Father MALEBRANCHE HIS TREATISE Concerning the SEARCH after TRUTH The Whole WORK Complete To which is Added The AUTHOR's TREATISE OF Nature and Grace BEING A Consequence of the PRINCIPLES contained in the SEARCH Together with His ANSWER to the ANIMADVERSIONS upon the First Volume His DEFENCE against the ACCUSATIONS of Monsieur De la Ville c. Relating to the same Subject All TRANSLATED by T. TAYLOR M. A. Late of Magdalen College in OXFORD The SECOND EDITION Corrected with great Exactness With the ADDITION of A Short Discourse upon LIGHT and COLOURS By the same AUTHOR Communicated in Manuscript to a Person of Quality in ENGLAND And never before Printed in any Language LONDON Printed by W. Bowyer for Thomas Bennet at the Half-Moon and T. Leigh and W. Midwinter at the Rose and Crown in St. Paul's Church-yard 1700. THE PREFACE THE Mind of Man is as it were by its Nature situated between its Creator and Corporeal Creatures nothing according to St. Austin being above it but GOD nor beneath it but Body But as the great Elevation it obtains above all Material Beings is no hindrance to its uniting with them and even to its Depending after a sort upon a Piece of Matter so notwithstanding the infinite distance between the Sovereign Being and the Humane Mind the latter is immediately and most intimately united with the former This last Union exalts the Mind above all things 't is this which gives it Life and Light and all its Happiness And of this Union it is St. Austin speaks in very many Places of his Works as of that which is most Natural and Essential to it On the contrary the Union it has with the Body extremely debases it and is at this Day the Principal Cause of all its Errours and its Miseries I do not wonder that the vulgar part of Men or that the Heathen Philosophers should only consider in the Soul its Relation and Union with the Body without acknowledging any Union or Relation that it has to GOD But I admire that the Christian Philosophers who ought to prefer the Spirit of GOD to the Mind of Man Moses to Aristotle St. Austin to any wretched Commentatour upon an Heathen Philosopher should regard the Soul rather as the Form of the Body than as made in and for the Image of GOD that is according to St. Austin for Truth to which alone She is immediately united 'T is true the Soul is united to the Body and is naturally the Form of it but 't is likewise true that she is united to GOD in a much stricter and more essential manner The Relation she has to her Body might have not been But her Relation to GOD is so essential that 't is impossible to conceive GOD should create a Spirit without it It is evident that GOD can have no other End of acting than Himself that He cannot create Spirits but to know and love Him that he can neither give them any Knowledge nor impress upon them any Love but what is for and tends to Himself but He might have refus'd to unite to Bodies those Spirits which He has united Therefore the Relation of our Minds to GOD is Natural Necessary and absolutely Indispensible But their Relation to our Bodies though Natural is not of absolute Necessity nor of indispensible Obligation This is not a proper place to alledge all the Authorities and Arguments which might induce us to believe That it 's more essential to the Mind to be united to GOD than to a Body That would carry us out too far To expose this Truth in its just Light it would be necessary to overthrow the principal Foundations of Pagan Philosophy to explain the Corruptions of Sin to encounter what is falsly named Experience and to argue against the Prejudices and Delusions of the Senses So that to give the common sort of Men a perfect Knowledge of it is not so easie a Task as may be undertaken in a Preface However 't is not difficult to make it out to Attentive Persons and such as are skill'd in True Philosophy For they need only be put in Mind That since the Will of GOD Regulates the Nature of all things it is more congenial to the Nature of the Soul to be united to GOD by the Knowledge of Truth and by the Love of Good than to be united to the Body since 't is certain as is abovesaid that GOD created Spirits more for the Knowledge and Love of Him than for the Informing Bodies This Argument is instantly able to startle Minds any whit enlightned to render them attentive and afterwards to convince them But 't is morally impossible for Minds immers'd in Flesh and Blood whose Knowledge goes no farther than their Senses to be ever convinc'd with such kind of Reasonings No Proofs will serve these People but such as may be even felt and handled since every thing seems Chimerical that makes not some Impression on their Senses The First Man's Sin has so weakned the Union of our Mind with GOD that none but those whose Heart is purify'd and Mind enlightned can perceive it For 't is an imaginary Union in their Opinions who blindly follow the Judgments of the Senses and Motions of the Passions On the contrary it has so strengthned the Soul's Union with the Body as to make us think these