other and giveth real Grace to both But because the intellect is in the natural order the first in acting and the will but second and because the act is commonly and reasonably supposed to go before the Habit though not before all Divine Influx ad actum therefore men are uncertain whether God who first acteth the Intellect do not by its act first operate on the will But this dependeth much on the Physical Controversie whether the Intellect determine the will ad speciem actus or at least really and efficiently move it or rather only present the object to it and so work but in subserviency to the material cause which is constitutive indeed of the act in specie but not efficient and the perception of it goeth to the conditio objectiva without which it is no object to the will This I incline to with Scotus and suppose that the Intellect moveth not the will per modum naturae by necessitation But while we know not the order and nature of the operations of our own souls how shall we know the unsearchable way of the operations of the Holy Ghost The seventh Crimination C. They make Gods Grace a resistible thing which man can frustrate and so God worketh at uncertainties * Mans ignorance of the way of Gods operation on second causes told us by Christ himself Job 3. should end such quarrels and teach us all with judicious Davenant to prosess uncertainty and with judicious Jos Placeus de lib. arb p. 174. speaking of the dependance of the second cause on the first and the Papists digladiations about concurse and predetermination to say Nos quidem qua reverentia erga infinitam Dei majestatem ducimur non audemus definire quanta sit dependentia causae secundae a prima Nobis sufficit modo ne Deo ullam peccatorum nostrorum vel minimam labem aspergat non posse nimiam statâ—i To which also the very judicious Lt Blank subscribeth Thes 51. de concursu c. The Remonstrants Syn. ar 3 4. p. 15. c. do profess that Gods operation of the Intellect Affection and Will do thus differ that the converting work on the will is more resistible than the other And to the question An conversâ—o contingens sit et in certa an vero necessitate causae aut eventus insallibiliter sequatur in â—o qui convertitur Respondent conversionem esse contingentem quia Libera est nec tameâ— Dâ—o incertam quia praecognita est nec sequi necessitate causae sive consequentis quia resistere poterat homo sed necessitate consequentiae c. Et pag. 17. Declarat Quare dicimus hominis voluntatem ad volendum bonum non necessitari sed hominem posse resistere hoc est non-velle et saepe actu non-velle et resistere gratiâ— sufficientis operationibus B. I have said so much of this before that I need not tire you with much more Quest 1. Do you know of no way for God to work with certainty of success if Grace be resistible C. I will not say so I know what you have said to this before B. Why then do you speak that which is not valid in your own judgment Quest. 2. Dare you undertake to justifie all the world against the accusation of having resisted the Grace of God C. No I dispute not on such hard terms B. Quest. 3. Did you never repent your self for resisting Grace C. Yes in some sense but not as I now mean it B. How is that C. To resist the Gospel and Ministry is a resisting of Grace and the Holy Ghost Acts 7. and so I have done But I speak of immediate resisting God B. 1. Remember that here you confess that the Gospel is Grace even to them that resist it 2. God himself cannot be resisted immediately where he worketh not immediately 3. But where he doth so he is said to be resisted 1. Not by any repelling of his strength 2. Much less by opposing a greater strength 3. Nor by acting by any strength but what he giveth 4. Not by causing any difficulty to him 5. Not by frustrating any absolute will of his But 1. Passively by being ill disposed to the reception of that Grace which he offereth and that operation which else might effect it 2. And actively by doing that which rendereth us yet more ill-disposed both naturally and morally by commerit 3. As also in that we do that which is contrary to Gods actions in their tendency to the effect When he moveth us to hear read meditate pray love trust c. and we do the contrary this may be called a resistance C. If God intend the effect it will be done but if he intend it not how is he resisted in that which he never intended to do B. You know the Scripture speaketh not at these rates but when men will set their silly wits against Gods Word thus they will seem subtiler than he But it 's but a dream 1. God may be resisted when he intendeth not the effect in that his Law is resisted and with it that necessary measure of Grace by which the effect might have been wrought Though his Decree be not resisted yet his Law and his Grace and help which had a tendency to the effect and a sufficiency on its part may be resisted 2. And he is ordinarily resisted in that which he doth both intend and do For he seldom doth us any good without resistance though he overcome But he that overcometh resistance is resisted C. But I mean by Resisting Overcoming B. Why then did you not speak as you meant None dreameth that Omnipotence is overcome by a greater strength much less by the derived power of us worms But the Case is weighty which you and others perilously overlook C. Let me hear your explication of it B. God doth not work like necessary agents to the utmost that he is able His Wisdome hath diversified Creatures and his Wisdome hath appointed even in the works of Grace a stablished order of second causes and means which he will use for the effect And his Wisdome and Free will hath fixed a certain degree or proportion of his concourse suitable 1. To the nature of man 2. And to the nature and use of all those means 3. And to the effect as it is to be ordinarily accomplished Even as in nature he concurreth with all causes agreeably to their stablished nature and use Now though Omnipotency cannot be overcome yet the same creature that hath a certain stated proportion of natural activity and Gods suitable concourse e. g. to a healthful body which hath strong appetites and also a congruous proportion of Gracious means and concurse and helps of Grace by which he can rule the foresaid appetite may yet by neglect of that help and by wilful indulging of that appetite make the appetite stronger than his ordinary degree of help and so overcome the Grace of God though he overcome not Gods Omnipotence or Decrees
him But it followeth not necessarily that this will be done because it 's possible no nor because it is easie or not difficult to be done 150. * * * Ruiâ— de praedet Tr. 2. diâ—p 12. §. 1 2. p. 172. so defineth Permission as I confess so it is positively decreed viz. Increatam permissionem Deus non praedâ—finit Creata permissio simul complecâ—itur quâ—rundam rerum productionem aliarum rerum negationem quibus positis peccatum permittitur And if by permission they will mean quid positivum it must have a positive Will and Cause but what 's that to the Negative or meer non impedire Thus still all our wranglings shall be but about ambiguoâ—s words His reason §. 2. is Permission of sin is good 1. Negatio Volitionis essicacis qua Deus impediret peccatum And he said that permissio increata is not decreed 2. Negatio motivorum c. 3. Prodâ—ctio Constitutio circumstantlarum 4. Generalis concursus Ans 1. Nothing is not Good meer Negations are Nothing 2. Moral Negations or Logical that is Denyal and restraints are something and have a Cause 3. Production and Concursus are something and have a Cause but so is not a meâ—r non-impedition which is proper permission But the Case differeth as to permitting of a propense agent and an indifferent agent and a contrarily disposed agent To permit a stone to ascend will not make it ascend To permit the Air to move will not make it move But to permit a stone in the Air to fall I think with Durandus is enough to make it fall supposing the continuation of the Nature of it and all circumstances And so is it in permitting some sinners to sin 151. But yet here we must distinguish 1. Between a necessary and a free agent 2. Between Adams sinning and ours 3. And between the sin of a man strongly inclined or but weakly or that hath many disswasions or but few 1. Though a bad man be under a moral necessity of sinning in the general that is of not living innocently yet he is not under a necessity of committing every sin that he committeth nor is it a valid consequence He is a bad man Ergo he will do this and that and the other Sin Because a free agent oft acteth contrary to his habits 2. And some Sinners have so great impediments in sinning that they stand long in aequilibrio before the act 3. And Adam had no more propensity to his first sin than to the contrary So that bare permission will not inferr the Certainty of all sin atleast and therefore will not here serve turn 152. But saith Rada it is not common permission but also a withdrawing of effectual helps against sin Answ 1. God did not so by Adam at first 2. But are sufficient or necessary helps also withdrawn as well as effectual If so then Adam was as much necessitated to sin by God as he was to dye by Gods withdrawing his Vital influx or sustentation and it would have been as naturally Impossible for him not to sin as to live without God But if not so then while Necessary Grace called sufficient is continued the withdrawing of any other inferreth not a necessity of sinning But indeed it is an unproved and improbable fiction that God withdrew from Adam any Grace which he had given him till Adam cast it away It is therefore no good Illation Deus permittit aliquem peccare ergo peccat unless by permitting you mean withholding necessary help which is more than proper permission 153. And it must be remembred that God is far from a total permission or non-impedition of sin He alwayes hindereth it so far as to forbid it to threaten damnation to affright men from it to promise salvation and all felicity to draw men from it He tells men of the vanity of all which would allure them to it And his daily mercies and corrections should withhold men from it Only by doing no more nor effectually changing or restraining sinners but leaving them to their own choice under all these moral restraining means he permitteth sin 154. But it is also confessed that when by great sin these means themselves are forfeited some of them are oft-times withdrawn or not given And so some are without that Teaching those mercies or those corrections which others have But yet they are still under a Law of Grace 155. And it is still supposed that God as the first Cause of Nature upholdeth man in the Nature which he gave him and concurreth with it as the first Mover and Universal Cause And therefore that mans Inclination to Felicity Truth and Goodness which is Natural doth continue Otherwise it is confessed that Permission would inferr sin materially but no sin formally if by permission be meant Gods withdrawing Reason Free-will or executive power 156. But I easily confess that if the Dominicans predetermining Premotion * * * Or Bradwardines Effective Volition as necessary and productive of all that cometh to pass in sinful actions could be proved that would certainly inferr the event of sin And if God decreed so to pre-determine the will sin may be fore known in that decree And if Scotus or the rest had been of that mind they had never omitted that easie solution of the Case How God fore-knoweth sin But this I have elsewhere confuted and shall add a little here 157. But first having disproved all these presumptions of Gods way of fore-knowing future sin I shall in a word tell you the answer which may and must satisfie us which is That Gods Understanding is Infinite and therefore extendeth by its own perfection unto all things intelligible But How his understanding reacheth them what Idea's he hath of them how they are Intelligible to him with such like are sinful presumptuous questions of blind men who know not their own ignorance And no manner of understanding is properly Divine which mortals can comprehend SECT IX Of Predestination and Free-will of which see more Sect. 20. against Mr. Rutherford 158. THough Pre-determination belong to Gods Execution and be after his Volitions in order yet because I am now only to speak of it as a pretended medium of his knowledge of sin and as quid decretum I shall touch it here It is confessed that there is no substance which God is not the Maker of besides himself Nor any Action of which he is not the first Cause 159. God may well be called the perfect first Cause of humane Actions in that he giveth man all his Natural faculties and a Power to Act or not act at this time or to choose this or that and as the Fountain of Nature and Life and Motion doth afford his Influx necessary to this free agency So that when ever any Act is done as an Act in genere God is the first Cause of it For it is done by the Power which he giveth and continueth and by his Vital Influx And there is
God is Morally and most fitly said to Nill such Nothings it is not as Nothings but as Possible Evils For only Evil is the proper object of Positive Nolition so that it may be spoken fullier of sin than of other Nothings even fitly in a Moral sense 494. VII Lastly Acts of Will are ordinarily ascribed to God when it is meer operations or privations that are meant and so the phrase is as they say ab effectu ad affectum When a man 1. Denyeth his aid 2. And actually hindereth it is a sign of nolition And so from Gods 1. Not causing 2. And his hindering he is said to Nill that Nothing that never shall be So much of the phrase 495. Now for application 1. Non-dare fidem aut gratiam not to convert is Nothing Therefore it is not Positively willed or decreed of of God or at least no man can prove it so to be So not-to give the Gospel the Spirit c. 496. Yet note that when mans sins have so forfeited such gifts that they are penally withheld this non-agency hath the denomination of a Moral Act. And also that the making of the Penal Law which maketh this Privation due as a punishment was a positive act of God and had a positive Volition But Negations not-penal are not so 497. 2. Not to hinder sin or to Permit sin barely as permission is Nothing As elsewhere I have proved Therefore it hath no Positive Decree or Will save that when it is penal and the execution of a Law that Law being a real natural being and the Jus thence resulting a real relation and the executive Privation quid Morale they are Willed and Decreed answerably as they are To permit a man to be spiritually Dead is not-to make him alive To permit his Darkness or Ignorance is not-to give him Light or Knowledge To permit his unbelief is not-to cause him to believe To permit his want of Love is not-to give him Love To permit his positive sins of Malignity or Carnality is but not-to cure and hinder them by Grace or Providence supposing the Natural support and concurse whith the Author of Nature giveth to all things 498. Therefore when Gods Acts in themselves are his Essence and all one and are diversified but by connotation of divers objects relatively and denominatively when he knoweth all things uno intuitu and willeth all that he willeth unica Volitione when nihil physicum is no denominating terminus of a physical act though so far as it may be called Moraliter id est Reputative aliquid as a Privation it may be said to denominate reputatively as a quasi aliquid and that which is moraliter vel imputative nihil cannot morally denominate when both Non dare spiritum gratiam fidem vitam c. and permittere infidelitatem peocatum c. are truly Nothing and even in Reputative Moral sense are wihil morale when they are not penal And as antecedent to sin they are not penal Judge now impartially whether 1. Those men deal not presumptuously with God 2. And troublesomely with his Church who assert the Being of Positive Decrees and Volitions in God about such Nullities and raise Controversies about the Reasons and the Order of them yea unto dangerous inferences when as 1. They can prove no such thing in God as they assert 2. Nay when we say so much to prove the contrary 499. And here consider whether Scotus himself assert not without all need or proof that God hath a positive knowledge and reflexive Volition of his own Non-Volition and so that a Nullity as to his own act must be the terminus of a positive act When that Nullity is neither God nor a Creature nor aliquid vel Dei vel Creaturae and so seemeth to be no denominating terminus of a distinct act Yet no doubt God is not to be called Ignorant of such Nullities or Idle for those are terms of privation If God be said either not to Know nothings or not to Wilâ— or Nill them it is because it signifieth his Perfection And no part of perfection is wanting to him But we must not place his perfection in a conformity to our imperfect mode of knowing or willing 500. For we dare not here presume peremptorily to determine Negatively that God doth not positively Will his own non-agency or non-volitions because we know how dark we are and distant from God and unfit to say any thing but certainties of him as certain truth But we abstain from the contrary assertion as utterly unproved and we will impute no needless acts to God as his Perfection Though we yield to reputative moral denominations 501. And so I contradict not the language of Aquinas 1. q. 14. 9. who saith that God knoweth such non-entities as never will be ut possibiliâ— And esse in potentia quamvis non in actu is more than nothing But remember that esse in potentia speaketh the esse Potentiae but the possibile is a pure nothing So that this is but to know the Potentia and not any thing else Yet no doubt but God knoweth all things as they are in himself that is he knoweth that he can do all things and knoweth what he knoweth and willeth but this is no esse creatum but God himself at least as to that which never will be But if any will call it a knowing of things possible which are nothings when God knoweth his own Power to make them we quarrel not with words while the sense is known 502. But remember that it is not the Knowledge but Decrees and Volitions of God that our enquiry now is about And Aquinas and his followers commonly say that Gods will goeth not so far as his knowledge and that he knoweth indeed mala ex bonâ— of which they are the privation as no doubt he doth so far as it is not imperfection to be said to know them or as they are objects of knowledge but yet that Mala neque vult neque â—â—lit sed tantum non-vult as Lombard said 503. Ockam Quodlib 3. q. 6. hath the question Utrum Cognitio intuâ—tiva potest esse de objecto cognito And he 1. concludeth that per potentiam divinam potest esse de objectâ— non existente but he meaneth only quod fuit vel fuerit 2. That naturally it cannot be And faith that Contradictio est quod visâ—o sit tamen illud quod videtur non sit in effectâ— nec esse possit Ideo contradictio est quod chimaera videatur intuitive fed non est contradictio quod illud quod videtur nihil sit in actu extra caâ—som suam dummodo possit esse in effectu vel aliquando fuerit in rerum natura Unde Deus ab aeterno videt omnes res factibiles tamen â—unc nullâ— fuerunt By which it is plain that he meaneth as Aquinas that it is not as Nothings but as Possibles and Futures they are known even by God saving that Aquinas and
positivas causas To which what I have said is a sufficient answer And 1. Sometimes they have not but only the cessation of a causation 2. They never have a positive efficient of themselves for nothing is not made but only a positive remover of the cause of that which the subject is deprived of or an interposer or hinderer of the causation of it e. g. of Light or life And death hath no cause but that which ceaseth the causes of life Reprobation is commonly looked at in the two most notable parts as called 1. Gods Reprobating men to unbelief and impenitency 2. His Reprobating men to final damnation The last of these also is considered in the execution 1. As Privative 2. As Positive called Poena damni sensus And both especially the Privative part are considerable 1. As executed by man himself on himself freely 2. Or as executed by God Concerning each of these observe 512. 1. Not to Believe and Repent is no real entity And not to Give faith and Repentance as is said is no real entity And to Permit Infedelity and Impenitency is no real entity as is proved And not to Decree the Giving of saith and the hindering of unbelief is nothing And most clearly besides these four nothings nothing can be proved either existent or needful All that cometh to pass will come to pass without any more ado Therefore 513. As far as any mortal man can prove God hath no such Act of Reprobation at all as is 1. Either a Decree that a man shall not eventually Repent 2. Or a Decree not to give him Repentance 3. Or a Decree to Permit his Impenitence 4. Nor can we prove an after Volition of his own former non Volition which is asserted by Scotus But the three first we have great reason to lay by and so not only to say as Davenant that this part of Reprobation is an Act negative quoad objectum but that it is no Act and there is no other Reprobation as to this part save 1. Gods not decreeing to give faith 2. And his not giving it 514. 2. And as to Damnation so much of it as consisteth in sin it self God no otherwise causeth than as he doth all sin which is properly not at all It being but the Act as an act which he causeth as the Cause of Nature and not as sinfully qualified and so no more decreeth this than other sin 515. And most men little think how much of damnation lyeth in sin it self and the privative consequents which need no other cause 1. To be ignorant of God and Goodness 2. To be void of the Love of God and Holiness and Holy persons and all the Holy employment of Heaven 3. To be thereby void of all the Delights of Holy ones which consist in such Knowledge Love and Employment Praise Obedience and holy Communion 4. To be uncapable of the Reception of Divine complacency as he that maketh himself blind is uncapable of the light or he that maketh himself unlovely is uncapable of immediate Love 5. To be defiled and diseased with all kind of sinful lusts and malignity and made like the Devil 6. To have all sorts of Lusts in violence when they can have no fewel or satisfaction and so to be tormented with these lusts To have extream selfishness and Pride when they have cast themselves into the utmost shame and misery 7. To see that no Creature can deliver them and to despair of ever being better as having no hope from God or any other 8. To see or know that others enjoy the Glory and everlasting felicity which they have lost 9. To think how easily once they might have attained it and how it was offered freely to their choice 10. To think of all the solicitations of mercy that importuned them and all the time and means they had 11. To think for how base a vanity they lost it and that misery was their wilful choice 12. To be tormented with envy and malice against God that forsaketh them and against his Saints And to feel conscience awakened setting home all their former folly All this is nothing but sin and its own effects which hath no Causation at all from God but to continue the nature which he gave them and is not bound to destroy And how great a part of hell is this 516. Nay we know not how much sensible Pain may be the consequent of their own sin without any other Act of God than his common continuation of nature it self As a man that eateth Arsnick or unwholsome meat is tormented by it without any other act of God than as the universal Cause of Nature 517. All this much of Damnation then being meerly the work of the sinner himself so far as there is no Act of God in the execution so far no man can prove any Positive Act of Volition or Decree 518. But 1. As God in these is the universal cause of Nature and so of natural acts 2. And as in other instances he actually further punisheth them 3. And as he actually made that Law which made these penalties the sinners due so far God hath a Positive Decree and Volition that these persons shall be damned And moreover as improperly or morally his not sanctifying them and not saving them is called his Act and is really their penalty even so may his not-willing to save or glorifie them be called his Decree and will to damn them if you will 519. By this time we are ready to answer our first question What are the objects of these several acta of God so far as connotatively we must call them several And 1. * * * Besides all before cited against Volitions de nihilo see Ruiz de Vol. Dei disp 6. §. 1. p. 36. Antiquorum gravissimi sentiunt Deum non omnia Velle sed ea duntarat bona quae in aliqua differentia temporis existunt proinde possibilia que nunquam futura sunt non amari à Deo â—â—â—â— Mala inde Deum not esse omni-volentem nâ—llam creaturam à Deo amari necessario Ita Albertus Alexand. Boâ—â—vent Richard Gaby Bannez Zumel Molina Valentia Scotus Against which he bringeth frivolous reasons and asserteth that God willeth as a material object the Goodness which the Creature would have if it were made and this as to all Creatures which never will be What putid contradictions are here to will Goodness which is no Goodness of all Creatures which are no Creatures as material objects which are nothings God willeth his own Power whence man calleth that Possible which is nothing But was there from Eternity any Possibles not-future to be willed What was there from Eternity but God And are all theâ—e Nothings God himself Gods not giving the Gospel to any persons is no Act and so hath no object But reductively or improperly the object is Man sinning against the grace of the first edition of the Law of Grace that is These are the
Creatures and their various species of being is after by PROVIDENCE to manage them as Active or Passive in their several Capacities And the ACTIVE Natures are threefold which he hath made to operate on the threefold Passives viz. INTELLECTUAL SENSITIVE and IGNEOUS or VEGETATIVE in its proper matter upon AIR WATER and EARTH § 12. GOD is so Active as not to be at all PASSIVE All the Active Creatures are first Passive as receiving the Influx of the first Cause and Inferiours from the Superiour second Causes But they are Naturally Active in that dependence and supposing that Influx § 13. The works of Providence about the Existent Creatures are MOTION causing Motion GUBERNATION causing ORDER and ATTRACTION or meet objective Termination satisfying their Appetites and giving them their Ends. * * * Cyprianus sie explicat Act. 17. In ipso sumus movemur vivimus In Patre sumus in Filio vivimus in Spiritu Sancto movemur Pater est sons omnis essentiae Filius est Vita Spiritus Sanctus est agitator seu motor unde apud Hebr. nomen habet Ruah quod significat endelechiam continuam perennem agitationem Vid. Strigel in Melanct. Loc. com pag. 294. § 14. MAN being endowed by his Creator with his Image in Vital-Active-Power Intellect and Free-will a Threefold Virtue in One as the formal Essence of his soul is peculiarly fitted for such acts of Providence as he must be under § 15. As the higher and Nobler Natures are under God the Immediate 1. Movers 2. Governours of the Inferiour so also are they 3. Their Immediate or nearest End having a Goodness in them fitted to attract terminate and satisfie the Appetites of the Inferiour God is not the only end of Appetites § 16. The Acts of Divine PROVIDENCE about MAN-existent are 1. Action or Motion 2. Special Government 3. Love From whence God is Related to Man the fundamental Relation of CREATOR supposed †††I hold with Bradwardine li. 1. c. 2. cor 3. Quod necesse est Deum servare quamlibet creaturam immediatius quacunque cansa creata Et c. 3. cor 3. Quod nulla res potest aliquid facere nisi Deus faciat illud idem immediatius quolibet alio faciente Et c. 4. cor 3. â—adem de Deo Motore â—aking immediation for proximity and facere movere for the action as such and not for the meer moral specification and comparability 1. As ACTOR vel MOTOR 2. As RECTOR 3. As AMICUS vel FINIS Lover Benefactor and End 1. ACTION as such is from God in the first relation 2. Action as ORDERED is by him in the second 3. Action as TERMINATED FINALLY and in perfection is in him in the third § 17. Creation inferreth Propriety and making us Good and inter bâ—na and ad bonum inferreth that God is our Benefactor So that ab origine he standing in these three Relations to us from what is past he is to dispose of us by Providence accordingly § 18. Gods Omnipotence is most conspicuous in Creation propriety and Motion His Wisdom in Governing and Order and his Good will in our Benefits efficiently and our Perfection finally in mutual Love § 19. MOTION is caused by Moving â—â—â—ce impressed ORDER moral by LAW or signification of Gods Will de debito And PERFECTION by attingency and union with our END § 20. From the first resulteth NECESSITY properly so called From the second Moral RECTITUDE In the third is FELICITY as to single persons § 21. From the first viz. God as Actor upon Many or the Universe ariseth CO-OPERATION or Concurse All things work together as the Wheels in a Watch. From the second Divine ORDERING ariseth HARMONY and from the third UNIVERSAL PERFECTION and Melody of the whole Creation and to man perfect Love § 22. Motion is unresistible unless by a greater or unequal Contrary Motion or passive impedition and its effect as such not free but Necessary Government by Law is resistible and obedience free Final Goodness or Love do perfect and felicitate necessarily and freely not effecting for so they are not now considered but satisfying so far as they are enjoyed § 23. The Creation being past and Beings existent except what Generation and Composition make unfearchably and Gods fundamental RELATIONS setled we shall confound and be confounded if we distin-guish not Gods after-actions according to the Relations in which he worketh them and their foresaid differences in themselves SECT II. The Order of Divine Operations § 1. GOD is the Immediate Cause of all things and actions caused * * * Bradwardine ib. p. 172. seemeth to favour Averrois saying that God is Forma omnis formae forma maxime essentialis principalis cujuscunque formati and so acteth all things And indeed when we deny him to be the form of any creature we mean that he is More and not Less And that we have not a fitter Analogical conception of God than that he is eminently more than the soul of the world And c. 14. p. 210. he calleth Necessarium the most proper name of God But when he saith c. 17. that Gods Essence Omnipotence Intellect Naturally precede Gods Knowledge and cause it and so putteth Causes and Effects in God he is too bold by him as to the Proximity of God to the effect For he is every where present in Essence and as near to every Being and Action as it is to it self We must not conceive of Gods using means as we do of mans where the Pen the Saw the Knife c. is between the hand and the effect God is as near and as total a Cause of what he doth as if he used no second cause § 2. They that say God is thus Causa Immediata Immediatione Suppositi seu Essentiae Virtutis speak true but not aptly because it ill insinuateth as if Gods Virtus were not his Essence when as in God they are all one only as inadequate conceptions we may distinguish suppositum à virtute but not otherwise And it is not as quid creatum that we speak of Virtus § 3. Since the Creation in the Motions of Providence God who at first made the Universe to be One by conjunction and co-operation of parts as truly as a Clock or Man is one hath setled a course of second Causes that one thing may act upon and move another and though he work upon the Highest of these Causes immediately without any other subordinate Cause yet on all the rest he ordinarily worketh by superiour created Causes which are some of them Necessary and operate in one constant course and some of them Voluntary and Free and operate more mutably and contingently § 4. The course of Necessitating Causes is commonly called NATURE and the Influence of Angels and other Voluntary Causes distinguished from Natural But they all operate as second Causes under the Influx and Government of God upon us that are here on earth § 5.
There is no Place where any Corporeal being is where some Active created Nature is not with it so that considering the proximity and the natures we may well conclude that we know of no corporal motion under the Sun which God effecteth by himself alone without any second Cause § 6. Joh. Sarisburiensis and some Schoolmen liken Gods presence with the Creature in operation to the fire in a red hot Iron where you would think all were Fire and all Iron But the similitude is too low The SUN is the most Notable Instrument in visible Nature And GOD operateth on all lower things by its virtue and influx God and the Sun do what the Sun doth and we know of nothing that God moveth here on earth that 's corporeal without it § 7. But the Sun moveth nothing as the Cartesians dream by a single Motive Influx alone but by emission of its Threefold Influx as every Active Nature doth that is Motive Illuminative and Calefactive which are One-radically in Three-effectively § 8. This Efflux of the Sun is universal and equal ex parte sui But causeth wonderful diversity of effects without diversity in God the prime Cause or in it self The same Influx causeth the Weed and Dunghill and Carrion to stink and the Flowers of the sweeter Plants to be sweet some things to live and some to dye some things to be soft and some hard c. In a word there are few changes or various actions below in bodies which the Sun is not the Cause of without difference in it self But not the specifying Cause § 9. The reason why one equal Influx causeth such wonderful diversity of motions is the DIVERSITY of RECEPTIVE DISPOSITIONS and natures Recipitur ad modum recipientis So one poise maketh various Motions in a Clock c. § 10. God operateth on second Causes as God Omnipotently but not ad ultimum potentiae but Freely as he pleaseth § 11. God worketh by second Causes according to the said Causes aptitude so that the operation of Infinite power is limited according to the quality of the second cause which God useth § 12. There is a superiority and inferiority among Spirits as well as Bodies And whether God work on all our souls by superiour Spirits as second Causes is unknown to us It is not improbable according to the order of his providence in other things But we know little of it certainly § 13. But certain we are that superiour Voluntary Agents Angels and Devils have very much to do with our souls and operate much upon them It is a wonderful power which wise observers perceive Satan hath upon the Imagination or Thinking faculty of which I could give some instances enough to convince a rational Sadducee And it is not like that good Angels have less power skill or will § 14. And we are sure that God hath ordained One Great Universal second Cause to convey his Spirit and Grace by which is JESUS CHRIST As the Sun is an Universal Cause of Motion Light and Heat to Inferiour creatures and God operateth by the Sun So is Christ set as a Sun of Righteousness by whom God will convey his spiritual Influx to mens souls and there is now no other conveyance to be expected § 15. Christs Humane Nature united personally to the Divine and Glorified is by the Office of Mediator Authorized and by Personal Union and the Fulness of the Holy Spirit enabled and fitted to this communication of Gods Spiritual Influx to mankind § 16. Object A Creature cannot be a Cause of the Operation of the Holy Ghost who is God the Creator Sending is the Act of a Superiour But Christs humanity is not superiour to the Holy Ghost Answ 1. Christ as a Creature is no Cause of any Essential or purely Immanent Act of God for that hath no Cause But 1. He is a Cause of the Spirits operation as it signifieth the effect 2. And so the cause why his Act is terminated on the soul and 3. Of the ordering of these effects why rather on this soul than on that and at this time measure c. And 2. This Christ doth not as a superiour sender of the Spirit but a Ministerial and a second cause As a Master payeth his servants as his Steward determineth § 17. It is certain that Christ is the Political Cause or Head of this spiritual Influx on souls that is As Mediator is Authorized to determine of the Persons measure time conditions of the Communication of the Spirit But whether he be a Physical Head of this Influx by proper efficiency giving the Spirit from himself as the Sun giveth us its Influx is all that is disputable That is Whether the Spirit be first given Inherently to Christ and pass from his person as his unto us as the Spirits do from the Head to the Members § 18. This question may be put either of all Natural Being and Motion or only of Spiritual Motion in the soul of man Whether Christ be so the Head of Nature as that all Nature in Heaven and Earth is sustained and actuated by him as the physical efficient Cause or whether this be true of this Lower World which was curst for sin or whether it be true at least of Humane nature or whether it be true only of Gracious operations § 19. 1. That Christ hath the Political dispose of the whole Universe contained in the words Heaven and Earth the Scripture seemeth to assert 2. That he hath the Political disposal of humane nature and of all other creatures that belong to man so far as they belong to him Angels Devils Sun Air Earth c. is past dispute 3. That the real â—hysical effects acts and habits of the Spirit on mens souls are caused by Christs Moral Causation by his Merit and his Political Mission is past dispute 4. That besides all this the Spirit it self by Baptism is in Covenant with all the members of Christ and that as they are such and is in a prior Covenant first Related to Christ himself and so by this Covenant given us in relation as we are united to Christ is past dispute 5. And that Christ himself doth make such Physical changes on our souls by Means and by the foresaid Political Mission of the Spirit by which we are made Receptive of more of the Spirits operations is past dispute 6. But whether moreover any Action of Christs own Humane soul glorified do physically reach our souls or whether the Holy Ghost may in its own essential Virtue which is every where be said to be more in Christ than elsewhere and communicated to us as from the root or the Spirits effects on the soul to come by Reflection from the first effects on Christ as Light and Heat from the Sun by a Speculum or Burning-glass are questions not for me to determine § 20. Christs spiritual Influx on souls is not single but is ever Three in One as the Sun 's aforesaid which are according to
the Natural power in it self but by so doing formaliter relativè it maketh it no power ad hoc to the contrary in that instant Of which more anon § 10. Such grace of God as cometh from his Absolute Will or Decree of the due Event is never overcome For Gods decree is not frustrate § 11. Gods gracious operations are never overcome by any contrary Act but what he himself is the Agent Cause of as an Act For in Him we Live and Move and Be. Yet man is the only Cause of the Inordination of that act by which it is set in opposition to Gods other acts For God doth not militate against himself § 12. The case lyeth thus God antecedently to his Laws framed Nature that is the Being and Natural Order of all the World and so he became the Head or Root of Nature the first Cause who by his wise decree was to concurr to the end with that Natural frame and to continue to things their proper forms and motions And man is one of his creatures having a Nature of his own to which God as the God of Name doth Antecedently concurr By this natural concurse of God the fomiâ— cator the murderer the thief c. are naturally able to do those acts But being free agents that can do otherwise God maketh them a Law to restrain and regulate them And when they break this Law they resist that gracious concurse which suitable to the organical cause God conjoyneth with the means But they do this by their Natural power and activity not used as God requireth them but turned against his own Law So that if God would withdraw his sustentation and destroy mâ—ns Nature they could not resist his grace But that he will not do being his antecedent work and so God is resisted by his own-given-power and act disordered and turned against his grace § 13. The Will of God which is thus resisted is only 1. His Preceptive or Legal will de debito 2. And his will of purpose to give man so much help and no more by which he can and ought to believe and Repent is said to be resisted or frustrate so far when by mans fault it doth him not that good which it might have done § 14. Gods Grace and Spirit are said to be resisted when the Word and other Means are * * * That God doth govern inseriora per superiora and work by means not for want of them but from the abundance of his Goodness so as to communicate to his creatures the dignity of causality See Aquin. 1. q. 103. a. 8. q. 104. a. 2. Alexand. 1. p. q. 26. m. 5. a. 2. 3. m. 7. Albert. 1. p. q. 67. m. 4. a. 1. Richard 1. d. 39. a. 2. q. 3. d. 45. a. 2. q. 2. Agid. Rom. 2. d. 1. p. 1. q. 2. a. 6. ibi Gabritl d. 1. q. 2. resisted which call him to his duty For these themselves are gifts and acts of grace § 15. But it is not the barâ— Word or Means alone but the Spirit working in and by those means which is so resisted For though no moâ—tal man can clearly know just how the Spirit concurreth and operateth by the Word and Means yet we may know that God doth limit his own operation to the aptitude of the means ordinarily and that he worketh with and by them not according to his Omnipotency in it self considered but according to the means or organs And as in Nature he operateth nor quantum potest but agreeably to the order and aptitude of Natural Causes so in Grace he operateth non quantum potest but according to the aptitude and order of the sapiential frame of Governing-means of grace § 16. When the preaching of the Word Education Company and other visible Means seem equal God hath innumerable means supernal internal external invisible and unknown to us by which he can make all the difference that he maketh in men So that we cannot prove that ever he worketh on souls without any second cause or means at all though we cannot prove the contrary neither And therefore he that resisteth all means for ought we know in so doing resisteth all Gods gracious operations on his soul § 17. * * * I know not how to find both sense and concord in the words of your Alvarez de Aâ—x l. 7. disp 59. p. 264. Eadâ—m contritio que est ultima dispositio ad gratiam in genere cause materialis antecedit illam In genere tamen causae formalis efficientis est effeclus ejusdem gratiae propterea quamvis non sit meritoria gratiae est tamen meritoria vitae aeternâ— Et p. 265. Contritio qua penitens disponitur ad infusionem gratiae habitualis est meritoria vitae aeternae ut Thom. 1. 2. q. 112. a. 2. ad 1. Ergo est effectus gratiae habitualis Nulla enim operatio hominis est-meritoria vitae aeternae nisâ— procedat à gratiâ— habituali ordine saltem naturae sit ea posterior How can the Act be the ultima dispositio to the infusion of that habit which it floweth from Unless he mean eadem specie and not numerically which yet is false For it is not eadem or else he falsly supposeth that the same Love of God may go before Grace Whereas Dr. Twisse so frequently asketh Whether Gods condional will and so his operation be Volo te velle modo velis or credere modo credas to give us faith if we believe and so maketh non credere or non velle to be the only resistance and the Arminians to be ridiculous in making the effect antecedent to the cause as a condition of the causation and itself This semi-subtilty though it beget voluminous confidence must cry peccavi if a little more subtilty do but detect the defectiveness of it We are not now enquiring of the Rationes fidem habendi but of the Rationes non habendi nor are we enquiring Whether God have made a Covenant or formal Promise of giving faeith upon antecedent conditions But whether he deny or give-not grace for actual faith effectual or sufficient to any but those that resist and wilfully omit the preparatory acts which they were able to perform even preparatory Volitons Or if you will make the question to be de ratisnibus fidem habendi not de causis Actus donandi Whether God do not ordinarily give or produce the act of faith in that soul which doth not wilfully resist and omit such preparatory acts as it could do even Volitions And so I answer 1. It is not I will give thee faith if thou wilt believe or I will make thee willing if thou be willing of the same thing But it is 1. If by resisting common preparing grace thou so harden â—hy heart or increase the privation of receptive aptitude in thy self as that the same degree of grace means help impress will not change thee which otherwise would
