Power to act upon our Spirits and to give them new Modification I say Modifications for that well expresses the general Nature of Sensation And it is a new Modification or different Way of existing of the Soul that makes this or that Sensation which is not any thing really distinct from the Soul but the Soul it self existing after such a certain Manner Wherein it is distinguished from our Idea's which are representative to us of something without us whereas our Sensations are within us and indeed no otherwise distinct from us than Modalities are for the thing modified Accordingly there is a vast Difference between knowing by Sentiment and knowing by Idea We know Numbers Extension and Geometrick Figures by Idea but we know Pleasure and Pain Heat and Colour c. by interior Sentiment To know Numbers and Figures there is need of Ideas for without an Idea the Soul can have no Perception of any thing distinct from it self as Numbers and Figures are But to know or perceive Grief there is no need of an Idea to represent it A Modality of the Soul is sufficient it being certain that Grief is no other than a Modification of the Soul who when in Grief does not perceive it as a thing without and distinct from her self as when she contemplates a Square or a Triangle but as a different Manner of her own Existence Sensation then being a Modification of the Soul this single Consideration setting aside all other Discoursings will furnish us with a demonstrative Argument to prove that not Bodies but GOD alone is the Cause of our Sensations For who else should either have Power or Knowledge to new modifie our Beings but he who made them and perfectly understands them But I shall not enter upon a further Demonstration of this Point since I have abundantly proved it in my printed Discourse of the Love of GOD and since you do as good as allow it in your present Objection This therefore appearing to be a clear and certain Truth give me leave again to remind you of a certain Maxim that I observed to you in my first Letter That we are to stick to what we clearly see notwithstanding any Objections that may be brought against it and not reject what is evident for the sake of what is obscure Supposing therefore that there are or might be Objections raised to shew that GOD is not the Cause of our Sensations which I could not answer yet since my Reason as often as I consult her does most convincingly assure me that he is I ought to rest here and not suffer that which I do not perceive to hinder me from assenting to that which I evidently do But to consider your Objections I observe in the first place that having granted that sensation is only in the soul that there is nothing in Body but Magnitude Figure and Motion and that being without Thought it self it is not able to produce it in us and therefore those sensations whether of Pleasure or Pain which we feel at the Presence of Bodies must be produced by some higher Cause than they all which well agrees with the Conclusion I contend for you afterterwards object against their being only Conditions serving to determine the Action of the true and proper Cause which Objection seems to come a little unexpectedly after such a Concession For if they are not true and proper Causes of our sensations what else can they be but Conditions serving to determine the Agency of him who is so Yes you seem to point out a middle Way by supposing that as they are not so much as proper Causes so they are more than mere Conditions viz. That they have a natural Efficacy towards the Production of our Sensations But if I am not mightily mistaken this middle Way will fall in with one of the Extreams For to have a natural Efficacy for the Production of a thing is the same as to have a Causality and that again is the same as to be at least a partial Cause If therefore the Objects of our Senses be not true and proper Causes of our Sensations then neither have they any natural Efficacy towards the Production of them But if they have any such natural Efficacy then they are true and proper Causes which though it be a Proposition which you formally and expresly deny is that however which your Objection in the true Consequence and Result of it tends to prove And to prove this That Bodies have a natural Efficacy towards the Production of our Sensations or that they are true Causes of them for I take them to be Propositions of an equivalent Import you argue from a twofold Topick first That the contrary Theory renders a great Part of GOD's Workmanship vain and useless Secondly That it does not well comport with his Majesty Now to set you right in this matter and to acquit our Theory from both these very threatning Inconveniences we need only fairly propose it The Case then is this GOD has united my Soul to a certain Portion of organized Matter which therefore for the particular Relation it has to me I call my Body This Body of mine is placed among and surrounded with a vast Number and Variety of other Bodies These other Bodies according to the Laws of Motion established in the World strike variously upon mine and make different Impressions upon it according to the Degree of their Motion and the Difference of their Size and Figure These Impressions have a different Effect upon my Body some of them tending to the Good and Preservation and some to the Evil and Dissolution of its Structure and Mechanism even as in the greater World some Motions tend to the Generation and Perfection and others to the Corruption and Destruction of natural Bodies Now though it be not necessary that my Soul should know what is done to other Bodies yet for the good of the animal Life it is very necessary she should know what passes in her own whether such or such Impressions make for its good or hurt Now there are but two Ways for this Light and Sentiment My Soul must know this either by considering and examining the Nature of other Bodies the inward Configuration of their Parts the Difference of their Bulk and external Figure the Degree of their Motion and withal the Relation that all these bear to the Configuration of her own Body or by having some different Sentiment raised in her according to the Difference of the Impression or in clearer Terms by being differently modified her self according as the Modification of her Body is altered by the Incursion of other Bodies The first of these Ways besides that it would employ and ingage the Soul which was made for the Contemplation and Love of GOD her true and only good in things altogether unworthy of her Application is withal considering the Narrowness of our Faculties and the frequent Return of such Occasions not only infinitely tedious painful and distracting but
