Selected quad for the lemma: cause_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
cause_n	body_n	nature_n	soul_n	2,893	5	5.2542	4	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A21003	The moral philosophie of the Stoicks. Written in French, and englished for the benefit of them which are ignorant of that tongue. By T.I. fellow of New-Colledge in Oxford; Philosophie morale des stoïques. English	Du Vair, Guillaume, 1556-1621.; Epictetus. Manual.; James, Thomas, 1573?-1629.	1598 (1598)	STC 7374; ESTC S100004	56,994	220

well rigged and furnished with all necessaries hauing winde at wil and seas fauourable Therefore we will heere conclude this poynt thus Seeing that the happines of man doth lye in procuring of his good and that his good is to li●e according vnto nature and to liue according vnto nature is not to bee troubled with any passions or perturbations of the minde but so to behaue himself happen what happen may as that he do not exceed patience or passe the bounds of reason that if wee will bee truelie happie we must purge our minds of all manner of passions learne how to be affected in minde towards all things which shall happen Now there is nothing which can so soone set vs in this way and learne vs how to obtaine the right course of ordering our affections mindes and wils according vnto reason as Wisedome which is in my simple opinion both the beginning and end of all vertues For causing vs to haue an exact and true knowledge of the condition and qualitie of things which come into our considerations viewes she teacheth and telleth vs what is according vnto nature and what not and like wise what is to be desired and followed or shunned and auoyded She remoues al false opinions out of our heads which trouble our braines makes our affections kind and naturall and finally vpon her waite all other vertues as being their mother nurse and keeper O how happie would mans life bee if it were alwayes led and guided by her direction But alas as this vertue is most faire and excellent so she is most rare and hard to be found for she is so hidden in the bottome of our mindes as the veynes of gold lye secret in the bowels of the earth and are found but in few places This is as I bele●ue that great stately and impenetrable buckler which Vulcan forged for Achilles wherein were ingrauen heauen earth the sea clowdes starres lightnings cities weapons assemblies of people and combats and in a word there was nothing in the world which was not there to bee seene signifying vnto vs by that deuice that wisedome the true knowledge of things doth better preserue the minde of man from danger then the buckler or helmet doth keep the bodie from wounds But as Achilles went to schoole vnto Chiron to learne the vse of that buckler so we must go to schoole to Philosophy to know the right vse of wisedoome And if wee will hearken vnto her she will tell vs that wisedome hath two properties and vses the one to prick vs forward to that which is good the other to pull vs backe from following that which is euil Now because when we come vnto Philosophie we doe not bring with vs a mind pure and neat but alreadie distempered euilly disposed and possessed with filthie humours and such as are incident vnto the common sort of people because I say wee come vnto her as vnto a skilfull leach or cunning phisition therefore if we will bee cured wee must doe as surgeons doe which haue to doe with sores and wounds who before they apply any medicine or salue to cure them doe first draw out all the bad humours and dead flesh and so must we also in like manner begin first of all to purge our minds of all such passions as doe arise in them and with the smoke of them darken and obscure the eye of reason for otherwise precepts of manners and wholesome instructions would profite our soules as little as plentie of meate doth a corrupted bodie which the more you feede the more you offend Now to know what these passions are you must vnderstande that we doe terme them a viol●nt or vehement motion of the soule in the sensitiue part which is caused in the following or eschuing of that which seemeth to be either good or euill For albeit there be but one soule in euery one of vs which is the cause of life fountaine of all our actions and is all in all and all in ●uery part yet there bee many faculties in the soule which it is straunge to see how diuers yea how contrari● they be many times one towards another according vnto the diuersitie of instruments and vessels where it is kept and varietie of obiects which are offered vnto her In one place she causeth vegetation in another motion in another sence in another desire or appetite in another imagination in another remembrance in another reason and discourse euen as the Sunne which though he bee all in his owne essence yet diuiding and parting his beames in diuers places he bringeth heat to one place and light to another softeneth waxe and hardens clay scattereth the clowds and drieth vp standing pooles and lakes And when the parts where the soule lieth inclosed doc retaine and vse her but in a proportion of their capacities and as farr● foorth as it is necessarie for their conuenient vse then she bringeth foorth gentle sweet and orderly effects but contrariwise if her parts doe take mor● heate and motion then is requisite and conuenient you shall haue cleane cōtrary operations such as will proue very hurtful and preiudiciall vnto the soule and right so for all the world fareth it with the Sunne who as long as his beames do wanderabroad according vnto their naturall and wonted libertie doe gently and moderatly heate the earth but if they be gathered and knit together in the hollow of a burning Christall they doe burne and ●●nsume that which they were wont before to cherish and quicken Now it hath pleased nature to grant vnto sence this power and strength which commeth from the soule to applie it selfe vnto things and extract their formes and afterwards either to choose or refuse them as they shall best please or displease him and agree or disagree with his nature And this is done for two reasons one because they should be in stead of sentinels vnto the bodie still watching and warding for his good the other which is a principall cause indeede because they should bee messengers and vantcouriers from the soueraigne and chiefest part of the soule and also serue for ministers and instruments of bettering our discourse and reason But as she hath alotted them this power and authoritie so she doth most straitly will and command them to cōtent themselues with their office which is to call to mind things past thereupon to aduise themselues what is best to be done not presuming or daring to disquiet the higher and stronger faculties or breede any further vprore or confusion For so it falleth out many times in an armie that the watch because they know not the purpose of the Generall whose direction they should follow may be deceiued and take the enemie comming vnto them disguised for friends and their friends which come in good will to succour and relieue them for enemies and euen so the sences because they cannot throughly conceiue and comprehend thinges appertaining vnto reason as being