to Angels nor to Brutes For as God made one sort of creatures naturally determined to things sensible and another sort necessarily though freely determined to things spiritual so it pleased him to make a middle sort endued with Reason and free-will undetermined as to their choice and able freely to determine their own Volitions without any predetermining premotion of their Creator or any other That so they might be fit subjects to be governed in this Life by Laws and other moral means § 4. God as Creator maketh substances with their necessary Accidents and as the Natural Orderer of them placeth them in their natural order and as Motor or Actor he causeth Action as such But as Moral Rector he causeth only the Moral Order of Actions as far as belongeth to a Rector the rest being presupposed in Nature and leaveth it to man to cause the rest § 5. Seeing God is not to be blamed for making such a creature as man of a middle defectible undetermined Will left to his free choice with necessary helps it being part of the beauty of his works to be diversified He is not then to be blamed for any of the sins of such a creature because he supporteth his Being and his Active Nature and is his first cause of Action § 6. God could prevent all future sin if he absolutely willed so to do either by destroying the World or disabling the sinner or by withholding his Moving Influx or by such a change of his nature as should make him indefectible But he that made man in this Middle state will so continue him and not make a change in the frame of Nature to fulfil our wills § 7. No Act as an Act no Vital Act as Vital no Intellection no Volition as such is Virtue or Sin And therefore to cause it as such is not to cause either moral good or evil § 8. As God is Related to us as our Owner Ruler and our chief good efficiently as our Benefactor and finally as our End so to consent to these Relations and to the Duties of our correlations and to Practise them is the summ of all Moral Good even Dispositively and Actually to be Resigned and devoted to God as our Owner to obey and please him as our Ruler and to be Thankful to Him and totally Love Him as our Benefactor and our ultimate End All Moral Goodness lyeth in this § 9. By which it appeareth that Morality consisteth in the due or undue ORDER of our actions and dispositions as they are a Moral Agent 's related to God himself in these three Relations and to his Actions therein viz. his Disposals his Laws and his Attractive final Goodness with his Benefits § 10. In these the Morality consisteth as simpliciter talis in all three inseparably as Gods Relations are inseparable and our correlations But the Relation of our Actions to any one of them is Morality secundum quid § 11. And among them all our Action submission resignation patience to God meerly as our Owner is Moral but in the slenderest initial sense And our Actions as related to him as our Rector are Moral in the fuller formal sense And therefore by most accounted the only formal Morality as being a relation to a Law But yet our Actions as Related to God our Benefactor Lover and End are Moral in the highest most perfective notion § 12. It is not only sub rationâ— obedientia as it is a thing commanded by a Law that Love to God is Morally good but also in that superiour sense formally as it is the Love of God And therefore Love is called the Law of Laws and the fulfilling of the Law not only as commanded by a Law but as being the End of the Law and the state of perfection above it as Christ is to the Law of Moses and also as being a Law eminenter something greater though not formaliter § 13. But as there is an Order in these Relations so is there in the Morality of our Actions as towards them So that the Last still includeth the rest foregoing All Love is Obedience and all Obedience is submission to our Owner But all Obedience is not Love nor all Submission or Resignation formal obedience to a Rector Though they must all concurr and not be divided when they are formally distinguished § 14. I have thought it necessary though I be guilty of some repetition to open here the Doctrine of formal Morality Virtue and Vice because we cannot understand how God is vindicated from being the Author of sin till we know what sin is which we cannot do till we know what Virtue is which we cannot do till we know what Morality is And also because the Schoolmens most subtile elaborate enquiries into this point especially de naturâ— peccati are generally too little subtile or accurate as comparing it with this little you may perceive § 15. From all this it is plain 1. That God as the meer Author and Motor of Nature doth not cause us to Obey or Love him And therefore that these must be caused by another superadded operation § 16. Yet when we Obey and Love him the Generical Nature of the Act is from God as the God of Nature viz. as it is Intellection Volition Action But that these Actions are so duly ordered as to be thus terminated on God and things commanded is otherwise caused For though the Generical nature of Action Intellection and Volition as such be seldom found but in some Moral species and that be never found but in singular acts yet can one causality procure the Generical nature and another the Specifical and another the singularity in the same action As the Sun is the Generical Cause and the Virtus Seminalis the specifying and the Individuatio seminis the Individâ—â—aâ—ing of Plants Animals c. § 17. As God is the God of Nature so he hath setled Nature in such a constant course of motion as that we have small reason to expect that he should there make any ordinary mutations And therefore as the Sun aforesaid he doth by his Generical Influx concurr with all Specifying and Individuating Causes according to their several natures or receptivities § 18. They therefore that suppose that God as the Cause of all Action must of natural necessity ad esse by physical efficient premotion predetermine every Act natural and free to its object compared with other possible objects and that in all its modes and circumstances do confound Nature and Morality and leave nothing for God to do in causing Holiness but what he must needs do to cause all action that is caused allowing the difference of the second effects â— yea but what he doth in causing every sin For his Pracept is not with them the Causing predetermination § 19. Jesus Christ and his Gospel with all the fore described frame of moral means and the Spirit to co-operate are the proper second causes by which God as RECTOR will on his part ordinarily
to be simply necessary to motion Here the Reader must know that the Controversie is equally of Natural and Free agents and action And first let us enquire of natural action I. Fire is an Active nature as much Inclined to Action as Earth to non-action or rest Yea it s Active Virtue and Inclination is its very Essential Form and this as to a threefold action viz. Motion Light and Heat If God then make Fire and continue its Nature or Essential Inclination For I have before shewed how many wayes this is certainly done The whole experience of the world sheweth that God doth operate by second causes according to their natures and wayes of operation Therefore it more concerneth us here to know what second causes do on the soul in good and evil actions than in these disputes is usually observed Adrian Quodl 3. fol 18. Sententia Durandi plurium aliorum certum tenet c. Quam opinionem ultimo tradit Magister 37. d. 2. judicium relinquens prudentis lectoris examini to these acts and continue fuel approximate with all necessary concauses and media without impediments to say that this Fire yet cannot burn or act without another kind of Divine premotion besides all this even an Immediate physical impulse besides the described Influx is a plain contradiction For Fire is essentially an Inclined Power to act And that which hath a true Power to act can act It 's a contradiction to say It hath power but it cannot And a Power naturally inclined to act will act caeteris paribus The question then is Whether it be an impossibility for fire to burn if God do but as the first Cause of Nature continue its burning power and inclination with all concauses or rather Was it not a Miracle for the three Confessors Dan. 3. not to be burnt in that fiery Furnace If you say that the Miracle was in Gods withholding his additional premotion you then imply that God as principium vel causa prima Naturae doth ordinarily give that additional premotion For that is no Miracle which is not dissonant from the common course of nature But nothing can belong to God as the Cause of Nature but to continue Nature as he made it and he actually premoveth and concurreth while by his Influx as the first cause he continueth all its Moving Nature both Power and Inclination In the motus projectorum so far as the moving vis impressa continueth and prevaileth the motion continueth accordingly And who can prove that though the vis impressa continue e. g. in a Bullet shot out of a Gun and all concauses yet there can be no motion unless God otherwise thrust it on or move it by some other impulse Suppose a Stone or Rock hang in the Air quasi per filum or by somewhat that hindereth its descent If God continue the Natural Gravity of that Rock which is not only a power but an inclination to descend and if he continue all concauses and media and if the thred be cut or the impediment removed that held up the stone yet saith the Dominican this Stone cannot fall unless God moreover by another action thrust it down or by an efficient physical premotion predetermine it or as the Jesuits say unless God concurr with a further moving Impulse A plain contradiction That a Power of motion strongly inclined to act so as a greater power is necessary in the impediment that will hinder it and this in genere Agentis continued by Divine Influx yet cannot act unless otherwise moved God worketh so constantly by Natural Inclinations of second causes as fully proveth to us that ut prima Causa Naturae he hath decreed so to work And how is that then but by his Influx into Nature as Nature If my house cannot fall when the foundations and pillars are gone unless God otherwise thrust it down If I cannot fall though I leap down from the house top unless God otherwise thrust me down If the Town cannot be fired unless God predetermine it or concurr besides his continuation of Nature why should we fear it when we know not that God decreeth any more than the continuation of natural causes and that action which is by them and by him as the upholder of them II. And the case of Free-agents is here confessed to be the same The Influx into their Natures and Virtues is it that continueth them in esse substantiali and in esse movente moto An Act is but the modus substantiae And it surpasseth my understanding to conceive what it is for God physice influere in actum immediate non in potentiam seu virtutem agentem nor how he can be said to move the faculties to act that doth cause the act and not meddle with and therefore not move the faculty Nor know I how an Act immediately and not the agent can be the terminus of a physical motion Though it 's easie to conceive how God should cause an act by moral and extrinsick objective means Therefore as God moveth things Natural by his Influx into their moving Virtues or into the moving Virtues of second Causes which being Active operate on passive matter so as the Soul and its Will is quadam natura inclined to Action in genere and to will good in special God as the cause of nature moveth it by his Influx into the faculty as he doth other natural agents But having made it a Free self-determining Agent his Influx upholdeth and moveth it as such And the same Influx is upholding and moving and moving as upholding seeing God as Motor also doth influere in naturam vitalem liberam Besides which supporting and moving Influx no other predetermining premotion is necessary to an Act as an Act that I know of But the very natures or dispositions of lapsed man being depraved the reparation of them is necessary to holy actions And here also God operateth on the faculties by right disposing them and by that grace which Augustine and Jansenius well call Gratia medicinalis his special Influx causing maintaining and actuating it he causeth the holy actions of believers I do verily believe that Durandus and his followers under the name of supporting the natural and free faculties did mean inclusively that which Bellarmine pleadeth for A General Concurse to the Act as an Act And that they differ in words and not in sense And if his doctrine hold not true I cannot see how God can be said to Permit mens sinful Actions or any action at all For if neither the Inclination of natural agents as of Fire to burn a Stone to descend c. nor the Inclination of the most wicked nature would cause any act unless God otherwise cause it by premotion then there is no place for Impedition for we cannot be said to Hinder a Stone from speaking or a Mountain from walking nor anything from any act which it could not as And permittere is non impedire And
therefore Gods moving a man to the Act of sin is not a permitting him to sin Motion being one thing and the not hindering of motion another thing or nothing §. V. III. Of the Scotists and Nominals way III. ANd as to the third way ascribed by Alvarez to the Scotists and Nominals I think that de nomine it is not a proper expression to call God causa partialis But if we agree of the sense we may bear Vasqu ubi sup taketh Alex. Al. 1. p. q. 26. n. 7. a. 2. ad 1. Ronavent 1. d. 40. a. 2. q. 1. to be for him because they say Actus nostros esse liberos quia Divina voluntas non est Tota Causa sed cum libero arbitrio quod cum sit proxima causa modificatur concursum primâ— But if this be his opinion he joyneth with these Scotists and Nominals de causa non-totali So Pet. à S. Joseph Thos Univ. de Deo saith that God is Causa totius effectus sed non tota Causa sed partialis with improper expressions about God of whom we can say nothing without some impropriety Doubtless God and man are not to be accounted co-ordinate concauses of the act but whatever man doth he doth it in subordination to God But God operateth 1. As the prime cause of Nature in a stablished way by natural causes And so he giveth man his Natural vital power and the Liberty of using it and by this Power and Liberty a man can do more than he alwayes doth So that Gods natural causality and concurse doth not bring all the Power which he giveth men into proportionable adequate Action but men freely exercise the same power sometime more and sometime less 2. And in the like manner God causeth gracious or holy acts Rectifying our Powers and fortifying them by holy habits and preserving and actuating them by the Holy Ghost Yet the Spirit is to Grace as God the prime cause is to Nature He giveth us more Gracious Power than we use and than his own concurse alwayes reduceth into adequate act So that Gods operations in Nature and Grace are not ad ultimum posse Dei nor ad ultimum posse hominis but limited by his most wise and holy will And man as a free agent is not only Able but obliged to use his power further than by all Gods concurse or premotion it is used And in this sense I conceive it is that Scotus and others call God and man Causae partiales in that there is a certain proportion of premotion and help which God as the first Cause of Nature and Grace doth afford to man And there is moreover a certain use of Gods help and Grace beyond what God predetermineth man to as comparative to this object rather than that c. which man can do and is bound to do Not independently or in co-ordination with God but by the Power and Liberty which God only giveth and upholdeth and affordeth him sufficient help to actuate Now if man do this Part which is left to his liberty the effect alwayes followeth If he do not it may not follow though God gave him that necessary help or grace or premotion which is commonly called sufficient And when Scotus likeneth God and man to two drawing a Boat where the strength of both must concurr I believe he meant no more than I have said 1. All the Power is of God as the total first cause 2. All the Grace that rectifieth and disposeth our faculties is of God as the total first cause 3. All the Act as an Act in genere is of God as the total though not the sole cause 4. All the Holiness or Moral Goodness of the Act is of God as the total first cause though not the only cause 5. But all the sinfulness or moral evil of Acts and Habits is from Man 6. And that implyeth that mans free will is not so much freed from sin mutability and infirmity but that it can neglect to use well the power and helps of grace afforded But of total and partial Causality I have spoken more fully in the first Book And of their opinion that Gods Influx puts nothing into the will but only is ad actum seu effectum if it be true it easily endeth the controversie of the difference of sufficient and effectual grace as to that Act But it is to me unintelligible and the thing quite above all our understandings and very unfit for bold disputes or mutual censures §. VI. The true face or Scheme of the Dominican predeterminant way as to the sense and consequents I Do readily confess that as the summ of all the Controversie is Whether man have truly any Free-will that is not moved as necessarily as any natural motions are caused so the arguments of Hobbes and the Dominicans and Dr. Twisse are not easily answered And had we not better proof of all that Morality and Religion which is inconsistent with this opinion I should my self be inclined also to think that we must be contented with the naked name of Liberty there being nothing indeed but Volition necessitated and that man is an Engine moved by God and other causes no less necessarily and physically than a Clock or Watch but only by more invisible causes and to us unknown and therefore our Volitions are called Contingent and free when truly there is nothing contingent in the World We that converse in the body with things corporeal are so much strangers to our selves and to all the race of Intellectual-free Spirits that we are very prone to such gross corporeal imaginations and to think that all action is like the motus projectorum violent and necessitated and that it belongeth to the perfection of the first mover that it should be so yea that he himself should be in all things the most necessary agent and consequently all things necessitated by him But as Alvarez confesseth Free-will is proved by Aquinas and many others by natural proofs and no Predeterminant or Hobbist can give the tenth part so full and certain proof of the necessitation of all Volitions as we can give of all the contrary principles in Morality which are overthrown thereby And therefore whatever some think of the fatum Stoieorum the Light of Nature taught almost all the Philosophers in the World the Freedom of mans will and the morality there founded of which Grotiâ—s hath collected so full a Volume of testimonies in his Book entituled De fato that it shall save me the labour of transcribing any Yet though I think Christianity inconsistent with their opinion I doubt not but many of the Predeterminants are good Christians and excellently learned and acute Divines as not apprehending the inconsistency of their own thoughts And I confess that there is a Religion consistent with their fundamental error which I shall therefore put into the Scheme lest any think that none but Hobbes hath made the right deductions from it And remember that I
the days of Arminius to this day especially between Prince Maurice and the States at the death of Barnevelt the imprisonment of Grotius c. The Synod at Dort and all the strife and discontent before and after it 3. Peruse but the Volumes written on one side by Suecâ—nus Arminius Grevinchovius Corvinus Tilenus Episcopius Curcellaeus Grotius c. with many Lutherans And on the other side by Gomarrus Lubbertus Macchovius c. Molinaeus Amesius Dr. Twisse Rutherford Spanhemius c. and think how sad such Combats are 4. Think what a lamentable distance to this day is kept up between the Lutherans and Calvinists in all Countries and much upon the account of these same Controversies And what bitter Books the Lutherans have written comparing the Calvinists to Papists Turks c. and how little Mr. Ducy by forty years Labour did to reconcile them and how small success all other Reconcilers have had though excellent learned judicious men such as Calixtus Johan Bergins Conrad Bergins Ludov. Crocius Mat. Martinius Isleburg Testaidus Amyraldus Placens Capellus Dallaeus Blondel Davenant Hall Carlton Abbot Morton Preston c. 5. Think of the great Conflicts in France and Flanders between the Jansenists and their Adversaries and the multitude of elaborate Volumes between the Dominicans and the Jesuites And of how many Ages continuance those contests have been 6. Then rise up to the Time and Case of Faustus Rhegiensis Cassianus and the Massilienses and their Adversaries and the hard Characters left by those controversies on the names of worthy men 7. From thence ascend to Chrysostome and his Reproaches and Austin's Censures on the other side with all the Conflicts which he and his Abettors Prosper and Fulgentius had with the Pelagians and Semipelagians of those times 8. And lastly read and pity almost all the Fathers especially of the Greek Church whose Names are now blotted with the censure of speaking too like our Arminians and Jesuites and after all this you will sure think this Contention was a very ill work if it be proved causless and you will think that it's time to end it if it be possible To which end an attempt is not discommendable if it should prove lost as to the greater part of men And some I doubt not God will bless it to at least to increase their love of peace A. I pray you tell me what is your Undertaking and in what measure it is that you think this Work may be accomplished B. My Undertaking is this To prove that in the points of Predestination and Redemption there is no difference between moderate men of each Party * Eadem enim difficultas fuit semper donationis in tempore praefinitionis aut praedestinationis in praescientia Cum ergo in tempore detur nobis prima gratia sine ulla causa ratione aut conditione sine qua non sic etiam praedestinatur Neque solum negari debet ratio cur unus praedestinetur alii verâ— non ut quidam dicebant sed etiam quare aliquis praedestinetur nulla facta comparatioâ—â— siquidem nulla ratio esse potuit ob quam Deus dederit primam gratiam nisi per modum sinis Vasquez in 1. Them Disp 91 c. 7. You see how much a Jesuite granteth but what is resolved into the points of Grace and Free-Will and in the points of Grace and Free-Will there is no real difference but what is resolved into the question of the degree of Gods co-operating influx compared with mans agency and with it self as on several Objects which will prove either no difference at all or else about a thing past mans Understanding And that only in the point of perseverance there is a real perceptible difference but such as is not worthy to be insisted on to the breach of Charity or the Churches peace but must consist with toleration and mutual love A. I know not whether this great Undertaking look more smilingly on the Times to come or frowningly on the Times past For if this be true what thoughts what names do we deserve for troubling the Christian World so perniciously and distractingly with a feigned difference But I pray you tell me in general how you will manifest all this B. 1. You must give me leave to tell you who they are that I undertake this Reconciliation of 2. And then how I shall perform it I. It is not every violent Contender that runneth into such palpable Errors as the common cause needeth not and will say any thing rather than agree that I am speaking of About these matters there are two Parties that stand on each extream who are not to be called Calvinists and Arminians but by other Names for their other Opinions These I intend to confute distinctly instead of reconciling them which iâ— impossible but by reforming them 1. On the one side I undertake not the Reconciliation of the Predeterminants who hold That Free-will is nothing but will a related to Reason Lubentia juxta rationem and that all its acts are as truly necessitated by the efficacions premotion of God as is the motion of a Clock or other Engine or of a Bruit though they will needs call them free because they are Volitions as if willing and free-willing were words of the same signification and that is deifying of mans Will or any Creature to say that it can move or determine it self to this Object rather than another without a Physical perdetermining efficient premotion by God at the first total Cause notwithstanding God should uphold its natural power and â—â— the cause of Nature afford his necessary universal Concourse and that to think that a Will thus predetermined by God could have forborn its act it to deifie it also They that think that God cannot make a Creature whose Will can determine it self without his predetermination to that act as circumstantiated though God uphold all its powers and all natural concurrentâ— else and that a self-determined not predetermined by premotion is a God or a Contradiction I am to confute and not to reconcile A. How will you confute them B. That is to be the work of a Disputation on that Point It shall now suffice to mind you that it seemeth to me very plainly to subvert Christianity if not all Religion For when Adam's sin and all the sin in the World of Men or Devils is resolved into the absolute unresistible Will and efficiency of God as the first total Cause and that it had been as impossible to have done otherwise as to be Gods or to Conquer God it 's easie to perceive whether God â—ate such sin and whether Christ died to signifie his hatred of it and whether he will damn men for not being Gods and whether he that is said unresistibly to predeterminâ— by immediate efficiency the thought will and tongue of every Lyar to every lye that ever was spoken can have any word delivered by man which we can be sure is true In a word if this
without using the memory and imagination to the Act and this deep insensible Act is such as that a man may doubt whether it be not the very thing which we call a habit I say now all these ten things being presupposed which yet are none of them commonly taken to be the habit of Grace How hard is it to us to know what a habit is indeed beyond all these and what it is that it addeth to these We are sure that it is a Disposition Propensity and Aptitude to holy Action in Specie But what that Disposition and Propensity is besides all this fore-named it is not easie to understand And yet undoubtedly it is the Operation of the Holy Ghost XVIII How hard then must it be to know how much Power or what kind of Power and in what sense so called it is that this superadded habit containeth beside all the ten fore-mentioned excitations and propensities And whether it be properly called Power and how it differeth from the potentiae naturales XIX But yet our great Disputes being more about the first act of Faith which antecedeth the habit than about any of the acts that follow the habit the case will be yet harder what that Power is which the Holy Ghost giveth before the habit of Faith as to the performance of that particular act That it suscitateth the natural â—aculty to act is certain Therefore in order of nature it must be disposed or inclined to that act before it act That the Soul receiveth the Divine influx is certain But no mortal man knoweth what that is We commonly conclude that ex parte Dei it is nothing but God himself By God himself is meant his Act By his Act is meant his Essence as in Act But how his Essence is always immutably in equal Act and yet produceth a world in time which it produced not from eternity and how the equal Act or Agency of the Essence is natural necessary and eternal and the Effect free How the Volition is necessary in se and yet free in every termination and effect ad extra How a natural-equal-eternal Agency can produce such wonderful diversity of Effects And how Souls are said to receive Gods Influx if it be nothing but his Agent Essence All these are past the reach of Mortals XX. And it addeth to these difficulties that we are uncertain what use it is that God maketh of Angels in operating on the Soul They are ministring Spirits for the good of them that are Heirs of Salvation about the matters of their Salvation It is absurd to think that Devils whose very powerful Operations on our imagination we surely feel have more power to put evil thoughts into us and stir up evil passions in us than Angels good ones And seeing a Spirit is more active than a Body they that take the Sun to be a Body and perceive that its Beams and Virtue of Light and Heat and Motion is extended to this Earth and incomparably further in a minuite should not take an Angel to be like a stone or staff that moveth no where but where it corporally toucheth and is no where but where it moveth XXI And all Motion and Action hath so many impediments in the world and all Active Natures as fire have so strong a natural inclination to act when they are not hindred by a greater Power that we little know how much of the action of the Soul is promoted by removing impediments internal and external As they that dam up the water all ways save one do force it to rise if it be a stream till it flow that one way Embittering all other things to a Soul doth much to turn its thoughts towards God and dispair of any delight or felicity on Earth maketh Heaven regarded XXII Seeing all naturally-necessary Concauses Objects Media are supposed to the Ratio formalis of Power which is Relative ad possibile he that giveth or taketh away any one of those necessaries doth give or take away Power though he never change the Soul or faculty at all And this is called A moral collation or causation of Power not a moral Power As when a man bringeth a Light into a dark Room he enableth us to see or if he bring in a Book he enableth me to read that which else I could not have read If he open the Windows or if he cure me of blindness by cutting a Suffusion c. So he that preacheth the Gospel to them that had not heard it and God when he gave Christ and the Gospel to be an Object of Faith did make the natural faculty to be more in sensu naturali potentiam ad hoc to which before it was no power but hypothetically only XXIII The Will is not a Power of choosing or willing an unknown good Therefore it may be truly said to be naturally unable to will that which the Intellect perceiveth not to be good And he that giveth knowledge to such a Mind doth truly give more power to the Will as the loss of knowledge is its loss of power Though the Will it self should receive no habitual alteration by it XXIV We must not conceive of the suscitation of an active nature as we do of the motion of dead matter which is meerly passive But as of that which is passive indeed from God and superior Causes but active in it self and on inferiors And I think like the Sun beams passive from no lower nature save by stop or resistance of its own activity XXV As the Scotists distinguish Passive Receptive Power into natural which is naturally disposed to the form received and violent which is averse or opposite to the form or neutral which is indifferent and affirm the Soul to have the first sort of passive power natural to the love of God and supernatural felicity so the distinction is sound and their assertion is true as to the nature of the Soul in it self considered for it was made to love God But accidentally by reason of adventitious pravity it is but potentia passiva violenta for the the carnal mind is enmity to God and neither is nor can be subject to his Law So that it is both natural and violent in several respects XXVI As for the great question what is a moral Power I answer 1. Power may be called Moral ab objecto because it is ad mores and so our natural power is moral and actus humanus and actus moralis are oft put for Synonima's 2. Power may be called moral from the way of effecting it And so our natural Powers also are moral not in the Essence of the Soul but in the Relative form of the power in specie vel individuo ad hoc objectum For he that causeth or revealeth the Object doth by moral causation give us a natural power ad hoc 3. Power is called moral formally In that of it self it is a moral Virtue or Vice Good or Evil which yet could not be true if it were
by it self anon Before we come to that these things I here conclude of 1. That the Diversity of Nature or Receptive Dispositions being presupposed God hath an established order of means and a congruous established universal Concurse which quantum in se as far as belongeth to it to do worketh equally on all 2. That this established measure of aid or concurse recipitur ad modum recipientis and operateth variously as to the effects according to the various disposition of the Recipients from whom the ratio diversatis is to be fetcht and not from it 3. That this established measure of Concurse or aid may by the greatness of the Passive and Active Indisposition and Illdisposition of the Recipient be both resisted and overcome or frustrate 4. That as Adam did resist and overcome such Grace so do all wicked Hi praecedanâ—i effectus virtute verbi spiritusque in hominum mentibus producti rebellis voluntatis vitio suffocari penitus extingui pâ—ssuâ—t in multis solent adeâ— ut nonnulli in quorum mentibus virtute verbi spiritusque impressâ— fuit aliqualis notitia veritatis divinae c. mutentur plane in contrarium c. And even Alvarez Disp 18. n. â—0 saith Si non operatur actione qui est in praeceptâ— imputabitur illi ad culpam eo quod suâ— culpa se impedivit ne dareter illi auxilium efficax quod necessarium erat ut actualiter operaretur sicut si Deus imponeret homini prâ—ceptum volandi quantum est ex parte sua offerret illi alas adjutorium necessarium uâ— volaret ipse autem responderet Dâ—mine nec vâ—lâ— alas accipere nec volâ—re meritâ— reputaretur reus etiamsâ— non possit absque alis volare qâ—ia sua culpaâ—se impedirit ne illi dâ—narentâ—r a Deâ— men in some cases now And so do all godly men in most of the sins if not all which they commit 5. As God rarely worketh Miracles and we hardly know when he violateth his established course of nature though we may know when he worketh beyond the power of any second cause known to us and when he leaveth his ordinary way but ordinarily keepeth to his established course and use of the second causes even in his wonders So it is very probable that in the Works of Grace Recovery and Salvation he ordinarily keepeth to his established order his Ordinances and fixed degree of Concurse 6. Yet as God is still above all his Works and a free Agent and is no further tied to one constant order and measure of Concurse than he tieth himself by his Wisdom and Free-will so God is free in the conveyance of his Grace and can when he please forsake that order and work Miracles by Grace as well as on natural things above nature He can strike down Saul and convert him by a voice from Heaven and in a word can do what he will 7. And as in most wonders its past our power to know whether and when God doth indeed forsake his established order and work contrary to it or without such second causes as are unknown to us though we can tell when he acteth unusually So is it in this case about his works of Grace A Comet or Blazing Star is an unusual thing whose necessary antecedent cause we know not And yet it is but a natural effect of second causes operating in their established course so are ecclipses better known and unusual Tempests and terrible Lightnings c. So great and sudden unusual and wonderful changes may be made by Grace on sinners and yet all in Gods established course of working and by those second causes which are to us unknown C. But God is not a natural but a voluntary Agent and Grace is hiâ— immediate work or off-spring B. 1. He is a voluntary Agent in Creation Preservation and in all the works and changes of nature and yet he operateth constantly in his appointed course 2. It s unknown to us what means he useth out of our reach in his operations upon souls as well as in nature 3. We find that Grace keepeth a harmony with nature yeâ— as morality is but the modality of things natural so we may conceive that God may possibly work it by the modifying of physical Agents and their actions and the recipients 4. Immutability and constancy is one of Gods perfections and the expression of it in the constant order of his Works is part of his glory in the world Though our mutable Free-wills are better than the fixed or necessitated appetite of Bruits that is not as they are mutable and the acts contingent but as they have a higher object But the fixed unchangeable wills of the Glorified Angels and Saints are far better than ours And why should we think unsetled mutability of efficiency to be the best discovery of Gods Immutability 5. But yet we grant that God is free to do what he please C. But it is by fixed second causes that God keepeth a fixed order of natural productions and alterations in the world But you can name no such universal second cause of Grace affording under God a resistible Influx as the Sun doth in Nature B. What will you say if I name you such a second universal cause though if I could not it followeth not that therefore there is none such I think I can name you one that all Christians should know and yet it seems is not well by Divines themselves considered JESUS CHRIST as MAN and MEDIATOR is Gods Administrator General of the humane world and is compared to the Rising Sun which illuminateth all the world with a light suitable to it and them So Christ is the light of the world the Sun of Righteousness that ariseth with healing Grace and enlightneth every man that cometh into the world or as Crotius and Hammond render it which coming into the world enlightneth every man supposing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be the Nominative Case and Neuter Gender and not the Accusative Masculine In him was Life and the Life was the light of men not only to the sanctified who received but uneffectually though quoad se sufficiently the light shined in darkness and the darkness comprehended it not The world that was made by him knew him not He came to his own and his own received him not yet he came to them But as many as received him to them gave he power to become the sons of God John 1. 3 10 11. It is apparent in Scripture that all power in Heaven and Earth is given to Christ Matth. 28. 19 20. that all things are delivered into his hands John 13. 3. and God hath given him power over all flesh John 17. 2. and he is head over all things to the Church Ephes 1. 22 23. C. We all grant that Christ is an universal light and Saviour 1. Objectively 2. And as to his Doctrine Covenant and Example But what 's that to internal efficient Grace which is immediately from God
and not have spoken evil of what you understand not But it 's better now than not at all Our judgement is as followeth I. That God hath three Essential Attributes which he expresseth and glorifieth in his works His Vital Power or Activity his Wisdom and his Will or Love That all these are and operate conunctly but yet each appeareth in eminency in its special effects That Gods Power eminently appeareth in the Being and Motion of things and his Wisdom eminently in the ORDER of things and his LOVE in the Goodness and Perfection of things That accordingly he is 1. The first Efficient 2. The chief Dirigent 3. The ultimate Final Cause of all II. That as to man he is Related to us 1. As our Creator the Cause of our Being Nature and natural Motion as the Fountain of Nature where Power is most Eminent 2. As our Governour and the God of ORDER and the Dirigent Cause where all Attributes concurr but Wisdom is most Eminent 3. As our most Bounteous Benefactor and most Amiable Good and End where Goodness or Love is most eminent III. That accordingly God is the Author of Nature Grace and Glory and since the fall of Natura Medela Sanitas of our Nature our ORDER and Gracious Government and of our Holiness and Happiness and so is our Creator Redeemer and Sanctifier IV. That neither Man Angel or any Creature can possibly have any good but by Gods gift any more than they can make themselves or a World And this Gift must needs be free seeing the Creature hath nothing that is good but what it hath of God and nothing to give him that can add to him or but what is absolutely his own V. God is to us 1. Our OWNER 2. Our RULER 3. Our BENEFACTOR antecedently And no man can Merit of God as he is an Owner or a meer Benefactor for so he freely disposeth as he pleaseth of his own But only of God as a Ruler as is after opened VI. Therefore it is blasphemy to hold that man or Angel can Merit of God in point of proper Commutative Justice which giveth in exchange one thing for another to the benefit of the receiver For as is said God cannot Receive any addition to his perfection nor have we any thing but his own to give him Luke 17. 10. we are thus unprofitable servants as to a Proprietor in point of Commutation though the unprofitable servant be daâ—â—ned Matâ—h 25. 30. in another sense that is who improveth not his Masters stock to the benefit of himself and others and the pleasing of his Ruler VII Mans Duty therefore meriteth only in point of Governing distributive Justice And not every way neither in respect of that For Governing Justice is distinguished according to the Law that governeth us which is either 1. The Law of Innocency or 2. The Law of Grace And no man since the fall can Merit of God according to the Justice of the Law of Innocency which exacteth personal perfection VIII The Law of Grace is in its first notion a free gift of Christ Pardon and Right to Life Eternal by Adoption to all that will Accept it believingly as it is offered that is according to the nature of the Gift And this Gift or Conditional promise and pardon no man can merit For Christs perfect Righteousness and Sacrifice hath already merited it for us and so hath left us no such work to do Nor is there the least place for any humane Merit or Rewardableness from God but on supposition of 1. Christs Merits and Meritorious Righteousness 2. And of this free gift or Act of Oblivion and Life already made to us without our desert IX But yet this is not a meer Gift but also a true Law God is still our God and Governour and Christ is Lord of all Rom. 14. 9. He that is a King and Ruler hath his Laws and Judgement That which is a Gift in the first respect hath 1. It s condition 2. Many commanded duties and so is a Law of Grace in other respects And it is only in respect to this Law of Grace that man is Rewardable or can Merit X. The Gift is from God as Benefactor considered as Good and in it self But it is from God as Sapiential Rector quoad ordinâ—m conferendi as to the Order and Reason why one man rather than another receiveth it So that we Merit not of God as Benefactor nor as Rector by the Law of Innocency or Works nor yet as to the Value or Goodness of the Benefit which is a free Gift But only of God as Rector by the Law of Grace which regulateth the Reception of his free gifts merited by the perfect Righteousness of Christ and so only as to the Order and Reason why one more than another receiveth that free gift As if a Father hath many Sons One living obediently Others playing the prodigals and upon his freely-offered pardon and grace one receiveth it thankfully and the other refuseth it scornfully Here both the obedient and the penitent son have all upon free gift as to Commutative Justice but on various terms And yet both merit in point of paternal Governing Justice but very differently One meriteth of strict Fatherly Justice The other only of a forgiving Father quite on other terms And it is a Comparative Merit by which he is fitter for pardon than the Sons that despise it and spit in the Fathers face XI God as a Benefactor and a Governour giveth some benefits Antecedently to any duty of man And these are never a Reward to us but of Christ perhaps in some instances As Legislation so the benefits of it and that attend it are before Reward and Judgement But other benefits are given by God both as Benefactor and Legislator upon condition of some duty of ours in the Antecedent gift and so in the Judicial sentence and execution that duty is rendered as the reason of our actual Right to them And these are a Reward XII Our first Grace is no Reward nor merited because it antecedeth all conditional duty of ours XIII Our first Reception of Right to Christ Pardon and Life being given on the condition of penitent Acceptance in faith may be called a Reward because they are consequent gifts on condition But because the condition is so slender a thing as the thankful Acceptance of a free gift Divines agree not of the fitness of the name Reward and Merit while they wholly agree about the thing But our after-mercies and final Glory being promised on the condition of such a faith as worketh by Love obedience and improvement of Gods mercies in good works and patience perseverance and conquest of the Flesh the World and the Devil therefore they have more unanimously agreed not only de re but that the names of Reward and Rewardableness or Merit and Worthiness are here fit but used only in the fore explained sense XIV And though the Scripture oftest use the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉
the believing sinner may stand before this righteous and holy God is to affirm the eternal damnation of all the World VII The Covenant mentioned justifieth not but declareth our Justification which is the immediate proper effect of Christ's righteousness VIII Never any man in his wits affirmed that the righteousness of Christ is the formal cause of our Justification Give us but leave to call it the material cause or the meritorious cause immediately and properly of Justification c. Some will think that they are great and heinous errors which either these words or some of mine that seem contrary import But I must crave leave here to follow my usual method in separating the Controversies de re de nomine and then I think that even these strange words prove not him and me at so great a distance as they seem to intimate For I grant him as followeth de re 1. That God hath such a decree of Election or eternal purpose as he describeth and calleth the Constitution of the Covenant 2. That God doth wisely and graciously execute this Decree 3. That all Grace and Mercy is given by Christ And therefore so far as Mercy is common Christ is the common cause of it 4. That Christ himself is a blessing or gift decreed and also freely given by God even from his love to the World Joh. 3. 16. 5. That God's electing Act or Decree as in him hath no condition nor his purpose to give Christ as a Saviour to mankind 6. On our part no condition is required either that God may elect us or that the first promise of a Saviour be made or that Christ come into the World or that he fulfill all righteousness or that he obey or die or rise or be glorified or come to judgment or raise the dead or that he enact it as his Law of Grace that he that believeth and is baptized shall be saved and he that believeth not shall be damned 7. Nor is any condition on our part necessary absolutely necessitate medii that the Gospel or the first Grace yea the first special Grace be given us 8. That Christ by his suffering and merits hath procured to his elect not only pardon and life if they believe and obey him but Grace to cause them effectually and infallibly to believe repent obey and persevere 9. That no man can or will believe and repent but by his Grace 10. That to give men a promise of pardon and life if they will believe repent and obey the Gospel is not the whole of Christ's Grace to any but where-ever he giveth this he giveth also much means and gracious help by which men may do better than they do and so be more prepared for his further Grace 11. That if God only gave men a promise of pardon if they believe and gave them no Grace to enable or help them to believe it would be no saving Covenant 12. God did not repeal his Law of Innocency or as he had rather call it of Perfection nor did properly dispense with or relax the preceptive part of it Nor is it absolutely ceased as to a capable subject And therefore Christ was bound to perfection 13. God would not have his Law to be without the honour of the perfect performance of mans Mediator though it be violated by us all 14. No man is saved or justified but by the proper merit of Christ's perfect obedience yea and his habitual holiness and satisfactory sufferings advanced in dignity by his divine perfection 15. This merit as related to us supposeth that Christ as a Sponsor was the second Adam the Root of the justified the reconciling Mediator who obeyed perfectly with that intent that by his obedience we might be justified and who suffered for our sins in our room and stead and so was in tantum our Vicarius poenae as some phrase it or substitute and was made a curse for us that we might be healed by his stripes as he was obedient that his righteousness might be the reason as a meritorious cause of our Justification which supposeth the relation of an undertaking Redeemer in our nature doing this and in our stead so far forth as that therefore perfect obedience should not be necessary to be performed by our selves And righteousness therefore is imputed to us that is we are truly reputed righteous because we as believing members of Christ have right to impunity and life as merited by his righteousness and freely given to all penitent believers And Christ's own righteousness may be said so far to be imputed to us as to be reckoned or reputed the meritorious cause of our right or justification as aforesaid Thus far we are agreed de re And then de nomine I willingly leave men to their way of speech 1. If he will call God's Decree his Covenant in Constitution 2. If he will call the execution of his Decree his Covenant in execution 3. If he will call nothing else the Covenant of Grace or at least nothing of narrower extent but what comprehendeth God's eternal Decrees and the promise and gift of a Redeemer and so of the rest I cannot help it his language is his own But I shall tell you further my thoughts de re de nomine 1. De re 1. God's eternal decrees purposes or election give no one right to Christ Pardon or Life and so justifie no man 2. The execution of God's Decrees yea of Election hath many Acts besides Justification 3. It must therefore be some transient Act done in time ad extra by which God justifieth men 4. There are divers such acts concurring in several sorts of causality or respect 5. Christ's meritorious righteousness and satisfaction are the sole proper immediate causemeritorious of all the Grace or Mercy procured and given by him there being no other meritorious cause of the same kind either more immediate or at all co-ordinate and copartner with him 6. As Christ giveth us Holiness qualitative and active by the real operation of his Spirit though he merited it immediately himself so doth he give us right to impunity to the further Grace of the Spirit and to Glory by the instrumentality of his Covenant as by a Testament Deed of Gift or Law of Grace Which by signifying God's donative will doth not first declare us justified or to have the foresaid right to Christ and Life but doth first give us instrumentally that right and so immediately justify us And God's will giveth us not right as secret or of it self but by such instrumental signification 7. God hath signified his will to us partly by absolute gifts and promises and partly by conditional that such there are he that denieth must deny much of the Scripture Christ was absolutely given to fallen mankind for a Redeemer and so was the Conditional Law or Covenant of Grace and many other mercies But he hath made and recorded a conditional Gift of Christ as in special Union to be our
