being joyned with the Parts of the Liquid Body which are agitated determine them to push it and communicate to it one Part of their Motion But 't is plain that according to this Answer the Piece of Wood being once agitated must not diminish its Motion but on the contrary continually augment it Art 5. For by this Answer the Piece
of Wood is pushed more by the Water to the Side of A than to the Side of B therefore it must always advance towards it And because this Impulsion is continual its Motion must always increase But as I have already said the Water is so far from facilitating its Motion that it continually resists it and its Resistance always diminishes it and at last will make it perfectly cease We must now prove that the Piece of Wood that was equally pushed by the little Particles of the Water that surrounds it has no Motion or Power at all that is capable to move it although it continually changes its Place and though the Surface of the Water which encompasses it is different at different Times For if it is so that a Body equally pushed on all Sides as this Piece of Wood is has no Motion it is certain that 't is only the Forreign Force that strikes against it which communicates it since in the same Time that this forreign Force pushes it the Water resists it and by little and little destroys the Motion which is imprest on it for by degrees it ceases to move It is certain at least to those whom I speak to that there never is in Nature more Motion at one Time than at another and that Bodies in Rest are moved only by meeting with some agitated Bodies which communicate their Motion to them From thence I conclude that a Body which I suppose created perfectly at rest in the middle of the Water will never receive any Degree of Motion from the little Particles of Water which surround it and continually strike against it provided they push it equally on all Sides because all these little Particles which strike against it equally on all Sides reflecting with all their Motion they communicate none to it and consequently this Body must always be considered as in Rest and without any moving Power although it continually change its Surface Now the Proof I have that these little Parts reflect thus with all their Motion is that besides this that we cannot conceive the thing to be otherwise the Water that touches this Body must grow cold or even freeze and become very near as hard as the Wood upon its Surface since the Motion of the Particles of Water would be equally distributed to the little Parts of the Body they encompass But to accommodate my self to those that defend Descartes's Sentiment I grant we must not consider a Boat in the Water as in Rest I also allow that all the Parts of the Water which are about it agree to the new Motion that the Water-man imprints on it although it be but too visible by the Diminution of the Motion of the Boat that it resists it more on the Side it goes to than from that whence it was pushed This supposed I say that from all the Particles of Water that are in the River there is according to Descartes only those that immediately touch the Boat on the Side from whence it was pushed that can assist its Motion Art 63. For according to this Philosopher The Water being fluid all the Parts of which it is composed act not together against the Body we would move but only those that touching it conjoyntly bear upon it Now those which are conjoyntly born upon the Boat and the Waterman together are twenty times less than the Boat See Art 63. of the second Part of his Principles It is therefore plain by the Explanation that Decartes has given in this Article upon the Difficulty we have to break a Nail between our Hands that a little Body is capable of agitating a much greater than it self For indeed our Hands are not so fluid as Water and when we would break a Nail there is more Parts joyned together which act conjoyntly then in the Water which pushes a Boat But here is a more Sensible Experiment If we take a Board well plained or some other very hard Plane drive in it a Nail half-way and set the Plane in an inclining Position placing a Bar of Iron an hundred times thicker than the Nail above it and suffer the Bar to slide down I say this Nail will not break And we must further observe That according to Descartes all the parts of this Bar rest upon and conjoyntly act upon this Nail for this Bar is hard and solid If then there was no other Cement than rest to unite the parts of this Nail the Bar of Iron being an hundred times greater than the Nail Art 63. Art 50. would according to Descartes's fifth Rule and according to Reason communicate some of its Motion to the part of the Nail it fell upon that is break it and pass beyond it although even this Bar should slide but very slowly So that we must seek another Cause than the Rest of the parts to make Bodies hard or capable of resisting the Efforts that we make when we would break them since Rest has no power to resist Motion And I believe these Experiments suffice to shew that the abstracted Proofs we have brought are not false We must then examine the third thing we have before supposed might be the cause of the strict Union that is found between the parts of hard Bodies viz. An invisible Matter that environs them which being extreamly agitated with much Violence pushes the External and Internal Parts of these Bodies and compresses them after such a manner that to separate them more Force is necessary than this invisible and extreamly agitated Matter has It seems then I might reasonably conclude that the Union of the constituent parts of hard Bodies depends upon the subtle Matter which encompasses and compresses them Since the two other things that we can think to be the Causes of this Union are not truly so as we have already seen for since I find resistance enough in breaking a piece of Iron and that this resistance proceeds neither from the Iron nor the Will of God as I think I have proved it must necessarily proceed from some invisible Matter which can be no other than that which immediately encompasses and compresses it Nevertheless I shall further give some positive Proofs of this Opinion after I have explained it more at large by some Example Take a Globe of any hard Metal which is hollow within cut it into two Hemispheres and joyn these two Hemispheres with a little Wax at the place of their union and exhaust the Air out of it these two Hemispheres joyned one to the other after this manner if many Horses were fastened to them some on one side and some on the other could not be separated by them supposing the Magnitude of the Hemispheres to be in Proportion to the number of Horses Yet if we suffer the Air to re-enter one Person alone could separate them without any Difficulty It is easie to conclude from this Instance That what so strongly unites these two Hemispheres proceeds from their being compressed and surrounded
upon their External and Convex Surface by the Air which environs them whilst there was no Counterpressure in their Internal and Concave Surface So that the Action of the Horses that drew the two Hemispheres on both sides could not overcome the Efforts of an infinite Number of little Particles of the Air that resisted them by pressing these two Hemispheres together But the least Force is capable of separating them when the Air being entred again within the Sphere pushes the Concave and Internal Surfaces as much as the Air without presses the External and Convex ones But if on the contrary we take a Carps Bladder and put it in a Vessel from whence all the Air has been exhausted this Bladder being full of Air will crack and break because then there is no Air without the Bladder to resist that which is within 'T is likewise the same Reason that I have given for the first Experiment that two Planes of Glass or Marble having been used to be joyned one upon another so that in one Sense we find some resistance in the separating of them because these two parts of Marble are pressed and constring'd by the External Air which encompasses them and are not so strongly pushed by it within I might bring an infinite Number of other Experiments to prove that the gross Air which environs Bodies strongly unites their Parts but what I have said may suffice clearly to explain my Thoughts upon the present Question I say then that which so strongly unites the Parts of hard Bodies and these little Links I have before spoke on is other little external Bodies infinitely more agitated than the Air we breath in and these push and compress them and that which gives us some Trouble to separate them is not their Rest but the Agitation of these little Bodies which surround them So that what resists Motion is not Rest which is only a Privation and has no Power of it self but some contrary Motion This bare Exposition of my Opinion perhaps seems reasonable yet I well foresaw that many Persons would have some Difficulty to receive it Hard Bodies make so great an Impression upon our Senses when they strike us or when we make any Effort to break them that we are inclined to believe their Parts are united much more strictly than indeed they are And on the contrary the little Bodies which I have said encompasses them and to which I have given the Power of causing this Union makes no Impression upon our Senses seeming to be too weak to produce so Sensible an Effect But to destroy this Prejudice which is founded only upon the Impressions of our Senses and the Difficulty we have to imagine Bodies smaller and more agitated than those we see every Day we must consider that the Hardness of Bodies must not be judged of in Relation to our Hands or to the Efforts we are capable of making which vary at different Times For indeed if the greatest Force of Man is almost nothing in Comparison of that of the Subtle Matter we should be very much in the wrong to believe that Diamonds and the hardest Stones might not have for the Cause of their Hardness the Compression of little rapid Bodies which encompass them Now we may plainly discover that the Force of Man is very small if we consider that the Power he has of moving his Body into many different Ways proceeds only from a little Fermentation of his Blood which by agitating some few little Parts so produces the Animal Spirits For 't is the Agitation of these Spirits which gives Force to our Bodies and gives it a Power to make these Efforts that we unreasonably look upon as something very great and powerful But it must be well observed that this Fermentation of our Blood is only a very little Communication of the Motion of this subtle Matter we speak of for all the Fermentations of Visible Bodies are only Communications of the Motion of Invisible Bodies since every Body receives its Agitation from some other We must not therefore wonder if our Power is not so great as that of this Subtle Matter which we receive it from But if our Blood fermented as much in our Hearts as Gunpowder does when we put Fire to it that is if our Blood received as great a Communication of the Motion of this Subtle Matter as that of Gunpowder receives We might do extraordinary things very easily as break Iron throw down a House c. provided we suppose there was an agreeable Proportion between our Members and the Blood thus agitated We ought then to destroy our Prejudices and not to imagine according to the Impression of our Senses that the Parts of hard Bodies are so strongly united together because we have so much Trouble to break them But if we should consider the Effects of Fire in Mines in heavy Bodies and in many other Effects of Nature which have no other Cause than the Agitation of these Invisible Bodies as Descartes has proved in many Places we should manifestly discover that 't is not above their Power to unite and compress togeâ—her the Parts of hard Bodies as strongly as we see they are united For in fine I am not afraid to affirm that a Cannon-Bullet whose Motion appears so extraordinary does not even receive the Thousandth Part of the Motin of the Subtle Matter that is about it We should not doubt of what I advance if we first considered that Gunpowder is not all enkindled in the same Instant Secondly that although it should all take Fire at the same Instant it swims but a very little while in the Subtle Matter and Bodies which swim but a little while in others cannot receive much Motion from them as we may see in Boats that we abandon to the Course of the Water which receive their Motion but by little and little In the third Place and chiefly because each Particle of Powder can receive only the Motion which the Subtle Matter impresses for the Water communicates to the Vessel only the direct Motion which is common to all the Parts thereof which is generally very small in Relation to other Motions I could further show the Greatness of the Motion of the Subtle Matter to those that receive Descartes's Principles by the Motion of the Earth and Gravity of Bodie and could even from thence bring Proofs that are certain and exact enough but it is not necessary to my Subiect It 's enough without having read the Works of Descartes or having a sufficient Proof of the Agitation of this Subtle Matter which I ascribe as the Cause of the Inflexibility of Bodies to read with some Application what I have said of it in the 2d Chap. of the 4th Book Being then now delivered from the Prejudices which incline us to believe that our Efforts were very powerful and that that of the Subtle Matter which environs and compresses hard Bodies is very weak and being otherwise perswaded of the violent
Agitation of this Matter by what I have said of Gunpowder It will not be difficult to see that 't is absotutely necessary that the Matters acting infinitely more upon the Surface of hard Bodies that it encompasses and compresses than within the same Bodies it must be the Cause of their Inflexibility or the Resistance we feel when we endeavour to break them Now as there is always many Particles of this Invisible Matter which passes through the Pores of hard Bodies they make them not only hard as we have already explained but further are the Cause that some are Springy and Elastick others stand bent and that others are fluid and liquid and in fine that they are not only the Cause of the Force that hard Bodies have to continue united together but also that fluid Bodies have to separate that is are the Cause that some Bodies are hard and others fluid But because 't is absolutely necessary to know distinctly the Physicks of Descartes the Figure of his Elements and Parts which compose particular Bodies to give a Reason why certain Bodies are stiff and some others pliable I shall not stay here to explain it Those who have read the Works of this Philosopher will easily enough imagine what may be the Cause thereof which I could not explain without great Difficulty and those who are unacquainted with this Author would but confusedly understand the Reason that I might bring for it Nor shall I also stop here to resolve a great Number of Difficulties that I foresee may be brought against what I have established Because if those that raise them have no Knowledge of true Physicks I should only tire and displease them instead of satisfying them But if they are learned Persons their Objections being stronger I could not answer them but by a great Number of Figures and long Discourses so that I believe I ought to desire those that find any Difficulty in what I have advanced very carefully to read this Chapter over again for I hope if they do so and meditate on it as much as is necessary all their Objections will vanish But if they find my Request incommodious they may omit it for there is no great Danger in being ignorant of the Cause of Bodies inflexibility I speak not here of Contiguity For 't is plain Contiguous things touch so little that there is always much Subtle Matter which passes between them and which endeavours to continue its Motion in a right Line to prevent their uniting For the Union that is observed between Marbles which have been polished one upon another I have explained it and 't is easie to see that although this Subtle Matter always passes between these two Parts how united soever they may be the Air cannot pass it and therefore 't is that which compresses and binds those two Pieces of Marble together and causes some Trouble to disunite them if we do not make them slide off one another It is plain from all this that the Continuity Contiguity and Union of two Marbles will only be the same thing in a Void neither have we different Idea's of them so that 't is as much as to say we do not understand them if we make them absolutely differ without any Relation to the Bodies which surround them Here now follows some Reflexions upon Descartes's Sentiment and the Original of his error I call his Opinion an Error because I find no Expedient to defend what he says of the Rules of Motion and Cause of the Hardness of Bodies in many Places at the End of the Second Part of his Principles and it seems to me that I have sufficiently proved the Truth of the contrary Opinion This great Man very distinctly conceived that Matter could not move of it self and that the Natural moving Power of all Bodies was nothing else but the general Will of the Author of Nature and that the Communications of the Motions of Bodies at their mutual Meeting could only proceed from this same Will If we take this for granted we can give no Rules for the different Communication of Motions but by the Proportion that is found between the different Magnitude of Bodies which beat against them since it is impossible to penetrate the Designs of God's Will And because he judges that every thing had Power to continue in the State it was in whether in Motion or Rest because that God by his Will determined this Power always to act after the same manner he concludes that Rest has as much Power to act as Motion So he measures the Effects of the Power of Rest by the Magnitude of Bodies which possessed it as those of the Power of Motion and hence he gave the Rules for the Communication of Motion that are in his Principles and the Cause of the Hardness of Bodies which I have endeavoured to refute It is difficult enough not to be of Descartes's Opinion when we look upon it as he did for once more since the Communication of Motions proceed only from the Will of the Author of Nature and that we see all Bodies continue in the State they are once placed in whether it be Motion or Rest It seems we ought to seek the Rules of the different Communication of Motions at the meeting of Bodies not in the Will of God which is unknown to us but in the Proportion there is between the Magnitudes of these Bodies I do not therefore wonder that Descartes had this Thought but I only wonder that he did not correct it when he had made a farther Advance in his Discoveries and found both Existence and the Effects of the Subtle Matter which environs all Bodies I am surprized that in the 132 Article of the 4th Part he attributes the Elastick Force that certain Bodies have to this subtle Matter and that in Articles 55 and 43 of the Second Part and in other Places he does not attribute it to their Hardness or the Resistance they make when we endeavour to bend or break them but to the rest of their Parts It appears evident to me that the Cause of the Elasticity and Stiffness of certain Bodies is the same with that which gives them the Power of Resistance when we would break them for indeed the Force that we use to break Steel differs but insensibly from that by which we bend it I will not here bring all the Reasons that might be urged to prove these things nor answer to any Difficulties that we might form from hard Bodies making no Sensible Resistance and yet we have some Trouble to bend them For it will be enough to make these Difficulties vanish to consider that the Subtle Matter cannot easily take a new course in Bodies which break when we bend them as in Glass and in tempered Steel and that it cannot more easily do it in Bodies that are composed of branchy Parts which are not brittle as in Gold and Lead And indeed there is no hard bodies which make not some
