who thus suppose a Corporeal God do also suppose a Corporeal Soul Thus from the Knowledge of our Selves we come to the Knowledge of the Divine Nature 3. From hence also we come to the Knowledge of the true Nature of the Divine worship that seeing we consist of Soul and Body therefore must we offer both to God as our reasonable Service for external Solemnity and outward performances are not to be excluded out of the Divine Worship First Because those immoderate pretences to Spirituality are either the natural causes or necessary results of Enthusiasm and Fanaticism Secondly By excluding those outward decent Testimonies of our inward Devotion towards God we give occasion of Scandal to Heathens and those that are without for they would be apt either to entertain low and mean thoughts themselves or at least think that we did so of that God whom we for ought they perceiv'd did so rudely worship But then on the other hand we must have a more especial regard to the Soul for without this all our other performances are nothing but mere formality and hypocrisy CHAP. II. Of Man as compounded of Soul and Body WHAT was the State and Condition of the Soul before its Union with the Body whether it enjoy'd any State of Praeexistence or was then first created when first put into the Body or if it did praeexist then in what manner whether in a pure separation from all matter or in conjunction with an etherial Vehicle is not my design here to examine only 't is observable that in things of this Nature where inclination rather than any cogent Reasons of belief take place in things where Providence hath not thought fit to give us a certain or determinate truth of things there Men are usually determin'd to this or that side of the question by very accidental considerations as in this case of Praeexistence by the more or less favourable apprehensions they may have receiv'd of the Platonick or Peripatetick Philosophy or by those previous notions they have entertain'd of Providence to which they think this or that Opinion may seem more agreeable Nor Secondly shall I consider Man in his Natural or Physical capacity that which I here design being an Essay of Moral or Political rather than of Natural Philosophy I shall not here enquire into the more explicable modes of Sensation or Intellection much less shall I attempt to explain those natural Mysteries of Humane Nature viz. The particular mode of the Souls union with the Body being discouraged therefrom by the difficulties of the thing and the unsuccessful attempts of some who have endeavoured to effect it Claubergius hath a discourse particularly de conjunctione Anime Corporis but whether he has left it any whit more plain and intelligible than he found it I shall submit it to the judgment of those who will take the pains to peruse it His way is this The Soul says he is united to the Body by those mutual actions that pass betwixt 'em but more especially by those more confused operations of sense and by the less distinct perceptions of mind And in his 37th chap. he tells us that homo alius alio idem seipso diver so tempore magis minúsve homo censeri debet For according to him the denomination of a Man as such consists chiefly in such an union of the Soul and Body which is more especially perform'd by the operations of Sense Now I see not why that especially should denominate us men wherein we come the nearest to the nature of Brutes nor is there any reason why a Contemplative Person one who enjoys a more quick and lively exercise of his higher faculties why such a one should not be counted as much yea more a Man than he that lives more by sense That the Soul doth make use more especially of the Body and Bodily representations in these actions of sense is very true but if we enquire farther how it is joyned to the Body even in these more confused operations the difficulty would perhaps still return Nor shall I here dispute whether the Soul immediately upon the dissolution of the whole Frame or of the more principal Parts of the Body doth thereupon by its own activity quit its station and launch into those other unknown Regions or whether besides this there be not also requir'd which seems as probable as immediate an act of God to take it out as there was to put it into the Body only we may observe that God both by the light of Nature and his reveal'd Law hath made the union of the Soul and Body so sacred that it now becomes absolutely unlawful for us by laying violent hands upon our selves to separate those whom God hath thus strictly joyned together that whatever natural tye it is under as to the Body 't is certain it ought not to quit its Station without a lawful Warrant from its great Commander I shall here rather state the question betwixt the Stoicks and Epicureans and show their several errors and mistakes on either hand the one by ascribing too little to the Body and too much to the Soul the other by attributing too much to the Body and too little to the Soul in the Accounts they give of humane Nature The Stoicks would make Man so wholly rational that they will scarce allow him to be sensible and would wholly exclude all natural affections and bodily passions out of humane Nature and the Epicureans on the contrary make all the most noble Actions of the Soul meerly subservient to the designs of such Pleasure as is really below the true happiness of the Soul By the Body here I understand all those passions and affections of the mind which belong to Men more immediately upon account of the Body all those motions and inclinations of the inferiour appetites so far as they are natural The Design therefore of the Stoicks to root these Passions out of Humane Nature is First impossible Secondly it would be prejudicial thereunto were it feisible for these when duly regulated become the subject matter of moral Vertue and also add Vigour and Wings to the Soul in its pursuits of Vertue Among the many charges brought against Stoicism that of Pride and Arrogance seems the most obvious and the most unanswerable it naturally tending to beget such haughty thoughts of ones self as are indeed inconsistent with the State and Nature of a frail and depending Creature What a prodigious thing do they make their Wise Man far above any thing that is called Mortal and in some respects equal to God himself As for Repentance they look upon that as a mean thing far below the height of their attainments Innocence indeed is better than Repentance but for them to pretend unto it argues a great deal of Pride founded upon a bad understanding of their own State But this description which they give of a Wise Man is of some thing which perhaps they may fancy in their minds but
the Being of God is not to be proved either by any Original Tradition or by any Natural Impressions made upon Men's Minds but only by external Arguments drawn from the Nature of things and from the Nature of Man that is from the consideration of his Soul and Body not supposing or including any such Natural Notices I do not here go about to oppose any Arguments brought to support and defend the Cause of God and Religion in the World Valeant quantùm valere possunt Only when their Authors would monopolize all the force of Argument to their own way of arguing and absolutely reject all the rest this I think is to give our Adversaries advantage over us Thus that Ingenious Gentleman Mr. Tyrrell in his late Book p. 197. tells us That the knowledge of the Being of God is clearly and without difficulty to be read from the great Book of the Creation without any assistance from natural Impressions and he cites Rom. 1. 19 20. Because that which is known of God is manifest in them for God hath shewed it unto them for the invisible things of him from the Creation of the World are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made even his Eternal Power and Godhead Where he says The Apostle appeals to the common reason of Mankind guided by things without us for the proof of a Deity But it doth not appear from hence that he draws his Argument meerly from things without us for the 19th Verse seems as clearly to relate to those inward Impressions made upon our Minds as the 20th doth to the outward Creation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is manifest in them I know that Preposition 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is sometimes render'd inter but when the proper and natural signification of words may be kept why should we look for another For the invisible things of him from the Creation By Creation here is neither meant the things created nor the Act of Creation but only it relates to the time thereof From the Creation that is ever since the Creation by which says Dr. Hammond it appears That there is no necessity of interpreting God's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his Doings or Actions here of the Works of Creation that is solely but of all things that from time to time to this inclusively have been done in the World by him and so it will be extended to all the Doctrines and Miracles and Actions of Christ the whole business of the Gospel Nay I may add that even those natural Impressions upon the Minds of Men may be meant by God's 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 here mention'd Even his Eternal Power and Godhead 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The first may refer to his Omnipotence in Creating the Material World The other 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to the more Divine Constitution of Spiritual and Intellectual Beings CHAP. V. Of the State of Nature that it is neither a State of Equality nor a State of War I Shall here by way of Introduction to this Chapter briefly take notice of what Mr. Hobbs tells us in Chap. 4. of his Leviathan concerning Speech and the particular uses of it viz. that it is for the acquiring of Arts and the improvement of Knowledge to convey to others that skill which we have attain'd to our selves and to communicate to them our Counsels and