Beumler and many others And Paraeus Joh. Crocius de Justif and many more expresly deny Christ's righteousness to be the formal cause And I believe that all they that assert it mean as the rest though they speak incautelously and unaptly And what they mean by Imputation let Davenant speak ib. c. 27. p. 359. Imputantur quando illorum intuitus respectus valent nobis ad aliquem effectum aeque ac si a nobis aut in nobis essent siquis indignus aut ignavus ob paternam virtutem merita erga rempublicam in gratiam regis admittatur gratum nobilitatum dicamus per propter Imputationem virtutis paternae This is Bradshaw's sense but yet the similitude falls short So Altingius states the Question Loc. Com. part 2. p. 679. An justificatio consistaet in Imputatione Justitiae Christi hoc est in Imputationae Justitiae per Christum acquisitae And what Protestant will deny this And Maresius with him saith Cum Paulo justitiae Imputatio peccatorum remissio idem sint prout nullum est discrimen inter satisfactionem Christi illius meritum non est necesse subtilius inter haec dùo scrupulose distinguere cum remissio sit peccatorum tum commissionis tum omissionis per illam jus plenum ad vitam aeternam habeamus But this needeth somewhat more I think Loc. 11. p. 284. And the description of the effect sheweth what the Imputation is which Maresius truly thus describeth Exeg Art 23. p. 326 327. Transit reatu peccatum orig ut non amplius imputetur adhaeret quidem ei inseparabiliter Reatus potentialis sive in actu primo ut sonat intrinsecum meritum poenae sed ablatus est Actualis sive quoad actum secundum ut sonat jus voluntatem Dei de paena illa adhuc exigenda N. B. Thysius in synopsi Leidens Disp 33. p. 413. saith Mirum hic videri non debet Christi justitiam non meritoriae solum materialis imo Formalis causae rationem habere cum id fiat diversi mode nempe qua illa est propter quod in quo seu ex quo per quod justificamur So he taketh Christ's righteousness to be all three the meritorious material and formal cause of our Justification De nomine I add as to our Author 1. I hope few will follow him in calling the Decrees of God the Covenant and confounding Election and the Covenant in Constitution For my part I will not 2. Constitution signifieth 1. actum Constituentis 2. more usually passively statum seu rem constitutam God's Eternal Purpose is not properly the Covenant in Constitution in either sense 3. God's Eternal Decree is nothing but his Essence for there is nothing in God but God and nothing but God eternal denominated as related to its connoted object which from eternity was nothing And the Covenant in Constitution is not God nor shall be by me so called 4. Nor will I call the whole execution of God's Election by Christ the Covenant in Execution nor any part of it but that which Scripture so calleth 5. I grant him that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is usually taken for a divine disposition and constitution but that is not meerly in God's Decree but as Grotius hath at large opened Praef. ad Annot. in Evang. as it is God's signal revealed determination of the terms of life and death or as it is a Law and a Covenant on God's part imposed on us before we consent And Jer. 33. 20. doth not call God's meer Decree his Covenant but his created course and law of nature 6. He that will but try the Texts which his Concordance referreth him to and cannot find a multitude of places where the word Covenant is taken for somewhat else than God's Decrees and their general Execution even for a Law with its premiant and penal sanction and for a free donation or promise which yet hath its proper conditions as the moralis dispositio recipientium and that cannot find divers such Covenants made by God with Christ and us that are really distinct and not to be confounded must not expect that I here trouble other Readers with such a task as his conviction 7. I fully agree that Christ's righteousnrss is fitly called both the meritorious and material cause of our Righteousness or passive Justification Though I lately read one contending that it cannot be both For we mean but that it is that Matter or Thing which meriteth it The First Part OF THE Nature Relations Knowledge AND DECREES OF GOD AND OF FREE-WILL AND PROVIDENCE As the Objects thereof Such selected Verities as are needful to reconcile the common Differences about Predestination Providence Grace and Free-will between the Synodists and Arminians Calvinists and Lutherans Dominicans and Jesuits c. By RICHARD BAXTER LONDON Printed by Robert White for Nevill Simmons at the Princes Arms in S t. Pauls Church-yard MDCLXXV THE CONTENTS Sect. 1. WHAT Knowledge of God is here to be expected Pag. 1. Sect. 2. Of mans Soul as the Glass or Image in which God must be seen p. 3. Sect. 3. The several inadequate Conceptions which together make up the most exact and orderly Knowledge of God p. 4. Sect. 4. The Relations and Denominations of Gods Active Power Knowledge and Will as to the Creatures p. 6. Sect. 5. Of Futurity and the pretended Eternal Causes of it and Gods Knowledge of it p. 8. Sect. 6. Of the Co-existence of the Creature with God in Eternity and of Gods Knowledge of them as existent p. 13. Sect. 7. Of the presumptions and uncertainties of many Scholastick Disputes about Gods Knowledge which should moderate our censures of Dissenters in such matters and check our sinful curiosity p. 15. Sect. 8. More of Gods knowing things future and of Permission of sin p. 24. Sect. 9. Of Predetermination Universal Causation Humane Power and the Nature of Liberty of Will Distinguished in a Table p. 27. Sect. 10. Of Natural and Moral Power and Impotency Their difference p. 36. Sect. 11. More of the same and Whether God bind man to Impossibilities p. 39. Sect. 12. Of Scientia Media p. 42. Sect. 13. Of the Will and Decrees of God in general Their simplicity and diversity supposed priority and posteriority Of Negations of Nolitions and Volitions of Negatives c. p. 45. Sect. 14. Several distinctions of Gods Will explained 1. Positive acts and non-agency 2. Positive and Negative as to the object 3. Positive and Oppositive Volitions and Nolitions 4. Immanent and Transient 5. Efficiently Transient and Objectively Transient 6. Natural and Free 7. Efficient and Permissive 8. Beneplaciti signi de eventu de debito Decretive and Legislative Where the true nature of Laws is opened 10. Absolute and Conditional 11. Effectual and uneffectual 12. Antecedent and Consequent p. 49. Sect. 15. Whether Gods Decrees must be said to be diversified and proved according to the order of Intention or Execution Whether
God do intendere finem and what is his End The Order and Objects opened p. 57. Sect. 16. What Election and Reprobation are The order of the Decrees called Reprobation and of the Objects Of Negations of Decree p. 66. An Additional Explication of Divine Nolitions p. 76. Sect. 17. Whether God Will Decree or Cause Sin Five Acts of God in and about Sin What Sin is Many wayes God can cause the same thing that the sinner causeth and so fulfil his Decrees without Willing or Causing the Sin Objections answered God freely not idlely or impotently restraineth his own possible operations sometimes that he do not such or such an act at all and sometime that he do but so much towards it and no more Whether God be ever Causa partialis p. 84. Sect. 18. A Confutation of Dr. Twisses Digress 5. li. 2. sect 1. Vindic. Gratiae where he asserteth that God Willeth the existence of Sin and that sins are a medium sua natura summe unice conducibile to the Glorification of his Mercy and Justice p. 92. Sect. 19. The same Doctrine in Rutherford de Providentia confuted Whether things be good because God willeth them or willed by him because good resolved Whether there were eternal rationes boni mali Dr. Field vindicated p. 106. Sect. 20. The old Doctrine of Augustine Prosper and Fulgentius thought by some Jesuits too rigid but indeed Conciliatory for absolute Election to Faith and so to Salvation and for no reprobating Decree but only of Punishment for Sin foreseen but not decreed Prosper ad Cap. Gall. Sentent translated p. 115. Sect. 21. The summ of Prospers Answer to Vincent 16. Object p. 118. Sect. 22. Fulgentius words to the same sense p. 121. Sect. 23. The healing Doctrine and Concessions of many called Calvinists of the Synod of Dort Pet. Molinaeus c. p. 124. Sect. 24. And of Petr. á Sancto Joseph Suarez Ruiz c. on the other side especially Bellarmines at large and others p. 127. ERRATA PART 1. pag. 10. l. 38. in marg for Reason Being r. Relation being p. 24. l. 25. r. those Causes l. 26. r. first Case p. 27. l. 2. r. Of predetermination Reader Pain and Greater business forbad me to gather the Errata some are gathered by a Friend out of the first Book many more I must leave to your ingenuity I see in the Premonition p. 4. l. 22. for Mr. W. Mr. D. l. 47. for Armatus Annatus Also Dial. 11. p. 231. l. 30. r. refuse Dial. 13. p. 291. l. 13. for not r. done Catholick Theologie The First BOOK PACIFYING PRINCIPLES Collected from the common Notices of Nature the certain Oracles of GOD in the Holy Scriptures and the common Consent of Christians For the RECONCILING OF THE CHURCH-DIVIDING and DESTROYING CONTROVERSIES especially about PREDESTINATION PROVIDENCE GRACE and FREE-WILL REDEMPTION JUSTIFICATION FAITH MERIT WORKS CERTAINTY OF SALVATION PERSEVERANCE and many others In Three Parts I. Of Gods Nature Knowledge Decrees and Providence about Sin with Mans Free-will as the Objects of the former II. Of Gods GOVERNMENT and MORAL Works III. Of Gods Operations on Mans Soul By RICHARD BAXTER An earnest Desirer of the UNITY LOVE and PEACE of Christians For endeavouring of which he expecteth with resolved Patience still to undergo the Censures Slanders and Cruelties of IGNORANCE PRIDE and MALICE from all that are possessed by the Wisdom and Zeal which are from beneath Earthly Sensual and Devilish the Causes of Confusion and every evil work James 3. 14 15 16. LONDON Printed by Robert White for Nevill Simmons at the Princes Arms in S t. Pauls Church-yard MDCLXXV The First Part OF THE NATURE KNOWLEDGE WILL AND DECREES of GOD As far as is needful to the intended CONCILIATION and CONCORD SECT I. Of our Knowledge of God as here attainable THough it be about the Knowledge Will and Decrees of God that our Controversies are agitated yet because the consequent Verities are scarce ever well understood without the understanding of the Antecedents out of which the Consequents arise and without the just order place and respect which the later have unto the former and unless things be understood in their true Method I will therefore expose my self to the obloquy of those who will call it Over-doing so far as to premise somewhat of the Deity it self But not what is necessary to the full explication of the Divine Attributes as we are capable as must be in a Method of Theologie which I have attempted elsewhere but only so much as lyeth under our Controverted Subject And when I have done that I shall leave the rest Thes 1. To Know the only true God and Jesus Christ whom he hath sent is Life Eternal * * * John 17. 3. Bradward l. 1. c. 11. p. 198. The first necessary incomplex Principle is God and the first complex simply is of God Deus est c. But yet it is not to us the primum cognitum 2. To †††Exodus 20. know GOD is to know his Being Nature and Relations For though those Relations that are to Man be not essential to his Divine Nature yet are they essentially contained in the signification of the name GOD as he is the object of our Faith and Religion For to be OUR GOD doth speak his Relations to us as well as his Nature As the name KING and FATHER doth among men 3. We neither have nor can have here in flesh any one proper formal Conception of the Divine Nature that is formally suited to the truth in the object But only Metaphorical or Analogical Conceptions borrowed from things better known 4. Yet nothing beyond sense at least is so certainly known as GOD so far as we can reach though nothing be less perfectly or more defectively known or less comprehended Even as we know nothing Visible more certainly than the Sun and yet comprehend nothing Visible less 5. It is not true which many great Metaphysicians assert that the Quiddity of God is totally unknown to us For then it could not be life eternal to know him nor would a meer Negative knowledge cause in us a sufficient Positive Love or Joy or Trust c. But to know that we cannot know him would but inferr that we cannot Love him For we Love not an unknown Good 6. Nor is it true that Pet. Hurtado de Mendoza in fine Disput and some others say that the Notions of Life and Intellect are all that we have of the Quiddity of God and that the Divine Will is not a Quidditative notion 7. God is here seen in the Glass of his Works with the Revelation of his Word and Spirit And from these works we must borrow our conceptions * * * The doubt is How Imperfect works can notifie the perfect God And the Schoolmen manage it as an insuperable difficulty Whether God could have made the World or any thing better than it is If you will pardon me for making
at words What is this Complexe object Deus est Is it any thing or nothing If nothing it is not before Gods knowledge and the Cause of it If any thing Is it God or a Creature A Creature is not before God nor a cause of his knowledge which is God himself If it be God is it his Essence as such or his Essential properties or the Persons None of these For Gods essence is the prime Incomplexe Being and not a Complexe proposition Dens est His Properties primary are Omnipotent-vital-power Intellect and Will But these also are the same Incomplexe essence and not propositions And his Intellect as an object of it self is not before his Intellect as an Actual Knowledge of himself nor the cause of it All the sense he can make of it is that this proposition Deus est est Aeternus c. if it had had an eternal being would in order of nature have been conceivable to us before this Deus scit se esse or before his knowledge it self or that if man had been the Knower it had been first a true proposition that He is before he knoweth that he is But God knoweth not himself by propositions Words in mente vel ore are but artificial organs for blind creatures to know by And doth God need such to know himself Doth he know by Thinking and by Artificial means as we do Hath he Entia rationis in his Intellect as man as Propositions are And had he an Intellect and these Entia rationis or propositions in his Intellect Deus est c. before he knew them yea and his self-knowledge which in Act is his pure eternal necessary Essence caused by these All that you can say is that poor creatures know by Propositions and phantasms and diverse thoughts and that God knoweth man and therefore knoweth all our propositions and thoughts as ours but not that he had the like eternally in himself and knoweth them in himself and that Himself as a proposition is the Cause of himself or self-intellection as in Act. He can know that you see by Spectacles and yet not eternally use Spectacles himself as the Cause of his sight But Bradwardine saith that God knoweth illa vera complexa quae voluntatem divinam praecedunt per solam suam essentiam sicut alia vera incomplexa Illa vero quae voluntatem ejus sequuntur non scit Deus per illa complexa neque per aliquid aliud à voluntate ejus semota sed per suam voluntatem vel per suam substantiam cum voluntate c. More presumption still He saith God knoweth complexa sed non complexe And who knoweth what sense those words have What meaneth he by complexa but Notions that is names and propositions as distinct from the Things And what is it to know propositions complexe but to know them as they are And what is it to know them incomplexe unless it be to know quid physicum a proposition is or to know that it is no proposition that is to err If God know a Complexum or a proposition that Proposition is in being And where was it in being before God knew it If in God or no where 1. God then is a proposition 2. And God is before he knoweth himself 3. And a proposition being in intellectu an act of knowledge it is to say that God knoweth that he is before he knoweth that he is and his knowing that he is causeth him to know that he is If it be said that by complexa he meaneth not organical notions words nor propositions but the Verity of Gods Being Eternity c. I answer To know things is said to be to know some Truth because by knowing the thing we can make this proposition This is or This truly is But Gods knowledge of Things is not as ours but by pure perfect intuition and so maketh not propositions in himself by knowing things But if it be the Truth of this proposition Deus est that you mean it supposeth that proposition to exist for quod non est non verum est and so to exist in God which is denyed And it is that proposition that Bradwardine speaketh of But if by Truth you mean nothing but Gods Essence that is not a Complex object which he speaketh of And he saith not that God knoweth suam essentiam creata vel futura but that he knoweth per suam essentiam quod Deus est est Omnipotens Aeternus c. per suam essentiam cum voluntate quod mundus futurus est So that it 's a proposition that he calleth complexum incomplexè cognitum by contradiction when he cannot prove that Gods Intellect made propositions in it self and that antecedently to themselves and the Causes of themselves And all this which men talk in the dark about God is non-sense to trouble themselves and the world with on false suppositions that Gods knowledge is such as ours or that we can have formal conceptions and descriptions of it when we should tremble to read men thus prophanely take Gods Name in vain and pry into unrevealed things I have purposely been the larger on this instance to warn the Reader to take heed of the common cheat of Scholastick Word-mongers who would obtrude on us humane entia rationis or Thoughts as real Divine entities and would perswade us that every nothing which they make a name for is therefore something yea some of them God himself What I have said of Divine Intellection I say of his Volitions of which cap. 20 21. Bradwardine saith that Voluta priora viz. Deum esse omnipotentem esse bonum cognoscentem c. sunt Causa But 1. It is too bold to say that Gods Will is an Effect 2. If it were so it must be his Essence Omnipotency and Intellect that is the Cause of his Will and not a Complex verity as Deus est omnipotens bonus est c. For Gods Will is not caused by Propositions 3. If you say that his Volition as terminated objectively on his Essence Goodness c. is his Will in act se Velle which some call the third Person yet here would be no Cause and Effect but our distinct partial conceptions of that incomprehensible simplicity which hath no real diversity or priority SECT VI. Of Gods Knowledge and the Co-existence of the Creature 88. AUgustine well and truly saith that fore-knowledge in God is the same with the Knowledge of things present Past present and future through his Infiniteness and Eternity being alike to him even all as present 89. But this dependeth upon the Indivisibility of Eternity in which all the things of time are included and co-exist 90. Thus saith Augustine li. 2. ad Simplic q. 2. Quid est praescientia nisi scientia futurorum Quid autem futurum est Deo qui omnia supergreditur tempora Si enim in scientia res ipsas habet non sunt ei futurae sed praesentes ac
powers †††Natura humana eâ—usque potentiae Naturales quamvâ—s mere naturales sint sibi innatam proserunt potentiam receptivam gratiae immo â—tiam potentiam activam â—x se aptam ut simul cum divino auxilio vitalitâ—r producat supernaturalâ—m actum fidei charitatis c. Ruiz 199. Morality is first seated in the Will and from it our Power is first called Moral But yet it is secondarily in the other two faculties 200. As to Dr. Twisse his saying that Potentia non fundatur in Potentia Moralis scilicet in Naturali and as others say Accidens non fundatur in accidente I answer 1. Potentia univocè sic dicta non fundatur in potentia But this is not such 2. It is false that accidens non fundatur in accidente as the instance of Relation proveth The term Accident is indeed so ambiguous as proveth that the distribution of all things first into Substance and Accidents is not genuine and congruous but inept If you will call Calor Lumen or Motus Accidents and call Gradus also an Accident and then say that Caloris Luminis Motus non dantur diversi gradus because Accidentis non est accidens you are not to be believed And if you will say that Ordo is an Accident and that Qualitatum Actionum c. non datur or do it is false 3. But the worst of the error is that the Natural Powers are called Accidents which is a falshood of very ill tendency in many respects They are the very formal Essence of the soul And surely the soul may have its Good or Evil Dispositions 201. There is in the very Essence of the Natural Power or faculty besides the Vis vel Virtâ—s agendi a certain Natural Inclination to some things which is Inseparable from it from which the Schoolmen say even of the Will that it is quaedam Natura pondus animae So the soul is Inclined or propense and not only Able to Activity as such to Intellection as such to Volition as such and objectively to Truth as such and to Natural Good and felicity as such And there is an Inclination of the soul which is not essential and inseparable but is much under the power of the Will and may be got and lost 202. This adventitious Disposition is found in the soul in various Degrees 1. When it is in such a Degree only as that immediately and properly without any other power added the will may be said to be Able to Act thus or thus then it is called a Moral Power But when it is in such a degree as that we are Disposed to Act promptly and easily it is called a Habit. 203. He therefore that is so far disposed to any Good act and whose Indisposition or disposition to the contrary is but such as that in his present state without any more help than * * * Yet the Jesuits themselves as Ruiz ubi sup are not so much for the necessity of predisposition but that they confess that Grace oft taketh occasion of things natural or indifferent yea of heinous sins themselves And that the beginning of Justification Sanctification is not from the strength or endeavours of nature but from Grace he largely proveth in the whole disp 17 18. as Vasquez and Suarez and other Jesuits also do he hath he can move his own will to the said act and the difficulty is not so great but that such Power sometime doth overcome it is said to have a Moral Power But he that wanteth not Natural force or power but only a right Disposition of his Will and so far wanteth it as that none in his case do ever change their own acts to good without more help and power than he hath is said to be Morally unable or impotent and not only to want the Habit. 204. Whether the Natural Powers be properly called A Power to Believe Repent Love God c. without the Moral Power or right disposition though it be a question of some use among the Contenders about these matters yet it is chiefly de nomine and therefore of the less moment This is to be granted of all de re †††Of this see Mr. Truman's Treatise of Natural and Moral Impotency and Mr. William Fenners notable though popular Tractate of Wilful Impenitency that Unbelievers want not that Natural Power or faculty which can Believe and Repent if duly suscitated and disposed But through an Ill Disposition and contrary course of action and want of due excitation that Power will not Act without Gods special Grace Which Will not signifieth 1. The Undisposedness 2. The Non-agency And in strictest speech the former is best expressed by The Will is undisposed and averse to Believe c. and the latter by The Will doth not consent But the first may be expressed by It cannot because it will not come to pass Though it is no such Cannot as is distinct from Will not but the very same And as Power is distinct fom Will and a man is said to be Able to do that which he can do if he will so no doubt but he that Will Believe and Repent can do it so far as he is Willing And this is it that Augustine so much pleadeth for when he would have us distinguish Cannot and Will not and when he saith that Posse Credere est Omnium Credere autem fidelium 205. To the fuller opening of this note the following Conclusions No man doth that which he cannot do at that instant 206. Humane and all created Power is dependent and is not properly a Power to do any thing but on supposition of Gods Emanant support and concurse as he is the first Cause of Nature 207. Humane Power is finite and is not a Power ad omnia but ad haec which therefore are called Possible to us 208. Power being a Relative word it may be said to be nullified ad hoc by an alteration of the Object only As if you double the weight that man may be Unable to bear it who Could bear it when it was less when the object is changed and not the power indeed 209. Power supposeth the due object and its due proposal or state We have no Power to see invisibles to understand things not intelligible to will things not apprehended to be good and not so revealed c. 210. The three Conjunct Powers of the soul suppose each other though they are not formally the same We have no Power to Will objects not understood nor to understand will or execute without Vital-activity nor to understand most things without the Wills determination ad exercitium 211. The due qualification also of the Inferiour faculties the Senses and Phantasie and Organs is supposed to the being of true Power We never had Power to see without eyes no more than without Light This Power of the Inferiour faculties some call Potentia secunda as to the acts of the Superiour
528. 3. Others say as Camero that the Intellect necessitateth the will and the Objects and temptations necessitate the Intellect and God causeth the Objects and Laws and permitteth the Tempter 529. 4. Others say that God only as the Cause of Nature 1. By Support and Concurse necessary to all agents causeth the Act as an Act in general 2. And giveth Power also to act or not act freely 3. And as Governour of the World doth that which he knew men would make an occasion of their sin 4. And also by his Providence causeth many effects of which mens sins are also a cause 5. And after bringeth good out of their evil 6. But as to the sin it self he is no cause of it either as sin or punishment either of the form or of the Act as morally specified that is as it is about this Forbidden object or End rather than another And this opinion I take to be the undoubted truth 530. Let it here be noted 1. That the five things here granted are all certain truths 2. And that they are as much as is necessary on Gods part in respect to the events which we see And unnecessaries are not to be asserted 3. That they fully shew God to be the perfect Governour of the World and all therein 4. And yet to be no Author of sin Let us consider of the particulars 531. I. It is certain that God as Creator hath made man a Vital Agent and therefore a self-actor under him and an Intellectual Agent and therefore is not tyed to follow the perceptions of sense alone And a Free-willing Agent and therefore hath a Power to Act or not Act hic nunc or to choose or refuse or to choose this rather than that as far as consisteth with his Necessary Volitions which I acknowledged and enumerated before which is part of Gibieufs and Guil. Camerarius Scot. meaning by their servato ordine finis Though I think that Annatus doth not unjustly accuse Gibieuf of confusion and unskilfulness in the managing of that matter 532. II. It is certain that as Motus vel Actio is quid Naturale it is of God as the first Cause of Nature * * * Vid. Gregor Arim. in 2. d. 28. q. 1. a. 3. ad arg 8. 12. whose judgement many Schoolmen follow Vasquez thus abbreviateth and reporteth him in 1 Tho. q. 23. d. 99. c. 4. Mâ—tionem Dei ordine causae priorem esse co-operatione determinatione nostra in operibus bonis at in operibus peccati etiam secundum substantiam seclusa malitia priorem esse nostram determinationâ—m codem ordine baec inter se comparari in aeternitaâ—â— Ex quo inserunt Deum praefinisse opera bona ante detâ—rminatiâ—nâ—m nostram ullo modo praevisam sed mala secundum substantiam nequaquam nisi praecognita determinatione nostrae voluntatis Vid. Marsil in 1. q. 45. ar 2. post 4. conclus And so when a sinner acteth it is not without this Universal first Cause Whether God do it only as Durandus thought by the meer continuation of the nature of all things Active and Mobile or by any superadded concurse besides is nothing to our present business which only sheweth that God is the Cause 533. III. It is certain that Governing Providence by doing good doth set before men that which they make an occasion of all their evil Every thing is turned into sin by sinners †††Titus 1. 15 16. and to the unclean all things are unclean through the uncleanness of their own minds and consciences As to the pure and holy all things are pure and sanctified Bad stomachs corrupt the wholsomest food All Gods mercies are abused to sin 534. It is certain that God fore-knew this And yet that he is no way obliged to deny men life or take it away lest they abuse it or deny men all those mercies or remove them which he foreseeth that they will turn to sin 535. IV. It is certain that God often concurreth to the causing of the very same effect which sin also causeth and so is as a concause of it with sin And this effect is so near to the Act of sin as that the sin it self is ost called by its name as if it were its nearest matter which it is not And this is the occasion of the Great mistake of men in this case that cannoâ— distinguish Of which more anon in the instances 536. V. And it is certain that God as the Governour of the World doth do much good by the occasion of mens sin But this is not to turn the sin it self into good 537. VI. And to these five operations of God I add as to his Volitions that all this which he doth he willeth or decreeth to do And he hath no contrary will at all 538. But that which we deny is that He is any proper cause of the sin it self efficient or deficient culpable or not culpable Physical or Moral For the opening of which we must enquire what sin is and what goeth to its being or constitution 539. All grant that God is our Ruler by a Law and also our ultimate End as he is Optimus Amabilissimus and that he is our absolute Owner And that as rational free agents we that are his own are also his Subjects and Beneficiaries and made capable of Loving him as our ultimate end and of obeying his Laws And that sin is our Disobedience to these Laws with our denying God our selves as his Own and withholding or perverting the Love which we owe him as our End 540. As Logick hath confounded us in most other cases by arbitrary unsuitable second notions making us a Shoo not meet for the Foot so that it 's easier to know Things without those unfit notions than with them so hath it done here Men may more easily know what sin is and what it is to disobey a Law and that either by doing what we should not or by not doing what we are commanded than they can know by what Logical or Metaphysical name it should be called Whether a privation or a relation an act or no act c. But it is not only for Logicians that God made his Laws nor is it only a Metaphysical Conscience that will accuse men or condemn them and torment them for their sin 541. No Act meerly as an Act in genere is forbidden of God For the soul is an Active nature and can no more cease all action than to be though it can forbear a particular act as to this object and at this time And God is the Cause of Acts as such 542. I have shewed before that as Action it self is no substance but the mode or motion of a substance so to choose this object rather than that hath no more of Action in it than to have chosen the other or than Ex to verb quod Dâ—us concâ—â— at nobiscum ad actum peccati prout facultas liberi
arbitrii postulat sive prius sive posterius sive simul non sequitur malitiam Deo esse tribuendam cum illa solum ex modo operandi creaturae sequatur Vasquez in 1 Tho. q. 23. d. 99. cap. 4. the general nature of action when existent hath So that this Moral specification addeth not to the natural generical entity 543. It is therefore 1. Acting 2. Not acting 3. Moral disposition which are Commanded and Forbidden by God And not any one only and these not in themselves but about the Materials commanded or forbidden Objectively in the Law To Act on a forbidden object Not to Act on an object when commanded and to be viciously disposed to either is a sin 544. You may see then that sin is a Connotative notion yea and a Relative notion It connoteth a Ruler a Law and End a Subject and is thus variously Related 545. As Subjection is the Root of Obedience and all obedience Virtually being A Consent to obey and Love is the Root of benefits so to forsake God simply as our Rector or our End or our Owner is Atheism practical and all sin in one But to violate only a particular precept de mediis is but a particular sin 546. God is the Cause of the Law which commandeth and forbiddeth and God is the Cause of Nature and Objects and Action as Action That therefore which he hath made mans part is to Love God and Holiness and not to over-love the creature nor to love it as our End or in his stead and to do all that he commandeth and not to do the particular acts about such particular objects as he forbiddeth 547. The remote subject or relatum then of sin is the person sinning But the nearest is the Act Omission or disposition The fundamentum or ratio referendi is the said Acts Omissions or dispositions as such or such about such or such objects commanded or forbidden which is a Relation And the form of sin is the Moral Relation of Disobedience or Disconformity to the Law So that if you must needs have it in Logical notions Sin is a Moral Relation resulting from a Physical relation of Actions Omissions or dispositions of Gods subjects which are modified contrary to his Law 548. It is a Moral Relation as it is Disobedience found in a Moral agent against a Law and Rector as such It is a Physical Relation as the Act c. is prius naturâ quid naturale about an object that is quid naturale It s fundamentum of both relations And one Relation may be sounded in another is the Mode of the Act Omission or disposition as to an undue object c. as it is forbidden by the Law Of the subjects and relatum I have spoken before 549. So that the form of sin being Relative can have no Cause but that which causeth its fundamentum and cannot possibly but result when that is laid 550. It were an injury to God to feign him to make such a Law as should say Though thou hate me see that that hatred be not Related formally as a breach of my Law or I forbid thee not to commit Adultery but only forbid that thy Adultery be quid prohibitum or a sin For if God forbid not the act it cannot be a sin and if he forbid it it must needs be sin And so of omissions 551. They therefore that tell us that sin is nothing but a Privation speak not satisfactorily nor altogether truly It is no substance indeed nor any such Reality as Man cannot Cause without Gods Causing it supposing his Universal Natural Support and Concurse But the thing forbidden is often Acts and Dispositions as well as Omissions and the form of sin is a Moral Relation which hath so much reality as a Relation hath if that be any And that Relation hath a positive name It is not only a meer Non-conformity but also a Disconformity becaused founded in See Dr. Wallis against the Lord Brooke of this very well Actual Volitions and Nolitions as forbidden and not only in Omissions 552. Subtile Ockam Quodl 3. q. 15. disputing Utrum rectitudo deformitas actus differant à substantia actus denyeth it and after a Confutation of the common saying that Deformitas est carentia rectitudinis debitae distinguitur ab actu quod in peccato Actus est materiale carentia justitiae debitae inesse est formale concludeth Quod deformitas non est carentia justitiae vel rectitudinis debitae inesse actui sed est carentia rectitudinis debitae inesse voluntati Quod non est aliud dicere nisi quod voluntas obligatur aliquem actum elicere secundum praeceptum Divinum quem non elicit ideo rectitudo actus non est aliud quam qui debuit elici secundum rectam rationem But I conceive 1. That the rectitude of the Will can be nothing else but the rectitude of its acts suspensions and dispositions 2. That Ockam here describeth only sins of omissions whereas the Rectitude of the Will is ofren also materially in not doing or willing what is forbidden And with these two animadversions I am reconciled to Ockam who addeth Ad aliud dico Quod illud dictum de Materiali Formali est falsum Quia aut est peccatum commissionis aut omissionis si primo modo est Materiale sine formali quia ibi non est carentia rectitudinis debitae inesse actui si secundo modo tunc est ibi carentia quae est formale sine materiali Resp 1. To the first I add that It had been true if it had been the Act as an act that had been forbidden or else the species of the act as quid naturale But it being the Act not as an act in genere but as this act thus modified or specified by an undue object that Act with its Relation as quid physicum are presupposed as the relatum to the moral relation of Pravity or Disconformity And to the second I say that it 's true that Omission is not Materia Physica but it is an inadequate first conception of sin and so is materia moraliter dicta vel loco materiae And the Omission being considerable 1. Quatenus Non-agere 2. Qua privatio naturalis 3. Qua Privatio disconformitas moralis these three inadequate conceptions take up the whole nature of the sins of omission 553. The same Ockam Quodl 1. qu. 20. Utrum actus exterior habeat propriam bonitatem vel malitiam moralem even as dependent on the Will And he denyeth it against Scotus who affirmeth it I will not trouble the Reader with their reasonings not doubting but Ockam erred and that it 's true 1. That no exterior act is Morally good or evil primarily 2. But that secondarily and participatively as it is voluntary there is a morality in the acts Words and deeds and passions are under Law next to the Will and in dependance on it As the body conjunct with
soever that God is not the Cause of sin except some odd presumers who are condemned by the generality One or two spoke some hard words that way in Belgia whom the Synod of Dort rejected Mr. Archers Book was burnt for it by the Parliament or Westminster Synod Beza himself in Rom. 8. 28. passim abhorreth it as intolerable blasphemy But this Doctrine in question plainly maketh God the Willer and Cause of sin Yea more very much more than wicked men or Devils are which is not true 578. For they make Men and Devils to be but a second pre-moved predetermined Cause of the Act of Volition and Execution whence the formal obliquity necessarily resulteth But 1. God is certainly the Cause of the Nature which is the Agent 2. He is the Cause of the Law which maketh the act in specie to be sin His saying Thou shalt not commit Adultery or Murder maketh Adultery and Murder to be sin when they are committed which they would not be without the Law 3. God causeth and ordereth all the objects and occasions 4. And now they also say that God willeth ut peccatum fiat and is the first predetermining Cause even the total Cause of all that is in the act and all its circumstances without which predetermination it could not be So that man doth but will what God first willeth and act what God first moveth him unavoidably to act as the pen in my hand 5. And the Law and the Act being put in being the Relative obliquity is but the necessary result and hath no other cause 579. And note here what Estius before cited after Aquinas saith that to Will that peccatum sit vel fiat is all that the Sinner himself doth when he willeth sin And therefore it 's a vain thing here to distinguish between willing sin and willing the event futurity and existence of it ut peccatum fiat vel eveniat Though I confess I was long detained in suspense if not deceived by that distinction For he willeth sin who willeth the existence of it or that it be or come to pass 580. And note that it is both matter and form Act and obliquity which they say God willeth ut fiat For it is sin And forma dat nomen It is not sin but by the form of sin But if they had said otherwise it had been all one For he that willeth the fundamentum relate and correlate Saith Twisse Vindic. Graâ— li. 1. P. 1. Sect. 7. p. 137. Posito quod velit perâ—ectiones istas manifestare necesse est non impediat ingressum peccati sed permittat 1. As if he had proved that God was not able to manifest his Mercy and Justice by Laws and Illuminating men to know them without execution by the occasion of sin 2. Yet doth he make Christs death unnecessary and his satisfaction to Justice so far as that God could have accomplished our pardon and salvation another way if he would And is sin better or more necessary than Christs satisfaction 3. And methinks they that lay so little on Moral means and operations of Grace in comparison of Physical should not give so much to sin which were it a means as it is not but a Passive and opposite occasion is but a moral means And himself saith page 136. Permissio peccati proprie medium est assequendi â—inem à Deo praefixum At peccatum non est Medium proprie dictum sive manifestandae Dei misericordiae sive justitiae Media enim ejus sunt naturae ut ad ea facienda movâ—atur quis ex intentione finis Would the Reader have a better confuter of him than himself But he there addeth that it is Materia etsi non medium as stone and Timber to an House And yet sin they say hath no matter besides the subject and object but is a meer Privation of moral Rectitude But if it be to the Devils Kingdom loco materiae it is not so to Christs Rather if a beggar Want a house is that Want the Materia domus no nor the Materia of his mercy or bounty that buildeth it Thus the defectiveness of the subtilest wits abuseth God and his Church when the Christian simplicity of modest souls with a holy life would honour him So Sect. 9. pag. 137. Peccatum mihi videtur propriâ— dicendum esse materiam manifestandae Dei sive misericordiâ— sive iâ—stitiâ— potiâ—s quam medium Permissionem vero peccati medium esse ejus manifestandae proprie dictum But 1. how oft elsewhere doth he forget and contradict this 2. Permission it self is nothing being but non-impedire And is nothing or non-agere a proper means But especially I intreat the Reader to observe that in that very place Twisse and Arminius are herein professedly agreed that it is the Permission of sin and not the sin that is the Divine medium only one saith Praedestinationis and the other providentia And yet they will differ while they agree And I that differ from both would agree with both willeth the Relation 581. There is nothing left to be said then but that God willeth that sin be done but not as sin or because it is sin But this is nothing For 1. Either none or few of the Reprobate do will sin because it is Sin but because of the pleasure of sense or imagination or for seeming good 2. And if a man or Devil do maliciously Will sin as sin because it is against God so doing is but one of their sins which they say God willeth ut fiat before they willed it and predetermined them to it so that here is nothing in it but what is first and chiefly of God 582. If they say that God willeth it for the Glory of his Justice and so do not wicked men but for wicked ends or in enmity to God I answer That proveth that God hath a will which the wicked have not but not that the wicked have any will which God hath not For that Will and that Enmity to God still is but one of their sins which they say God first willeth ut fiat 583. Obj. But it is only ut fiat ipso permittente non faciente Answ The hypocrisie of that addition maketh it but the worse in the assertors For 1. They usually make Gods will effective of the thing willed 2. They maintain that there is nothing in the act as circumstantiated which God is not the total first efficient Cause of 3. They confess that the formal relation necessarily resulteth from the act and Law And why then do they put in the word permittente Would not that deceitfully insinuate to the Reader that the sinner doth something which God doth not do but only permit when they mean no such thing For that is my second reason against them 584. 2. By their doctrine God never permitteth sin which is false For that which he Willeth and Causeth as the first total Cause he cannot be said to Permit To do a thing and