little Resistance It is difficult enough to perswade our selves that Descartes positively believed the Cause of Hardness was different from that of Elasticity And what appears most probable is that he has not sufficiently reflected upon the Matter When we meditate long upon any Subject and are satisfied in things we would know we often think no more of them We believe that the Thoughts that we have had are undoubted Truths and 't is useless to examine farther But in Men there are many things which disgust them against Application incine them to a rash Assent and make them subject to Error and although the Mind continues apparently satisfied it is not always because it is well informed of the Truth Descartes was a Man like us I confess we never saw more Solidity Exactness Extension and more Penetration of Mind than what appears in his Works yet he was not infallible So that it is probable he was so very strongly perswaded of his Opinion from not sufficiently reflecting that he asserted something elsewhere in nis Principles contrary to it He maintained it upon very specious and probable Reasons but such however as were not of sufficient Force to make us submit and therefore he might and ought to have suspended his Judgment It is not enough to examine in a hard Body what might be the Cause that made it so We ought also to think of the invisible bodies which might render them hard as he has done at the End of his Philosophical Principles when he attributes the Cause of Resistance to them He ought to have made an exact Division which comprised whatsoever might contribute to the Inflexibility of bodies It is not sufficient still to seek the Cause in God's Will he ought also to have thought of the Subtle Matter which environed them For although the Existence of this extreamly agitated Matter was not yet proved in that Place of his Principles where he speaks of Hardness it was not then rejected He ought then to have suspended his Judgment and to have remembered that what he had writ of the Cause of Hardness and Rules of Motion ought to have been reviewed anew which I believe he did not do carefully enough Or else he did not sufficiently consider the true Reason of a thing that is very easie to discover and which yet is of the utmost Consequence in Physicks I will explain it Descartes well knew that to maintain his System of the Truth which he could not reasonably doubt It was absolutely necessary that great bodies should always communicate their Motion to the lesser bodies they should meet and the less reflect at their meeting with the greater without a like Loss on their Side For without that the First Element would not have all the Motion that it is necessary it should have above the Second nor the Second above the Third and his whole System would be absolutely false as is sufficiently known to those that have but thought a little upon it But in supposing that Rest had Force enough to resist Motion and that a great Body in Rest could not be moved by another that is less than it although it strike it with a furious Agitation It is plain that great Bodies must have much less Motion than a like Mass of little Bodies since according to this Supposition they can always communicate what they have and cannot always receive from the lesser Thus this Supposition not being contrary to whatsoever Descartes has said in his Principles from the Beginning unto the Establishment of his Rules of Motion and agreeing very well with the Sequel of his Principles he believed that the Rules of Motions which he thought he had demonstrated in their Cause were also sufficiently confirmed by their Effects I agree with Descartes that great Bodies communicate their Motion much more easily than little Bodies do and therefore his First Element is much more agitated than the Second and the Second than the Third But the Cause of it is clear without having any Regard to his Supposition Little and fluid Bodies as Water Air c. can only communicate to great Bodies an uniform Motion which is common to all their Parts The Water in a River can only communicate to a Boat the Motion of Descent which is common to all the little Parts of which the Water is composed and every one of these Parts besides this common Motion has also an infinite Number of other Particulars Thus by this Reason 't is plain that a Boat for instance can never have so much Motion as an equal Bulk of Water since the Boat can only receive from the Water that Motion which is direct and common to all the Parts that compose it If Twenty Particles of a fluid Body push any other Body on the one Side and as many on the other it will continue immoveable and all the little Particles of the fluid Body in which it swims rebound up without losing any thing of their Motion Thus great Bodies whose Parts are united can only receive the Circular and Uniform Motion of the Vortex of the Subtle Matter which environs them This Reason seems sufficient to them to make it comprehended how great Bodies are not so much agitated as the lesser and that there is a Necessity for an Explanation of these things to suppose any Force in Rest to resist Motion The Certainty of Descartes's Principles cannot be a sufficient Proof to defend his Rules of Motion and we may believe that if Descartes himself had again without Prejudice examined his Principles and compared them with such Reasons as I have brought he would not have believed that the Effects of Nature had confirmed his Rules nor have fallen into a Contradiction by attributing the Hardness of Bodies only to the rest of their Parts and their Elasticity to the Force of a Subtle Matter Here follows now the Rules of the Communication of Motions in a Void which are only the Consequences of what I have established about the Nature of Rest Bodies not being hard in a Void since they are only hard by the Pressure of the Subtle Matter which surrounds them if Two Bodies meet they would flatten without rebounding we must therefore give these Rules Suppose them hard of themselves and not by the Pressure of this Subtle Matter Rest having no Power to resist Motion and many Bodies before being considered as one only in the moment of their meeting it is plain they ought not to rebound when they are equal in Magnitude and Velocity or that their Velocity supplies the Desect of their Magnitude or their Magnitude the Defect of their Velocity And it is easie from thence to conclude that in all other Cases they must always communicate their Motion A general Rule for the Communication of Motion so that they may afterwards proceed with an equal Swiftness So that to know what must happen in all the different Suppositions of Magnitude and Swiftness of Bodies which meet one another we need
only add together all the Degrees of Motion of two or many Bodies which must be considered only as one at the Time when they meer See Descartes's Rules in the second Part of his Principles and after divide the Sum of all the Motions in Proportion to the Magnitude of these Bodies From whence I conclude that of the Seven Rules that Descartes gives of Motion the Three first are good The Fourth is false and B must communicate its Motion to C in Proportion to the Magnitude of the same C and afterwards move together So that if C is double to B and B has Three Degrees of Motion it must communicate Two of them For I have sufficiently proved that Descartes ought not to have supposed Rest to have had any Force to resist Motion That the Fifth is true That the Sixth is false and that B must communicate the Half of its Motion to C. And that the seventh is false since B must always communicate its Motion to C in Proportion to the Magnitude and Motion of both B and C. That if according to the Supposition C is double to B and has three Degrees of Motion whilst C has but two they must necessarily move together since indeed C and B are but one Body at the Time of their Meeting and because we must add the Degrees of Swiftness which are five and afterwards divide them in Proportion to their Magnitude and so give 1â…” to B and 3â…“ to C the double of B. But these Rules although certain by what I have said are yet contrary to Experience because we are not in a Void The chief of all the Experiments which are contrary to what I have said of the Rules of Motion is that it always happens that hard Bodies which shock each other do still rebound different Ways or at least they do not follow one another after their meeting To answer to which we must call to mind what has been said about the Cause of Elactity that there is a Matter whose Agitation is strangely violent which continually passes between the Parts of hard Bodies and makes them so by compressing them as much upon the external as internal Parts For from thence 't is easily seen that in the Time of Percussion two Bodies which meet drive or divert the Course of this Matter from the nearest Places to those where they are shockt And this Matter resisting with a great Violence repels the two Bodies which meet and restores its Passage which the Percussion had stopt up That which proves yet more clearly what I have said is that if two Balls of Lead or some other less elastick Matter meet together they rebound not after their Shock but go on according to the Rules I have before established which they keep with so much the more Exactness as their Elasticity is less Bodies then rebound after their Percussion because they are hard that is as I have explained because there is a Sort of Matter much agitated which compresses them and which passing thro' their Pores with a great Violence repulses the Bodies which strike against one another But we must suppose that the Bodies which meet break not those they strike against by a Motion that conquers the Force which these little Parts of subtle Matter has to resist as when we discharge a Musket against a Piece of Wood It is true this subtle Matter compresses soft Bodies and passes very quickly thro' their Pores as well as it does thro' those of the hard and that nevertheless these soft Bodies make no Resistance The Reason is because the Matter which passes thro' soft Bodies can open its Passage on all Sides very easily because of the Smallness of the Parts which compose them or of some particular Configuration proper for this End which hard Bodies cannot suffer because of the Grossness and contrary Disposition of their Parts to this effect Thus when a hard Body shocks another that is soft it changes all the Ways by which the subtle Matter passes which is often visible as in a Musket Bullet that is flatted when we strike it But when a hard Body hits another like it self it produces none or very sew new Ways and the subtle Matter which is within its Pores is forced to return by the Way it came or else it repels those Bodies which shut up its little Passages Suppose A an hard and B a soft Body and C c the Channel of the subtle Matter I say that if A shocks B at the Point c the Channel C c is obstructed and the subtle Matter finds out new Ways in this soft Body Thus the subtle Matter having a free Passage it repels not the Bodies which hit against it but the Bodies themselves change their Figure and become a little flat And we must suppose that in the least hard Bodies there is an infinite Number of Channels like to C c. But if A and a are two hard Bodies which meet the Passage C c will be straightened and the subtle Matter which is there obstructed continuing its Motion in a right Line must for want of new Passages repel the Body which shocks it with so much the more Violence as its Difficulty is greater to find a Way or else the Parts of the Body A will break and separate from one another and be reduced into Powder or very small Pieces In short it appears evident that all Bodies in Motion continually endeavour to keep in a right Line and turning the least that is possible when they meet with any Resistance they must never reflect since by reflecting they deviate much from a right Line It must therefore be either that Bodies become flat or that the strongest overcome the weakest and make it move the same Way the other does But because Bodies are elastick and hard they cannot follow one another since if A pushes a a will repel A again and so they must keep asunder from one another Nevertheless if the two Bodies were in a Void altho' they were very Hard they would follow one another because having no Bodies about them they could have no elastick Force the shocked not at all resisting that which shocks it But Air Gravity c. resisting the great Motion that the striking Body gives to that it strikes the stricken resists the striking and hinders it from following it For Experience teaches us that Air and Gravity resists Motion and so much the more as the Motion is more violent It is easie to discover by what I have said why when different Bodies meet which are surrounded with Air or Water c. sometimes that which strikes rebounds and sometimes it communicates all its Motion and continues as if it were immovable and sometimes follows the stricken but always with less Swiftness if either of them is absolutely soft For the whole depends only upon the Proportion which is between their Magnitude Hardness and Gravity supposing they are moved with an equal Swiftness If they are very inflexible the
those of which we actually think I suppose nevertheless that our Sensations do not fill all the capacity of our Mind for that we may be free with the liberty I speak of it is necessary not only that God should not invincibly impel us towards particular goods but also that we may make use of the impression we have towards good in general to love some other thing than that we actually love Now as we can love no Object but those we may think of nor actually think of any other but those that cause too quick Sensations in us it is evident that the dependance we have upon our Body lessens our liberty nay does on many occasions take away the use of it So our Sensations destroying out Ideas and the union we have with our Body by which we only see or rather feel our selves weakening that which we have with God by which all things are present to us the Mind must not suffer it self to be divided by confused Sensations if it be willing always to have the principle of its determinations to be free It appears from all this that God is not the Author of Sin and that Man does not give himself new Modifications God is not the Author of Sin since he continually imprints a motion to go farther on him who Sins or stops at a particular good and he gives him the power to think of other things and to apply himself to other goods than that which actually is the Object of his thought and of his love that he commands him not to love those things which he can forbear loving without being troubled by any remorses and he continually calls him to himself by the secret reproaches of his Reason Is is true Gob does in one sense impel the Sinner to love the Object of his Sin if this Object appears to be good to the Sinner for as most Divines say all that is positive in Sin or what there is of act or motion proceeds from God But it is only through a false judgment of our Mind that the Creatures appear good to us that is capable of acting in us and making us happy The Sin of a Man lies in this that he does not refer all the particular Goods to the Soveraign Good or rather in that he does not consider nor love the Severaign Good in the particular Goods and so does not regulate his Love according to the Will of God or according to the essential and necessary order of which all Men have a knowledge and which is so much the more perfect as they are more strictly united to God and are less sensible of the impressions of their Senses and Passions See the Explanations upon the Third Chapter of the Second Part of the Sixth Book towards the end where I explain my thoughts more distinctly For our Senses diffuse our Souls through our whole Bodies and our Passions transport them if I may so say into those Objects which are about us they remove us from the light of God which enlightens us Neither does Man give himself new Modifications for the motions of love that God continually imprints upon us increases or diminishes not whether we actually love or not I mean although this natural motion of love be or be not determined by any Idea of our Mind This motion does not cease even by its acquiescence in the possession of Good as the motion of Bodies ceases by their rest 'T is probable that God always impels us with an equal force towards him for he inclines us towards good in general as much as we are capable of and we are at all times equally capable of it because our Will or Natural capacity of Willing is always equal in it self Thus the impression or Natural motion which carries us towards good neither increases or diminishes I confess we have no clear Idea nor even any internal Sensation of this equality of impression or natural motion towards Good But 't is because as I have elsewhere proved that we know not our selves by a clear Idea not are we conscious of our own Faculties whilst they don't actually operate we do not feel in our selves what is natural common and always the same as we are not sensible of the heat and motion of our Hearts We are not likewise sensible of our Habits and whether we are worthy of the Love or Wrath of God There is perhaps in us an infinite number of Faculties which are absolutely unknown to us for we have no internal Sensation of what we are but only of what we feel If we had never felt Pain nor a desire for particular Goods we could not by the internal Sensation we have of our selves discover whether we should be capable of feeling Pain or willing such Goods 'T is our Memory and not our internal Sensation that teaches us we are capable of feeling what we no longer feel or of being agitated by Passions which at present we feel no motions of Thus there is nothing which hinders us from believing that God always inclines us towards him with an equal force although after a very different manner He always preserves in our Souls an equal capacity of willing or one and the same will as in all matter he preserves an equal quantity of motion But although it were not certain I don't see how we can say that the encrease or diminution of the natural motion of our Souls depends upon us since we cannot be the cause of the extension of our own Will It is however certain by what I have said before that God produces and also preserves whatsoever is real and positive in the particular determinations of the motions of our Souls whether Ideas or Sensations For 't is he who determines our motions for a general Good towards particular Goods but not after an invincible manner since we have a tendency to go farther So that all we do when we sin is that we do not all that we are able to do by means of the impression we have towards him who includes all Goods For we can do nothing but by the power that we receive from our Union with him who does all things in us Now what chiefly makes us Sin is because we choose rather to enjoy than to examine because of the Pleasure we feel in enjoying and the Pain we find in examining We cease to make use of the motion that is given us to enquire after Good and examine it and we stop in the enjoyment of such things as we ought only to make use of But if we narrowly observe we shall see there is nothing real on our part but a defect and cessation from enquiry which if we may so say corrupts the action of God in us but which however cannot destroy it Thus What do we when we do not Sin We do then whatever God does in us for we limit not to a particular or rather to a false Good the love that God imprints on us for the true