Resolutions that so we may have the mutual help and advice of one another but now how can these Uses be applyed to that cross-grain'd state of Nature which he has describ'd to be nothing but a State of Fraud and Violence What place is there for Arts and Sciences What room for friendly counsel and kind advice in a state where all are Enemies to one another where what counsel we give to others ought rather in reason to be suspected seeing therein we design nothing but our own advantage Why should we desire or hope for the assistance of others seeing there we design nothing but by force or fraud to supplant all we deal with and by degrees to draw 'em into their own ruine Now Speech must be suppos'd in the State of Nature for without it he tells us there could be no entering into Societies no Compacts no transferring of Rights per verba in praesenti In the same Chapter also he tells us how necessary it is for those who aspire to knowledge to be strict in fixing the true sense of Words and framing true Definitions in examining those of former Authors and either to correct 'em when deficient or to make new ones themselves Therefore he says in Geometry which is the most accurate Science Men begin with setling the significations of their words which setling of Significations they call Definitions and place 'em at the beginning of their work Now it had been well if Mr. Hobbs had practis'd his own rule and that in one of the most considerable Instances of his Moral Philosophy that is if he had at first given us a perfect definition of that word so oft made use of in his Writings Nature and had fix'd the Significations of those Expressions Naturally and by Nature Which he could not well have done without distinguishing it into pure and primitive and into corrupt and depraved Nature Which he having no where done it has occasion'd a great deal of obscurity and uncertainty in all his Discourses relating thereunto which if he had done in all probability it would have put an end to many of those Controversies which were perhaps at first begun and afterwards continued by the want of it 'T is true he has given us several Senses and Acceptations of these words but yet has been so far from setling and fixing their Significations as he calls it that he has rather left them still in greater uncertainty especially in those other places where they are mentioned singly without any intimation at all in what sense they are to be taken In his Preface to his Book de Cive where 't is objected that from his Principles it would follow that Men are wicked by Nature This he says does not follow for though Men by Nature that is from their first Birth as they are meer sensible Creatures c. Here Nature must signifie Man as he comes first into the World with respect meerly to his Animal Qualisications which he has in common with other Creatures In the same Preface forasmuch as God over-rules all Rulers by Nature that is by the dictates of Natural Reason here Nature seems to refer rather to the higher than the lower Faculties of the Soul Chap. 1. Paragraph 2. if by Nature one Man should love another that is as Man here Nature seems to refer to Man in his largest extent The Law of Nature he thus defines that it is the dictate of Natural Reason conversant about those things which are either to be done or omitted for the constant preservation of our Life and Members as much as in us lies Here he makes Natural Reason to truckle
the Being of God should either through the shortness of his Meditations or the sublimeness of the Theory make use of an Argument not perfectly conclusive yet seeing the success of the Cause depends not upon it and seeing the Man perhaps has effected as much as he intended by it that is added his Mite to the former Treasury upon the whole matter it seems hard if such an one must be prosecuted as an Atheist or a Betrayer of the Cause of Religion Cicer. de Univers Si fortè de Deorum Naturâ ortuque Mundi disserentes minùs id quod habemus Animo consequimur c. hand sanè erit mirum contentique esse debebitis si probabilia dicentur aequum est enim meminisse me qui disseram hominem esse vos qui judicetis ut si probabilia dicentur nè quid ultra requiratis Among the many Arguments brought to prove the Being of God these two seem the most considerable First That comprehensive one which is drawn from the Being of the World whereby I understand not only the Divine Power of creating or producing something out of nothing but that admirable Wisdom also that appears in making it such as it is and in the proper subserviencies of things therein to their respective Ends That Argument further which is drawn not only from the Material but the Intellectual Universe not only from the structure of the Body but the Nature of the Soul Secondly That which is drawn from the Consent and universal Acknowledgment of all Nations As for that which seems Aristotle's Opinion That the World was from Eternity and yet that it was in Nature of an Effect in respect of God the Cause it will be impossible to free this Assertion either from a Contradiction or from an unworthy reflection upon the Excellency of the Divine Nature For if God as a Cause was in time antecedent to the World then it is a contradiction to say it was from Eternity If it did flow from God as an Emanative Effect as the Beams from the Sun then this destroys the chiefest Perfection of the Divine Nature viz. its Liberty And this seems one of the best Arguments to prove That the World neither was nor could be from Eternity and it will be very hard if once we give our Adversaries leave to suppose it to be Eternal by any other Argument to force 'em out of their Opinion For I do not see that it would be any absurdity to say That supposing the World to be Eternal there has been as many Years as Days that is an equal Infinite number of both all Infinites being Equal for Infinity can no more be exhausted by Years than Days if it could then it would not be what it is in its own nature inexhaustible But the truth is such is the nature of Infinite with respect to our Finite Capacity that the one is not a Competent Iudge of the other and when we enter into disputes of this nature we are often entangled with unanswerable difficulties on both sides But the Atheist tells us That all this visible Universe the Heavens the Earth and all Mankind at first were the lucky hits of blind Chance which after almost infinite successless Tryals going before did at last happen upon these admirable and excellent Structures particularly those of humane Bodies But here we must know that according to these Principles the same Chance which first made us must still continue us But then how comes it to pass that Chance is so regular and constant in its Productions since That whereas it is above ten thousand to one according to these Principles but that Mankind long ere this must have wholly ceased to have been or else nothing but Monsters have been produced instead hereof we see a very regular and orderly course of Nature generally observed This is as if a Man should be a thousand years in casting all sizes upon six Dice and then for a thousand years after to throw nothing else if we could suppose a Mans Life to last so long Whoever can believe such strange things as these ought never to blame any one for being over credulous As for that other Argument drawn from the consent of Mankind there are some who tell us That those natural Impressions of God upon the minds of Men upon which this universal consent is founded are mere imaginary things and that there is no need of 'em in our disputes against Atheism But these Men might do well to consider whether they do not too much oblige the Atheists and go too far towards the betraying the Cause of God and Religion in the World who willingly quit and give up that Argument which hath hitherto been managed with such good success by the best and wisest of Men in all Ages willingly I say to give it up gratis for I verily believe it can never be forc'd and wrested out of the hand of a Christian Philosopher who rightly understands it And why should we grant any thing to an Atheist which may tend to the advantage of his or the prejudice of our own Cause unless he necessarily force it from us by dint of Argument always provided that we readily acknowledge evident Truth whereever we find it First I conceive there neither is nor can be any Argument in a true and proper sense à priore to prove the Being of God that taken from the Idea is not such But it is an arguing from the effect to the Cause only the effect seems a more immediate one and such as bears a more particular resemblance to the Cause That somewhat was from Eternity is evidently demonstrable for if once there was nothing it was impossible for any thing ever to begin to be Now this something must be either Matter or Spirit a thinking or unthinking Being it cannot be an unthinking Being for then it would be impossible that there should be any such thing as Knowledge or Cogitation in the World which yet we are inwardly conscious to our selves of For as Dr. Lock Chap. 10. Book 4. hath well observ'd It is as impossible to conceive that ever bare incogitative matter should produce a thinking intelligent Being as that nothing of it self should produce matter Now it must be either Man that was the first Eternal Being the Creator of all things or some other Being But though the Atheists are not the greatest Wits in the World yet we must not think 'em such very Atheists neither as to make mere Man to set up for a Sovereign Creator Thus we have an Idea or Conception of a Being infinitely more perfect than our selves and therefore we were not the Cause of our own Existence for if we had we should then have given our selves those Perfections which we find wanting in us and conceive in another Therefore we owe our Existence to and dependance upon that Being without us which enjoys all Perfections But now the Question is Whether the Idea be the Cause or occasion