but rather than another 603. As the Wind hath its natural course and so hath the Water and the Miller Causeth neither of them but supposing them doth so set his Mill to Wind and Water that by the meer receptive qualification of the patient they shall fulfil his will and he is the Cause of the effect viz. that they turn his Mill and grind his Corn so is it easie for God to use mens sins permitted to his ends without willing them * * * Even Vasq in 1 Tho. q. 23. d. 49. c. 8. pag. 758. saith that Of mens non respondere vocationi God is Causa per accidens ut removens prohibens dum negat auxilium efficax congruum But this is but a Controversie about a Logical name causa per accidens which Gibieuf and many others do with as good reason deny to be fitly applicable to God as to mans sin 604. Next the Doctor cometh with Reasons And the first is because †††Pet. Alliac Cam. 1. q. 14. A. Secundum Bradward alios qui tenent quod Deus vult mala culpae quod respectu cujuslibet rei habet Velle vel nolle nec habet solum non velle Deus illo modo non permittit mala culpae fieri sed ideo secundum hunc modum dicitur permittere quia non approbat ea neâ— impedit ea fieri cum possâ—t sed secundum Magistrum Deus permittit ea quia nec vult ea fieri nec vult ea non fieri quia si nollet non fierent sed solum non vult per consequens non habet actum voluntatis respectu hujus quod est malum culpae fieri Saith Bonaventure that plain and honest Schoolman li. 1. dis 47. dub 2. Diâ—â—ndâ—m quod non est sigâ—um quod Deâ—â— velit illud quod â—â—â—â—â—iâ—â—itur sed quod velit illud quod ex â—o elicitur Alliâ—co â—â— q. 14. A. 1. Permittit qui. nec prâ—cipit nec â—â—â—â— nec consulit sed indulâ—â—t talis Permissio est signum Voluntatis Dei quia aliquem actum significat in siâ— permittente ita Deuâ— non permittit mala culpae â—â— Permittit fieri quia nec habet Velle nec habet nolle sed solum non Velle ut flat Et talis Permissio non est signum Divinâ— Voluntatis quia â—ullum actum Volendi significat in sic permittente isto modo secundum Mag. Deus permittit mala culpae Permission is a sign of Willingness as well as command And what is permitted and that for good infallibly cometh to pass Answ All this is before confuted * * * If he really holâ— with Bradward li. 1. c. 33. that God willeth all that he permitteth why is it denyed that he willeth the formale peccati as much as the materiale seeing he permitteth it But his citation of Bradwardine I think not my self obliged to regard nor do I coâ—sent any more to that doctrine in Bradwardinâ— than in him See Alliaco before of Bradward It 's false that non impedire efficaciter is a sign that one wills the thing The King that only forbiddeth drunkenness or murder by a Law with penalties could also lock up or guard some men and effectually keep them from the sin And doth he Will it because he doth not so And it 's false that all cometh to pass that is not hindered 605. His second argument is spoken very plainly and grosly viz. Both sides confess that the substrate act is done God not only willing it but effecting it v. g. Absalom 's congress with his Fathers Concubines Yea not only the congress as an exercised imperate act but that the Volition of congress the internal elicite act was efficiently and Principally of God why then should it be denyed that the very evil and deformity of the act was done God willing it though not effecting it or any way failing of his duty Especially when the Malice and Deformity doth necessarily follow the substrate act in respect of the Creature though not of God Answ Hobbes could desire little more But we vehemently deny that the substrate act is of God as it is morally specified that is as it is exercised on this forbidden object rather than another lawful one ex parte eligentis God did not as a principal efficient cause Absalom to Will that Congress with his Fathers Concubines nor to Act it The nature of the Wind and Water and God as the Cause of Nature cause the wind and water to act and to act as they do on their own part But that they turn this wheel and milstone and run in this Channel rather than another is long of the Miller Absalom's Motus qua motus and qua cupido ordinata was natural from God but not as acted hic nunc towards this object And the Reception of the Act by that Object supposing his lust and action might be morally and penally from God 606. If you here bring forth the common Medusa's head and tell me that It is injurious to God that his act be determinable by a Creature and so dependent I confidently answer you for God 1. No man is injurious to himself And God did not wrong himself when by making a Creature with free self-determining Power he resolved so far partially to suspend his own operation so as not to necessitate the will no more than he wrongeth himself by a Greater suspension in making no more Worlds or Creatures 2. You quite mistake We do not at all alter or limit Gods Acts or influx nor determine it but terminate it and determine of that effect which requireth both Causes God and Man and cannot be ordinarily by one alone because God hath otherwise appointed And again I beseech the adversaries to note How great and innumerable changes are made in the world by the various Disposition of Recipients The Rose and Vine and Weed and Dunghill do not at all Change the Action of the Sun but their various Reception and co-operation is the Cause that its Act hath such various effects And it is the Millers work in making a various and special Receptivity in his Channel Wheels c. which causeth the variety of effects And God hath enabled men Variously and freely to Receive his Influx 607. His third Argument is God giveth not that effectual Grace without which he fore-knoweth sin will not be avoided ergo he is willing that it be done Answ I deny the Consequent It only followeth that he doth not Absolutely and effectually Nill it If the King have several subjects inclined to eat a luscious poyson And his Children he effectually keepeth from it one he locketh up another he committeth to a Keeper another he keepeth the poison from But to a Traytor he saith I once forgave thee and saved thy life and I now command thee that thou avoid this poison and if thou do not it will torment and kill thee but if thou wilt take
answer that the consequence holdeth not of a metaphorical improper Instrument who hath somewhat of his own which he hath not from the principal agent yea such have somewhat of Principal Causality and somewhat mixt of their own which they have not of God besides the nature of a pure instrument such are sinners to God Therefore it holds not that the horse halteth ergo the rider halteth no nor causeth it Thus insciously he unsaith what laboriously he writeth a Book to prove and the very same that I say The Rider doth not cause the halting as it is halting at all but only as it is Motion in genere so doth God by sinful acts That they are exercised on the forbidden object rather than another is not at all of God but that they are Actions in genere is of God 637. So p. 256. he well sayeth that the fault of the pen is not to be ascribed to the Writer nor the effect as from that fault nor of the Saw to the Sawyer And so of the Sabeans robbing Job And he asserteth p. 257. that Diabolus Impii homines sunt causae principales in actu peccandi And what need we more Remember then that sin is an effect and hath a Cause and to make man a Principal Cause in actu peccandi is not to deifie him And he saith p. 256. that if God were the moral impeller as a principal agent he were the principal cause of sin But if you mean by moral impulse only commanding it let others judge whether Physical premotion be not much more than command And whether I cause not my pen to write though I command it not And quoad terminum to impel a man physically to moral acts is moral impulse 638. But the plausiblest argument is Cap. 20. p. 261. viz. God willeth sin as it is a Punishment of sin * * * Vid. Aureol in 2. d. 37. p. 300 301. shewing six wayes how sin is a punishment of sin without God's willing the sin But if we make it sin he will make it be a punishment ergo he willeth that the sin come to pass or be And indeed Augustine saith much contr Julian to assert Gods willing of sin as a Punishment of sin But I answer this 1. Even these men themselves oft say that God willeth not the formale peccati but the materiale And forma dat nomen ergo he willeth not sin as a punishment in proper sence 2. Sin it self though denyed by many Arminians is verily a Punishment and more to the Sinner himself than to any other †††Gab. Bid in 2. d. 36. concludeth 1. Omne peccatum est poena 2. Non omnis culpa est peccati alterius poena viz. non prima 3. Omne peccatum posterius poena est prioris causa nisi ultimum fuerit posterioris And Bonavent there cited by him sheweth how sin bringeth poenam damni sensus And he sheweth there how each sin is its own punishment the formale peccati being first and the formale poena next in the same act And how the latter sin is the punishment of the former as being an effect of it For when we have cast away the Intention of the right end there is nothing sufficient to hinder more sin Biel. ib. In a word God antecedently so formed nature that if we will sin that sin shall be our misery and as a voluntary self-wounding cause our pain and let out our blood and life And it is the most difficult part of the question how God maketh sin a Punishment to the sinner himself which yet I have plainly opened before and here repeat it To be sin or disobedience and to be Punishment are no absolute entities but are two Relations of one and the same Act but not as referred to one and the same correlate God is not at all the Cause of the Act which is sinful in its forbidden mode and circumstances as Claudicatio equi before said but only in genere actus or hujus actus when two sins are compared But that the Act when done is sin and is punishment God is the Cause of both That is he maketh mans nature first and in that and by revelation his Law by which he first maketh mans duty and telleth him what shall be sin if he do it And next he doth by his threatning tell him that this sin it self shall be the sinners own misery if he do it As if as aforesaid God first made man of such a nature as that poyson would torment him ex natura rei And then commandeth him to avoid it And then threatneth that it shall torment and kill him if he eat it Here now God maketh the Man and the Law God maketh not the Act of sin as modified or oblique or as that circumstantiated act But when the act is caused by Man God by his Law causeth two Relations to result first that of sin and then that of punishment So that man first causeth the sinful act and then that it is quid prohibitum and quid poenale result from Gods Will and Law made before Now if God cause not that sin which is a punishment to our selves he causeth not that which is a punishment to others And yet supposing it he maketh it a punishment to us and them on several accounts 639. But though God cause not the sin yet when he hath before in his Law threatned to withhold his grace and spirit if we sin without which grace and spirit we will sin If God now for former sin do deny us or withhold that grace or help which we need to keep us out of it he is morally and improperly said to cause that sin as a punishment because that penally he refuseth or forbeareth to save us from it and so permitteth it as is said 640. The Arminians grosly erre if he cite them justly Remonst in Script Synod art 1. p. 202. saying that God may predetermine and pre-ordain the obstinate and rebellious to sin by his penal judgement and yet those sins are not be reckoned to them for sins nor increase their guilt unless the word sin be used equivocally For to have sin and no sin are contraries Whether God determine Ideots and Madmen to those acts which would be sin in others as he doth Bruits I leave to others 641. I am weary of pursuing this ungrateful dispute As to his controversie Q. Whether things be good because God willeth them or he will them because they are good against Camero cap. 22. Whether God will Justice and holiness because it is good or whether it be good because God willeth it It troubleth me to read bitter and tedious disputes about that which one easie distinction putteth past all controversie Of things ad extra Gods will is first the efficient and then the ultimate end as is oft said Gods will as efficient giveth first the Being and then the Order to all things or else they could never be
what they are All created Justice and Holiness is such that is Good for Goodness is their essence because Gods efficient will made them so And then Gods final will taketh complacency in them or Loveth them because they are so But if they talk of Goodness or Justice c. as it is in God there is in him no effect and so no cause of himself or any thing in himself 642. But some things God maketh moral duties by the very work of Creation and Ordination of the World without any other Law And these are called Duties by the Law of Nature because the very Natura rerum is a Law that is a signification of Gods will constituting mans duty It is mans essence to be an Intellectual-free-agent It is impossible that such an agent Created of God should not be Gods Creature and Gods own and dispositively a Moral governable agent and that he should not owe God all that he is and hath and can do and that God should not have the Jus Dominii Imperii over him and Jus ad summum ejus Amorem * * * Deus non posset obligare nos ad hoc quod teneatur sibi non obedire Quaero enim an tenetur obedire an non si sic habetur propositum quia tenetur non tenetur quod est impossibile Consequentia patet Quia teneri non obedire est teneri ad aliquid Pet. de Alliaco 1. q. 14. T. Yet after he thinketh it possible for God to have made a Reasonable creature not obliged As if his very nature were not obligatory His instance of the Mad is vain for they are not actually Reasonable Ockam presumptuously concludeth that God could command a man to hate God and make it meritorious it being no contradiction His follower Greg. Arim. confuteth him And Cameracensis invalidateth the confutation and leaveth it doubtful But it is a contradiction to be a man and not obliged by Nature to Love God And a contradiction to be bound by nature to Love him and yet stante natura bound to hate him And a contradiction to hate God and be good or happy It is a contradiction to be a Created Man and not Gods Own and his obliged Subject and Beneficiary Therefore it is a contradiction that submission obedience and Love should not be his Moral duty and good and that self-alienation rebellion or disobedience and hatred should be no sins 643. To dispute then as he doth with Camero and his followers Whether it be good ex natura rei or by Gods meer free-will is a strange dispute and of most easie resolution Either they speak of Gods creating will or of some other subsequent Volition Man is made man by Gods free creating will And the foresaid Relations and duties are made such by making him Man And the duties of Love and Justice to others are made such by his Creators placing him in a world where his Neighbours are about him who are due objects as a part of the society This he himself confesseth pag. 329 330. like a Wheel in a Clock The Creators will is before Nature and therefore before natural duty as the Cause before the effect God could have made beasts instead of men who had owed him no more than beasts can do But from the Nature of a Man coexistent with God his said duties to God so necessarily result that it could not be otherwise nor did there need any subsequent act of Gods will to make that duty 644. But those that are not Duties by Nature must have moreover a Vid. Durand 1. d. 38. qi 4. n. 9 10 11. Scot. 3. d. 37. q. 1. Gabr. 3. d. 37. a. 2. Suarez de Legib. l. 2. c. 15. Aquin. 1 2. q. 94. a. 5. q. 100. a. 4. further act of Gods will as signified to make them so As the Mosaical Ceremonies our Sacraments c. 645. And many Natural Laws and duties are mutable towards one another because the very Nature and Natural Location or Order of the Things from which they did result are mutable And a word of God can make a change when yet before such antecedent mutation the duty must be duty still 646. As to Mr. Rutherfords oft saying that Omnis actus entitativus simplex est moraliter de se indifferens neque bonus neque malus And then that per actum simplicem he meaneth such as include not the object It is ludicrous or vain talk There is no such Act as hath not an object any more than physical form without matter Quicunque movet aliquid movet Quicunque intelligit aut vult aliquid intelligit aut vult vel seipsum vel aliud An Act without its object is but a partial or inadequate Generical conceptus of that Act which hath an object or an abstract partial notion of an act Why then doth he talk of that which is not Had he said that every act is in the first instant rationis or abstract-partial conception an Act in genere before it be intelligible as this or that act about this or that object he had spoken intelligibly as other men do 647. Such another question many called Arminians much use Whether Whether Justice c. be eternally good or have rationem boni aeternam Justice c. be eternally good Or An dentur rationes boni mali aeternae indispensabiles which needs no other solution than this last There is no such thing as an Universal existent per se and not in some Individual And so no such thing as Love Justice c. Bonum Malum which is not alicujus Justitia Bonum c. There was no Creature from Eternity being Just or unjust good or bad But Gods perfect Nature But that Gods own eternal perfection hath in it that root of humane virtue truth justice c. which therefore analogically have the same name our holiness being Gods Image I would prove to the Reader by this weighty reason Because else we have no certainty that Gods word is true For all our certainty is hence that God cannot lye But if Veracity be not in God we cannot prove that And if he have not that which is eminenter Justice mercy c. how can we prove that he hath Veracity might be called Eternally Just in that he must necessarily be Just if he had been a governour And necessarily was Just when he freely became a governour And also this proposition was Eternally true if there were eternally propositions Si Homines existerent Justitia in ipsis debita foret quandocunque Homines fuerint Justitia in ipsis debita fuerit But when all the sense of these questions is no more but what Duties are natural and what superadded called Positive and what natural duties are immutable and what mutable it 's an unhappiness that the world must be troubled with such uncouth forms of speech as make the question unintelligible till unravelled 648. As to
Rutherfords charge of Camero and his followers in France Amyraldus c. with Semipelagianism and Arminianism and filthy opinions it is but the effect of the good mans overweening and conceitedness of his own apprehensions which must be allowed or endured in most of these contenders And the fruits of such disputes is like to be little better But the worthy praises of Blondel Dallaeus Placeus Capellus Amyraldus Testardus c. shall survive such reproach And a thousand pitties it is to read a good man Voluminously proving God to be a Willer of sins existence and a prime-predetermining Cause of all prohibited Volitions and acts and reproaching the Jesuits Lutherans Arminians and Socinians as the great enemies of Gods Providence for denying this As if he would tempt the World to think that Socinians were in the right and that Jesuites Lutherans and Arminians were the only defenders of the Holiness of God whilst Calvinists made him the Lover of all the sin in the World as the most appetible conducible Medium to his Glory 649. But to proceed his next Argument is cap. 23. Sin conferreth something to the splendor ornament and plenitude of the Universe Eâ—go See Bonavent well confuting this in 1. d. 46. q. 3. Malum fieri nullatenus bonum esse sed bene occasio boni God willeth its existence This is answered before The antecedent is utterly unproved Sin addeth nothing to the ornament or perfection of the World His word is no proof 650. Afterwards he heapeth up many frivolous arguments against that which he calleth reproachingly The Idle Permission of sin and saith that it frustrateth the prayers of the Saints and their patience their gratitude trust hope fear joy alloweth the arrogance of the persecuters fighteth with Gods Wisdom Clemency Justice Providence with the Ministry of the Word the Promises Threatnings with Ministers confirming â—â—â— against sufferings and it is blasphemously injurious to God and contrary to the order of things in the world that he should permit sin and not will the being of it Resp What is it that a man yea a pious man in a blind zeal of God and self-conceit may not pour out confident words for What a case is the poor Church in when the unlearned people must be on both sides charged by their Teachers with blasphemy what way ever they go This man will tell them that they are * * * Pag. 370. blasphemous and overthrow all reason and Religion if they say that God only Permitteth sin and doth not himself will the being of it and move unavoidably all wills and tongues and hands to all the blasphemies persecutions and murders that are done and damn men for it when he hath done And others will as confideâ—â—ly say that he is a Blasphemer for charging God to be much more the cause of all forbidden acts of wickedness than Devils and men are and theâ— damning them for it and for putting God into the shape of the Devil and painting him odious to humane nature that man may not love him What shall poor people think when they are thus torn and tormented by their holy Guides But all his arguments are before answered when I shewed him how many wayes God hath to secure the Effects and Events in the world and attain all his Ends and yet only Permit and neither Will nor Love nor Cause the sin 651. Cap. 26. he cometh to plead for Predetermination and saith p. 385. God predetermineth us to the Act of hating God in linea meâ—â— physica non morali Meer delusory words He maketh it by the Law of Nature a sin to hate him and then he maketh men hate him â—â— linea physica non morali as if the moral sinfulness resulted not from the Law and act that is here from Nature it self viz. of the Man and act both which God made 652. Pag. 386. he saith that Directa expressa efficax Dei Vâ—litio qua Vult ut sit seu fiat actus Dei odii non facit Deum Malitia qâ—â— I confess Gab. Biel in 2. d. 37. speaketh too like these several atheological assertions as do many others per accidens sequitur actum authorem Resp But that per accidens is no reason of the denyal if God cause that accident also as the first cause If he make a Law and make the forbidden act the relation of sinfulness is an Accident indeed but ariseth from the said fundamentum so necessarily that it cannot be otherwise But it should have made a holy Divine to tremble to have said that God directly expresly and effectually willeth mens Act of hating God viz. that it exist or be 653. And it is false that he saith that God is equally the Cause that men hate him if he will the Act hypothetically ineffectually and determiâ—ably by anothers will as if he willed it efficaciously And so when he maketh the Doctrine of Universal Concurse and Causation as guilty as â—is predetermining pre-motion As if God could not make man a free-â—iller and agent and as the spring of Nature enable him and concurr â—o his Act as an Act in genere without causing it to terminate on the forbidden object in specie As if it were impossible for the Sun to be â—n universal cause of the stinking of a Dunghill and Weed without being â—he special or as if God must be made the cause of every blasphemy unless â—e will make the blasphemer speechless and of every villany unless he will strike men dead to prevent it This is not reverent and holy judging of the most holy God the Judge of all 654. The summ of all his Vindication of God from being the chief Author of all sin pag. 387. passim is but this one reason God is under no Law But if this be all why do you not speak out what you mean but hold that which you dare not name viz. That God is the chief So Bannes in 1. q. 23. â— 3. p. 270 271. Voluntas hominis malâ— est quia exercet actum odii Dei sine regula rationis immo contra legem Dei Deus autem bona vol untate vult fieri illum actum permittens defectum Causâ— secundâ— in ipso ut inde aliquod majus bonum faciat which is true of the act in genere but not as it is Odium Dei. For so if he will it and cause it he doth more than permit and the defectus Causae secundae is that very odium as against God And doth God cause the greatest sin that he may do good by it He can do as much good without causing the evil â—nsuperable cause of all the sin of Devils and men for which he damneth â—hem and that both as to the matter and form but yet thus to do is no sin in God himself because he is under no Law This is your most â—lain undoubted sense or else your Book is non-sense What need we then any further enquiry what you hold It is
supposed in Gods Law which is the reason of our participation in his Sin and not any Will or Judgment of God without or beyond our Natural interest For else it should be God most properly who by his arbitrary imputation should either make us Sinners or repute us such when we are none But yet when we become Persons it is by Derivation from Adam and so the effect can be no better than the cause and as soon as we are Persons we are Guilty persons having Guilt with personality from him though we were not persons in him 3. So Christ is though not the Natural yet the Federal Adam or Root of Believers when he satisfied and merited we were not in him either as in Adam seminally as in a natural Generator nor as existent Persons nor did God falsly so repute us to be But he was then the Cause materially or had that Virtus effectiva which would Justifie and Sanctifie and Glorifie us in due time It was the Nature of Sinners though not a sinful Nature which he assumed But that Nature which he undertook was existent in his Individual person and no other Individual person was existent in his existent personal Nature So that when we say it was the common Nature of Man we mean only specifice that Nature which is of the same Species with all other mens but not that which existed individually in any but himself and a Species extra individuum is nothing but an ens rationis or a notion But it was individual Persons in whose stead or place Christ suffered and whom he undertook to Justifie Sanctifie and Save and gather into a holy Society to that end and to that end he undertook and performed his office and merited all this by his perfect righteousness So that hereby he made Himself a Federal Head and Root of a holy Society his Church And whenever any person doth Believe and is united federally to him he then receiveth the effects of that which was before in Christ as a Virtus effectiva The Law made to Adam or to us did not assign Christ to this office nor oblige him to suffer or merit for sinners according to it Therefore by so doing he fulfilled not the Law as it obliged us that is by that obligation nor suffered by that obligation which bound us to suffer But by the obligation of his own Consent and that Law which was peculiar to himself as to the formal obligation though materially he was bound by it to fulfill the Law of Nature and of Moses The Law of Innocency then or Works took not Christ for the Civil or Legal Person of such Sinner or Believer no more than it made him such 4. As Gods Law to the Mediator made him this office so Christ's Law of Grace doth quod jus Relationem give to every true believing Covenanter first Christ himself in union to be their federal Head and with him title to his Grace Spirit and Glory And now they are Personally and actually his federal Subjects Friends and Members and have right to all his conferred gifts 5. But this right floweth not immediately to them from what Christ did or suffered for them but from his Law or Covenant of Grace by which as his Donative and Ruling Instrument he conveyeth that title to them 6. And therefore they have no right before the Time nor any but on the Conditions and Measure specified in that Covenant or Law so that Righteousness is not theirs because it is Christs nor in the manner or measure and to the ends of the donation 7. This much containeth the matter of this Doctrine of the Collation and Imputation of Christ's righteousness still remembring that as no one till he was a Person could be a person-guilty of Adam's sin not when he was a person any sooner than he was also guilty of his own inherent pravity and none that had the use of Reason was guilty of either or both these only without the guilt of his own Actual Sin and all three together 1. Adam's sin justly imputed to us 2. And our innate Pravity 3. And our actual Sin are the parts which constitute our plenary guilt even so no one till he is a Believer is related as a Member of a Perfectly Righteous Saviour and that is done no sooner in time that he hath the Inherent Righteousness of his personal faith and federal consent and that obligeth him to the further active righteousness of a holy life and all these three conjunct though not co-ordinate make up the total Righteousness of a Saint viz. 1. Our Relation to Christ in Union as to a perfectly Righteous Head who fulfilled all righteousness for us to merâ—â— our Justification which is called Christ's Righteousness Imputed to us as being thus far reputed ours 2. And our penitent believing consent to his Covenant which is the condition of the foresaid Relation to Christ 3. And our after Sanctification and obedience to Christ's Law 8. And when we are commonly thus far agreed of the Matter if any will contend for their self-coyned phrases and words and not being content to call Christ our Redeemer Saviour Teacher King Priest Head Lord Teâ—â—ator Sponsor or Surety Ransom Price Sacrifice c. as the Scripture doth will needs plead that he is or was our Person or was holy obedient suffered in our Persons Legal or Civil or was our Substitute Delegate Instrument c. his contention will be both corrupting and dividing And yet I will acknowledge that among Lawyers the word Person hath so many senses that in some of them were they our way of speech here it might be said that Christ did in some things personate each Sinner or each believer limitedly in tantum ad hoc non simpliciter aut ad omnia And all verbal quarrel I would shun even with them that speak ineptly and dangerously and injuriously to â—he truth and Church so they will but by a sound and necessary explication vouchsafe us an Antidote against the hurtful tendency of their â—hrases 9. Obj. If Christ's person be given us then his personal Righteousness is given us with it Ans Yes as his Person is He is not given us as Proprietors and Lords to become our Own at our dispose Nor is his Person made one Person with each or any of us His Person is not turned â—nto ours nor ours into his As the Husband is not the person of the Wife nor the King of each Subject But as one that hath a Great Wise Learned Bountiful Holy King or Husband hath also his Greatness Wisdom Learning Bounty and Holiness as they have him that is As his perfections for their good as far as his Relation binds him but not as â—f his endowments were removed from him to them or falsly reputed to â—e in them or his person to be their persons so here as we have a Christ â—o we have a perfect Righteous Christ given us to be our federal Head when we believe
may be called 1. A Receiving Cause 2. And a mediâ—â— or dispositive Cause of the effect Justification as Received but not as Given As I said Dr. Twisse chooseth to call it But this causa Dispositiva is pâ—â— of the causa Materialis viz. Qua disposita A cause or more properly a condition why I receive Justification and by receiving it am Justified which is their meaning who call it A Passive Instrument that is A â—â—ceiving Instrument 199. The plain easie truth is that Faiths Nature which is to be â—â—lieving Acceptance of Christ and Life offered on that Condition being â—â— very essence is but its Aptitude to the office it hath to our Justification by which the Question is answered why did God promise us Christ and Life â—â— the Condition of faith rather than another Because of the congruity of its Nature to that office But the formal Reason of its office as to our Justification is Its Being the performed Condition of the Covenant And if God had chosen another condition a condition it would have been Now the true notion in Law being a Condition Logicians would call this improperly a Receiving cause and more properly A Receptive Disposition of the matter reducing it to Physical notions But the most proper term is the plainest We are justified by that faith which is the Believing Practical Acceptance of God the Father Son and Holy Ghost as Given us on that condition in the Baptismal Covenant because or as it is made by God the condition of his Gift thereby Understand this plain doctrine and you have the plain truth 200. They that say contrarily that Faith justifieth proximately as it is an Instrument or a Receiving Accepting act and not as a Condition of the Covenant do evidently choose that which they vehemently oppose viz. that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 credere justifieth For the very 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 credere or the â—â—â—â— of Faith is to be an Acceptance of Christ given But if they will to avoid this say that By Faith they mean Christ believed in then they say that by Receiving Christ they mean not the receiving of him but Christ himself And why then do they not say so but trouble the world with such unintelligible phrases But to open the senselessness and coâ—sequents of that Doctrine would but offend All know that Chriâ—â—â—â— the object is connoted as essential to the act of Faith SECT XII How Repentance is joyned with Faith 201. Repentance is a Dispositio materiae recipientis too and a part of the condition of the Covenant And so far a Material or dispositive Receiving Cause But not an Acceptance of the Gift formally in its averting act 202. Faith and Repentance are words used in Scripture in divers significations Saith Malderus Gu. Amesius a parte recedit ab antiquo Calvinismo quiae requirit ad justitiam bonae operâ— tanquam conditionem praerequisitam quod â—tiam extendit ad ipsam â—lectionem See here how little the Papists understand us As Faith is sometimes taken for bare Assent as Jam. 2. and usually for Affiance or Trust and always when it denominateth a Christian or Justified Believer as such it essentially includeth all the three parts Assent Consent and Affiance but yet denominateth the whole by a word which principally signifieth One act which commonly is Affiance as including the other two so Repentance is sometime taken comprehensively for the whole Conversion of a Sinner to God the Father Son and Holy Ghost and so it includeth Faith in the narrower sence and is the same thing as Faith in the larger sence but express'd under another formal notion Sometimes it is taken more narrowly and that 1. As to the Act. 2. As to the Object 1. As to the Act and so the word Repentance signifieth only the Aversion of the Soul from evil by sorrow and change of mind And this is the strict formal notion of the word though usually it be taken more largely as including also the Conversion of the Soul to Good which is the usual Scripture and Theological sense though the word it self do chiefly signifie the Averting act 2. As to the Object 1. Repentance sometime signifieth the Turning of the Soul from Sin and Idols to God as God And so Repentance towards God is distinguished from Faith towards our Lord Jesus Christ 2. And sometimes it signifieth only the turning of the Soul and life from some particular Sin 203. Repentance as it is the turning of the Soul from sin and Idols * The Papists take Repentance it self to be part of the Remission of Sins And let the Reader note for the fuller opening of what I have said of their darkness thereabouts that Jansenius Aug. To. 1. li. 5. c. 22. p. 126. maketh four things to be inseparably conteined in Remission though distinguishable 1. The Conversion of the Soul to God 2. The abstersion of the Macula or filth 3. Reconciliation or the remission of Gods offence 4. The relaxation of the aeternal punishment That all these are then at once given us we are all agreed But whether the name Remission or Pardon of sin â—e meet for them all we disagree Is it not visible then how unhappily we strive about words wheâ— we talk like men of several Languages But all is but removation and remitting the penalty of which Gods offense is the first part And Macula is either the sin it self or the relative consequents to God is the same with Faith in God in the large Covenant-sence and includeth Faith in God in the narrower sence Repentance as it is our Turning from Infidelity to Christianity is the same with Faith in Christ in the large Covenant-saving-sence and includeth Faith in Christ in the narrower sence as it is meer Assent Repentance as it is a Turning from the Flesh to the Holy Ghost as our Sanctifyer is the same thing as our Faith in the Holy Ghost in the large Covenant sence and includeth Faith in the Holy Ghost in the narrower sence But when they are the same thing the ratio nominis or formal notion is not the same As man's mind is not so happy as to conceive of all things that are one by one entire single Conception so we are not so happy in our language as to have words enough to express things entirely by one name but we must have several words to express our inadequate conceptions by And so that is called Repentance as the Souls motion from the Terminus a quo which is called sometimes Faith or Affiance and sometimes Love from the motion of the Soul to the Terminus ad quem though the Motus be the same But when Faith and Repentance are distinguished as several parts of the Condition of the new Covenant the common sence is that Repentance signifieth the Conversion of the Soul from Sin and Idols to God as God which is or includeth Faith in God And Faith signifieth specially Faith in Christ as the Mediator and way
Creature doth preach him to us and all things must be sanctified and used to this holy end § 33. He setteth Death continually before our eyes assuring us of the shortness of our lives and shewing us how we must leave this world that we may read Vanity upon all and not be deceived by it § 34. By all this we see that this Kingdom of Christ is a sapiential frame of Moral Causes designed for the Government of man in right ordering his internal and external acts and glorifying eminently the wisdom of our Ruler § 35. And he that will think rightly of this excellent frame must have all these things in his consideration 1. That Christ himself is not only a Justifier and Actor of us but a Prophet Priest and King and that the Government is laid upon his shoulders Isa 9. 6. 2. That we are not only Patients and pardoned sinners but also Subjects and engaged Covenanters 3. That Christs Church is not like a Statuaries shop but a Kingdom and a School where all must learn and obey 4. That Christ hath not only Motive power but Laws Promises Threatnings c. to work by 5. That his great blessings of Glory are his Rewards and Hell at last after those here are his punishments foretold to work on souls 6. That he hath a day in which as Rector he will judge the world in righteousness according to what we have done in the body 7. That faith is wrought by Preaching and Love and Hope and obedience are the ends and uses of faith 8. That the felicity of individuals and in them of the Heavenly Society in one Glorified body with Christ is the end of all where Gods Remunerating Justice is to be glorified and his governing Wisdom and Love for ever § 36. From all this I conclude That they that slight all this work of God by the contemptuous name of Moral Suasion and take it to be a diminutive term as to the honour of it to call it Moral and by Means and talk of Gods work of Grace on the soul as if there were no more in it very honourable than a physical Motion and God Converted souls but as Boyes whip their Tops or Women turn their Wheels or the Spring moveth the Watch are Cartesian blind Theologues and overlook the very nature of that Theologie which they profess which is the Doctrine of the Kingdom of God over man And while they see little but Matter and Motion they are fitter mechanically to treat of or deal with Stones or Bricks or Timber than men â— being unfit to treat of humane Government much more of Divine SECT IV. How far God useth Means § 1. CHrist who is the chief means is used in all the Conveyances of Grace to any one in the world § 2. God hath a double work in Illuminating and Converting souls One by activity of exteriour appulsive causes The other within us on the Agid. Column Rom. Quodl 1. qu. 2. p. 5. citeth Dioâ—ys de div nom l. 3. as holding that every order of second causes is like a beam of light streaming down from God as so many cords let down to men to draw them up to God And if a man should take hold of one of them and ascend to Heaven he might imagine that Heaven did bow down to him when indeed it moveth not but he would draw himself up to it so when upon Prayer or other second Causes God doth us good he seemeth to incline and bend to us but it is not so but he is unchangeable and it 's we that are drawn and moved to him and by the use of means by us we are conjoyned to Gods purpose that the things may be done for us which he hath decreed Vid. reliq where he confuteth the contrary errours faculties of the soul without those causes I cannot better illustrate it than by the causing of sight hearing c. The Light without us is not only a terminating object as some dream but an Active thing or Action which operateth by appulse upon the eye And the Sun and Aire are the causes of it The eye is not only a passive Receiver as some dream but an Organ where the visive spirits and soul are Active And God worketh internally on this visive faculty by his influx to sustain it in its activity And by a congress of these two fires or Active causes the sensitive soul doth see Now we all know that God giveth the external light only per media by the Sun c. But how he sustaineth and actuateth the Visive faculty is more difficult His own influx or Causation is undoubted And that the same Sun ut causa universalis cherisheth and moveth the visive spirits But whether God move the sensitive faculty or soul it self by any superiour spirit or mediate cause in its motion or action towards and on the exteriour light is past our knowledge Though the order observed in other cases maketh it not improbable Even so in the Illumination of the mind and conversion of the will we are sure that beside the terminative object there is an external motion which by the foresaid means is made at least on the senses and imagination whatever it do further on the Intellect But in the superiour Influx on the soul it self what use God may make of Angels or other superiour spirits or causes we cannot tell We are sure as is said that if there be a second cause yet as to proximity it is never the less neerly from God And souls being Intellectual and for ought we know of the highest nature of Creatures though not the highest Degree neither is improbable that God moveth us by a second cause or that he doth it without § 3. But as Christs fore-described mediate Causality is still supposed so it is certain that God doth not only work as some think concomitantly with the word but by it as his Instrument Though his wayes of co-operation are past the reach of man yet this much is sure 1. That he adapâ—eth the means to do their work both word Minister c. 2. And that his concurse maketh the due Impression on the sense and imagination 3. And though no Philosopher certainly know whether the Images in the phantasie be meerly passive as to the Intellect or what use is made of them and the passions to Intellection and Volition yet such use as is naturally to be made of them for these ends God maketh and manageth them accordingly by skill and power § 4. But here MOTION the effect of Active force and ORDER of motion as the effect of GOVERNMENT must be well distinguished For it is not so much the second Causes of the souls Action as such that we are now enquiring after But of the ORDER and Rectitude of its Actions which is done by Government § 5. That God doth work Grace on man by means ordinarily as ordinarily he causeth natural effects by means and Miracles are rare may be proved by all
these following evidences § 6. 1. In that he hath made so large provision of means and that in an admirable frame which is as it were a Moral world Which he would never do in vain nor if he ordinarily workt without them that work which he hath appointed them to do It is the reason of the Brittish Divines in their suffrages at Dort Had not God decreed to work Grace by means he could have done it with a fiat § 7. 2. The Glory of this Kingdom or Sapiential Rule which is so constantly and largely given him in the Scripture Psal 103. 10. and 145. and 119. throughout and Matth. 25. As the Ship master or Pilot is praised who by a Helm can turn about the Ship as he will Jam. 3. 4. § 8. 3. God worketh on all things according to their nature And this is suitable to the nature of man And the Causation is answerable to the effect And ORDER is a moral effect which needeth not a Creation but a moral ordering Causation § 9. 4. Experience telleth us that those prosper best in grace that most faithfully and diligently use the means And we never knew of any man 1 Tim. 4. 15. Prov. â— 20 21. 3. 5. 8. 13. 4. in the world that came to Actual knowledge faith or Love without means but all by the causality of them § 10. 5. We find that the greatest neglecters and despisers of means are every where most graceless and the worst of men § 11. 6. We have Ministers and people frequent and strict commands to use means most diligently constantly and carefully § 12. 7. We have abundance of promises of Gods blessing upon the Licet omnis causa secundâ— proprie dicta causet effectum ex natura rei tamen quod ipsa sit causa non est ex natura rei quia solum ex voluntate Dei Alliac in 4. q. 1. F. use of means Act. 26. 17. I send thee to open their eyes and turn them Rom. 10. How shall they hear without a Preacher c. Isa 55. 2 3. Hear and your souls shall live Matth. 28. 20. I am with you alwayes c. Luke 10. 16. He that heareth you heareth me Psal 19. 7 c. The Law of the Lord is pure Converting the soul 1 Pet. 1. It is the incorruptible Seed that regenerateth us Heb. 4. The word is powerful and a searcher of the heart c. § 13. 8. When God will save a people he sends them the Gospel and Amos 8. 11. Prov. 29. 1â— when he will forsake them he taketh it away § 14. 9. The Devil sheweth his malice to souls and grace by opposing the means depriving men of them or keeping them from them or from the faithful using of them § 15. But it is none of my meaning that the bare means of it self doth change the soul or that it is the principal cause But only that God operateth Moral effects by Moral means as he doth Natural by Natural means being still the prime Cause of all himself § 16. If we thus conjoyn all Causes and separate not what God hath conjoyned it will help us the better to escape errour in this matter But if men will dream that all the honour or action that is ascribed to second causes is a derogation from God and a dishonouring of him they forsake the truth and injure him § 17. For if this were true that to honour the means or acknowledge Though God be proxiâ—uâ—â— not as in loco in all his operations yet seeing he operateth by second causes he doth it according to them as all experience tells us Therefore to end these Controversies we should consider more how those causes operate second Causes and their aptitude and efficacy is to dishonour God then God should be the greatest dishonourer of himself by making and using such causes and means And so many Creatures as there be in the world so many dishonours are cast on God and the excellentest Creatures would dishonour him most which sottish conceit must needs be joyned with Manichaeism that an ill God was the Maker of the World God is Glorious in all his works and shineth to us in them all SECT V. Of the Causes of the different Effects of Grace and Means § 1. * * * Gerhard Tom. 2. de lib. aâ—b cap. 6. §. 1. supposeth that no cause of the efficacy of Grace is found in the will of man as being dead and vicious but yet that Grace doth not physically determine the will but so work as leaveth it a power to resist and that resistance is it that maketh the difference between man and man by making Grace uneffectual And Georg. Calixtus was of the same mind as you may see in his words de Minist Verbi p. 241. in Judic de Controvers num 33. See â—e Blank Thes de distinct Gratiâ— ALl that is Good in the Difference between man and man is Willed by God and Caused by him But nothing that is Morally Evil. § 2. As in Nature God seemeth to Cause Motion in genere by an equal universal Influx of the Sun which maketh no difference per se but per accidens But the wonderful variety of motions and effects is otherwise caused So it seemeth that Christ the Sun of Righteousness affordeth by his Means of Nature which he Politically manageth an indifferent influx or help for Action as Action to the souls of men which as Dr. Twisse frequently saith well is to be called Nature rather than Grace except as the repriving of Nature is Grace so far as it is meer Power to Act because it is equally indifferent to a good act as a bad and to do or not do § 3. The Power of Action as such being given by an equal Natural Universal Influx it is the ORDER of Actions where we must enquire of the difference and its Cause § 4. Action it self is not a proper substantial being but a Modus Rei But yet it is such a Mode as by the Cartesians leave requireth more Causation to it than a meer non agere doth But ORDO Actionum is but a modus modi § 5. ORDO is the beauty of the World and soul the genus of all Relation in fundamento and of all morality and worthy to have had a notable place in the predicaments And yet we know not what to call it whether any thing or nothing The ORDO Rerum is not Res And it is Rerum status which we better know in se than we know with what Logical Notion to cloth it § 6. This excellent Nothing is the summ of Morality in its form and the business of frail man on earth and much of the glory of the Church triumphant in Heaven It is Gods work and not ours to make new substances It is ours to keep ORDER in our selves as Gods work yea in the Actions which God by Nature enableth us to So vain a thing is man that
