Medium of Demonstration 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with respect to the Question to be demonstrated so are the Principles or Premisses to the Conclusion Wherefore as the Medium is the Cause of the Affection so the Principles are the Cause not only why the Conclusion is known For in this Sense the Principles are the Cause even in all Syllogisms but also why they are true And as the Medium is before the Affection not in time but Nature So also the Principles obtain a Verity not in Time but Nature prior to that of the Conclusion Lastly as the Medium is more known than the Affection not as to us and in way of confus'd Knowledge but of Nature and distinct Cognition So also the Principles are more known than the Conclusion For because we embrace the Conclusion with a full Assent of the Mind for the sake of the Principles we must assent more to the Principles themselves of Necessity because that for the sake of which any thing is such that it self is more such as Aristotle teaches Book 1. Post Cap. 2. c. Ax. 7. Now when the Principles have all these Conditions they are proper to the Thing to be demonstrated Ax. 8. Principles are said to be proper to the thing to be demonstrated when they are neither Heterogeneous or Foreign nor yet Common 1. § Now Principles are said to be Heterogeneous then when they are fetch'd from some other Science As if one for the proving of Physical Questions should make use of Mathematical Principles or Geometrical Arithmetical But it is not lawful for a Demonstrater to pass from one Science to another to wit because the Medium with the Third that is the Subject and the First that is the Predicate with the Medium ought to agree by it self as is taught Cap. 6. of the same Book which cannot be if the the Conclusion and Principles are not of the same Genus or Subject that is of the same Science For that is said to be of the same Science which is of the same Genus or Subject as appears from Cap. 28. of the same Book 2. § If yet one Science be Subalternate to another as Musick to Arithmetick or Optick to Geometry The Questions of the Inferiour are to be demonstrated by the Principles of the Superiour Science Nor is this a passing to another Genus because the Subalternated Science has in some manner the same Subject with the Superiour and so they are not to be esteemed divers Sciences I said in some manner because the Subalternated Science considers the Subject of the Superiour with some sensible Quality which yet appertains not to the formal Ratio of the Subject From whence it is that the Affections of both are diverse tho' in the rest they consent So Arithmetick considers Number absolutely Musick which is Subalternated to it only in â—ound So Geometry considers Magnitude absolutely The Optick or Science discussing the Reasons of Sight which is subalternate or inferiour to it only in Colour Light and Shadow See Cap. 7. of the fore-cited Book 3. § The Principles Common are those which may be accommodated to many Sciences Such Principles as these generate not Science because they contain a Medium which coheres not with the Part of the Question by it self but Accident But it is then that we know a Thing truly when we know it so far as it is in the Subject and that from Principles which are such as it is that which it is as Aristotle speaks Cap 9. of the same Book But that which we know from common Reasons we know only by Accident c. It is not yet to be thought that the Principles of Sciences are Common which when of the Superiour are adhibited to the Inferiour Science because the Science Subalternate as has been said before is not esteem'd diverse from the Subalternating c. Ax. 9. Now Principles are divided into Axioms and Thesis's Ax. 10. And an Axiom is that the Truth of which knowing only the Signification of the Words no Person can be ignorant of Ax. 11. A Thesis whose Truth is not known by the meer Signification of the Words only but by the Judgment of the Senses or some other way of Declaration Ax. 12. And this is either Definition or Hypothesis Ax. 13. A Definition is an Oration as we have observed before in which we declare what a Thing is An Hypothesis whether it be in Being or no c. This Division of the Principles is fetch'd from Book 1. Post Cap. 2. and 10. Whence Axiom is so call'd is declar'd Book 1 of the Institutions Cap. 27. The Word Thesis is sometimes taken for any Proposition which is proposed Pro and Con to be disputed of as Book 8. Top. Cap. 4. and 5. and sometimes for a Sentence Paradoxal of some eminent Philosopher as Book 1. Top. Cap. 1. In Rhetorick it is taken for an infinite Question but here for a kind of Proposition Immediate Now 2. § Aristotle Cap. 10. of the fore-cited Book defines an Axiom in this manner viz. to be that which of necessity is true of it self and of the like Necessity must seem so Of Necessity true that is worthy of it self of our Belief or that that has no Cause of its Truth by which to be demonstrated And this is Common to all as well Thesis's as Axioms Adds of Necessity must seem so that is by a Person of compleat Reason It cannot seriously and with the Consent of his Mind be deny'd For a Person perchance may deny an Axiom rather than confess himself to be overcome but no one can be found who supposing him of a compleat Reason can deny it in his Soul and Mind For Example such Enunciations as these Nothing can at the same time be and also not be The whole is greater than its Part Those things that are equal to the same those also will be equal amongst themselves If from equal things you take away equal those things which remain will be equal too c. The Evidence of which is so great that knowing only the Signification of the Words by which they are express'd the Truth of them cannot but be apparent For he who knows what signifies a Whole and what a Part and what to be greater cannot be ignorant that a Whole is greater than a Part c. 3. § And in this respect differ Axioms from Thesis's For to the Knowledge of Thesis's besides the Knowledge of the Signification of Words is requir'd the Judgment of the Senses and sometimes the Declaration of a Master Of Definitions Examples may be taken out of every Discipline As for Instance Physick As a Body Natural is that which consists of Matter and Form Principles are those which are neither made out of themselves nor others and out of which are made all things Nature 's the Principle and Cause of Motion and Quiet in that in which it is first by its self and not by Accident c. Geometry As that
Man differs from another because one sits the other stands one is silent the other speaks or from it self So Hector seemed to Aencas when he appeared to him in a Dream to differ from that Hector who returned clad with the Spoils of Achilles Difference properly so called is that by which one thing differs from another by an inseparable Accident or Propriety as a Crow from a Swan because this is white that black Both of these Differences are Accidental The Difference most proper with Porphyrie is that which we call Essential as when a Man because endued with Reason is said to differ from Brute Beasts 2. § Every Difference says Porphyrie adjoined to any thing else makes it to be other than it was Accidental that it be dislike or other ways affected Essential that it be quite different Whence by the Greeks they are called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is Specifick Ax. 5. The Offices of Essential Difference are Two to divide the Genus and constitute the Species 1. § As it divides the Genus it is called divisive as it constitutes the Species constitutive or completive because it compleats the Definition of the Species when it is conjoined to the Genus Difference therefore Divisive and Constitutive are not two diverse Differences but Offices of the same Difference The highest Genus's have no constitutive Difference because first and immediately diverse And the lowest Species's have no divisive because Individuals agree in their whole Essence But Accidental Differences belong to the following Predicables only Essential to this Place and is so defined Ax. 6. Difference is that which is predicated Essentially of many things different whether in Number or Species in the Question in which it is asked Of what Quality a thing is 1. § The Differences of the lowest Species's are predicated of many things different in Number as Rational Of Plato and Socrates c. Those of Species's Subaltern in Species as to be endued with Sense of Man and Beast Difference is said to be predicated in the Question in which it is asked Of what Quality a thing is because it is a certain Quality of the Genus For Genus being in its own Nature indetermined is determined and as one may say qualified by Difference For to one asking What sort of Animal is Man it is aptly answered a Rational Difference is said to be Essentially predicated because put in the Definition of Species and predicated Synonymously of it that is as to Name and Definition And therein is Difference distinguished from Propriety and Accident CHAP. XIII Of Property and Accident Ax. 1. PRoper is that which declares not what a thing is and yet is only in it and reciprocated with it COMMENTARY 1. § A Thing is said by Porphyrie to be proper four Ways First that which agrees and convenes to one only Species and not to all its Individuals So it agrees to Man to be musical Secondly that which convenes to all the Individuals of any one Species but not to it only and so it agrees to Man to be Two-footed Thirdly that which agrees to one only Species and all its Individuals but not always So it agrees to Man to laugh Fourthly that which belongs only to one Species and all its Individuals and always and so it agrees to Man to be risible or a laughing Creature 2. § The Fourth of these Properties Porphyrie calls properly proper For the rest says he are only proper in some Respect and for some time 3. § This Definition of Property is extant in the first Book of the Topicks Cap. 5. Properties says he do not declare What a thing is that is they are not contained in the Essence of the Subject but follow it reciprocated with that in which alone they are that is with the first and proximate Subject not those contained under that proximate Subject For of Properties some are of Genus's others Species's The Properties of Genus's with Genus's not Species's and those of Species's with Species's not Individuals are to be conferred and reciprocated So to be of Quantity is reciprocated with Natural Body and not the Heaven or Element or Stone And Risibility is to be reciprocated with Man not Socrates or Plato When the Property then of the Genus is predicated of the Species as when the Heaven is said to be of Quantity or the Property of the Species with the Individual as when Plato is said to be risible The Predication is not of the Accident of the Subject nor yet the Property For the Number of Predicable arises from a Comparison of the Predicate with the Proximate Subject For those compared with the remote are not of this Place as have been beforesaid Ax. 2. Properties either flow from the Essence of the Subject or from External Cause 1. § Propers either flow immediately from the Essence of the Subject as Risibility from the rational Soul Quantity from the Essence of Natural Bodies Or by the Mediation of some other Property So to be in a Place flows from the Essence of a Body by reason of its Quantity But now an Eclipse which is the Property of the Moon flows not from the Essence of the Moon but from an External Cause to wit the Interposition of the Earth between the Sun and the Moon These are not absolutely proper but only from Supposition of some External Cause which Cause yet being in being they are no less necessarily in their Subject than the others Ax. 3. Properties which flow from the Essence of the Subject are so necessarily in it that they cannot be separate from it so much as in Thought 1. § So that he would be guilty of a Contradiction that should say or think that the Property was absent from it For whosoever says or thinks a Body is not Quantity or that the Fire is not hot says or thinks as much as if he should say or think a Body is not a Body or a Fire a Fire Ax. 4. Properties cannot be communicated to Subjects of different Species's 1. § Let no body call that a Property says Aristotle Book 4. of the Topicks Cap. 5. which may be in another For since Properties flow from the Essence of the Subject if Properties should be communicated of necessity also the Essence would be communicated For if Risibility or Rationability could be communicated to an Horse a Horse would be a Man if Quantity to a Spirit a Spirit would be a Body and if to be every where to a Creature a Creature would be God c. Ax. 5. As Properties which flow from the Essence of the Subject are to their absolute Subjects so are Properties also which flow from an External Cause to theirs the Cause being put 1. § So altho' the Moon does not always suffer an Eclipse yet when the Earth is interposed between the Sun and the Moon it is as necessary it should suffer an Eclipse as that a Body should be a Quantity or that the Fire should be hot c.