two parts of our selves but one single Substance or rather has so enslav'd us to our Senses and Passions as to persuade us our Body is the Principal of the Two Parts whereof we are compos'd If we consider the different Occupations of Men we shall have all the Reason in the World to believe they have this so mean and gross a Notion of themselves For whereas they all love Felicity and the Perfection of their Being and are constantly labouring to grow happier or more perfect could it be suppos'd they set not a greater value on the Body and the Goods of it than on the Mind and the Goods of that when we find them almost always employ'd about things relating to the former and seldom or never thinking on those that are absolutely necessary to the perfection of the latter The greatest part of Mankind lay themselves out with so much Industry and Pains merely for the Support of a wretched Life and to leave their Children some necessary Sustenance for the Preservation of their Bodies Such as by their good Fortune or Chance of Birth are freed from that Necessity do no better manifest by their Business and Employments that they look upon the Soul as the Nobler pâ—ri of their Being Hunting Dancing Gaming Feasting are their ordinary Occupations Their Soul grown the Slave of their Body esteems and cherishes all these Divertisements though wholly unworthy of Her But because their Body is related to all things sensible the Soul is not only the Slave of their Body but through its means and for its sake of all things sensible likewise For 't is by the Body that
procure them which Union engages us in infinite Errors and excessive Miseries though we are not always sensible of these Miseries no more than we are of the Errors that occasion them I give here a remarkable Instance The Union that we had with our Mothers in their Womb which is the strictest possible to be had with Mankind was the Cause of two of the greatest Evils namely Sin and Concupiscence which are the Original of all our Miseries And yet for the forming of our Body it was necessary that Union should be so close and strict as it is This Union which was broken at our Birth was succeeded by another whereby Children are con-sociated to their Parents and their Nurses This second Union was not so strict as the former and therefore did us not so much mischief having only inclin'd us to believe and imitate all that our Parents and Nurses do and say 'T is plain this second Union was farther necessary not as the first for the forming but the preserving of our Body that we might know all the things useful or advantagious to it and might accommodate it to such Motions as are necessary to obtain them Last of all the Union which we have at present with all Men is unavoidably the cause of a great deal of Evil to us though it be not so strait as being less necessary to the Preservation of our Body For 't is upon the score of this Union we live by Opinion that we esteem and love what is esteem'd and lov'd in the World in spight of the Remorse of our Consciences and the true Idea's that we have of things I speak not here of the Union we have with the Mind of other Men in behalf of which it may be said we receive instruction from it I speak only of the sensible Union that is between our Imagination and the Air and Manner of those that speak to us We see then how all the Thoughts we have by the Dependance on the Body are false and so much the more dangerous to the Soul as they are the more useful to the Body Which being so let us try to rid our selves by degrees of the Delusions of our Sense of the Vision and Chimera's of our Imagination and of the Impression made by other Men's Imaginations on our Mind Let us carefully reject all the confus'd Idea's we have contracted through the Dependance we are in to our Body and let us only admit the clear and evident Idea's which the Mind receives through its necessary Union with the Divine Logos or with Eternal Wisdom and Truth as we shall explain in the following Book which treats Of the Vnderstanding or Pure Mind F. MALEBRANCHE'S TREATISE CONCERNING The Search after TRUTH BOOK the THIRD Concerning The UNDERSTANDING OR The Pure Intellect CHAP. I. I. Thought is only essential to the Mind Sensation and Imagination are only the Modifications of it II. We know not all the Modifications our Soul is capable of III. They are different from our Knowledge and our Love nor are they always Consequences of them THE Subject of this Third Book is somewhat dry and barren In which we enquire into the Mind consider'd alone and without any reference to the Body in order to discover the Infirmities peculiar to it and the Errors deriving only from it The Senses and Imagination are exuberant and inexhaustible Sources of Error and Deception But the Mind acting by it self is not so subject to straying and misconduct It was a difficult thing to put an end to the two last Treatises and 't is no less difficult to begin this not that there is not enough to be said on the Nature and Properties of the