be stronger Now this is another motion a derived motion and a derived sound from the same first cause but as the motion was the immediate cause of the first sound so the first sound was parent and immediate cause of the second sound Now here is a divers sound and a divers subject the ecchoing place or the ayre dissipated and expulsed the subject of that eccho but the bodies moved or the ayr forced by these bodies the subject of the first This is one way of Philosophers and doth abundantly satisfie his objection and shew there are outward subjects to these two sounds each hath his own But others make this eccho a kind of rebound of that sound not onely stopping the ayre which carried the sound from going farther but retorting it againe from whence it came like a Ball which moves at the first by the hand that banded it out but when it is stopt by a wall returnes towards the place it moved from first if it meet with the wall in a right line to its motion or if oblique moves obliquely and may in that motion be retorted by two or three walls and this answer shews the outward subject of this sound to be the ayre which carries it about with it and is retorted A third way is of such who conceive the subject of this sound to be ayre in which at the first it was propagated and that sound from that place and subject of its birth emitts as colours do its species and likenesse which by ecchoing places are entertained as the images of colours are in looking-glasses and there shew themselves and from them multiply themselves to the ear or perhaps to other ecchoing places as glasses transmit their species and this likewise fully answers his objection and shews how there may be one subject and divers ecchoes of the same sound if the sound be double it hath a diverse subject if it be a rebound the same ball is diversly retorted from the power of the same stroak by divers wals if it be a species or likeness the same colour with divers images of it Let no man expect my opinion be it any of these it serves my turne to invalid his argument and these opinions and some expressions like these might he have observed in Philosophers and ought to have confuted Sect. 3. But he proceeds with a Philosophical Axiome Nothing can make any thing which is not in it self There are some rules given by Philosophers which are something like this as Nihil dat quod non habet Nothing can give that to another which it self hath not But not to trouble a Reader with other distinctions this is sufficient for our businesse nothing can give another what it self hath not either formaliter formally inhering in it or virtualiter that is it hath power of producing it A man who hath not a peny in his purse formally yet having it vertually can give another a thousand pounds by his Bond or command to his Steward The heavens which according to Aristotles Philosophy have no heat in them formally yet vertually by their Philosophy produce heat in sublunary bodies The steel and flint which are cold and have no fire in them no formal fire yet knockt together having it vertually produce fire enough to burn a world Instances might fill this sheet but this last is very pat to this business The two bodies which make a noise or sound have not the noise or sound in them formally but like fire in a flint so doth sound lye asleep in them and by their collision and knocking together this fire is produced I have discoursed of this Proposition before as it was applied to sight under those termes as I remember that motion produceth nothing but motion Sect. 4. I go on with him he saith the Clapper the Bell the ayr have motions but not sounds then he brings this motion to the brain and there he saith is motion and not sound last of all he gives this motion a rebound from the braine to the nerves outward and thence it becometh an apparition without which we call sound What I have delivered before concerning the object of sight I guess may be applied to this of sound but in particular here are some peculiar absurdities which I will examine as that he saith the rebound to the nerves outward nerves in the plural number not naming what so that by this Philosophy for all I see a man may heare with his eyes or nose for the rebound may be made to them and he names not any nerve of the ear and truly for all I see by his rebounds a man may see with his ears and heare with his eyes for either of these are capable of such motions as he speaks of But then let me ask this Philosopher how this motion becomes an apparition Had that motion that apparition before or not If not how came it by if afterwards neither could that motion give it that nature of a sound or apparition which it had not according to his Philosophy nor any thing else that had it not If the motion had it before then either in the brain the ayr the bell or clapper which he denied If any thing else had it before and then produced it then there was sound before and this was not the production of sound but he doth not say that it is sound but that the apparition is called sound but as before concerning light of what was that an apparition was is not an apparition of sound Then sound was somewhere else and then how was it made an apparition was it made by that which had an apparition in it or not as before Sect. 5. This is all he hath written there concerning sounds he runs over all the senses And saith he to proceed to the rest of the senses it is apparent