consider that though he be Almighty yet he doth not all that he can do nor do his works equally manifest his Omnipotency And there are these causes for Limiting his operations in the effects § 2. 1. * * * Gemina operatio Providentiae reperitur partim naturalis partim voluntaria Naturalis per occultam Dei administrationem quae etiam lignis herbis dat incrementum Voluntaria vero per Angelorum opera hominum Vid. catera August de Genesi ad lit l. 8. cap. 9. plura li. 9. cap. 15. The chief cause is his Wisdom and Free-will It is his Will to do what he doth and to do no more which hath no cause § 3. 2. Another cause is that God operateth by Jesus Christ whose Humanity is finite being a Creature and God worketh according to the Instrument or medium As he shineth by the Sun Moon or Stars according to their several natures and not according to his meer omnipotency so doth he communicate Grace by Jesus Christ § 4. †††Mark 6. 5. He Christ could there do no mighty work because of their unbelief and 7. 24. He could not be hid and 1. 45. Jesus could no more openly enter into the City with many such places all speak of an Ordinate power working not ad ultimum posse And Christ by Office being King and Prophet will operate upon certain terms which in his Sapiential Government he sets down And God will not violate those terms § 5. 3. Also under Christ there are many subordinate Causes There are his Word Preachers and all the forementioned means and helps and Christ will work according to these means Though he tye not himself from doing more or otherwise I have proved that this is his usual way And the effect will be limited according to these second causes § 6. As the Sun shineth on us first in and through the air which abateth somewhat of its force and then through the exhalations and then through the glass window and each maketh some alteration as to the effect on us so is it in this case § 7. 4. But the notable limitation is the foresaid Indisposition of the Receiver Every eye hath a tunicle which the Suns light must penetrate But he that hath a suffusion or he that winketh hath a greater impediment to limit the effect so is it with the various degrees of Indisposition or moral incapacity which yet be nothing if God did work ad ultimum posse and did not as aforesaid work according to his free will and second causes SECT VII Of the Resistibility of Grace § 1. TO Resist Grace signifieth 1. Either Not-to Receive it Passively * * * Ruiz de Vol. Dei disp 1◠§. 6. p. 187. distinguisheth of Gods will 1. As to its ratio totalis including not only the viâ— aut causalitas effectiva but also the formal reason of Volitio effiâ—ax which includeth the prescience of future contingents And so he saith It is never resisted 2. Secundum partialem inadaequatam rationem praecise ut causa efficiens nostrorum actuum liberorum prout offert motiva confert causas secundas suum concursum abstrahendo à formalissima ratione Volitionis efficacis quae quidditativè supponit formalissimam rationem praescientiae c. Et ita etiam in sensu composito cum tota causalitate illius in actu primo ut praecisus ab actu secundo potest non sortiri effectum as a stone receiveth not the rain ad intus or as oyl resisteth water or hard things receive not impressions as the soft 2. Or Not-to-Receive-Actually which is Receptio Moralis as a man receiveth not a gift who consenteth not or as he resisteth the light who will not open his eyes The bare Not-Consenting with the Will or not using the senses or organs not opening the hand c. is such a Resisting 3. Or an Active opposition which is more As a man resisteth an Enemy with heart or hand or a man by Nolition and not only Non-volition resisteth a suiter § 2. Mans sinful soul resisteth Gods gracious operations all these wayes 1. It is Passively become undisposed to Reception And thus he is said to have a hard heart of stone and a seared conscience and to be dead and past feeling Eph. 4. 18 19. 2. 1 2. 2. It doth not do what it can do morally to receive grace that is it doth not Conari or suscitate it self to be willing of it 3. Yea it doth Positively resist by Action and is unwilling of Gods gracious operations And this is twofold 1. By willing the contrary and prosecuting carnal interest over-loving the pleasures of the flesh and so turning away from the motions of grace 2. And therefore by an enmity to that grace and work which would †††Bradwardine li. 1. c. 1. cor 8. p. 5. proveth that Gods will is universaliter efficax nec impedibilis frustrabilis aut defectibilis which we grant as to his will as it is efficient and not meerly final and complacite But yet the Schoolmen that say he is not Omnivolens give reason for it convert him and take him off his chosen Idols § 3. No creature by resisting God doth abate or retund his essential Power or Activity nor make any thing properly difficult to him § 4. All the Elect resist Grace before it overcome and convert them And all our lives after we resist it too commonly when it exciteth us to duty and draweth us from sin § 5. He that repenteth not of his Resisting of Gods Spirit and Grace doth not understand and well repent of his sin § 6. All Resisting is not Overcoming All Resist grace but all overcome it not that is do not frustrate it as to the due effect § 7. There are several Degrees of yielding to Gods motions and operations and so several degrees of overcoming He is fully overcome by it who yieldeth to it wholly He overcometh it in some part who yieldeth to it but in part And because Gods grace moveth us to more than we ordinarily yield to therefore we do ordinarily overcome it in too great measure even when we are happily overcome by it § 8. God worketh not alike on all sometime as on Paul he so suddenly changeth the mind and will as that at once he both produceth the Act of mans consent and also taketh away even the moral though not the natural power to the contrary in the antecedent instant So that no man ever denyeth consent who is so moved And sometimes he procureth Actual Consent by such an operation as in the antecedent instant might have been resisted and overcome there being a Moral Power to the contrary So that there is Actually-Converting Grace which was superable in the antecedent instant as to Moral power and there is such a converting Grace as no man ever doth overcome § 9. Gods grace when it prevaileth doth not take away but determine
be equal or unequal physical or moral c. is to dote § 5. But yet this Knowledge and Will of God is transient or terminated Objectively when it is not so Effectively And so God is said to know things differently as they differ and to will things differently as they are different objects But this speaketh truly nothing New or various in God but only a Relative and so denominative connotation of his simple essence from these objects whose diversity giveth divers names to Immutable most simple Unity Of this all Schoolmen for substance are agreed however the Thomists Scotists and Occamists differ about the notions of Ratio ratiocinata formalitas denominatio extrinseca § 6. II. If it be the operation of the second Causes ex parte operantiâ—â—â—n and so of God by them that we dispute of the disputes would have the easier decision But this is denyed by the Dominicans and another Infusing Immediate operation is made the subject of these Controversies § 7. III. It remaineth therefore that it is only the effect as in the soul-receiving which we dispute of And if so this must be remembred that we dream not of any Controversie about Gods Action as ex parte agenâ—is in Him or between him and the soul § 8. In mans soul we know of nothing but 1. The substance in the first notion as answerable to Matter in bodies 2. The form which is a Threefold Virtue or faculty in One viz. The vital Power Intellect and Will which is at once Virtus Vis Inclinatio naturalis ad proprias actiones All these are but Inadequate conceptions of the same simple essence and not compounding parts None of this is the thing in question for the soul is presupposed to be a soul 3. The Accidental and mutable Disposition of the faculties to the Acts. 4. The Impressions of sâ—periour Causes God and means in moving to the Acts. 5. The Acts of the soul themselves 6. The Habits I know of no more § 9. I. Though All Habits are dispositions yet all Dispositions are not Habits And before Habits the soul may be many wayes predisposed to the Act As 1. By former acts of another sort which yet conduce to this 2. By other habits that are preparatory 3. By deliverance from many Internal and External Impediments 4. And lastly By the Divine Impress it self in the instant of Nature though not of time before the Act. For God so disposeth the soul to act § 10. This predisposition is sometime but a Moral Power that is in so low a degree as containeth only the Necessary power to the act with which alone it is sometime done And sometime besides this Moral Power it containeth some further degree of accidental Inclination or propensity to the Act. And these degrees are various in various instances and sâ—bjects § 11. II. When God moveth the soul to believe or repent we must conceive that in the instant antecedent to the Act the soul receiveth some Impress or Impulse from the divine essence by which it is disposed or moved to act * * * Aâ—xilium praevium non appellatur à nobis Forma Voluntatis impressa quoniam hoc nomen significare videtur qualitatem constituentem potentiam in actâ— primo sed proprio vocabulo dicitur motio Actualis qua Deus vere efficienter facit ut liberum arbitrium operetur actum liberum determinatum cum vera expedita facultate qua potest illum non operari si velit Alvarez de Auxil disp 23. p. 108. Mâ—tio is the proper notion he thinks between God and the Act or Habit of man as aforesaid but unaptly I think so conceived by him And though spirits especially God move not by such contact and impress as things corporeal yet in an unconceivable manner some spirit some spiritual Impress Influx or motion must be Received by which faith is caused And this Impress and the Disposition to the Act caused by it perhaps are really the same § 12. III. The Act it self by this and by the soul disposed and excited is next caused not given as pre-existent but given by causal efficacious suscitation of the pre-existent faculty or power § 13. IV. The Habit which is a Promptitude to facile acting is caused by all the forementioned causes conjunct and not by any one alone viz. by God and his Impress on a soul some way pre-disposed and by the soul it self further disposed and excited by that Impress But of Habits more anon And here because almost all our seeming difference dependeth on the question What it is that is between Gods essence and mans act which is the cause of our Act or may be called grace sufficient or effectual more or less c. I shall tell you how Alvarez handleth the question and thereby further shew you that it is a thing unsearchable and past mans knowledge and though I satisfie my self with calling it an Impulse or Impress or a Received energie or force or Influx yet these are but general notions and tell us not as to a distinct formal conception What it is And you shall see that the boldest disputers know no more Alvarez de Aux l. 3. disp 19. p. 77. tells you that there are these several opinions of it What is the previous motion by which God moveth and applyeth second causes to operate I. Some Thomists hold that It is a Quality not permanent but by way of transient disposition with operation Cabrera 3. p. q. 18. ar 4. dub 1. Conc. 4. n. 58. For it must be some Virtus and that must be a Quality Imperfect supernatural acts as attrition fear of hell c. are before habits and have only such transient virtues or qualities c. II. Others hold contrarily that Gods motion is nothing besides his own will or essence and mans act being simultaneous Their reasons I omit * * * So Bradwardine and many others And this would cut short most of our present Controversies if it would hold Dr. Twisse saith Vind. Grat. li. 2. p. 2. Crim. 3. c. 15. §. 9. p. 348. Probabile esse nullam motionem à Deo recipi in Voluntatem sed quia Deus velit Voluntatem creaturae Velle aliquid necesse est ut velit Ratio haec est cujus solutionem mihi expediat Arminianus aliquis Sola Dei Voluntate factum est ut Mundus crearetur Quis enim influxus Dei potest fingi praecedaneus qui occuparetur circa nihilum c. III. Others hold that Gods previous motion is somewhat received in second causes in order of nature before they operate and when they are asked What it is they say It is really the very operation of the second cause e. g. man it self as it proceedeth from God And so that Gods premotion and predetermination of our Will is not really distinct from the actual determination by which the will determineth it self but is the same The same act being of God and man So that they
481. An Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratia pâ—ssit demonstrari naturali ratione vel cum Infallibilitate Praescientiae Providentiae praedestinationis Divinae Where he tells you that one opinion of some Catholicks is that It is certain by the doctrine of faith that man hath Free-will but it cannot be proved by natural reason The second opinion is contrary that It is not only evident to natural reason that man hath free-will but also the concord of it with the infallibility of Divine prescience and providence may easily and clearly be made out by Scientia Media which is the Jesuites way But the third opinion which he defendeth is that Free-will may be evidently known and proved by natural reason alone But how the actual use of it consisteth with the infallibility of the prescience providence and predestination of God and with the efficacy of the helps of grace cannot be perfectly known or comprehended by natural light alone and therefore the reason of it must be Believed and the understanding captivated to the obedience of Faith Where note 1. That though he say perfectè he proveth that it cannot be known by that which is below a perfect knowledge 2. And that he denyeth not only a practical saving knowledge but a proper theoretical or dogmatical knowledge For this he citeth those words of Cajetan at large in 1. p. q. 22. art 4. which many others cite and commend In ignorantia sola quietem invenio c. And there is no man besides Alvarez higher for the Dominicans way of Absolute predetermination than D. Bannes who is of Cajetans opinion in 1. p. q. 23. art 5. 2. 2. q. 10. art 1. Siquis non intelligit quomodo usus liberi arbitrii sit liber nihilominus sit effectus jam praedefinitus à Divina providentia oportet eum credere Primum omnium debuisset credere quod aiunt se non posse intelligere Credimus enim Catholicum mysterium Trinitatis etiamsi non intelligamus And Alvarez citeth Calvin lib. de aetern Dei praedest cont Pigh p. 136. saying Siquis hoc mentis suae captu superius esse excipiat idem de me fateor Sed quid mirum si modulum nostrum imcomprehensibilis immensa Dei majestas exsuperet Atqui tantum abest ut pro carnis ratione explicandum suscipiam sublime istud reconditúmque arcanum ut quod initio praefatus sum assiduè in memoriam redire velim desipere qui plus scire appetunt quà m Deus revelaverit Quare nos potiùs docta ignorantia delectet quam intemperans ebria plus quam Deus permittit curiositas What Augustine confesseth you may see a little in Alvar. ib. p. 482 483. but more in himself often What Suarez Hurtado Mendoz. and other the most subtil philosophical Divines confess commonly of the incomprehensibility of these things and the darkness and uncertainty of our conceptions I have elsewhere partly cited and any that readeth them may find Now all this being so notorious and their ignorance commonly confessed may I not confidently inferr 1. That then seeing all must be reconciled by Believing we must have nothing obtruded on us herein which is not to be proved by the Word of God What the Word saith of Predetermination of the manner of Gods operation on second causes and influx on souls and of the nature of his first effect or Vis Impressa c. we will receive But yet men must not snatch up a metaphorical expression in one or a few Texts and urge that against the frequent and plain expressions of the Scripture of the spirits Operation on souls Christ himself saith which is more than all forecited The wind bloweth where it listeth and ye hear the sound thereof but ye know not whence it cometh and whither it goeth so is every one that is born of the spirit But as for the operations of God by the word preached and other means and the Holy Ghosts operation by and with those means and the Holy Ghosts indwelâ—â—ng and operating after in Believers these are frequently asserted in Gods Word And that all Christs members have his Spirit regenerating illuminating quickning sanctifying them both as he is in Covenant with them to be the sanctifier of their souls and as the Love of God and all his Graces are by him caused in us all this is sure But if men will go further with us and give us as many distinctions of Gods Grace as Alvarez doth and tell us that besides God himself one of them simultaneous operation is nothing but mans act and another previous motion is somewhat else but no man knoweth what but may be named motio Virtuosa though it be neither God nor a quality nor a humane act And then will dispute how much of this some thing this motio virtuosa will serve to such an effect and how much to another and how and by what reason it is efficacious and will build on his assertions such a systeme of consequents as shall make up the doctrines of a sect or party which shall set up with this stock to militate against the Love and unity of Christians this is the course that I oppugn Once more Let the Reader note that the waies of reconciling Grace and Free-will as Alvarez mentioneth them are these four I. The Jesuits way by scientia media which I need not recite to the Learned but think it meet to recite Alvarez words of their description of Grace Supponunt gratiam praevenientem excitantem esse formaliter actiones quasdam vitales quas Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur sine nobis inquam libere co-operantibus non tamen sine nobis vitaliter efficienter concurrentibus consistere in illustratione illuminatione Intellectus atque excitatione suasione voluntatis quae efficienter procedunt ab intellectu voluntate non quidem ut Libera sed ut Natura est quamvis antecedenter dependeant à Voluntate ut Liberum arbitrium est quatenus viz. ex ejus libertate fuit dependens quod homo compararet notitias mysteriorum fidei vel eorum quae facienda erant accedendo ad praedicatores vel alio modo eos propriâ industriâ acquirendo quibus notitiis Deus se insereret eas elevando suo speciali influxu ut supernaturales sint quales ad salutem oportet sic sortiantur naturam gratiae praevenientis Suppositâ ergo Illuminatione quâ Deus illuminat Intellectum proponit Voluntati bonum ut sibi conveniens affirmant quod statim absque ulla libertate oritur merè naturaliter in voluntate motus affectionis ad bonum sibi propositum quo motu allicitur quasi invitatur ad amandum illud bonum imperandum potentiis executivis ut illud exequantur ut v. g. ad imperandum intellectui ut assentiatur rebus fidei propositis explicatis In his ergo duobus motibus viz. in illustratione Intellectus affectione
of the great alterations in the World being admirably fetcht from the various Passive or Receptive dispositions of matter no wonder Cum Thomistae dicunt Deum suo auxilio efficaci physice praedeterminare Voluntatem ad actum bonum non excludunt Motionem Moralem sed eam praesuâ—â—â—â—â—â— Alvarez de Aâ—xil disp 23. p. 108. â—â— if it be so with mans soul also A spark of fire which long was unseen if you put Straw Gunpowder or other fuel to it may burn a City or Kingdom when yet the fuel is not an efficient cause save the fire that is in it but an objective Matter What work doth a Student find all his life among Books What abundance of knowledge doth he learn by them which he had none of in his Infancy And so do Travellers by viewing the actions of the World And all these are but fuel to the fire The soul only is the Agent and all these are signs and objects that do nothing really on the soul at all You may lead a Beast up and down and govern them by objects which yet act nothing on them So Satan doth by the Drunkard Glutton Fornicator Gamester Covetous c. What Reputed work do objects make on them by doing nothing Thus Verâ—m Bonum are said to work And the case is this The Active Spirit is not only Naturally Active but Essentially Inclined to some certain objects Truth and Goodness And this Inclination being their very Nature when the object is duly presented to it and it self delivered from all false objects and erroneous Action on them and ill habits thence contracted it will Naturally work accordingly And therefore duly externally and internally to bring God and Holy objects to the prospect of the soul is the way of working them to God And sure the World would never make such a stir about Preaching to get fit men and to perswade them to diligence and to keep sound doctrine c. if these objective causes as fuel to the fire did not do much by occasioning the Active soul to do its proper work 9. Yet still remember again that Jesus Christ is the Political Head of Influx if not more who sendeth forth the Spirit as he please but ordinarily upon his setled Gospel terms to work on souls by his threefold fore-mentioned influx with and by these means according to them but in an unsearchable manner As God doth in Nature by the Sun and other Natural Causes SECT XI What Free-Will Man hath to Spiritual Good c. § 1. THe understanding of the Nature of the Power and Liberty of the Will is the very key to open all the rest of the controverted difficulties in these matters But having spoken of it so much before in the former part of this Book and more elsewhere I shall no further weary the Reader with repetitions than to note these few things following § 2. If any like not the name of Free-will Libera Voluntas let them but agree about these two the Power of the Will and Free-choice * * * Nolite esse adeo delicati ut abhorreatis ab usâ— vocabuli Lib. arbit Hypocritarum propriâ—m est rixari de vocabulis Nemo offendatur hoc titulo quia August in multae Volum singulis fere pagellis ad fastidium Lectoris hoc vocabulum inculcat Melancth Loc. Com. de lib. arb c. 1. Liberum arbitrium and they need not contend about Free-will § 3. 1. As to the first It is the very Essence of the Will to be a natural Power or faculty of Willing Good and Nilling evil apprehended by the Intellect and commanding the inferiour faculties either politically or despotically difficultly or easily perfectly or imperfectly according to its resolution and their Receptivity § 4. 2. The Liberty of choice is not only Libertas Voluntatis but Libertas Hominis when a man may have what he chooseth or willeth Here the Act of choosing is the Wills but the object is somewhat else either an Imperate act of some inferiour faculty or some extrinsick thing So we say truly that the unbeliever or unconverted sinner may believe may repent may have Christ and life if he will as Dr. Twisse frequently asserteth § 5. 3. But the Liberty of the Will it self is but the mode of its self-determination as without constraint it is a self-determining principle in its elicite Acts considered comparatively § 6. The Liberty of the Will is threefold 1. Liberty of Contradiction or exercitii 2. Of †††Note that the Papists confess that by Christs Case it is proved that Libertas specificationis inter bonum malum is not necessary to merit So Pet. â— S. Joseph Thes Univers pag. 90. Contrariety or specification in the Act 3. Of objective specification which is Liberty of Competition 1. The first Liberty is to will or not will to nill or not nill 2. The second is Liberty to will or nill this 3. The third is Liberty to will This object or That or to nill This or That * * * Of the real difference of these three see Rob. Baron Metaphys I take not that which many Schoolmen call Liberty of Complacence to be another sort of Liberty Though I distinguish Liberty of simple Complacence from Liberty of election as being a prior distribution And I deny not but that Liberty of Complacency specially may stand with necessity of immutable disposition yea and with some sort of necessitating operation of God as is in Christ and the Glorified And in this large essential sense Liberum and Voluntarium are all one supposing Voluntarium to be the act of a self-determining unconstrained will So that the word Free-will being so exceeding ambiguous as my foresaid Scheme sheweth we must be sure that we pretend not the Controversies de nomine to be de re But it is the Indifferency of a Viators will that we have now to do with and not that state of perfect determination or that Amplitude or advancement of the will which Gibieâ—f and such others talk of And note that by Posse agere vel non agere which we put into the definition of free-will we must not mean that Potentia moralis metaphorica which is nothing but the wills moral disposition or habit but the Potentia Naturalis And so it may be said of Christ and the glorified that their not sinning or not willing sin is not ex impotentia naturali but ex perfectione § 7. The Will hath not all these sorts of Liberty about every object For it cannot will known evil as such c. But it hath all these about several objects § 8. By this power and Liberty the Will is made of God to be a kind of Causa prima secundum quid of the Moral ORDER or specification of its own acts Not simply or strictly a Causa prima For 1. It was God the first Cause that gave man this self-determining Power 2. It is God that upholdeth it And so it
cessationem aâ— vaâ—ationem ab aâ—â—u boâ— necessitate naturaliter praecedentâ— cor p. 649. Omnia quâ— sunt fiunt aut eveniâ—â—t sunt â—â—â—â— eveniunt â—â— aliquâ— necessitate ipâ—â— naturalâ—tâ—r praecedentâ— This is just Hobbs Soâ— 5. â—â— 654 that No creature hath simple liberty of Contradiction or Contingency but only secundum quid in respect to second causes but only Gods acts of will ad extra are simply free and contingent As if God had given no creature Liberty to forbear sin or do good but doing it or not doing it were from Gods necessitation though not from the creatures The Dominicans the Masters of the Inquisition and Murderers of the Waldenses and Albigenses of old and therefore faulty as well as the Jesuits though there are very Learned men among them both do commonly hold that No Creature natural or free can act unless God by Immediate physical efficient premotion predetermine it to that act both in the act as such which they call the substance of it and all the modes circumstances and order of it 3. Augustine and Jansenius after him with their true followers hold not this necessity of predetermining premotion to all acts natural or sinful but only to spiritual good acts which is not from the Nature but the Corruptâ—â—n of â—â—an and therefore the predetermination is not made say they by Gods Common Natural Motion but by Medicinal Grace 4. Durandus and his followers as Lud. à Dola and Aureolus partly do hold that if God do but uphold â—ll creatures as compaginate in the Universe in the Nature he made them in and so natural Inclination and media and objects all supposed this sustentation and Influx maintaining their Active Natures and means is sufficient to cause an Act without another particular predetermining premotion of God As e. g. in Naturals they think that if a Rock were violently held up in the Air God continuing its Natural Gravity and all other circumstant Natures and Concauses this Rock if loosed can fall down of it self without another predetermining premotion of God And that a new Act of God supposing the said support of Nature is more necessary to the not-falling than to the falling of it As it was to the fires not burning the Three Confessors Dan. 3. And I am unable to see the error of this Opinion And so in Free agents they think that if God continue the Nature of a free-will with all circumstants and necessary natures it can freely determine it self without another act of predetermining premotion And doth so in each act of sin Though as Jansenius saith by accidental corruption for Conversion we need Medicinal Grace 5. The Jesuits and all others explode this Opinion of Durà ndus as singular but give so little and slender reason of their dissent as would draw one the more to suspect their cause Instead of it they scarce know what to assert But Bellarmine and the chiefest of them under a pretended opposition speak I think the same in other words Even an Universal Concurse like that of the Sun which operateth in specification according to the nature of Recipients which specifie the effect Which Universal Influx no doubt Aureolus and Durandus include in Gods sustentation of Nature For to sustain an Active Nature in all its Active disposition by a suitable active Influx is universally to cause its motion The difference they are unable to assign 6. After these come Hobbs Cartesius and Gassendus with a swarm of Epicureans a Sect commonly despised even in Cicero's time and yet called Wits in ours by men that have no more wit than themselves and some of these say that Motion needeth no continued cause at all any more than non-movere But when a thing is in motion it will so continue because it is its state without any other continued cause than the motion it self And so they may as well say and some do that when a thing is in Being it will so continue till it be positively annihilated without any continued causation of its being As if esse existere were nothing more than non esse and agere were no more noble a mode of Entity than non agere and so needed no more that is no Cause For non esse non agere need no Cause When this distraction is worn out and shamed the next Age will reproach us for attempting the confutation of it And yet the Wits of this delirant Age have not the wit to understand a Confutation Some of them say that Spirits cannot move bodies for want of Contact as Gassendus Some say that Matter and Motion are eternal and that of themselves As if there were no God but Matter and Motion Some say that there is a God who gave matter one push at first and so set it in that motion by which one body by a knock will move another to the end And some say There is no other Intellect but the wonders of wisdom and order in the World are done by such fortuitous motion But Hobbes meeteth the Predeterminants and saith that the Will is free in that its Act is Volition but that this Volition is necessitated by superiour or natural Causes as much as any motion in a Clock or Watch and that it is unconceivable that any Act or Mode of Act can be without a necessitating efficient cause But he differs from them in his consequents and in the Notion of a Spirit acknowledging no being but Corporeal § 2. The Predeterminants commonly build not their doctrine on Gods free-will but on the Necessity of the thing As if it were a contradiction which God cannot do for God to make a creature that can Determine it self ad ordinem actionis without his particular predetermining premotion or to make a Stone that can fall from the Air of it self unless he move it downwards besides his sustentation of its natural gravity and all other natures by his Influx or universal Concurse § 3. But till they can prove the Contradiction they must pass for the denyers of Gods Omnipotency which is to deny a God § 4. * * * Let the Reader note 1. That all the rest of their arguments save this one are of no value 2. And that Dr. Twisse affirmeth that God is not alwayes the effector of all Good either of Profit or Pleasure which yet he saith are Good Now if there be no such Entity in Bonum conducibile vel Bonum Jucundum as necessarily to require God to be the Cause of them tell us if you can Why there is so much entity in Malum morale as that man is not able to cause it unless God predetermine his will Yea as to Entity there is no more in Bonum honestum than in the rest fore-named His words are Nos tueri poterimus Malum fieri esse Bonum per se neâ—â—pe in genere Boni conducibilis ad certum aliquem fiâ—â—m sed arguit adversarius Ergo Deus esset non modo
an Infinite effect But the world is not Infinite § 4. As to the second question it is either de nomine or de re If the former let every man speak as he list for me rather than I will contend with him whether Creation of faith be a fit name As to the matter 1. It is agreed on that faith is not a substance 2. Nor an Accident con-created with a substance 3. Nor a composition of substances into one done by secondary Creation Generation or Art 4. But that it is the right ordered Act of a substance whose natural power which performeth it was pre-existent though without that act and the moral disposition Therefore it being a Modus entis or modus modi that we talk of the common name is Alteration and suscitation actuating and ordering But if men sober sometime call it a New Creation as indeed the whole frame of holiness together is called the New Creature in the Scriptures and sometimes the Divine nature sometimes Regeneration sometimes a Divine Artifice Alteration Conversion Sanctification c. it is the same thing that is meant by all their several names § 5. As to the third Question Whether it be a Miracle * * * Justificationem non esse proprie Miraculum Vid. Malder ib. p. 578. Et Brâ—anson in 4. q. 8. Cor. 2. fol. 144. confessing it above the power of a Creature to justifie us but not properly a miracle p 1. As a Miracle signifieth a wonder a thing is wonderful either for the Rarity or for the Great appearance of Gods power in it In the first respect faith is not so Rare as to be a miracle In the second the Sun and Heavens are a greater wonder than faith 2. But as a Miracle signifieth that which is done by second Causes but unknown to us and out of Gods ordinary way of working so it is no miracle 3. And as some men call that a Miracle which exceedeth the power of the second causes so all things would be Miracles that God doth For they are effects of his power as exceeding the power of second causes 4. As a Miracle is that which is done by God without any second causes †††Many good people would never be so much against the acknowledgement of second Causes if they understood the matter But they ignorantly think it derogateth from God the first cause so some think that the propagation of souls is a miracle But of souls and faith it is much unknown to us how far God useth second causes But that Generation as to one and Preaching and all other means to the other are some sort of second causes * * * We have no reason to think that God useth no second cause in working faith It is much to be noted which Pet. de Alllaco saith in 4. q. 1. E. Plus facit Deut faciendo aliquem effectum mediante causa secunda quam si faceret euâ—dem effectum se solo Quia in prima factione sunt plures termini divina actionis quam in secunda For as he said before Quandocunque Deus facit aliquem effectum mediante causa sceunda ipse non solum facit illum effectum sed etlam facit causam secundam esse causam illius effecti Marâ— this well is sure 5. And lastly if by a Miracle be meant that effect which God produceth both above the power of second causes and by a more glorious exertion of his own power than in his Course of Nature and Government he useth by and with second causes so it is not a Miracle because in the way of his ordinate co-operation with his Gospel he ordinarily produceth it § 6. So that as all Christians must confess that we had never believed if God had not wrought it in us by that spirit of Wisdom and Love which is Omnipotent so to contend any further whether it be a Miracle and a proper Creation or an effect of Omnipotency as such c. are such questions as presumptuous Schoolmen heretofore and hot-headed Sectaries in our times have used to afflict the Church of Christ with and to tempt their ignorant zealous followers into such employments as most effectually destroy their charity and injure others and scandalize the world SECT XV. Of the sufficiency and efficacy of Grace § 1. I Have said so much of this before as that lest I be tedious by repetition I must be but brief * * * Malderus against the Synod of Dort and 1. 2. q. 111. art 3. dub 8. bestirs himself with special industry to tell what Gratia efficax is And he concludeth that it is afflatus gratiae praevenientis sub genere gratiae excitantis quae non respuitur cum respui possit rather praeparans voluntatem quam adjuvans rejecting Valentia who placeth it in the Habit of Grace caused by excitation and à Lorca who takes it to be adjuvant and those that make it co-operant and those that place it in praedetermination physical of which he confuteth four opinions p. 502. and saith Probabilior sententia est quae negat omnimodam gratiae infallibilitatem adeóque efficaciam sumi posse ex sola reali aliqua differentia considerata ex parte gratiae praevenientis And that Just and unjust have effectual grace and therefore it differeth not from sufficient really And he resolveth all per scientiam mediam that Grace is effectual because ex proposito convertendi Deus it a hominem trabit sicut aptum novit ut sequatur certissime secuâ—urum and so that Grace iâ— effectual er natura sua and not so called only ex eventu I. By sufficient Grace is meant that which is necessary to the effect and without which it Cannot be but with it it may be though it sometimes be not § 2. That there is such a sufficient Grace not alwayes effectual to mans act is before proved by Adams Case And that no man hath such now for any means or duty in order to his recovery as Adam had to stand when he fell is not to be asserted or received And that no prepared soul hath such sufficient Grace to believe that yet believeth not is a thing that is past our reach to know § 3. This sufficient Grace consisteth in a Power to the act when the Indisposition of the natural power is so far altered or repressed as that by the means and helps vouchsafed by God the act is Morally possible to be done For he that truly can do it all things considered is well said to have such necessary grace § 4. But God of his bounty usually giveth men more than such a meer moral possibility by many additional helps and urgencies to the act which I mentioned before § 5. But by sufficient is not meant As much as is useful yea or needful to the Ascertaining of the Event much less to the meliority of the act § 6. II. The EFFICACY of Grace relateth to the effect And
by the effect it must be described Efficacy is Aptitudinal which is the force and fitness of the Efficient Cause Or Actual which is Efficienty it self § 7. Aptitudinal efficacy is 1. In God 2. In the means And 1. In Gods Absolute Power 2. In his Ordinate Power § 8. 1. Gods Absolute Power is Omnipotency or Infinite and therefore was aptitudinally efficacious to make a world before it was made § 9. 2. Gods Ordinate Power is the same Essential Omnipotency denominated from the Connotation of those effects which he hath decreed to produce according to the limited aptitude of second Causes and means or the disposition of the recipient or at least as limited in the effects by his meer free will § 10. In these respects though still Gods power in it self be Omnipotency yet in the limited way of operation it is various 1. As Gods Will quoad terminos is various 2. And as the means are various 3. And as the Receivers capacities are various To one the same operation ex parte Dei mediorum though not from the same Decree is abundantly efficacious and to another not § 11. And thus God so limiteth the effect of his Power as that it shall be effectual sometime on a Condition to be freely performed by man receiving it even by a former help and not absolutely § 12. Therefore all that is Aptitudinally efficacious is not actually efficient of every effect to which it was thus apt § 13. The aptitudinal efficacy of the means being of God falleth in with his ordinate power herein and is not the thing in question § 14. The effects in respect to which Grace is called efficacious are 1. The Giving of the Means themselves 2. The first Impress on the soul 3. The altering of the souls Disposition 4. The production of the act 5. And of the Habit. And it must be some of these effects which are called efficacious or inefficacious to others So that by that time the state of the Question is truly opened this which Dr. Twisse saith Arminius durst never speak out his opinion of and which he and others make to be the very heart of all these Controversies perhaps will appear to be nothing § 15. For what is that Grace whose efficacy you enquire of â— Is it Gratia operans or operata The efficient cause or the effect If it be Gods Gratia operans it is either the Prime Cause or the second Causes If it be the Prime Cause it is Gods essence only Even his Essential Power Vasquez in 1 Tho. â—â—â—â— 19. disp 8c p. 5â—â—â—â—â— Voluntas libera Deâ— â—â—â—â— essentia Divina significata per modum actus vitalis affectus eliciti cum revera sit ipsamet substantia Dei includit tamen habitudinem etiam qúandam rationis ad res futuras quae liberâ— Deo convenit sient etiam res libere futurae sunt Cum enim haec relatio consurgat ex fundamentis non necessaries â—â—â—â— ex rebus ipsis objâ—â—â—â— futuriâ— ipsa etiam habitudâ—â—â—â—â—re Deo convenit non intrinsicè sed extrinsecâ— solum denominationâ— quam Deo convenire non conveâ—ire â—on est absurdum Ergo cum Velle liberam Dei non solum includat essentiam sed cum tali respectâ— â—ti-â—â—sâ— libera Volunt as possâ—â— Dâ—o adesse abesse niâ—il sequitur absurdi quod divina simplicitati immutabilitati repugâ—et This little is all that they can tell us what Gods free Volition of extrinsick effects is And can you tell us any more Bradwardine denying in God any executive power besides meer Volition though he call him oâ—â—nipotent antecedently to his self-knowledge and Volition doth make Grace â—x parts Dâ—â— to be nothing but his Will that we shall do the act and be such and â—â—ch Intellect and will And is that the Question Wherein consisteth the efficacy of Gods essence Why it consisteth in it self if you mean Aptitudinal efficacy It is Gods essential Virtue If you mean Actual efficiency that speaketh the effect of which more anon So that about Gods essential efficacy there is no Controversie § 16. But if you say that It is his Potentia quà ordinata and not quà essentialis vel absoluta that you enquire of the efficacy of Remember that the word Ordinata or Limited signifieth no alteration in Gods Power at all but only An effect which as Limited and ordinate from whence the Power causing it is extrinsecally so named Gods essential Power is never limited but Infinite and to be Ordinate is but to have ordinate effects So that still either the Controversie must be of Gods essence which is past Controversie or of some second cause or some meer effect § 17. And if you transferr the Question to the efficacy of second causes 1. You will deny your selves that means and second causes have any power but from God 2. And that the very nature of those causes is sufficient to the ascertaining of the effect because they cause mostly morallyâ— And it is one of the accuâ—ations against the Aâ—minians right or wrong that they lay all on moral suasion or causality 3. And second causes are so numerous and unknown to us that we are uncapable of judging well of their efficacy 4. But it is I think agreed between you that the force of Means or second causes in Conversion is not such as necessitateth the will Or if some of the Schoolmen and Jesuites which with their Scientia Media do joyn Gratiam per congruitatem mediorum efficacem do make this efficacy to be the chief cause of the effect yet they deny it to cause necessarily at least alwayes when the effect followeth And what if we add that objects effect not as such And therefore this question de efficacia causarum secundarum must extend to some second effective Agents and not only to objects as such nor to those that preach present and offer objects as such And what that Agent Cause must be under God by that time you are agreed you will find that they are new Controversies that will there rise up before you And yet I think that if we will needs wrangle about the efficaciousness of any cause foregoing the first effect it self on the soul it must be of the efficacy of some or all these second causes or we must question whether God be God For I can find nothing else to question § 18. It remaineth then that the question Wherein the efficacy of Grace consisteth must be meant of Gratia operata even of the effect it self And then either you mean that this effect is efficacious to it self or to something else The first is such a contradiction as is not to be imagined that you should think that an effect is its own cause and ask How doth faith e. g. cause it self Therefore there is nothing left but only to question How the first effect of God on the soul in its conversion is efficacious of the second § 19. And here 1.