Mind but because we enquire not here so much into its Properties as its Weaknesses 'T is not therefore to be wonder'd if this Tract is not so large nor discovers so many Errors as the two fore-going nor ought it to be complain'd of for being somewhat Dry Abstract and Applicative For 't is impossible in all Discourses to move the Senses and Imaginations of others nor ought it always to be done A Subject of an abstract Nature in becoming sensible commonly grows obscure and 't is enough to be made intelligible So that nothing is more unjust than the usual Complaints of those who would know every thing and yet take pains for nothing who take pet if you desire them to be attentive who would ever be touch'd and mov'd and have their Senses and their Passions eternally gratify'd But we confess our selves unable to give them Satisfaction Writers of Comedies and Romances are oblig'd to please and to procure Attention but for us it 's sufficient if we can instruct even those that labour to make themselves attentive The Errors of the Senses and Imagination proceed from the Nature and Constitution of the Body and are expos'd to view by considering what Dependency the Soul 's in to it But the Errors of the Pure Understanding cannot be discover'd but by considering the Nature of the Mind it self and of the Idea's that are necessary to its knowing Objects And therefore to penetrate into the Causes of the Errors of the Pure Understanding 't will be necessary to insist in this Book on the consideration of the Nature of the Mind and of Intellectual Idea's In the first place I shall treat of the Mind consider'd in its own Nature without any Relation to the Body to which it is united So that what I shall say on this point will extend to pure Intelligences and by stronger Reason to what we call Pure Understanding For by the Word Pure Vnderstanding I mean only to design that Faculty the Mind has of knowing External Object without forming Corporeal Images of them in the Brain to represent them by After which I shall discourse of Intellectual Idea's by means of which the Pure Vnderstanding perceives Exteriour Objects I am perswaded no Man can doubt after he has seriously thought on it but the Essence of the Mind consists only in Thought as the Essence of Matter consists only in Extension and that according to the different Modifications of Thought the Mind one while Wills and another while Imagines or has many other particular Forms as according to the different Modifications of Extension Matter is sometimes Water sometimes Wood and sometimes Fire or has abundance of other particular Forms I only advertise thus much That by the word Thought I understand not here the particular Modifications of the Soul that is this or that particular Thought but Thought capable of all sorts of Modifications or of all sorts of Thoughts as by Extension is not meant this or that Extension round or square for instance but Extension capable of all sorts of Modifications or of Figures And this Comparison would have no difficulty in it but that we have not so clear an Idea of Thought as we have of Extension for we only know Thought by Internal Sentiment or Conscience as I make
of Nothing because to the producing an Angel out of a Stone so far as that is possible to be done the Stone must be first Annihilated and afterwards the Angel Created but simply to Create an Angel there needs no Annihilation at all If then the Mind produces its Idea's from the Material Impressions the Brain receives from Objects it does still the same thing or a thing as difficult or even difficulter than if it Created them Since Idea's being Spiritual cannot be produc'd out of Material Images that are in the Brain to which they have no Proportion or Analogy But some will say That an Idea is not a Substance Be it so but still it is a Being and a Being of a Spiritual kind And as it is impossible to make a Square of a Spirit though a Square be not a Substance so 't is impossible to frame a Spiritual Idea out of a Material Substance tho' an Idea were not a Substance But suppose we should allow the Mind of Man to have an absolute Power of Creating and Annihilating the Idea's of things yet after all he would never imploy it to the producing them For as a Painter though never so excellent at his Art could not represent an Animal he had never seen or had no Idea of so that the Picture he was oblig'd to make of it would not be like that unknown Animal so a Man could not form the Idea of an Object unless he knew it before that is unless he had already the Idea of it which has no dependance on his Will But if he has the Idea of it already he knows the Object and 't is needless to form a new one of it 'T is therefore needless to attribute to the Mind of Man the power of producing its Idea's It may perhaps be said that the Mind has general and confus'd Idea's which it does not produce and that those which it produceth are particular more clever and distinct but it all comes to the same thing For as a Painter could not draw the