Similitude Accidents in the Concrete as Just White c. in which the Subject is as it were the Matter Accident in the Abstract is the Form in which Number also are Works performed by Art Of this Place also are those things in which are distinguished Material and Formal Or in which there is something Analogous to Matter and Form So the Matter of Disciplines are Precepts the Form Method Of Interpretation Voice the Form Signification This whole uses to be call'd Physical because Physicks vindicate to themselves the Consideration of those things which consist of Matter and Form Vulgarly it 's called Essential Ax. 12. An Integral Whole is that which has Part out of Part. 1. § Now Essential Parts are really different for Matter is one thing and Form another But yet one Part is not out of another For Matter permeates Matter and informs all its Parts But Parts Integral because each is endued with his proper Quantity not only differ in themselves but also Site or at least Order So that one is not contained in another For this it is to have Part out of Part. For Example The Parts of the Human Body are Head Breast Belly Limbs of the which one containeth not another So the Parts of Number are divers and one is not contained in another This Whole is termed Mathematical because Quantity is of Mathematical Consideration Vulgarly Integral more properly Integrate Ax. 13. An Integral Whole is either Continued or Discrete Ax. 14. Both are divided into Homogeneal and Heterogenal that is Similar and Dissimilar Ax. 15. Homogeneal is that which has Parts of the same Name and Nature Ax. 16. Heterogeneal of a Diverse 1. § This Distribution of the whole Integral is extant in the First Book of the Hist An. Cap. 1. and Book 2. Of the Parts of An. Cap. 1. and Book 1. Of the Gener. of An. Cap. 1. For Example Inanimate Substances as Water Wine Flesh also Magnitude Motion and Time are Wholes Homogeneal Continual The Bodies of Animate Heterogeneal Continual Numbers as Three Ten are Wholes Homogeneal Discrete An Army Church the World Heterogeneal and of the same Denomination Ax. 17. A Part Heterogeneal is either Principal or less Principal Ax. 18. That 's a Principal by whose Ablation or Taking away the whole is destroyed Ax. 19. The less by whose taking away the Whole is only maimed or mutilated 1. § For Example Hand Brain Heart Liver are Principal Parts of Man because these taken away of Necessity the Man must die Foot Hand Ear c. are less Principal because these being taken away it is not necessary a Man should die Ax. 20. A Whole by Accident is chiefly said Four Ways and first of a Cause of divers Effects secondly an Effect of divers Causes thirdly of a Subject of divers Adjuncts fourthly of an Adjunct of divers Subjects 1. § First a Cause of divers Effects And so a Plant may be said to be a Whole because of Plants some heat others cool c. Secondly an Effect of divers Causes as Mice some of which are said to be generated of the Sun others of Mice c. Thirdly a Subject of divers Adjuncts as Men some of which are said to be bond some free some good some bad c. An Adjunct of divers Subjects as Diseases some of which are said to be of the Mind some the Body these again either of the Brain Eyes Lights c. CHAP. XV. Of Cause and Caused in general Ax. 1. A Cause is that by the Force of which a thing comes to pass COMMENTARY 1. § Principle Element and Cause are Words that are ally'd in Signification Principle is either largely taken or strictly Largely it is defined Book 4. Of the Metaphysicks Cap. 1. to be the First from whence any thing is or exists or is known More strictly Book 4. Of the Physicks Cap. 5. where Principles are defined to be those things which are neither from one another nor others and of and from which are all things In this Sense there are only reckon'd Three viz. Matter Form and Privation The Definition of Element is Extant Book 4. Of the Metaphysicks Cap. 3. and is thus An Element is that our of which any thing at the first is compounded in which it is and which in its own Species is indivisible into any other Species 2. § Cause is here said to be that by which a thing is that is which confers somewhat towards the things Existence and therefore Privation cannot be a Cause because it confers Nothing but only towards its Mutation Ax. 2. A Caused is that which is constituted of its Causes Ax. 3. The Cause is before it s Caused both in Nature and Knowledge 1. § In Nature because the Caused depends upon the Cause Knowledge that is simply and distinct Knowledge which follows the Order of Nature For to us the Cause is more known than it because nearer to the Senses For from the Senses do we derive all our Sensible Knowledge Ax. 4. The Causes are Four viz. Matter Form Efficient and End 1. § This Partition is extant Book 2. Of the Post Cap. 2. Book 2. Of the Physicks Cap. 3. and Book 4. Cap. 2. And is built upon the best Reason For whatever is made is made by another For nothing is made by its self There is therefore an Efficient Cause Nothing finite can produce any thing out of nothing There is therefore Matter out of which things are to be made and Form which is introduc'd upon that Matter when things are made Nothing lastly acts without Design there is therefore an End for whose sake the Cause Efficient acts Ax. 5. The Caused of Matter and Form is call'd the Composed of the Efficient the Effect of the End the Means or Designed and these differ not in Reality but Reason 1 § And since to the Constitution of the Caused Four Causes concur as in all Corporeal things there do it ought not to seem strange that one and the same thing should be called Composed Effect Means c. according as it is compared with divers Causes Ax. 6. In every Genus there is a certain Subordination of Causes Ax. 7. Subordinate are those that depend one upon another 1. § To wit either as to their Existence and so the Son upon the Father the Father upon the Grandfather or Causality and so the Quill upon the Hand in Writing or both and so the Second Causes upon the First or Creatures upon God Ax. 8. Causes likewise are said either to be Essentially or Accidentally subordinated Ax. 9. Essentially are those of which one depends upon another when and in as much as it causes Ax. 10. Accidentally Of which one indeed depends upon another but not when or in as much as it causes 1. § And so a Cause is said to be two Ways subordinated by Accident First when it depends indeed upon a superiour Cause but not when that is when it Causes and this is Effected when it depends upon it
the Effect the less Principal as far as it causes is always worse than or inferiour to the Effect 1. § When we compare the Effect with the Cause we are to consider the Cause as it is such that is according to that Virtue by which it causes when the Virtue of the Cause is such as that it contains in it whatever is in the Effect it is said to be a principal Cause The Effect is said to be contained in the Cause either formally or eminently When formally or the Effect is of the same Nature with the Cause the Cause is said to be univocal and is equal to its Effect as when Heat begets Heat or a Mouse a Mouse When Eminently or the Cause by a Nobler Sort of Virtue produces the Effect it is said to be Aequivocal and is better than its Effect as when Light produces Heat or the Architect an House when neither formally nor eminently it is said to be less Principal and that not so much effects as subserves the Principal in producing the Effect Ax. 22. The less Principal is subdivided into procatarctical Proëgumenal and Instrumental Ax. 23. Procatarctical is that which Extrinsically excites the principal Cause to Action Ax. 24. The Proëgumenal which inwardly disposes or also excites the principal Cause to Action 1. The Cause in Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Procatarctical in Latin may be called Incipiens or Inchoans that is beginning or inchoating And is either Object Occasion Author or Merit So far it may be said to be the Object as it moves or excites the principal Cause to Action Occasion is the Conveniency of Time and Place to act in which it self also has some Force of moving to Action in as much as it removes Impediments to Action Author here is said to be him who proposing Reasons persuades the principal Cause either to or from Action He is also call'd the Moral Cause Merit or Meritorious Cause is that which moves the Agent to a Requital and that either in good or evil things And even all these are without the principal Cause In which they are distinguished from the Proegumenal which consists in the principal Cause it self For Example If any one walking about in the Night should see many precious things in the open House of his Enemy from whom just before he had receiv'd an Injury to be negligently kept and at the Instigation of another should take them away The objective Cause of of this would be the Precious Things themselves exciting the Covetousness of the Thief the Occasion the Darkness of the Night and open House which in no little Measure further him in his Purpose the Author or Moral Cause he who instigated him the Meritorious the Injury received for which the Thief comes to be more prone to steal The Proëgumenal Cause is the proper Avarice of the Thief Farthermore Author or Cause Moral has Place only in voluntary Causes Object Occasion Meritorious and Proëgumental also in others Occasion is sometimes taken for Cause Meritorious As when an Injury committed or done is said to be the Occasion of a Fight or War or Slaughter and in this Sense if feigned is call'd by the Greeks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the Latins Pretext The Proëgumenal either disposes only the principal Cause as when the Temperament of the Body is said to be the Cause of Manners or also moves it and spurs it on As when Anger is said to be the Cause of Revenge or Avarice of Theft 2. § The Procatarctical and Proëgumenal Causes are of great Use in Physick For Physicians reduce almost all Diseases to three Causes Procatarctical Proegumenal and Synectical or Containing The Procatarctical with them is the External and Evident Cause The other Two the Internal and hidden Causes The Proëgumenal the Antecedent The Containing the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or that which is connate with and also exists together with the Disease and coheres immediately with it and this with us is the next Cause For Example The Procatarctical Cause of the Fever is either Cold or the Astringent Bathes the Proëgumenal the Skin bound up and Evaporation hindred the Containing the Humour Putrescent and accended Ax. 25. The Instrumental Cause is that which subserves the principal Cause in its Effecting 1. § All Instruments subserve not the Principal in the like Manner For there are some Instruments joyn'd to the principal Cause in acting and there are some in acting separate from them Those are Instruments conjoyn'd of which the principal Cause makes use in the Effection of the thing And these are either Active as the Heat in the Fire or Passive as a Knife a Sword c. Separate Instruments are those which act in the place and stead of the principal Cause So the Ambassadour is the Instrument of the Prince and the Seed seems to many the Instrument of Generation but mistakenly For separate Instruments have no Place in Naturals but Morals And this brings us to the next Maxim viz. Ax. 26. The Essence of Instruments consists in their Fitness for Use 1. § Instruments says Aristotle Book 2. of An. Cap. 4. in Offices and Uses are distinguish'd or convene amongst themselves For every Instrument is that which it is because and so far as it is fit for some certain Use So an Ax is so far an Ax as that in the Quality of its Matter and Form it is fit to cut And the Eye so far an Eye as it is fit to see with For the Eye the Hand and other Organical Parts of Man or Beast when dead are not Eye or Hand unless Homonymously or ambiguously that is doubtfully as Aristotle says Book 4. of the Meteors Cap. 17. Ax. 27. Sixthly Cause Efficient is divided into First and Second Ax. 28. The First is that which depends upon none Ax. 29. The Second which depends upon the First 1. § A Cause is Two Ways said to be First to wit absolutely or in its own Genus That is said to be absolutely on which all things depend both when they are Made Exist and Operate or as they say in Fieri Esse and Operation The Cause absolutely First is only One to wit God For all things depend on God both as to their Making Being and Operating according to that of the Apostle St. Paul Acts 17. In him we live and move and have our Being Furthermore all things are said to depend upon God as they are made or in Fieri as they say by reason of Creation and that either proximately or remotely as they are or in being by reason of Conservation as they operate of his Providence either ordinarily or extraordinarily c. 2. § That Cause is said to be First in its own Genus on which the rest of the Causes of the same Genus depend Such a First Cause is not only given in every Genus of Causes but also in every Subordination So Adam is the first Cause of Men in his Species