saith is not willed by the sinner himself § 33. So far as God Causeth not sin he willeth it not and they that say that he Loveth and Willeth the existence of it as a means to his glory abuse Gods Moliness and are confuted before Par. 1. § 34. How God overruleth sinners and the effects of sin and procureth his own ends not by the Means or Causality but Occasion of it I have so largely there opened that I must refer the Reader thither SECT XX. How far God and how far Man himself is the Cause of Hell and other punishments THough somewhat be said of this in the Conclusion of the second Jo. Major in 4. sent d. 50. fol. 289. q. 1. inquit concl 3. Sive actus damnatorum dicantur mali culpâ— vel peccata non patientur aliquam poenam inflictam ratione illorum actuum Quia non sunt in statu merendi demerendi sed addit Signanter de poena inflicta loquor quae à culpa distinguitur ejus est reordinativa per cruciatum De poena enim acta non est possibile dare culpam quin suam poenam habeat annexam eo modo quo idem potest habere se Ipsa scilicet peccandi continuatio est poenae miseriae continuatio Nec mihi probabile videtur quod Demerendi ratio cessat apud inferos Praemium quidem mereri non possunt At quare non Poenam commereri sunt putandi Nonne adhuc sunt subditi etiam ipsi daemones sub quadam Lege ideâ—que peccandi adhuc capaces nonne omne peccatum suâ naturâ meretur poenam Ipsius scilicet Joh. Majoris ibid. Conclus 1. Est Damnati habent multos malos actus in inferno libere An opâ—abilius sit damnà tum esse an non esse vide quae ibidem sequuntur ubi concludit Itaque tenco si daretur viro optio vel non esse vel esse in perpetua flamma quod licitè posset vel alterutrum eligendum est non esse Nam minus malum habet rationem boni See Aureolus in 2. d. 31. a. 2. pag. 301. shewing ten wayes how one sin causeth another and so multiplyeth and continueth it self in the wicked Part I think meet to say more here because I find that the not understanding it doth tempt many to unbelief and others to hard repining disaffected atheistical thoughts of God § 1. Again here consider that God made man such as he is in Nature before either Laws or sins or punishments had any being so that if you can but forgive God for making you men that is Rational Free-Agents you can have no fair pretence of quarrel with him As will appear by these considerations following § 2. Mans Body and sensitive soul are of such a nature as that things inconvenient will be his pain He that will take poison shall be griped and tormented by it and he that will eat unwholsome meat or will surfeit shall be sick and he that will cherish diseases by sloth or excesses or abuses of nature will have the pain of them And he that will wound himself or break his bones will be his own afflicter And he that cuts his throat or hangeth himself must dye And all this without any doing of God besides the making him a man and continuing such a nature under his Government in and with the world § 3. Not only positive hurting but omissions will bring mens bodies unto pain and death As not eating not exercising not keeping warm c. And consequently such a life of prodigality or sloth as tendeth to such wants § 4. The inward senses Imagination and Passions are so constituted as that their inconveniences will be a pain and torment as well as the inconveniences of the outward senses 1. Cares and Melancholy thoughts are distracting 2. Desires breed such care and are themselves like a thirst or hunger to the soul 3. Fears are tormenting 4. Sorrows if deep and long are as a living death 5. Anger is a vexatious feaver of the mind And revengeful malice and envy do prolong it 6. Despair anticipateth eternity of misery c. 7. And Love it self how pleasing soever at first is the strength of them all § 5. The superiour faculties as they are more noble are capable of greater misery and their corruption and disorder is the worst To have an ignorant erring mind that taketh evil for good and good for evil To have a carnal malignant wicked obstinate froward Will and sinful Affections and by these to have mens actions misguided and so the sensitive soul it self brought into the foresaid misery through bad government is a misery to man in the Nature and immediate effects of the thing § 6. Man liveth among multitudes of fellow Creatures in the world which will all be tormentors of him if he will make them such As a post will hurt him if he knock his head to it The fire will burn him if he touch his flesh with it The water will drown him if he will leap into it over-head The Sun will scorch him the frost will pain him if he expose himself to them A Lyon or Mastiff will tear him if he avoid them not His neighbours will hurt him likely if he hurt them and cross their interest Men in power will hurt him if he offend them And all things will be to him as he behaveth himself to them § 7. All this being Natural let us now consider what sin doth to the sinner here and you will find that almost all his calamity consisteth in his very sin it self and the natural effects of it But yet it is sin as mans and it is punishment as from God when yet God is no Cause of the sin § 8. This is plain if you consider that Gods Act by which he maketh sin a Punishment was Before the sin though the Relation of a Punishment come after the relation of sin Here are two Agents 1. God making Nature and a Law therein 2. Man disordering his actions by transgressing 3. Hence Immediately followeth Guilt or the form of sin 4. And with it even in the change or after it the natural pain of loss or hurt 5. And this is Related to man as a punishment for the sin in the last place For instance God made man and God made meat wine and poyson God telleth Man in Nature I have made thee such a Creature as that excess of Meat will make thee sick excess of Wine will make thee mad and Poyson will torment and kill thee I have given thee self-love and command thee that thou avoid all these and I will not deny thee necessary help But if thou wilt not it will be thy pain which I will that thou suffer for and by thy sin I need not further apply it here the application is obvious § 9. All this I speak only of natural punishments which by the Law of nature follow sin what is supernatural is after to be considered §
are wrought by common grace and that it is special acts and habits overcoming the flesh and world which are wrought by special grace So that those firemen that are resolved that yet differ they will and implacably differ and their adversaries shall be enemies of Gods Grace whether they will or not are yet defective in that acuteness and pregnancy of wit which is necessary to pretend a real disagreement and are forced to say that they disagree when they have not wit enough to seem to prove it to any but those that take their cholerick zeal and reproach for proof For in this there is no difference among us 6. Obj. At least we can prove that we differ in this about the effects that one side make Gods gracious habits given to believers to be such as may be lost and dye and the other do not Answ That is no difference You still want wit to make differences though you want not will For both sides are agreed that perseverance ariseth not from the meer nature of the Habit of grace but from Gods superadded sustentation For Adam and the faln Angels had as is commonly held such kind of habitual grace as we though objectively differing 7. Seeing there is no difference on Gods part as they all conclude Resistible grace and irresistible sufficient and effectual can have no difference but in the very effect or event and the connotation of mans Power or impotency to the contrary I know as I have said that not only the Dominicans and Calvinists but Suarez and other Jesuits say that Effectual Grace is such ex parte principii as is forcibler for faith as the effect But they contradict themselves who confidently say that besides that effect it is nothing but Gods essence which hath no degrees or real differences And mans power of Resistance and frustration is none as to Gods will and essence but only as to the effect When he could have done otherwise 8. The same Vanity they declare in the question Whether the same degree of Divine Grace help or operation would Convert one man as doth another or would Convert as doth not Convert When they are agreed that the effect is not the same and that the cause hath no degrees of difference 9. And though it 's past mans understanding to comprehend how all the various effects in the world should be produced without the least diversity in the Cause Will or Action ex parte agentis and that Velle salvare Petrum velle damnare Judam should be perfectly the same Volition ex parte Volentis yet it is the liker to be true because man cannot comprehend it as long as he hath no evidence to prove that it is not true For God is incomprehensible 10. Seeing then that we must concent 1. That God Decreed to do all that he doth and properly and absolutely no more 2. And that Christs death is the cause of all that it effecteth and properly of no more Of which the conditional gift of pardon and life is part And so that all the Controversie 1. Of Decree 2. Of Redemption is resolved into that of the effects 3. And seeing all the effects are such whose difference we little differ about if at all and ex parte Dei agentis they agree that there is no difference where then is the Difference among all the contenders §. II. Alvarez his Epitome in Twenty Propositions considered BUt that all this may more plainly appear I will recite the Twenty Conclusions which Alvarez in his Epilogus giveth us as the summ of all his Book one hundred twenty one Disputations And I shall tell you how far they are all to be consented to * Thus Bradwardine concludeth his Book with thirty six errors and as many verities which he would have the Church especially that of Rome determine But leaving out the most unsavoury parts or expressions of his own judgement Whether God be the chief necessitating Cause of all sin is none of them I. Free-will in lapsed nature cannot without the help of grace do a moral work which by co-operation of the supernatural End shall be truly good and a work of Virtue so as that by the doer it be referred to God beloved simply above all as to the ultimate natural End Answ It is granted and more that though all natural men have one sort of Grace given them yet I think this cannot be done without special saving grace II. Man by the sole strength of nature cannot assent to all supernatural mysteries propounded and explained to him as revealed of God or because revealed of God so as the formal reason of his belief is Divine revelation Answ It 's true He must have commoner grace to believe them dogmatically and uneffectually and special saving grace to believe them practically and savingly III. Not only faith it self but also the first beginning of faith proceedeth from the help of grace and not from the strength of Nature only Answ Very true IV. The free-will of man in lapsed Nature cannot without the help of Grace Love God above all simply even as he is the author of Nature Answ It 's true V. Man in lapsed Nature without the help of Grace cannot fulfill all the precepts even of the Law of Nature nor overcome any great difficulty and temptation even for any little time which it is necessary to overcome for the keeping of that Law Answ True Therefore they have some Grace that do it VI. There is no Law nor ever was made by God of his giving the actual helps of preventing grace to them that do all that is in them by the sole faculty of nature nor hath Christ merited or would have any such Law Answ True For he giveth some common grace to all men antecedently without any condition on their part And though he give to those that use their common grace to the utmost or near it sufficient encouragement to go on and hope that such endeavour shall not be in vain as to the obtaining of peculiar grace yet de nomine vel definitione Whether this encouragement shall be called a Law or a Promise or neither we contend not VII God by his helping grace floweth into free-will by premoving it that it may co-operate and also truly-efficiently together with the same free-will causeth its pious operation Answ It 's true But all adjuvant grace produceth not the second effect which floweth from both Causes of which before and after VIII When God by his exciting Grace striketh and toucheth the hearts of men he doth not expect that the will by its innate liberty begin its motion by Consenting But God by adjuvant grace effecteth that it freely and infallibly Consent Answ It 's true of all that do consent But God hath a degree of exciting and adjuvant grace which are Necessary and give the posse Velle which cause not the act through mans defect And though God expect not that effect as one that is deceived
morally attracting even inwardly but also efficaciously and truly effecting that the will moved and excited of God determine it self and act well Answ We know what mans perswading and moral operations are a little But the difference between these interiour acts of God named by you no man knoweth You cannot prove that his Interiour swasion is not truly efficient of the act nor know you how God proâ—ureth our determination as to the mode of his interiour operation Your arbitrary names have no signification of your true formal conceptions of the matter This Controversie therefore is vain XVI The efficacy of the help of preventing grace and the infallible connexion of it with the free co-operation of the will is totally founded and taken as from its first root from the Omnipotency of God and from the absolute and efficacious decree of his will willing that the man whom he moveth be converted and work piously nor doth this efficacy any way depend no not as on a condition sine qua non on the future co-operation of the created will though the free act by which man persevereth depend effectively on his will moved by God Answ 1. I grant that all the good that cometh to pass is fore-decreed by God 2. But Gods meer will effecteth it not without his Power 3. His power effecteth it not from eternity before it is effected 4. You leave out one of the causal Attributes The effect of Grace is as well from the Wisdom of God as from his Will and Power 5. Gods act dependeth not on mans will But mans co-operation which is his own act you must confess dependeth on his will as the effect on the nearest efficient 6. The non-efficiency of sufficient Grace dependeth on the sinners will It was not meerly nor principally from an absolute efficacious Decree or predetermination of God that Adams will omitted his duty first or committed sin first And if any run to the common shadow that sin hath no efficient cause and man only is deficient I answer 1. He is the first Reputative Deficient though not culpable because under no Law who must be the first efficient of the contrary and is not As if Adams body had never had a soul God was the first Non-efficient Cause that is into whose will and non-agency the whole ratio defectus is to be resolved 2. Forget not that Alvarez himself saith lib. 6. disp 45. p. 210. Licet peccatum originale non sit pro formali aliquid positivum sed privativum peccatum tamen actuale est pro formali aliquid positivum causat in anima habitum vitii XVII Supposing effectual Grace in free-will it infallibly followeth that free-will will consent and act piously so that these two are incompossible that effectual Grace be in a man and that he actually dissent Answ True because it is not called properly effectual unless either 1. Because it effecteth 2. Or as it cometh from an absolute decree of effecting 3. Or is of such a nature and degree that it cannot but effect And in all these cases it is true But such Grace may be eventually uneffectual which had a sufficiency ex parte sui to effect XVIII The gift of perseverance as such and the efficacy of it dependeth not no not as on a Condition sine qua non on the co-operation of our free-will but on the absolute decree of God effecting mans perseverance Answ This needeth no other explication or observation but as aforesaid Only that the Jus ad gratiam quâ ad finem perseveremus is given on condition in the Gospel from how absolute a decree soever it proceed XIX Effectual aid and a Power of dissenting are compossible in the same subject and consist in the same will Answ True And remember that a true Power is that quâ verè possumus and not that faculty which could do this or that if God will predetermine it and otherwise cannot no more than the Sun can shine without him When God withholdeth the Influx necessary to action such a faculty is no true power as to that action in that State XX. By preventing Grace efficacious as aforesaid the Liberty of the will is not destroyed nor the actual use of it hindered but is wonderfully perfected and roborated Answ There is a Liberty that is perfected by some even necessitating Free-will in name is owned by you all I say as August Enchir. c. 105. Sic oportebat prius hominem fierl ut bene velle posset male nec gratis si bene nec impune si male postea vero sic erit ut male velle non possit Quia ordo praetermittendus non suit in quo Deus voluit ostendere quam bonum sit animal rationale quod etiam peccare possit quamvis sit melius quod peccare non possit predetermination of God And there is an inferiour Liberty of Imperfect Viators which some efficient Divine predetermination feigned by you would destroy And if God did by that insuperable premoving influx which omnipotently moveth all things predetermine all men and Devils to all the wicked Volitions and actions that ever were done with all the circumstances and as respecting every object comparatively so that no creature ever did nor can resist such a predetermination any easier than make a World this were to destroy the true Liberty of that Creature with his innocency and felicity however you may at pleasure put the name of Liberty on and deny the name of Necessity to such an absolutely necessitated Volition and act and then may say that they are premoved and predetermined to do the Act of all sin freely or constrained to do it without constraint and so the liberty of the will is established For I see not but cogere ad Volendum is as apt a phrase as cogere nolentem ad agendum when a will formerly innocent is irresistibly predetermined by physical efficiency to all those comparate circumstantiate acts which are forbidden in Gods Law and that on pain of mans damnation But note how wisely Alvarez left out the great difference about predetermining to the acts of sin from this summary of his disputations §. III. Of the three other wayes and I. Of the Jesuits way Quest AS you have past your judgement on Alvarez and his Dominican way tell us how much you think well or ill of in the other three wayes mentioned by Alvarez and recited by you sect 8 Answ I. I have said enough before to answer this Briefly as to the Jesuits way de scientia media 1. It is certain that God knoweth all that Vasquez in 1. Tho. q. 22. d. 99. c. 6 7. after the rejection of many opinions holds this the only way of Concord 1. Gods preventing operating grace is Vocatio Congrua with good cogitations and the primus motus voluntatis ante actum liberum 2. Gods co-operating Grace ad consensum liberum is neither before nor after our act but concomitant simul And so
causeth no antecedent necessity but concomitant existentiae 3. This supposeth Gods Scientia futuri conditionalis Against this Dr. Twisse hath said much in a peculiar Digression And surely God ever operateth as God which is ut Causa prima But how far he determineth is the doubt i a capable object of knowledge And therefore he knoweth what conditional propositions of future contingents are true 2. Whether this should be called scientia media or not is a vain question 3. Gods acts ex parte sui being but his Essence and all one can no otherwise be distinguished nor ordered as to the denominations of priority or posteriority than as the objects are distinct and by their order of priority and posteriority allow us by Connâ—tation so to denominate the acts 4. The Intelligibility and the Amability of things are in themselves simultaneous though from the order of humane operations we say that things are first Intelligible before they are Amiable And so we may say of God after the manner of men but not otherwise 5. God doth not will the form or the act of sin as circumstantiated and as the form necessarily resulteth from it neither for it self nor propter aliud the essence or existence 6. Therefore God doth not foreknow sin as willed and decreed by him nor therefore foreknow it because he willeth it 7. God fore-knoweth or knoweth the formale peccati as well as the materiale yet almost all confess that he willeth not the formale Therefore he knoweth that which he willeth not Therefore his Volition of it is not necessary to his knowledge of it 8. There is no effect in God for all that is in God is God who is not effected Therefore there is no Cause in God of any thing in God Therefore Gods will or decree of Good is not the cause that he foreknoweth it noâ— his foreknowledge the cause that he willeth it But he both knoweth and willeth all that is Good at once 9. Gods inward operations on the soul are real efficiencies and yet moral and to us unsearchable They cause the will to determine it self to Good when it doth so but how we know not But we know that he ordinarily worketh by means and according to their aptitude 10. God useth such means with the free wills of his elect as he foreknoweth will prevail with them and setteth them in such circumstances as he foreknoweth they will freely act aright in But his inward grace is the principal or chief cause And he doth not will or decree to give them such means and circumstances because he foreknoweth they will prevail That is Gods will and decree as in him hath no cause 11. But the word because is in Scripture applyed sometimes to Gods Love or hatred and sometimes to his outward acts as John 16. 27. The Father loveth you because ye have loved me and believed And in the first case that which is meant is that the qualification of the object is the material constitutive cause of the act of God not as it is Himself but as relatively denominated ab extra from the object in specie vel individuo And in the second case It meaneth that the effects of God ad extra called his transient acts as in passo have their proper uses and we our commanded ends in using them And so God is said to send Ministers e. g. because he would save the hearers that is the Ministry is a cause of mens â—â—lvation 12. From all this it appeareth that they err who think that their scientia media is equally useful in the points of Election and of Reprobation and that they run pari passa For all Good is both willed and known and so Election supposeth not the foresight of our faith or obedience as causal or antecedent if we speak of that Act of Election which is to faith and obedience But Evil is foreknown and not willed at all And therefore there is no such Reprobation which is a will or decree that men shall sin And the non-impedition of sin being no act needeth no positive act of will or decree * * * Yet none of the stress of their differences lyeth on this And the Jesuits with the rest assert a Positive Volition de peccato permittendo without proof which I leave to â—uens various opinions But Reprobation which is the decree of damning ever supposeth the object to be a foreseen-sinner finally rejecting grace The rest about this is spoken to sufficiently before §. IV. II. Of Durandus 's way II. AS to the way of Aureolus Durandus Ludov. à Dola c. I conceive it is commonly rejected because not understood or because the wording of it soundeth disgracefully But it is a great matter that all confess how easily it would end all these controversies were it true And by Lud. à Dola's Explication and what Capreolus saith of Aureolus I conceive that they are commonly mistaken Durandus thinketh that to the motion of the Creature it is necessary 1. That God by his continued No doubt but God is quoad praesentiam Immediate in all his efficiency and as Near to the effect as if he used no second cause But yet he is not so immediate as to exclude second causes as media And while he useth them he operateth on us according to their kind of operations even as if they were between him and the effect And this is the sense of Durandus and à Doâ—a and easily reconcileth all Amyraldus de lib. Arbit c. 4. concurreth with Durandus It is consâ—derable that all confess that if Durandus's way did hold it easâ—ly ended all the controversie As Lud. le Blank noteth Thes 3. de Concurs Juxta hos doctores nulla est difficultas in conciliando divino concursu cum libertate c. And this way is as consistent with Gods certain disposal of events as predetermination it self influx continue the being and the nature and properties of the agent 2. And that he continue all the circumstant creatures concauses and objects and the media of action 3. And that no powerful impediment hinder the action Now say the Jesuits and Dominicans and the rest God doth moreover concurr as the first cause to the Act it self by an Immediate efficient Influx besides that by which he upholdeth the Power and second Causes But I think that Durandus meaneth as much as they that is that God doth not only uphold the creature in its meer esse but in its Nature which is its Mobility and its principium motus And this Nature is not only a Power to Action but also an Inclined Power So that for God by constant Influx to continue a Natural Power and Inclination to Action or motion with all necessary concurrents without impediments is truly by his Influx to concurr to the motion as the first Cause while his Influx is not only as to Being but as to the Motive force and inclination And no more than this doth seem to me
circumstantially but by the Immediate Physical efficient adequate predetermining Premotion of Gods Omnipotency as the first Cause besides his Influx by which he sustaineth their natures and concauses and affordeth them his general Concurse or premotion to the act as an act in genere only And it is Impossible for any Agent so predetermined by physical premotion not to act in all the circumstances that it is so moved to act in II. To say that any creature can act without this physical predetermination to all the circumstances or can forbear to act when so predetermined is by consequence to say that such a creature is God the first cause For it is as impossible as to be God or to make a World III. Yea the creature that will forbear any act which God so predetermineth him to must be stronger than God and overcome him or do contradictions IV. And if God had not decreed so to predetermine by physical efficient premotion he could not have known any future acts No though with Scotus we say that he willed all those Acts antecedently to his prescience it would not serve unless he willed so to predetermine the agent in causing them V. Yet we will say that the Will is free but we mean only that to will and to will freely are words of the same sense For a man is said to will freely in that he willeth and his Willing is not a Nilling VI. Free-will then is nothing but Facultas Voluntatis rationis â—d utrumlibet agendum vel non agendum ad agendum unum vel alterum sed tantum prout à prima causa physice praedeterminatur That is it is such a faculty as God can predetermine to act which way he will by making it will yet its Indifferency is not only objective or passive but also Active because it is an Active Power of the will which God predetermineth God predetermineth the will to determine it self VII We will call this the wills Power but it is but hypothetically a Power viz. It can act if God physically predetermine it else not at all As the Wheels of the Clock can move if the Poise or Spring move them or rather as the hand can move if the Will and the Spirits in the Nerves do move it VIII The will is said to be free partly by reason that its active power is capable of being determined by God and then by it self ad utrumlibet and partly in that it is not lyable to coaction IX The will that is by Omnipotent physical premotion efficiently predetermined by God is not constrained because it willeth not unwillingly that is so far as it is willing it is not unwilling and reluctant X. Yet the will that was one way enclined habituated and acted in the precedent instant is oft physically premoved and predetermined by Omnipotency to the contrary act in the next instant which it could not resist As he that in this instant wilâ—eth Chastiâ—y may in tâ—e next instant be predetermined by unresistible Omnipâ—tency to will fornication or he that Loved God may be predetermined and premoved by God to hate him the next moment But we will not call this irresistible efficiency coaction because it is ad Volendum and so in ipso actâ— there is no reluctancy or resistance XI When God hath given man a Power with liberty to will or nill or not will to will this or that and also giveth him all necessary objects and concauses and also as the first cause of natural and free action giveth him all that Influx which is necessary to an Act as such yet the moral specification of that Act to this proposed object rather than that as to hate God rather than to hate sin or to this Act rather than to that as to hate God rather than to Love him or to speak a lye rather than the truth hath so much Entity in it that it is a blasphemous deifying man to say that man can do it without Gods fore-described unresistible predetermining physical premotion XII God made the Law which forbiddeth sin and God made mans nature Intellectual and free to be ruled by Law and God made and ordereth all the objects temptations and concauses and God by the said efficient physical premotion causeth irresistibly every act of sin in all its circumstances As when David was deliberating Shall I do this Adultery and Murder or not God first by omnipotent motion determined his will to it or else he could not possibly have done it And sin in its formale is nothing but the Relation of Disconformity to Gods Law which can have no cause but that which causeth the subjectum fundamentum terminum nor can it possibly be but it must exist per nudam resultantiam hisce positis And yet though God make the man the Law the act the object and all that is in the world from whence sin resulteth as a meer relation we are resolved to say that God is not the Author or Cause of sin XIII Yea though the Habits of sin are certain Entities and therefore God must needs be their first cause in their full nature according to our principles who account it proper to God to be the first and principal cause of any such entity yet we are resolved to say that God is not the Cause or Author at least of sin XIV Yet we will say that he is an enemy to Gods Providence that holdeth that man can possibly do any wickedness unless God thus predetermine both Will Tongue Hand and every active part to every act which he hath forbidden with all its circumstances XV. Sin is caused by God as to the circumstantiated Act which is the materiale but not as to the formale And yet we must confess that the Relation is caused by causing the subject foundation and term all which God principally doth and can be caused no otherwise XVI But the formale of sin is but a defect or privation which is nothing Therefore man and not God is the cause of it For God cannot be a deficient cause nor have any privation And yet we cannot deny but that 1. There is as much positivity of Relation in disobedience as in obedience in curvity as in rectitude in disconformity as in conformity 2. Nor that God can be a Cause of Privations such as death is though not a subject of them even such a cause as they can have 3. Nor that some of ours even Alvarez say that sins of commission and habits are positive in their formale 4. And sin is such a Nothing as is mans misery and he is damned for and by And if it be such a Nothing as can have no cause man can no more be the cause of it than God 5. And that the Reason of non existences negations or privations is as notoriously resolved into the will or non-agency of the first necessary cause of the contrary as existences and positives are resolved into his will and agency And if a man cannot
think a good thought by any help that God can give him unless he physically predetermine him to it then the reason why man doth it not is as notoriously to be resolved into Gods not-predetermining him to it as the reason why he doth it into his predetermination and as it is night because the Sun shineth not XVII But at least we can say that God is not the cause of sin because he is under no prohibiting Law Though it be true 1. That his nature or perfection the root of all Laws is more than a Law 2. And we know indeed that this proveth him not at all to be no cause of the sin of man but only to be no sinner himself though he cause it which is none of the question XVIII And from this necessity of predetermination it followeth that all that part of our holiness and obedience which consisteth in not sinning is not at all caused by God e. g. that we hate him not nor his truth and wayes and servants that we murder not commit not adultery steal not lye not covet not blaspheme not wrong none do no evil c. we need no help of God for this Because if he will not move our wills by efficient predetermination to do them it is impossible for us to do them at all XIX And though we say that God willeth sin to be by his permission only and not by his efficience yet indeed predetermining by efficiency as the first cause is the principal efficiency And properly we must say that God permitteth no sin at all For we say that his permission proveth the consequence of the thing permitted And therefore we must say that he permitteth no sin but what is done And that which is done by commission positively he effecteth by effecting the fundamentum and therefore permitteth not And men sin by omission because God doth not make them sin and not because he meerly permitteth it For permission is not de impossibilibus XX. God willeth not sin because he willeth it not as sin in its formale which also we must confess that the wicked themselves do not XXI And whereas we hold that God cannot foreknow things future but as he willeth or decreeth them we must confess that the formale peccati as well as the materiale was such as it is quid futurum if it was but futura privatio And therefore this would inferr that God willed and decreed the formale peccati also XXII Gods Will is his Love and what he Willeth he Loveth XXIII God willeth the futurity and existence of sin not only of the materiale but the formale even of all the sin that ever is done XXIV The existence of sin is Good and Amiable not only by accident but per se as being very conducible to the Glory of Gods Justice and Mercy and therefore is per se Willed and Loved of God XXV It is incomparably much more sin than Holiness which God willeth and Loveth and by predetermination causeth in mankind on earth For it is much more sin than Holiness that existeth in man And all that existeth God causeth as aforesaid the circumstantiated act and so the resultancy of the relative form And he willeth and Loveth the existence of all and the thing existing so far as he causeth it XXVI God Willeth Loveth and Causeth sin incomparably more than wicked men do For they Will and Love it with a humane mutable dependent will but God with a Divine primary immutable will Man causeth the forbidden act whence the relation resulteth with a Will that is irresistibly moved so to do by God as the pen writeth only sâ—o modo with Volition But God causeth it as the first omnipotent unresistible cause of all that the Creature doth in sinning XXVII The same must be said of God and the Devil who can no more commit one sinful act till God unavoidably predetermine his will to it by his premotion than sinful man can XXVIII God by his Law doth strictly forbid all those sinful acts which he principally and unavoidably causeth And he strictly commandeth all those good acts whose contraries he thus causeth us to do XXIX Though there is nothing in sin which can have a cause of which God is not the Principal cause and though he Willeth and Loveth all that he causeth yet the Scripture saith that God hateth sin and cannot behold it and hateth all the workers of iniquity and that it is abomination to him that he is as one laden with it and wearied provoked and offended by it And that he Loveth the Acts of obedience and holiness when he will not cause them but doth cause and will the contrary XXX Pardon and salvation is promised and earnestly offered by God to the Reprobate themselves on condition that they will believe and repent when God doth unavoidably as the first cause determine their wills to the contrary acts even to disbelief and impenitent hatred of God and holiness XXXI The Law of God is that all the Reprobates shall be damned to hell fire if they will not believe and repent when his omnipotence doth unavoidably premove and determine them to unbelief and impenitence and if they will not give over those acts of sin to which God doth thus unavoidably move and determine them XXXII Gods executions are answerable to these Laws and all save Christians and all professed Christians saving the sanctified are to be punished in hell fire for ever only for not doing the acts of Faith Love and obedience when God as the first cause predetermined them to the contrary and for doing the acts of sin when God unavoidably moved them to it and made them do it so that consequently all that are damned suffer in hell for not being Gods even the first sufficient causes of their own acts and for not being above God or stronger than he that is for not overcoming or avoiding his invincible and unavoidable predetermining premotion unto evil acts XXXIII The same must be said of the Devils who sin and suffer on the same terms XXXIV Q. What kind of torment then will there be in Hell Can Conscience torment men for doing that which they were unavoidably made to do by Omnipotency and for not doing that which without Divine predetermination they could no more do than make a world or for not doing that whose contrary they were thus predetermined to that is for not overcoming God when they know the case Or must we not more congruously say that the state of Hell torments lyeth in a most vehement hatred of God for so using them and a justifying of themselves Or will every mouth be thus stopt in judgement XXXV Q. Is not Divine Justice the most perfect Justice and the exemplar of all humane Justice allowing for disparities And should Kings and Judges imitate this fore-described course And how then would they be esteemed XXXVI Q Is not that best which is most agreeable to Gods Will and Love And therefore sin better than
And who it is that erreth indeed the Light must discover and the studious impartial prepared Children of the Light must discern and the Father of Lights must finally judge Note that in the first part I speak as in the name of the Predeterminants till I come to the Questions and thence-forward I speak as in my own name which the Reader may easily perceive §. VII Of Jansenius his way of reconciling Grace and Free-will § 1. BUt after all these cometh Jansenius and justly blaming Philosophy as the great occasion of our heresies and errours which misled the Schoolmen Jesuites and others he goeth to Augustine alone as Lombard thought he had well done before him and disgraceth his cause by saying that Augustine first taught it to the Church as if Grace had been unknown by the former ages And because many will not be at the labour to know his mind by reading so big a volume I shall briefly select what concerneth the matter in hand and animadvert upon it 1. His first Tome describeth the Heresie of Pelagius wherein he proveth that Pelagius held all this that followeth concerning grace 1. The Remission of sins containing 1. Conversion to God 2. The abstersion of the blot and filth 3. Reconciliation or remission of Gods offence 4. And of the eternal punishment Jansenius Aug. To. 1. l. 5. c. 22. p. 126 127. 2. That Pelagius owned the Infusion of habitual grace And that God in Baptism did blot out all sins purge cleanse and expiate them save and renew the soul restore nature deliver from the body of this death and from the contracted custome of sinning He held that Grace doth Regenerate Illuminate cause Faith Justifie even Infants Sanctifie make us new Creatures incorporate us into Christ as his members give us the anointing of the Holy Ghost not only restoring us to the state that we were in in Adam but to a better and to be adopted sons of God and saved cap. 24. And 25. as to the Relative effects that Grace Reconcileth man to God maketh him an adopted Son of God and the Temple of the Holy Ghost an Heir of God and co-heir with Christ So that they acknowledge not only Habitual Infused Grace but more even in Baptism As also the Assisting motions of the spirit to good acts making them possible Also that after Pope Zozymus had condemned the Pelagians they went further and that their design was but to lay mens salvation or damnation on free-will lib. 6. c. 7. c. And when he cometh to characterize Pelagius he doth it as he doth elsewhere the Protestants and as Malignants do Religious persons by presumptions viz. that he was indeed as Augustine saith Temperate and of a good life but singular and very proud which he proveth by his opinion and because he was against Swearing and said that Gods servants mouths should vent no bitter thing but only that which is sweet and that Christians must be so patient as readily to let go what is taken from them and that gallantry and gay cloathing is contrary to God and that enemies must be loved as friends and yet not believed and that Riches must be forsaken c. as holding nothing mean and moderate that he affected novelty and yet his â—rrours were old coming from Origen â—uffinus Palladius Evagrius Jovinâ—an and the Philosophers that he affected fame admiration hypocrisie pretending to more holiness than others under the garb of poverty c. over-â—alued Reason Logick Syllogismes Philosophers c. All which I mention not to abate any mans dislike of any one errour of Pelagius but to shew that it is so usual for dissenters to make one another seem odious and to feign or aggravate faults and to vilifie or deny Gods grace in others that he that would not be tempted into malice uncharitableness and slander must take heed what he believeth even of men accounted most abominable hereticks Doubtless Pelagius his denying original sin and his laying too much on mans will and too little on grace are things to be detested II. Jansenius asserteth that the Angels and Adam had such Free-will as could obey or disobey and so could determine it self to good and persevere therein without any more grace than they had when they did it not And that by this Free-will some Angels stood and some fell and Adam fell when he might by it have stood and thereby fell from a nobler sort of Free-will which consisteth in a due subservience to God and fell to the Love of Himself not primarily of external things instead of God and to selfdependency and dominion De Grat. primi hom c. 6. p. 40 41 42. c. 7. Nos hic asserimus tanquam sine dubitatione verissimum juxta doctrinam sancti Augustini ecclesiae omnia hujusmodi opera adeoque ipsam fidem dilectionem Dei ab eo potuisse per arbitrii libertatem fieri sic ut ea non donaret ei gratia Dei vid. c. 7 8 c. The reason of this was sanitas Voluntatis Adami c. 9. III. Yet Grace was necessary to man and Angels both to perseverance and to every good act c. 10 11. And c. 12 13 c. this Grace necessary to all was not Habitual Grace for that they had nor general concurse which none denyed but it was Actual Adjuvant Roborating help But the Grace given to Angels and Adam was Adjutorium sine quo non giving the will power to determine it self but not Adjutorium quo which ever determineth it One giveth the Power and the other the Act. The same that is meant by the common distinction of Grace sufficient and effectual by the Dominicans Yet this Adjutorium sine quo non did with free will procure the Act in the standing Angels and Adam while he stood But that made it not Adjutorium quo because it is not so called efficax only ab eventu but because it so helpeth that illo praesente continuo fiat id propter quod datur illo absente nunquam fiat p. 63. c. 14 15. One is like Light and the visive faculty ad videndum the other ut ipsa visio such as all formal causes are and Gods simultaneous efficiency The difference is c. 15. that Adjutorium sine quo non doth but perfect the power and the chief honour belongeth to the will that useth it and could choose But contrarily the adjutorium quo is the principal cause of the Act and leaveth not the event to the will but useth it effectually to the act intended Therefore merit and perseverance in Innocency were no special gifts of God IV. That without or before faith no good work is done but lies and sins l. 3 4. c. 1. p. 223. no nor without true Godliness p. 261. passim To think that Infidels and ungodly have any true virtue is dotage c. 17. V. The first sin had no necessity being meer sin and no punishment and so easily avoidable and wholly voluntary Other sins
as the sole cause IV. Whether the best actions of Infidels or ungodly men be properly to be called good is but a Logomachy Call them but a Less evil or the abatement of evil and actions that tend as Means to their repentance and salvation and I shall not disagree with you in this V. His concession that the first sin was not necessitated is of great moment But it is a great mistake that following sins are necessary because they are punishments It is not the existence of the sin that is a punishment but the hurtfulness of it supposing the existence If drunkenness or gluttony be themselves noxious and penal that is but a consequent of their existence which was not necessitated by God as punishing them that caused them VI. The sixth I think sound and the Schools pure nature as if Adams Love in the principle was not his necessary Sanity is unsound VII Here again 1. I think he giveth too much to free-will in innocency and too little to God For Gods Help did not then serve mans will so much as Gods and God fulfilled all his will while Angels used their power and liberty and they did no good but what God willed and caused as he saw best And while man and Angels used their liberty they fulfilled Gods will in all their duty as much as if they had been necessitated by natural predetermination 2. And it is not true that their sufficient grace gave not Merit to the will For it followeth not that because they could have omitted a duty therefore in doing it they did any thing of which God was not the prime cause He that gave them all their power disposition objects helps and motives did give them that which he calleth Merit 3. It is his grand error that Gift and Reward are repugnant and that Life would not have been to Adam and was not to the Angels of free gift though of Reward For it is impossible that any creature can merit of God as a Proprietor in point of Commutative Justice seeing God is the absolute Owner of us and all things and no creature can give him any thing but what is his own Therefore there is a natural impossibility that quoad valorem rei aut ipsum beneficium a creature can have any thing but of free gift But God who is an Owner and Benefactor is also a Rector and so the cause of Moral Order as well as of real Benefits And so that which as a Benefit is a meer gift yet quoad ordinem conferendi is given by God per modum praemii to those that will Accept the Gift according to its nature and denyed to those that will despise it and refuse it As a Father will give a purse of Gold to the Child that will thank him and humbly take it and not to the Child that will spit in his face Jâ—nsenius doth so weakly open the nature of Merit and Reward as that alone would shew that he was not meet for his great undertaking Though he excellently shew that God is our Reward himself yet the Ratâ—â—nes praemii he â—aith little to that can satisfie the judicious Of which more anon 4. Angels were differenced inter se by Gods will and their own And we confess that so far as sin made the difference it was by their own will and not by Gods But was he sure that no such difference is made since the fall among men He will confess that when Eve sinned before Adam it was she that made the difference And how can he prove that it was not Cain who by sin first differenced himself from Abel or the Prodigal Luke 15. that by forsaking his Father first differenced himself from his Brother According to his own principles who holdeth falling away from Grace and Justification doth not he that falleth away difference himself from him that standeth He can never prove that now two men may not have equal help from God to go to Church or read a good Book and one do it and the other go to the Tavern or read a Play-book VIII 1. God doth not so use man as his Instrument in good but that he giveth the Instrument its proper aptitude and action as to the effect And that which it is and doth may be spoken of it To say a thing is gud is to praise it and good must be called good And to say that you were the Actor of Good and that Voluntarily is to praise you Therefore the Actor of good ex natura rei deserveth praise seeing Truth must be spoken of all things 2. God himself doth so often praise his servants and promise to honour them that honour him that to say no praise is due to them is to charge God with error 3. To deny all Reward and Merit as it signifieth Rewardableness or Moral â—ptitude for Reward is to deny the greatest part of the Scripture to deny God to be our Rector and so to be our God to deny the whole frame of his Sapiential Government and his glory therein and so to deny his Laws Judgement and Execution Sin Duty Heaven and Hell Thâ—â— summ of all is this â— No man or Angel can merit of God in Commutative Justice as Proprietor But only as Rector All is as is before said of free gift from God as â—roprietor and Benefactor 2. The same God who is Omnipotent is also sapientissimus optimus And he that glorifieth his Power eminently as the Author of Nature as Creator Conservator and Motor doth also glorifie his Wisdom in rerum Ordine And he ordereth Moral Agents eminently per sapientâ—am â—t Rector per media moralia viz. Doctrinam Leges Judicia And he glorifieth his Goodness and Love partly Antecedently to mans Actions and as a free Benefactor partly consequently according to the order of his Laws So that as his Attributes are inseparable so are herein the operations of them And the same Benefit is ut quid productum the effect of Gods Omnipotency and Dominion and ut Bonum Beneficium the effect of the Benefactors Love and yet quoad ordinem conferendi it is Prâ—mium à Rectore adjudicatum And between all these there is no repugnancy 3. We grant that God Rewardeth no man now according to the Law of Innocency for that condemneth every sinner 4. Nor according to or for the works of the Mosaical Jewish Law 5. Nor for any sincere obedience to the Law of Nature or any other without Redemption by Christ 6. We are agreed that the Reward is now doubly and eminently a free gift and the reward of Christs merits It is not only free as all Benefits from God to man are as to commutation but also after forfeiture freely given to sinners and it is procured by the merits of Christ who was freely given to be the Saviour of the world and it is given us by Christ as free gifts are upon condition of Acceptance and an Accepting Will is Gods free gift and they that