hath justly blam'd in others or that he sometimes draws universal conclusions only from particular observations and sometimes from the meer Fact he insers the jus of a thing and from the more general practice of most men he goes about to justifie that which is not in it self lawful 'T is the Observation of a learned man that a flight and superficial study of Nature and Natural Causes may encline a man to Atheism but a full and perfect understanding of 'em fixes him more firmly in the Principles of Religion and Piety Thus 't is probable that it was only Mr. Hobbs's superficial observation of Human Nature that betray'd him into those mistakes and false notions of it if he had by a profounder study and impartial search enquired into the inward recesses of it he would then have found Man not altogether so void of all natural Principles of Virtue and Goodness as he has represented him His political Principles seem to be founded upon no better or surer grounds than the observation of the vicious Inclinations of some and the prudent and cautious Practices of others because some men are violent and injurious and make no conscience of doing Wrong others are wary and accordingly arm themselves as much as they can against the receiving of any From hence he would infer the State of Nature to be a State of War and all the evil and false consequences that follow thence So that the approbation that his Principles have met withal in the World was the result of Mens vicious Inclinations and natural proneness to believe such Opinions rather than any solid Ground or Reason on which they were founded It might perhaps be some mitigation of his fault herein if by supposing men worse than they were he hereby laid the Foundation of Humility and Amendment But it has been well observed of him that he supposed Men worse than they are and made 'em worse than otherwise they would be thus making 'em more the Children of Wrath than they were by Nature Mr. Hobbs has well observ'd That Arguments seldom work upon Men of Wit and Learning when they have once engaged themselves in a contrary Opinion and that if any thing will do it it is the shewing them the Causes of their Errors I shall accordingly here intimate some few things in general and leave them to thy own consideration whether they might not be some ways influential either as Causes or Occasions of his Mistakes And first Has he not digged for Principles out of his own Fancy without consulting the universal Consent of Mankind or the more constant received Opinions of the best and wisest both Moralists and Politicians For the true knowledge of Human Nature doth not consist only in the searching of our selves but it also requires a full and perfect understanding both of Men and Books Thus we ought to consider what the best and wisest Men of all Ages have left upon Record concerning their apprehensions of it and by our own Observations both of our selves and others either more fully confirm or prudently correct what they have deliver'd And though 't is true there may be as it were a mechanical use of Books an enslaving a Man's Reason to his Reading without a due examination or just digestion of what we read into our own Reason and Iudgment yet there are some who have fallen into Mistakes by being more conversant with their own Meditations than with other mens Writings Or if he hath been a great consulter of Authors yet doth he not seem rather afferre quà m auferre sensum doth he not come to 'em with Prejudice and with a Resolution rather to elude than fully to answer their Reasons How doth he sometimes seem to march boldly into his Enemy's Country and leave their greatest strength behind him never regarding to answer the Reasons upon which the contrary Opinion is founded Doth he not seem also to suit his Principles to the Times wherein he writ rather than to the Truth of things yet always in obedience to and pursuance of his own grand Principle os Self-preservation Seems he not sometimes to affect Novelty more than Truth being perhaps more desirous to be the Author of a New Error than the Asserter of an Old Truth In his Introduction to the Leviathan he tells us That there is a Saying much usurped of late That Wisdom is acquired not by reading Books but Men consequently here upon those persons that for the most part can give no other Proof of being Wise take great delight to shew what they think they have read in Man by uncharitable Censures behind their Backs But doth not he himself here lye under his own lash Doth he not seem to please himself in uncharitable censuring of what he thinks but without just grounds he hath read not only in Particular Persons but in Human Nature in general Here we may observe how like the troublesome Fly he is always busie about the Sores of Human Nature not with an intent to cure 'em but to make 'em worse How much more worthy of a Man a Philosopher and a Christian too was M. Antoninus Advice lib. 6. Whensoever thou wouldst rejoyce thy self call to mind the several Gifts and Virtues of those whom thou dost daily converse with viz. the Industry of one the Modesty of another the Liberality of a third c. for nothing can so much rejoyce thee as the Resemblances and Parallels of several Virtues eminent in those that live with thee c. Here we may also observe the many Straits and Difficulties he is sometimes put to in defending his Opinions what inconsistency of Notions and Expressions he is forced to use in making out his Assertions or answering the Objections that are brought against 'em so that sometimes his Notions seem to lye a-cross his Brains as the Cudgels of his natural Statesmen did to each others Heads Thus when 't is objected That if a Son kill the Father in the state of Nature he doth him an injury he answers That we cannot at any time suppose a Son in the state of Nature as being under the power and command of those to whom he owes his Protection as soon as he was born But seeing we cannot suppose the propagation of Mankind any other way than by Father and Son and that there is a natural obligation incumbent on a Son to his Father may we not with more reason say That there never was nor could be such a state of Nature as he describes rather than that therein there can be no Son suppos'd 2. Tho' Sons be under the power and command of those to whom under God they owe their Beings and Preservations doth this take away their Obligations as Sons Do they therefore cease to be Sons because now they are also become Subjects This way of reasoning cannot hold good unless we suppos'd Men in the state of Nature to spring out of the Earth like Mushromes That which at present I would only infer from
motion and agitation of the particles how can any one secure himself or others that a saction of the dissenting Particles for Example or such a motion as causes dissent may not rise up when the nature of the thing requires the contrary assent and by this means erect a Babel in Man and bring all into confusion Further If Cogitation consist only in the various motion and disposition of the Atoms then Phaeton might possibly produce a greater and more undoubted Deity out of his flaming Chariot than that of his Father Phoebus If this Hypothesis be true then Ex quovis ligno fiat Mercurius and the Chair may be as infallible as he that sits in it and this perhaps might gratifie some Men in the World all other methods failing thus to solve Infallibility by mechanick Principles Pardon me if in a ferious argument I thus seem to trifle seeing those I have here to deal withal first taught me the way For herein they seem rather to give an Essay of their own extravagant Fancies than to perswade others that they themselves believe their own Assertions But to return These Men must either assert That there neither is nor can be any such thing as Spirit in the World or if there be that it is impossible for such a being to cogitate neither of which will they be ever able to prove As for the being of a Spirit they do indeed with as much strength of confidence as weakness of Reason tell us that the Notion thereof includes in it a Contradiction tho' this they do not as much as attempt to prove any other way than first by supposing a material Universe and that nothing but matter is contained in it But this is to beg not prove the Question But the Essences of things being unknown the Notion of a Spirit seems as obvious and intelligible as that of matter for we may as easily conceive of one thing to which we attribute cogitation as its immediate property as we do of another to which we ascribe extension and impenetrability And then supposing a Spirit Cogitation seems the natural result of such a being Tho' I do not here go about to explain the particular way and manner how Spirits think for it is hard to conceive how their own Native penetrability or the reduplication of themselves upon themselves does any ways explain the manner of Cogitation We must satisfy our selves with this which is as far as our most exact Searches will extend to That first and immediate properties are not demonstrable of their Subjects neither as to the things themselves nor as to the modes Indeed Sharron in his Book of Wisdom lib. 1. ch 7. tells us that Spirits and Devils according to the opinion of all Philosophers and our greatest Divines are corporeal Here he cites Tertullian Origen St. Basil Gregory c. The Names he mentions but not their Assertions or the Places where they say so But this being a general accusation we may as easily deny it as he assert it But as for those places which perhaps may seem to favour his assertion I doubt not but they may and have already receiv'd easy Solutions from one of these general considerations 1. That either they asserted the opinion of the Platonists who yet were no favourers of an universal corporeity viz. That Souls were never in a perfect State of Separation from all Body but had certain etherial Vehicles and so in that respect might partake in some Sense of a Corporeal Nature Or 2. He doth not rightly interpret those places of