Note or Affection of Quality arises either from Contrariety or Disposition of the Matter Habit and patible Qualities receive more and less from Contrariety For they are remitted when intermixed with their Contrary and intended when they are free from it Light excepted which altho' a a Patible Quality yet is intended or remitted upon the Account of the unequal Disposition of the Subject because is has not a Contrary After the same Manner are the natural Powers intended and remitted To which nothing is contrary with which they can be mixed Ax. 13. Things by Quality are said to be like or unlike 1. § For Likeness and Unlikeness are Relations agreeable to things by Reason of their Qualities CHAP. VII Of Things related to each other Ax. 1. THose things are said to be related which in Respect of what they are are said to be others that is of others or in any other Manner or Respect are referred to 〈◊〉 1. § This Definition of things related is Extant in the Beginning of the First Chapter of the Categories Ax. 2. Relateds are usually divided into Relateds in Respect of their Names and those in Respect of their Essence Ax. 3. Relateds according to their Names are absolute things which include or connote a Relatition and therefore not in Essence but in Name only are referred to something else Ax. 4. Relateds according to their Essence are those things in whom to be and to have respect to something else is the same thing or whose Essence is wholly placed in the Respect they bear to some other thing 1. § Relateds in Respect of their Names and Relateds in Respect of their Essence differ not in the Nature of their Relation but their Names For the Names which agree to Relateds according to their Names signifie of themselves first an Absolute thing and secondly connote a Relation which is included in that Absolute thing But to Relateds according to their Essence are such Names given which of themselves signifie a Relation and connote an Absolute thing which that Relation presupposes as it were its Subject For Example Knowledge and a thing Knowable are said to be Relateds according to their Names because Science is the Name of a Quality which includes a Respect to the Object knowable or which may be known And therefore the whole Essence of Science is not placed in Respect to the Object which may be known Nay the Essence of Knowledge or Science is an Absolute Quality which is yet said to be referred to another because it connotes a Relation But Father and Son are Relateds according to their Essence because these Words of themselves first signifie a Relation or Mutual Respect and therefore the whole Essence of the Father as he is Father is placed in Respect to the Son and that of the Son in Respect to his Father For what is it else to be a Father but to have a Son and to be a Son but to have a Father 2. § From Relateds according to their Names little or nothing differ Relateds transcendent so called because they surpass or transcend all the Bounds of Categories For there is nothing to which such Relateds do not agree So Accident to the Subject Action to the Object Part to the whole and Cause to the Caused c. Ax. 5. Relateds are also divided into Relateds Real and Relateds Rational Ax. 6. Relateds Real are those which of their own Nature and without the Help of the Mind are referr'd to some other thing Ax. 7. Relateds of Reason are such as only by the Operation of the Mind are referred or related to somewhat else 1. § For Example Father Son Husband and Wife and other Relateds of that sort are real Relateds because the Father's being the Son's Father and the Husband 's the Wive's Husband does not depend upon the Cogitation of our Mind But Right and Left are Relations of Reason because that to one standing betwixt two Columns this should be Right that Left rather than the Contrary is from the Ordination of the Mind In this Sense to the Heaven also we assign Right and Left Before and After and other Differences of Positions But that One Hand shou'd be called Right and the other Left seems not to be attributed to Reason but Nature To Relateds of Reason also Identity or Sameness is to be referred For when any thing is so compared with it self as that it is said to be the same with it self that one thing is so used by the Understanding as if it were two Hitherto also refer Beings of Reason which are mutually referred to each other as Genus and Species Subject and Predicate c. Ax. 8. In every Relation are required Subject and Term. Ax. 9. That is called the Subject to which the Relation is attributed or that which is referred to some other thing Ax. 10. That the Term to which the Subject is referred Ax. 11. The Subject is said to be the Relate and the Term the Correlate when affected with a Relation and considered together with it Ax. 12. Related and Correlated are mutually referred each to the other and that not in one but a two-fold Relation Ax. 13. In which Reciprocation or mutual Relation that which is the Subject of one Relation is the Term of the other and so on the contrary Ax. 14. As also that which is in one Relation the Relate is in the other the Correlate and so on the contrary 1. § These things that you may understand suppose we between the Father and the Son Two Relations to intercede of which the One in which the Father is referred to the Son is commonly called Paternity the Other in which the Son is referred to the Father Filiation or Son-ship But Paternity and Filiation are not one but two Relations diverse from each other Because the Father is otherwise related towards the Son than the Son is towards the Father These Two Relations require two Subjects and two Terms which are two Men as suppose Philip and Alexander Philip is the Subject of Paternity Alexander the Term. On the other side Alexander is the Subject of Filiation Philip the Term Father is the Relate in Paternity Son the Correlate On the other side Son is the Relate in Filiation Father the Correlate 2. § Father the Subject of Relation is wont vulgarly to be distinguished into Subject of Inhaesion and Subject of Denomination But these things have more in them of Subtilty than Truth Ax. 15. Some Relations are supposed supposing the Subject and Term Others besides these do require a Foundation Ax. 16. And a Foundation is that by whose Means the Relation accrews to the Subject 1. For Example When an Egg is said to be like an Egg the Similitude between these two Eggs arises in each as soon as they begin to exist nor is there any thing required towards their Relation besides the Existence of two Eggs. But the Relation of Servant does not presently arise in the Subject so soon as
for Existence and not Causality After this manner depends the Father upon his Ancestors in the begetting of his Son and every near Cause upon the more remote Secondly when it also depends upon a Superiour Cause when it causes or for its Causality but not for as much as it causes or not in the same manner after which it causes In this manner the Statuary is subordinate to the Heavens in the making of the Statue For because the Statuary stands in need of the Virtue of the Heavens towards his Work he may be said to depend upon the Heavens in Respect of his Causality but because not as he makes the Statue but as he lives He is said to depend upon the Heavens by Accident and to be Accidentally subordinated to them in the making of the Statue In the same manner the Horse spurr'd on by his Rider hurting his Leg halts The hurt Leg is the Cause of his Halting subordinated to the Rader by Accident For the Leg or Horse is impell'd on by the Rider to Motion but not to a vitious Motion c. Ax. 11. In such a Subordination there is ever one next Cause the rest are remote Ax. 12. The next Cause is that which immediately constitutes the Caused Ax. 13. Remote that which concurs to the Constitution of the Caused by the Mediation of some other Cause of its own Genus 1. § A Cause is said to be next two Ways either in its own Genus or absolutely That is said to be absolutely next which not only immediately but by its own Existence constitutes the Caused And so that it being supposed it is necessary the Caused be so too The next Cause in its Genus we have already defined and have said it immediately concurs towards the Constitution of the Caused no other of its own Order coming between One thing may have many Causes in their own Genus next but one only that is absolutely next which in Substances is Form Accidents Efficient and End So whereas to Man the Proximate Matter is Humane Body Efficient Father End Well-being Form Rational Soul the Rational Soul yet only is the next absolute Cause Ax. 14. Lastly In every Genus there are some Causes Total some Partial Ax. 15. That Cause is total which in its Species wholly causes the Whole Caused Ax. 16. That Partial which joyned with the other Causes of its own Species causes the Caused only in Part. 1. § In every Genus of Causes there are many Species's of Cause and those either Subordinate as Cause First and Second Next and Remote Principal and Instrumental or Coordinate of which one depends not upon another A Total Cause is said wholly to constitute the Caused because not assisted by other Causes of its own Species For Example The Writing depends upon the Quill and the Hand but upon both as total Causes For the Quill is only or wholly the Instrumental and the Hand the Principal Cause So likewise when God the Sun and Man are said to Generate Man every one of these Causes is Total God is the First the Sun or Heaven is the total Universal Man the total Second and Particular But when two Horses draw in a Cart they are said to be partial Causes because they are both of the same Species which brings us to the next Axiom viz. Ax. 17. Of One thing there cannot be many total Causes of the same Species but there may be many different in Species and Subordinate 1. § If many Causes not Subordinate do concur to the same Caused of necessity they must be Partial For the total Cause causes the whole thing Wherefore if there are many total Causes either the rest cause Nothing and so are not Causes or else cause again what was caus'd before But if Causes different in Species are Subordinate it may so be that the same Caused may depend upon many Causes total So the whole Writing depends on the Hand and the Quill and the whole Man upon God and the Sun and his Parents CHAP. XVI Of Matter and Form Ax. 1. OF the Four Causes Two are Internal Matter and Form and as many External Efficient and End Ax. 2. Those Causes are said to be Internal which enter the Essence of the Caused as Parts COMMENTARY 1. § Altho' Form be far more noble than Matter and confer more to the Constituting the Caused yet it is not to be doubted but that Matter also is part of the Essence and not only a Vehicle or Receiver Ax. 3. Matter in Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is defined to be that out of which inexisting something is made 1. § This Definition is extant Book 2. of the Physicks Cap. 3. and Book 4. of the Metaph. Cap. 2. But it may more Fully and Explicatiously be defined in this Manner Matter is an Internal Cause of which any thing is made or consists Why I add Consists will be sufficiently understood out of the 9th Theoreme Matter is also defined Book 2. Post Cap. 11. but more obscurely to be That which any thing being supposed of Necessity must be so too 2. § Generally Matter is divided into that out of which in which and about which That out of which is that which is properly so called and we have but now defined In which the Subject about which the Object Of which in their Places Ax. 4. The Offices of Matter are two to take up Forms and sustain them and with the Form to constitute the Composed Ax. 5. Matter is either First or Second Ax. 6. The first Matter is informed Ax. 7. The Second formed 1. § Altho' no Matter may exist without Form yet Because Matter is not altogether nothing nor the same with Form why may it not by it self be understood not understanding Form And this is the first Matter which Aristotle Book 1. of the Physicks Cap. 9. defines in this Manner That is Matter says he which is the first Subject out of which any thing is made So that it is not in it by Accident and if it should be spoiled it would be into that resolved at last Nor is it yet to be thought that the First and Second Matter are two several Matters Nay one and the same Matter is said to be first and second as it is this way or that way considered Ax. 8. Farther Matter is either of Natural or Artificial Bodies 1. § For Example Elements are the Matter of Mix'd Bodies Seed of Living Gold or Silver of the Cup Wood of the Shelf c. Ax. 9. And both of these either of Composition or Generation Ax. 10. The Matter of Composition is that of which a thing consists Ax. 11. Of Generation out of which it is made 1. § For Example The Body is the Matter of Composition in an Animal Seed of Generation In things of Art the Matter of Generation and Composition is almost the same as also in Meteors For a Shelf is made and consists of Wood Clouds of Vapours Ice of Water c.
