Selected quad for the lemma: cause_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
cause_n	body_n	nature_n	reason_n	1,625	5	4.6916	4	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A35750	Six metaphysical meditations wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body / written originally in Latin by Renatus Des-Cartes ; hereunto are added the objections made aganst these meditations by Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury with the authors answers ; all faithfully translated into English with a short account of Des-Cartes's life by William Molyneux.; Meditationes de prima philosophia. English	Descartes, René, 1596-1650.; Molyneux, William, 1656-1698.; Hobbes, Thomas, 1588-1679. Objections made against these meditations.	1680 (1680)	Wing D1136; ESTC R1345	67,590	180

violently and more than ordinarily moved that motion of them being propagated through the Medulla Spinalis of the Back to the inward parts of the Brain there it signifies to the mind that something or other is to be felt and what is this but Pain as if it were in the Foot by which the Mind is excited to use its indeavours for removing the Cause as being hurtful to the Foot But the Nature of Man might have been so order'd by God that That same motion in the Brain should represent to the mind any other thing viz. either it self as 't is in the Brain or it self as it is in the Foot or in any of the other forementioned intermediate parts or lastly any other thing whatsoever but none of these would have so much conduced to the Conservation of the Body In the like manner when we want drink from thence arises a certain dryness in the Throat which moves the Nerves thereof and by their means the inward parts of the Brain and this motion affects the mind with the sense of thirst because that in this case nothing is more requisite for us to know then that we want drink for the Preservation of our Health So of the Rest. From all which 't is manifest that notwithstanding the infinite Goodness of God 't is impossible but the Nature of Man as he consists of a mind and body should be deceivable For if any cause should excite not in the Foot but in the Brain it self or in any other part through which the Nerves are continued from the Foot to the Brain that self same motion which uses to arise from the Foot being troubled the Pain would be felt as in the Foot and the sense would be naturally deceived for 't is consonant to Reason seeing that That same motion of the Brain alwayes represents to the mind that same sense and it oftner proceeds from a cause hurtful to the Foot than from any other I say 't is reasonable that it should make known to the mind the Pain of the Foot rather than of any other part And so if a dryness of Throat arises not as 't is used from the necessity of drink for the conservation of the Body but from an unusual Cause as it happens in a Dropsie 't is far better that it should then deceive us then that it should alwayes deceive us when the Body is in Health and so of the Rest. And this consideration helps me very much not only to understand the Errors to which my Nature is subject but also to correct and avoid them For seeing I know that all my Senses do oftener inform me falsly than truely in those things which conduce to the Bodies advantage and seeing I can use almost alwayes more of them than one to Examine the same thing as also I can use memory which joyns present and past things together and my understanding also which hath already discovered to me all the causes of my Errors I ought no longer to fear that what my Senses daily represent to me should be false But especially those ●xtravagant Doubts of my First Meditation are to be turn'd off as ridiculous and perticularly the chief of them viz. That * of not distingui●hing Sleep from Waking for now I plainly discover a great difference between them for my Dreams are never conjoyned by my memory with the other actions of my life as whatever happens to me awake is and certainly if while I were awake any person should suddenly appear to me and presently disappear as in Dreams so that I could not tell from whence he came or where he went I should rather esteem it a Sp●ctre or Apparition feign'd in my Brain then a true Man but when such things occur as I distinctly know from whence where and when they come and I conjoyn the perception of them by my memory with the other Accidents of my life I am certain they are represented to me waking and not asleep neither ought I in the least to doubt of their Truth if after I have called up all my senses memory and understanding to their Examination I find nothing in any of them that clashes with other truths For God not being a Deceiver it follows that In such things I am not deceived But because the urgency of Action in the common occurrences of Affairs will not alwayes allow time for such an accurate examination I must confess that Mans life is subject to many Errors about perticulars so that the infirmity of our Nature must be acknowledged by Us. FINIS ADVRTISEMENET CONCERNING THE OBJECTIONS AMong seven Parcels of Objections made by Divers Learned Persons against these Meditations I have made choise of the Third in the Latine Copy as being Penn'd by Thomas Hobbs of Malmesbury a Man famously known to the World abroad but especially to his own the English Nation and therefore 't is likely that what comes from Him may be more acceptable to his Countrymen then what proceeds from a Stranger and as the strength of a Fortification is never better known then by a Forcible Resistance so fares it with these Meditations which stand unshaken by the Violen● Opposition of so Potent an Enemy And yet it must be Confess'd that the Force of these Objections and Cogency of the Arguments cannot be well apprehend●d by those who are not versed in other Pieces of Mr. Hobbs's Philosophy especially His Book De Corpore and De Homine The former whereof I am sure is Translated into English and therefore not Impertinently refer'd to Here in a Disc●urse to English Readers And this is the Reason that makes the Great Des-Cartes pass over many of these Objections so slightly VVho certainly would have Undermined the whole Fabrick of the Hobbian Philosophy had he but known upon VVhat Foundations it was Built OBJECTIONS Made against the Foregoing MEDITATIONS BY THE FAMOUS THOMAS HOBBS Of MALMESBURY WITH DES-CARTES'S ANSWERS OBJECT I. Against the First Meditation Of things Doubtful 'T IS evident enough from What has been said in this Meditation that there is no sign by Which we may Distinguish our Dreams from True 〈…〉 Phantasmes which we have waking and from our Senses are not accidents inhering in Outward Objects neither do they Prove that such outward Objects do Exist and therefore if we trust our Senses without any other Ground we may well doubt whether any Thing Be or Not We therefore acknowledge the Truth of this Meditation But Because Plato and other Antient Philosophers argued for the same incertainty in sensible Things and because 't is commonly Observed by the Vulgar that 't is hard to Distinguish Sleep from Waking I would not have the most excellent Author of such new Thoughts put forth so antique Notions ANSWER Those Reasons of Doubt which by this Philosopher are admitted as true were proposed by Me only as Probable and I made use of them not that I may vend them as new but partly that I may prepare the Minds of my