the Fathers where perhaps sometimes body or matter may be ascribed to the Soul or Angels but then by Body there is to be meant nothing but Substance or Essence So that their Sense was good and orthodox though their Expressions might be liable to exception and yet I think it is only Tertullian that expresses himself in that manner The said Sharron goes on and tells us That Whatever is Created being compared with God is gross corporeal material and only God incorporeal I would willingly here be so charitable as to think that such was his awful respect and veneration of the Divine Essence that he would not easily grant any thing else to partake of the same generical nature Far be it from me to speak any thing that may in the least derogate from the excellency of the Divine Essence only we may consider that it is no honour done to that to depress other things below that just Order wherein God has placed them This seems but a piece of Will-worship and something like the Opinion of those who think they cannot sufficiently magnifie God's love to some unless they absolutely damn all the rest thus also as if we could not sufficiently magnifie the Spirituality of the Divine Nature unless we dispose all other beings into the rank and Order of Corporeity 2. Though I do not assert this yet I would propound it to consideration whether it may not be possible for the nature of a Spirit to admit of degrees of excellence as to the very Essence and Substance thereof and not only in respect of its more accidental perfections yet so as that which we suppose of the lower order to be perfectly Spiritual and contain nothing of Corporeity in it and perhaps the Logicians meant this when they called God Super-Substantia But he says further if it appear That Spirits change their place the very change shows they are moveable divisible subject to time and the successions thereof c. Which are all qualities of a Body But here I would only ask Whether the existence of a Spirit be possible or whether God could have created such a being or no If he could then his argument proves nothing for supposing such a being it must move and be in a place just in such a manner as we now suppose Souls and Angels to be and move and the argument would have the same force if we either suppos'd or were on all sides assur'd of the actual being that it has now So that it either proves the impossibility of a Spirit or else nothing at all to the purpose this being only such an objection or such a difficulty as would lye against an acknowledged truth I should now Secondly show how from hence we justly infer the Spirituality of the Divine Nature But I shall not need to spend any time herein for though there have been some who granting the immateriality of the Divine Nature have yet asserted the Corporeity of the Soul yet there never was any who granting the Soul to be immaterial ever asserted God to be Corporeal As for those who assert a material Universe and a Corporeal Deity they may perhaps nomine ponere but indeed they do re tollere Deum For a Corporeal Deity is inconsistent with the Notion we have of God uncapable of the Perfections we ascribe to him and unable to perform such actions as do properly belong to such a being But however those
informs his Understanding then assists and inclines his will by his Grace and so applys himself to his inferiour Appetites in a way suitable to their Natures in bringing them under the Power and Government of Reason and Religion I shall here rather enquire how far God made use of the Fancy and Imagination in the Communications of himself to his Servants under the Law by way of Prophecy and this I shall rather do because of the dangerous Opinions that some Men have of late vented on this Subject thereby endeavouring to undermine the very Foundation of all Divine Revelation truly so call'd For they think if they can but once sufficiently disparage the manner of God's revealing himself to the Prophets under the Old Testament they will be hereby better enabled to reject all Divine Revelation under the New I shall here therefore make some short reflections upon the Author of Tractatus-Theol Polit in his two first Chapters of Prophets and Prophecy In Order thereunto I shall premise 1st God in the Communications of himself to Mankind is not ty'd to any either Natural or Moral qualifications of the Persons he pleases to make use of For what ever is wanting either as to the vigorousness of the Fancy or strength of understanding God can supply the defects hereof some other way or act more immediately by himself in absence of them all 2dly Yet notwithstanding God commonly makes use of Second Causes and of Instruments duly qualified in order to the effecting his Designs in the World particularly in Prophecy According to the constant Opinion of the Iewish Doctors there were certain previous preparatory dispositions in order to it and these were of three Sorts Natural Acquir'd and Moral 1. A good Natural Complexion and Temper of Body a due mixture of the Humours without any predominancy of Melancholy a Mind naturally Calm and Chearful a Fancy Active and Vigorous an Understanding Clear and Strong without any Crazedness or Inconsistency 2. All these improv'd to the highest Degrees of perfection by Study and Industry 3. To these must also be added a vertuous and well-disposed Temper of Soul free from all vicious habits and inclinations Thus the Iews had their Schools of the Prophets for the fitting and preparing Young Scholars which they call'd the Sons of the Prophets for that imployment Now this sufficiently shews that something more than mere Fancy was required to the Nature of Prophecy Yet this is not so to be understood as if Prophecy was the Natural result of any of these singly or of all joyntly unless God was pleas'd to Communicate himself to some as he saw fit For all these who were brought up in the Schools of the Prophets did not presently prophesie Thus neither the absence of the usual qualifications do incapacitate a Man for Prophecy nor doth the concurrence of 'em all make one actually a Prophet Prophecy in the formal Notion and Nature of it being no ways in the power of Man but wholly depends upon the will of God Hence we see what little reason the soresaid Author had to say that tho' God did make use of the Fancy sometimes in the conveyance of his Will to the Prophets yet that Prophecy Non nisi ope imaginationis persicitur à solâ imaginatione pendet and this he proves no other ways than because they prophesied But this is not to prove but to beg the Question He first makes an injust Comparison betwixt Natural Knowledge and Divine Revelation 1. In respect of the Name and tells us that the one may be called Divine as well as the other because they are both deriv'd from the same Fountain viz. God But thus by the same way of arguing he must and indeed doth assert That either there are no Miracles at all or else that all the effects of Nature are such because the power of Nature is the Divine Power as well as that of Miracles But in order to either of these he should first make good one or both of these Positions either that God hath not an immediate Power of Acting by himself distinct from the ordinary course of Nature or else that since the constitution of the Natural Frame of the Universe he hath not reserv'd to himself a liberty of Acting according to that Original Power neither of which will he be ever able to prove 2. Suppose Natural Knowledge may also be call'd Prophecy or Divine Revelation in respect of it's Original yet how can it be call'd aequali jure as he says Divine because in other respects both as to the manner of their conveyance and largeness of extent there is a great deal of difference betwixt 'em however why should Natural Knowledge be call'd Divine Revelation since Custom and good Reason have justly affix'd them to several things for he that goes about to unhinge the signification of Words which Use and Custom has truly appropriated to 'em in Divinity has probably no better design than he that removes the ancient Land-Marks in a common Field viz. Injury Disorder and Confusion Tho' this must be also granted that Natural Knowledge doth bring us under an Obligation to those respective Duties which it dictates even antecedent to that of Divine Revelation For we are first Men and then Christians and by both these ways God hath made known his Will and claims our Obedience He grants indeed that Humanae Naturae Leges in se consideratae non possunt ejus i. e. Divinae Revelationis esse causa Why he should thus mince the matter as to insert these Words in se consideratae I know not whereas 't is certain That the Laws of Humane Nature can be no ways the cause of Divine Revelation I know his meaning here is suspected by some to be this that the Laws of Nature consider'd in themselves that is without the supposal of a God which is one integral part of the Universe so indeed they cannot be the cause of Divine Revelation but then supposing a God so interwoven with the Laws of Nature as that he shall be either really the same with or very little different from the Universe and the Laws thereof under this consideration how far the Laws of Nature may be the cause of Divine Revelation that is of that which he calls such is the grand mysterious Question The other thing wherein he compares Natural Knowledge with Prophecy is in respect of certainty wherein Natural Knowledge he says comes no ways short of Prophetical If we consider the certainty the Prophet himself had of those things which were reveal'd to him we are now at a loss how certainly to determine this Question for he only could fully assure us of the truth of these things they relating to himself Yet it seems very reasonable to believe that the certainty of their Knowledge did not any way fall short of but rather exceed that of Natural Knowledge seeing we may casily suppose that God may by the secret influences of his Spirit by the