abases it towards sensible Objects which seem to cause it It is Evil in as much as it is Injustice in us who are Sinners and consequently deserve to be punish'd rather than rewarded to oblige God in pursuance of his Primitive Will to recompence us with agreeable Sensations In a word for I will not repeat here what I have already said it is Evil because God now forbids it since it alienates the Mind from him for whom it was made and preserv'd for that which God ordain'd to preserve the Righteous Man in his Innocence now establishes the Wicked Man in his Sin and the Sensations of Pleasure which he wisely ordain'd as the easiest and most obvious expedient to teach Man without diverting his Reason from his true Good whether he ought to unite himself with the Bodies about him these Sensations I say at present fill the Capacity of his Mind and fix him on Objects incapable of acting and infinitely below him because he looks upon these Objects to be the true Causes of the Happiness he occasionally enjoys from them THE SECOND EXPLANATION OF THE First Chapter of the First Book Where I say That the Will cannot differently determine the Impession it has towards good but by Commanding the Understanding to represent some particular Object to it WE must not imagine that the Will commands the Understanding otherwise than by its desire and motions for the Will has no other Action Neither must we believe that the Understanding obeys the Will in producing in it self the Ideas of those things which the Soul desires For the Understanding does not Act It only receives the Light or the Ideas of Objects by the necessary union it has with him who includes all Beings after an intelligible manner as we have explained it in the Third Book See the Explanation of the 6th Chapter of the 2d Part of the 3d Book This then is the whole Mystery Man participates of the Soveraign Reason and Truth discovers it self to him proportionally as he applies himself to it and prays it The desire of the Soul is a Natural Prayer which is always granted for it is a Natural Law that the Ideas should be so much the more present to the Mind as the Will desires them with the more fervency Thus provided the Capacity we have of thinking or our Understanding be not filled with the Confus'd Sensations we receive by means of what passes in our Body we never desire to think on any Object but the Idea of the said Object is immediately present to us and as experience it self teaches us the said Idea is the more present and clear according as our desire is stronger and that the confused Sensations we receive by the Body are weaker and less sensible as I have already observ'd in the preceding Remark Therefore in saying that the Will commands the Understanding to present some particular Object to it I only meant that the Soul which would consider that Object with attention draws near unto it by its desire because this desire pursuant to the efficacious Will of God which is the inviolable Law of Nature is the cause of the presence and clearness of the Idea which represents that Object I could not express my self otherwise nor explain my self as I do now since I had not as yet proved that God alone is the Author of our Ideas and that our particular Wills are the Occasional Causes of it I spoke according to the common Opinion and I have often been forced so to do because all things cannot be said at one and the same time Readers must have Equity and trust for some time in order to be satisfied for none but Geometricians can always pay in ready Coin AN EXPLANATION OF THE THIRD CHAPTER Where I say That it is no Wonder we have no Evidence of the Mysteries of Faith since we have not so much as Ideas of them VVHen I say that we have no Ideas of the Mysteries of Faith Ne omnino taceremus interrogati quid tres cum tres esse fateamur De Trinitate B. 7. Ch. 4. Cum quoeritur quid tres Magnâ prorsus inopiâ humanum laborat eloquium Dictum est tamen tres Personae non ut illud diceretur sed non taceretur In the same place B. 5. Ch. 9. it is visible by what precedes and what follows that I speak of the clear Ideas which produce Light and Evidence and by which we have a Comprehension of the Object if I may so speak I grant for Instance that a Peasant could never believe that the Son of God was made Man or that there are Three Persons in the Godhead unless he had some Idea of the union of the Word with our Humanity and some notion of Person But if those Ideas were clear we might by applying our selves to them perfectly apprehend those Mysteries and explain them to others they would no longer be ineffable Mysteries The Word Person according to St. Augustin has been spoken of the Father of the Son and of the Holy Ghost not so much clearly to explain what they are as not to be silent upon a Mystery which we are oblig'd to speak of I say here that we have no Ideas of our Misteries as I have said elsewhere that we have no Ideas of our Soul because the Idea we have of our Soul is not clear no more than that of our Mysteries Thus this Word Idea is Equivocal I have sometimes taken it for whatever represents to the Mind any Object whether clearly or confusedly I have taken it yet more generally for whatever is the immediate Object of the Mind But I have also taken it for that which represents things to the Mind in so clear a manner that a Man may discover at first fight whether such or such Modifications belong to them Therefore I said sometimes that we had an Idea of the Soul and sometimes I have denied it It is difficult and often tiresom and disagreeable to keep too rigorous an exactness in our Expressions since it is sufficient to make our selves understood When an Author only contradicts himself in the Mind of those who Criticise upon him and who are desirous he should contradict himself he needs not much value it and if he should undertake by a tedious Explanation to solve whatever the malice or ignorance of some Persons might urge against him he would not only make an ill Book but moreover the Readers would be displeased at his Answers to his Objections that would be contrary to a certain Equity which all Men pretend to For Men hate to be suspected either of Malice or Ignorance and commonly Men are not allowed to answer weak and malicious Objections until they are actually made whereby the Readers are secured against the reproach which such Answers seem to charge those with who exact them AN EXPLANATION OF These Words of the First Chapter This being granted we must say that Adam was not induced to the Love of God
several places Therefore the Joy he could find in his Duty was not very sensible which being suppos'd as the first Man had not an infinite Capacity of Mind his Pleasure or his Joy lessen'd the clear sight of his Mind which made him sensible that God was his Good and that he ought to love him only For Pleasure is in the Soul and modifies it So that it fills the Capacity we have of thinking proportionably as it affects us and acts in us This is what we learn by Experience that is by the inward Sensation we have of our selves Therefore we may conceive that the first Man having by degrees suffer'd the Capacity of his Mind to be divided or fill'd up by the lively Sensation of a presumptuous Joy or perhaps by some love or sensible Pleasure the presence of God and the remembrance of his Duty were blotted out of his Mind by his having neglected couragiously to follow his light in search of his real Good Having thus divided his Mind he was capable of falling for his principal Grace and Power was his Light and the clear knowledge of his Duty since then he did not want those preingaging delectations which we now stand in need of to resist Concupiscence IX And we must observe that neither the preingaging Sensations which Adam felt in the use of the Goods of the Body nor the Joy which he found in considering his Happiness or Perfection are the real causes of his Fall for he was sensible that God only was capable to make him feel Pleasure or Joy Therefore he ought to have lov'd him only since we ought to love nothing but the real cause of our Happiness As nothing did disturb the Knowledge and Light of the first Man while he was willing to preserve it pure he could and ought to have obliterated out of his Mind whatever Sensations did divide it and put it into the least danger to forget or lose the sight of him who enlighten'd and satisfy'd it It was his Duty to remember that if God did not make him feel him as good but only know him as such it was that he might the sooner deserve his reward by the continual use of his Liberty Supposing then that Adam and Eve Sinn'd and that in consequence of their Sin they have felt in themselves involuntary and rebellious motions I say it was necessary their Children should be Born Sinners and liable like them to the motions of Concupiscence These are my Reasons X. I have prov'd at large in the Chapter that occasioned this Discourse that there is such a communication between the Mothers Brain and her Childs that all the Motions and Traces which are made in the Mothers Brain are excited in the Childs Therefore as the Childs Soul is united to its Body in the first moment it is created because it is the conformation of the Body which obliges God pursuant of his General Will to give it a Soul to inform it It is evident that at the very Instant the Soul is created it has corrupt inclinations and is inclin'd towards the Body since from that very moment it has the inclinations which answer to the motions that are actually in the Brain to which it is united XI But whereas it is a disorder that the Mind should incline to Bodies and love them the Child is a Sinner and in disorder as soon as it is created God who loves Order hates it in that condition Nevertheless its Sin is not free 't is its Mother who has conceiv'd it in Iniquity upon the account of the communication which is Establish'd by the Order of Nature between the Brain of the Mother and that of the Child XII Now the said communication is very good in its Institution for several Reasons 1. Because it is useful and perhaps necessary towards the conformation of the Foetus 2. Because the Child might thereby have some commerce with its Parents for it was reasonable it should know from whom it deriv'd the Body it animates Finally the said communication was the only means by which the Child could know what pass'd without and what it ought to think of it Having a Body it was reasonable it should have thoughts that had a relation to it and that it should not be depriv'd of the sight of the Works of God amongst which it liv'd It is very probable that there are many other Reasons for the said communication besides those I have related but these are sufficient to justify it and to vindicate the Conduct of him whose Will is necessarily conformable to Order XIII However it is not Just the Child should receive the Trace of sensible Objects forcibly And if the Soul of Children was created but one moment before its being united to their Bodies if it were but one moment in a state of Innocence or Order it would of Right and by the necessity of the Eternal Order or Law have a power to suspend the said Communication just as the first Man before his Fall had a power to stop whenever he pleas'd the Motions which were excited in him for Order requires the Body should obey the Mind But as the Souls of Children never were agreeable to God there was no reason that God should change the Law of the Communication of Motions in their behalf therefore 't is Just that Children should be Born Sinners and in disorder And the cause of their Sin is not the Order of Nature that Order is Just but it is the Sin of those from whom they derive their Being In this sense it is not Just that a Father who is a Sinner should get Children more perfect than himself nor that they should have a power over their Body which their Mother has not over hers XIV I grant that after Adam's Fall which corrupts and overthrows all things God might in making some alterations in the Order of Nature have remedy'd the disorder which the said Fall had caus'd But God does not change his Will thus he Wills nothing but what is Just What he Wills once he Wills it ever he does not correct himself he does not repent he Wills constantly his Eternal Decrees do not depend on the inconstancy of a Man's Will it it not Just they should be submitted to it XV. But if it be allowable to penetrate into the Councels of God and to say what we think upon the Motives which he may have had to Establish the Order I have above-mentioned and to permit the Fall of the first Man I am of Opinion that it is impossible to have Sentiments more worthy of the greatness of God and more consonant to Religion and Reason than to believe that Gods principal end in his external Operations is the Incarnation of his Son See the 9th Dialogue of the Christian Conversation That God establish'd the Order of Nature and permitted the disorder which has happen'd in it to favour that great Work That he permitted all Men to be subjected to Sin that no
easily when it has a Spherical Figure than when it has a Cubical one But the Figure of a Body is different from its Motion and it may be Spherical and stand still It is true Spirits are not like Bodies they can feel no Pleasure without being in Motion because God who only makes and preserves them for himself moves them continually towards Good But this does not prove that the Pleasure of the Soul is the same thing with its Motion for two things though different may always meet together Finally I answer That though Pleasure were not different from the Love or Motion of the Soul that which the first Man felt in the use of the Goods of the Body did not incline him to love those Bodies Pleasure inclines the Soul towards the Object which occasions it I grant it But it is not the Fruit which we eat with Pleasure which occasions that Pleasure in us Bodies cannot act in the Soul and make it in any measure happy God only can do that 'T is through Error we fancy that Bodies have that in them which we feel by their means Adam was not so stupid before his Fall as to imagine that Bodies occasion'd his Pleasure Therefore the Motion which accompanied his Pleasures did not move him towards Bodies If Pleasure contributed towards the Fall of the first Man it was not by causing that in him which it now causes in us It is only the taking up or dividing the Capacity he had to think it blotted or diminished in his Mind the Presence of his real Good or of his Duty Objection against the Sixth Article WHat likelihood is there that the immutable Will of God should have depended on the Will of Man and that in favour of Adam Exceptions should have been made in the general Law of the Communication of Motions Answer At least it is not evident that there can be no such Exceptions But it is plain that immutable Order requires that the Body should be subject to the Mind and it were contradictory to believe that God neither loves nor wills Order In the Explanation which relates to the Nature of Ideas I shall explain more particularly what Order is and why God loves it necessarily For God necessarily loves his Son Therefore it was was necessary before the fall of the first Man that Exceptions should be made in his Favour in the general Law of the Communication of Motions This perhaps may seem abstruse but here is something that is more sensible Man though a Sinner has the Power to move and stop his Arm whenever he pleases Therefore according to the different Volitions of Man the Animal Spirits are determin'd to produce or stop some Motions in his Body which certainly cannot be done by the general Law of the Communication of Motions Thus the Will of God being still at this very time subject to ours why might it not have been subject to Adam's If for the advantage of the Body and for the sake of Civil Society God stops the Communication of Motions in Sinners why should he not have stopt it in favour of a Just Man for the Good of his Soul and for the Preservation of the Union and Society he had with him for God had only made Man for himself As God will have no Society with Sinners he has taken from them after the Fall the power they had to leave as it were the Body to unite themselves to him But he has left them the Power to stop or change the Communication of Motions in reference to the preservation of Life and Civil Society because he was unwilling to destroy his own Work having even before he had form'd it designed according to St. Paul to restore it and reform it in Jesus Christ Objection against the Seventh Article MAN still conveys his Body at this time where he will he moves as he pleases all the parts of it the motion of which is necessary for the prosecution and avoiding of sensible Good and Evils And consequently he stops or changes every moment the Natural Communication of Motions not only in things of small Consequence but also in things which are of no use for Life or Civil Society and even in Crimes which ruine Society shorten Life and dishonour God in all respects God Wills Order I grant it But does Order require that the Laws of Motion should be violated for Evil and remain inviolable on the account of Good Why should not Man have the Power to stop the Motions which sensible Objects produce in his Body since those Motions hinder him from doing good from drawing near to God again and from returning to his Duty and still have the Power to do so much evil with his Tongue his Arm and with the other parts of the Body the Motions of which depend upon his Will Answer To answer this Objection we must consider that Man having sinn'd was to return to his Original Nothingness For being no longer in order nor in a possibility to return to it he ought to cease to exist God loves nothing but Order See the 5th Dialogue of the Christian Conversation a Sinner is not in Order Therefore God does not love him Sinners then cannot subsist since Creatures only subsist because God will have them to be and God will not have them to be unless he loves them Neither can a Sinner restore himself to Order because he cannot justifie himself and whatever he can suffer cannot attone for his Offence Therefore he ought to be reduced to nothing again But whereas it is unreasonable to think that God should make a Work to annihilate it or to put it yet into a worse condition it is evident that God would not have made Man nor permitted his fall which he had foreseen had he not had in view his Sons Incarnation in whom all things subsist and by whom the Universe receives a Beauty Perfection and Greatness worthy the Wisdom and Power of its Author We may then consider that Man after his Sin is without a Restorer but under expectation of one If we consider him without a Restorer we see clearly that he can have no Society with God that he cannot have the least power in himself to draw near unto God again that God must needs repulse and use him ill when he pretends to leave the Body to unite himself to him That is to say that Man after Sin must lose the power of freeing himself from sensible Impressions and Motions of Concupiscence Moreover he ought to be annihilated for the reasons abovesaid But he expects a Restorer and if we consider him under that expectation it is plain he must subsist together with his Posterity out of which the said Restorer is to come and therefore it is necessary that Man after his fall should still retain the power of moving diversly all those parts of his Body whose motions may be useful towards his preservation It is true Men continually abuse that Power they have
