Selected quad for the lemma: cause_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
cause_n	body_n	motion_n	part_n	3,580	5	5.0404	4	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A35750	Six metaphysical meditations wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body / written originally in Latin by Renatus Des-Cartes ; hereunto are added the objections made aganst these meditations by Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury with the authors answers ; all faithfully translated into English with a short account of Des-Cartes's life by William Molyneux.; Meditationes de prima philosophia. English	Descartes, René, 1596-1650.; Molyneux, William, 1656-1698.; Hobbes, Thomas, 1588-1679. Objections made against these meditations.	1680 (1680)	Wing D1136; ESTC R1345	67,590	180

violently and more than ordinarily moved that motion of them being propagated through the Medulla Spinalis of the Back to the inward parts of the Brain there it signifies to the mind that something or other is to be felt and what is this but Pain as if it were in the Foot by which the Mind is excited to use its indeavours for removing the Cause as being hurtful to the Foot But the Nature of Man might have been so order'd by God that That same motion in the Brain should represent to the mind any other thing viz. either it self as 't is in the Brain or it self as it is in the Foot or in any of the other forementioned intermediate parts or lastly any other thing whatsoever but none of these would have so much conduced to the Conservation of the Body In the like manner when we want drink from thence arises a certain dryness in the Throat which moves the Nerves thereof and by their means the inward parts of the Brain and this motion affects the mind with the sense of thirst because that in this case nothing is more requisite for us to know then that we want drink for the Preservation of our Health So of the Rest. From all which 't is manifest that notwithstanding the infinite Goodness of God 't is impossible but the Nature of Man as he consists of a mind and body should be deceivable For if any cause should excite not in the Foot but in the Brain it self or in any other part through which the Nerves are continued from the Foot to the Brain that self same motion which uses to arise from the Foot being troubled the Pain would be felt as in the Foot and the sense would be naturally deceived for 't is consonant to Reason seeing that That same motion of the Brain alwayes represents to the mind that same sense and it oftner proceeds from a cause hurtful to the Foot than from any other I say 't is reasonable that it should make known to the mind the Pain of the Foot rather than of any other part And so if a dryness of Throat arises not as 't is used from the necessity of drink for the conservation of the Body but from an unusual Cause as it happens in a Dropsie 't is far better that it should then deceive us then that it should alwayes deceive us when the Body is in Health and so of the Rest. And this consideration helps me very much not only to understand the Errors to which my Nature is subject but also to correct and avoid them For seeing I know that all my Senses do oftener inform me falsly than truely in those things which conduce to the Bodies advantage and seeing I can use almost alwayes more of them than one to Examine the same thing as also I can use memory which joyns present and past things together and my understanding also which hath already discovered to me all the causes of my Errors I ought no longer to fear that what my Senses daily represent to me should be false But especially those ●xtravagant Doubts of my First Meditation are to be turn'd off as ridiculous and perticularly the chief of them viz. That * of not distingui●hing Sleep from Waking for now I plainly discover a great difference between them for my Dreams are never conjoyned by my memory with the other actions of my life as whatever happens to me awake is and certainly if while I were awake any person should suddenly appear to me and presently disappear as in Dreams so that I could not tell from whence he came or where he went I should rather esteem it a Sp●ctre or Apparition feign'd in my Brain then a true Man but when such things occur as I distinctly know from whence where and when they come and I conjoyn the perception of them by my memory with the other Accidents of my life I am certain they are represented to me waking and not asleep neither ought I in the least to doubt of their Truth if after I have called up all my senses memory and understanding to their Examination I find nothing in any of them that clashes with other truths For God not being a Deceiver it follows that In such things I am not deceived But because the urgency of Action in the common occurrences of Affairs will not alwayes allow time for such an accurate examination I must confess that Mans life is subject to many Errors about perticulars so that the infirmity of our Nature must be acknowledged by Us. FINIS ADVRTISEMENET CONCERNING THE OBJECTIONS AMong seven Parcels of Objections made by Divers Learned Persons against these Meditations I have made choise of the Third in the Latine Copy as being Penn'd by Thomas Hobbs of Malmesbury a Man famously known to the World abroad but especially to his own the English Nation and therefore 't is likely that what comes from Him may be more acceptable to his Countrymen then what proceeds from a Stranger and as the strength of a Fortification is never better known then by a Forcible Resistance so fares it with these Meditations which stand unshaken by the Violen● Opposition of so Potent an Enemy And yet it must be Confess'd that the Force of these Objections and Cogency of the Arguments cannot be well apprehend●d by those who are not versed in other Pieces of Mr. Hobbs's Philosophy especially His Book De Corpore and De Homine The former whereof I am sure is Translated into English and therefore not Impertinently refer'd to Here in a Disc●urse to English Readers And this is the Reason that makes the Great Des-Cartes pass over many of these Objections so slightly VVho certainly would have Undermined the whole Fabrick of the Hobbian Philosophy had he but known upon VVhat Foundations it was Built OBJECTIONS Made against the Foregoing MEDITATIONS BY THE FAMOUS THOMAS HOBBS Of MALMESBURY WITH DES-CARTES'S ANSWERS OBJECT I. Against the First Meditation Of things Doubtful 'T IS evident enough from What has been said in this Meditation that there is no sign by Which we may Distinguish our Dreams from True 〈…〉 Phantasmes which we have waking and from our Senses are not accidents inhering in Outward Objects neither do they Prove that such outward Objects do Exist and therefore if we trust our Senses without any other Ground we may well doubt whether any Thing Be or Not We therefore acknowledge the Truth of this Meditation But Because Plato and other Antient Philosophers argued for the same incertainty in sensible Things and because 't is commonly Observed by the Vulgar that 't is hard to Distinguish Sleep from Waking I would not have the most excellent Author of such new Thoughts put forth so antique Notions ANSWER Those Reasons of Doubt which by this Philosopher are admitted as true were proposed by Me only as Probable and I made use of them not that I may vend them as new but partly that I may prepare the Minds of my