purely and intirely from our selves The former Part of this I absolutely allow and contend for concerning the latter I distinguish when you say that all our Evil is purely and intirely from our selves if you mean of moral Evil I grant it but if you mean of natural Evils then I must distinguish again upon the Words from our selves which may signifie either a physical or moral or if you will an efficient or a meritorious Causality We are certainly the meritorious Causes of all our natural Evils as bringing them upon us by our Sins but that we are the efficient Causes of any of them I deny As all our good is wholly from GOD so in this Sense is also our evil We have not the Power to modifie our own Souls and can no more raise the Sensation of Pain in them than that of Pleasure GOD is the true Author of both as I have elsewhere shewn You say again that Afflictions are not evil but good to which I return that they are both in different Respects They are certainly evil in their own formal Nature and simply in themselves considered and can be good only occasionally or consequentially as they may serve as Means to some greater Good And this I think may serve to reconcile the Goodness of Pain to that Assertion of mine that nothing does us good but what causes Pleasure that is either formally and directly or occasionally and consequentially some Way or other whatever does us good must be supposed to cause Pleasure to us Now though Pain cannot cause Pleasure formally as being a Sensation formally distinct from it yet it may occasionally and consequentially and so may come within the Inclosure of those things that do us good You think fit to confine my Sense of the Word Pleasure to such only as are truly agreeable to the Nature of Man by which I suppose you mean those Pleasures which are called rational and Intellectual To this I reply that it seems to me very evident and I think I have elsewhere made it so that GOD is the true Cause of all the Pleasure that is resented by Man But you say you know not how it can consist with the Purity of the most holy GOD that he should be the Author of those pleasing Sensations which wicked Men feel in what we call sinful Pleasures But 't is your Mistake to suppose that sensual Pleasures as such are evil or that there is any such thing as a sinful Pleasure properly speaking As Sin cannot be formally pleasant so neither can Pleasure be formally sinful All Pleasure in it self is simply good as being a real Modification of the Soul 't is the circumstantiating of it that is the Evil. And of this GOD is not the Cause but the Sinner who rather than forego such an agreeable Sensation will enjoy it in such a Manner and in such Circumstances as are not for his own or for the common Good and therefore unlawful But concerning this matter you may further satisfie your self out of the Letters between Dr. More and Me and by reading the first and second Illustration M. Malebranch makes upon his De la Recharche de la Verite Where he shews you that GOD does all that is real in the Motions of the Mind and in the Determinations of those Motions without being the Author of Sin There are two other Passages in your Letter which I know not how to assent to till I better comprehend them One is that mental Pain is the same with Sin the other is that Sin is the only true Evil of Man I cannot stay long upon these but as to the first besides that Sin is an Act and Pain a Passion of the Soul and that Pain is a real Modification of our Spirit whereas Sin in its Formality is not any thing positive but a mere Privation I say besides this if mental Pain be the same with Sin how shall we distinguish Sin from the Punishment of it And how shall a Man repent for his Sin For if mental Pain be the same with Sin then to be sorry for one Sin will be to commit another Then as to the other Part that Sin is the only evil of Man I grant it is the greatest but I cannot think it the only one for besides that mental Pain is as I have shewn an Evil distinct from it there is also a thing call'd Bodily Pain which I have also shewn to be an Evil. Now Madam as to what you request of me in the Conclusion of your Letter if you think that distinction of mine of seeking Creatures for our good but not loving them as our good too nice I further illustrate it thus you are to distinguish between the Movements of the Soul and those of the Body the Movements of the Soul ought not to tend but towards him who only is above her and only able to act in her But the Movements of the Body may be determined by those Objects which environ it and so by those Movements we may unite our selves to those things which are the natural or occasional Causes of our Pleasure Thus because we find Pleasure from the Fire this is Warrant enough to approach it by a Bodily Movement but we must not therefore love it For Love is a Movement of the Soul and that we are to reserve for him who is the true Cause of that Pleasure which we resent by Occasion of the Fire who as I have proved is no other than GOD. By which you may plainly perceive what 't is I mean by saying that Creatures may be sought for our good but not loved as our Good But after all I must needs acknowledge that this as all our other Duties is more intelligible than practicable though to render it so I know no other Way than by long and constant Meditation to free our Minds of that early Prejudice that sensible Objects do act upon our Spirits and are the Causes of our Sensations carefully to distinguish between an efficient Cause strictly so called and an Occasion to attribute to GOD and the Creature their proper Parts in the Production of our Pleasures to bring our selves to a clear Perception and habitual Remembrance of this grand Truth the Foundation of all Morality that GOD only is the true Cause of all our Good which when fully convinced of we shall no longer question whether he ought to be the only Object of our Love I am Madam With great Respect Your humble Servant J. NORRIS Bemerton Nov. 13. 1693. If you are satisfied thus far I would desire you to go on to communicate what other Thoughts you have concerning the Love of GOD for 't is a Subject I like and would willingly pursue to the utmost LETTER V. To Mr. Norris SIR SO candid and condiscending a Treatment of a Stranger a Woman and so inconsiderable an one as my self shews you to be as much above the Generality of the World in your Practice as you are in your Theory and