Picture of a particular Man so as to be certify'd he had hit it right unless he had a distinct Idea of him and even unless the Person himself should sit so the Mind that had only the Idea for instance of Being or of an Animal in general could not represent to it self an Horse nor form any very distinct Idea thereof nor be assur'd this Idea perfectly resembled an Horse unless it had a former Idea thereof wherewith to collate this second Now if it had a former it is in vain to form a second And the Question proceeds upon that former Therefore c It is true that whilst we conceive a Square by pure Intellection we may besides imagine it that is perceive it by drawing the Image of it in the Brain But 't is to be observ'd in the first place that we are not the real and principal Cause of that Image but it would take up too much time to explain it And again that the second Idea which accompanies that Image is so far from being more distinct and accurate than the others that on the contrary it owes all its Exactness to its Resemblance with the first which serves to regulate the second For in brief it is not to be believ'd that the Imagination or even the Senses make us a more distinct Representation of Objects than the Pure Intellect but only that they make the Mind more concern'd and applicative For the Idea's of Sense and Imagination are not distinct any farther than they are conformable with those of Pure Intellection The Image of a Square for instance that the Imagination delineates in the Brain is no otherwise just and regular than as it conforms with the Idea of a Square which we have by Pure Intellection 'T is that Idea which regulates the Image 'T is the Mind that conducts the Imagination and obliges it as I may say to look time after time whether the Image painted by it be a Figure of four right and equal Lines whose Angles are exactly right In a word if that which is imagin'd be like that which is conceiv'd After what has been said I suppose no body can doubt but it is an Error in those that affirm the Mind can form the Idea's of Objects since they attribute to the Mind a Power of Creating and even of Creating with Wisdom and Order though it has no Knowledge of what it does a thing utterly inconceivable But the Cause of this their Error is that customary Judgment Men make of one thing 's being the Cause of another when they are found conjoin'd together supposing that the true Cause of this Effect be unknown to them 'T is for this Reason that every one concludes that a Bowl in motion meeting with another is the true and principal Cause of the motion it communicates to it that the Will of the Soul is the true and principal Cause of the motion of the Arm and such like Prejudices as these because it always happens that a Bowl is mov'd when it lies in the way of another that knocks against it and we move our Arms almost as often as we will it and we do not sensibly perceive what else could be the Cause of these Motions But when an Effect is not so constant an attendant on any thing that 's not the Cause of it there are ever very many who believe this thing to be the Cause of the Effect that happens though all Men fall not into this Error A Comet for instance appears and presently after a Prince goes off c. Stones are expos'd to the Moon and are eaten with Worms The Sun is in Conjunction with Mars at the Nativity of a Child and that Child has some Fortune extraordinary This is Argument sufficient to perswade a great many that the Comet the Moon the Conjunction of the Sun with Mars are the Causes of the Effects I have mention'd and of others that are like them And the Reason why all the World is not of the same Opinion is their Observation that the like Effects do not at all times attend these Causes But all Men having commonly Idea's of Objects present to their Mind when they desire it and this happening many times a day very few of them but conclude that the Will which accompanies the Production or rather Presence of Idea's is the true Cause of them because they see nothing at the same time to which they can attribute them And they imagine that Idea's cease to exist when out of the view of the Mind and that they begin to exist again when re-presented to it 'T is upon the same account too that some judge that External Objects send forth Images that resemble them so as has been said in the preceding Chapter For it being impossible to see Objects by themselves or any otherwise than by their Idea's they judge that the Object produces the Idea because when 't is present they see it