doctrine of faith and Law and promises of Christaâ—e the Means which the Spirit useth in operating our Faith Love and Obedience And it is not two Covenants that give these two but as soul and body make one man so the Word of Christ and his Spirit make up one total cause of our sanctification The Spirit causeth us to believe that which the Word revealeth and to love the good which it proposeth and to obey the Precepts of the Word Therefore the Gospel is Grace and the Spirit is Grace that is a free gift of God to miserable sinners for their recovery and inward holiness is the effect of both And to feign that all obedience as it is performed to Christs Law upon its proper motives is therefore not of the Spirit or is our own Righteousness opposed to Christs because our own reason and free-will is exercised in it is Phanaticism and subverteth the Gospel and the Prophetical and Kingly Office of Christ II. God never gave a Law no not to the Jews only to convince them that they could not keep it but to be the Rule of their obedience And the Just did keep it in sincerity But the Law of Moses as separated by the ignorant Jews from the promise and grace of Christ could not be kept by any to Justification To say that Christs Laws now have no higher end than to tell us that we cannot keep them is Antichristianity Are we commanded to repent believe love God only to tell us that we cannot do it It 's true that without the Spirits help we cannot But it 's as true that the Command is the Rule of our duty and all the Gospel and Covenant of Grace is the means of exciting us to our duty by which the Spirit worketh in us faith repentance love and obedience But saith Jansenius the Law of Christ is to humble men in the sense of their disability and drive them to seek to Christ for his grace I answer 1. Is not humbling men and driving them to Christ a good effect If so then his Law is the means of all that good 2. Were the Gospel and all the Apostles Epistles written only to drive men to Christ and not to edifie them and make them perfect to salvation Were not the Precepts of Love and Holiness means of working Love and Holiness in men Is not the Word the seed that begetteth men to eternal life and is not the receiving of this seed into good and honest hearts made by Christ the cause of holiness and salvation Were not the Disciples clean by the word that Christ spake to them and doth he not say that his Word was spirit and life as being the concause of the Spirits vivification He that never received more benefit by Christs Doctrine Law and Gospel than to be convinced that he cannot believe repent obey or love God hath not yet the benefit which they are principally intended for But suppose that by Law he had meant the meer penal part or threatning as some words would make a man suspect 1. It 's a strange description of a Law to exclude the precept and premiant part and include only the penal part which is the last and least 2. As it is the same Man that hath Love and Hatred Hope and Fear so it is the same Law of Christ which hath precept and prohibition promise and penalty And it is the same Holiness or New Creature which is a conformity to all together Of which more anon III. He can never prove that all unbelievers have no Power to â—â—e any means which tendeth to â—aith by a preparatory grace nor that the use of all such means is Impossible to them XIII His distinction of Natural and Moral Impotency is good But then that Moral Impotency it self must not be made the same with the Natural else there will be the same reason for excusing sin by it If mans Will had been made by God such as could not possibly love him or holiness it would not have left a man unexcusable in judgement that his enmity was Voluntary It is reason enough for a man to kill a â—oad or Serpent as malum sibi naturale because it is a hurtful creature But this is no Moral Evil in them nor is their death their punishment nor yet in any ravenous creature which preyeth on the rest that are innocent And so would it be with bad men if God had made them bad Indeed if Adam have made them all bad and God have given no Saviour Grace or Remedy they are conâ—emnable and unexcusable as they were virtually in Adam if judged only by the Law of Innocency as made to Adam But they are excuseable if judged by Christ by the Law of grace which condemneth no man meerly as not innocent or a sinner but as a rejecter of grace These things are so plain and weighty that Jaâ—senius should not joyn with the Antinomians in opposing them XIV While he confesseth that Christ so far dyed for all as to procure them all the mercy which he giveth them I have no further quarrel with him but to prove that a Condition pardon of sin and grant of Life eternal with much means and help to make men perform the Condition which is but a suitable Acceptance is indeed mercy XVI That Christs grace is Love or Complacency in good is a truth which I highly value but with all these exceptions to his doctrine 1. It is the Heart of the new Creature and that which must communicate it self to all the rest or else they are lifeless and unacceptable For the will is the man in Gods account And complacency or love or appetite is the first act of the will which is it that he calleth with Augustine Delectation Grace lyeth principally in a Placet But the man hath more parts than his Heart And all other parts of sanctification are graces of Christ in their several places and not love only 2. Though no man is to love himself as God nor instead of God nor above God nor as the noblest ultimate object of his love yet all men are necessitated by nature to love themselves and therefore to desire their own felicity in loving God next to God as the final object of that love And so our end is finis amantis vel amicitiae which includeth mutual complacency and union though not in equality And to such an end grace causeth us to use the means And Christ is proposed to us as our Saviour and all his grace as for our good and all Gods commands as necessary for our happiness and sin is described to us to be hated as our oâ—â— evil and destruction and against our good as well as against Gods will and honour And with us this is denyed scarcely by the Antinoâ—ians themselves Much less by any judicious Christians 3. It is past the reach of any of us to prove that our actual love is the first effect of the sanctifying Spirit on the soul
I mean not only Whether some other acts as Intellectual perception and belief be not in order of nature before it and in time with it and real parts of the same new creature but also Whether aâ— Alvarez and others say there be not such a divine motion or Impulse on the soul tending to this love and antecedent to love it self in nature love being an effect of Gods will and mâ—â—s which Jâ—â—sâ—nius denyeth But 4. If it be not so but really love be the first effect of God on the soul then the controversies are all at an end about the difference of sufficiâ—â—t and effectual equal and unequal grace For then it would be as Jaâ—senius saith and there is no grace but the effect it self and so there would be no question but Whether all men love God and all alike But I yet believe that there is soe preparatory grace of Christ which tendeth to the love of God XVI I believe that the will is the prime seat of Morality and that love or complacency is as the spirit of all saving special grace But yet it is ill said that Christs grace is necessary only to love or delight For the soul of man hath three faculties which must be conjunctly sanctified viz. Vital active power Intellect and Will and sin is in all And the Spirit reneweth them by a threefold effect Vivification Illumination and Conversion or love And hatred of sin and fear of sinning and of God are graces of Christ also as are obedience patience c. though below love 2. There is an Analogical good that is done by self-love and fear which hath a tendency to mans recovery though not such good as is true holiness and hath a promise of salvation XVII I. Here we come to a difficult case 1. Whether indeed any ungodly man or Infidel do love God sincerely amore amicitiae propter se The doubt is because to love him less than sinful pleasures and the creature seemeth to be a loving him as less amiable or good And to love him as such is not to love him as God nor indeed to love God but an Idol of the imagination I think we must say 1. That no man loveth God adequately for no man hath an adequate conception of him 2. But yet that there are some essentials of such true love as is necessary and suitable to our dark and weak condition which all must have that will be saved either distinctly or confusedly As to know and love him as the Infinite Spirit the first cause and last end of all most powerful wise and good our Owner our Ruler and our Benefactor and chief good Father Word and Spirit the Creator Redeemer and Sanctifier the Author of Nature Grace Glory 3. That no wicked or unholy person truly loveth God thus viz. As his own Governour to make him holy and save him from the Flesh and World and as the Author of those holy Laws by which he governeth and a righteous Judge according to those Laws 4. Therefore Jansenius's little sincere Love in sensual men is but a love of aliquid Dei somewhat of God and not properly of God as God speaking of God as the object of love it self 5. Yet the same person may have all the â—orâ—said Notions of a Deity and may notionally call them all good and laudable but his Practical Judgement is not such of God as his holy Governour Judge and End as to bring him truly as such to love him 6. Yet this may be called a Love of God analogically as he is said to love the King who loveth him as great and good to the Common-wealth though not as a governing restrainer of his lusts By this I would have that explained which I have said of this subject in my Saints Rest II. But here I am at â— further loss Did he mean that this love called sincere is in none but those that are saved oâ— not As I said before If he did then a common Drunkard Adulterer c. may have this love and be saved But I suppose he meant Negatively And if so methinks hence all his opposition to sufficient Grace turneth back upon himself And to him it may better be said Why do you feign Christ and the Holy Ghost to give men such a Grace such a Love to God as no man ever was or will be saved by without more Is it any more dishonour to Christ to give men some such Power to do some more good â—han actually they do as Adâ—m had to have continued innocent than effectually to give so many persons sincere love which shall never save theâ— Whether these be they that he will adjudge to Purgatory I know â—â— If so he will stretch the rank of Venial sins to those that other men call Mortal III. But yet my greatest difficulty remaineth I am in doubt Whether he that denyeth common sufficient grace and extendeth the grace of Christ seemingly but to few do not really either make it the same thing with Nature or extend it to all For I suspect that all or almost all men on earth till they have sinned themselves into diabolical desperate malignity have this which he calleth Amor amicitiae and sincere imperfect love to God and Justice For Intellectus est Entis veri intellectus Voluntas est Boni Good apprehended such is the Wills necessary natural object And a simple complacency in apprehended good is the wills first necessary act Nature telleth man that there is created goodness and that the Creator who giveth it must needs have more than all his creatures And nature tells men that the World or millions are better than one person and their good to be preferred And how can it be then that he that taketh the World to be so much better than himself and God to be better that is more amiable than all the World should not have the least simple complacency in thinking of him All men take Wisdom and Goodness and Beneficence for amiable And they that believe that God hath most of these must needs have some Love to him not only as good to them but as most excellent in himself Insomuch that as Adrian the sixth before cited saith in some sort a bad man may love God better than himself and he is scarce worthy the name of a man that would not rather be annihilated or wish that he had never been born than that there were no World or no God if per impossibile he supposed he could live without them And if you tell every man that he hath that sincere love to God which is Gratia Christi who hath the least love to God and Justice propter se though he have more love to his fleshly interest and sinful pleasures I doubt you will not much differ from Pelagius and will have no way left but to say that it is not of Grace by Christ that Nature is reprieved and supported Or at least that this is of a common
strange But I must say 1. That I see no cogent proof of this super-angelical nature 2. That seeming congruities and conveniences must not embolden us to take up a doctrine which is new and strange to the Church of Christ in so great a matter as the Natures and person of Christ are 3. And were it never so true if it be not sufficiently revealed to us in Gods Word it cannot be necessary to our salvation 4. Yea presuming too boldly to conclude of unrevealed things so high seemeth to me dangerous temerity curiosity and prophaneness like the Bethshemites or Uzzah's meddling with the Ark and the Sons of Aâ—râ—n offering false fire Let them therefore here thus proceed that dare For I dare not § 18. But this much I easily concede 1. That as all Being is originally from God so there is a continued divine causation of them without which they would all cease or be annihilated which some call a continued Creation and some an Emanation and some a continued Action or operation ad rerum esse And it is an intolerable errour to hold that God hath made the World or any part of it self-sufficient or Independent as to himself as to Being Action or Perfection We grant therefore that all the world is so far United to God as to depend on his continued causality And that the Beams do not more depend on the Sun or Light heat and motion on the Sun and other fire nor the branches fruit and leaves more depend on the Tree than the Creature on God § 19. 2. I grant that thus far the world may be said to be one as all things are united in one first cause from which they flow and by which they are § 20. 3. But yet all these are no parts of God as the fruit and leaves are of the Tree and as the beams are of the Sun 's But they are Creatures because Gods emanation or causation is creative causing the whole Being of the effect And it seemeth likest to the Sun or fire's causation of Motion Light and Heat as they are in the Recipient distinct ab essentia actione Agentis quà tuli § 21. 4. I grant that though as to proximity of essence God is no further from one Creature than from another being intimate to all immediatione essentiae yet he useth one Creature as a second Cause to operate on another and that the Higher and Nobler operate on the lower and more ignoble And in that sense we may conceive that some Creatures are first from God or nearest to him that is of the highest nature and use And so we deny not but that it is like that in the Creation God made one nature existent e. g. the highest Intellectual as more excellent powerful pregnant active and perfect than any of the rest that there was in the wonderful diversity some one that was Best and above the rest § 22. 5. I grant that it soundeth probably that the first and noblest Nature in specie should be found but in one Individual But of this there is not the least certainty to us mortals viz. Whether from one God first flow one perfect Created Intelligence of Spirit or ab uno plures two three or millions in the first order flow from one God Though in nature we see that from the trunk of the Tree few great members first arise and multiplicity is in the extremities And we grant that the greatest multiplicity appeareth where things dwindle to littleness or baseness One sound Sheep iâ— better than a rotten one that hath a thousand Worms in his Veins and Intestines And a man that hath a thousand Lice on his Head is not the Nobler And when the one soul hath left a Garkass it may turn to thousands of contemptible Vermine And a Looking-glass broken into an hundred pieces is not the better because it will make an hundred images of the face But yet we are strangers to Gods unseen works further than he revealeth them and therefore must confess our ignorance § 23. 6. We grant that all Gods works have some Union Concord and Harmony among themselves which yet consisteth with numerical diversity And though Men and other Animals walk about with Bodies that touch not one another and therefore the ignorant conceive of them as totally incoherent and think that though Pears Apples and other Fruit on the Tree and Trees in the Earth be both Many and Divert and yet parts of one Tree and of one Earth yet it is not so with animals because the union of spiritual beings in invisible yet indeed it is not probable that the souls of Animals have no dependant coherence with noblet supriour Spirits Though because we know of no nature above the Intellectual it is utterly uncertain to us Whether Humane souls depend on any proper superiour Cause of their Being but God alone immediately For God causeth the highest Natures without any mediate second Cause Though as to ORDER and helps of action and well being they may depend on others as the several Wheels or parts of the same Watch or Clock or as the Sheep upon the Shepherd § 24. Augustine de Anima is put to it whether he will hold 1. That souls are Many and not One 2. Or One and not Many 3. On both One and Many The two first he rejecteth The last he confesseth hard to defend but seemeth most inclined to But what Union he meant is hard to conjecture Whether that they were all the spiritual Parts of one Universal or one Greater soul if souls may be Parts or Whether distinct products of one such soul either Universitatis or hujus systematis or Whether One Relatively and Politically by making up one society or Whether one because emaning from one spring or Causa prima The two last are certain The two first are far otherwise § 25. 7. If he could prove that there is one First Best Universal created Intelligence or super-Angelical Spirit which God made the chief of all second causes by which he created and governeth all the rest and that this is Christ in his second Nature we would not deny but that Christ as the Mediator of Nature as Mr. Sterry calleth him is in all other Creatures as the Cause is in the being of the effect But it would not follow that the Essence of Christ or this Universal Intelligence is any Constitutive Cause or part of each creature For as God causeth them by Creative Emanation and not as a Constitutive part of them so we should rather hold that under God by a Power of producing Entities received from him this Universal Spirit did the same in a subordinate second place § 26. But his Opinions which I am now most concerned to renounce are those about Gods Moral Government his Laws Justice our free-will sin guilt and Gods Redemption Judgement and Punishment of man all which I think he much subverteth § 27. And I. I take the root of his error to be
first giveth all creatures what they have and next faileth them and leaveth them in darkness as the Sun setteth and then Rising again revolveth all things into his original pure spirituality like the revolution of day and night Summer and Winter it is sure another thing than the Scripture describeth it which maketh it a noble part of that Sapiential frame of Moral Government which some despise § 37. IX But let it be noted that we hold that as the Almighty Father is the glorious Creator Motor and Life of Nature and the Eternal Wisdom Word and Son the Glorious Ordinator Rector and Redeemer so the Eternal Love and the Holy Ghost is the final Perfecter of believers even of Gods Elect and that this Sanctification and proficiency is by more than Moral Sapiential Regiment even by the Real shedding abroad Gods Love upon the soul or by a Quickning Illuminating felicitating Communication of Divine Life and Light and Love which yet maketh not the Sapiential Regiment vain § 38. And as to Free-will I further say that we are far from holding that it is a state of man in which he is Above God or Independent and as a God to himself or that God is any way a defective or idle as they call it Spectator of mans sins or free acts But that this rank and state of free agents is Gods own wisely-chosen work in which he is delighted And that he doth truly attain his ends in all § 39. Therefore as Mr. Sterry magnifieth the harmony which aâ—â—seth from Moral Good and Evil as designed and necessitated by God so we first admire the harmony which ariseth from Natural and free agents and their works which must not be dishonoured and left out § 40. And more than so we doubt not but all Gods works are perfect it being their perfection to be suited to his own will And the difference between us and Mr. Sterry Dr. Twisse c. is not Whether God be Glorious in all his works or they be perfect For we say that though mans sin be found upon Gods works and that sin be none of his works nor any means properly so called of Pleasing or Glorifying him nor at all willed or caused by him but hated and punished yet he loseth none of his complacency or glory by it but notwithstanding its malignity shineth gloriously in the perfection of all his works § 41. Yea more we say that men sin under his Disposing power and that he will make use of their evil unto Good and sin shall become an occasion of that Glory to God as sickness to the Physicion of which it is no Cause or proper Means nor of it self condâ—ceth thereunto Yea and that no Act as an Act how sinful soever is done but by Gods causation as he is the fountain of nature and prime Motor Yea more that all the Effects and Consequents of sin that are not sin it self are under the Causal Government and disposal of God who will attain his Ends in all § 42. Therefore we differ but in this Whether God get not all that glory which Mr. St. floridly describeth notwithstanding sin or on supposition of it as barely permitted negatively but with a Decree or Volition of all the good consequents occasioned by it rather than by sin it self as a willed designed effect of his own necessitating Negations and in the positive part of the acts as circumstantiated of his determining premotion Whether mans permitted sin be any of Gods works And whether Gods glory be not rather non obstante peccato and also by occasion of it supposed to be mans work only and by all the good consequents caused by God than by the sin it self as a Means conducible or a Cause § 43. For we deny not that God could have prevented all sin if he had so resolved and yet we believe not that such a permission is equivalent to a necessitating Motion or Privation as Mr. Sterry would perswade us To make a creature no better than such as can do good if he will and can be willing with a decree to make many willing is much different from making the creature bad and then condemning him to Hell for being so as an act of Justice Yet we doubt not but the Divine Light will shortly give us all a fuller discovery of that which shall vindicate the Wisdom Goodness and Justice of God in his Government of man than yet the wisest mortals have § 44. Either you suppose that God doth all that he can do or not If yea then you suppose that he cannot nor ever could make any one Creature Worm or Grass more or less greater or smaller sooner or later or otherwise than he doth which few will believe It being not for want of Power but through perfection of Wisdom and freedom of Will that he doth no more But if God can make one creature more or one Motion more and yet doth not I ask Whether you dare call that non-agency by the name of Idleness or deficiency If not why should the Non-causation of sinful Volitions in specie morali or the leaving free-will to its own determination be so called Not to make more creatures or more physical motion or not to give more Grace and Glory is as much a non-agency as not to determine a sinning Will. § 45. As to all Mr. Sterry's Reasons against Free-will they are so Rhetorically rather than Logically delivered that I think it not meet to trouble the Reader with any further answer of them or to suppose them to have any more strength than those that other men plainlier have delivered § 46. I conclude with this repeated profession that I am fully satisfied that all the rest of the Controversies about Grace and Nature and Predestination and Redemption as they stand between the Synod of Dort and the Arminians are of no greater moment than I have oft expressed in this Book nor worthy any of that stir and contention which men that sufficiently difference not Words Methods and Matter have made to the mischievous injury of the Church And that the true life of all the remaining difficulties is in this controversie between the defenders of Necessary Predetermination and of Free-will that is not What free-will sinners have left but Whether ever in Angels or Innocent man there was such a thing as a will that can and ever did determine it self to a Volition or Nolition in specie morali without the predetermining efficient necessitating premotion of God as the first Cause or as Hobbes speaketh Whether ever a created will did act without a necessitating premotion And whether to will and to will freely be all one And whether the will except as to the kind of action be not as much necessitated to will or not will as my Pen to write or not write are we call not its acts Contingent or free either because they are what they are Volitions or though Ignorance because we see not the moving Causes § 47. And if
What man can do further opened p. 114. Crim. 3. Holding free will to good p. 121. A manifold Liberty evinced by many Questions p. 122. Whether any that use it not have liberty to believe p. 124 125. Crim. 4. That men are not dead in sin p. 125. Crim. 5. That man is not meerly passive in his first conversion p. 126. Crim 6. None damned for Adam's sin only p. 128. The seventh days Conference Of Sufficient and Effectual Grace Crim. 1. Of the Armin. Denying sufficient Grace they damn men for meer Impossibilities p. 130. Had Adam sufficient Grace p. 132. Of the 13th Artic. of the Church of England p. 133. How God willeth mens Salvation p. 134. Crim. 2. Making Grace unresistible p. 136. How far they do so The eighth days Conference Crim. 1. Of the Calv. They assert universal sufficient Grace p. 139. Queries evincing Common Grace p. 139. The greatness of their error that deny it p. 141. Doth this satisfie while God that can save men will not p. 143. What Grace and what sufficient Grace is p. 145. Whether the same measure of Grace called meerly sufficient be ever effectual p. 148. What the Grace in that question is Whether a vis impressa Of determination by God and by the Intellect p. 151 152 153. Crim. 2. By Grace they mean Nature as Pelagius p. 156. What Nature is Grace how far supernatural p. 158. Crim. 3. Making Grace but a Moral swasion p. 160. Physical operation what p. 162. Crim. 4. They hold faith to be acquired and not infused p. 162. What acquired and infused means p. 163. Dr. Twisse about this noted p. 167 c. Crim. 5. They hold Grace given according to works or preparation p. 169. Crim. 6. They make the Will to have no sin or Grace p. 171. Crim. 7. They make Grace resistible p. 172. The case further opened p. 173 174 c. Is there any universal second cause of Grace under God as the Sun in Nature which worketh resistibly and God by it ad modum recipientis p. 177. Christ how far such ib. Crim. 8. They make mans Will to make himself to differ c. p. 180. What differing is what the causes as to believing ib. How far God worketh by universal Grace p. 185. Who made thee to differ opened p. 186. Crim. 9. Man's will maketh Gods Grace effectual and not Gods p. 186. Whence Grace is effectual p. 189. Differencing Grace what p. 192. It not all the question of the Divine Impress p. 193 194. The case summarily opened p. 196. The ninth days Conference Of Perseverance The Arm. Crim. 1. They make fear and care to be folly p. 198. Crim. 2. They cherish all sin p. 200. Crim. 3. Their Doctrine is uncomfortable on pretence of confuting p. 200 201. Both sides charge each other thus A middle way about Perseverance avoiding both p. 204. Crim. 4. They dishonour Gods Image making heinous sin consistent with it p. 204. Crim. 5. Immodesty and singularity contradicting all the ancient Church p. 206. Crim. 6. Contradicting express Scripture p. 207. The tenth days Conference The Calv. Criminations about Perseverance Crim. 1. They overthrow the comfort of believers that deny Perseverance p. 208. What comfort may be had by such p. 211. Crim. 2. and 3. They make God or his Covenant mutable p. 212. Crim. 4. They deny the Promise of Perseverance p. 213. Crim. 5. They infer a second Regeneration p. 214. Crim. 6. They go against the Doctrine of Augustine c. p. 215. The just extenuation of this last controversie p. 215. The eleventh days Conference with a Libertine called Antinomian vindicating sound Doctrine against divers accusations Chap. 1. Whether we must call men to come to Christ without Preparation p. 220. Chap. 2. Of denying our own Righteousness p. 223. Personal Righteousness necessary p. 224. Of Reward and worthiness or Merit p. 225. The truth largely opened about merit and reward p. 230. Reasons for it p. 232 c. Ch. 3. Whether our own Righteousness conduce to our Justification Or we are any way justified by it p. 238. Ch. 4. Whether the Gospel be a Law of Christ p. 243. Ch. 5. Whether Christ and not we be the only party in Covenant with God p. 245. Ch. 6. Whether the new Covenant have conditions p. 247. Ch. 7. Whether justifying faith be a believing in Christ as Teacher Ruler c. or only a receiving his Righteousness p. 251. Ch. 8. Of Faiths Justifying Instrumentally p. 251. Ch. 9. Whether Faith it self be Imputed for Righteousness p. 252. Ch. 10. Whether it be a change in God to justifie the before unjustified p. 256. Ch. 11. Whether a justified man should fear becoming unjustified ibid. Ch. 12. Of mans power to believe and our calling the unregenerate to Duty p. 258. Ch. 13. Of the witness of the Spirit and of Evidences of Justification p. 261. The Conclusion The twelfth days Conference with a learned Lutherane Whether the difference among Christians about Merit be as great as some think it p. 263. Some Protestants and the late Lecturers Reasons against Merit proposed p. 265. and the case opened Of the Doctrine of the Council of Trent p. 266 c. Of condignity p. 267. The Doctrine of Vega Scotus Waldensis Eckius Marsilius Bellarmine Greg. Armin. Durand Brugens Cusanus Stapleton Bradwardine Soto Bonaventure st Clara and all the Schoolmen as he judgeth Carthus Cassander p. 270. Holiness and Glory a greater gift than Glory without holiness p. 271. Aquinas judgment His confusion occasioned by his opinion that the new Law is that which is in the heart and not written viz. the Spirit as the Quakers hold ib. Vasquez denyeth Commutative Justice in God with all the School Doctors 17 of them cited He confuteth it even as to Christ He denyeth proper Distributive Justice also in God citing Bonavent Scotus Durand Palud Gabriel Alexand. Aquin. c. p. 272 c. Aquinas sense in Carbo's words p. 275. Many Schoolmen deny as much as Legal or Governing Justice in God Ruiz citeth for this Argent Bassol Suarez Pesant Suarez saith God's promises are but naked Assertions declaring his Will Durand that promises signifie not obligation Greg. Armin. That the Crown is no Debt but of free Ordination Marsil That God is no Debtor but free Giver Scotus Major Ricard deny God to be a Debtor by his promise but hold that Merits are such by Promise Ruiz saith against Suarez That Promises are more than Assertions but that God's obligation is to himself p. 276. Medina against Meriting Remission p. 277. Against Preparation p. 277. Contarenus judgment Fisher's of Rochester p. 278. The words of Tolet p. 280. The thirteenth days Conference with a Sectary Of the great errors sin and danger which many Ignorant Professors fall into on the pretence of abhorring and avoiding Popery p. 283. The sins of such as Calumniate sound Teachers as favouring Popery p. 285. Errors vended by some Protestants through an injudicious opposition to
but God himself 3. That Understanding and Will are not univocal terms spoken of God and of man nor of the same formal Conception And 4. That our formal Conception of Understanding and Will is only of them as they are in man and not as in God and so this to us is the prius significatum 5. And therefore that God doth not understand or will in our sence formaliter but only eminenter 6. And lastly That Mortals know not just how Gods eminent Intellection and Volition differ from the formal in Man All this you must grant me or be singular and ignorant A. All this is past denial but proceed to the Case B. Do you differ from us de eventu whether there be a Hell or yet of the number of those that are damned A. No or if we do about the Case of Heathens that belongeth not to this Point B. Do you differ from us about the Cause of mens Damnation We say that God damneth no man but for Sin yea for Sin impenitently continued in to the last against all the mercy which tended to their Cure A. So far we are agreed But it 's not the cause of damnation which I speak of but the cause of the Decree B. Do you not hold that what ever God doth he willeth to do A. Yes God doth nothing without a will to do it at least consequently B. Do you think that God willeth any thing to day which he willed not yesterday and so from eternity A. No we do not with Vostius make God mutable B. Good still you grant then that God damneth men that he damneth them for sin that he doth it willingly that he willed it from eternity And do you think that from eternity here was any thing but God A. No. B. Then can that which is not be a cause was there any thing but God himself to be the Cause of Gods Will from eternity A. Not in esse reali but there was in esse cognito B. So now the game begins Thus the World is cheaâ—ed and troubled by Logical Notions and meer words Is that esse cognitum any thing or nothing If nothing it is no Cause If any thing is it God or a Creature It can be no Creature because it is eternal If God you do but say That God caused his own Will A. It is Gods fore-knowledge of Sin which causeth his Decree or Will B. 1. Even fore-knowledge it self say the Schools is but the same with knowledge and spoken say they but to the respect and sense of man There being neither priâ—s vel postoriâ—s before or after in eternity But this I now insist not on 2. It is commonly taken for blasphâ—my to talk of a Cause of God or any thing in God If Gods Will be his Essence it hath no Cause He causeth not himself being no Effect 3. If this were so as you say yet still you make but God himself the Cause of his own Will by his knowledge * Vasquer in 1. Thâ— d. 91. saith of the Cause of Gods Decree Divinâ— voluntatis non solum nullam esse causam finalem motivam per modum objecti sed etiam nullum esse objectum creatum quod possit Deo esse ratio volendi aliud sed solam suam bonitatem Posse tamen unum creatum objectum esse rationem causam alterius italicet Deus non velit unum objectum creatum propter aliud velle tamen unam rem creatam esse propter aliam quia â—na est causa altâ—rius Non ergâ—â—â—â—â— mus an aliud â—â—â—â— ratio â—â—tiva Deo per modum â—â—â—â— ut velit nos prâ—dâ—stinare praeter suam bonitatem nihil enim esse potest Id. ib. disp 91. c. 4. Respectu voluntatis Dei nihil creatum est id cujâ—s gratia ratio nolendi aliquid sed propter quod câ—tera esse vult Deus For Siâ— fâ—re-seen is no Sin and nothing is no Cause so that you your self resolve all into God And indeed what can be a cause of the first Cause or any thing in him Use not tergiversation and vain words now and tell me what you have to say A. A thing not existent but fore-seen may be â— moral Cause though not a physical and so fore-seen Sin may be to God B. 1. Yet dare you talk of a Cause of God There is nothing in God but God To be a cause of his Will is commonly said to be a cause of his Essence And shall so base a thing aâ— Sin cause God 2. We are still at the cheating Game of playing with â—rbitrary Notions What mean you by a moral Cause If a true cause of moral Being that 's one thing If any thing that is not physically or properly but by moral imputation only a cause of any event that 's another thing The first you dare not own as if any thing which is nothing Sin not existent were a Cause of Gods Will. The second Cause is called Cause metaphorica It is really no Cause but that for which the Agent shall have such praise or dispraise as belongeth to one that â—â—â—â— equivocally a Cause 3. Therefore if you use not the word Cause equivocally your rule is false Nothing is no moral Cause You will instance in good destrâ—d in fine nondum existente c. But I answer you Good and amiable are Accidents or Modes which are never found but in an existent entity or subject A negatione subjecti ad negationem accidentis à negatione est secundi Adjecti ad negationem est tertii valet argumentum That which is not is not good or amiable Therefore that which existeth not is no Cause But if we will let go the toy and come to the matter It is no other good but the desire of good or the apprehension of the â—â—â—â—rity of good which causeth so that all the Cause is in the Agent 4. The common reason of man must acknowledge that when any mâ—n saith That sin which is no sin and nothing as fore-seen is the moral cause of Gods Will he must needs mean no real cause Because to be a cause is tertium Adjectum and presupposeth to be That which is not is not a cause much less of God or of his Will A. I can shew you that you overthrown the Christian Religion by your Logick For if this hold true then the fore sight of Christ's Incarnation and Sufferings c. was no moral true cause of Gods Will to pardon Sin and save Souls to â—hose under the Promise before the Incarnation B. Your diversion turneth us from the matter but advantageth you not at all Would you bring it to deny so evident a Principle as this that nothing can do nothing nor cause nothing It was not Christ's Body or actual Suffering not yet existent that caused Gods Will tâ— pardon Sinners Nor had Gods Will any proper cause But seeing God willed one thing to be the means of another he willed that
Christ's Incarnation and Death should in the fulness of time demonstrate his Justice and make it agreeable to the ends of his Government to dispence with the Law of Innocency and to pardon Sin And therefore not Christ's Death it self but God's Decree of the Death of Christ Incarnate was the cause of the Promise and of the New Covenant made with Adam and of the Salvation of Believers then Which Will or Decree is called by some the interpellation or undertaking of the eternal Word A. But at least Sin fore-seen is causa sine qua non B. Call it by what name you please as long as you confess it to be no Cause for causa sine qua non is called Causa fatua and is none But it is not Sin which is Causa sine qua non for it is no sin from eternity A. It is the futurity of sin that is Causa sine qua non B. Yet more notions what is futurity any thing or nothing nothing certainly For quoad ens it is terminus diminuens and nothing is no cause But it is Gods knowledge that Sin will be which is to be called the Cause of Gods Decree as sine qua non if any be But I must deal most about futurition with the Calvinists when I come to save you from Dr. Twisse his Ferula A. I pray you then open me the matter as it is your self B. I will make your Cause better than you have made it But not by making other mens worse but by opening the reconciling truth 1. I shall tell you in what sense Gods Will and Decrees may and must be said Predestinatio nihil ponit in praedestinato inquit Aquin. 1. q. 23. a. 2. to have an extrinsick cause without change in God 1. Know therefore that Gods Essence is his Will but not as Essence To say that God is God and that God willeth this or that are not terms of the same signification 2. Gods Will is his Essence denominated from some amiable good as the Object and so there is ever quid respectivum in the notion of Will 3. As God willeth himself the Act being perfectly immanent his Will is called himself much more properly than his Will of things extrinsick which is ever either effectively or at least objectively transient Because it is God that willeth and that is willed or loved which made many Ancients say That this was the third Person in the Trinity 4. But as God willeth things ad extra though it is his Essence that so willeth them yet it is unfit to say simply that this Will is God e. g. that to will Peter's Salvation is God because the name Will here includeth the thing willed 5. And therefore when we speak of Gods Will in the universal notion as abstracted from all particular Objects and Acts it is less inconvenient to say simply that this Will is God than when we speak of his Will in act ad extra By this time you may see that though Gods Will as his Essence hath no cause yet his Will as denominated extrinsecally from the Object may have some kind of Cause that is * Alvarez himself saith that by a Cause he meaneth also any objective condition or reason of the Act. Objective which is quasi materia actus and the terminus sine quo non that is Gods Will is not denominated a complacency in Christ existent or in Peter regenerate * This is all that Ruiz his Reasons prove De Vol. Dei disp 115. Sect. 4. p. 102 Who saith that there is more than extrinsick denomination Et relatio rationis â—um realis formalitas But he doth but shew by his quodammodo that he knoweth not what to say or his understanding a seeing that the World was good before any of these things did exist So that by extrinsick denomination without any change in God he may and should be said de novo to know things to be existent to be past to will things as existent with complacency or will them with displicency But not to will the futurity of mens damnation de novo but yet his Will of the futurity of mens damnation hath several degrees of the Objective Cause from whence it is denominated As in esse cognito the person who is the Object is in order of nature first a man a subject and then a Sinner and a Despiser of Mercy and then a damnable Sinner And so these are indeed conditions in the Object or Causae sine quibus non or Objective material-constituent causes not in themselves but the fore-sight of them not of Gods Will as his Essence nor of his Will as a Will but of his Will as extrinsecally denominated a Decree to damn Judas e. g. because no otherwise is Judas an Object capable of giving such an extrinsick denomination to Gods Will. II. Both you and I hold and must hold that God decreeth to damn all that shall be damned * Vasquez in 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 3. p. 709. Conclusio quod Deus aliquos reproâ—at est de fide constat â—nim ex scriptura multos a Deo reprobari Vid. Ruâ—z de prâ—de fin Tract 2. per totum But it is false that we hold that he doth it without any respect to fore-seen sin For 1. He fore-seeth this Sin as the only meritorious cause of their damnation what he doth in time that is it which he decreed to do from eternity But in time he damneth no man but for Sin therefore from eternity he decreed to damn no man but for Sin For sin I say as the cause of damnation which Dr. Twisse doth frequently profess 2. And though this Sin can be no proper efficient cause of Gods Volition or Decree yet it is a presupposed necessary qualification in the Object as fore-seen in the Mind of God and so as aforesaid is an Objective Cause as fore-seen III. The execution of Justice and glorification of it and Gods Holiness thereby is good and fit to be the Object of Gods Volition or Decree But in the word Reprobation is in most mens sense included much which we hold not which is to be opened further anon IV. And as to the absoluteness of Gods Decree to damn those that are dammed I think you will not deny it your self supposing them to be fore-seen finally impenitent Sinners God doth not only will that all the finally impenitent shall be damned nor only that e. g. Judas shall be damned if he be finally impenitent But also that Judas as fore-seen finally impenitent shall certainly be damned So that when the condition is fore-seen in the Recipient or Object it is no longer a meer conditional Decree but absolute supposing that condition In all this we are agreed The second Crimination A. II. But that 's not all But you hold That God eternally decreed mens sin yea all the sin of Men and Devils some say That he decreed to predetermine men insuparably to the forbidden Act and
the moderatest that he * Vid. Episcopii Resp ad qu. 64. qu. 33. pag. 32. â—bi dicit Deum decrevisse ut Judaei Christum e medio tolleren ex praescientia quod id liberâ— voluntate facturi essent atque inde praedictiones certas natas esse decreed the event that Sin should come to pass ipso permittente quamvis non efficiente or at least that he decreed his permission of it B. I. The first sort are those few whom I in the beginning renounced of whom the Dominicans and good Dr. Twisse and Rutherford his Follower de providentia are the chief I easily confess to you that God made the Law and God made man and God maketh the Objects and God causeth the Act as a natural Act in genere by a natural general concourse And if it could be also proved that God were the chief efficient Determiner of the Will and that by necessitation to this Act or Object comparatively rather than to that e. g. that David willed the Acts which were Murder and Adultery I could never deny that God is the chief Author of the Sin For the formal reason of Sin is Relative viz. Its disconformity to the Law of God And the Relation resulteth without any new Act or Agent Posito fundamento omni absoluto And neither God nor Man do or can do more to cause the Relation And Dr. Twisse and Rutherford so far saw this that the up-shot of all their Vindication is 1. That God causeth not sin as sin but as a means to his Glory 2. That God is under no Law as we are and therefore can be no Author of Sin But to the first I answer It 's one thing to will Sin as Sin and another thing to cause Sin as Sin We charge them not with inferring that God willeth Sin as Sin but Nullus est Catholicus qui ignoret peccatum non esse effectum praedestinationis etiam si praedestinatus occasionem ex eo saepius capiat suae salutis Nam cum Deus causa peccati esse nequeat efficitur ut Deus peccatum nulla ratione praedestinare possit Neque actus ipse peccati secundum esse naturale non est effectus praedestinationis quamvis sit hoc modo effectus divinae voluntatis Vasquez in Tho. 1. q. 23. cap. 2. disp 93. if he will it and cause it for another end he causeth the formal nature of Sin that we may not play with the ambiguity of Quatenus and that 's as much as man doth For Sinners do not all if any will sin as sin under this formal notion as it is a breach of the Law of God and displeaseth him but as it bringeth them some seeming good And by doing evil for that good they are Sinners To the second we do not charge the Dominicans with making God a Sinner But with making him the chief cause of the sin of man even in its form II. But this is nothing to the Calvinists in general Therefore I say that your selves hold the same that they do in this point Q. 1. Do not all the Jesuites and Arminius hold That God is the Decreer of what he is the Author of And that God is the Author of the Act as an Act natural in the general See but Rob. Baronius his Metaphysicks and Bellarmine whom he followeth A. That is nothing to the moral specification of the Act. B. And Dr. Twisse hath oft enough told you where Arminius saith That God would have Ahab to fill up the measure of his Sin A. That is not that he willed the sin but that Ahab having made himself wicked God decreed not to stop him but let him go on B. Either you mean that the Object of Gods Decree was but his own permission as the Arminians use to say or else that it was the Sin it self matter and form permitted not because it is sin or evil for so man oft willeth it not at least but as an occasion of Gods Glory Arminius his words import the latter And then you go as high as Dr. Twisse or Rutherford But if you say that it was but a rash word of Arminius which you stand not to to make plain and short work with you I am so far from being liable to your charge that I charge you as presumptuous if not erroneous in saying that God decreeth or willeth to permit Sin And I assert 1. That God doth not Decree the form of Sin as Sin 2. Nor yet the event of that form for any good end For Ut peccatum eveniat is but peccatum futurum and what is it to decree Sin but to decree that it shall be Nor 3. Hath he decreed that this Act which is the Sin shall come to pass in its comparative circumstantiated state from whence it is that Sin in its form resulteth And so Augustines saying so much decantate by Dr. Twisse and others * As Bradwardine who also tells us That if God damn the Innocent his Will is the rule of justice and equity But I think they that so describe his Justice do rather think that none are damned than that the Innocent are or may be as an act of Justice whatever a meer Proprietor may do is not found that nothing cometh to pass but what God willeth either effecting it or permitting it It cometh to pass without Gods willing it or decreeing it so that he permitteth it but decreeth not that it shall come to pass Not that it is against his contrary absolute Decree but as Lombard from other places in Austin telleth you plainly God neither willeth that it shall be because it is sin nor properly and simply willeth that it shall not be for his Will is not overcome 4. Yea he cannot be proved to decree his own permission Because to permit is but not to hinder which is nothing but a negation And we have no ground to feign that God hath Volitions or Decrees of nothing or of negations So that I say that Sin cometh to pass without Gods Decree of the event or of his permission Though not without his Decree of the good which cometh by it of which more when I speak to the other extream And of this also more anon The third Crimination A. III. You make God necessitate mens sin and damnation by your negative decrees as well as others by their positive For you hold That no man can believe and repent but such as God decreeth to give Faith and Repentance to And no man can do any more good than God decreeth that he shall do And some say that God decreeth Not to give men any more Grace than he giveth them which is a Decree objectively negative de non dando And you and others say That he doth not Decree to give them more And so as a stone is not culpable for not flying no more are Sinners not elected for not believing and obeying God * Note what Vasquez granteth in 1. Tho. q. 23. a. 5.