enough that the some and taste of the same-thing are not the same to every man and therefore are not in the thing smelt or tasted but in the men short and sweet and he shall have as short an answer nay I shall make his argument stronger and then refute it Smell and taste of the same thing are not the same to the same man at divers times and yet it doth not follow that these qualities smelt are not in the object for the defects and ill qualifications of the Organ do disrelish and alter the thing tasted and yet upon consideration of his terms I grant his Proposition and his inference but say that neither prove the conclusion he proposed His Proposition is true for he saith Smell and taste are in the men not in the thing smelt and tasted it is true these are immanent acts and are in the Organ produced by the power of the sensitive soul and are not in the object but this concludes not against the Universities that as there is no colour in the object so there should be no odour or savour but produced according to his
of light and not of motion for although perhaps he may say it is an Image of light in motion yet it is an Image of the light not of the motion which was his proposition to prove Sect. 8. But he proceeds to explaine himself That is to say in the object if we look directly on it and in the glasse or water when we look upon it in the time of reflection which in effect is the third proposition consider first the coherence he said before that the Image was in the line by which the object was last c. mark now that is to say in the object or glasse you cannot say that the object or glasse were in the line but one of the extream termes of the line and indeed not Terminus Initians beginning which in some sense may be said in the line but Terminus à quo the terme from which the line takes its motion which can in no sense be said to be in it Then conceive that he saith the Image is in the object when we look directly upon it which is most unreasonable that the Image and the thing imagined should be in the same subject Then conceive it to be affirmed of the Image of light of which he spoke the Image of that is no where as I have shewed it self indeed as it is propagated is Imago lucis an Image of that light which is inherent in some lucide bodies as I have conceived and if not because I love not to multiply controversies yet it is such a thing which neither is nor can be represented by any image but only as it is incorporated into some body so that a light body may be seen in a glasse or water but not light its self neither in its self or Image terminating our sight Now saith he this in effect is the third proposition but let a man put them together and see which way these can prove that Image and colour is but an apparition of motion there is no appearance of proof But he seems to proceed in proof of this cause numb 8. This number is very long I will therefore take it in pieces Sect. 9. But saith he that from all lucide shining illuminate bodies there is a motion produced to the eye and through the eye to the optick Nerve and so into the brain by which that apparition of light and colour is affected I think it should be effected is not hard to prove This Proposition if proved conduceth not to the confirmation of the conclusion which he intends the conclusion which he aims at is that image and colour are an apparition of motion Now here he sayes he will prove that by this motion which he speaks of the apparition of light and colour is effected his Proposition is that image and colour are apparitions of motion he sets down to be proved that by this motion there is an apparition of light and colour Image and colour are the subject in one of the Propositions and motion the predicate motion the subject in the latter and light and colour the predicate in nothing the same which is a most illogical way of discoursing and extreamly fallacious to any Reader who by this means when he finds any thing proved mistrusts that all is so although he know not why So it seems if this were granted it were not material but let us see his proof Sect. 10. And first saith he it is evident that the fire the only lucide body upon earth worketh by motion equally every way insomuch as the motion of it stopt or enclosed it is presently extinguished and no more fire He is not to be trusted no not for that which he sayes he sees for that which he sayes is evident I am confident to him that hath eyes appeares otherwise that fire doth not work equally every way for a candle any fire that you ever looked on consider whether it move not by its flame upwards for although in a candle it necessarily creep downward for its sustenance yet the motion of the fire is upward more then any other way whether the endeavour it hath to propagate its like which is innate in every thing makes it follow the smoak as a fit matter to be ignified and made fire or a desire to ascend to the place of motion as heavy things downward which I am likely to vindicate from his scorn hereafter whatsoever it is that it is done is evident against that which he sayes is evident that it moves equally every way Sect. 11. Why he should say what follows I understand not that is in so much as the motion of it stopt or inclosed it is presently extinguished and no more fire for this no way proves or illustrates the equal motion of the fire for first the hindering of the operation of the second acts doth