of producing certain Motions and that that Power for instance they have to move their Tongue several ways occasions an infinite number of Evils But then it is evident that this Power is absolutely necessary to maintain Society to ease one another in the wants of this present Life and to be Instructed in that Religion which gives the hopes of that Redeemer for whose sake the World subsists If we carefully examine those Motions which we produce in our selves and in what part of our Body we can produce them we shall find clearly that God has left us no more Power over our Body than what is necessary to preserve our Life and maintain Civil Society For instance the Beating of the Heart the Dilatation of the Diaphragme the Peristaltick Motion of the Bowels the Circulation of the Spirits and Blood and divers Motions of the Nerves in our Passions are produced in us without staying for Orders from the Soul As they must needs be partly the same on the same Occasions nothing obliges God to submit them now to the Will of Men But whereas the Motions of the Muscles which serve to stir the Tongue the Arms and Legs must change every moment according to the almost infinite diversity of the Good or Ill Objects which surround us it was necessary those Motions should depend on the Will of Men. We must observe that God always Acts by the most simple Means and that the Laws of Nature must be general and therefore having given us the Power to move our Arm and Tongue he must not take away that Power from us to strike a Man unjustly or to Calumniate him For if our Natural Faculties did depend on our Designs there would be no Uniformity nor certain Rule in the Laws of Nature which nevertheless must be very plain and general to be suitable to the Wisdom of God and conformable to Order Insomuch that God in pursuance of his Decrees chooses rather to perform the Materiality of Sin as the Divines say or to serve the Injustice of Men as one of his Prophets says than by changing his Will to put a stop to the disorder of Sinners But he reserves his Vengeance for the unworthy treatment he meets with until he may be allow'd to do it without acting against the Immutability of his Degrees that is when Death having corrupted the Body of the Voluptuous God will lye no longer under the necessity he has impos'd upon himself of giving them Sensations and Thoughts relating thereunto Objection against the Eleventh and Twelfth Articles ORiginal Sin does not only make Man a Slave to his Body and subject to the motions of Concupiscence but likewise fills him with Spiritual Vices The Childs Body is not only corrupted before Baptism but its very Soul and all its Faculties are infected by Sin Though the Rebellion of the Body is the chief cause of some gross Vices as Intemperance and Incontinency yet it does not occasion Vices that are purely Spiritual such as Pride and Envy So that Original Sin is something very different from the Concupiscence wherewith we are Born and is probably the privation of Grace or of Original Justice Answer I own that Children are depriv'd of Original Righteousness and I prove it when I show they are not born Just and that God hates them For in my Opinion it is impossible to give a clearer Idea of Justicâ— and of Righteousness than in saying that the Will is upright when it loves God and that it is irregular when it is turn'd towards the Body But if by Original Justice or Grace you mean certain or unknown Qualifications like unto those which 'tis said God had infus'd into the Soul of the first Man to adorn it and to render it agreeable in his sight it is also evident that the privation of this Justice is not Original Sin for properly speaking that Privation cannot be transmitted If Children have nor those Qualifications it is because God does not give 'em to them And if God does not give 'em it is because they are unworthy of it 'T is then that unworthiness which is transmitted and which is the cause of the privation of Original Justice Therefore 't is that unworthiness which properly speaking is Original Sin Now this unworthiness which consists as I have shown in this that the Inclinations of Children are actually corrupted that their Heart is turn'd towards Bodies and Loves them this I say is really in them It is not the Imputation of their Fathers Sin they are actually in disorder So those that are justify'd by Jesus Christ of which Adam was the Figure are not justify'd by Imputation They are actually restor'd into Order by an inward Justice different from that of Jesus Christ tho' it is only he that has merited it for them The Soul has but two Natural or Essential Relations the one to God the other to its Body Now it is evident that the Relation or Union it has with God can neither corrupt it or make it vicious Therefore it is only so in the moment of its Creation by the Relation it has to its Body So that it is necessary to say either that Pride and the other Vices which are call'd Spiritual may be Communicated by the Body or that Children are not liable to them at the moment of their Birth I say at the moment of their Birth for I do not deny but those ill habits are easily acquir'd Yet pure Intelligences have no other relation then to God and that in the moment of their Creation they were subject to no Vice yet they are fallen into Disorder but 't is only by their having made an ill use of their Liberty and Children have made no use of it for Original Sin is not free But I am of Opinion that those are mistaken who fancy the Rebellion of the Body only occasions gross Vices as Intemperance and Incontinency and not those which are call'd Spiritual as Pride and Envy And I am perswaded that there is such a Correspondence between the dispositions of our Brain and those of our Soul that perhaps the Soul has no ill habit but what derives its Principle from the Body Saint Paul in divers places calls Law Wisdom Desires and the Works of the Flesh whatever is contrary to the Law of the Spirit he does not mention Spiritual Vices He places among the Works of the Flesh Idolatry Heresies Dissentions and many other Vices which are call'd Spiritual According to his Doctrine we follow the motions of the Flesh in being guilty of Vain-glory Gal. c. 5. Passion and Envy Finally it appears by the Expressions of that Apostle that all Sins proceed from the Flesh not that the Flesh commits them or that the Spirit of Man without Grace or the Spirit of Jesus Christ does that which is good but because the Flesh acts upon the Mind of Man in such a manner that it does no Evil which the Flesh does not sollicit Rom. c. 7. St. Paul
the Husband is her Head and Master We see that the Evangelists and even the Blessed Virgin calls Joseph the Father of Jesus Christ when she says unto her Son Thy Father and I have sought thee sorrowing Ecce pater tuus Ego dolentes quaerebamus Therefore since the Holy Scripture assures us that it is by the Woman we are all liable to Death and to Sin it is absolutely necessary to believe it Nor can it be thrown upon Man But though it assure us in other places that by Man Sin came into the World there is not the same necessity to believe it since that may be attributed to the Man which belongs to the Woman And if we were obliged by Faith to excuse either the Man or the Woman it would be mote reasonable to excuse the Man than the Woman However I am of opinion that the Passages I have quoted ought to be explained in the Literal sense and that we ought to conclude That both the Man and the Woman are the Real Causes of Sin each in their way The Woman because Sin is Communicated by her as it is by her that Man begets Children And Man because his Sin has occasion'd Concupiscence as his Action is the Cause of the Impregnation of the Woman or of the Communication which is between the Woman and her Child 'T is certain that it is the Man who impregnates the Woman and consequently he is the Cause of the Communication which is between her Body and the Childs since that Communication is the Principle of its Life The said Communication does not only give to the Bodies of Children the Dispositions of their Mothers it also gives to their Minds the Dispositions of her Mind Therefore we may say with St. Paul That By Man Sin was introduced into the World and nevertheless upon the account of that Communication we may also say that Sin proceeds from the Woman that it is by her we are all lyable to Death and that our Mother has conceived us in Iniquity as it is said in other places of the Scripture Perhaps it may be urged That though Man had not sinned the Woman would have had sinful Children for having sinned her self she had lost the Power God had given her over her Body And therefore though the Man had remained Just she would have Corrupted the Brain and consequently the Mind of her Child upon the account of the Communication she had with it Certainly this does not appear lively For Man whilst Righteous knowing what he does cannot give the Woman that miserable Fruitfulness of conceiving sinful Children If he remains Righteous he will have no Children but for God and sinful Children can never be acceptable to God for I do not suppose a Mediator in this place However I grant that in this case the Marriage might not have been dissolved and that the Man might have known his Wife But it is certain the Body of the Woman did belong to her Husband since it was taken out of his and was of the same Flesh Duo in carne una It is also certain that the Children belong as much to the Father as to the Mother This being granted we can never imagine that the Woman after her Sin would have lost the power she had over her Body unless her Husband had sinned as well as her self for had the Woman been deprived of that power her Husband remaining in Innocence there would have been this disorder in the Universe That a Just Man should have had a Corrupt Body and Sinful Children Now it is contrary to Order or rather it is contradictory that a Just God should punish the Man when he is in perfect Innocence Therefore Eve feels no Involuntary and Rebel Motions immediately after her Sin She is not as yet ashamed to see her self naked She does not hide her self On the contrary she draws near to her Husband though naked as well as her self Her Eyes are not as yet opened She is as before the absolute Mistress of her Body Order required that immediately after her sin her Soul should have been disturbed by the Rebellion of her Body and by the shame of her own and Husband's Nakedness For it was not reasonable that God should any longer suspend the Laws of the Communication of Motions in favour of her as I have said in the Seventh Article But whereas her Body belongs to her Husband and her Husband is still Innocent she is not punished in that Body That punishment is deferred until he has himself eaten of the Fruit which she presented to him Then it was they both felt the Rebellion of their Bodies they perceived they were naked and that shame obliged them to cover themselves with Fig-Leaves Therefore we must say That Adam is really the Cause of Original Sin and Concupiscence since it is his sin that has deprived his Wife as well as himself of the power they had over their Bodies and that it is for want of this power the Woman produces Traces in her Brain and in the Brain of her Child which corrupt the Soul from the very moment it is created OBJECTION Against the Twelfth Article Those speak by guess who say that the Communication of the Mothers Brain with that of her Child is necessary or useful towards the Conformation of the Foetus For there is no such Communication between the Brain of a Hen and her Chickens and yet the Chickens are perfectly well form'd ANSWER I Answer that in the Seventh Chapter of the Second Book I have sufficiently demonstrated that Communication by the use I make of it to Explain the Generation of Monsters and certain Marks and Natural Apprehensions For it is evident that a Man who falls into a swoon at the sight of a snake because his Mother was frightned by one while she bore him can only have this Weakness because the Traces were formerly form'd in his Brain like unto those which open themselves when he sees a snake and that the said Traces have been attended with the like accident Therefore I guess not for I do not presume to determine wherein the said Communication does precisely consist I might say it proceeds from the Fibres which the Foetus shoots into the Mothers Womb and by the Nerves with which that part is probably fill'd And yet I should no more guess in this than a Man who never having seen the Machines of the * Samaritan Fountain upon Pont Neuf in Paris should affirm that there are Wheels and Pumps in it to draw up the Water However I am of opinion it is sometimes lawful to guess provided we do not pretend to set up for Prophets or speak with too much assurance I fancy Men may be allowed to say what they think provided they do not aim at Infalibility or injustly impose upon Mens Minds with a discisive behaviour or by the help of some Terms of Art We do not alwayes guess in saying things that are not seen and are contrary
act of God as I have already show'd but also because we know those things after a very perfect manner and also we should know them after an infinitely perfect manner were the capacity we have of thinking infinite since nothing is wanting in the Idea which represents them We ought also to conclude that it is in our selves we see whatever we know by Sensation Not that we can produce any new Modification in our selves or that the Sensations or Modifications of our Soul can represent objects by whose means God excites them in us but because our Sensations which are not distinct from us and consequently can never represent any thing that is distinct from us may nevertheless represent the existence of Beings or make us judge that they do exist For God exciting our Sensation in us at the presence of Objects by an action which is no wise sensible we fancy we receive from the Object not only the Idea which represents its Essence but also the Sensation which makes us judge of its Existence for there is alwayes a pure Idea and a confused Sensation in the knowledge we have of the Existence of Beings if we except that of God and our Soul I except the Existence of God for that is known by a pure Idea without Sensation his Existence not depending on a Cause and being included in the Idea of the necessary Being as the equality of Diameters is included in the Idea of the Circle I also except the Existence of our own Soul because we know by an Internal Sensation that we think will and feel and that we have no clear Idea of our Soul as I have sufficiently explained in the Seventh Chapter of the Second Part of the Third Book and elsewhere These are part of the Reasons that may be added to those I had already given to prove that God only inlightens us and that the immediate and direct object of our clear and evident Knowledge is an immutable and necessary Nature Men commonly make some Objections against this Opinion I shall now indeavour to resolve them Against what has been said That God only Inlightens us and that we see all things in Him FIRST OBJECTION Our Soul thinks because it is its Nature God in Creating it has given it the Faculty of Thinking there needs no more Or if there is any thing more required let us rely on what Experience teaches us about our Senses We find enough by Experience that they occasion our Ideas 'T is ill Philosophizing against Experience ANSWER I wonder that the Cartesians who have so much and yet so reasonable an aversion against the general Expressions of Nature and Faculty so freely use them on this occasion They will not allow Men to say that Fire burns by its Nature and that it turns certain Bodies into Glass by a Natural Faculty And yet some of them are not afraid of saying that the Mind of Man produces in it self the Ideas of all things by its Nature and because it has the Faculty of Thinking But yet they must give me liberty to say that these Expressions are no more significant in their Mouths than in those of the Peripatetics I am sensible the Soul is capable of Thinking but I