that it be conjoin'd with the Patient and 2dly unlike unto it 1. § The first of these is precepted Book 7. Physicks Cap. 3. and the other Book 1. of Gener. and Corrup Cap. 7. An Efficient is said to be two ways joined to the Patient to wit either by Existence vulgarly call'd Suppositum or Virtue For Example When Fire burns Wood it is conjoyn'd to the Wood by its Existence when heats the Sitters by it is not joyn'd to them by its Existence but Power or Virtue 2. § An Agent likewise is said to be Two Ways unlike the Patient either as to Species or Degree In the first manner Hot to Cold in the last that which is more hot to that which is less hot or that which is more cold to that which is less cold Those which neither the one cannot act upon the other or suffer from it any manner of ways Ax. 9. Thirdly the Efficient is divided into free and necessary Ax. 10. A Free is that which Causes Consultedly or with Design Ax. 11. A Necessary not but by Necessity of Nature 1. § Liberty in general is a Faculty of doing what one pleases and therefore he who is absolutely free is free from all Servitude Law imposed upon him by others Coaction and Necessity of Nature But when the Will is said to be free and a free Cause opposed to a Necessary nothing farther is understood by the Name of Liberty but an Immunity from Coaction Necessity and natural Determination For he who is a Servant or Subject to another's Law enjoys the Liberty of his own Will when he judges that he is to live according to the Law or Beck of him with whom he lives But Natural Necessity and Coaction evert Liberty Why therefore is not coacted Cause contained in this Division Because he who is compell'd is so compell'd by another as that he conduces nothing to the Effect himself and therefore cannot be numbered amongst the Efficients 2. § By Natural Necessity we understand not only that by which Inanimate things act as Plants but that also by which Brutes and Infants before the Use of Reason For the Actions of Brutes and Infants proceed almost in the same manner from Natural Instinct and Sense as do the Actions of Plants from Nature it self In this Sense are the Parts of the Division immediately opposed and in this are contained all the Species's of Causes which follow Ax. 12. A free Cause can act and not act what how and when it pleases Ax. 13. A Necessary is determin'd to one certain thing and acts both when and as much as it can 1. § For Example For this Cause is one said freely to dispute or write because Voluntarily and of ones own Accord one disputes or writes and also because one can dispute or not dispute and the Disputation begun can at Will interrupt or do any of those things which are said to be in our own Power For to these only does the Liberty of the Will extend Causes necessary are determin'd to one thing that is they can but cannot but act and that only which they do and nothing else and as much as they can So Fire cannot but heat fit Matter and heats every thing so much as that it cannot heat it any more Ax. 14. Fourthly Cause Efficient is divided into Cause by it self and Cause by Accident Ax. 15. Cause by it self is that which as it is such produces an Effect of its own Council and agreeable to its Natural Disposition Ax. 16. By Accident which not as such or else besides its own Council or Natural Propension 1. § That a Cause Efficient be a Cause of it self two Conditions thus are required First that the Effect answer to its Council or Natural Propension to its Council if a Free Propension if a Necessary The other that it produce it as such If either of these are wanting the Cause is said to be by Accident If the first because some Event or Effect by Accident coheres with the Effect which is produc'd by the Cause Efficient by it self As when one digging up the Earth finds a Treasure For to dig the Earth is the Effect of the Digger by it self with which Effect the finding of the Treasure by Accident that is besides the Council of the Digger and Nature of the Digging is joyn'd So when an Animal begets a Monster it is the Cause of the Monster by Accident Because the Generation of the Monster is joyned with that of Nature by Accident and besides its Scope and Intention If the latter that is if the latter Qualification be wanting the Cause is said by Accident because the Effect is not ascrib'd to the Cause but that which happens to it As when Polyclete or a Musician is said to be the Cause of a Statue For neither does Polyclete make the Statue as he is Polyclete or Musician as he is Musician but a Statuary For it is Accidental to the Statuary that he is either Polyclete or a Musician See Book 2. of the Physicks Cap. 2. Ax. 17. To cause by Accident are reduc'd Fortune and Chance 1. § Videlicet To the first Species of it which is said to be by reason of its Effect Fortune in Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is defin'd by Aristotle Book 2. of the Physicks Cap. 5. thus It is therefore manifest that Fortune is a Cause by Accident in those things which are done for the sake of something and consultedly undertaken By Themistius in his Periphrase upon this Place more fully to be a Cause by Accident of those things which neither necessarily nor often but rarely happen and in those alone which for the sake of something are consultedly undertaken 2. § Now Chance in Creek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is a Cause by Accident of those things which rarely happen and that in all those things which are undertaken for the sake of another and not only consultedly For Chance extends farther than Fortune For whereas both are Causes by Accident which act for the sake of some End and are conversant in things rarely happening Fortune only is placed in those things which act consultedly Chance also in those which act by Necessity of Nature as in Infants Brutes Plants and also inanimate things in which there is no Place for Fortune As for Instance when any one digging finds a Treasure we may say that 't was by Chance or Fortune done But when a Tile falling from a House shall wound a Passer by that is we say by Chance not Fortune done All Fortune therefore is Chance but not on the contrary as is said Book the same Cap. 6. Altho ' these Words are often confounded Ax. 18. Fifthly Cause Efficient is divided into Principal and less Principal Ax. 19. A Principal is that which produces the Effect by its own Virtue Ax. 20. A Less which inserves the Principal towards its producing the Effect Ax. 21. The Principal Cause is either equal to or nobler never worse than
or of greater Antiquity than another thing Ax. 4. Nature two Ways viz. in Consecution of Existence and Causality 1. § Aristotle indeed affirms that alone to be first in Nature which is first in Causality But that also seems to be reasonably so call'd which is first in Consecution of Existence viz. Ax. 5. That from which Consecution of Existence is not reciprocated And 1. § This Simplicius interprets in this manner That says he is said to be first which another thing being supposed is it self supposed But that supposed that other thing is not supposed For Example Supposing the Binary Number you suppose also Unity but supposing Unity you suppose not the Binary Number and supposing Man you suppose also Animal but supposing Animal you do not suppose also Man Unity therefore is before the Binary Number and Animal before Man And likewise every Genus before its Species and Species its Individual as to Consecution of Existence Ax. 6. That which is before in Causality is that which is reciprocated according to the Consecution of Existence and is every way the Cause why the other exists 1. § So the Sun is before its Light and Thing Truth of Speech For altho' the Sun and Light Thing and Truth of Speech may be reciprocated according to Consecution of Existence and mutually take away and suppose each other Yet the Sun is the Cause of its Light and the Thing of Verity in Speech Because as the Thing is or is not the Oration is said to be true or false In this manner therefore the Sun is said to be before its Light and the Thing Verity in Speech 2. § That which is before in Causality or Nature causing farther by the Testimony of Aristotle Book 2. of the Parts of An. Cap. 1. is said to be two Ways viz. either by Nature so generating or intending That which is first by Order of Nature generating that is which is most simple As the Parts the Whole Principles and Elements than the things which out of such Principles and Elements are made Of Nature intending that which is the most perfect and for whose sake and Cause other things were made As the Whole than its Parts that which consists of Principles and Elements than the Principles and Elements themselves and every End than its Means c. Ax. 7. That is said to be First in Disposition which is the least distant from the beginning 1. § So the Exordium in a Speech is before its Proposition the Proposition the Narration the Narration the Confirmation the Confirmation the Refutation and the Refutation the Epilogue c. And in every Discipline that which is first delivered Ax. 8. That in Dignity is always first which is of the more Worth or Value So the Magistrate is before the Subject the Father the Children the Master the Servant Gold Silver Virtue Gold c. Ax. 9. In Cognition that which is most easily known 1. § Of this Mode no Mention is made by Aristotle in this Place But in Book 4. of the Metaph Cap. 11. and Book 6. of the Top. Cap. 4. he does mention it Where that which is first in Cognitions he calls more known or rather that I may so say more noscible A Thing is so said two Ways viz. either simply or in regard of us That is said to be so simply which is so according to Reason and them in whom Reason is rightly disposed To us which as to the Senses and vulgarly Those things therefore are said to be simply more known which by their own Natures are first as Universals Singulars or less Universals Parts than their Whole Principles than those things which are made of such Principles But to us which are Posterior in Nature and more Neighbouring upon the Senses Farther those things which are simply so are more known according to a distinct and perfect Knowledge For a distinct and perfect Knowledge follows the Order of Nature and lies in them which are endued with a well-disposed Mind But those things which to us are according to a confused and imperfect Knowledge which takes its Original from the Senses c. Ax. 10. Things also are said to be together as many Ways as first But Two are more used than the rest and those are Time and Nature Ax. 11. Those things are said to be together in time which exist at the same time and that may be said 1. § Two Ways viz. Simply or according to something Those things are said to be together simply which take their Originals together at the same time as Equals Some respect of which the one begins before the other ends As such as live at the same time or are Contemporaries So Aristotle and Plato are said to be Contemporaries altho' Plato was born before him and died before him Ax. 12. Together in Nature also Things may be said two Ways viz. some simply or absolutely and others according to something or in some respect And Ax. 13. Such things are said to be so absolutely which are reciprocated indeed according to Consecution of Existence but yet not so as that the one should be the Cause why the other exists 1. § So the Relate and Correlate are said to be together in Nature and two Effects depending upon the same next Cause As to be risible and capable of Disciplines in Man Ax. 14. Those things are said to be together according to something or with respect to some third which are opposed under the same Genus in Division each to the other 1. § So Man and Beast are said to be together nor simply and of themselves but in respect of Animal For Animal is predicated of both together and not first of the one and then of the other In which the Synonymous Genus is distinguished from the Homonymous because this is not predicated together of its Species's but first of one and then of the other And thus far of Affections of simple Theme as well the simple as the conjoyned CHAP. XXIV Of Interpretation in general and of Noun and Verb. Ax. 1. INterpretation is an Articulate Voice signifying the Conceptions of the Mind according to Institution 1. § Of Voices the one is Articulate whilst the other not That we call Articulate which consists of so many Syllables or Letters as so many Joynts So that it may be written as Man Animal c. Inarticulate which consists not of Syllables and Letters as the other and may not be written as Lowing Whynnying Weeping and Laughing c. According to Institution that is the Arbitrary Use of Men which use the same Society in whose Power it is to give Force and Law to Speech Or Interpretation might have been defin'd in this Manner viz. Interpretation is a Symbol consisting of an Articulate Voice signifying the Conception of the Mind according to Institution Which brings us to the next Observation Ax. 2. That Interpretation must be perspicuous that is distinct proper and used Ax. 3. Interpretation is either Word or