more immediate applications of himself to the minds of Men as fully assure 'em of the truth of his Revelations as they can be of any thing by any Natural Principles and that it really and actually was so may appear from hence that those to whom God convey'd these Revelations have by vertue hereof undertaken the performance of such things which arguments drawn from mere Sense and Reason in all probability could not have perswaded 'em to Cum it aque mens nostra ex hoc solo quod Dei naturam objectivè in se continet de eadem participat potestatem habeat ad formandas notiones c. Merito mentis naturam quatenus talis concipitur primam Divinae Revelationis causam statuere possumus This seems very strange mystical Divinity if by Divine Revelation he mean Revelation truly so call'd then it is altogether unconceiveable how any impressions of Natural and Moral Truths and that is all that he ought to understand by those expressions quod Dei Naturam objective in se continet de eâdem participat How these can any ways be the cause of Divine Revelation if by Divine Revelation he mean nothing but Natural Knowledge besides the impropriety of the Expression I do not see how the Soul can so truly be call'd the first cause even of that neither but rather the first and immediate subject of it Upon the whole matter one might almost be perswaded from hence to think That by our Souls containing in it the Nature of God objectively and partaking of the very same that hereby he design'd as it were to melt down God and the Soul of Man into an equal constitution and both into parts of a material Universe Then he tells us that Quicquid dici potest ex Scripturâ solâ peti debet What ever is said of things relating to Divine Revelation ought to be fetch'd from Scripture alone This in general is a very good Rule yet it is to be understood with some certain limitations as he himself acknowledges in the same Paragraph unless we had rather say that the latter part thereof contradicts the former for he tells us That the Iews never took any notice of Second Causes but did generally recur to God as the cause of all great and excellent things they had occasion to speak of And therefore we must only take that for Supernatural Revelation which Scripture expressly says is such or what may be gathered to be so from the circumstances of the Relation First I grant that God may declare that again which a Man either by Natural Principles or some other way knew before Secondly When God makes any Revelation to a Man it is necessary that he should make such a reduplicative Declaration as this That this which I now speak is Pure Simple unmixt Divine Revelation such as exceeds the Power of Natural Causes to make known if so then it may be questioned Whether God ever made any supernatural Revelation to Mankind or no because we no where meet with any such Declaration And as to the circumstances of the Narration we can never according to his Principles from thence gather any thing to be truly Divine because as I intimated before he makes the Power of God and the Power of Nature the same or however asserts that we are very much ignorant how far the Powers of Nature may extend However we may make use of this assertion against himself that if we may argue from the circumstances of the Relation then it is not necessary that whatever is said concerning these things should be fetch'd from Scripture only 'T is easily observable how this Author by unsetling the significations of Words and confounding the Notions of things designs to bring all into confusion he argues much what at a rate with Mr. Hobbs that is weakly and probably with the same design that is Wickedly But Providence hath so ordered affairs that a bad Cause should always be a weak one He founds all Prophecy meerly in the imagination hence he says it is that the Prophets conceiv'd all things parabolically and express'd spiritual things after a Corporeal manner because this agrees more with the Nature of Imagination Hence it was that those that were with Christ saw the Spirit descending like a Dove and the Apostles as it were Tongues of Fire and S. Paul when he was Converted saw a great light because all these things did suit with the nature of Imagination As if either there was no Foundation in Nature for any such belief but only the imagination of Men or as if these appearances reach'd no further than the Fancy without any Divine Influence making any further impressions upon the minds of those who were concern'd herein Si igitur sacra volumina percurramus videbimus quod omnia quae Deus Prophet is revelavit iis revelat a fuerunt vel verbis vel figuris vel utroque modo That all the Prophecies we meet withal in Scripture were convey'd to the Prophets by Words or Figures and sensible Representations or both I shall here show First That this assertion is false Secondly If it was true yet it would not prove what he thereby designs 1. It doth not appear that all the Divine Revelations in Scripture were convey'd one of these two ways There are some instances where there is no mention made of either of these two and to say that one of these was made use of tho' not express'd this is gratis dictum and contrary to his own Rule That whatever is said of these things must be drawn from Scripture The instances I mean are those of Ioseph's interpreting the Dreams of the Butler and the Baker and of Pharoah's Dream concerning the Seven Years of Dearth c. Gen. 40 and 41 chap. Now the Interpretation of Dreams is as much Prophecy or Divine Revelation as the Dreams themselves and yet here we do not find either any Voice or sensible Representation Nor are his Reasons any whit more cogent than his Instances for tho' he grants it possible for God immediately to communicate himself to Men Attamen ut homo aliquis solâ mente aliqua perciperet quae in primis nostrae cognitionis fundamentis non continentur nec ab iis deduci possant ejus mens praestantior necessariò atque humana longe excellentior esse deberet But I know no reason why the Soul of Man is not of capacity enough to perceive and apprehend the Objects of Divine Revelation when duly communicated to the perceptive Faculties without the assistance of Fancy or Imagination For this is certain and both Reason and Religion obliges us to believe That God doth convey his gracious Assistances by which he both enlightens the Understanding and reforms the Will without the mediation of the Phancy and it is also very reasonable to believe That God did many times under the Old Testament convey the Intimations of his Will to Men without either Voice or Vision however this is certainly done by the
other way by which they might and did attain to the Knowledge of 'em without such Philosophical Disquisitions And indeed the very attempt to search into the Causes and Reasons of a Thing seems to suppose that we have at least some knowledge of the Thing before-hand as to matter of fact for Men would scarce go about to enquire into the Reasons and Causes of the Laws of Nature if they had not some consciousness to themselves that there were such Things in Nature and we cannot for the reason before-mention'd say that they then only first came to be known when the Causes of 'em were thus search'd into And though 't is true that the whole Order of Nature duly consider'd doth generally conspire to the confirmation of this Truth that the doing our duty is the best way to secure our Interest yet such is the intricacy many times of Divine Providence and the visible inequality in the distribution of Rewards and Punishments in this life that without the Motives and Encouragements of some other Arguments Men would hardly be perswaded to the practice of that of which they did not see the present Advantage And though Vice and Wickedness especially in any high degree do naturally tend to the prejudice of our Healths and ruine of our Estates yet if there were no other way to attain to the knowledge of our Duty or of our obligation to it we might perhaps sometimes with too much reasos plead ignorance thereof and might pretend a liberty to be vicious at least so far as might be without any considerable prejudice to our Healths or Fortunes not but that Rewards and Punishments are naturally interwoven in the frame and order of the Universe without us and the constitution of humane Nature within us that so though sometimes there may be an unequal distribution of outward Rewards and Punishments yet that Vertue might always be sure at least of a secret recompence and Vice not altogether go unpunish'd even here in this Life But though our duty be always our real Interest and Honesty the best Policy yet such is the disorder and confusion which Sin has introduc'd into humane Nature such the general depravation of Mankind that the truth of these Propositions is not readily many times acknowledg'd by us but Men commonly without any regard either to the present nature of things or their future consequences do make Lust and Passion and a mistaken Self-Interest the Rule of all their Actions 2. I would here propound it to consideration whether our now being able to resolve these Laws of Nature into their further Causes as it is call'd and to demonstrate their Obligations from reasons fetch'd from the Constitution of the Universe whether I say this doth not depend upon that clearer Revelation which God hath made of those things in Scripture for hereby we come to a clearer Knowledge of the Nature and End of the Creation how that the whole Universe acts in subserviency to the glory of God and to the promoting those noble ends of Providence of promoting Vertue and discouraging Vice in the World hereby we are also more fully assur'd of a future state of Rewards and Punishments And these also must be comprehended in the full and adequate Sanction of the Laws of Nature for without these the other of temporal Rewards and Punishments would be found many times deficient and ineffectual for what they were there design'd Now these things being more clearly reveal'd and sully confirm'd to us by holy Scripture and the belief hereof made habitual