only by the potential being of a thing which in proper speech is nothing but requires an actual or formal being to its production Of all which forementioned things there is nothing that is not evident by the light of reason to any one that will diligently consider them Yet because that when I am careless and the Images of sensible things blind my understanding I do not so easily call to mind the reasons why the Idea of a being more perfect then my self should of necessity proceed from a being which is really more perfect It will be requisite to enquire further whether I who have this Idea can possibly be unless such a being did exist To which end let me aske from whence should I be From my self or from my Parents or from any other thing less perfect then God for nothing can be thought or supposed more perfect or equally perfect with God But first If I were from my self I should neither doubt nor desire nor want any thing for I should have given my self all those perfections of which I have any Idea and consequently I my self should be God and I cannot think that those things I want are to be acquired with greater difficulty then those things I have but on the contrary tis manifiest that it were much more difficult that I that is a substance that thinks should arise out of nothing then that I should acquire the knowledge of many things whereof I am Ignorant which is only the accident of that substance And certainly If I had that greater thing viz being from my self I should not have denyed my self not only those things which may be easier acquired but also All those things which I perceived are contain'd in the Idea of a God and the reason is for that no other things seem to me to be more difficultly done and certainly if they were Really more difficult they would seem more difficult to me if whatever I have I have from my self for in those things I should find my Power put to a stop Neither can I Evade the force of these Arguments by supposing my self to have alwaies Been what now I am and that therefore I need not seek for an Author of my Being For the Durance or Continuation of my life may be divided into Innumerable Parts each of which does not at all depend on the Other Parts Therefore it will not follow that because a while ago I was I must of necessity now Be. I say this will not follow Unless I suppose some Cause to Create me as it were anew for this Moment that is Conserve me For 't is evident to one that Considers the Nature of Duration that the same Power and Action is requisite to the Conservation of a Thing each Moment of its Being as there is to the Creation of that Thing anew if it did not exist So that 't is one of those Principles which are Evident by the Light of Nature that the Act of Conservation differs only Ratione as the Philosophers term it from the Act of Creation Wherefore I ought to ask my self this Question whether I who now Am have any Power to Cause my self to Be hereafter for had I any such power I should certainly know of it seeing I am nothing but a Thinking Thing or at least at present I onely treat of that part of me which is a Thing that Thinks to which I answer that I can discover no such Power in Me And consequently I evidently know that I depend on some Other being distinct from my self But what if I say that perhaps this Being is not God but that I am produced either by my Parents or some other Causes less perfect then God In answer to which let me consider as I have said before that 't is manifest that whatever is in the effect so much at least ought to be in the cause and therefore seeing I am a thing that thinks and have in me an Idea of God it will confessedly follow that whatever sort of cause I assign of my own Being it also must be a Thinking Thing and must have an Idea of all those Perfections which I attribute to God Of which Cause it may be again Asked whether it be from it self or from any other Cause If from it self 't is evident from what has been said that it must be God For seeing it has the Power of Existing of it self without doubt it has also the power of actually Possessing all those Perfections whereof it has an Idea in it self that is all those Perfections which I conceive in God But if it Be from an other Cause it may again be asked of that Cause whether it be of it self or from an other Till at length We arrive at the Last Cause of All Which will Be God For 't is evident that this Enquiry will not admit of Progressus in Infinitum especially when at Present I treat not only of that Cause which at first made Me But chiefly of that which conserves me in this Instant time Neither can it be supposed that many partial Causes have concurred to the making Me and that I received the Idea of one of Gods perfections from One of them and from an other of them the Idea of an other and that therefore all these Perfections are to be found scattered in the World but not all of them Ioyn'd in any one which may Be God For on the contrary Vnity Simplicity or the inseparability of All Gods Attributes is one of the chief Perfections which I conceive in Him and certainly the Idea of the Vnity of the Divine Perfections could not be created in me by any other cause then by That from whence I have received the Ideas of his other perfections For 't is Impossible to make me conceive these perfections conjunct and inseparable unless he should also make me know what perfections these are Lastly as touching my having my Being from my Parents Tho whatever Thoughts I have heretofore harbour'd of Them were True yet certainly they contribute nothing to my conservation neither proceed I from them as I am a Thing that Thinks for they have onely predisposed that material Thing wherein I that is my mind which only at present I take for my self Inhabits Wherefore I cannot now Question that I am sprung from them But I must of necessity conclude that because I am and because I have an Idea of a Being most perfect that is of God it evidently follows that there is a God * Now it only remains for me to examine how I have received this Idea of God For I have neither received it by means of my Senses neither comes it to me without my Forethought as the Ideas of sensible things use to do when such things Work on the Organs of my Sense or at least seem so to work Neither is this Idea framed by my self for I can neither detract from nor add any thing thereto Wherefore I have only to conclude that it is