know also that Extension is capable of Figures The Soul is capable of volition as well as Matter is of motion But as it is false that Matter though capable of Figure and Motion has in it self a Power a Faculty a Nature by which it can move it self or assume sometimes a round Figure and sometimes a square one so that the Soul is Naturally and Essentially capable of Knowledge and of Volition yet it is false that it has Faculties by which it can produce its Ideas in its self or its tendency towards good There is a great difference between being Movable and Moving Matter of its Nature is moveable and capable of Figures Besides it cannot subsist without Figure But it moves not it self it gives not it self a Figure it has no Faculty for all that The Mind by its Nature is capable of Motion and Ideas I grant it But it moves not it self it inlightens not it self God does all in Spirits as well as in Bodies Can we say that God makes all the alterations which happen in Matter See the first Illustration and that he makes not those which happen in the Mind Do we give that unto God which belongs to him in abandoning the last of all Beings to his Disposition Is he not equally the Master of all things Is he not the Creator the Preserver the only true Mover of Spirits as well as Bodies Certainly he makes all things Substances Accidents Beings manners of Beings We take away his Knowledge by putting bounds to his Action But if Men will needs have it that Creatures have such Faculties is are commonly conceived that we must say that Natural Bodies have a Nature which is the Author of their Motion and Rest as Aristotle and his followers say This overthrows all my Ideas But yet I would rather allow it than say that the Mind inlightens it self Let Men say the Soul has that power of differently moving the Members of their Body and to communicate Sensation and Life to them Let them say if they please that it gives Heat to the Blood Motion to the Spirits and to the rest of the Body its Magnitude Disposition and Figure But let them never say that the Mind gives it self its Motion and Light If God does not all at least let us allow him to do that which is greatest and most perfect in the World And if Creatures do something let them move their Bodies and let them order them as they please but let them not act upon Minds Let us say that Bodies move one another after having moved themselves Or rather let us not pretend to understand the different dispositions of Matter that little concerns us But we ought not to suffer our Minds to be ignorant from whom they receive the Light which lightens them Let them know from whom they receive that which can make them happier and more perfect Let them know their dependance according to its utmost extent and that whatever they have actually they receive it from God every moment For as a great Saint sayes upon another Subject It is a very criminal Pride to make use of those things which God gives us as if they were Naturally ours Above all things let us not imagine that the Senses instruct our Reason that the Body directs the Mind and that the Soul receives that from the Body which it has not it self It were better to fancy our selves independant than to think we have a real dependance on the Body It is better to be our own Master than to seek out a Master among the Creatures that is less valuable than we But it is much better yet to submit to the Eternal Truth which assures us in the Gospel that he is our only Master than to give
his Physician and though the Physician should prescribe bitter Medicines and which indeed are kinds of Poyson yet they must be taken for 't is experienced that these Poysons stay not in the Body but drive out with them those ill Humours that are the Cause of the Distemper Here it is that Reason or rather Experience must command the Senses provided the horrour of the presented Medicine is not new for if this horrour was as old as the Disease 't is a sign the Medicine is of the same Nature as the ill Humours that caused the Distemper and then perhaps it would only exasperate it However I believe that before we take strong Medicines to which we are averse we ought to begin with such as are more gentle and natural as by drinking much Water or taking an easie Vomit if the Appetite is lost and if we have much difficulty to vomit Water may attenuate the over-thick Humours and facilitate the Circulation of the Blood in all the parts of the Body Vomits cleanse the Blood and hinder the received Nourishment from any longer corrupting and feeding the intermitting Feavers But I must no further insist upon these things I believe that we ought to follow the Counsel of Wise Physicians who are not over-hasty nor rely too much upon their Medicines nor too quick in prescribing Remedies for when one is sick for one Medicine that does good there are always many that do hurt The Sick are impatient and as 't is not for the Honour of Physicians or the Profit of Apothecaries to visit the Sick without prescribing to them so also Physicians visit too seldom and prescribe too often therefore when one is sick he should pray his Phisician to hazard nothing but to follow Nature and fortifie it as much as he can he should acquaint him that he has more Reason and Patience than to take it ill that he is often visited without Relief for on these Occasions he sometimes does a great deal who does no hurt I believe then we should consult Physicians and not refuse to obey them if we would be well for though they cannot assure us a Recovery yet they may sometimes contribute much to it by reason of the repeated Experiments they make upon different Distempers They know little of any thing certainly yet they know more than we and if they take the pains to know our Constitutions carefully observe all the Accidents of the Distemper and have much regard to our own Sensations we may expect from them all the Assistance that we can reasonably hope from Men. What we have said of Phisicians may be also said of Divines it is absolutely necessary to consult them on some occasions and it is commonly profitable But it often happens that it is very unprofitable and sometimes very dangerous to consult them For Instance 'T is commonly said That Humane Reason is subject to Errour but there is something equivocal in this which we are not sufficiently aware of for we must not imagine that the Reason which Man consults is depraved or that it ever deceives when faithfully consulted I have said and still repeat it That it is sovereign Reason alone which makes us reasonable it is sovereign Truth which enlightens us and it is God only who speaks clearly to us and knows how to instruct us We have only one True Master Jesus Christ our Lord the Eternal Wisdom and the Word of the Father in whom are all the Treasures of the Wisdom and Knowledge of God and it is Impiety to say that this Eternal Reason of which all Men participate and through which they are only reasonable should be subject to Errour and capable of deceiving us For it is not the Reason of Man but his Heart that deceives him it is not his Light which hinders him from seeing his Darkness it is not the Union he has with God that deceives him it is not even in one Sense that he has with his Body It is his dependance upon his Body or rather it is because he will deceive himself because he will injoy the Pleasure of Judging before he has been at the Trouble of Examining because he will rest before he is come to the Place of Truth I have more exactly explained the Cause of our Errour in many places of the Search after Truth and here I suppose what I have there said And now I affirm it needless to consult Divines when we are assured that Truth speaks to us and it is certain that Truth speaks to us when we meet with Evidence in the Answers that are made to our Demands or the Attention of our Mind Therefore when we return into our selves and in the silence of our Senses and Passions hear a Voice so clear and intelligible that it is impossible to doubt of it let Men think what they please we must not consider Custom and secret Inclinations or have too great a respect for their Answers who are called Learned We must not suffer our selves to be seduced with an appearance of false Piety nor be dejected through their Oppositions who know not the Spirit that animates them but we must patiently suffer their Insults without condemning their Intentions or despising their Persons We must with simplicity of Heart rejoice at the Light of Truth which enlightens us and although its Answers condemn us we must prefer them before all the Subtle Distinctions which the Imagination invents for the Justification of the Passions Every Man for Instance who knows how to examine himself and to still the Noise of his Senses and Passions clearly discovers that all the Motion which God puts into us should be terminated upon himself and that even God cannot dispense with the Obligation we have of loving him in all things It is evident that God cannot but act for himself that he cannot create or preserve our Will to will any thing but him or to will any thing besides what he himself wills for I cannot see how it 's conceivable that God should will a Creature to have more love for what is less lovely or love chiefly or as its end what is not most lovely I know well that Men who consult their Passions instead of Order can easily imagine that God has no other Rule of his Wills than the same Wills and that if God follows Order 't is surely from this that he has willed it by a Will that is absolutely free and indifferent There are some who think there is no Order that is immutable and necessary by its nature and that the Order or Wisdom of God according to which he made all Things although the first of Creatures is it self a Creature made by a Free-will of God and not begotten of his Substance by the necessity of his Being But this Opinion which shakes all the Foundations of Morality by taking away from Order and the Eternal Laws which depend upon it their Immutability and which overturns all the Superstructure of the Christian Religion by despoyling
that are but a little enlightened may sometimes destroy our Soul as unexpert Physicians may our Body As I don 't throughly explain the Rules which might be given in respect of the choice and use that should be made of Guides and Physicians I desire my Sentiments may be equitably interpreted and that it may not be imagined that I would hinder any from seeking necessary assistance from others I know that a particular Blessing attends our submission to the Opinions of the Wise and Understanding and I am willing to believe this General Rule Let us dye according to the received Laws of Phisics to the generality of Men they are safer than any other that I could establish for the Preservation of Life But because it is alwayes profitable to examine our selves and consult the Gospel to hearken to Jesus Christ whether he speaks immediately to our Mind and Heart or by Faith declares himself to our Ears or Eyes I believe I might say what I have said for our Guides themselves deceive us when they speak contrary to what Faith and Reason teach us And as it is to give Honour to God by believing his Works to have that which is necessary for their preservation I thought I should make Men sensible that the Machine of their Body is contrived after so admirable a manner that of it self it discovers more easily what is necessary for its Preservation than by Science or even the Experience of the most able Physicians AN EXPLANATION OF THE Third Chapter of the Fifth Book That Love is different from Peasure and Joy THE Mind commonly confounds things which are very different when they happen at the same time and are not contrary to one another Of which I have given many Instances in this Work because 't is therein that our Errors chiefly consist in respect to what passes in our selves As we have no clear Idea of what constitutes the Nature or Essence of our Mind nor of the Modifications it is capable of it often happens that we confound things absolutely different if they happen within us but at the same time since we easily confound what we do not know by a clear and distinct Idea It is not only impossible clearly to discover wherein the difference of such things consists as pass within us but it is also difficult to discern whether there is any difference between them For to effect this we must look into our selves not to consider what is voluntarily done in reference to Good and Evil but to make an abstracted Reflection upon our selves which cannot be performed without much Distraction and Pains We easily conceive that the Roundness of a Body is different from its Motion And although we know by Experience that a Bowl upon a Plane cannot be pushed without being moved and then Roundness and Motion are found together however we don't confound them one with the other because we know both Motion and Figure by very distinct and clear Ideas But 't is not so with Pleasure and Love for we commonly confound them Our Mind if we may so say becomes movable by Pleasure as a Ball does by its Roundness and because it is never without an impression towards good it is immediately put in motion towards the Object which causes or seems to cause this Pleasure So that this motion of Love happening to the Soul at the same time it feels this Pleasure it is enough to make it confound its Pleasure with its Love because it has not so clear an Idea either of its Pleasure or its Love as it has of Figure and Motion Wherefore some Persons will believe that Pleasure and Love are not different and that I distinguish too many things in each of our Passions But to make it plainly appear that Pleasure and Love are very different I shall distinguish two sorts of Pleasures one of which precedes Reason as agreeable Sensations which we commonly call Pleasures of the Body and the other sort neither precede Reason nor the Senses and are generally called the Pleasures of the Soul Such as Joy which is excited in us in consequence of a clear Knowledge or a confused Sensation which we have that some good is or will happen to us For instance A Man tasting of a Fruit which he knows not finds some Pleasure in eating it if this Fruit be good for his Nourishment This is a preventing Pleasure for since he feels it before he knows whether this Fruit is good or nor it is evident that this Pleasure prevents his Reason An Huntsman when hungry expecting or actually finding something to eat actually feels Joy Now this Joy is a Pleasure which follows the knowledge he has of his present or future good It is perhaps evident by this distinction of Pleasure into that which follows and precedes Reason that there is neither of them but differs from Love For that Pleasure which precedes Reason certainly precedes Love since it precedes all knowledge which in some degree or other is always supposed by Love And on the contrary Joy or Pleasure which supposes Knowledge also supposes Love since Joy supposes the confused Sensation or clear Knowledge that we do or shall possess what we love and if we possessed a thing we had no love for we should receive no Joy by it Thus Pleasure is very different from Love since the Pleasure which precedes Reason precedes and causes Love and the Pleasure which follows Reason necessarily supposes Love as an Effect supposes the Cause Otherwise if Pleasure and Love were the same thing there would never be Pleasure without Love nor Love without Pleasure for a thing cannot be without it self Yet a Christian loves his Enemy and a Child well educated loves his Father how unreasonable and unkind soever he may be The sight of their Duty the fear of God and love of Order and Justice makes them love not only without Pleasure but even with a kind of Horrour such Persons as are not agreeable to them I confess they sometimes feel Pleasure or Joy when they think they do their Duty or when they hope to be recompensed according to their Merit But besides that this Pleasure visibly differs very much from the Love they have to their Father or Enemy although it be perhaps the Motive of it it often happens that 't is not even this Motive which makes them act it is sometimes only an abstracted view of Order or notion of Fear which preserves their Love We may even in one sense say they have a Love for these Persons at the time they think not of them For Love remains in us during the diversions of our thoughts and whilst we sleep but Pleasure seems to me to subsist no longer in the Soul than whilst it is sensible of it Thus Love or Charity remaining in us without Pleasure or Delight it cannot be maintained that Pleasure and Love is the same thing As Pleasure and Pain are two direct contraries If Pleasure were the same thing with Love