If Science it is call'd Demonstrative or Apodictical as Cap. 2. Soph. Elench And if Opinion or other Assent besides Science it is called Dialectical c. Ax. 3. So that a Dialectical Syllogism is nothing more than a Syllogism Generating Opinion or any other Assent besides Science Or as Aristotle explains himself Book 1. of his Top. Cap. 1. arguing out of Probables And he is thought the best Dialectick who can best defend his own and dilute or wash away the Opinions of his Adversary c. Ax. 4. And in treating of this sort of Syllogism we are to consider of Questions Propositions and Invention of Arguments Ax. 5. And a Question here may be any thing provided it contradict not Piety good Manners or common Sense 1. § For he that shall call in Question whether God be to be worshipped or Parents Honoured or the Magistrates to be obeyed ought rather to be punished than followed with Dialectical Arguments So he that shaâ—â— doubt whether the Snow be white is not otherwise to be convinc'd than by the Testimony of his outward Sense which he who disbelieves what is iâ— that he will believe c. Ax. 6. So that concerning the Subject of the Dialectical Problemes we need not much to be sollicitous anâ— their Attributes are either of the first or second Notions of which those constitute Real these Notional Problemes c. Ax. 7. A Real is when the Attribute of thâ— Question is real as is a Place a Superficies or so A Notional when a Notional as is Superficies the Gonus of Place or so Because Genus is not a true thing but a second Notion or Logical and only feign in the Mind whereas a Superficies is a true thinâ— and not feign'd in the Mind c. Ax. 8. Real again are either absolute or compared Ax. 9. Absolute that in which sought whether tâ—â— Attribute agrees to the Subject or no. Ax. 10. Compared when two or more Subject being proposed it is asked which the Attribute â—â—grees or disagrees most to or two or more Attributes whether of them agrees more or most to 〈◊〉 Subject c. 1. § For Example When saught whether Glery to be numbered amongst our good things it is an Aâ—solute Probleme when whether Virtue or Glory a most to be desired or Alexander more Valiant or Tâ—â—â—rate a Compared Ax. 11. Problemes Dialectical of what kind soeveâ— may be taken out of all Disciplines whatsoever Ax. 12. Propositions Dialectical are to be true 〈◊〉 least probable not Paradoxal that is against the common or receiv'd Opinion For how shall the Respondent grant that which is against the common or râ—ceiv'd Opinion and which it may be he judges to be false But let us take some Notes from the Learned Hereboord and so end this Chapter Notes and Observations from the Learned Hereboord having Relation to this Chapter 1. A Dialectical Syllogism may also thus be defin'd A Dialectical Syllogism is that which begets Opinion Human Faith or Doubt or any other Assent besides Science or Error which distinguishes it likewise from the Sophistical Syllogism 2. A Syllogism Dialectical is also by another Name called Topical from the Greek Word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Place in Latin Probabilis that is Probable or Contingent because tho' it produces a true yet is it an uncertain and infirm Assent because its Propositions tho' true are yet Contingent as may appear by what is said above 3. When a Paradox is said to be a Probleme true against the common Opinion it is not to be understood only of that of the Unlearned or Vulgar but also of the Multitude of the Lettered who have taken up with Principles Ancient and not so well examined such as that viz. the Earth moves which tho' it be true yet may it be so against the common Opinion and therefore a Paradox 4. A Term of Art signifies no more than this viz. a Term proper to every Art So Metonymy and Synecdoche are Terms of Art viz. Rhetorical Meridian Horizon Zodiac Astronomical Genus and Species Logical c. And this brings us to the next Consideration viz. that CHAP. XVI Of the Invention or finding out of Dialectical Arguments or Topical Places and Rules Ax. 1. NOW to the Invention or finding out of Probable or Dialectical Arguments belong Place and Rule A. 2. A Place is a Seat or certain Common Note by whose Admonition an Argument is found Ax. 3. A Rule a Canon or Proposition containing the Reason of the Consequence of Dialectical Syllogism c. Ax. 4. The Distribution of the Arguments here to be used viz. in Dialectical Disputations is usually into Artificial and Inartificial that is into those of Art to be drawn from the Consideration of the Parts of the Question and Testimonies which are to be found without Now the first Ax. 5. Are to be used for the Confirming or Refelling of all sorts of Problemes alike that is in the same manner being no other than Testimonies But the Artificial not but may be said to be of two sorts viz. those for the Confirming and Refelling of Notional and those for Confirming and Refelling of such as we have call'd real Problemes because concerned about real things Ax. 6. Now those of the first kind viz. for the Confirming and Refelling of Notional Problemes are always taken from the Nature or Propriety of that Affection or 2d Notion concerning which it is query'd in the Probleme 1. § Which or else some Canon belonging to it being placed in the Major an Assumption being made the controverted Affection is prov'd to be in the Subject as because Air is the Subject Matter of Wind we prove it not to be its Genus and because Immortality is the Affection of Life Eternal we prove it not to be its Genus both which Arguments lean upon this Rule viz. That that which is the Subject or Propriety of a thing cannot be its Genus c. given us Cap. 11. of the first Book And so Divines make it appear that good Works are not to be the Cause of our Justification because every cause is before its Effect But good Works are after our Justification and therefore not its Cause And this Argumentation leans upon this Foundation Theoreme 3. Cap. 15. of the first Book viz That every Cause is before it s Caused in Nature and Knowledge c. Such Syllogisms as these Aristotle calls Book 2. Post Cap. 8. Syllogisms Logical that is Notional and the Use of them is very great in all Discipline Ax. 9. Arguments of the other sort viz. for Proving or Refelling of real Problemes are always taken from the Affections belonging to the Nature of the Subject or Predicate as from their Places Ax. 10. Of which those are the best which are taken from the Nature of the Predicate because not sought whether the Subject be but Predicate or whether the Predicate be in the Subject or not c. 1. § Now for Examples of them both suppose any one
should argue in this manner viz. Animal is a Genus or Trissylable Man is an Animal And therefore Man is a Genus or Trissyllable c. Ax. 9. Secondly Taking away the Genus you take away the Species or that from which you take away the Genus you take away also the Species 1. § As if to prove that the Sense were not Science one should say it was not a Habit because if not a Habit it cannot be a Science since there is no Science but what is a Habit that is but what is comprehended under that Genus c. The Canons from hence observing the Cautions above-given are always very certain Ax. 10. The next Place is that of the Species which has three Canons First supposing the Species you suppose also the Genus or that to which the Species is attributed to that also the Genus c. 1. § And so it may be concluded that Logick is an Habit because it is an Art which is a Species of Habit c. Ax. 11. Secondly The Species's being all taken away the Genus is also taken away or that from which all the Species's are taken away from that also the Genus 1. § As Friendship is not Fortitude or Temperance or Justice or Prudence c. And therefore not a Virtue c. And such an Argumentation as this is a Syllogism of numeration of Parts Ax. 12. Thirdly That which to all the Species's that also to the Genus and that which to none that neither to the Genus c. 1. § And this Canon is the Foundation of Induction as well the Affirmed as Denyed Of which we have entreated in its proper Place to which Recourse may be had if the Reader shall so think fit for Examples Now all the Canons of this Place are very faithful Ax. 13. The Place from the whole has two Canons and first the whole being posited all the Principal Parts are so 1. § Or that to which the whole is attributed to that also all the Principal Parts as to Sempronius there was Maintenance given and therefore Clothes Victuals and Habitation c. I said the the Principal because the Whole being supposed that every the least Part that tends to the Integrity not Essence of it should be so is not necessary Ax. 14. Secondly That which agrees to the similar Whole that also to the Singular Parts of it and that which not to such a Whole that neither to any Part of it As for Instance 1. § Water by its own Nature is moist and therefore every Drop of it is moist The Heaven is not Corruptible and therefore not the Stars c. Here we are to take heed lest what is attributed to the Whole as Whole be not also attributed to the Part. For not because there is Water every where about the Earth does it follow that every Drop of it is every where about the Earth c. Now the Canons of this Place are very Certain Ax. 15. The Place from Parts has four Canons And first all the Parts being posited and joyned the Whole must be also posited too As for Instance 1. § Caesar occupied Belgium and Aquitaine and Celtica and therefore all Gallia I said united because positing all the Parts of a Whole and those Parts not united the Whole is not yet posited As for Instance a House which you know till the Materials are joyned as well as provided becomes not a House c. Ax. 16. The Second is taking away the Principal Part you take away also the Whole As for Instance 1. § Infants are destitute of the Knowledge of Christ and therefore of Faith I said the Principal Parts because the Hand taken away the Man does not die but becomes only lame but let it be the Head or the other Principal Part and he totally expires c. Ax. 17. Thirdly That which agrees to all the Parts that also to the Whole And that which to none that neither to the Whole c. 1. § As for Instance the Law Prophets Gospels with the Writings of the Holy Apostles are all Divinely inspir'd And therefore the whole Scripture is Divinely inspir'd The Walls Columns Beams Rafters Roof of the House c. seem not to be old And therefore the House seems not to be old c. Ax. 19. Fourthly That which agrees to a similar Part that also to the Whole and that which agrees not to the similar Part that neither to the Whole 1. § As for Instance Every Drop of Water is moist And therefore the Water it self is so The Stars are incorruptible And therefore the Heavens c. Here one is to take Care that that which agrees to the similar Part only by some External Cause and not the Condition of its proper Nature be not Concluded of the Whole For it does not follow from every Drop of Water's being round that the whole Element is so For besides that no Element besides the Earth is of any determinate Figure even the Rotundity of the Drops does not proceed from the Nature of the Water but the Paucity of their Matter by which it comes to pass that they cannot flow In other Cases the Canons of this Place are very certain Ax. 19. The Place from the Causes in general has this Canon viz. that the Cause being Actually put it is necessary that the Caused should be so too And so Vice versà 1. § The Cause in Act is said to be that which Causes or Exercises its Office and Causality Now it would imply a Contradiction for one to say that the Cause causes and yet that the Caused is not Caused as for Example That the Workmen are Building and yet that the House is not or that the House is a Building and yet that there are no Workmen c. Ax. 20. The Place from Matter has two Canons and first the Matter being taken away the Composed and also its Material Form are so 1. § As if you should prove where there is no Wood there can be no Ships or because Stones have no Organical Body neither can they have a Soul I said Material Form because Immaterial such as is the Humane Soul by taking away the Matter cannot be taken away c. Ax. 21. Secondly Such as is the Matter such is also the Composed 1. § As the Statue is of Worm-eaten or rotten Wood and therefore it self also is so This Canon takes Place only in Things made of Art For in other things it will be fallacious Ax. 22. The Place from Form has this Canon viz. Positing the Form the Composed also is posted and that taken away the Composed is also taken away 1. § As the Pigmies have a Rational Soul and therefore they are Men The Stars have not a Soul and therefore they do not live This Canon is altogether irrefragable provided the first Part be understood of Material Form For positing the Rational Soul that the Man should be so too is not necessary but yet this viz.
That he should be a Man if he has a Rational Soul is requisite and necessary c. Ax. 23. Place from Efficient has two Canons and the first of them is Such as the Cause is such is the Effect c. 1. § And thus God is very good and therefore his Works are so This Canon is deceitful unless cautiously used For first it sails in Causes that are by Accident For neither does it follow that a Son is good because his Father is so nor yet bad For a Son is not produc'd by his Father as he is good or bad but as he is a Man c. And so it fails in Equivocal Causes For it does not follow that the Sun is animated although it animates the World nor that the Whetstone is sharp although it sharpens Iron Lastly in Causes Voluntary when making use of their utmost Endeavours they do something which does not correspond to their Skill or Art As when a Painter paints less elegantly than becomes his Art c. Ax. 24 Secondly That which is the Cause of the Cause is also the Cause of the Caused c. 1. § As Virtue is partly from Nature partly from Institution partly from Custom Virtue is the Cause of civil Happiness And therefore civil Happiness is partly from Nature partly from Institution partly from Custom c. This Canon has Place only in Causes Subordinate of themselves For in Causes Subordinate by Accident it for the most part fails For it does not follow because God is the Cause of our Will and our Will is the Cause of Sin that therefore God is the Cause of Sin c. Ax. 25. Place from the End has this Canon viz. That the End being put there are also put the Means to that End 1. § And so Ovid concludes that Man was made with an upright Countenance because to contemplate the Heavens deeming that to be the End of an upright Figure The Words of the sweet Poet are these Omnia cùm spectent Animalia caetera Terram Os homini sublime dedit Caelùmque tueri Jussit erectos ad sydera tollere Vultus Which admirable Pare-Royal may be rendred in these two sorry Couplets in this manner And whereas other Animals behold With down-cast Looks this Sublunary Mold To Man he gave a stately upright Frame And bad him view those Heav'ns from whence he came Which tho' they fail as to their Versifcation yet may they serve to shew in some measure the Meaning of that memorable Passage of excellent Ovid. Now the Means are often express'd by a Negation of those things which impede the End As the Pupil or Apple of the Eye is to admit all Colours and therefore to be without Colour The Elect must be saved And therefore must not Sin unto Death c. But now tho' the End being put it is necessary that the Means should be so yet that the End not being put they should not be so is not always necessary For it is not necessary that a Man should be destitute of Books and Masters because he is not Learned c. Ax. 26. Now the Place from Caused has four Canons And the first is the Composed posited the Matter and Form must be so too And when that 's taken away the