soever in their other particular Determinations agree in this and because we have no manner of Freedom in this Motion or Command over it but are altogether passive in it which shews it to be properly a natural Motion I lay down this therefore as an evident and undeniable Proposition that the natural Motion of the Will is to good in general But now how can the Will be moved towards good in general but by being moved towards all good For to be moved towards good as good is to be moved towards all good And how can the Will be moved towards all good but by being moved towards a universal Being who in himself is and contains all good For as the Understanding cannot represent to it self universal Ideas but by being united to a Being who in the Simplicity of his Nature includes all Being so neither can the Will be moved to good in general but by being moved towards a universal Being who by reason of the Infinity of his Nature comprehends all good that is towards GOD who is therefore the true Term of the natural Motion of the Soul And that he is so will be further evident if we consider the Operation of that Cause by which this natural Motion is produced This Cause I here suppose and have elsewhere shewn to be GOD and indeed who else should be the Cause of what is natural in us but he who is the Cause of our Natures Let us see now how this Cause acts GOD cannot act but by his Will that 's most certain But now the Will of GOD is not as in us an Expression that he receives from without himself and which accordingly carries him out from himself but an inward self-centring Principle that both derives from and terminates in himself For as GOD is to himself his own good his own Center and Beatifick Object so the Love of GOD can be no other than the Love of himself Whence it will follow that as GOD must therefore be his own End and whatever he wills or acts he must will and act for himself as I have already represented it in the Discourse of Divine Love so also that the Love which is in us must be the Effect of that very Love which GOD has for himself there being no other Principle in the Nature of GOD whereby he is supposed to act Whence it will further follow that the natural Tendency of our Love must necessarily be towards the same Object upon which the Love of GOD is turned For since Love in all created Spirits is not produced but by the Will of GOD which it self is no other than the Love which he bears himself it is impossible that GOD should give a Love to any Spirit which does not naturally tend whither his own Love does And since it is evident that the Term of his own Love is himself it is as evident that the same is also the natural Term of ours that as our Love comes from him so it naturally tends to him and that as he is the efficient so he is also the true final Cause of the Will of Man which I take to be nothing else but that continual Impression whereby the Author of Nature moves him towards himself Which by the way may serve to furnish us with the true Reason of a very considerable Maxim which has hitherto been entertained without any as being thought rather a first Principle than a Conclusion I mean that the VVill of Man cannot will Evil as evil VVhich though a Truth witnessed by constant Experience and such as all Men readily consent to and acquiesce in I despair of ever seeing rationally accounted for upon any other Supposition than the present But according to this the Account is clear and easie For here the VVill it self being supposed to be nothing else but that general Impression whereby GOD moves us continually towards himself it is plain that we cannot possibly will or love Evil as evil as having no Motion from GOD towards it but to the contrary viz. to himself who is the universal good And as we may demonstrate a Priori from this Impression whereby GOD moves us towards himself that we cannot love Evil as evil so from the Experience we have that we cannot love Evil as evil we may argue as a Posteriori that our VVills are by their original Motion carried towards GOD and that he is the true and sole Object of their natural Tendency VVhich is also further proved by all those Arguments which I have already and may more at large produce for our seeing all things in GOD as our universal Idea For since the VVill of Man is moved only towards what the Spirit perceives as is universally granted and by Experience found to be true and since as it has been sufficiciently proved we perceive all things in GOD who presents to Spirits no other Idea than himself who indeed is all it plainly and necessarily follows that the natural Motion of our VVills is and must be towards GOD and him only who having made himself the sole Term and Object of our natural Love ought also to be made by us the sole Object of that which is free since as was laid down in the Beginning the Determinations of our VVill that are free ought to be conformable to that which is natural The whole Sum and Force of this reasoning lies in this Syllogism That which is the sole Object of our natural Love ought to be the sole Object of that which is free But the sole Object of our natural Love is GOD therefore GOD ought to be the sole Object of that which is free The first of these Propositions is evident from that moral Rectitude which must necessarily be supposed in the natural Motions of our Love as proceeding from the Author of our Natures to which therefore the free Motions of it ought to be conformable The second Proposition is that which I have professedly proved and I think sufficiently Wherefore I look upon the Conclusion as demonstrated viz. that GOD ought to be the sole Object of our free Love which being the only Love that falls under Command and the only one that is in our Power we must conclude that GOD requires all the Love which he can possibly require and all the Love which we can possibly give even our whole Heart Soul and Mind which we are not therefore to divide betwixt him and the Creature but to devote to him only and religiously to present as a Burnt-offering intirely to be consumed at his divine Altar And thus the whole Motion of our Wills falls under the Right and Title of GOD who becomes the just proprietary and adequate Object of them in their largest Capacity and utmost Latitude There are but two Sorts of Motions in our Souls as in our Bodies natural and free and both these belong of right to GOD who has taken the greatest Care to secure them to himself He prevents that which is natural and he