Pain would not differ from Hatred Now it is evident that Pain is different from Hatred since Pain often subsists without Hatred A Man for instance who is hurt without observing it suffers a real and cutting Pain but is free from Hatred for he does not so much as know the Cause of his Pain or Object of his Hatred or rather the Cause of his Pain not being worthy of Hatred it cannot excite it in him Thus he hates not this Cause of his Pain although his Pain inclines him to or disposes him to hate it It is true this Man hates his Pain for Pain deserves Hatred but the hatred of Pain is not Pain but only supposes it The hatred of Pain is not worthy of Hatred as Pain On the contrary 't is very agreeable for we please our selves in hating Pain as we are displeased in suffering it Pain therefore is not Hatred nor is Pleasure which is opposite to Pain Love which is opposite to Hatred Consequently the Pleasure which precedes Reason is not the same thing as Love And I likewise prove that the Joy or Pleasure which follows Reason is also distinct from Love As Joy and Sorrow are directly opposite If Joy was the same thing as Love Sorrow would not differ from Hatred But it is plain that Sorrow is different from Hatred for Sorrow sometimes subsists without Hatred For instance A Man finds himself by chance deprived of such things as he has need of This is enough to cause Sorrow but it cannot excite Hatred in him either because he knows not the Cause which deprived him of these necessaries or else that this Cause not being worthy of his Hatred it could not stir it up in him It is true this Man hates the privation or the good that he loves but it is plain that this kind of Hatred is properly Love For he hates the privation of good only because he loves the good And since to fly the privation of good is to incline towards good it is evident that the motion of this Mans Hatred differs not from that of his Love Thus his Hatred if he 's possest of any not being contrary to his Love and Sorrow being always opposite to Joy it is plain that his Sorrow is not his Hatred consequently Joy differs from Love In fine it is manifest when we are sorrowful 't is because of the presence of something we hate or rather the absence of something we love Thus Sorrow supposes Hatred or rather Love but is very different from both these things I very well know St. Austin affirms that Pain is an a version which the Soul conceives because the Body is not disposed after such a manner as it wishes and that he often confounds Delectation with Charity Pleasure with Joy Pain with Sorrow Pleasure and Joy with Love Pain and Sorrow with Aversion or Hatred But 't is very probable that this Holy Doctor spoke all this according to the general Language amongst the common sort of Men who confound the greatest part of those things which pass within them at the same time Or it may be he had not examined these things after a very exact and Philosophical manner However I believe I may and ought to say that it appear'd requisite to me exactly to distinguish these things if we would clearly and without equivocation explain many Questions which St. Austin has treated on For even those who have contrary Opinions amongst themselves have been accustomed to maintain them from the Authority of this great Man because of the different Sense his Expressions may be taken in which is not alwayes exact enough to reconcile such Persons who perhaps have more mind to dispute than agree A N EXPLANATION OF THE Third Chapter of the Second Part of the Sixth Book Concerning the Efficacy attributed to Second Causes EVer since the Fall the Mind of Man is continually imployed upon External Objects he even forgets himself and him who penetrates and inlightens him and suffers himself after such a manner to be seduced by his own and the Bodies about him that he expects in them to find his Perfection and Happiness He who alone is capable of acting in it now hides himself from our Eyes nor are his Operations performed after a sensible manner and although he produces and preserves all Beings the Mind which eagerly seeks the Cause of all things finds much difficulty to discover him although it meets with him every moment Some Philosophers have chose rather to imagine a Nature and certain Faculties as the Causes of those Effects we call Natural than to give God all the Honour which is due to his Power And although they have no Proof nor so much as a clear Idea of this Nature and these Faculties as I hope I have shown they choose rather to speak without knowing what they say and to respect a Power purely imaginary than to make any endeavour to discover the hand of him who performs whatever is done in all things I cannot forbear believing that one of the most deplorable consequences of Original Sin is our having no more gust nor sensation for God or that we perceive him not or meet him but with a kind of horrour and fright We ought to acknowledge God in all things be sensible of his Strength and Power in all Natural Effects admire his Wisdom in the marvellous Order of the Creatures and in a word adore fear and love only him in all his Works But there is now a secret opposition between Man and God Man finding himself a Sinner hides himself flyes the Light is apprehensive of meeting God and chooses rather to imagine in the Bodies which are about him a Power or blind Nature which he can make familiar to himself than to meet there the terrible Power of a Holy and Just God who knows and performs all things I confess there are many persons who by a different Principle than that of the Heathen Philosophers pursue their Opinion about Nature and Second Causes But I hope we shall discover by the consequence of this Discourse that they are of this Opinion only through a received prejudice which it is almost impossible to deliver themselves from without the assistance that may be drawn from the Principles of a Philosophy which has not alwayes been sufficiently known For it is probably this which has hindered them from declaring in favour of an Opinion which I have thought my Duty to maintain There are many Reasons which keep me from ascribing to Second or Natural Causes a strength power or efficacy to produce any thing whatever but the chief is because I cannot even conceive this Opinion What endeavours soever I make to comprehend it I cannot find in my self an Idea which represents to me what this Strength or Power can be which they attribute to Creatures And I believe that I should not make a rash Judgment if I affirm that those who maintain that Creatures have in themselves this Strength and Power
are in themselves or the Body which speaks only out of interest and in relation either to the preservation or conveniency of Life For in fine What Prejudices will not be justified if we take the Senses for Judges to whom almost all Prejudices owe their birth As I have already shewn in the Search after Truth When I see one Bowle hit another my Eyes tell me or seem to tell me that it is truly the Cause of the Motion it impresses For the true Cause which moves Bodies does not appear to my Eyes Bur when I ask my Reason I see evidently that Bodies cannot move themselves and their Moving power depending only upon the Will of God which successively preserves them in different places they cannot communicate a power which they have not nor could communicate if they had it For 't is plain there is a Wisdom requisite and one that is infinite too to regulate the Communication of Motions with the exactness proportion and uniformity that we see A Body moved cannot know the infinite number of Bodies it meets at every moment It is farther clear That although we should even suppose knowledge in it it could not have enough to regulate in the instant of the Shock the distribution of the Moving power it self is carried with If I open but my Eyes it appears plain to me that the Sun is very gloriously bright and seems not only to be visible it self but makes all the World so too 'T is that which covers the Earth with Flowers and Fruits which gives Life to Animals and which by its Heat penetrates into the very Bowels of the Earth and produces Stones Marbles and Metals there But when I consult Reason I see nothing of all this and if I consult it faithfully I clearly discover that my Senses seduce me and that it is God who performs all in all Things For knowing that whatever changes happen in the Body they have no other principle but the different communication of Motion which occur in visible or invisible Bodies I see that it is God who does all Things since it is his Will which Causes and his Wisdom which Regulates all these Communications I suppose that Local Motion is the principle of Generations Corruptions Alterations and generally of all the Changes which happen in the Body which is an Opinion that is now sufficiently received amongst the Learned But whatever Opinion they have about it signifies little for it seems much more easie to conceive that a Body drives another when it meets it than to apprehend how Fire produces Heat and Light and draw from the power of Matter a Substance which was not there before And if it be necessary to acknowledge That God is the True Cause of the different Communications of Motions by a much stronger Reason we ought to conclude That none but he can Create and Annihilate Real Qualities and Substantial Forms I say Create and Annihilate because at least it seems as difficult to me to draw from Matter a Substance which was not in it or to cause it to re-enter again as to Create or Annihilate it But I shall not stand upon Terms I only make use of them because there is no other which I know of that clearly and without Equivocation express the Changes which the Philosophers suppose every Moment to happen through the power of Second Causes I had some difficulty here to relate the other Proofs which they commonly give for the Power and Efficacy of Natural Causes for they appear so weak to those who are able to resist Prejudices and prefer their Reason to their Senses that it does not seem likely that reasonable Men should be perswaded by them Yet I will produce and Answer them since there are many Philosophers who make use of them The first Proof If Second Causes do effect nothing we could not says Suarez In his Metaph. Disp 18. Sect. 1. Assert 1. In Metaph. Arist qu. 7. Sect. 2. Fonseca and some others distinguish Animate from Inanimate Things for neither of them would have an inward principle of their Actions ANSWER I Answer That Men would have the same Sensible Proofs that have convinced them of the distinction they put between Animate and Inanimate Things They would alwayes see Animals perform Certain Actions as Eating Growing Crying Running Leaping c. Nor would they observe any thing like this in Stones And it is this only which makes the common Philosophers believe that Beasts live and Stones do not for it must not be imagined that they know by a clear and distinct View of the Mind what the Life of a Dog is It is their Senses which regulate their Decisions upon this Question If it were necessary I could here prove That the Principal of a Dog's Life differs very little if at all from that of the Motion of a Watch. For the Life of Bodies whatever they be can only consist in the motion of their parts and it is not difficult to judge that the same Subtil Matter which in a Dog causes the Fermentation of the Blood and Animal Spirits and is the principle of his Life is not more perfect than that which gives Motion to the Springs of a Watch or causes Gravitation in the Weights of a Clock which is the principle of their Life or to speak as others do of their Motion The Peripatetics ought to give to those whom they stile Cartesians a clear Idea of what they call The Life of Beasts Corporeal Soul Body which perceives desires sees feels wills and afterwards we will clearly resolve their difficulties if they continue to propose them The Second Proof We could not discover the Differences nor Powers of the Elements So that Fire might cool as Water does and the Nature of nothing would be settled and fixed ANSWER I Answer That Nature continuing as it is that is whilst the Laws of the communication of Motions remain constantly the same it is a contradiction that Fire should not burn or not separate the parts of certain Bodies Fire cannot cool like Water except it becomes Water For Fire being only fewel whose parts have been agitated with a violent Motion by an invisible Matter which incompasses them as is easie to be demonstrated it is impossible these parts should not communicate some of their Motion to the Bodies which they meet Now as these Laws are constant the Nature of Fire its vertues and qualities cannot change But this Nature and these Vertues are only consequences of the general and efficacious Will of God who does all in all things as we learn from the Scripture So that the study of Nature is false and vain in every respect when we seek for any other true Causes than the Will of the ALMIGHTY I own we must not have recourse to God or the Universal Cause when we inquire into the reason of particular Effects For we should make our selves ridiculous if for instance we said that 't was God who dryes the wayes or
to fight against himself but because he designed to make use of this shocking of Bodies as an occasion to establish the general Law of the communication of Motions by which he foresaw he might produce an infinite number of admirable Effects For I am perswaded that these two Natural Laws which are the most simple of all Viz. That all Motion inclines to put it self in a right Line And That in the time of concurrence Motions are communicated in proportion to the magnitude of the Bodies which are shockt are sufficient to produce the World as we see it at this day I mean the Heavens the Stars the Planets Comets Earth and Water Air and Fire In a word the Elements and all inorganized or inanimate Bodies For organized Bodies depend upon many other Natural Laws which are wholly unknown to us It may be also that animate Bodies are not formed like others by a certain number of Natural Laws For 't is very probable they were all formed at the Creation of the World and that by time they only received that growth which was necessary to make them visible to our eyes Let it be how it will 't is certain they receive this growth from the general Laws of Nature according to which all other Bodies are formed upon which account their growth is not alwayes regular I say then that God by the first Natural Law positively will'd and consequently produced the Collision of Bodies and that he afterwards made use of it as an occasion to establish the second Natural Law which regulates the communication of Motions and that thus the actual shock is a Natural or Occasional Cause of the actual communication of Motions If we consider this well it will be visibly discovered that nothing could be better ordered But supposing God had not ordained it thus and that he had diverted Bodies when ready to hit each other as if there were a void to receive them First Bodies would not then have been subject to this continual vicissitude which causes the Beauty of the Universe for the generation of certain Bodies is only produced by the corruption of some others and 't is the contrariety of their Motions which produces their variety Nor Secondly Would God then act by the most simple wayes For that Bodies ready to shock each other might continue their Motion without striking it would be necessary that they should variously describe an infinite number of Curve-Lines and consequently we must admit different Wills in God to determine their Motions Lastly If there was no uniformity in the action of Natural Bodies and if their Motion was not performed in a right Line there would be no certain Principle for us to Reason upon in Natural Philosophy nor to guide us in many Actions of our Lives 'T is no disorder for Lyons to eat Wolves Wolves Sheep and Sheep the Grass which God has taken so much care of that he has given it all things necessary for its own preservation and also a Seed to preserve its Kind Yet this proves Second Causes no more than the Plurality of Causes or contrary Principles of Good and Evil which the Manichees invented to give a Reason for these Effects But 't is a certain Mark of the Wisdom Greatness and Magnificence of God for he does nothing unbecoming an Infinite Wisdom and performs all things with such a Munificence as sufficiently shows his Power and Greatness Whatever is destroy'd is again repair'd by the same Law which destroy'd it so great is the Wisdom Power and Fruitfulness of this Law God does not prevent the destruction of Beings by a New Will not only because the first is sufficient to repair them but chiefly because his Wills are much more valuable than the reparation of these Beings They are of much more value than all they produce And if God made this visible World although in it self unworthy of the action whereby it was produced 't was for ends unknown to Philosophers and to Honour himself in JESVS CHRIST with such an Honour as the Creatures are uncapable of giving him When a House by its fall crushes a good Man to death a greater Evil happens than when one Beast devours another or when one Body is forced to give way by the shock it receives at the meeting of another But God multiplies not his Wills to redress such disorders real or apparent as are necessary consequences of Natural Laws He ought neither to correct nor change these Laws although they should sometimes produce Monsters He must not confound the order and simplicity of his wayes He ought to neglect inconsiderable things I mean he should not have particular Wills to produce Effects of no value or unworthy the action of him who produces them God works Miracles only when the Order he always follows requires it and this Order wills that he should act by the most simple wayes and that there should be no exceptions in his Wills but when 't is absolutely necessary to his designs or on certain occasions which are wholly unknown to us For although we are all united to the Order or Wisdom of God we know not all the Rules of it We see in it what we ought to do but comprehend not by it what God ought to Will nor must we be too solicitous about it We have a great instance of what I have been saying in the damnation of an infinite number of persons that God has permitted to perish in times of Ignorance God is infinitely good loves all his works would have all Men be saved and come to this knowledge of the Truth for he has Created them to injoy him And yet the greatest number are damn'd They live and dye in blindness and will continue in it to all Eternity And does not this proceed from Gods acting by the most simple wayes and from his following Order We have shown that according to Order God ought not by preingaging Pleasures to have prevented the Will of the First Man although his Fall caused the disorder of Nature See the Explanation of the fourth Chapter of the Second Part Of Method It was requisite that all Men should descend from one not only because this is the most simple way but for Reasons too Theological and abstracted to be here explained See also the First Explanation of the Fifth Chapter In fine We ought to believe that this is conformable to the Order which God follows and the Wisdom he alwayes consults in the intention and execution of his designs The Sin of the first Man has produced an infinite number of Evils 't is true but certainly Order required that God should permit it and that he should place Man in an estate wherein he was capable of sinning God is willing to repair his work but rarely gives those victorious Graces which conquers the Malice of the greatest Sinners He often gives Graces that are useless to the Conversion of those who receive them although in respect to them he foresees