not destroy the first and essence of any thing the stoping of the streams doth not presently destroy the Fountain but the taking away the Fountain dries the stream and so it is betwixt the first act which is the form of any thing and the second which are the operations Now the hindering a man from discourse which is a second act doth not destroy his being and nature to hinder or stop the motion of fire is such And that which he saith that it is presently extinguished and no more fire he must take that terme presently in a very large sense for a little time for we see fire raked up in embers keeps its being many hours yea daies without motion but feeding upon its own bowels and consuming away but it is then ruined by enclosure when no ayre is suffered to come to nourish it or else some fumes distilled down upon it doe suffocate it as I say then so I may add therefore not because its motions are stopt or inclosed for which he gives no reason but because it lacks ayr to nourish it or is suffocated as before yet suppose it were this is done when the motion principally aimes upward no whit the more for its distending its self about In my life I never read a reasonable man talke so unreasonably of sense Sect. 12. He goes on And further that that motion whereby the fire worketh is dilation and contraction of it self alternately commonly called Scintillation or glowing is manifest also by experience There was never heard the like did ever any man experimentally find such a motion or was ever contraction called glowing or sparkling the motion of fire is either that which is natural to inflame or ignifie the neighbouring body or what is in way to it to heat and warme what is about it and by that and that effect out of it exsiccation to prepare a matter for a form of fire other motion I acknowledg none in fire that which he calls contraction I conceive to be nothing but when the smoak or ambient ayr supplyes it not with a fit matter for a flame then negatively it cannot
oppâ—est with the Negotiations of the day will busie its self about them in the Night as is most apparent so that I remember that the first Latine verses which I made were made in my sleep my thoughts having run upon nothing else in the day busied themselves about them in the night and you shall observe that a dog used to hunting barks in his sleep with the like earnestness and useth actions of that nature so that all natural dreams spring not from the inward parts Sect. 3. But in his 3. Chap. of Humane Nature he offers at some reasons to prove his conclusion and they are delivered at numb 3. under the name of a Sign thus The signes by which this appeareth to be so are the differences of dreams old men commonly dream oftner and have their dreams more painful then the young proceeding from the different accidents of mans body Thus he I conceive this Instance mistaken God be praised I have lived to the age of an old man and I find it other because I think my thoughts are more composed and by practice have made my passions less violent and trouble my self wâ—â— h lesse eagerness of businesse but he saith only Old men commonly and then I say this may be a sign but not a certain one yea in natural things very weak for the course of Nature is constant and is a sign that that proposition of his which is universally proposed is not universally true That many times natural Dreams may arise from such inward causes may be granted because they co-operate with the businesse or thoughts or passions to which that man is inclined but most oft they fail when it is otherwise What he further disputes there to shew that such and such Constitutions do produce alike effects in the dreams of those persons I deny not so it be not universally affirmed for we read of some men who never dreamed but in the same Numb pag. 23. he proceeds to another sign thus Another sign that Dreams are caused by the Actions of the inward parts is the disorder and casual consequence of one conception or image to another I grant the conclusion that may be deduced hence that is that some Dreams may arise hence but deny the universality for fancy not guided by reason but taking things as by chance they offer themselves out of that book of the memory may be as confused and disorderly as any disturbance that comes from the inward parts yea that confusion can hardly be conceived to come from the inward parts for suppose the predominant humor be Melancholy or choler these can suggest only such fancies when on a sudden we may observe that Dreams alter their conditions and sometimes in an instant change from one fancy to another which that constant condition of the humor cannot promote his instance which he immediately gives is not perswasive thus For when we are waking the antecedent thought or conception introduceth and is cause of the consequent as the water follows a mans finger upon a dry and level Table but in Dreams there is commonly no coherence This Example seems to me most incongruous to this purpose for the understanding of man waking and his fancy are imployed and set at work by his will which often interrupts and crosseth the Chaine of Consequences and imployes the Reason sometimes to seek out new reasons other fingers to draw water to its end sometimes commands that finger to stop in the midst of its progress and so the finger imployed other where is not followed by the water but in a Dream if it arise from such a