to us by the long succession of many Ages hence probably that method becomes now more evident to us than otherwise it would have been yet if this should be granted that at least the evidence of that Proposition studium communis boni totius systematis agentium naturalium conducit ad bonum singularum partium quo nostra velut partis unius continetur foelicitas doth in some measure depend upon some further Revelations made known to us by the Christian Religion yet it would be no small or inconsiderable advantage hereby gain'd to Vertue if it be prov'd that that Proposition is of equal extent with the Christian World both as to its Truth and Evidence and both these methods of probation being join'd together seem an undeniable Argument of the Divinity of these Laws in that the God of Nature hath both made 'em natural to the minds of Men which is that which I here mean by Impression and hath also further added the respective Sanctions of rewards and punishments thereunto in the natural frame of the Universe Not as if that other way of resolving these Laws of Nature into those natural Notions and Obligations resulting therefrom was destitute of its proper Sanctions of rewards and punishments but then we say according to this method they are not resolv'd only into these penal Sanctions but that the will of the Law-giver being publish'd with an intent to be obey'd is the intrinsick form of a Law though it did not come attended with outward force not but that these penal Sanctions do also further declare and inforce the Law If it be here objected that it is not easy to conceive the way and manner how these natural Notions are or can be imprinted upon the minds of Men. I answer there is no more difficulty in conceiving how these truths and obligations may be the natural results of our Minds rightly qualify'd at first than it is to conceive how those Ioys and Torments which ariso from the sense of our Innocence and Guilt should be the natural results of our Consciences afterwards which yet are acknowledg'd by those who make the objection That a Vertuous and holy Life doth naturally tend to promote the honour of God and the good of all Men in general and of our selves in particular is readily granted especially by those who believe the Christian Religion but then this Proposition doth suppose First That we know what it is to be Vertuous Secondly That this Vertuous and holy Life is a duty incumbent on us and both these in order of nature before we understand that these tend to the glory of God and the good of Men otherwise the Virtuoso's of our Age those who pretend to be Philosophically Religious might perhaps plead this in excuse of their present Wickedness that they are only at present making an Experiment whether Vice may not as well tend to the publick good as Vertue but as soon as they find the contrary by Experience then they will become devout Proselytes to Vertue But Mr. Tyrrell p. 199. tells us That though all Men do not ordinarily reduce the Laws of Nature into that single Proposition of endeavouring the common good of all rational beings or may not have an explicit Notion of it yet it a Man be but thoroughly convinc'd that he is not made for himself alone that he doth truly observe the Laws of Nature towards himself by a temperate and rational Life
much strength retorted upon themselves 1. The Foundation of the Argument is this That that is justly suspected as false in Religion the Belief or Practice whereof is joyned with either publick or private Advantage to those concern'd Now nothing is more false than this for this is one main Foundation of our Natural Religion and part even of the Gentile's Creed viz. A Belief that God is and that he is a rewarder of those that diligently seek him That such is the Goodness of God towards us that he has joyned our Duty and our Interest together not only as to the future but also as to the present Life And God in so ordering the Frame of our Religion has but seconded and confirmed the common sense of Mankind and acted according to the Principles of Humane Nature for such is the Constitution thereof that Good and Convenience is the necessary Object of all our Desires Now if any thing of present or future Advantage be made an Argument of the falseness of things in Matters of Religion we may then upon the same grounds question the Truth and Reasonableness of all humane Actions because Men necessarily propound some kind of advantage to themselves in 'em all But this would lay a Foundation of Scepticism in Humane Nature and cause us to reject or doubt of things for those very reasons for which we ought to receive ' em 2. This Objection taken from the Advantages that attend Religion is a very contingent and accidental one such as could be of no force in the first Ages of the Church when Christianity exposed its Professors to nothing but Persecution their Names to Sandal and Reproach their Estates to Ruine and their Bodies to Martyrdom 3. I shall show the unfitness of the Objection as made by them that urge it indeed if those Men were so Heroical in their pursuits of Vertue and Holiness as to embrace 'em meerly upon the account of their Intrinsick Excellence then might there something more be pleaded for 'em But since they are Men of Debauched Lives and if possible to justifie their own Wickedness would insinuate into the Minds of others a secret belief That Religion is nothing but a meer Cheat This is the greatest instance not only of Profaneness but of Folly too because the Argument may be retorted with as much strength upon themselves thus If the Belief of a God and Religion be therefore suspected to be false because it is the Interest of those that believe 'em that there should be both Then why may not the Denial of a God be rejected for the same reasons because it is as much the Interest of wicked Men that there should be no God as it is of good Men that there should be one So that if there be any force in the Argument it proves as much against themselves as it doth against us As for those who tell us That the Notion of God includes in it a Contradiction and that it is and ever was impossible that there should be one these Men indeed take the most effectual way of defending their Cause in case they could prove their Assertion For whoever grants the possibility of the Being of God must either grant that he really is or else will be forced to contradict himself for what is possible may be reduced into Act. But if God be not now and actually was not existent from all Eternity it is impossible for such a Being as is included in his notion ever to begin to be And this seems to be Bradwardine's Argument Cap. 1. p. 3. So that an Atheist must prove not only that there is no God but that it was from Eternity impossible that there should be one neither of which he will ever be able to prove The Being of God is not the less credible because it is not capable of such proofs as some other things are all things will not admit of Mathematical Demonstrations nor indeed is it expected that they should nor are they on this account less true and certain than those that do For sometimes the very possibility of Demonstration argues some degree of uncertainty or obscurity in the thing to be demonstrated thus Indemonstrables are always the most certain therefore the Being of God is not therefore the less certain because it cannot be demonstrated Some indeed are so gross in their Reasonings that they make the Invisibility of Spirits an Argument against their Existence whereas indeed the very Reasons upon which we believe their Existence are inconsistent with their Visibility That some Heathens did worship that one supream and true God is certainly evident both from the Testimony of Profane and Sacred History Act. 17. 23. Whom therefore ye ignorantly worship him declare I unto you So that the Athenians either worshipped the true God or St. Paul declar'd to 'em a false one yet 't is generally agreed that such Heathens might be and were guilty of Idolatry Nothing therefore hinders but that the Papists may be guilty of Idolatry though they do not only acknowledge the true God but the Christian Trinity nor do I see how their Idolatry as such that is such as is consistent with the Belief of the true God is capable of any mitigation because no one charges them with any other than what they are truly guilty of Some Protestants indeed say That some of the Heathens are capable of the same defence that the Papists make for themselves that is That they only give an Inferiour Worship to Saints and other Inferiour Daemons but pay the Supream Worship to the Supream God only Now this Plea seems to hold as much for the one as for the other and must either acquit both or neither Nor can the Papists their being more particularly instructed in the Knowledge of the Nature and Will of God be any Mitigation of their Offence but rather an Aggravation of it Falsehood is neither in its own Nature fit nor was it ever intended by God as a proper means whereby to defend truth For this neither stands in need of a Lye nor can it really be defended by it nor is it our Interest or Prudence to attempt the defence of a good Cause by weak Arguments for this will only give occasion to our Adversaries when they see that they can easily answer these to think worse of our cause and that all the rest of our reasonings are of the same nature Yet granting that some Arguments sometimes made use of to prove the Being of God are not absolutely cogent and conclusive yet are they not presently to be rejected as useless and that upon these two accounts First Because they that urge them do not make use of any single Argument as if the Cause did wholly depend upon it Secondly In things of a Moral Concernment there may be such a thing as an Accumulative Demonstration as Bishop Taylor tells us in another Case Pag. 124. Lib. 1. Cases of Consc. Therefore supposing a Man in his attempt to prove