God makes him will and continually inclines him towards Good and gives him all the Ideas and Sensations which determine him I also acknowledge that Man of himself commits sin But I deny that in that he does any thing for Sin Error and even Concupiscence are nothing Which Point I have sufficiently cleared in the First Explanation Man wills but his Determinations are weak in themselves they produce nothing nor hinder God from doing all Things for it is even he who causes our Wills in us by the impression he gives us towards God Man of himself is only capable of Errour and Sin which are nothing There is a great deal of difference between our Minds and the Bodies which are about us Our Mind in one sense wills Nemo habet de suo nisi mendacium peccatum Conc. Araus 2. Can. 22. acts and determines I grant it Of which we are convinced by the inward sensation we have of our selves To deny our Liberty would be to take from us future rewards and punishments for without Liberty there is neither good nor bad Actions So that then Religion would be an Illusion and a Fancy But that Bodies have any power to Act is what we do not clearly see but appears incomprehensible and is also what we deny when we reject Second Causes Even the Mind does not act so much as we imagine I know that I Will and Will freely I have no reason to doubt of it which is stronger than that inward sensation I have of my self I likewise don't deny this But I deny that my Will is the True Cause of the Motion of my Arm the Ideas of my Mind and other Things which attend my Determinations for I see no relation between Things which differ so much On the contrary I clearly discover that there can be no relation between the Will I have to move my Arm According to the sense discussed in the Chapter upon which this Explanation is made and between the Agitation of some little Bodies of which I neither know the Motion nor Figure which make choice of certain Nervous passages amongst a Million of others I know not to cause that Motion in me which I wish by an infinite Number of Motions I wish not I deny that my Will produces my Ideas in me for I do not so much as see how it could produce them For since my Will cannot Act or Will without knowing it supposes my Ideas but does not make them Nay I do not so much as precisely know what an Idea is I cannot tell whether they are produced out of nothing or become nothing again as soon as we cease to behold them I speak according to the Opinion of some persons I produce they will tell me my Ideas by the Faculty God hath given me of Thinking And move my Arm because of the Union God has placed between my Mind and Body But Faculty and Vnion are Logical Terms rambling and indeterminate Words There is no Being whatever nor Manner of Being which is either a Faculty or an Vnion Therefore these Terms must be explained If they will say That the Union of my Mind with my Body consists in Gods Willing that when I wish my Arm should be moved the Animal Spirits are then dispersed into the Muscles of it to move it according to my desire I clearly understand this Explanation and receive it But it is the same Thing which I maintain For if my Will determine that of God it is evident my Arm will be moved not by my Will which is impotent in it self but by that of Gods which can never fail of its effect I always mean a true and efficacious power But if it be said That the Union of my Mind with my Body consists in Gods having given me the power to move my Arm as he has given my Body the power of feeling pleasure and pain that I might be assiduous about my Body and interest my self in its preservation Certainly by this we should suppose the Matter in dispute and make a Circle on 't We have no clear Idea of this power that the Soul has over the Body nor of that the Body has over the Soul Nor very well know what we say when we positively affirm it Prejudice first gave rise to this Opinion we believed it from Infants as soon as we were capable of sensation But the Understanding Reason and Reflection have no share in it as sufficiently appears by what I have said in the Search after Truth But they will say I know by the inward sensation of my Action that I truly have this power So that I shall not be deceived in believing it To which I Answer When we move our Arm we have an inward sensation of the Actual Will whereby we move it and are not mistaken when we believe we have this Will And further We have an inward sensation of a certain Effort which accompanies this Will and we ought likewise to believe that we make this Effort In short I mean that we have an inward sensation that the Arm is moved in the very instant of the Effort Which supposed I consent to what is said That the Motion of the Arm is performed in the same instant we feel this Endeavour or that we have a practical Will to move it It appears evident to me that the mind does not so much as know by inward sensation or Conscience the Motion of the Arm which it animates It knowes by Conscience only what it feels or thinks We know the sense we have of the Motion of our Arm by inward Sensation or Conscience But Conscience does not inform us of the Motion of our Arm or the pain we suffer in it any more than the Colours we see upon Objects Or if this will not be granted I say that inward sensation is not infallible for Errour is often found in Complex Sensation as has been shewed in the First Booke of the Search after Truth But I deny that this Effort which is only a Modification or Sensation of the Soul given us to make us apprehend our Weakness and which affords us but an obscure and weak discovery of our power should be capable of moving or determining the Animal Spirits I deny that there is any relation between our Thoughts and the Motions of Matter or that the Soul has the least knowledge of the Animal Spirits it makes use of to move the Body it Animates In fine although the Soul should exactly know the Animal Spirits and should be capable of Moving them or determining their Motion I deny that with all this advantage it could be capable of making choice of those Nervous Canals of which she is wholly ignorant so as to impel the Spirits into them that thereby the Body might be moved with that quickness exactness and strength as we observe in those who are least acquainted with the Structure of their Bodies For even supposing our Wills were truly the Moving power of
Bodies although it appears incomprehensible how could we conceive that the Soul could move the Body The Arm for Instance is only moved by means of the dilatation or contraction of some of the Muscles which compose it And that the Motion which the Soul impresses on the Spirits that are in the Brain may be communicated to those in the Nerves and these to others which are in the Muscles of the Arms it 's requisite that the Determinations of the Soul should be multiplied or changed in proportion to the almost infinite Occurrences or Shocks which would be made by the little Bodies which constitute the Spirits But this cannot be conceived without admitting in the Soul an infinite number of Wills at the least Motion of the Body since to move it an infinite number of communications of Motions are necessary For the Soul being but a particular Cause and which cannot exactly know either the greatness or number of an infinite Variety of little Bodies which mutually strike each other when the Spirits are dispersed into the Muscles it could neither establish a general Law for the communication of the Motions of these Spirits nor exactly follow it if it were established So that it is plain the Soul could not move its Arm although it had the power of determining the Motion of the Animal Spirits These Things are too clear for us to stand any longer upon them It is the same thing with our Faculty of Thinking By inward sensation we know that we would think on something and make some effort to that end and that in the instant of our Desire and Endeavour the Idea of this Thing presents it self to the Mind But we do not discover by inward sensation that our Will or Endeavour produces our Idea nor does Reason tell us it can do it It is through Prejudice that we are perswaded that our Desires cause our Ideas whilst we prove an hundred times a day that the latter follows or attends the former As God and his Operations have nothing sensible in them and as we do not feel any thing else but our Desires which precede the presence of our Ideas we think there can be no other Cause of them But if we observe the Matter more closely we shall discover we have no power in our selves to produce them For neither Reason nor the inward sensation we have of our selves give us any information of it I do not think I am obliged to relate all the other Proofs that are made use of by these Defenders of the Efficacy of Second Causes because they appear so weak that it might be imagined I only intended to render them ridiculous and if I should answer them seriously I should become ridiculous my self An Author for Instance asserts very seriously in favour of his Opinion That Created Beings are True Material Formal Final Causes and why then should they not also be Efficient or Efficacious Causes I believe I should not very well satisfie the World if in Answer to the Demand of this Author I should stay to explain so gross an Equivocation and show the difference between an Efficacious Cause and that which some Philosophers have been pleased to call a Material one So that I shall omit some of the like Proofs to come to those they have taken from the Holy Scripture The Seventh Proof Those who maintain the Efficacy of Second Causes commonly bring the following passages to support their Opinion Let the Earth bring forth Grass Gen. 1. Let the Waters bring forth the moving Creatures that hath life and Fowl that may fly c. Therefore the Earth and the Water have from the Word of God received Power to produce Plants and Animals After which God commands the Fowls and the Fish to multiply Be fruitful and multiply and fill the Waters in the Seas and let Fowl multiply in the Earth Therefore he has given them Power to beget their like JESVS CHRIST in the Fourth Chapter of St. Mark sayes That the Seed which falls on good ground shall bring forth an hundred fold and that the Earth bringeth forth fruits of her self first the blade then the ear and afterwards the full corn Lastly it is also written in the Book of Wisdom That the Fire had as it were forgotten the Power it had of burning in favour of the People of God 'T is therefore confirmed by the Old and New Testament that Second Causes have a Power to act ANSWER I Answer That in the Holy Scripture there is also many passages which attribute to God the pretended Efficacy of Second Causes of which these are some Ego sum Dominus faciens OMNIA extendens Coelos SOLVS stabiliens terram NVLLVS mecum Isa 44.24 Manus tuae fecerunt me plasmaverunt me TOTVM in circuitu Job 10.8 Nescio qualiter in utero meo apparuistis singulorum membra NON EGO IPSA COMPEGI sed enim Mundi Creator qui hominis formavit nativitatem c. Mac. l. 2. c. 7.22 23. Cum ipse DEVS dat omnibus vitam inspirationem omnia Acts 17.25 Producens foenum jumentis herbam servituti hominum ut educas panem de terrâ Psal 103. 48. There is an infinite number of the like passages but these may suffice When an Author seems to contradict himself and Natural Equity or some stronger Reason obliges us to reconcile him to himself It seems to me that we have an infallible Rule to discover his true Opinion since we need but observe when he speaks according to his own Understanding and when in compliance with the common Opinion When a Man speaks like the rest of the World it is not alwayes a certain sign he is of their Opinion But when he speaks positively contrary to what we are accustomed to say although he should say it but once we have a great deal of Reason to believe 't is what he thinks provided we know he speaks seriously and having first well considered it For instance An Author speaking of the Properties of Animals if he should in an hundred places say that Beasts feel that Dogs know their Master love and fear him and should only in two or three places say Beasts are insensible and Dogs uncapable of knowing loving or fearing any thing How shall we reconcile this Author who appears to contradict himself Must we not collect all the passages for and against it and judge of his Opinion by the greatest number If so I don't believe there is any Man to whom for example we may attribute this Opinion that Animals have no Souls For the Cartesians themselves often say that a Dog feels when he is beaten and 't is very rarely that they deny him feeling And although I have incountered an infinite number of prejudices in this Book we may draw many passages from thence whereby if this Rule I have explained be received we may prove that I have established them all and even that I hold the Opinion of the Efficacy of
places in Scripture where God is only said to act Ego sum Dominus sayes Isaiah faciens OMNIA extendens Coelos SOLVS stabiliens terram chap. 44.24 NVLLVS mecum A Mother animated with the Spirit of God sayes to her Children that it was not she who formed them Nescio qualiter in utero meo aparuistis singulorum membra NON EGO IPSA COMPEGI Mac. 7.22 23. sed Mundi Creator c. She does not say with Aristotle and the Peripatetic Schools that 't was she and the Sun who gave them birth but the Creator of the Vniverse Now this Opinion that 't is God only who works and forms Children in the Womb is neither conformable to Prejudices or the common Notions Therefore according to the Principle I have before established these passages must be explain'd literally But on the contrary the Opinion of the Efficacy of Second Causes being conformable to the common Notion and impression of the Senses Sol homo generant hominem Arist Phys ausc l. 2. c. 2. See St. Th. upon this Text. although we should find such passages as expresly tell us that Second Causes act of themselves alone they would be of no force when compared with these Concourse therefore is not sufficient to reconcile the different passages of the Scripture and all Force Power and Efficacy must be ascribed to God But although the immediate concourse of God with Second Causes should be proper to reconcile these different Texts I know not whether it ought to be admitted after all For the Sacred Books were not made for the Divines of these times but for the Jews So that if the Jews were not formerly sufficiently inlightened or subtle enough to imagine such a concourse as is admitted in our School-Divinity and to reconcile a thing that the most able Divines have had much trouble to explain it follows methinks that the Holy Scripture which attributed to God and to him only the production and preservation of all things would have thrown them into Error and that the Holy Penmen of these Books would have spoke to Men not only in an unknown but deceitful Language For by telling them that God does all things they would only have intended that God gives his concourse to all things and 't is probable the Jews never so much as thought of this concourse those amongst them that were not great Philosophers believing that God did all things and not that he concurred to all But that we may make a more certain Judgment about this Concourse it would be very proper carefully to explain the different Hypotheses of the Schools about it For besides the impenetrable obscurities which are common to all Opinions that we can explain or maintain only upon rambling and indeterminate terms there are upon this matter so great a variety of Opinions that it would not be very difficult to discover the cause of them But I will not ingage in a discussion which will be too tiresom both for my self and the greatest part of those who will read this Book I rather choose on the contrary to endeavour to show that my Opinions may in some respect be reconciled to the greatest number of the School Divines although I must not dissemble but confess their Language appears very equivocal and confused to me I will explain my self I believe as I have already said elsewhere that Bodies for instance have no power to move themselves and that their Moving Power is only the action of God Or to avoid a term which signifies nothing distinct their Moving Power is only the Will of God alwayes necessarily efficacious which successively preserves them in different places For I don't believe that God creates certain Beings to make them the Moving Power of Bodies Not only because I have no Idea of this kind of Being nor see how they could move Bodies but also since these Beings would themselves have need of some others to move them and so on ad infinitum For none but God is truly immovable and sole Mover together Which being supposed when a Body strikes and moves another I may say that it acts by the Concourse of God and that this Concourse is not distinct from its own action For a Body moves another which it meets only by its Action or Moving Power which at the bottom is nothing but the Will of God that successively preserves this Body in many places The transferring of a Body not being its Action or Moving Power but the effect of its Moving Power Most Divines likewise say That the Action of Second Causes differs not from the Action whereby God concurs with them For although they understand it variously they suppose that God acts in the Greatures in the same Action with the Creatures And they are it seems obliged to speak thus For if the Creatures acted by an Action which God did not produce in them their Action considered as such would as it appears to me be independant Now they believed as they ought that the Creatures depended immediately upon God not only as to their Being but also as to their Operation So in respect to Free Causes I believe that God continually gave the Mind an impression towards Good in general and that he also determined this impression towards particular Goods by the Ideas or Sensations he has given us as I have shewn in the First Explanation And 't is the same Thing with what the Divines believe when they say That God moves and prevents our Wills So that the power which puts our Minds in motion is the Will of God which animates and inclines us towards Good For God created not Beings to make them the Moving power of Minds for the same Reason that he did not create any to make them the Moving power of Bodies The Wills of God being Efficacious of themselves it is enough for him to Will a Thing to have it done And it is useless unnecessarily to multiply Beings Besides whatever is real in the determinations of our Motions likewise proceeds from the Action of God in us as is clear from the First Explanation Now we neither Act or produce any Thing but by our Wills I mean by the impression of the Will of God which is our Moving power For our Wills are Efficacious no farther than as they proceed from God even as Bodies put in motion impell not others but in as much as they have a Moving power which transfer them and this Moving power is only the Will of God which creates or successively preserves them in different places Then we Act only by the Concourse of God and our Action considered as Efficacious and capable of producing any Effect differs not from that of God's And is as most Divines say the very same Action Eadem numero Actio Now all the Changes which happen in the World See Suarez l. 1. de concursu Dei cum voluntate c. 1. have no other Natural Cause than the Motion of Bodies and