the Will of man as a Will it essentially depends on the Love that God bears to himself on the Eternal Law and in short on the Will of God It is only because God loves himself that we love any thing for if God did not love himself or did not continually influence the Soul of man with a Love like his own that is with the Motion of Love which a Man feels in himself for Good in general we should love nothing we should will nothing and consequently should be destitute of Will since Will is nothing else but that Impression of Nature that carries us towards Good in general as hath been said several times But the Will considered as the Will of Man essentially depends upon the Body since it is by reason of the Motion of the Blood and Animal Spirits that it feels its self affected with all its sensible Commotions And therefore I have called Natural Inclinations all the Motions which the Soul has common with pure Intelligences together with some in which the Body hath a great Share but of which it is only the indirect Cause and End and I have explained them in the foregoing Book Here I understand by Passions All the Motions which naturally affect the Soul on occasion of the extraordinary Motion of the Blood and Animal Spirits And so shall these sensible Commotions be the Subject of this Book Though the Passions be inseparable from the Inclinations and Men be only susceptible of a sensible Love and Hatred because they are capable of a Spiritual Love and Hatred however it was though fit to treat of them separately in order to prevent Confusion For if it be considered That the Passions are far stronger and livelyer than the Natural Inclinations that they have for the most part other Objects and are always produced by different Causes it will be granted That we do not distinguish without Reason things that are inseparable in their own Nature Men are capable of Sensations and Imaginations only because they are capable of pure Intellections the Senses and Imagination being inseparable from the Mind and yet none finds fault with those that distinctly treat of those Faculties of the Soul which are naturally inseparable Last of all the Senses and Imagination differ not more from the pure Understanding than the Passions from the Inclinations And therefore as the three first Faculties use to be distinguished so ought also the two last that we may the better distinguish what the Soul receives from its Author with Relation to its Body from that which it also has from him but without that Relation The only Inconveniency that may grow out of the distinction of two things so naturally united is the necessity of repeating some things that had been said before as is usual in the like occasions Man is one though he be Compounded of several parts and the union of those parts is so intimate that one of them cannot be affected without a Commotion of the whole All his Faculties are linked together and so subordinated that it is impossible to explain some of them without touching upon the others So that when we labour to find out a Method to prevent Confusion we necessarily fall into Repetitions but 't is better to repeat than not to be Methodical because we ought above all to be plain and intelligible and therefore whatever we can doe in this occasion is to repeat if possible without wearying the Reader The Passions of the Soul are Impressions of the Author of Nature which incline us to love our Body and whatever is useful for its preservation As the natural Inclinations are Impressions of the same Author that principally move us to love him as the Sovereign Good The natural or occasional Cause of these Impressions is the Motion of the Animal Spirits which disperse through the Body to produce and maintain in it a disposition suitable to the Object perceiv'd that the Mind and Body may in that conjuncture mutually help each other For 't is the Institution of God that our Willings be attended with such Motions of our Body as are fit to put them in execution and that the Motions of our Body which Machinally rise in us at the perception of some Object be follow'd with a Passion of the Soul that inclines us to will what seems at that time profitable to the Body It is the continual Impression of the Will of God upon us that keeps us so strictly united to a portion of matter for if that Impression of his Will should cease but a moment we should instantly be rid of the Dependency upon our Body and all the Changes it undergoes For I cannot understand what some people imagine that there is a necessary Connection betwixt the Motion of the Blood and Animal Spirits and the Commotions of the Soul Some small Particles of Choler violently move in the Brain must therefore the Soul be agitated with some Passion and must that Passion be Anger rather than Love What Relation can there be conceived betwixt the Idea of an Enemy's Imperfections the Passion of Contempt or Hatred and the Corporeal Motion of some Particles of the Blood that beat against some parts of the Brain How they can imagine that the one depend upon the other and that the Union or Connection of two things so distant and so incompatible as the Mind and Matter can be caused and preserved any otherwise than by the continual and Almighty Will of the Author of Nature is to me unconceivable Those that suppose that Bodies necessarily and by themselves communicate their Motion to each other in the instant of their concourse make but a probable supposition neither is their prejudice altogether groundless