right reason there is in all Mr. Hobbs his Discourses that depend hereupon for he himself tells us in his De Cive 2 Ch. That right reason is that which concludes from true Principles Now these true Principles in matters of Morality and Policy must be more than supposedly true indeed a certain kind of truth may be in favour granted to an Hypothesis of natural Philosophy if it exactly answer all the Phaenomena of Nature though it self do not answer the real truth but this Indulgence cannot be granted to things of a moral or political concern Neither Secondly is it a good Hypothesis as wanting those qualifications which are requir'd to any Hypothesis in general which are these three 1. An Hypothesis must be possible this is the least that it can pretend to but it must not be only so according to the utmost extent of possibility but also fairly possible according to the most easy methods of our Conceptions that is probable so contriv'd that we might be thence perswaded that that was the way that God and Nature made use of in that particular that as the Epicureans say of the Universe that though it was the result of blind chance yet all things therein have happen'd as well as if they had been the result of the greatest wisdom and contrivance thus an Hypothesis though perhaps it be not the real truth yet it should give as full and natural Solutions of things as if indeed it were 2. It must be self-consistent and not contain Principles of Self-dissolution within it self for it is impossible that that should be agreeable to the wise and regular methods of Nature and Providence which is not agreeable with it self 3. An Hypothesis ought to employ our Faculties in the search of true and useful Knowledge and also to promote real Piety in the World therefore we ought not to fancy to our selves such an Hypothesis in Philosophy as excludes God out of the World and such an one as asserts a mere material Universe Now here I might easily show that this of Mr. Hobb's is neither 1. Possible much less probable 2. Not consistent with it self 3. So far from promoting sound Knowledge and true Piety that it is really destructive of both Whether such a state of Nature as Mr. Hobbs describes be a proper and effectual means in order to a Mans self-preservation may be justly question'd and indeed he himself seems not to be of that Opinion seeing he makes his natural Statesmen to get out of it as soon as they can in order to the bettering of their condition yet this is certain that he makes private interest the great and ultimate end of all humane actions in general and of his Levia in particular as being that wherein he thinks he has laid the best and surest foundations of all humane happiness I shall therefore here by way of Appendix to this Chapter speak something in general concerning this great Principle of Self-Preservation It is the natural folly of Mankind to run out of one extream of Vice and Errour into another thus perhaps the ignorant Zeal and blind Devotion of some who attributed too little might first give occasion to others to ascribe too much to Sels-preservation however we must not deny it its due regard so far as Reason and Religion admit because others have extended it further than in either it ought I shall therefore freely grant what the greatest Patrons of Self-preservation can with any just ground or reason demand and hereby I shall gain this double advantage 1. It will hence appear that it is not out of any preiudice or heat of opposition that I contradict any thing even in that Opinion I do oppose 2. Hereby I shall come to a truer stateing of the Question and so shall be better able to defend it for this disadvantage there is even to Truth it self in the false stating of a Question that we either undertake to oppose that in an adversary which is really true and so irresragable or else to defend something that is false and so not capable of being defended To deny that which is true is altogether needless for we need not fear any prejudice to a good Cause from truth elsewhere because all truths of this nature are consistent with themselves and no ways contrary to each other whereas the denyal of any thing that is true tho' in an adversary may break that continuity of truth and some way or other weaken our own cause I shall ad two or three general considerations relating hereunto 1. That God has imprinted in Man a principle of self preservation is not only true but very agreeable to the goodness of God and very subservient for the carrying on the designs of Prudence and Piety in the world for it would have reflected dishonourably either upon the goodness or wisdome of God to have made such an excellent creature as Man and taken no care for his preservation so far as it should not be in the power of any one upon every slight occasion to throw away himself and so destroy Gods peculiar Image or to have expos'd him to all the dangers that either his own inadvertency or the malice of others might have brought upon him without some innate inclinations of self preservation and suitable principles of prudence to inable him thereunto Thus Religion it self doth not only permit but command us to act with a due respect to those two grand Principles of a Christian Life Prudence and Innocence to be wise as Serpents and innocent as Doves Further without this we had wanted that most exact and easy rule of Charity to others Whatsoever you would that Men should do unto you even so do you unto them where our love to our selves is made the rule and measure of our Charity to others But Mr. Hobbs makes self preservation without any respect to the lawfulness of the means to be the first and great dictate of Reason and Nature and charges Christianity with folly in that in some cases it so little regards its own safety but exposes its professors to Martyrdome for Religion's sake If says he Chap. 42. we be commanded by our lawful Prince to say that we do not believe in Christ we must obey him for words are but external things and do no more express the assent of the Speaker than any other external action and therefore a Christian in such things hath the same liberty that the Prophet gave to Naaman the Syrian 2 Kings 5. 18. In this thing the Lord pardon thy Servant that when my Master goeth into the House of Rimmon to worship there and he leaneth on my hand and I bow my self in the house of Rimmon the Lord pardon thy servant in this thing and he said unto him go in peace Here Mr. Hobbs saith that Naaman believed the true God in his Heart but by worshiping would seem not to believe least he should offend his King But here he supposes but proves not that Naaman here
in his Estate he must comply with the humours of such as may hurt him and even imitate their Vices and Corruptions In Answer hereto I shall not here mention some small Passages of those two Emperours which some Historians take notice of as possible occasions of those Disgusts that grew among their Men of War but shall suppose that these Soldiers did really hate the Vertues of these Emperours For it will not follow from hence that Vertue is equally liable to the hatred of Men. Thus Thieves hate the Magistrates because they execute Iustice upon 'em yet hereby do they get more Love from the publick than they contract hatred from the Offenders Thus though those two Emperours were hated by some few dissolute and disorderly Bands of Soldiers yet never did any Emperours fall more lamented by the generality of the Empire than they And though sometimes a private Person as I before intimated may be the cause of some inconveniences to himself by his Natural Ability or Moral Vertues yet this cannot take place in a Prince because he is already in that Supream Authority which others perhaps only aim at nay thus by being eminently Vertuous he will present all growing Popularity in the most Ambitious of his Subjects and eclipse their histre even in the Opinion of those why would otherwise be their great Admirers I shall here only add the Apology that the â—lorentines themselves make the their Country-man Machiavil viz. That he himself did not really believe his own Assertions in his wicked Maximes of Policy and Religion only designing hereby if possible to ruine the House of the Medices who had oppress'd the Common-wealth of Florence he broach'd these Pestilent Doctrines in hopes they would embrace 'em and so ruine themselves by the practice of them As for that Opinion of Machiavil That the Christian Religion has so effeminated the Spirits of its Professors that Christendom is now become an easie prey to all Invaders this is so false and soolish so contrary both to Reason and Experience that it scarce deserves a Confutation Christianity forbids indeed all private Revenge and teaches us Meekness and Humility towards all Men but this is no way destructive of true Valour and ' Generosity For a firm belief of God and the Immortality of the Soul and a due care of engaging in a just Cause are certainly the best foundations of true Courage There is nothing that a Christian fears more than to commit sin now if the fear of offending God and violating his Laws be counted Cowardise then who would be asham'd of such an Honorary Accusation but there is no necessity to purchase one Vertue at the expence of another or to forfeit our Magnanimity to maintain true Christian Meekness For the most Stout are always the most Generous Meek and Merciful and Cruelty is commonly a certain sign of a Pusillanimous Spirit and as for Experience both Ancient and Modern Histories testifie that neither Turks nor any other Infidels have any advantage over Christian Kingdoms upon this Account CHAP. VII Of Moral Vertue MOral Vertue is a thing so natural and only proper to Mankind that a Discourse of Humane Nature without this would seem defective in one of its most principal parts the retaining of this Vertuous Innocence was the Duty of Adam in Paradise and the regaining of it as far as this present state of Imperfection will admit is still ours now So that this universal rectitude of our Natures was the first and most absolute Duty incumbent on