Physical cause as many times it doth a man may conceive rather why things as they are linked together in the Memory should follow one another when one is moved or raised up because there is no Superiour Power to controul that Consequence CHAP. XI Sensitive creatures not intelligent Their specifick differences Their Sagacity Sect. 1 WEll that we may part with a Gingle the rest of his Fancies of dreams and his dreams of Fancies I let pass for the present guessing that what is material in that Discourse will conveniently be met with hereafter and now skip to the latter end of the Chap. 2. pag. 8. where he defines understanding to be that imagination which is raised in every creature by word or voluntary signes I should have let this passe with the rest but that I am unwilling to betray that noble faculty of mans soul his Understanding by which he is sever'd from and exalted above all other sublunary creatures to that sordid condition of being onely a sensual quality That we may the better apprehend this we will first observe that these words and other such signs which are apprehended by things meerly sensual although the signs are voluntary such as are imposed by any sign-maker yet they are perceived to have such signification by those Beasts or Dogs and the like not in a rational or intellectual manner but a natural for custome meerly which is another nature and doth the same way facilitate any thing to us as Nature doth is the onely cause of their apprehension of these and this custome works onely by these two Principles of a love to that which is profitable for them and a detestation of that is hurtful which is nothing but that natural appetite before spoken of for when any of these find that by coming at such a word he is rewarded by disobeying such a menace he provokes his own punishment he by custom being sensible of this doth accordingly Nor do any of those words signifie any more to thar Beast but his pleasure or pain he understands not any simple term what it signifies but only these two things and from these Principles they do not only listen to the words but speak them as Parrots without any understanding more then their belly and by that you may have Corvos Poetas Now here is no understanding in these Acts but almost like a Tree which if you use to keep bent it will grow such so these being used to the reward or punishment upon such words do apprehend them such and naturally follow or avoid them But because there are some acts in these beasts which have a nearer affinity with Reason then these he specifies although I have already written somewhat to this purpose I will for the further satisfaction of the Reader enlarge my self a little and so pass on to other things Sect. 2. As it is with man who is one kind or species of Animals that he hath besides that general nature of a sensitive soul another soul which distinguisheth him from other Animals so likewise it is with the other species or kinds of Animals they must have some particular soul or degree of a sensitive soul which may distinguish them from man and one from each other as the Canine or doggish soul distinguisheth a dog from a lion a beare a cat a man
a husbanding of these seeds and therefore these words must needs be taken in that Indefinite sense they are exprest that these are the seeds of all Religion I will consider them apart and fiâ—st the Opinion of Ghosts is a seed of Religion Sect. 2. All the Opinion of Ghosts which he expresseth in the former part of this Chapter he makes to be an Error now for Errour to be a sâ—ed of Truth was never heard of before an ill tree cannot bring forth good fruit nor ill seed a good tree Errour the greater growth it hath the greater is the Errour but it never growes into Truth Again in the seventh Chapter he makes Opinion to be a very weak assurance as indeed it is although his description of it is weak in that place but the assurance that there is a God is the greatest that may be and therefore not to grow out of such a seed Thirdly consider that although there can be no assurance of God without an assurance of a Ghost or Spirit because God is exprest in Scripture to be a Spirit yet the beliefe and assurance of God cannot grow out of the Opinion of Ghosts for although the Opinion of Ghosts hath many reasonable and probable arguments in Nature to induce it which prevailed with many Philosophers to perswade them that there were such things yet the Arguments for them are not of like force with those which evince there is a God and therefore the assurance of God may introduce and be a seed of the Opinion of Ghosts but the opinion of Ghosts which is lesse certain and lesse evident cannot introduce it He brings no manner of proof for what he speakes and in his Catalogue of those Deities which this opinion should produce Pag 55. He nameth Chaos Ocean Planets Men Women and other things which have no likeness with Ghosts or Spirits although his Daemons and some others have Now although the opinion of Spirits may perswade a Religion towards those things which were thought Spirits yet it could never invite but would crosse and oppose those Religions which were paid to corporeall things for by all men who have writ of Spirits both Christian and others Spirits are thought to have a more God like power in them then Bodies and therefore the opinion of them could not introduce the other Sect. 3. His second seed is ignorance of second