feel at the Presence of Bodies must be produced by some higher Cause than they yet if the Objects of our Senses have no natural Efficiency towards the producing of those Sensations which we feel at their Presence if they serve no further than as positive and arbitrary Conditions to determine the Action of the true and proper Cause if they have nothing in their own Nature to qualifie them to be instrumental to the Production of such and such Sensations but that if GOD should so please the Nature of the things notwithstanding we might as well feel Cold at the presence of fire as of water and heat at the Application of Water or any other Creature and since GOD may as well excite Sensations in our Souls without these positive Conditions as with them to what end do they serve And then what becomes of that acknowledged Truth that GOD does nothing in vain when such Variety of Objects as our Senses are exercised about are wholly unnecessary Why therefore may there not be a sensible Congruity between those Powers of the Soul that are employed in Sensation and those Objects which occasion it Analogous to that vital Congruity which your Friend Dr. More Immor of the Soul B. 11. Chap. 14. S. 8. will have to be between some certain Modifications of Matter and the plastick Part of the Soul which Notion he illustrates by that Pleasure which the preceptive Part of the Soul as he calls it is affected with by good Musick or delicious Viands as I do this of sensible by his of vital Congruity and methinks they are so symbolical that if the one be admitted the other may For as the Soul forsakes her Body when this vital Congruity fails so when this sensible Congruity is wanting as in the Case of Blindness Deafness or the Palsie c. the Soul has no Sensation of Colours Sounds Heat and the like so that although Bodies make the same Impression that they used to do on her Body yet whilst it is under this Indisposition she has not that Sentiment of Pleasure or Pain which used to accompany that Impression and therefore though there be no such thing as Sensation in Bodies yet why may there not be a Congruity in them by their Presence to draw forth such Sensations in the Soul Especially since in the next place it seems more agreeable to the Majesty of GOD and that Order he has established in the World to say that he produces our Sensations mediately by his Servant Nature than to affirm that he does it immediately by his own Almighty Power Nor will this be any Prejudice to the Drift of your Discourse which is to prove that GOD only is to be loved because he only does us good for the Creature has as little Right to our Affections this way as the other If a bountiful Person gives me Money to provide my self Necessaries my Gratitude surely is not due to the Money but to the kind Hand that bestowed it to whom I am as much obliged as if he had gone with me and bought them himself For there seems no Necessity to conclude that every thing that does me good that is that produces Pleasure in me though it be but the contemptible Pleasure of a grateful Odor has on that account a just Title to some Portion of my Love since in some Cases the occasioning a moral and durable Good does not necessarily challenge our Love As for Instance my Enemy does me very much good by his greatest Injuries and most virulent Reproaches because he gives Opportunity of exercising my Charity and makes such a Discovery of my Faults that thereby I come to know and amend them But I suppose you won't say I am obliged to him for all this or that I ought to desire those Injuries or admit him to my Bosom who offers them Though perhaps my dearest Friend could not possibly do me a greater good We do not therefore owe Love to any Object merely on account of what it produces but in Proportion to that voluntary Kindness whereby it produceth it Agreeably to what you say in your first Letter concerning Pain that GOD occasions it only indirectly and by Accident it is not his antecedent and primary Design he does not will it from within or for it self but from without and therefore for these Reasons is not the Object of our Aversion And so say I allowing that Bodies did really better our Condition that they did contribute to our Happiness or Misery and did in some Sense produce our Pleasure or Pain yet since they do not will it do not act voluntarily but mechanically and all the Power they have of affecting us proceeds intirely from the Will and good Pleasure of a superior Nature whose Instruments they are and without whose Blessing and Concurrence they could not act therefore they are not proper Objects of our Love or Fear which ought wholly and intirely to be referred to him who freely acts upon our Souls and does us good by these involuntary and necessary Instruments For certainly that Being only deserves our Love even our whole Love who has it always in his Power to better and perfect our Nature and who does voluntarily and freely exert that Power Which former Clause I add to cut off our Love from all rational Creatures who may be instrumental to our good designedly and freely but since their Power is not originally from themselves neither are they always in a Capacity of exerting it seeing they may and very often do want either Power or Will to help us therefore they are not the proper Objects of our Love For that Being only is so who constantly and chusingly pleasures and perfects our Natures or at least is always ready to do so and actually does it when not prevented and hindered by our Indispositions and wilful Incapacities These Sir are at present my Thoughts though hastily huddled up for I had but a few Hours to examine and digest them and was not willing to remain any longer in your Debt for this Letter having trespassed too much already And I am confident you are such an unfeigned Lover of Truth that you will on that Account easily pardon her Boldness in objecting thus freely against your ingenious Discourse who is with all Respect and Gratitude Your faithful Friend and Servant Aug. 14. Mr. Norris's Answer Madam YOU are no less happy in this your Review than in your first Overture to pitch upon the only material Objection to which the Proposition you attack is liable But before I set my self to answer it give me leave to suggest to you that 't is a Proposition of the most incontestable and philosophick Evidence and in the Discourse you refer to most clearly demonstrated to be so that the Bodies that are about us are not the true Causes of those Sensations which we feel at their Presence but that GOD only is the Cause of them who being the Author of our Beings has the sole