Man for Faith and Repentance those two great Evangelical Duties though they be absolutely necessary in this laps'd State of Mankind yet their necessity did only commence with Man's Fall for in Innocence there had been no need of either but Vertue and Holiness Piety towards God and Honesty and Charity to Men these were Duties at first and will be so to all Eternity hereafter when Faith shall be swallowed up in Vision and when all sin shall be done away and so no need of Repentance Thus Vertue was part of that Divine Image wherein we were first created and whoever in this sense speaks against it Blasphemes God Moral Vertue therefore as distinguish'd from original Righteousness and Evangelical Holiness may be thus describ'd It is an habit of the Mind founded indeed in Nature but perfected by frequent use and exercise whereby the Man is enabled by the mere strength of Natural Principles to do that which is most agreeable to the Duty and Dignity of his Nature in those three Relations he bears to him-self to others and to God I shall give a short Paraphrase upon the Desinition First It is an Habit and so distinguished from original Righteousness which was not an Adventitious Quality or super-induc'd upon Man in esse completo but it was as essential to Man in Innocence as roundness is to a Globe Here I call it an Habit rather than a Power or Energy because though External Causes and such is frequent Exercise by which Vertue is gotten be not of the Essence of a thing and so according to the exact Rules of Desining ought not to enter into the Definition yet it is very difficult to come to the knowledge of the Essences of things of this Nature and they are usually defin'd by their Causes and Effects by their Ends and Objects and the manner of their Operations Secondly Though a Man should be born with this Quality of Vertue yet notwithstanding he would be truly Vertuous yet here we speak of things as they are not as it is possible for us to suppose and imagine them because none naturally are born so Thirdly Habit is not a meer dull in-active thing but Action is included in the Notion of it especially in these Habits of Vertue wherein besides the general relation they bear to Action they also include a necessary obligation thereunto in the very Nature and Notion of ' em Indeed some tell us That original Righteousness or that first Grace by which Adam was enabled to rule his lower Faculties was only given as a Bridle into his Hand whereby he was to govern his Unruly Appetites which like a Wild Horse would otherwise easily have cast off their Rider and that this was only super-added to Man already perfect But this Opinion seems not so well to vindicate the Goodness of the Divine Providence herein for though Man had a super-added power of governing his Passions yet if they were naturally headstrong and exorbitant he was in much greater probability of falling than standing Founded in Nature and so neither by Inspiration from God nor by the Influence or Influx of the Stars 1. Not by Inspiration from God which either was or at least was more generally suppos'd to be the Opinion of Plato that Vertue could not be taught but was more immediately inspir'd by God But the later Platonists do either not make this his Opinion or if they do they do not then seem much to favour it Alcinous
Cum igitur virtus res divina sit c. upon which the Commentator's words are Omnis rei cujuscunque sit summa excellentia quae à Deo esse putatur divina appellatur quo modo rudiore quâdam Minervâ intelligi potest quod hoc loco dicitur virtutem quae hominis est perfectio rem quandam esse divinam Not but that every good and perfect Gift comes from God either immediately or mediately but perhaps this was a way of Expression common to Plato with the Iews of calling any thing that was great and excellent in its kind by the Name of Divine so that all that was probably meant by this Phrase was only to express the excellency of the thing and the great Opinion he had of it or else that Divine Providence had some more particular concern in the disposing and inclining Men to it either by giving them a more happy Constitution of Body or a more Ingenuous Temper of Mind or by affording more advantagious Circumstances of time and place yet so as that the most happy Occurrences do not necessitate Men to be Vertuous without their own Industry and Inclination nor the most Unhappy force 'em to be wicked without their own fault However if this be Plato's Opinion That Vertue is so from God that it cannot be gotten by Humane Industry in conjunction with the ordinary Influences of Divine Providence this Opinion is neither reasonable in it self nor is it sufficiently prov'd by that Argument made use of by Socrates for that purpose If says he Vertue was possible to be taught then would Good Men more especially teach their Sons that so they might inherit their Father's Vertues as well as Fortunes but the contrary frequently appears To this I Answer First That nothing can be prov'd from particular Instances seeing as many may be brought to the contrary where Vertue has been as it were propagated with the Family and we may furnish our selves even from our own Observation with Examples of the happy success of a Vertuous Education Secondly Vertuous Parents tho they may desire their Children may be such too yet many times such is their Tenderness and Indulgence to 'em that they do not make use of those Methods which are most proper thereunto which are commonly joyn'd with some degrees of Severity Thirdly Vertue though it may be taught and is capable of being learn'd yet is it a very conditional thing and depends upon the concurrence of many Circumstances together for the producing the effect and that which often defeats all the rest is the liberty of the Will which many Men use in opposition to all those Moral means which are otherwise sufficient in themselves and design'd by others to moderate their Passions and reduce 'em to Vertue Nor 2. Doth Vertue proceed from any Natural Influx of the Stars for if we consider the Nature of the Heavens and natural Causes and compare 'em with the Nature of the Soul and the Native Liberty of the Will it will be impossible to conceive how any Sydereal Influences can any ways certainly or necessarily determine the Minds of Men. And the same Arguments that prove the Vanity of Iudicial Astrology in other respects do much more evince the folly of their pretences who go into Heaven to fetch down Vertue from thence when indeed it is nearer us even in our Mouths imprinted upon our very Hearts and Natures I shall here give you Savanorola's Argument in a case much what to this purpose If says he the Christian Faith and Life proceed from the Stars then their Faith is either true or false if it be true then it cannot proceed from thence because it condemns that Opinion and asserts the Vanity of Iudicial Astrology if it be false and proceed from the Stars then it follows that the Stars incline Men to falshood and the falshood of the Effect will be no good reason why we should believe the truth of the Cause Whereby Men by the mere strength of Nature c. And thus Vertue is distinguished from Grace thus the Heathen Moralists have discours'd very well of Vertue in their Writings and given great Instances thereof in their Practices who yet were very Strangers to all Supernatural Revelation And this Notion of it seems fitly to assign the just Limits betwixt the Gentile and the Christian Religion it deprives not the one of what it may justly challenge as its right it allows to men in the state of Nature some inclinations and abilities too to Vertue but yet that without supernatural assistance he can never arrive at Evangelical Perfection it doth not so far depress humane nature Modices to make it perfectly stupid nor on the other hand doth it raise it to a pitch of Pelagianisin it grants Heathens to be Men and reminds Christians of their Original Sin and the present depravation of their Natures And though the Heathen Moralists do sometimes mention such a thing as afflatus divinus yet it cannot be in reason extended so far as to signify that which Christian Writers commonly understand by that expression To perform that which is most agreeable to the duty and dignity of his nature Thus though vertue in the proper acceptation of it be distinguish'd from Grace as to the Principle from whence it flows the one proceeding from nature the other from a more divine original yet do they agree in their end and Friendly conspire together to carry on the same designs of Providence in the World viz. the glory of God and the good of Men. Now the dignities or excellencies of humane nature are of two sorts 1. Natural and original 2. Such as are the results of the divine benignity afterwards 1. Natural and Original and under this head I shall only consider the excellencies of the Soul in particular 1. As to the excellency of its nature and essence that it is a spiritual being and ray of Divinity now considering this natural preheminence of the Soul above the Body we act unworthy of the dignity and excellence of the Soul when we make it only a Slave to the Body and only as it were the Bodies Purveyor to make provision for the flesh to fulfil the Lusts thereof 2. As to its intellectual Endowments Man only of all this lower Creation is endowed with a power of reasoning now certainly God never gave us such excellent faculties only to employ 'em upon mean objects and debase 'em by unworthy Employments Phil. 4. 8. What soever things are true what soever things are just c. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 think on these things 3. As to its moral Endowments that is all those natural Inclinations and Capacities the Soul has to Vertue and Goodness that inward sense of Honesty that tactus quidam divinitat is as Iamblicus calls it now this also obliges us to be true to that inward sense of obligation that lies upon us 2. Such dignities as are the result of divine benignity afterwards and these I shall consider