Causes a most unhappy and unreasonable speech Ignorance the Mother of Religion Ignorance of second Causes cannot make a man acknowledge the first Rom. 1.20 S. Paul saith The Invisible things of Him that is of God from the Creation of the world are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made even his eternal Power and Godhead This understanding of eternal Power and Godhead is the foundation and ground of Religion and this was visible although not in its self yet in the things that are made the second Causes so that not the ignorance but the knowledge of the second Causes like Iacobs ladder leads us from one to another step by step until we ascend to the highest and first Cause This he himself acknowledgeth before but as he often doth so he now forgot what he had said Ignorance of second Causes that they are second and mistaking them for first may make a man think them Gods and so turne a Religion to them but as may appear at the bottome of the preceding Page 53. he understands the Ignorance of the Causation of second Causes which without doubt is so farre from bringing in Religion that it is apt to produce Atheism and an opinion that the world is governed by chance not by Providence So that as for his first I deny it to be a Seed of Religion that is the opinion of Ghosts so for this Second the Ignorance of second Causes I affirm that is an enemy to Religion stopping the Soul from ascending up to Heaven by breaking the lowest step of that Ladder which is fixed on Earth Sect. 4. His third Seed is Devotion towards what we fear That feare Timor Reverentialis may be a seed the fomenter and cherisher of Religion yea an act of Religion I do not doubt but that that ugly sordid feare which he speaks of as appeares in the bottom of Page 52. is not to be imagined for the first feare ariseth out of the knowledge and apprehension we have of the Excellency of God but this second feare he speaks of out of Ignorance of Causes Because men know there are Causes saith he of every thing but know not those causes therefore they impute their good or evill fortune to some invisible Agent This ignorance oâ— Causes must needs be understood of second Causes for ignorance of the first Cause can never make a man worship the first nor impute the production of things to him It is true the ignorance of some Attributes as his goodness may make a Maniche think there is an ill God and the same ignorance may produce almost as ill an opinion in others that God is the Author of the evil of sin the one not apprehending his internal goodness conceives God evil in himself the other not apprehending his Goodness in operation his Benignity makes him do and produce that is ill but the ignorance of him as a first Cause can never introduce a Religion to him But then take this ignorance of causes to be the ignorance of the Causation of second Causes we cannot conceive how that should breed a fear of an invisible Agent as he terms it unless it be that god Fortune which the Poet derideth Te facimus Fortuna Deum coeloque locamus And worthily for there can be nothing more contradictory then the Providence of God and the Blindness of Fortune Now when men cannot find the Chain of Causes which produce the effects they discerned and cannot perceive how they depend upon the first Cause as they cannot who discern not the second they must needs have that doubt or fear that they are acted by Fortune and all things fall alike to all without either being rewards or punishments Rods or Scourges c. And therefore is so far from introducing of Religion as it leads to Atheisme But it is not said that this fear but the Devotion to what we feare is the Seed of Religion I could have wished that among other his expositions of words he had put down what he means by Devotion but he hath not Consider then the sense of it is Voto decernere to decree a thing to another by a vow so that when one devotes a thing to another he then decrees it in a sacred manner to be his Now then Devotion to what we feare is decreeing some thing to it by way of Vow Devotion then to what we feare if that we feare be God is not a seed but a fruit and act of Religion for Religion is not only as he not vainly onely but wickedly and prophanely defines Chap. 6. page 26. Feare of
will not meddle with what concernes not my present business but remit the madness of the worlds infinity in magnitude as not pertinent to my purpose and apply my self to that which is in his following words about Eternity Sect. 8. Preterea etsi ex eo quod nihil potest movere seipsum Moreover saith he although out of this that nothing can move it self may be right enough inferred that there is some first moving thing which shall be Eternall yet that cannot be inferred thence which men doe use to inferre to wit an eternal immoveable but contrariwise an eternall thing moved for as it is true that nothing is moved of its self so it is true likewise that nothing is moved but from a thing moved He is a most unhappy man in his way of reasoning this contradicts wâ—at went before for if from that conclusion which he holds true nothing can move its self may be deduced a first mover which is Eternall it necessarily follows that men ascending from effects to immediate causes thence to others may arrive at that which is eternall which was denyed not six lines before and hath been confuted by me Againe observe that that inference which he censures must be