separated us from the Love of God has made the Soul willing to fill that Emptiness which she feels in her self by the Possession of Creatures Whether these Objects are spiritual or Corporal the Desires which we have of them are always carnal in the Language of Scripture For which reasen it is that St. Paul puts Dissentions and Emulations among the Works of the Flesh. So that it is a no less carnal Lust to desire Glory and Reputation and all that serves in order to it than to desire the Pleasures of the Body because these Objects are no more our true good than the other God does no more permit that we should part our Love between him and Reputation between him and the 〈◊〉 of Men than between him and feasting and other Bodily Pleasures For 't is always the Division of a thing which was all due to him 'T is always a Debasement of the Soul which being made for Good stoops beneath and degrades her self in being willing to enjoy a Creature either equal or inferiour to her self God is great enough to be the only and intire Object of our Heart and 't is to injure him to divide it because 't is in effect to declare to him that he does not deserve it all You see here is the Judgment of a whole Society of great Men no less than the illustrious Port Royal of France in as clear and express Terms as can be to our purpose 'T were infinite to appeal to all those Writers who have either directly asserted this Conclusion or occasionally let fall Expressions that favour and insinuate it There is hardly a Book of Morality or Devotion extant whererein Passages of this Nature are not to be found I do not say there are many that offer to deduce this Conclusion from Principles but that it is generally held and upon all Occasions alluded to and glanced at which is enough to shew the irresistible Prevalency of the Truth and to skreen them from the prejudice and imputation of Novelty and Singularity who undertake upon a rational Ground to clear and defend it ERRATA PAge 44. Line 7. dele ◠l. 8. read from enjoying pleasures that do very much out-weigh it and is it self an Occasion and Medium to p. 49. l. 9. after pretend add 〈◊〉 p. 50. l. 6. f. that r. than p. 180. l. 15. d. that p. 192. 1. 6. f. the r. this p. 286. l. 5. r. pleases LETTERS Philosophical and Divine TO Mr. IOHN NORRIS With his Answers LETTER 1. To Mr. Norris SIR THough some morose Gentlemen wou'd perhaps remit me to the Distaff or the Kitchin or at least to the Glass and the Needle the proper Employments as they fancy of a Womans Life yet expecting better things from the more Equitable and ingenious Mr. Norris who is not so narrow-Soul'd as to confine Learning to his own Sex or to envy it in ours I presume to beg his Attention a little to the Impertinencies of a Womans Pen. And indeed Sir there is some reason why I though a Stranger should Address to you for the Resolution of my Doubts and Information of my Judgment since you have increased my Natural Thirst for Truth and set me up for a Virtuso For though I can't pretend to a Multitude of Books Variety of Languages the Advantages of Academical Education or any Helps but what my own Curiosity afford yet Thinking is a Stock that no Rational Creature can want if they know but how to use it and this as you have taught me with Purity and Prayer which I wish were as much practis'd as they are easie to practise is the way and method to true Knowledge But setting Preface and Apology aside the occasion of giving you this trouble is this Reading the other day the Third Volume of your excellent Discourses as I do every thing you Write with great Pleasure and no less Advantage yet taking the liberty that I use with other Books and yours or no bodies will bear it to raise all the Objections that ever I can and to make them undergo the severest Test my Thoughts can put 'em to before they pass for currant a difficulty arose which without your assistance I know not how to solve Methinks there is all the reason in the World to conclude That GOD is the only efficient Cause of all our Sensations and you have made it as clear as the Day and it is equally clear from the Letter of the Commandment That GOD is not only the Principal but the sole Object of our Love But the reason you assign for it namely Because he is the only efficient Cause of our Pleasure seems not equally clear For if we must Love nothing but what is Lovely and nothing is Lovely but what is our Good and nothing is our Good but what does us Good and nothing does us Good but what causes Pleasure in us may we not by the same way of arguing say That that which Causes Pain in us does not do us Good for nothing you say does us Good but what Causes Pleasure and therefore can't be our Good and if not our Good then not Lovely and consequently not the proper much less the only Object of our Love Again if the Author of our Pleasure be upon that account the only Object of our Love then by the same reason the Author of our Pain can't be the Object of our Love and if both these Sensations be produced by the same Cause then that Cause is at once the Object of our Love and of our Aversion for it is as natural to avoid and fly from Pain as it is to follow and pursue Pleasure So that if these Principles viz. That GOD is the Efficient Cause of our Sensations Pain as well as Pleasure and that he is the only Object of our Love be firm and true as I believe they are it will then follow either that the being the Cause of our Pleasure is not the true and proper Reason why that Cause should be the Object of our Love for the Author of our Pain has as good a Title to our Love as the Author of our Pleasure Or else if nothing be the Object of our Love but what does us Good then something else does us Good besides what causes Pleasure Or to speak more properly the Cause of all our Sensations Pain as well as Pleasure being the only Object of our Love and nothing being Lovely but what does us Good consequently that which Causes Pain does us Good as well as that which Causes Pleasure and therefore it can't be true That nothing does us Good but what Causes Pleasure Perhaps I have express'd my self but crudely yet I am persuaded I 've said enough for one of your Quickness to find out either the strength or weakness of this Objection I shall not therefore trouble you any further but to beg Pardon for this and to wish you all imaginable Happiness if it be not absurd to wish Felicity to one who