Appetites and Affections in It and for I● and lastly I perceived pleasure and Pain in its Parts and not in any other Without it But why from the sense of Pain a certain Grief and from the sense of plea●ure a certain Ioy of the Mind should arise or Why that Gnawing of the stomach Which I call Hunger should put me in mind of Eating or the driness of my Throat of Drinking I can give no other Reason but that I am taught so by Nature For to my thinking there is no A●●inity or ●ikeness between that Gnawing of the Stomach and the desire of Ea●ing or between the sense of Pain and the sorrowful thought from thence arising But in this as in all other judgments that I made of sensible objects I seem'd to be taught by Nature for I first perswaded my self that things were so or so before ever I enquired into a Reason that may prove it But afterwards I discover'd many experiments The Reasons why I doubt my senses wherein my senses so grosly deceived me that I would never trust them again for Towers which seem'd Round a far off nigh at hand appear'd square and large Statue● on their tops seem'd small to those that stood on the ground and in numberless other things I perceived the judgements of my outward senses were deceived and not of my outward only but of my inward senses also for what is more intimate or inward than Pain And yet I have heard from those whose Arm or Leg was cut off that they have felt pain in that part which they wanted and therefore I am not absolutely certain that any part of me is affected with pain tho I feel pain therein To these I have lately added two very general Reasons of doubt Medit. 1. The first was that while I was awake I could not believe my self to perceive any thing which I could not think my self sometimes to perceive tho I were a sleep And seeing I cannot believe that what I seem to perceive in my sleep proceeds from outward Objects what greater Reason have I to think so of what I perceive whilst I am awake The other Cause of Doubt was that seeing I know not the Author of my Being or at least I then supposed my self not to know him what reason is there but that I may be so ordered by Nature as to be deceived even in those things which appear'd to me most true And as to the Reasons which induced me to give credit to sensible Things 't was easie to return an answer thereto for finding by experience that I was impelled by Nature to many Things which Reason disswaded me from I thought I should not far trust what I was taught by Nature And tho the perceptions of my senses depended not on my Will I thought I should not therefore conclude that they proceeded from Objects different from my self for perhaps there may be some other Faculty in me tho as yet unknown to me which might frame those perceptions But now that I begin better to know my self and the Author of my Original How far the senses are now to be trusted I do not think that all things which I seem to have from my senses are rashly to be admitted neither are all things so had to be doubted And first because I know that whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive may be so made by God as I perceive them the Power of understanding clearly and distinctly one Thing without the other is sufficient to make Me certain that One Thing is different from the Other because it may at least be placed apart by God and that it may be esteem'd different it matters not by what Power it may be so sever'd And therefore from the knowledge I have that I my self exist and because at the same time I understand that nothing else appertains to my Nature or Essence but that I am a thinking Being I rightly conclude that my Essence consists in this alone that I am a thinking Thing And tho perhaps or as I shall shew presently 't is certain I have a Body which is very nighly conjoyned to me yet because on this side I have a clear and distinct Idea of my self as I am only a thinking Thing not extended and on the other side because I have a distinct Idea of my Body as it is onely an extended thing not thinking 't is from hence certain that I am really distinct from my Body and that I can exist without it Moreover I find in my self some Facult●es endow'd with certain peculiar waies of thinking such as the Faculty of Imagination the Faculty of Perception or sense without which I can conceive my whole self clearly and distinctly but changing the phrase I cannot conceive those Faculties without conceiving My self that is an understanding substance in which they are for none of them in their formal Conception includes understanding from whence I perceive they are as different from me as the modus or manner of a Thing is different from the Thing it self I acknowledge also that I have several other Faculties such as changing of place putting on various shapes c. Which can no more be understood without a substance in which they are then the foremention'd Faculties and consequently they can no more be understood to Exist without that substance But yet 't is Manifest that this sort of Faculties to the End they may exist ought to be in a Corporeal Extended and not in a Vnderstanding substance because Extension and not Intellection or Vnderstanding is included in the Clear and Distinct conception of them But there is also in me a certain Passive Faculty of sense or of Receiving and Knowing the Ideas of sensible Things of which Faculty I can make no use unless there were in my self or in something else a certain Active Faculty of Producing and Effecting those Ideas But this cannot be in my self for it Pre-supposes no Vnderstanding and those Ideas are Produced in me tho I help not and often against my Will There remains therefore no Place for this Active Faculty but that it should be in some substance different from me In which because all the Reallity which is contain'd Objectively in the Ideas Produced by that Faculty ought to be contain'd Formally or Eminently as I have Formerly taken notice this substance must be either a Body in which what is in the Ideas Objectively is contain'd Formally or it Must Be God or some Creature more excellent then a Body In which what is in the Ideas Objectively is contain'd Eminently But seeing that God is not a Deceivour 't is altogether Manifest that he does not Place these Ideas in me either Immediately from himself or Mediately from any other Creature wherein their Objective Reallity is not * contain'd Formally but only Eminently And seeing God has given me no Faculty to discern Whether these Ideas proceed from Corporeal or Incorporeal Beings but rather a strong Inclination to believe that