Material Form also must be taken away 1. § And so Plants are living things And therefore they must have a Body and Soul And Stones are not And therefore they must not have a Soul I said Form Material For that the Composed taken away the Matter should be so too Or the Form Immaterial is not necessary For it does not follow that there is no Iron because no Sword or that the Soul of Man is not because he dies c. Ax. 27. Secondly The Effect being posited it follows that either there is a Cause Efficient or else that there has been one 1. § As there is a Building and therefore there is or was an Architect to build it Here are the Footsteps and therefore this Way in all likelihood there has passed some Man c. Ax. 28. Thirdly Such as is the Effect such is the Cause that produc'd it 1. § As this Picture is fine and therefore so must the Artist be that drew it To this are to be added the same Limitations which were added to the first of the Place from Cause Efficient viz the Cautions against Accidentals and Aequivocals because in these Cases this Rule may fail us Ax. 29. Fourthly The Means taken away the End must also be so too 1. § As Stones are not nourished and therefore they do not live Many Men the Gospel will not be Preached to and therefore many Men by means of the Gospel will not be saved c. Ax. 30. The Place from the Subject has this Canon viz. that the Subject being posited the Propriety must also be so too and that taken away the Propriety must also be so too 1. § As Christ is God and therefore he has the Power to forgive Sins The Writings of the Fathers are not the Word of God and therefore they are not of Divine Authority c. Now these Canons without any Limitation are certain and firm Ax. 31. The Place for Adjuncts is of great Extent and has under it Proprieties Objects Signs and Circumstances Now Ax. 32. The Place from Proprieties has two Canons and first that to which the Propriety is given to that also the Subject And that to which the Propriety is not given to that neither the Subject c. 1. § As Christ is Omniscient and therefore he is God Angels fill up no Place and therefore they have not Bodies c. Ax. 33. The Second is that which is said of the Propriety may be also said of the Subject And that which cannot be said of the Propriety that neither of the Subject c. 1. § As a Talkative Person is to be avoided and therefore a Busie-Body or one that is inquisitive into other Peoples Matters A wise Man is not to repose himself upon things of a Fleeting and Transitory Nature and therefore not upon Riches or other Earthly Commodities or Goods c. Ax 34. The Place from Object in the second Place has this Canon viz. That that to which the Object is given to that also the Subject and that to which the Object is not to that neither the Subject c. 1. § As The Doctrine of fallacious Sophisms directs the Mind towards the Knowledge of things and therefore is a Part of Logick Logick has not things necessary for its Object and therefore is not Science c. The Arguments of this Place are very firm if drawn from proper Objects but otherwise only Probable As if one should say thus He talks of Military Affairs and therefore he is a Soldier Of Laws and therefore he is a Lawyer Her Delight is not in Womens Company and therefore she is not a Woman c. Ax. 35. Place from Sign has this Canon viz. Positing the
Sign viz. Antecedent Consequent or Conjoyned the thing signed is also posited and that taken away the thing signed also is taken away 1. § As it is Day and therefore the Sun will rise The Woman longs and therefore she has conceiv'd The Man flyes and therefore he is guilty of the discovered Conspiracy It is not Full-Moon and therefore there can be no Eclipse c. Now Arguments drawn from this Place also are firm when the Signs are necessary and proper to the thing signed otherwise they are only probable As he was not Sempronius 's Enemy and therefore he kill'd him not The Woman does not love the Boy and therefore she is not his Mother c. And therefore it is that the Philosophers make use of these so much the more sparingly Ax. 36. The Place from Circumstance lastly has this Canon viz. positing the Circumstance of the thing you posit the thing it self and taking that away you also take away the thing it self 1. § As he has stolen something out of a sacred Place and therefore he is Sacrilegious The Spring comes on and therefore Flowers will be found He goes covered with a Cowle or Hood after the manner of the Monks and therefore he is a Monk Christ was to be born in the time of the Jewish Polity and that at Bethlethem which Polity is not now in being as likewise Bethlehem And therefore Christ is not now to be born as believe the unconverted Jews but is so al-already He is not in Mourning and therefore he mourns not c. Arguments also from this Place are Part firm and Part probable and Use will be the only means to distinguish betwixt them And now we come to treat of the Canons belonging to Places Dissentaneous Compared and Testimonies CHAP. XVIII Of Canons belonging to Places Dissentaneous Compared and Testimonies Ax. 1. THE Place from Opposites in general has these two Canons And first that of which one of the Opposites is affirmed of that the other must be deny'd COMMENTARY 1. § As It is a House and therefore cannot be a Man he is sick and therefore cannot be sound c. And here the Laws are to be observed which we have recited Book 1. Cap. 22. concerning Opposition Ax. 2. The Second is The Predicates of Opposites are also opposed 1. § As. A just Man is he that keeps the Law and therefore an Unjust that transgresses it But here Care is to be taken lest their Difference or Affection Generical be predicated For it does not follow in that a Man has an Animate Body that a Beast has an Inanimate nor that because Whiteness is visible Blackness is invisible because to be animated is the Difference Generical of Man and Visible the Affection of Colour not Whiteness c. But this viz. that because Whiteness scatters therefore Blackness gathers the Sight is a good Consequence and does follow c. Ax. 3. The Place from Contraries has three Canons First that which takes up one Contrary that takes up another and that which takes not up one that neither another 1. § As Love is in the Concupiscent Appetite and therefore Hatred Right belongs not to Beasts and therefore they cannot suffer Injury c. Ax. 4. Secondly The Causes Effects and Adjuncts of Contraries are Contraries 1. § As Virtue is from a good and therefore Vice from an ill Habit. That makes one happy and therefore this miserable That is to be wished and therefore this to be shunned c. But here two things are to be avoided And First lest we take the Causes or Effects by Accident instead of those per se For it does not follow a good Man loves and defends his and therefore a wicked Man hates and deserts his Because Love to one's own is not from Virtue but Nature Secondly whose Effects are dependent on the Disposition of the Matter For by reason of Dissimilitude of Matter it often happens that the same Cause produces contrary Effects or contrary like For Heat hardens Clay and softens Wax and Threatnings not rarely produce that in some which in others Entreaties To wit because the Efficient acts not according to the Measure of its Virtue but that of the subjected Matter Ax. 5. Thirdly Of Contraries Immediate Of Necessity one of them must be in the Capacious Subject and the other not 1. § As Libertus is not a Servant and therefore he is free The Number is not even and therefore it is odd The Canons here observing the aforesaid Limitations are firm enough and especially the Third Ax. 6. Place from Relateds has but this Canon viz. posited one of the Relateds there is also posited the other And that taken away the other also is taken away 1. § As he to whom his Father is Master the same is his Father's Servant The Confederates of Rome are not their Subjects and therefore the Romans are not their Masters c. This Canon is most certain Ax. 7. The Place from Privatives has this Canon viz. Of Privatives The one must of Necessity be in the Capacious Subject the other not 1. § As he is blind and therefore does not see I says our Saviour am the Light of the World and therefore whosoever follows me walketh not in Darkness The Subject is said to be capable when so in respect to Nature and the time set by Nature c. This Canon holds firm Ax. 8. Place from Contradictings has this one Canon and that is one of the Contradictings being placed the other must be removed and so on the contrary 1. § This Canon is the very Foundation upon which lean the Principles of all Sciences and which whosoever denies has no Reason c. Ax. 9. That from the Major has two Rules or Canons and the first is that to which the Major agrees to that also the Minor 1. § As God gave Life to Man and therefore he will give Food Bodies and therefore Raiment c. Ax. 10. The Second That which convenes not to the Major that neither to the Minor 1. § As Angels are not pure before God and therefore much less Man A Man taken by his Enemies cannot make his Will much less a Traytor c. Ax. 11. Place from the Minor has also two Canons and first that to which the less does not agree to that neither the greater 1. § As It is not lawful to be angry with ones Brother rashly or without a Cause much less to kill him Ax. 12. Secondly That which to the Minor that also to the Major 1. § As An unchaste Look upon a Woman is a Sin and therefore Adultery God gives Food and Raiment to the Beasts and therefore how much more to Men c. Ax. 13. Place from Equal has three Canons and first to Equals equal things agree 1. § As It was lawful for David to eat the Shew-Bread to allay his Hunger and therefore for Christ's Disciples to pull the Ears of Corn and eat them on the Sabbath-Day to satisfie
Ax. 1. NOW Canons Compared are either of certain or else uncertain Place Ax. 2. And the first of these are either General or Special Of which these contain a Comparison in every those only in one certain Genus COMMENTARY 1. § For Example This Canon that whose Effect is more such that it self is more such is of certain Place because it expresses the Place of the Effect from whence this Argument is taken and General because Adaptible to all things which admit of any kind of Comparison But now that that which agrees to the better subject that it self is better is indeed of certain Place because indicating the Argument was fetch'd from the Place of the Subject But not General because only to be adapted to those things which are compared in Goodness But this that which is more lasting is best is of uncertain Place and Special because it neither expresses Where the Place of the Argument is Neither can it be Adapted to all things which are compared amongst themselves c. 1. § Now compared Canons from the Conjugates are these and first that to which one of the Conjugates more agrees to that also the other As Caesar consulted the Republick more than Bibulus and therefore in this respect was more a Consul than he Secondly If one of the Conjugates be better than one then the other of the Conjugates will be better than the other as if Piety be before Learning then a Pious Man will be before a Learned Man c. Thirdly From the Definition these and first that to which the Definition most agrees to that also the Defined as if the Definition of Whiteness be a Colour dispersing the Sight it will follow that that which is whitest disperses the Sight most c. Secondly That which agrees to the Definition that also to the Defined as if a Habit recalling the Affectious of the Mind and Actions to Mediocrity confers more to Felicity than Riches then Virtue confers more to Felicity than Riches c. So from Genus and Species Fourthly we have these as first that which agrees most to the Genus that also to the Species's and that which most to the Species's that also to the Individuals as if a Substance Immaterial be more perspicacious than a Corporeal then the Soul of Man separate will be more perspicacious than it is now when it is in the Body c. Secondly that which is contain'd under the better Genus or Species that also its self is better and so because a living thing is better than a not a Fly will be better than the Heavent c. Fifthly From the Whole and Part we have these as first if the whole Homogenous or whole consisting of Parts of the same Name and Nature be more so than such a Whole then its Part will be more so than such a Part and conrariwise as If Gold be heavier than Brass then it will follow that every Part of Gold observing the same Proportion of Magnitude will be heavier than the like Quantity of Brass c. Secondly that which is absolutely such or effects any thing as such its Whole will be more such and Effect that any thing else be more such than its Part and so if Rhubarb have a Power of Purging Choler then a Drachm will have a greater Power than has a Scruple because it is but the third Part of a Drachm c. Under which general Maxim are contain'd several special as first many Goods are to be preferr'd before fewer and so Virtue with Nobility is to be preferr'd before Virtue alone Secondly that which is Honest Pleasant and Profitable will be beyond that which is only Honest Pleasant or Profitable Thirdly that which encreases or diminishes Good by its Abcess or Access is better than that which neither encreases nor diminishes Good by its Abcess or Access Fourthly by how much more it encreases or diminishes Good by its Absence or Access by so much is it better than any other thing than the which it is better in this Respect c. Fifthly from Matter and Form in the next Place we have these and first that whose Matter is more so that also it self is more so So because Gold is better and more durable than Stone it follows that a Golden Statue is better and more durable than a Stone one c. Secondly that which has a Nobler Form that it self is also Nobler So because the Form of Man is better than that of Beasts because this is Immaterial and Immortal and that Material and Mortal it follows that Man is better than Beasts c. Sixthly From the Cause Efficient these and first that which by it self simply and by its Nature is such is more so than that which by Accident is such or in some respect or by Participation And so Meat as Meat is wholesomer than Physick because that of it self is so and this only by Accident and Light is more Profitable than Darkness because that is useful to all this only to Thieves and such as will abscond Lastly the Sun is more splendid than the Moon because that shines of its own Nature this only by Participation c. Secondly that which of it self and by its own Nature is more such that effects more and so on the Contrary So Fire heats more than Water when it is warm'd because hotter So you know Iron to be heavier than Wood because it more swiftly descends c. This Canon can be used only in Causes of them selves For in Causes by Accident it fails often For Iron red-hot altho' not hotter than Flame burns yet more vehemently the Density of its Matter assisting it and impressing the Heat more strongly upon the Patient and so in other Instances of the like Nature Thirdly that to which the Cause agrees most to that also the Effect and so on the Contrary So you may prove Old Men to be more Prudent than Young because they have more Experience in Things Fourthly that by which any thing is such that it self also must be more such And so because Water grows Warm by Fire it may be collected that the Fire is more Hot than it But this Canon in some Cases will fail us And first in Causes by Accident and Aequivocal For it does not follow that because some one is drunk by Wine that therefore Wine should be more drunk or because the Knife is sharpen'd by the Stone that therefore the Stone should be sharper than the Knife Secondly in Effects which receive not more or less As if you should prove the Father to be more a Man than his Son because the Son is so by his Means Thirdly those which depend not upon one Cause For although the Scholar derive his Learning from his Master yet it does not follow that the Master must be always Learneder than the Scholar For it may be that the Scholar may have more Ingeny and Industry than his Master c. Fifthly those whose Operation Work or Effect