be capable of different Sentiments Being modified thus it shall be affected with Grief and being modified thus it shall be affected with Pain which will be sufficiently distinguished from each other by saying that Pain is a Modification of the Soul that anticipates and prevents all Reason and Reflection and that Grief is a modification that follows it and proceeds from it Thus I choose to distinguish them rather than by subjecting as you these two Sensations in two parts of the Soul whereof I have no Idea or by calling as others that Pain which the Soul suffers by the mediation of the Body and that Grief which the same Soul suffers in and by her self without the Mediation of the Body For though according to the Law of this State Pain be always occasioned by some Motion or Change in the Parts of the Body yet since 't is the Soul that truly feels it and GOD that truly raises it I can easily conceive that GOD can if he pleases raise the Sensation of Pain in her though no Change be made in the Body nay though she had no body at all That GOD for instance can raise the Sensation of Burning in the Soul without any Impression of Fire upon her Body Which by the way may serve to shew the Impertinency of that Question among the School-men how the Soul that is an immaterial Substance can suffer when separate by by a material Fire For let them tell me how Fire affects the Soul now she is in the Body and I 'll tell them how it may torment it when out of the Body But this by the by The thing I directly intend is that since the Soul may be capable of Pain as well without the Mediation of the Body as with it this cannot be its Distinction from Grief that it affects the Soul by the Mediation of the Body But to go on as I am not satisfied with the Ground of your Distinction so neither am I with the Use and Application you make of it Mental Pain say you is an Evil but such as GOD does not cause Again sensible Pain GOD does indeed cause but then that is not properly the Evil of Man Now I cannot accord with you in either of these As to the first I think it very certain that mental Pain being a real Modification of the Soul is caused by GOD who alone is able to new modifie our Souls who only acts upon them and is able to make them happy or miserable as I have sufficiently proved in my Discourse of Divine Love and as you will evidently perceive if you retire within your self and attentively consult your Reason And I wonder why you should stick to allow GOD to be the Author of mental Pain or Grief when you allow him to be the Cause of mental Pleasure or Ioy. If he be the Cause of our Happiness why cannot he be as well the Cause of our Misery And if of Pain why not of Grief For as to the other Part that sensible Pain which God causes is not properly an Evil you will find it very hard to perswade any one that has felt it to this Paradox That I suppose which perswaded you to it was your distinguishing the Soul of Man into two Parts a superiour and an inferiour Part the Latter of which being not properly the Man that Pain which is lodg'd there cannot be said to be the proper Evil of Man Thus the Stoicks reasoned of old and thus you now But besides that this Distinction of the Soul into a superiour and inferiour Part which is the Ground of this Supposition wants it self a good Foundation I further consider that if there were such a thing as an inferiour Part of the Soul yet since the higher is conscious of and affected with what is transacted in the other I do not see what Advantage accrues from this Distinction And since 't is the same Soul that feels Pain and Grief I see no Possibility of conceiving but that Pain must be as truly an Evil as Grief And if 't were put to my Choice there are several Degrees of Grief that I would chuse to indure rather than some Pains And I would fain know whether Pain be not against the Happiness of Man or whether Happiness can consist with it You your self imply that it cannot when you say that Indolence is necessary to perfect Felicity And must not that then be an Evil that is contrary to Happiness And should you not think your self guilty of offending against that Charity which you owe to your Fellow-Creatures and which obliges you to wish and seek their Welfare if you should put any of them without Cause to Bodily Pain Or would you try to bring your self off by your Distinction of the superiour and inferiour Part of the Soul That the Pain which you inflicted was only in the inferiour Part which being not properly the Man you could not be said to have done any real Evil to him and so not to have trespassed against Charity I believe you have too much good Nature as well as Discernment to use such a Plea as this But now if Pain be not a proper and real Evil how can it be against Charity to cause it in any one For what but willing an Evil to a Man can be contrary to wishing well to him It must therefore be concluded that sensible Pain is truly an Evil as well as mental evil I mean in it self formally and simply considered and that it can become good only occasionally and consequentially as it may be a Means to avoid a greater Evil or procure a greater Good and so may mental Pain too which when all is done I think the best Apology that can be offered for God's being the Author of it and to salve him from being the Object of our Aversion upon that Account viz. to say that though sensible Pain be truly an Evil as well as mental and that though GOD be the true Cause of both yet GOD does not will our Pain as he does our Pleasure and Happiness for it self and as such but merely for the sake of something else as it is a means to our greater good And is therefore so far from meriting our Hatred for the Pain which he causes in us that he ought for that very reason to be loved by us since 't is for the sake of Pleasure that he causes Pain This I take to be the most satisfactory Account of the Difficulty which as it resolves into what I offered in my last so 't is what you your self think fit after all to take up with as your last Expedient toward the latter Part of your Letter where indeed you deliver your self very nobly upon this Occasion Madam I have now done with the Body of your Notion and have now only to consider some looser Parts that relate to it You say you think it an unquestionable Maxim that all our Good is wholly and absolutely from GOD and all our Evil