true and his inference false For if there be a first mover and every thing moved is moved by another then that which moves must it self be unmoved for if it move then that was not the first mover but rather that other thing which moved that he said was the first moveable for a first can have nothing before it but that moveable according to his Philosophy must have another moved thing which moves it And for the two Propositions out of which he draws his inference he saith they are alike true I that they are a like false that which saith nothing moves its self For the nature of every thing as Aristotle defines it is the Principle of motion and rest of each natural body that is the natural motion and rest and therefore moves every natural body naturally And therefore the other Proposition is like false which saith that every thing which is moved is moved by something which is moved it self which can be affirmed of none but violent motions they are forced by something without but neither natural nor animal motions And this Philosophy he might have known to have been delivered by many of his friends the Schoolemen who disavow Aristotle in that Argument I will leave his discourse in the middle which is a proud contempt of such as labour to prove the beginning of the World and close with him again towards the latter end of 237. Pag. where he endeavours to answer an Argument somwhat like that which I urge but how weakly let the Reader judge The Argument it self is not so strong as mine and shall together be both examined Sect. 9. He begins thus Quis enim hoc modo demonstrantem laudet Who saith he will praise a man after this manner demonstrating if the world be Eternal then the number of dayes or any other measure of time infinite hath preceded the birth of Abraham but the nativity of Abraham preceded the nativity of Isaac therefore one infinite or one eternity should be greater then another which is absurd thus farre he Consider first the affinity this Argument hath with mine in the place to which this should be inserted his Argument is drawne from the number of Dayes mine of paternity which overthrows one of his Answers at the first view as will appear in its place But that whâ—ch he seems to apply his strength against is that Axiom one Infinite cannot be greater then another This is used concerning infinite in number the reason of this is because whatsoever is infinite is boundlesse it cannot be out-gone but its self out-goes every thing of its kind now what is greater then another containes that and exceeds it so foure exceeds three and therefore gives it bounds a hundred and every number is bounded it is not 100. and one it is bounded in its self and therefore every number hath its internal bounds and if it be exceeded it hath external bounds Minimum quod non as his friends the Schooles speak so well as maximum quod sic it hath the least terme of that it cannot extend to as the greatest it can exist in Sect. 10. Well let us consider his answer Similis demonstratio est It is a like Demonstration saith he as if he from thence that there is an infinite number of equall numbers therefore he should conclude that that there were so many equal numbers as there are numbers equal and unequal together taken I find a mighty errour run through his whole work which doth not become a Mathematician is evident in this Answer that he disputes Ex non concessis his Answer is drawn from a supposal that there is an infinite number of equal numbers which is false there is no infinite of either equal or unequal numbers for suppose the world made of Atomes with Democritus although they are called Infinite because mans eye cannot discern them nor his wit apprehend them yet they being bodies that have dimensions must have a finite nature and therefore a certain number of them must goe to the constituting another bigger body suppose a Million to make a barly corne what number you will yet it is a number and that number may be reckoned by unities every one for a Million and so every million of Millions may afterwards be reckoned by unities as one may goe for a Million or Millions and a million of sheets or papers may be filled by these or more greater numbers may be united yet they are and will be a certain number of them and the things of this world are made in number by GOD Almighty aswell as measure and weight as the Son of Sirak Wisdom 11.20 Well then there is no infinite number he answers from an impossible supposal but now hence doth he inferre If I should grant there were an infinite number of equall numbers then that should be equal to all numbers even equall and unequall yes it must for there cannot be an infinite number of unities but must be equall to infinite twoes threes twenties hundreds for 〈◊〉 which is infinite hath no bounds if it had not infinite twenties infinite Millions indeed infinite infinites it had some bounds it is not infinite whatsoever by any reckonings even by myriads can be bounded is not infinite can be exceeded therefore it is absurd to say the world was infinite in duration for if we conceive it infinite as I argue there must be as many paternities of Adam as of Robert and all that number of paternities betwixt Adam and Robert are no addition A drop in the Sea is an addition because the Sea is bounded and finite but if it were infinite there could be no addition to it The greatest number that is may have addition because it is