the Argumentation is infirm and begetteth not Science When Subject frivolous and inept For in vain should we prove for Instance that the Pigmies are Cholâ—rick because of their short Stature unless it appears that there are Pigmies c. Of Premisses or Principles also that they are true For otherwise we lay a Foundation of Things that are not known It remains therefore that of the Affection it should be demonstrated that it is and of the whole Conclusion consisting of Subject and Affection that it be true or that the Affection is in the Subject c. Ax. 6. Of which Precognitions those that are self-evident that is so that no body can be ignorant of them are only made in the mind those not so but that they may be unknown are always express'd in the first Entrances of Sciences Ax. 7. And if so soon as produc'd they are believ'd by the Disciple they may be properly term'd Suppositions but if not and the Disciple be doubtful of them or even encline to a contrary Opinion Postulata or things to be required or demanded 1. § There are some things says Aristotle in Sciences of which no one can be ignorant and these they call Suppositions as we said before or Axioms that is such as carry such a Native Clarity with 'em as they are worthy of every body to be credited some of which one may But yet so soon as proposed by a Master are believed without Proof And such as these are termed Definitions And some not so immediately but delivered Precariously and by way as it were of Agreement because the Probation of them if any belongs to the Metaphysicks And such as these they call Postulata or things required or to be demanded c. And so we come to the Conditions which in every Demonstration Why are to be observed and First to those of the Question to be demonstrated and Medium which is to be used in Demonstration CHAP. XXII Of the Question to be demonstrated and Medium which is to be used in Demonstration Ax. 1. THE Conditions which are to be observ'd in Demonstration Why are partly belonging to the Question partly to the Cause or Medium of Demonstration and partly to the Premisses or Principles of which in the Chapter following Ax. 2. Every Question does not admit of a Demonstration Why but only that which is true and has a certain and immutable Cause of its Truth Ax. 3. And therefore neither Propositions immediate nor fortuitous can be demonstrated but only proper Accidents 1. § Now Propositions immediate cannot because they have no Medium or Cause of their Truth 1. § Chance likewise cannot because they have not any Dependance upon any certain Cause or Rule Accidents therefore and those proper only can be demonstrated For Substances have no Cause why they 're in the Subject because they are predicated always as Genus's or Differences And Accidents improper have no certain and definite Cause Now whether these Accidents proper flow from the Essence of the Subject or some External Cause or whether they be perpetual or only frequent it matters not But this that they cohere with their Causes so as that they being put these also be put and that being taken away these also may be taken away is necessary and required For Instance Altho' the Moon be not always deficient yet that she is so when so may be demonstrated because she is always so when the Earth is Diametrically interpos'd between the Sun and the Moon and never so when otherwise c. And so much of the Question to be demonstrated Ax. 4. Now the Medium of Demonstration must be the next Cause of the Predicate and that either Efficient or Final and if Efficient either Internal or External 1. § Now whereas Cause is said to be two Ways next that is either absolutely or in its own Genus In this Place is to be understood the Absolutely next that is such as that being put the Effect also must be put and that taken away the Effect also must be taken away And farther it is required that it be also the Cause of the Predicate For that it be also of the Subject is not so necessary because it is not enquir'd whether the Subject be for that is pre-supposed but whether the Predicate or in plainer Terms whether the Predicate be in the Subject or not c. 2. § This next Cause must be either Efficient or Final because the Predicate being an Accident has not Matter or Form properly so call'd The Cause Final is adhibited in those things which are done for the sake of another As Means Natural Instruments c. Also Actions and Habits if such are to be demonstrated and in other Cases the Efficient It happens sometimes indeed that the Cause Proximate viz. the Efficient is also the Form or Matter of the Subject and when it is so the better But however they differ not in Specie from the rest But these things will appear more by Examples as here 1. Every Rational Creature is capable of Science Every Man is a Rational Creaturâ— Every Man therefore is capable of Science c. In this is the Medium Rational the Cause Efficient Internal of the Predicate and Form of the Subject Here 2. Every Earthly thing is overwhelm'd wiâ—n thrown into the Water An Ebony-Tree is an Earthly thing And therefore every Ebony-Tree is overwhelm'd when thrown into the Water The Cause Efficient Internal and Matter of the Subject Here 3. Whatever consists of Matter and Form has a Three-fold Dimension Every body consists of Matter and Form And therefore every body has a Three-fold Dimension c. Cause Efficient Internal of the Predicate and both Form and Matter of the Subject Here 4. That which is endued with a Three-fold Dimension admits not of another Body's being with it in the same Place But every body is endued with a Three-fold Dimension c. The Cause Efficient Internal of the Predicate and the Propriety of the Subject c. Here viz. 5. That which the Earth being objected cannot be illustrated by the Rays of the Sun that suffers an Ecclipse of the Light receiv'd from the Sun But the Moon the Earth being objected cannot be illustrated with the Rays of the Sun c. The Cause Efficient External of the Predicate Here 6. He who was made for the Contemplation of Celestial Things ought to be of an upright Countenance Man was made for the Contemplation of Celesti-Things And therefore Man ought to be of an upright Countenance The Cause Final and also that of the Predicate c. 3. § Now sometimes it happens that the same Question may be demonstrated by the Cause Efficient together with the Final and so you may demonstrate that an Animal sleeps viz. either because the common Sense is sopited or drown'd by Vapours and the Passage of the External Senses obstructed And this is from the Efficient or else that the Spirits may be refresh'd and Strength
repair'd And this is from the Final c. 4. § Demonstrations Why are not only affirmed but also denied For as we may demonstrate that a Man is capable of Science because endu'd with Reason So also that a Beast is not because not c. For as an Affirmation is the Cause of an Affirmation so must a Negation be the Cause of a Negation c. See Book 1. Post Cap. 13. And so we proceed to the Chapter of the Conditions of the Principles of Demonstration in which we are taught what they ought to to be CHAP. XXIII Of the Conditions of the Principles of Demonstration Ax. 1. THE Conditions of the Principles or Propositions of Demonstrations Why are either Absolute or Related Ax. 2. Absolute are those which agree to the Propositions in themselves consider'd and Related as Compared with the Conclusion Ax. 3. The Absolute are these and first that the Propositions be necessarily true and reciprocal Secondly Immediate and First COMMENTARY True because a False cannot be known and also necessarily because from Propositions not necessary a necessary Conclusion cannot be drawn unless by Chance or Accident 2. § Immediate because if not there would be a Progress to Infinite which is inconsistent with the Nature of Rnowledge Ax. 4. These Two in the Major are required Necessarily but that the Minor supposing it be true should be also Necessary and Immediate is not absolutely Necessary 1. § For the Major is to consist of the Affection and its next Cause which are not only Reciprocated amongst themselves but also necessarily and immediately cohering But the Minor of the Affections Cause and Subject which it is not necessary should so closely cohere as that they should constitute a Necessary Immediate and Reciprocal Proposition since of the Affection not Subject the Knowledge is required c. 2. § Now the Minor is not necessary much less Reciprocal and Universally first when the Medium of the Demonstration is the Cause Efficient External of the Predicate For Example That which with the Rays of the Sun the Earth being objected cannot be illustrated that suffers a Defect of Light receiv'd from the Sun The Moon with the Rays of the Sun the Earth being objected cannot be illustrated And therefore c. In this Demonstration the Minor has no Degree of Necessity because it is not perpetual In Demonstrations from Cause Efficient Internal or Final indeed the Minor is always Necessary but not Reciprocal because often the next and Reciprocal Subject wants a Name For Example Every Plant whose Humour is apt to congeal at the Foot or Stalk of its Leaf is apt to shed its Leaves But the Humour of the Vine is apt to congeal at the Foot or Stalk of its Leaf And therefore the Vine is apt to shed its Leaves c. In which the Minor is not Reciprocal because it happens not only to the Vine to have its Humour congealed but to all other Plants to whom it happens to shed their Leaves But this happens because there is not a proper Name by which should be signify'd All and only those Plants to which the Congelation of the Humours and Fall of the Leaf evenes For the same Reason is it also that the Conclusion is not Reciprocal See Book 1. Post Cap. 5. and Book 2. Cap. 66. 3. § The Minor is not Immediate also when the next Cause of the Predicate has any former Cause by which it may be demonstrated For in all Causes which enter Demonstration there is a certain Series and Subordination so that every Posterior is the Effect of the Precedent As often therefore as any Effect is demonstrated by such a Cause as is the Effect of a former Cause that Minor must necessarily be Mediate and then that Minor is to be resolv'd into that former Cause and so on till you come to the First of that Series which constitutes a Demonstration of both Propositions Immediate And this Demonstration is the Foundation of all the rest which are of the same Series And therefore in searching of Science we are to proceed from the first Demonstration to the following in Synthetic Order and then the Minor Mediate is esteem'd as it were Immediate because now before demonstrated For a Demonstrated Proposition is no less apt to beget Knowledge than a Proposition Immediate and Indemonstrable But yet if any one shall happen upon a Demonstration whose Minor is Mediate he must proceed in Analytic Order towards the first and Fundamental Demonstration Nor will he first have attained Science before he shall have arriv'd at the first Cause For in this the Mind acquiesces But let us add Examples that the Thing may be so much the better understood That which is endu'd with a Three-fold Dimension admits not another Body to be with it at the same time in the same Place All Bodies are endu'd with a Three-fold Dimension And therefore c. The Minor of this Syllogism may be demonstrated in this manner That which consists of Matter and Form is endued with a Three-fold Dimension Every Body consists of Matter and Form And therefore every body c. Now the Minor of this Syllogism is Immediate as well as the Major because to consist of Matter and Form is the Definition of Body c. 4. § The same Series there is in Demonstration from Cause Final in which the Subordinate is demonstrated by the farther End until you shall come to the last in every Genus in which the Mind acquiesces For Example An Animal has Lungs that it may breath breathes that it may refresh the Heart the Heart is to be refresh'd to preserve a Temperature of Heat a Temperature of Heat is to be kept that the Life of the Animal may be preserv'd c. If these Demonstrations be propos'd in Form all excepting the Last will have a Mediate Minor and the Last is the Foundation of all the rest 5. § It sometimes happens that Demonstrations from Cause Efficient cannot be resolv'd into Propositions Mediate unless the Demonstration from Cause Final be commixt with the Demonstrations from Cause Efficient For Example A Man is of a most Acute Touch because he is of a very thin Skin a thin Skin because having abundance of Elaborated Animal Spirits abundance of those Elaborated Animal Spirits because having a very large Brain the Shop or Office of those Elaborated Animal Spirits Hitherto are they all Causes Efficient That a Man has a very large Brain is to be demonstrated from the End to wit because he should reason that Man should reason again from Cause Efficient to wit because he is a Rational Animal Here now we acquiesce because the Minor is the Definition of Man and therefore Immediate and Indemonstrable Ax 5. The Conditions of Principles relating to the Conclusion are Three And first that they be the Causes Secondly Prior to and Thirdly more known than the Conclusion Ax. 6. And these Conditions are required in both Propositions 1. § For as is the