Virtue of a bare Submission consists such a passive Obedience to GOD is like the new Notion some have got of passive Obedience to their Governors a being content to suffer when we know not how to help it but our Divine Amorist has an intire Complacency in whatever GOD allots he in a manner goes forth to meet it chuses justifies and rejoyces in it But I must not omit what the holy Scripture makes a peculiar Character and special Effect of Divine Love and that is the Love of our Neighbour That it is so needs no Proof being expresly affirmed by our Lord himself and his beloved Disciple let us inquire a little into the Reason why it is so which seems to be this GOD by the Prerogative of his Nature his infinite Beneficence and Love to us having a Right to all our Love whether it be Love of Desire or Love of Benevolence but withal being no proper Object of the latter by reason of his infinite Fulness has therefore thought fit to devolve all his Right to that Love on our Neighbour and to require as strict a Payment of it to his Proxy as if he were capable of receiving it himself By this Notion we may fairly understand St. Iohn's reasoning in his 1 st Epist. Chap. 4. 20. a Text which those Expositors that I have met with give methinks but a crude Interpretation of And besides the Love of GOD pressing us to such an exact Imitation of him as I shewed in my last and GOD being in nothing more imitable than in his Charity and Communicativeness our Love to him will require us to transcribe this most lovely Pattern and to do all the good we can to those whom he is constantly pursuing with his Benefits It likewise teaches us the true Measure of Benevolence which is to bestow the greatest Share of our Love on those who are dearest to GOD and do most resemble him I cannot forbear to reckon it an irregular Affection and an Effect of Vitious Self-love to love any Person merely on account of his Relation to us All other Motives being equal this may be allowed to weigh down the Scale but certainly no Man is the better in himself for being akin to me and nothing but an overweaning Opinion of my self can induce me to think so I should therefore chuse to derive the Reasons why we are in the first place to regard our Relations rather from Justice and the Rules of Oeconomy than from Love For since the Abilities of Man are finite and determinate and he cannot universally extend any Act of Benevolence but Prayers and Wishes 't is therefore reasonable he should begin to communicate his Benefits to those within his own Verge and District whose Wants he is best acquainted with and can most conveniently supply whose Benefits to him are presumed to require this Return or else their Necessities bespeak him the fittest Author of their Relief I further observe that Resignation and Charity are the Tests by which GOD explores every Man's Love By the one he tries the prosperous by the other the afflicted He therefore who has this Worlds good and with-holds his Assistance from his Brother who needs it and he who because he has not the good things of this World murmurs and grudges at their Dispensation and envies them that have cannot be said to have the Love of GOD in him In the last place a true Lover of GOD is always consistent with himself one Part of his Life does not clash and disagree with the other He that has many Loves has by consequence many Ends whence it is that we too often see many who in the main are good People lash out into some particular Irregularity which like a Fly in a Box of Oyntment marrs the Sweetness and destroys the Loveliness of their Virtue and brings a Reproach on Religion it self The vulgar and Men of carnal Appetites partly out of Ignorance and partly to lighten as they fancy their own Crimes being too prone to reflect that Dash of secular Interest that time-serving or over-great Solicitude for the World or perhaps their too great Opinion of themselves or Censoriousness on others which zealous Pretenders to Piety are sometimes apt to slip into even on that unblemished Beauty whose Livery they wear which I am sure gives no Allowance to such unsuitable Mixtures however her Votaries happen to admit them But when we act by this one grand Principle the Love of GOD our Lives are uniform and regular wherein the great Beauty of Piety consists For I am apt to think that be Mens Pretences what they will that Life only is truly religious which is all of a Piece when a Man having deliberately bottomed on well-chosen and solid Principles without Fear or Favour acts constantly and steddily according to them To conclude this Divine Love is the Seal of our Adoption the Earnest of the Spirit in our Hearts it being impossible that the Soul that truly loves GOD should ever fail of enjoying him 'T is the Antipast of our Happiness here and the full Consummation of it hereafter Thrice happy Soul that canst look through the Veil and notwithstanding that thick Cloud of Creatures that obscures thy View discern him that is invisible live in the Light of his Countenance all the Time of thy sojourning here and at last pure and defecate with a Kiss of thy Beloved breath out thy self into his sacred Bosom And now Sir I have done for what have I further to add since I cannot sufficiently express how much I think my self obliged to you As for all your other Favours so particularly that you give me Occasion to declare my self Worthy Sir Your most unfeigned Friend As well as humble Servant Iune 21. 1694. APPENDIX Two Letters by way of Review To Mr. Norris YOu 'll wonder Sir that I look back upon a finished Subject but because you have in these Letters answered most of the Objections that are made against your printed Discourse and because I am very desirous your Hypothesis should appear in its full Light though in my first I conceded one of the main things you contend for viz. That GOD is the only efficient Cause of all our Sensation yet since very many object against this Proposition and something has offered it self to my Thoughts perhaps not altogether Impertinent give me leave to examine the matter a little furrher And methinks the main Stress of the Objections lies in these two Points First That this Theory renders a great Part of GOD's Workmanship vain and useless Secondly That it does not well comport with his Majesty For the first That this Theory renders a great Part of GOD's Workmanship vain and useless it may be thus argued Allowing that Sensation is only in the Soul that there is nothing in Body but Magnitude Figure and Motion and that being without Thought it self it is not able to produce it in us and therefore those Sensations whether of Pleasure or Pain which we