aboue their reach are beguiled with shew and appearance of thinges and doe oft times iudge that for a friend vnto vs which is our greatest aduersarie And so whilest they presently rush forward without staying or looking for any commandement from reason they prouoke and stir vp that part of the soule where concupiscence and anger dooth lodge whereby springeth such a ●umult hurly burly in the mind that reason during this furie can not bee heard nor vnderstanding o●eied no more thē lawes or Magistrates are regarded in a state rent and torne with euill dissention But in this trouble the passions which doe waxe most mutinous and troublesome vnto the quiet rest of the spirit doe first arise in the appetible or concupiscible parte that is to say in that place where the soule doth exe●cise this facultie of desiring or reiecting things presented vnto her as being things proper or contrary vnto her welfare and preseruation So then their first moouing and springing is vpon a shew and apparance or imagination of some good or euill Now if it be of some present good which she doth alreadie begin to possesse wee call this motion by the name of ple●sure but if it bee of some good ●o come which is as yet farre estranged from vs we call it desire ●f it be of a present euill the inco●uenience and griefe whereof we doe alreadie feele being moued and incensed against another we call it hatred or horror and being moued within our selues discontentednes which if it happen vpon occasion of any thing which concernes vs we call it sorrow if by reason of another mans euill pitie if by occasion of an apparant good where wee pretend a part ielousie if otherwise enuie Againe to fall backe vnto the second part of our second generall diuision if it be of some after ensuing euill it is rightly termed by the name of feare See here the first band of these seditious passions which so much trouble the quiet rest of our soule which are accōpanied with most daungerous effects and yet nothing like so daungerous as are those which follow after For why these first motions being bred and formed in that part by meanes of the obiect which presents it selfe doe passe foorth incontinentlie vnto the irascible part of y e mind that is to say to the place where the soule seekes al meanes possible of obtayning or auoyding that which seeme●h vnto ●er good or euill And then foort●with as a wheele which is alreadie mou●d being to receiue a fresh motion is carried about with greater swiftnes so the minde being moo●ed with the first apprehension hauing a second strength added vnto the former is whirled about with greater violence then before and stirres vp more strong and vntameable passions because they are doubled and coupled with the former and so being ioyned together doe stay and strengthen one another with mutuall helpe and consent For the first passions which are found of the obiect of some imagined or seeming good considering with themselues of the meanes how to obtaine and acquire it do stirre vp in vs either hope or despayre but those affections which are made of the obiect of some seeming euill doe bring forth feare and anger which foure passions are wonderfullie strong and violent and doe wholly ouerturne the frame of reason which they finde alreadie tottering Heere beholde and marke the foure winds as I verely suppose from whence spring the cruell tempests of our soules Their den from whence they come is nothing els as hath been alreadie shewed you but a false imagination which wee haue that those things which are presented vnto vs are either good or euill For by this meanes attributing that qualitie vnto them which indeede is not in them wee flye or follow after them with vehemencie and this is the very originall and spring of these passions Well then to stoppe this den assure the rest of our soules and prouide that they be not otherwise moued then it is meete for them to bee let vs call to minde that which was proued vnto vs in the very beginning and entrance into this discourse To wit that the good of a man and the perfection of his nature consisteth in the disposing and fashioning of his will to the right vse of things according vnto reason and contrariwise that his euill commeth from a disordered or vnskilfull vsing or rather abusing of them For by the first hee shall reape much profite receiue much content and quietnes and chance what chance nay he may set vp his rest and remain as stable andimmoueable as a rocke in the middest of the sea by the second euery small thing that chaunceth will trouble him and turne to his great griefe and disaduantage Now this disposition of our will lieth whollie in our power and consequently our good and euill Wherefore if at anytime there be presented vnto vs any obiect to the endethat we may not be troubled at all as with some good or euill which doth follow vs let vs consider whether the thing which happeneth be in our power or no. If it bee in our power well and good it may bee good or ill vnto vs. And yet in this case too wee must not be too passionaetly affected in any sort for if we can but moderate and guide our willes aright we shall make it good and so continue it still If it be out of our power then it is neither good nor euill and consequently wee ought not to seeke or prouide it Now the things which are in our power are these to approue vndertake desire and eschue a matter and in a word all our actions For our will hath authoritie and power to rule and gouerne them according vnto reason till they come vnto the place from whence our good and happinesse must come As for example sake she is able to dispose our opinion so that it yeeld not consent but to that which it is meete it should and which shall bee examined either by sence or reason that shee shal cleaue fast vnto things which are euidently true of themselues and keepe her selfe in suspence in things doubtfull and vtterly reiect thinges which are of themselues plainly vntrue and false Besides shee can so rule our desire that it shall follow after nothing but that which is agreeable with nature and eschue the contrarie The things which are out of our power are these our riches reputation and briefly that which doth no way depend of our willes and here if any thing doe happen wee may not say that it is contrarie to our natures because it happeneth either by the vniuersall and continuall order of things and ordinary co●tinuance of causes and therefore should not seeme strange vnto vs or els commeth to passe by some particular prouidence so ordering it and then we must know that nature hath made vs subiect thereunto Furthermore she hath giuen vs a power and abilitie in the soule of well vsing and applying our selues to all