Method is either Natural or Arbitrary Ax. 4. Natural in which the Order of Nature and Distinct Knowledge of Things is observed Ax. 5. In which we must observe in the first Place that all the Parts are to be Homogeneous that is not Impertinent or Foreign to the Subject 1. § By which Means we not only confirm that Rule that Disciplines ought not to be mixed So as in Mathematicks we are not to use Ethical Demonstrations Or in Ethicks Mathematical c. But this also viz. That every thing ought to be set in its proper Place And so those things which are reciprocated with the Genus to the Genus and with the Species to the Species should be attributed And that all things be Reciprocal as much as may be 2. § And indeed this Rule is to be observ'd in the very Precepts which belong to the Essence of Disciplines But yet in the Comments where the Precepts of them are explain'd and confirm'd the Observation of it is not so Necessary For it often happens to the Master teaching Physick that he is forc'd to fetch from Logick and Ethicks Physick Moreover in Divinity and all other Disciplines how much of Necessity must they fetch from Philosophy for the explaining their Controversies which yet becomes no Part at all of those Disciplines Which if that Censurer of Aristotle had better consider'd he would without all Question have judg'd more impartially of the Writings and Method of that admirable Philosopher in which he distinguishes not the Precepts from the Comments that are made upon them which in in the first Place he ought to have done Ax. 6. Now in Natural Method we are always to proceed from Universals to Particulars and in that Progress all the Parts are to be connected together by apt Bonds of Transition 1. § Which Progress is to be instituted by Division whose Parts are to be joyn'd together by apt Bonds of Transition which forms how much they help the Memory of the Reader is almost incredible Ax. 7. Method of Nature in the next Place is either Total or Partial Ax. 8. Total That in which some whole Science is disposed Ax. 9. And this is either Synthetic or Analytic Ax. 10. Synthetic is that which proceeds from the most simple Principles to those things which are compounded of those Principles Ax. 11. And so the Speculative Disciplines are to be handled Ax. 12. Analytie That which beginning from the End proceeds to the next Means and so from these to the more Remote till at last it arrive to the First and mosi Simple Ax. 13. And thus are Arts and Disciplines Practical to be entreated of 1. § The Disciplines Speculative have no end which is diverse from themselves but the very Knowledge of the Things proposed is their End For in that the Mind acquiesces But Arts and Disciplines Practical rest not there viz. in the Knowledge of the Thingt proposed but have some farther End viz. Work Practice or Operation that is agreeable to that Knowledge Whence is it that the Sciences Theoretical such as Physicks Metaphysicks Mathematicks c. are disposed in Synthetick Method proceeding from the first Principles to those which are formed or made of them and that first in the Genus and then in the Species till at last it is come to the lowest Species of all But in Arts such as Grammar Rhetorick Logick Medicine Architecture and in practical Disciplines such as Ethicks Politicks Oeconomicks c. We contrariwise proceed from the End to the Means For that which is first in the doing of things is always last in the Design or Intention of them And so on the Contrary Wherefore since the said Disciplines proceed from the Means to the End in Acting for the Architect first lays his Foundation then prepares his Timber Rafters Beams c and of these makes the House Itt follows in the Design that the End has the first Place and of the Means those the next which are last brought to pass For these Disciplines keep not the Order of Action but Design For the Design is nothing else but the very Practical Knowledge of Things which are propos'd And certainly the End in Practical Disciplines has it self no otherwise i. e. is no otherwise to the Means than are the Hypotheses or Principles in the Mathematicks to the Conclusions which are gathered from them As Aristotle says Book 7. Eth. C. 8. 2. In both these we are to observe the Order of Nature In the Synthetic that of Nature Generating or Effecting Analytick that of Intending or Designing Piccolominy therefore must be under a Mistake Cap. 21 Introd and Part 7. Com. Pot. Where altho' he confesses that Synthetic Method is fittest for Speculative and the other for Arts and Practical Disciplines yet he will needs have it That all Disciplines will admit both of One and the Other and Accordingly in his 10 Degrees of Moral Philosophy he has Observed the Synthetic but not the most to his Purpose as Zabarella solidly proves Book 2. of his Apol. Cap. 4. seq 3. Galen sets down three sorts of Method and explaining two of them adds a Third viz. Definition But it is not necessary nay indeed it cannot be that any other should be Observed in Science but the Synthetic and Analytick For Definition is not so much Method as an Instrument or Part of it For all Method takes its Beginning from the Definition of some Whole and Dividing goes on to the Parts and Species's of it which are contained under that Whole More against Galen concerning this Definitive Method you may see in Zabarella Book 2. Meth. Cap. 4. Ax. 14. A Partial Method is then when some Part of a Discipline is disposed or particular Theme severally handled 1. § For there 's a two-fold Use or Consideration of Method Partial For either it may be consider'd as it is a Part of the Total Method or as it is a Method of some Theme separately and apart by it self to be handled As it is a Part of the Whole This One thing is to be precepted more than what we have already said in the general to wit that it often happens in a Part of a Discipline whose Whole is in Method Synthetical that the Analytick Order may be kept And so on 〈◊〉 other Hand in the Parts of Analytick that 〈◊〉 Synthetick As for Instance Physick is Composed in Synthetick Order if the Whole be considâ—â—â—d And yet in that Part where we entreat of Animate Bodies a resolutive may well enough be kept viz. Beginning from the Operations which are the End of the Animated Body And so going on to the Causes and Principles which are the Faculties of the Mind and Temperament and Organical Parts of that Body c. In like Manner the Arts of Medicine Grammar Logick if look'd upon in the Whole are laid down in an Analytick Method But in the Parts of them the Synthetick is observed Physiology which is a Part of Medicine is delivered in a Synthetick Order and in Grammar we first entreat of Letters Sylables then Words and Lastly Speech and its Construction And so in Logick First we treat of Themes Simple and then Complex which certainly is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is to Compose or Proceed in Composed Order In so much yet as these Arts are begun from the Notion of the End and so go on to the Means they are said in the Whole to be disposed in an Analytical Order As Zabarella has well observed Lib. 2. de Math. Cap. 20. c. The rest may be sought for out of the Institutions Note the Chapters of Sophisms and Method were principally turn'd by another Hand Finis Libri Secundi
a Point is that which does not consist of Parts A Line is a Longitude void of Latitude A Right Line that which lies equally betwixt its Points c. Hypotheses in the first that there is a Natural Body a Heaven a Soul c. Arithmetick that there is a Unity seu non dari maximum Numerum that is that there 's no such thing as the highest Number Geometry that there 's a Line that from one Point to any other Point a right Line may be drawn c. All which are such as tho' they want not Demonstration yet are they such as that out of the Signification of the Words meerly known without the Accession of any thing else they cannot be known to be true For altho' any one should know what 's signify'd by the Name Body yet can he not know by this that every Body consists of Matter and Form Nay that there is such a Thing as Natural Body if not assisted by the Help of his Senses c. 4. § Hence is it that Axioms ought to be held by him that would learn any Science before he comes to his Master Theses's not because these are to be explained in the very Entrances of Sciences Definitions especially always but if known by the Judgment of the Senses Hypotheses indeed need not c. Ax. 14. Now when a Demonstration is Conform to these Laws it not only proves that the Affection 's in the Subject but also explains what that is and contains the perfect Definition of it 1. § That is contains all those things that are necessary to it only in Inverted Order For a Demonstration is thus proposed viz. The Earth is interposed between the Sun and the Moon and therefore the Moon suffers an Eclipse or a Defect of Light viz. receiv'd from the Sun And a Definition thus viz. An Eclipse is a Defect of Light in the Moon receiv'd from the Sun by Reason of the Earth's Interposition c. And this of Demonstration Why. Now come we to that which we call Demonstratin That of which the next Chapter as also of that which the Logicians call a Regress CHAP. XXIV Of Demonstration 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or That and Regress Ax. 1. NOW of Demonstration That the one is from the Effect and the other from the remote Cause Ax. 2. Of which that collects the Cause from the Effect Sensible and this the Effect from the remote Cause 1. § For Example If any one rising something later than usual should see the Walls of his Chamber collustrated with the Sun-Beams and collect from thence that the Sun had been sometime risen This would be from the sensible Effect From the remote Cause this viz. Plants have not a Sensitive Soul and therefore they don't breath c. Ax. 3. Now that from the Effect may be as well Affirmed as Denyed The remote Cause always Deny'd and Concluded in the Second Figure in Camestres And therefore as we collect Plants live because they grow and are nourished so also may we that Stones do not because they neither grow nor are nourished c. And as from an unequal Concitated Pulse of the Arteries we collect that there is a Fever So also from an equal and sedate that there is none or that there is an Immunity from a Fever c. But it does not follow that all Animals breathe because they have a Sensitive Soul altho' it does that no Plant does because it has not because having a Sensitive Soul is not the next Cause of Breathing c. 3. § Now of these two Species's of Demonstration the first is much nobler than the last First because it has more necessary Propositions consisting of the same Terms of which does the Demonstration 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Secondly begets Knowledge tho' not simply yet such as is in its Genus perfect For a Cause can no other ways be known but by its Effect Thirdly it is framed in the first Figure and may also be affirmed Whereas Demonstration from the Cause remote consists of less necessary Propositions and not immediate Neither does it beget Knowledge in its own kind perfect neither can it be fram'd in the first Figure c. Both yet beget such a Knowledge as that we may know whether the thing is or is not c. Ax. 4. As soon then as the Cause is deprehended from the sensible Effect a Comparison is instituted between that Cause and the Effect And when the Mind by its Sagacity discovers that that Cause is the Cause of that Effect then a Regress is made from the Cause to the Effect by a Demonstration 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. 1. § Sometimes the Effect is unknown and the Cause known and then immediately is made use of the Demonstration 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sometimes the Effect's perceiv'd and Cause unknown and then first the Cause from the Effect and then the Effect from the Cause is to be demonstrated And this sort of Demonstration is usually call'd by the Latins a Regress in which the Causes are first to be investigated by the Effects And then from the true Knowledge of those Causes is to be deriv'd a true and perfect Knowledge of those Effects whereby we not only know that the Effects be of which our Senses are Judges but also why and what they be further than which our Minds cannot reach And thus much may suffice for an Account of true Syllogism Notes and Observations from the Learned Heereboord in Relation to this 24th Chapter WHEN the Demonstration from the remote Cause is said to be always Negative by the Ingenious Author it is to be understood with this Restriction viz. when it is larger than the Effect and not reciprocated with it as in the Instance which he has given which is very true But sometimes it may happen that the remote Cause may be equal to and not larger than the Effect and then it is reciprocated with it and may be affirmed as in this Instance Those things which are Animals Vegetative are nourished Plants are Animals Vegetative and therefore they are nourished Wherein the middle Term is the Remote Cause For the next is the Nutritive Faculty and yet the Syllogism proceeds in the first Figure and is affirmed because the remote Cause is adequate to the Effect and reciprocate with it For whatsoever is nourished has a Vegetative Soul and whatsover is not has not c. CHAP. XXV Of Sophism Ax. 1. NEXT follows Syllogism 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Fallacious which counterfeiting a Shew of the True produces Error or an Ignorance of Depraved Disposition COMMENTARY 1. § Now Precepts concerning this are very necessary in Logick for Fear lest others should impose upon us For he that is liable to be deceiv'd by another and is not aware of it may also be deceiv'd by himself 2. § But say they who wo'n't admit of the Doctrin of Fallacious Syllogism in Logick the Right is the Rule both of it self and the Wrong