utterly impracticable For after all if I were not to take away my Hand from the Fire till I had entered into the Philosophy of it examined the Figure and Motion of its little Particles and considered the several Relations they had to the Configuration of my Body I should be burnt before I had a quarter ended my Speculation It is necessary therefore that there should be a quicker and a shorter Way of advertizing the Soul of the several Relations that other Bodies bear to her own and of the Conveniency or Disconveniency of their Impressions Which can be only by a suitable Sentiment either of Pleasure or Pain according as the Impression happens to be But this is an Advertisement I must in vain expect from Bodies They can give me no Intelligence of what even themselves do to me They can indeed change the Situation of the Parts of my Body but they cannot give any Sentiment to my Mind or new modifie my Soul GOD only is able to do this and accordingly being willing that I should know the Relations that other Bodies bear to mine with as little Trouble as may be it being not fit that a Soul made for the Contemplation of an infinite Good should be occupied and taken up with anxious Disquisitions about Bodies he leaves it not to my Reason to explore and sift out the Congruities or Discongruities of other Bodies with mine which would not only be a laborious but after all a very fallacious and uncertain Way but in Wisdom thinks fit to go another way to work and to give me due Information of these things by the short incontestable Proof of Sentiment And because Pleasure and Pain are the natural Marks of Physical good and evil and withal the strongest and most quickning Motives to incline me to seek or shun the Use of Bodies accordingly these are the two general Sensations he raises in my Soul according as the Impressions are which are made upon my Body Thus for Instance when the Motion of the Fire is moderate and temperate upon my Body and serves only to open and supple its Parts to quicken my Blood and to cherish and recreate my Spirits I feel a Sentiment of Pleasure But when it comes to be intemperate so as to indanger the Rupture of any of its Fibres I feel a contrary sentiment of Pain which admonishes me of the imminent Evil and in a Language that even Children and Idiots understand bids me remove my self at a greater Distance And all this with a great deal of Reason For though there be nothing in the Motions themselves resembling those sensations which attend them and though the Motion which occasions Pleasure differ only in Degree from that which occasions Pain which by the way is a plain Argument that those Motions do not properly cause or produce those sensations yet since as far as they respect the Preservation of the Machine and the good of the Bodily Life or State they differ essentially or in their whole Kind it is fit they should be attended with sensations essentially different such as Pleasure and Pain which therefore GOD raises in the soul in Consequence of those general Laws of Union which he has established between it and the Body touching it as it ought to be touched in relation to the Difference of sensible Objects The Wisdom and Goodness of which Conduct we can never sufficiently meditate upon or admire And now Madam I can no sooner suppose you to have gone over in your Thoughts this account concerning the Manner of sensation than to have formed within your self a satisfactory solution of the Difficulties you propose For though these sensible Objects are not the true Causes of those Sensations which we feel in our Souls upon the Impressions they make in our Bodies but only Conditions determining the Agency of the true Cause yet it does by no means follow from hence that therefore they serve for nothing and are wholly unnecessary No the contrary appears from the Account before given For though these Objects do not act upon our spirits or truly and properly speaking produce any sensation there yet they do really make an Impression upon our Bodies and according to the different Measure or Manner of that Impression minister to GOD the true efficient an apt and proper Occasion to act upon our spirits and so in this respect are not merely positive and arbitrary Conditions 'T is true indeed if by positive and arbitrary Conditions you mean that there is no real Analogy or necessary Connexion abstracting from all Will or Constitution of GOD about it between such Impressions and such sensations so they are mere positive and arbitrary Conditions For most assuredly there is nothing in those Motions that either answers the following sensations or naturally and necessarily infers them But if by positive and arbitrary Conditions you mean that there is no greater Reason why GOD in Consideration of the Welfare of the Body should give the Soul such a Sentiment rather than another upon such an Impression so they are not mere positive and arbitrary Conditions For though that Motion which is followed with Pleasure has no Physical Analogy with Pleasure as differing only in Degree from that which is followed with Pain whereas Pleasure and Pain differ essentially and so though GOD might if he pleased exchange sensations giving me suppose a sentiment of Pain when the Motion of the Fire is temperate and according to the present Order of things ought to be followed with a sentiment of Pleasure and so likewise giving me a sentiment of Pleasure when the Motion of the Fire is intemperate and so according to the present Establishment ought to be followed with a sentiment of Pain I say though he might thus transpose cur sensations for any Physical Proportion or Connexion that is between them and their respective Motions yet in regard to the good State of the Body it is not so fit and reasonable that he should as is obvious to conceive And this is all the Sensible Congruity I can allow you For in short if by sensible Congruity you mean only that considering the Good or Evil that arrives to the State of the Body from such an Impression there is an antecedent Aptness or Reason in the thing why GOD should touch the Soul with such or such a Sentiment rather than with its contrary I readilly acknowledge that there is such a sensible Congruity But if by sensible Congruity you mean as you seem to do that there is any natural similitude or Proportion between such an Impression and such a sentiment as to the things themselves or that by virtue of this Analogy such an Impression has any natural Efficacy to produce or in your Language to draw forth such a sentiment in this sense I deny that there is any such thing as a sensible Congruity that is I deny that sensible Objects have any such Congruity with our sensations as to be able to contribute any thing by way