and gives us Motion and Life nor is it that which covers the Earth with Fruits and Flowers and which supplies us with Food and Nourishment This Philosophy teaches us with the Scripture that it is God only who gives Rain and regulates the Seasons who gives Nourishment to the Body and fills the Heart with Joy Acts 14.15 16. Ergo nihil agis ingratissimè Mortalium qui te negas Deo debere sed naturae quia nec natura sine Deo est nec Deus sine natura sed idem est utrumque nec distat Officium si quod à Seneca accipisses Annoeo te diceres debere vel Lucio Non creditorem mutares sed nomen Seneca l. 4. Of Benefits c. 8. Ego Dominus non est alter formans lucem creans tenebras faciens pacem creans malum Ego Dominus ficiens omnia haec Isa 45.7 Amos 3.6 That he only is capable of doing us good and thereby has given us a perpetual Testimony of what he is although in Ages passed he has permitted all Nations to walk in their own ways According to the Language of this Philosophy we must not say That it is Nature that fills us with Good nor that it is God and Nature together But that it is God alone speaking thus without Equivocation that we may not deceive the Simple For we must distinctly acknowledge him the onely Cause of our Happiness if we would make him the onely Object of our Love 'T is likewise an undoubted Truth That we ought to fear such Things as are able to hurt us and fear them in proportion to the Evil they can do us But this Philosophy tells us That it is God alone that can do us Evil that it is he as Isaiah says who creates Darkness as well as Light who makes peace and creates Evil and even that no Evil happens but from him according to the Prophet So that it is him alone we ought to fear We must not fear either Plague or War Famine our Enemies nor even Devils themselves but God alone We ought to fly a Sword when ready to wound us shun Fire and avoid a House that is likely to fall upon us yet must not fear these Things We may fly such Bodies as are Occasional or Natural Causes of Evil but we must fear only God as the True Cause of all Evils and Misfortunes and only hate Sin which necessarily provokes the Cause of all our Happiness to become the Cause of all our Evils And in short all the Motions of our Minds ought to tend only to God since He alone is Superiour to tend only to God since He alone is Superiour to it and the Motions of our Body may relate to those about it This is what we learn from that Philosophy which admits not the Efficacy of Second Causes But this Efficacy being supposed I cannot see but we have some reason to fear and love Bodies And that to regulate our Love according to Reason it is enough to prefer God above every Thing else the First and Universal to Second and Particular Causes Then it is not necessary to love God with all our strength Ex totâ mente ex toto corde ex tota anima ex totis viribus at the Scripture says Yet when we content our selves with preferring God to all other Beings and adore him with a Love of Esteem and Preference without continually endeavouring to honour and love him in all Things it often happens that we deceive our selves that our Charity is dissipated and lost and that we are more taken up with Sensible than the Soveraign Good For if the greatest Sinners and it may be even Idolaters were asked If they preferred not the universal to particular Causes They would not perhaps be afraid in the midst of their Debauches and Extravagancies to Answer That they failed not in so Essential a Duty and knew very well what they owed to God I confess they would deceive themselves but take away the Efficacy of Second Causes and they will have no probable pretext to Justifie their Conduct And if it be supposed they may say this for themselves when their passions blind them and they listen to the Testimony of their Senses Since I am made to be happy I neither can nor ought to forbear loving and respecting whaterver may be the Cause of my Happiness Why therefore should I not love and respect Sensible Objects since they are the True Causes of the Happiness I receive in their Enjoyment I acknowledge the Supream Being is alone worthy of our highest Adoration and I prefer him to every Thing but not seeing that he requires any Thing of me I enjoy the Goods he has given me by the means of Second Causes to which he has subjected me and I pay no Acknowledgments to him which perhaps would dishonour him As he does me no good immediately and by himself or at least without the Assistance of the Creatures it is a sign he does not require my Mind and Heart should be immediately applied to himself or at least he is willing that the Creatures should divide with him the Acknowledgments of my Heart and Mind Since he has communicated a part of his Power and Glory to the Sun has surrounded him with Brightness and Majesty Established him Supream over all his Works and 't is by the Influence of this Great Luminary that we receive all the Necessary Goods of Life Why should we not then employ a part of this Life in enjoying his Light and testifying the sense we have of his Greatness and Benefits Would it not be the utmost Ingratitude to receive the Abundance of all Things from this Excellent Creature and have no Sentiment of Gratitude for it And would it not likewise be an unaccountable blindness and stupidity to have no Motion of respect and fear for him whose absence freezes us to death and who by approaching too near us may burn up and destroy us I say it again that God is preferable to all Things that we must esteem and love him infinitely more than the Creatures but that we must also love and fear them For thereby we honour Him who made them merit his Favours and oblige him to bestow New Benefits upon us It is plain he approves of the Honour we pay his Creatures since he has communicated his Power to them and all Power merits Honour But as Honour ought to be proportioned to Power and that the Power of the Sun and all Sensible Objects is such that from them we receive all sorts of Goods it is just we should honour them with all our strength and next to God consecrate our whole Being to them Thus we naturally reason when we follow the Prejudice we have received from the Efficacy of Second Causes 't is probably after this manner that the first Authors of Idolatry reasoned Here is what he thought of it who is esteemed the most Learned of the Jews He thus begins a Treatise he
wrote about Idolatry In the Days of Enos Men fell into strange Delusions R. Moses Maimonides and the Wise Men of that Time perfectly lost their Sense and Reason Enos himself was in the Number of those deceived Persons These were their Errours Since God said they has created the Stars and the Heavens to govern the World has placed them on high surrounded them with brightness and glory and employes them to exexecute his Orders it is just that we should honour them and pay reverence and homage to them 'T is the Will of our God that we should honour those whom he has raised and exalted in Glory even as a Prince requires we should honour his Ministers in his presence because the Honour we give to them redounds to himself After they had once received this Notion they began to build Temples in honour of the Stars to offer Sacrifices and Praises to them and even prostrate themselves before them thinking thereby to gain the favour of him who created them And this was the original of Idolatry It is so Natural and Just to have Sentiments of Acknowledgment in proportion to the Benefits we receive See Vossius l. 2. de Idolatria that almost all the World have adored the Sun Ipsi qui irridentur Aegyptii nullam belluam nisi ob aliquam utilitatem quam ex ea caperent consecraverant Cic. l. 1. de Natura Deorum because they all thought he was the cause of the Happiness they injoyed And if the Egyptians have adored not only the Sun the Moon and the River Nilus because its overflowings caused the fruitfulness of their Country but also the vilest Animals 't was as Cicero relates because of some benefit they received from them So that as we cannot and indeed ought not to banish out of Mens Minds the inclination they Naturally have for the true Causes of their Happiness it is evident that there is at least some danger in maintaining the Efficacy of Second Causes although we joyn thereto the necessity of an immediate concourse which has I know not what of incomprehensible in it and which comes in as an after-game to justifie our Prejudices and Aristotles Philosophy But there is no danger in speaking only what we know and atributing Power and Efficacy to God alone since we see nothing but his Wills which have an absolute necessary and indispensable connection with Natural Effects I confess that Men are now knowing enough to avoid the gross Errors of the Heathens and Idolaters But I am not afraid to say that our Mind is disposed or rather that our Heart is often inclined like that of the Heathens and that there will alwayes be some kind of Idolatry in the World until the day that Jesus Christ shall again deliver up his Kingdom to God his Father having first destroyed all Empire Power and Dominion that God may be all in all Quorum Deus venter est Phil. 13.9 Omnis fornicator aut immundus aut avarus quod est idolorum servitus Eph. 5.5 In spiritu veritate oportet adorare John 4.24 For is it not a kind of Idolatry to make a God of our Belly as St. Paul speaks Is it not to idolize the God of Riches continually to labour after Worldly Possessions Is this to render to God the Worship due to him to adore him in Spirit and Truth to have our Hearts filled with some sensible Beauty and our Minds dazled with the brightness of some imaginary Grandeur Men believing they receive from the Bodies which are about them the Pleasures they injoy by their use they unite themselves to them with all the Powers of their Soul And thus the principal of their disorder proceeds from the sensible conviction they have of the Efficacy of Second Causes 'T is Reason only that tells them there is none but God acts in them But besides that Reason speaks so low that they can scarcely hear it and the Senses which oppose it cry so loud that it stupifies them they are still confirmed in their Prejudices by Arguments which are so much the more dangerous as they bear external Characters and sensible Marks of Truth The Philosophers and chiefly the Christian Philophers ought continually to oppose Prejudices or the Judgments of the Senses and especially such dangerous ones as that of the Efficacy of Second Causes And yet I know not from what Principle there are some Persons whom I extreamly honour and that with reason who endeavour to confirm this Prejudice and even to make this Doctrine pass for superstitious and extravagant which is so holy pure and solid and maintains that God alone is the true cause of every thing They will not have us love and fear God in all things but love and fear all things in relation to God We ought say they to love the Creatures because they are good to love and respect our Father render honour to our Prince and Superiour since God commands it I don't deny it but I deny that we must love the Creatures as our goods although they be good or perfect in themselves I deny that we are to pay service and respect to Men as to our Masters For we must neither serve our Master obey our Father or Prince with any other design but to serve God and obey him This is what St. Paul sayes who became all things to all Men and complyed in all things for the Salvation of those to whom he Preached Servi obedite Dominis carnalibus cum timore tremore in simplicitate cordis vestri SICVT CHRISTO Non ad oculum servientes quasi omnibus placentes sed ut servi Christi facientes voluntatem Dei ex animo cum bona voluntate servientes SICVT DOMINI ET NON HOMINIBVS And in another Epistle Non ad oculum servientes quasi hominibus placentes sed in simplicitate cordis DEVM TIMENTES Quodcumque facitis ex animo operamini SICVT DOMINO ET NON HOMINIBVS We must therefore obey our Father serve our Prince and render honour to our Superiours AS VNTO GOD AND NOT VNTO MAN Sicut Domini non Hominibus This is clear and can never have any bad consequences Superiours would alwayes be more honoured and better served But I believe I may say that a Master who would be honoured and served as having in himself another Power than that of God must be a Devil and that those who served him under that Notion would be Idolaters for I can't but believe that all Honour and Love that tend not towards God are kinds of Idolatry SOLI DEO HONOR ET GLORIA AN EXPLANATION Of what I have said in the Fourth Chapter of the Second Part Of Method and elsewhere That God acts alwayes with Order and by the most Simple Wayes IT seems to some Persons to be too rash a Conjecture or an abusing of indeterminate and general Terms to say That God acts alwayes with Order and by the most simple wayes in
is Just and Wise that He loves not Disorder that Nature is Corrupted that the Soul of Man is Immortal and the Soul of Beasts is Mortal Because indeed 't is not a Substance distinct from their Bodies Therefore in the Language of Monsieur de la Ville which condemns Men from Consequences which he draws from their Principles the Cartesians may represent him as criminal and all Mankind besides because they believe that Beasts have Souls What would Monsieur de la Ville say if from his own way of Arguing we should accuse him of Impiety because he maintains Opinions from whence we deduce That God is not Just Wise Powerful Sentiments which overthrow Religion which oppose Original Sin which take away the only Demonstration that Reason furnishes us with to prove the Immortality of the Soul What would he say if we should treat him as unjust and cruel for making innocent Souls suffer and even Annihilating them for the Nourishment of Bodies which they Animate He is a Sinner they are innocent 'T is only to nourish his Body that he kills Bodies and Annihilates their Souls which are of more value than bodies Again If his Body could not subsist but by the Flesh of Animals or if the Annihilation of one Soul could make him immortal this Cruelty however unjust it is might perhaps be pardonable but how many Substances wholly innocent does he Annihilate only to preserve for a few days a Body justly condemned to death for sin Would he be so little a Philosopher as to excuse himself upon the Custom of the places where he lives But if his Zeal had carried him to the Indies where the Inhabitants build * Linsch ch 37. Hospitals for Beasts where the Philosophers and many of the best Sort of Men are so charitable even in respect to Flies that for fear of killing them by breathing or walking they wear a fine Cloath before their Mouths and fan the Ways in which they pass would he then be afraid to make innocent Souls suffer or Annihilate them for the preservation of a Sinners Body Would he not rather choose their Opinion who allow the Soul of a Beast to be no more Noble than their Body nor distinct from it and by publishing this Sentiment acquit himself of the Crimes of Cruelty and Injustice whereof these People would accuse him if having the same Principles he followed not their Custom This Example might be sufficient to show That we ought not to treat Men as Heretics and dangerous persons because we may draw impious Consequences from their Principles even when they disavow these Consequences But be it as it will I think it is infinitely more difficult to Answer these Consequences that I have now drawn than these of Monsieur de la Ville The Cartesians would ve very ridiculous if they treated Monsieur de la Ville and other persons who are not of their Opinion as Impious and Heretical 'T is only the Authority of the Church which may decide in Matters of Faith and the Church has not obliged us and probably whatever Consequences shall be drawn from Common Principles will not oblige us to believe That Dogs have a Soul more Noble than their Bodies that they know not their Masters that they neither Fear Desire nor suffer any thing Because it is not necessary that Christians should be instructed in these Truths The Second Proof Almost all Men are perswaded that sensible Objects are true Causes of the Pleasure and Pain which is felt by their means They believe that Fire disperses that agreeable Heat which rejoyces us That Nourishments act in us and give us the agreeable Sensations of Tasts They doubt not but 't is the Sun which ripens Fruits that are necessary for Life and that all Sensible Objects have a Vertue which is proper to them by which they can do us much Good or Evil. Let us see whether we cannot draw from these Principles such Consequences as are contrary to what Religion obliges us to believe A Consequence impugning the First Principle of Morality by which we are obliged to love God with all our Power and to fear him only 'T is a Common Notion according to which all Men act That we should love or fear whatever has Power to do us good or hurt to make us sensible of Pleasure or Pain to make us Happy or Unhappy This is a supposed Principle we ought therefore to love and fear them This is a Reasoning which all the World Naturally makes and which is yet a general Principle of the Corruption of Manners It is evident by Reason and the first of Gods Commandments that all the Motions of our Soul whether Love or Fear Desire or Joy should tend towards God and that all the Motions of our Body should be regulated and determined by External Objects By the Morion of our Body we may approach to Fruit avoid a Blow fly a Beast that would devour us But we ought to love and fear God only All the Motions of our Soul ought to tend towards him alone We ought to love him with all our Power This is an indispensible Law We can neither love nor fear what is below us without being disordered and corrupted To be afraid of a Beast ready to devour us or to fear the Devil is to do them honour To love Fruit to desire Riches to rejoyce in the Heat of the Sun as if it were the true Cause thereof nay even to love ones Father Protectour Friend as if they were capable of doing as good this is to give them that honour which is due to God only We must not love any one in this sense 'T is permitted and we ought to love our Neighbour by wishing or procuring for him as a Natural or Occasional Cause whatever may conduce to his Happiness but not otherwise We must love our Brethren not as capable of doing us good but as of enjoying with us the true Good These Truths appear evident to me but Men strangely obscure them when they suppose that Bodies which are about us can act in us as true Causes Indeed the greatest part of Christian Philosophers pretend that Creatures can do nothing if God did not concur to their Action and so Sensible Objects cannot act in us without the Efficacy of the First Cause We ought neither to fear nor love them but God only on whom all things depend This Explication shows Men condemn the Consequences which I have drawn from their Principle But if I should say with Monsieur de la Ville that 't is a slight of Philosophers to cover their Impiety if I should charge them with the crime of maintaining at the expence of Religion Aristotles Opinions and the Prejudices of their Senses if by examining their Heart I should impute to them a secret desire of debauching Mens Morals by the defence of a Principle which justifies all sorts of disorders and opposes the first Principle of Christian Morality by the Consequences