of all true profit to us no more true natural entity in my choosing the forbidden one than in my choosing the commanded one To hate God and love sin hath no more natural entity than to love God and hate sin To speak an Oath or Lye than to speak Truth and Holily To will a forbidden Act than to Nill it and to will a good one So that it is no deifying man to make him a first cause of that which hath no natural entity that is of an Act not as an Act but comparatively as rather this way than that way exercised And Dr. Twisse hence saith That moral specification of Acts is no true specification of them And it 's true that it is not a Physical specification 2. If you say that we have a Liberty ad exercitium as well as of specification or of Contradiction as well as of Contrariety Even to will or not will do or not do And in this case to do or will when forbidden is more than not to do or will I answer 1. The Soul is naturally an active vital power and it is as natural to it to be in act as to a stone to lie still And the Cartesians will tell you that Action needeth no more cause than Rest But I rather say that God never forbiddeth Action in general to the Soul but only this or that Action upon this or that Object at an undue time So that no man ever sinned by meer Action as such whether Vital Intellectual or Volitive The Action which God commandeth he willeth The Action which he forbiddeth is but this or that upon an undue Object Adam had this liberty of contradiction to will or not to will this particular Act of eating the forbidden fruit but not to will or not will simply Now for Adam to will to eat that fruit instead both of nilling it and of willing to please God by nilling or refusing it had no more natural entity in it than if he had not willed it but willed somewhat else at the same time 3. An Action it self is not properly Res but modus Rei and if any should say that God is not able to make a Creature that supposing God the cause of its Power continued shall be the first cause of its own Act or exercise of that Power he saith that which no mortal man can prove The Glory of Gods Works is their likeness to Himself And as Intellection and Free-will are parts of this likeness we know not just how far God can go in such Communications I see no contradiction in it to say that a faculty maintained by God in its natural force with necessary though not determining concurse can determine it self without any more causation And if it be not a Contradiction God can do it 4. But this is all prevented by considering that mans Soul is never out of Act. It s active force is never idle though it act not always the same way nor with the same extension or intension so that to reduce it into act is not to reduce it from a meer potentia in actum but from a power acting one way or slowly to act another way or more intensly 5. Yea this is all answered by considering that as I said while God continueth the Soul in its nature it continueth a naturally active force or power inclined essentially to activity So that though I say that Action needeth more cause than non-action that is here done in God still causeth the active disposition But supposing that upheld I say that there is oft more need of other causality or strength to keep it from Action than to cause it to act Whatever the world talketh against Durandus they are never well able to answer à Dola though in sense they that factiously oppose him mean the same as he And if a Rock hanged in the Air by something that might be cut off or removed as a threed supposing God to continue the nature of it and all things else there is more strength and causality needful to hold it from falling than to make it fall when the threed is cut It was a work of Gods Power to keep the fire from burning the three Confessors Dan. 3. and the Lions from devouring Daniel Dan. 6. and the Sea from flowing on the Israelites and the Sun from moving in Joshuah's fight 6. And yet consider that it is not so much as an Action which is but modus rei that is in question but only the comparative circumstantiating of that action so that it is but modus modi rei 7. And lastly The denial of the matter of our power and liberty in this I have else-where proved overthroweth the certainties and fundamentals of all our Religion Now whether any man should deny all our Religion and certain necessary Truths for such a metaphysical uncertain notion as this that God is not able to make a Creature that can cause a modus modi in determining its active nature to this Object rather than to that without Divine predetermination let sobriety be judge C. But thus you make man the specifier of his good acts without Gods determination as well as of the evil B. Jansenius is in the right in this we have more need of Divine help to the willing and doing of good than of evil We cannot do evil without his natural support and concurse But we cannot do good especially spiritual saving good unless we have moreover his medicinal special Grace To the specifying of good actions there must ever concur Gods natural help Gods gracious help and mans free-will or self-determination It is not two or three determinations of the Will which are made by these several Causes but one determination So that under God man is the specifying determiner of his Will to good or else he were not a Believer nor rewardable or punishable And that he cannot determine his Will to good as well as to evil proceedeth not from the Original nature of the Will for with that such a determination was consistent but from its Pravity or Corruption But how Grace and Free-will concur is after to be handled C. Dr. Twisse Vindic. Grat. lib. 2. p. 190. Vol. minoris hath a full digression 4 to prove that God willeth that sin shall come to pass he permitting it and saith Nostri Theologi affirmanâ— Arminiani â—ontificii negant * This Digression of Dr. Twisse is answered in the first Book His Friend Alvarez de Aux li. 11. disp 110. p. 442 c. discusseth the Qu. An detur ex parte nostra causa reprobationis and concludeth that Reprobatio qua Deus statuit non dare aliquibus vitam aeternam et permittere peccatum eorum non est conditionata sed absoluta nec praesupponit in Deo praescientiam demeritorum ipsius reprobi 2. In Angelis qui ceciderunt nuâ—la datur causa reprobationis ex parte ipsorum quantum ad integrum effectum c. 3. Et ita de reprobatione parvulorum
comparativa ita de adultis 4. Non solum comparative sed etiam absolute loquendo nulla datur causa reprobationis quantum ad omnes effectus Where note that he granteth that there is in man a cause of Reprobation as to some effects viz. punishment For by a cause he meaneth any prerequisite condition For no doubt there is no efficient cause of any thing in God And all his stress is laid on this that the permission of the first sin is the first effect of Reprobation and this permission hath no cause in man Ergo Reprobation quoad omnes effectus hath no cause in man But the truth is 1. A man may put such a sence on the word Reprobation as to include what he please But it 's usually taken for Gods Decree to damn men and to deprive them of somewhat necessary to their salvation and so is 1. A positive Act as a Volition 2. And privative objectively and 3. Some unfitly extend it to that which is objectively negative and not privative 4. And some most ineptly extend it to that which is negatio actus no Act that is to nothing And so a man that will play with words may say that 1. Gods non-agere nonâ—igere is an Act. 2. That his non-impedire is an effect which is nothing and therefore no effect And Alvarez utterly faileth iâ— this proof either that non-eligere is an Act or permittere vel non impedire an eâ—â—ect or that it is fitly called Reprobation which hath â—â— privation but a negation for its Object e. g. that Judas shall not be an Angel nor iâ—â—eccabilâ— but have natural free-will is no act of his Reprobation And so of the permission of the first sin Arminius himself exam Perâ—ins pag. 568. saith Voleâ—et Deus Israelem punire Achabum mensuram scelerum suorum implere Propria â—mmediata adâ—quata causa cur permiserit ut Achaâ— iâ—â—â— cadem perpetraret est illa quam dixi mensâ—ra sâ—elerum implenâ—â— erat â—â—â—â— Dâ—â—â—â—â—tra peccatum hominis per aliam â—â—em Nabothum ad se evocare Which Dr. Twisse useth through all his Writings against him ad hominem in stead of argument â—â—-thinks this concession should seem enough which is too much And I conjecture that Arminius wrote it by over-sight and woâ—ld have said that God permitted Ahab to kill Naboth because he would â—â—â—â— him to â—â—â—â— up the measure of his sin making permission the res Voâ—â—ta But all theiâ— assigning Causes of Gods â—â—â—â— are â—â—â—â—â—â—ld God being above all causeâ— B. I wonder not that Dr. Twisse holdeth that God willeth it when he holdeth that he efficiently premoveth and predetermineth the Will to every forbidden act clothed with all its circumstances That which God causeth he must needs will But when he saith Nostri Theologi affirmant he must mean but some few such as Maccovius Spanhemius Rutherford and perhaps Piscator or Beza of his own mind But the generality of Protestants either are against him or meddle not with it He that will read Davenant and such others shall find the difference I remember but few English Divines at all that own it besides the forenamed and Mr. Norton But having written both an answer to this Digression of Dr. Twisse and to his and Alvarez and other mens Doctrine of physical predetermining premotion I may pretermit that here C. But by this they make God an idle Spectator of sin in the World and so deny a great part of his Providence or Works B. 1. This belongeth not directly to the Point of Reprobation but of Gods Works 2. Take heed of such unreverent words of God Who will not hold him guiltless that taketh his Name in vain Dare you reproach God as Idle if he do not all that your shallow thoughts will cut out for him C. The blasphemy is theirs that give the cause by their unsound Doctrine and not mine that do but denominate their consequents B. Let us try that Do you believe that God doth as much as he can do that he made the World as soon as he was able and could have done it no sooner or that he is able to make no one Man or Beast or Plant or Atome more than he hath made nor to do any one action more than he doth C. No I hold no such thing For God is Omnipotent and Free B. I pray you then study it and tell me if God be not to be blasphemed as Idle for such a total Non-agency or Free-suspension of his own Acts as to all such possibles why should you call him Idle if by the same Wisdom and Free-will he only suspend some degree of his co-operation with man in the case of sinning And if God freely decree that man shall be made a free Agent able by Gods common generical concurse as the cause of nature to determine or suspend his own Volitions without any predetermining efficiency of God If God will delight himself in making such a Creature will you dare to say that he is Idle because he moveth him not in another manner you will not so reproach a Watch-maker for not moving the Watch all day with his finger C. I confess I cannot answer that But how then is God the Governor of the World if so much sin be done without his Will and Operation B. The Work of a Governor as such is only 1. By Legislation to make the Subjects Duty 2. And by Judgment to try and decide the case of each Subject whether he do that Duty 3. And to see to the execution of that Judgment But not to be the determining cause of all the Subjects Volitions and Actions C. It is so with man because he can do no more but not with God B. Indeed God governeth all meer Naturals and Bruits by physical motion as Engins are moved as a Clock or Watch by natural necessitation And so he doth the meer naturals of man As his Concoction Pulse circulation of Blood generation in the Womb c. But God having made man an Intellectual free Agent ruleth him as such agreeably to his nature even by moral Agency by Laws and Judgment And this is that Regency of which we speak If you believe not that God is thus the moral Ruler of Mankind or King of the World you deny him to be God and overthrow all Religion and Morality C. But what say you to all the Texts that tell us that God willed and caused that which wicked men did as in the case of Pharaoh Sihon Rehoboam Absolom the death of Christ and many others B. One of the greatest over-sights of them that thus Object is that they distinguish not between the sin and the effect of the sin or the forbidden Will and Act of the Sinner as of him and the reception of this Act in passo in the recipient God can many ways concur to the causing of the reception and the effect without causing the Volition or Act as Agents by a specifying determination Especially
diversity of quantity quality distance c. But this diversity is nothing besides the said absolute quantity quality distance c. But I must not write a Logick for you I am by this much remembred that as David saith man walketh in a vain shew or Image when multitudes of nothings go for somethings and fill up so much of his thoughts and life and constitute so much of his Learning which he glorieth in C. But you have said nothing yet of the fifth which is Modus Entis And futurition may be reduced to that B. A true modus entis is quid absolutum reale and the same that we call an Accident And Gassendus chooseth to call Accidents Modes or Qualities And they are not really distinct from the ens cujus modi sunt if they be intrinsical Modes or Accidents as quantity quality action c. But they are small inadequate conceptions of the thing modified not conceptions of its constitutive chief denominating part but yet conceptions of quid entis so that an entire perfect conception of the thing would comprehend or include the conception of the Mode or Accident So that they that deride the name of Pars accidentalis as put for Accidens speak not always so good sense as they think they do But such Accidents or Modes as are extrinsical to the thing as Cloaths to the Body Servants Lands Riches Honours are not properly Modes and Accidents at all but Adjuncts C. Apply this to the point in question of Futurity B. If Futurity as is said be an eternal Being it is God If nothing it hath no cause If it be called Quid medium the very Quid is a contradiction to it To begin backward 1. If it be Modus Entis from eternity it must be Modus Dei For there was no ens ab aeterno but God If it be Modus Dei it is Dens For all in God is God 2. If it be Relatio it is absoluti alicujus relatio If so either of some real Being or of nothing If of a Being from eternity it must be a Relation of God to the thing future in that he either willed or fore-knew â— For nothing was eternal but God And if so that Relation of God to the thing future is something or nothing If something it is God himself and so hath no cause If nothing it is no effect and so hath no â—â—â—â— But if it be the Relation of nothing viz. of the thing future to an Intellect possible or real that could know it future than it is nothing it self For the Relation of nothing cannot be something a real accident without a real Subject 3. If futurity was from eternity ens Rationis it was Rationis Divinae for there was no created Reason ab aeterno And if so either Aptitudinal or Actual If Actual it was God For all his Idea's and entia rationis for I suppose you one of the bold men that affirm entia rationis to be in God must needs be God himself and so have no cause If Aptitudinal and not yet in mente divina but objecta possibilia either they were something or nothing If something then there was something eternal besides God which is not said by any of us If nothing to call them future signifieth no more but that Gods infinite knowledge extendeth to things that are not as if they were which is true But futurity it self being nothing hath no cause 4. If you say that they are extrinsical Denominations it is something or nothing that is denominated future I know you will say It 's nothing If so quatenus extrinsical to God it was from eternity nothing which you call a Denomination But if you mean the Act of God denominating it was quid reale that is God himself who hath no cause But yet this is the true foundation of the notion Because Gods Knowledge of all things and his Will of all good things extendeth to all intelligible and amiable Objects to all eternity therefore we first justly denominate God to be an Intellect that knoweth what will be and a Will which willeth all that he will do And thence we say that the thing was future from eternity And so from an extrinsick Denomination of Gods Mind and Will we run on to give names to numberless nothings and then talk and write and make Sciences and Disputes of them in our dreams as if they were somethings And this is the work of the fantastical World And then we confound poor Scholars with the names of Entia Intentionalia Species Entia rationis Universalia And with Aristotle Themistius c. say that the Intellect is all things that it knoweth c. O what work have vain notions and be-fooling Philosophy made not only in the World but in the Church and among those that call themselves Orthodox and cry up the sufficiency of the holy Scriptures The notion of Privations I need not here apply C. But things future are future whether any one think of them or not B. And some men will trouble and deceive themselves and others what-ever is said to them It is certain that possible and futurum are termini diminuentes negantes quoad existentiam That which only will be is not Therefore the name signifieth nothing but that the thing will be without any connotation of any cause of it but it implyeth that there is some fundamentum vel ratio which might warrant any perfect existent Intellect to say It will be And there needs no more to that but the eternal perfection of Gods own Intellect But I have said more of this lib. 1. and thefore here will add no more C. But how is it possible for God to fore-know that sin will be unless he first Will or Decree that it shall be by his permission B. I abhor the question and supposition That such worms as we who know not what Gods Intellect or Will is should presume to conclude that he cannot fore-know sin unless we can understand how he fore-knoweth it yea unless it be by a way that a man could fore-know it When it is a wiser way of arguing to say This is the way that man knoweth by and that man can comprehend Ergo it is not like to be the way of Gods fore-knowledge But remember one thing that here you plainly make God to will the form of Sin as well as the matter For is not the form future C. Yes B. And is not Gods Will his Love C. Yes B. And do you not make God then to love the very form of Sin which yet you say that no wicked man loveth C. No It is but the existence of the form that he willeth or loveth B. O excellent distinguishing He willeth not the form of Sin but only willeth that it be or exist The form is the Essence He willeth that the Essence exist but willeth not the Essence which is nothing but as existing But do wicked men will any more or so
peruse the Citations of them in Jansenius and see specially Alex. Al. 2. p. q. 72. numb 3â— a. 3. Aquin. qu. 10 de Potent a. 2. ad 1. ejus sequacem Viguerium Institut c. 3. sect 3. vers 1. Cum plu ibâ—â— aliis Thomistis Bonavent in 2. d. 7. 4. 3. d. 25. q. 2. And the Scotists and some Nominals I have else-where cited Especially Reader if you would see more on the Subject Ripalda nameth you enow Expos Magist l. 2. d. 5. qu. 12. that go several ways But note with Jansenius de Grat. Salv l. 6. c. 37. that the necessity of voluntary acts as Scotas saith is not previous to the Will that the Will should be thought to fall under necessity as impelling it to and fixing it in the act For if it were so Voluntas ageretur non ageret nec staret in tali actu libertas sed est necessitas concomitâ—â—â— it a quod ipsa intelligatur cadere sâ—b voluntate sic quod voluntas propter firmitatem libertatis sua sibi ipsi necessitatem impoâ—it in eliciendo actum in perseverandâ— If we are agreed in all these twenty particulars and that in some of them we are under necessity and in some next to it and in others are under no small dangiâ— and that none of all these denied is the Liberty of Will which you contend for we are very unhappy if we do not all agree of the necessity of Gods Grace and if yet there remain any other sort of Liberty about which we must needs contend I pray you now tell me What Liberty it is that you accuse your Brethren for denying Is it a Liberty to good or unto sin A. Both 1. They make mans Will necessitated to sin and good to be impossible to it And 2. They make Gods Grace to work so irresistibly as to take away the liberty of sinning B. 1. What necessity is it that you mean Is it more than in all that aforesaid your self hath granted 2. And who thinketh that man obeyeth Grace and forbeareth resistance or committeth sin for want of either Power or Liberty O that we could be so happy as to take away our own and other mens Liberty to sin and to resist God and to undo themselves A. Tell me first what Liberty of Will you maintain and then I shall best tell you in what in we differ even as I have told you what Liberty we deny B. The method is convenient I. We grant that we have a Will which is naturally a self-determining Principle and Lord of its own acts able to determine it self with due Objects and helps without extrinsick predetermining physical motion either of God or Creatures II. We grant that this Will hath the command of other faculties respectively that is of some politically as they use to say and indirectly or imperfectly and of others despotically or directly and more perfectly III. We hold that this Will is directly and properly subject to none but God IV. For instance neither Angels or Devils can determine it antecedently to its own self-determination to its hurt though Angels may help it and Devils may tempt it V. No men by the greatest Power or Violence nor by the subtilest Oratory or Deceit can necessitate or predetermine it though they may do much to induce it to self-determination VI. No Objects though they necessitate the sense and appetite and the first apprehension of the Intellect can necessitate the Will to Election or comparative self-determination nor do Objects carry us by necessity as they do the Bruits VII Neither our external or internal senses or imagination can predetermine or necessitate the said elective or comparative Will VIII Though our passions and motions of the Spirits may much molest and hinder the Will they cannot necessarily predetermine it in the said election and comparative acts IX Though the Intellect may direct it to that which it will determine it self to in some cases necessarily ex principiis naturae and in others not necessarily and being it self deceived may mislead it to mischoosings and refusings yet is it not the commander of the Will but the guide as the eye to the Body which causeth us not to go but to go the right way And being it self under the Wills command quoad exercitium doth not efficiently predetermine it nor can necessitate it to sin or misery unless it be first the culpable unnecessitated cause it self X. And as none of these can necessitate the Will originally to evil Acts so much less can they necessitate it to any evil habits or inclinations nor take away those that are good XI I hold that this Free-will is joyned with necessity not constrained but convenient by its nature or inclination 1. In the specification of simple Volition of our own felicity 2. In the specification of simple Volition or Love to sensible good as such 3. In the specification of the Volition of that which is fully perceived to be the only means of our only felicity and to be only good But that it is separated from natural necessity and such necessitation as is before denied 1. In its subjection and love to God as its Creator or first efficient of good 2. In its love to and simple Volition of God as our Ultimate end 3. In the election of any end where divers things are Competitors to be our end besides our felicity whether God or the Creature 4. In the election of means where divers are offered 5. In the exercise of the act of intending our end 6. In the use of the means and commanding the imperate faculties therein XII I hold that this Liberty of the Will is of three sorts though but two are commonly held 1. Contradictionis vel exercitii viz. Velle aut non velle nolle aut non nolle 2. Contrarietatis seu specificationis quoad Actum viz. Velle aut nolle hoc 3. Competitionis vel comparationis i. e. Contrarietatis seu specificationis quoad Objecta viz. Velle aut hoc aut illud nolle aut hoc aut illud vel hoc potius quam illud XIII Out of all these freedoms of the Will it self resulteth the Liberty of the PERSON usually called largely Liberum Arbitrium or Free-choice which is 1. That no man can be compelled to moral good or evil against his Will 2. No man can deserve Rewards or Punishments of God against his Will 3. No man can be happy against his Will nor unhappy unless it be the Cause XIV All this that I have hitherto named is but mans natural liberty as a man which all men have and is part of that common natural Image of God which differenceth us from Bruits and is mentioned Gen. 9. 6. XV. Besides this there is a political or civil Liberty according to which no Man or Angel hath power to command us to sin against God or to cast away our Innocency or Happiness or undo our Souls XVI And God as our Governour
stir up their distast of others B. The question may have three several senses of passiveness as man is considered 1. In his Nature 2. In his Action And therein 1. In the reception of the Divine Influx 2. In the acting thereupon And so the questions are 1. VVhether mans Soul be an active nature or passive matter only 2. VVhether mans Soul be meerly passive in the reception of the Divine Influx ad agendum 3. VVhether mans Soul be meerly passive in its own first act of Faith or Repentance Tell me Are not these three distinct questions And are they not all that you can devise unless you will make another whether we are merly passive in the preparatory part And are you not now ashamed to confess that you need any answer to any one of these three questions I. All the world is agreed save the Hobbists and Somatists and Sadduces that mans Soul is not meer passive nature but is an active nature inclined to Action as passive Elements are to non-action And that when God moveth it he moveth not Earth Water or Air but a Spirit whose nature is self-moving as fire under the first mover II. All the world is agreed that the Soul and all Spirits are not so purely and meerly active as God is but are partly and first passive and that they do and needs must be receptive of the Divine Influx before they can act For all Creatures depend on the first Cause and both Being Nature and Action would cease if Gods emanation to it ceased And all the world agreeth that no man before Conversion or after doth any act of Faith Love c. no nor eating and drinking and going c. but he is in the first instant passive as influenced by God before he is active Who ever doubted whether physice recipere be pati Did you ever know such a man III. All the world is agreed that man is not meerly passive when he acteth An Act is an Act sure And to believe repent and love is an Act and an act of mans Soul And Scotus who thinketh that immanent Act are qualities as we think of habits yet thinketh that the Soul is truly active antecedently to that quality Where now is there any room for a Controversie C. You would make me believe that we are very ignorant Wranglers that make a noise in our dream and will not suffer others to rest Do not the Arminians say that man concurreth with God to the first act of his own Faith yea that he maketh Gods Grace effectual B. You shall not again tempt me to anticipate the question of effectual Grace though enough is said before to it as far as this Objection is concerned in it Gods Influx on the Soul is one thing mans natural faculty receiving that Influx passively is another And mans Act is another To thrust in here a general word man concurreth and so to run away from clear and necessary distinction is not the part of a man of knowledge Did ever man yet deny that man herein concurreth as aforesaid 1. Man concurreth not to make his Soul nor to continue it in being or power 2. Man concurreth not as any efficient of Gods Influx on his Soul ad agendum 3. But man receptively or passively concurreth as a Receiver of that Influx 4. And man actively thereupon concurreth to believe and repent Is not all this true But you would tempt the Arminians to say that it is you and not they that are herein to be accused For what mean you else by confining the Controversie to the first act of Faith or to our first Conversion Would you make men believe that a converted man is not as truly passive in believing loving God c. as the unconverted is Must not the holiest person be passive in receiving the Divine Influx on his Soul before he do any holy Act You seem to deny this and then you are the person that err by ascribing too much to man If not shew the difference C. There is a habit of Faith goeth before the first Act And it is in respect to that habit that the Arminians say we are active procurers of it which we deny But the godly operate from a habit B. You speak a private Opinion of your own brain against the sense of the Concordant Churches Where doth Scripture say that a habit of Faith goeth before the first Act Mr. Pemble * Vind. Gratâ— saith so indeed yet he sometime calleth that but a Seed which at other times he calleth a habit Dr. Ames in his Medulla contradicteth it Bishop Downame * In the end of his Treatise Of Perseverance Le Blank de diss Grat. 2. Thes 22. speaking of our being passive as to operating Grace saith truly Non videntur hac in parte Reformati a sanioribus inter Scholasticos dissentire licet aliis verbis mentem suam exprimant The School-men and Protestants little differ in the method of operations of Grace and all are drawn by Controversies too near curiosity beyond their reach hath written a large Confutation of Mr. Pemble The generality of Protestant Divines contradict it and thus with Rollock de Vocat distinguish Vocation from Sanctification that they suppose Vocation to cause the first act of Faith and Repentance and Sanctification to give us the fixed habit the act intervening Mr. Tho. Hooker is large upon it in his Souls Vocation Will you start one mans Opinion which Calvinists and Arminians are against and feign this to be a difference between Calvinists and Arminians And perhaps Mr. Pemble himself by his first semen or habit meaneth no more than the Divine Influx ad actum received I have before told you how unsearchable the nature of that Influx is and how hard it is to know the true nature of an Habit. C. But Mr. Pemble saith It is the Spirit that is given before we believe B. Away with Ambiguity By the Spirit is meant either the meer received Influx of the Spirit ad agendum and so it is granted Bad men receive the Spirits Influx to such acts as he moveth them to Or else you mean the foresaid fixed Habits and Dispositions to a ready and facile ordinary Operation Or else you mean the Spirit given relatively by Covenant undertaking to be the Sanctifier and Preserver of the Soul In both these latter senses the Spirit is not given before the first act of Faith to Infidels They have not the fixed habits of Holiness Love Hope Obedience c. Otherwise they were holy Infidels No Scripture speaketh it nay contrarily it promiseth the Spirit as to Believers and affirmeth it given after Faith Eph. 1. 13. Joh. 14. 17. 15. 26. Gal. 3. 14. 4. 6. Joh. 7. 39. And that the Holy Ghost is not given in Covenant to Infidels I need not prove to them that will not baptize Infidels The sixth Crimination C. They hold that none are damned only for Adam's sin imputed * Yes Vasqu and other
But there is yet another thing of great moment commonly overlooked C. What is that B. The great importance of that common saying Recipitur ad modum recipientis on which had I time I would write a Book of Instances Causa Receptiva is not well understood Aristotle maketh Privatio to be one of his three Principles in Physicks By Privation must be meant not Absentia formae sed Dispositio materiae And whether you will call it a third Principle or only the due qualification of the first Matter to make it immediately Receptive of the form the matter being de nomine â—umero is small But it is most certain that the wonderful diversity of alterations or effects of motion in the world is very much to be ascribed to the diversity of Receptive Dispositions And accordingly as in Physicks the three Active Natures Intellective Sensitive and Vegâ—tative which its like is Ignis are to be defined per virtutes suas Activas so the Passive Elements Earth Water and Air are to be defined by their several contextures or constitutions which make up Dispositionem Receptivam Influxus Activorum unicuique propriam which is their very form In Physical cases God doth first as Creator make all things in wonderful variety of natures quantities figures and contextures And secondly he causeth an Universal Cause to Influence them generally such as is the Sun for one what other we know not well whose â—râ—ple influx Motion Light and Heat affecteth all things according to their several Natures and Receptivities The special Active principle in every living thing is both cherished and suscitated by this universal solar influx But the diversity of effects is not from the Sun but from the diversity of Recipients The Sun by its influx is the cause that all things live and move But that one thing hath a life and motion Intellective and another Nonsttive and another Vegetative that by the Suns influx an Aâ—orn bringâ— forth an Oak and every Seed it s own kind of Plant that a Horse â—â—â—â— as a Horse a Dog as a Dog a Sheep as a Sheep c. that the â—osa hath one smell colour shape the Carnaâ—ion another the Tulip another â— that the Dungâ—â—l sâ—â—keth that the Clay is hardened the Waâ— softened c. the innumerable different effects in the inferior creatures are all caused by the Sun as to their general nature the received Influx of a Motive Illuminative and Calefactive Virtue but they are none of them in specie vel gradu unde differentia qua talis oritur caused by the Sun alone but also by the variety of the suscitated vital forms in animals And in things inanimate though not the Recipient but the solar Influx be the efficient cause of the variety of alterations and effects yet the Ratio diversitatis is more in the Disposition of the Recipient The Suns Influx is the same in it self without any difference on the clay and wax on the dunghill and the rose Let the question then be what causeth the different effects Answ 1. The Suns influx causeth all the Motion Light and Heat which they all receive as the Efficient cause 2. The Material Recipients I have marvelled oft why Elisha called for a Ministrel when the spirit of Prophecy was to come upon him And so Musick help'd Saul I am sure that Satan worketh on the minds of Melancholy Cholerick c. persons by and according to the temper of the spirits and humors and cannot do the same things without them And perhaps the spirit of God who can work as he list will do it ad modum recipientis and so Elisha's spirits must be brought up into an harmonious elevated preparation that the mind may be made fit to receive the spirits extraordinary work are the several things named as Material 3. The said Recipients being of divers Natures and Shapes c. have their variety of Receptive Dispositions 4. The forma Recepta a sole is nothing but its triplex influxus Motus Lux Calor 5. These are variously Received according to the various Dispositions of the Recipients 6. Hence follow the Variety of the second effects By the motive Influx some things are moved when stones and houses stir not By the Lucide Influx the eye seeth when the hand doth not the flowers appear in various colours according to their various Receptivities and some things give little reflective appearance of their Reception of it The Calid Influx cherisheth the living and burneth by a burning-glass when the dead stir not by it and some unapt recipients are little altered by it I call these the second effects which are thus various For the first effects are still the same viz. the Motive Illuminative and Calefactive efflux of the Sun is still sent forth and some how or other reacheth every capable recipient in general But the Alterations which are thereby made are diversified according to the diversity of Receptivities But yet these Receptive Dispositions are no efficient Causes of this difference or of any of the alterations But they are the Receptive Material Causes without which the efficient doth not make them and according to which he doth make them So that the Sun though but Causa Universalis yet is also the Universal Cause and sole efficient of all these Particular motions and alterations And yet the Ratio differendi is not to be given from it but from the different Receptivities according to which it still produceth them So the Rain falleth equally on the stones on the earth on vessels of various shapes and sizes The stone retaineth none The vessels variously retain it As they are round square long great or small so are they variously filled The efficient cause of the difference is the descent of the rain The material constitutive cause is the different quantities and shapes of the water But yet the Ratio differendi is to be assigned from the diversity of Receptive dispositions in the vessels And that you may see that these Receptivities are no efficients and yet contain the chief Rationem differendi note that the Reason to be given from them is ex alter a differentium parte still Negative or Privative as on the other it is Positive E. g. Why doth the Sun make the Rose smell sweet and not the stone or dunghill Because the stone or dunghill have not those odoriferous particles to be suscitated by it as the Rose had Why doth the Sun move the Flies and not the Stones Because the Stones had not that vital principle to be suscitated as the Flies had Why did not the rain fill the Stones as it did the Cisterns and this Vessel as that Because they had not the same Receptive and Retentive shapes C. Well! but what is all this physical Discourse to our present Controversie B. 1. The constancy of God in operating according to an established Order in the world doth shew us that the God of Order delighteth so to do 2. Therefore we
or degrees II. But if your question be of the Effect it is ridiculous or past question Do you ask what Grace in us it is that maketh the Difference between a Believer and an Infidel Why your question answereth it self It is Faith and that maketh the difference in one as Infidelity doth in the other Do you ask what is sufficient To what If to Salvation it is perseverance in Faith and Holiness If to Justification it is Faith if to Faith and Conversion nothing pre-existent in us Do you ask what maketh Grace effectual what Grace mean you If Faith it 's none of the doubt or Controversie It is improperly effectual to Justification being no efficient of it but a Condition which is a Receptive dispoâ—ition ex ordinatione divina virtute foederis You must recur then and ask what maketh Gods Essence or Spirit effectual As if Gods essence had a Cause or suffered from the Creature But if you mean no more but what are the Causes of Faith that 's another question oft answered Choose now whether you will lay all our Controversies on that fine thred of Gods various Impress on the faculties in order of Nature antecedent to Faith in act or true habit or else confess that we have no difference nor shew of any but have many ages abhominably abused the world C. But seeing you maintain that God as a free Lord and Benefactor doth vary his gifts of Grace as he doth of Nature though we know not when he doth it Morally and by means and when by Immediate differing Impress yet methinks you should hold that by one of the two he always doth it And that equal Grace hath never unequal effects by the unequal free reception rejection or other difference made by man B. To conclude this whole dispute 1. * By Grace here I mean not with Bradwardine Gods Will as denominated from various objects Gods Will in it self is but One and the Effects are many and the Will is variously denominated virtually ex connotatione terminorum vel effectuum If he could prove more diversity in Gods Will or that no man can do any thing but what he doth I should be of his mind That equal universal Grace can end in different effects in the same Man and in divers men by man's own free various concourse or neglect I have fully proved to you 2. And when we have proved that such a Grace there is and so it can do we have great reason to think that sometimes it doth so And no man can prove that it never doth so 3. And de facto I have proved that sometimes it doth so in Adam's case and in Cain's making a difference before God denyed him sufficient Grace And in all bad men and good men in the world who sometimes sinfully omit to do that which by the same Grace they could have done and did another time 4. But de facto How oft and when and in how many God converteth men by the one way or the other no Mortal man can tell And therefore forget not that when I call universal Grace ordinary and the special different Grace extraordinary I intend not to tell you which God most usually doth the work by as distinct from the other But I call one Ordinary because it is common to all or more in it self and also concurreth always with the other in its work and so is never left out And I call the other Extraordinary because it is above the universal degree and way and proper to some as superadded C. You did well to remember that For I was offended that you called that Different Grace Extraordinary B. I say again to conclude I will earnestly intreat you to take heed of these few errors in your foundation here that they mislead not your understanding in all the controversie I. Do not think that God must needs act ad ultimum posse in all his operations It 's certain that as to many possible effects he doth omnino non agere as to make more Suns more Men more Worlds And if he can therein totally not act he can act limitedly or in tantum only as he freely will II. Do not think these degrees of Operation as various ex parte Dei for they are but his most simple essence Nor do not Imagine that there is a certain Vis media called Grace which is somewhat Causal between the Creator and the Creature I doubt such a wrong conceit lyeth at the bottom of all these disputes and men think that besides Gods essence and the effects on the Soul there is some middle force or cause called Grace which is neither God nor a Creature whose kind and degree they enquire after * As Aureoluâ— maintaineth III. Do not overlook the Glory that God designeth to himself in his SAPIENTIAL Kingdom Government and operations I doubt some think so much of Strength and Power alone as if they thought God were Glorified by nothing else or more in an Oxe or Horse than in a Man And whatever is ascribed to Gods Sapiential operation they contemptuously call A Moral Causing and not a Physical As if God must move men as he doth the air the water or a stone Remember that though Gods Omnipotent Activity his Wisdom and his Will do still inseparably co-operate yet they have each its eminent Impress Effect and Glory And so the frame of Nature is the Glorious Impress of Omnipotency with Wisdom and Love The Kingdom of God on earth especially of Grace is the Glorious work of the Wisdom of God directly governing Man as a Moral agent by Moral means And the Kingdom of Glory as foretasted on Earth and perfect in Heaven is the glorious work of Divine Love Separate not these nor undervalue or dishonour any one of them But study the Glory of Gods Sapiential Kingdom and works And remember that Moral Means and Moral Operations of God are not unsuitable to the Government of Moral Agents in Moral works IV. Forget not the great difference between the way of operation suitable to such a Moral Rector as such and to a meer Proprietor or Actor and Benefactor And then you will see that standing Laws are the Rectors Instruments and Judgments and Executions equal according to those Laws And that Life Eternal and Gods Glory and pleasure being the ends of Government it cannot be doubted but Gods Laws to all the world have some aptitude and suitableness on their part to that end And therefore that the frame of Moral means and annexed help hath a certain universal equality antecedent to man's sinful will which by forfeiture and rejection maketh an inequality And therefore it is one of the noblest parts of your study here to find out what Acts God doth as Legislator for those are first and equal and as Judge which man maketh unequal and what he doth as Owner and free-Benefactor For so he may make what difference he pleases And the wonderful varieties through all the
not by such talk as this believe either that God Rewardeth himself or that he Rewardeth not us But we easily grant that he rewardeth us for nothing which cometh not from his free bounty For no creature can have any other good 2. But if Faith and Love and Obedience be not commanded to us but only given us then they are no Duties but Gifts only and unbelief hatred of God and disobedience is no sin nor brings no punishment Lib. At least they are no Conditions of the Covenant P. Do you think that they are any proper Means of our Justification and Salvation as their End or not Lib. Yes I dare not say that they are no means at all Faith and Repentance are Means of our Pardon and Holiness and Perseverance of our Glorification P. What sort of means do you take them to be Lib. They are such Gifts of God as in order must go before Salvation P. Going before signifieth only Antecedency and not any Means Lib. One Gift maketh us fit for a thankful improvement of another P. This speaketh them only to be a Means to our Thankful improvement and not to our Right to the things to be improved Lib. I do not think that they are a means of our Right or title P. Rev. 22. 14. Blessed are they that do his Commandments that they may have Right to the tree of life c. Lib. It may be translated that wash their garments and that they may have power upon as Dr. Hammond noteth P. 1. The Alexandrian Copy which giveth him this occasion is singular and not be set against all other though the Vulgar Latin go the same way Beza who yet thinks that a transposition of two Verses hath darkned these Texts this Book being negligently used because many for a time took it not for an Apostolical Writing or Canonical yet saith that it is contra omnium Graecorum codicum fidem that the Vulgar goeth 2. But all 's one in sense For to wash their Garments is to be sanctified or purified from sin and not only from guilt of punishment And 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifieth such a Power as we call Authority oâ— Right usually But what maketh you deny Conditions on mans part Lib. Because 1. It is supposed that a condition is profitable to him that requireth it 2. It is some Cause of the benefit 3. It is to be done by the performers own strength whereas God giving â—s Faith that can be no condition on our part which is first a Gift from him that requireth it For to give it first maketh it no condition of ours P. Here we see what it is to quarrell about ambiguous Words No one of these is true that you say of the common nature of a condition or at least as we mean by that word 1. Civilians define a Condition to be Lex addita negotio qua donec praestetur eventum suspendit As it is Required it is only Modus promissionis donationis vel contractus as Performed it is only a Removal of an Impediment and a Disposition of the Receiver So that as the Non-performance is but the suspension of a Causation so the performance of a Condition as such is no Cause efficient But it is dispositio subjecti which you may call a necessary Modus of a Material Cause as the Recipient may improperly be called Dr. Twisse therefore calleth faith Caâ—sa justificationis dispositiva 2. So it be an act of our own it is no way necessary that it be done without the Commanders help or gift For he that giveth us to believe doth give it by this means even by commanding it and making it a Condition of his further benefits that so he may induce us as rational free agents to perform it ex intuitu mercedis or by the motive of the end or benefit For he causeth it by suitable means And no doubt but faith and the rest are free acts of ours though caused by Gods grace 3. And it is accidental to a Condition that it be any way commodious to the Imposer What profit is it to a Father that his Child put off his Hat and say I thank you And yet he may make that a condition of his gift What profit is it to a free Physicion that the Patient observe his order in taking his Medicines And yet he may give them on that condition But yet I will add that as usually men make that the condition of a Gift or Contract which the person obliged is backward else to perform and that which is somewhat either for the Donor or Contracters Interest or the Ends of his contract so God who taketh his Glory and Pleasure in his Childrens Good to be as his Interest and the End of his Gifts and knoweth how backward we are to our duty doth on these accounts impose on us our duty and conditions his Pleasure and Glory being instead of his Commodity But if If be a conditional Particle and if Gods suspending by the tenour of his Donation our Right to Justification upon our free believing and our Right to Salvation on our free obedience do prove Conditionality as it doth all that we mean then you see that the new Covenant hath conditions Lib. Doth not God promise us the first Grace even to take the hard heart out of our bodies and give us hearts of flesh and new hearts c. And I pray what condition can the first grace have unless you will run in infinitum to seek Conditions of Conditions P. 1. This is a Cause of great moment of which I have my self had darker thoughts than now I have 1. If one Benefit of the Covenant have no Condition viz. the first will it follow that none of the rest are given upon condition May not God in Baptism give us a Right of special Relation to the Father Son and Holy Ghost his Love Grace and Communion Pardon Adoption and Glory on condition of Faith and Repentance and yet himself give us that Faith and Repentance which is the condition of the rest 2. But upon fuller consideration it will appear that It is not the first Grace that those promises mean by a new and soft heart For who ever will examine them shall find that the Texts mention Conditions and also antecedent Grace And indeed A new and soft heart is but the same thing which the New Testament calleth Sanctification And yet that Sanctification is promised as consequent to Faith as its condition And our ordinary Divines do accordingly distinguish of Vocation and Sanctification holding that in Vocation the Act of Faith and Repentance are caused by Gods Grace before proper Habits and that Sanctification is the Habits specially of Love and Holiness following them vid. Ames Medull de Vocat Rolloc de Vocat Hookers Souls Vocat Humil. Rogers of Faith c. And this is the new and fleshy heart But what need we more to prove that Covenant Conditional which I mean when it is nothing
but the Baptismal Covenant where sure the condition is notorious and every Baptizing Minister prerequireth the profession of it CHAP. VII Whether Justifying Faith be a Believing in Christ as a Teacher Lord c. or only a Receiving of his Righteousness P. VI. AS to this your sixth Charge I have said so much elsewhere in my Disputations of Justification and in other Books that I cannot justifie the tiring of Readers by repeating it And will say now but this little following 1. That Paul doth not distinguish between justifying faith and saving faith but excludeth the Works excluded by him from being the causes either of Justification or Salvation 2. That if Receiving Christs Righteousness be meant by them properly and physically it is no sort of faith at all but only the effect of the donation which they call Justificari or passive Justification But if it mean a moral metonymical Reception that is nothing but Consent to have the offered gift And if only Consent to have Christs Righteousness be Justifying faith then all the Assenting part is excluded in which Scripture much placeth it and most Divines in part and many in whole besides Camâ—ro and his followers And so also all the Affiance or Fiducial â—cts are excluded which almost all include even that which they call Recumbency being distinct from Consent 3. All these acts following are essential to Justifying faith as well as this Consent to be Justified 1. An Assenting belief in God in the baptismal sense 2. An Assent to the truth of Christs Person Office and Doctrine 3. A belief in the Holy Ghost 4. A belief of Pardon Sanctification and Glory as possible purchased and offered by Christ 5. A Consent that God be our God in Christ 6. And a Consent that Christ be our Teacher 7. And our King and Ruler 8. And our Intercessor 9. And our Judge and Justifier by sentence and as our Advocate 10. A belief of his Resurrection Power and Glory 11. A Trusting to the Father and the Son according to these forementioned Offices 12. A Consent to be Sanctified by the Holy Ghost 4. Plainly our Justifying and Saving Faith in Pauls sense is the same thing with our Christianity or becoming Christians And the same thing with our Baptismal faith and consent 5. To believe in Christ as Christ is in Scripture Justifying faith But to accept his righteousness only and not to believe in him as our Lord and our Teacher and Intercessor c. as aforesaid is not to believe in him as Christ 6. In my Answer ubi sup to Mr. Warner and elsewhere I have detected the fraud of their quibling distinction who say that All this is in faith quae justificat but not quà justificat as supposing a falshood that any act of faith quà talis justifieth 7. They that say that only our Acceptance of Christs Imputed Righteousness is the Justifying act of faith and that to expect to be Justified by any other viz. by Believing in God the Father and the Holy Ghost and believing a Heaven hereafter and believing the Truth of the Gospel and of Christs Resurrection Ascension Glory c. and by taking him for our Teacher Ruler Intercessor c. is to expect Justification by Works in Pauls disclaimed sense and so to fall from Grace I say they that thus teach do go so far towards the subverting of the Gospel and making a Gospel or Religion of their own as that I must tell them to move them to repentance not only the adding of Ceremonies is a small corruption in comparison of this but many that in Epiphanius are numbred with Hereticks had far lesser errors than this is CHAP. VIII Of Faiths Justifying as an Instrument P. VII ANd I have said so much in the foresaid Disputations of Justification and other Books of Faiths Instrumentality and the reason of its Justifying interest that I cannot perswade my self now to talk it out with you all over again but only to say 1. That I have fully oft proved from many plain Scriptures that pardon and salvation are given with Christ in the Covenant of Grace on Condition of a penitent believing fiducial acceptance And therefore that it is most certain that faith is a Condition of our Justification and so to be profest in Baptism 2. The name of An Instrument given to faith and its Justifying as an Instrument are of mens devising and not in Gods Word 3. But as to the sense It is certain that faith is no Instrument of our Justification Gods or Mans if it be meant properly of an Instrumental efficient cause 4. But if it be taken Metaphorically for an Act whose Nature or essence is An Acceptance of a free Gift and so by Instrumentality be meant the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 credere that is Faith 's very Essence in specie then no doubt it is what it is 5. Or if by an Instrument be meant A Moral aptitude or Disposition of the person to be justified answerable to the Dispositio Recipientis vel materiae in Physicks then it is such an Instrument But how well this is worded and what cause there is to contend for a word both of humane invention and metaphorical and this as if it were a weighty Doctrine I leave to sober judgements 6. But it is certain that the Accepting Act of faith is but its Aptitude to be the condition of the Gift and therefore that its being made by Christ the Condition is its Moral nearest interest in our Justification CHAP. IX Whether Faith it self be imputed for Righteousness Lib. VIII WHat do you but subvert the Gospel when you put faith instead of Christ or of his Righteousness When the Scripture saith that we are justified by Christs Righteousness Imputed to us you say it is by faith imputed P. Do you think any sober Christians here really differ or is it only about the Names and Notions Which ever it be 1. Of the name Is it not oft said that Faith is and shall be imputed for Righteousness Rom. 4. 22 23 24. James 2. 23. Lib. Yes I must grant the words but not your meaning P. Where doth the Scripture say that Christs Righteousness is Imputed to us Remember that it is only the Name that I ask you of Lib. It saith that Righteousness is Imputed and what Righteousness â—an it be but Christs P. I tell you still it is only the phrase or words that we are first trying Are these the same words Righteousness is Imputed and Christs Righteousness is Imputed If not where are these latter words in Scripture Lib. Grant that the words are not and your words are P. Then the question is Whether Scripture phrase or mans invented phrase be the better and safer in a controvertible case And next Whether you should deny or quarrel at the Scripture saying that faith is imputed to us for righteousness and not rather confute our misexpounding it if we do so Lib. Well Let us examine the sense then What
whom I recite to shew that he is not singular Alex. Alens 1. p. q. 39. m. 1. Scot. in 1. d. 46. q. 1. in solut arg Richard art 1. qu. 1. Durand q. 1. Palud q. 1. art 1. Capreol in 1. d. 45. q. 1. art 1. Concl. 14. art 3. ad arg S. Thom. 1. contra g. c. 39. ibid. Ferrariens Hosius in Confess Polon c. 73. Ruard art 11. Sot 3. de nat grat c. 7. 3. de Justit q. 5. art ult ad 1. Cajet in hunc art Joh. Bunder in Compend Concert tit 6. art 7. Gabr. Biel supplem in 4. d. 49. q. 4. art 4. dub 3. Bonavent in 4. d. 46. art 2. q. 1. ad 2. S. Thom. 1. 2. q. 114. art 1. Conrad ibid. Durand iterum in 2. d. 27. q. 2. Perrar cont Gent. 3. c. 179. Then because some words of Medina and Cajet and Romaus seem for Commutative Justice he sheweth that it was not their meaning Next he vindicateth Scotus and Gabriel as having no such meaning in some words of theirs Then he cometh to the case of Christs own Merits and saith that some say Christ satisfied for us in rigour of Justice But that Aquin. Bonavent and such ancients use not that form of speech but only teach that Christs satisfaction was perfect that is needed no Acceptilation but to this it is not necessary that it be according to Justice properly but that it was of equal condignity by way of Merit And other Schoolmen that speak as aforesaid mean not that in Christ there was proper Justice towards God but that the equality which he kept by the way and similitude of Justice in his satisfaction was according to rigour that is needed not Gods liberal acceptation but was altogether of equal condignity which is true I except but some late ones who contend that in that satisfaction there was proper justice whom he opposeth But they speak only of Imperfect Justice such as is found in Creatures which is not in God In Cap. 3. he layeth down several foundations against Commutative Justice and confuteth Cajetan and Medina who said that indeed between God and man there was no Commutative Justice but inter res that is inter meritum praemium there is which he sheweth is a contradiction of the former In Cap. 4. he disputeth against commutative Justice in God to man and that 1. Because there is not aequalitas dati accepti and to be short he brings against it the very same arguments as Protestants urge against Merit which sheweth that both sides mean and oppose the very same thing And he is so much against any Merit of ours from God in Commutative Justice that he labours to prove that Christs satisfaction was not such nor can any Creature so merit of God much less is mans penance or satisfaction such yea indeed he goeth too far in his reasons as I think For he argueth that where there is no Damnum damage in the sin against God there is no proper injustice but a common sort of it and therefore there can no merit in proper justice by satisfaction by Christ or us and that our sin bringeth no damage to God ergo c. But I deny his Major There may be injury where there is no Damage and consequently injustice Suppose a King or Father so far above his subject or son as that all his disobedience would no way hurt or damnifie him yet it would injure him because the father hath Right to the sons obedience and love and Juriâ— denegatio est injuria So that I confess that God cannot possibly give us anything by Commutative Justice in a strict and proper â—ence because we can so give him nothing in commutation But I see not but that by sin man sinneth against proper Justice in not giving God his Own or Due to his Injury though not to his damage But I confess the term Commutative nothing mutual Right is improper and their distinction of Commutative and distributive Justice is narrow ambiguous inepâ— and therefore â—eedeth and not endeth Controversies The true distribution of Justice is from the three Grand Moral Relations Dominii Imperii Beneficii vel Amicitiae 1. God hath the true proper Right of Propriety in us and to our service 2. He hath a proper Right of Imperium Rule and so to our obedience 3. By his Goodness Love and Benefits he hath a proper Right to our greatest Love and Gratitude And he that sinneth denyeth God all these and so doth violate proper Justice denying him that to which he hath Right But to return to Vasquez having said That our Merit and Satisfaction can be no benefit to God nor our sin his damage nec ulla inaequalitas inter ipsum nos constituta est quae sit objectum injustitiae proprâ—ae he addeth that his punishments are no parts of commutative justice in resarciendis vindicandis injuriis because here is no reparation of damage as Thom. 2. 2. q. 108. art 2. And Cap. 5. he proceedeth to prove his doctrine from the Condition of God and the Creature we being as Children and slaves absolutely his own therefore there can be no proper justice between us And he cometh to the great objection that As free our Actions are our own and so may merit of Justice and answereth No because the Value of our works to which the Reward is given dependeth on Gods grace which he freely giveth and conserveth to us though as free the actions are of us as Causes And because that Liberty is only a fundamentum of merit but giveth not the work its Value or worth therefore we cannot make God our Debtor by any meritorious work of which he himself is the author and Cause And hence he is so much against this merit of Justice as to inferr that Christ himself could not satisfie God according to strict Justice properly by the works of his Humane nature because the whole Value came from the Godhead it self sanctifying the humanity and making his works worthy Cap. 6. he proceedeth to shew that though it be not true that some say that full equal satisfaction may be refused it being not the ipsum debitum and that he proveth that a full equal satisfaction to proper justice cannot in justice be refused and if it be refuseable it is unequal though it may be equal condignitate meriti quae ad justitiam propriè non pertinet Yet even from Gods promise it self it is no obligation of proper justice that is on God to us Confuting Sotus that saith that Gods Fidelity is not to be referred to the virtue of verity but properly belongeth to commutative Justice If this be not enough Disput 86. he cometh to the other branch Whether God have distributive Justice to us and denyeth this also in proper sence And proveth it by the authority of Bonavent in 4. d. 46. art 2. q. 1. ad 1. Scotus qu. 1. Durand ib. q. 1. in