since Bodies seem to have an Essential Relation to Bodies But the Mind and Body are two sorts of Beings so opposite that those who think that the Commotions of the Soul necessarily follow upon the Motion of the Blood and Animal Spirits do it without the least probability For nothing but our own Consciousness of the Union of those two Beings and the Ignorance of the continual Operations of God upon his Creatures can make us imagine another Cause of the Union of our Soul and Body than the Will of God It is hard to determine whether that Union or Connection of the thoughts of the Mind of Man with the Motions of his Body is a punishment of Sin or a Gift of Nature And some persons believe it a rash and imprudent Attempt to chuse one of these Opinions rather than the other It is well known that Man before his Sin was not a Slave but absolute Master of his Passions and that he could merely by his Will stop at his pleasure the Agitation of the Blood that caused them But we can hardly persuade our selves that the Body did not importune the Soul of the first Man to find out such things as were fit for the preservation of his Life We can scarce believe but Adam before his
a convenient Staâ—e but the Soul relishes it with great Satisfaction whereas it is never in a State conâ—rary to its Good and Preservation but that she endures it with pain And therefore when we follow the Motions of our Passions and stop not the Course of the Spirits which the View of the Object of the Passion produces in the Body to put in it the most convenient State with relation to that Object the Soul by Nature's Law is affected with a Sensation of Satisfaction and Delight because her Body is in the Disposition it requires whereas when according to the Laws of Reason the Soul stops the Current of the Spirits and withstands those Passions she suffers a Pain proportionable to the Evil that may from thence arise to the Body For as the Reflection that the Soul makes upon her self is necessarily accompanied with the Joy or Sorrow of the Mind and afterwards with the Joy or Sorrow of the Senses when doing her Duty and submitting to the Orders of God she is conscious that she is in a due and convenient state or when having given her self up to her Passions she is afterwards affected with Remorse which teaches her that she is in a corrupt Disposition So the Course of the Spirits raised for the good of the Body is first attended with sensible and afterwards with Spiritual Joy or Sorrow according as the Course of the Animal Spirits is retarded or promoted by the Will There is however this notable difference betwixt the Intellectual Joy that attends the clear Knowledge of the good Estate of the Soul and the sensible Pleasure that accompanies the confused Sensation of the good disposition of the Body that the intellectual Joy is solid and substantial without Remorse and as immutable as its Original Cause the Truth whereas sensible Joy is almost ever followed with the Sorrow of the Mind or the Remorse of the Conscience and is as restless and fickle as the Passion or Agitation of the Blood from whence it proceeds To conclude the first is for the most part attended with an exceeding Joy of the Senses when it is derived from the Knowledge of the great good that the Soul possesses whereas the other is very rarely accompanied with any great Joy of the Mind though it proceeds from a Good considerable for the Body but contrary to the Good or Perfection of the Soul 'T is nevertheless true That without the Grace of our Lord the satisfaction the Soul relishes when she gives her self up to her Passions is more grateful than that which she enjoys when she follows the Rules of Reason which satisfaction is the Source of all the Disorders that have attended the Original Sin and would have made us all Slaves to our Passions had not the Son of God rid us from their Tyranny by the Delectation of his Grace For what I have said on behalf of the Joy of the Mind in opposition to the Joy of the Senses is only true amongst the Christians and was altogether false in the Mouths of Seneca Epicurus and all the most rational of the Heathen Philosophers because the Yoke of Christ is only sweet to those that belong to him and his Burthen only light when his Grace helps us to support the Weight of it CHAP. IV. That the Pleasure and Motion of the Passions engage us in Errours and false Judgments about Good That we ought continually to resist them How to impugn Libertinism ALL those general Qualities and Effects of the Passions that we have hitherto treated of are not free they are in us without our Leave and nothing but the Consent of our Will is wholly in our Power The View or Apprehension of Good is naturally followed with a Motion of Love a Sensation of Love a Concussion of the Brain a Motion of the Spirits a new Commotion of the Soul that encreases the first Motion of Love a new Sensation of the Soul that likewise augments the first Sensation of Love and lastly a Sensation of Satisfaction which recompenses the Soul for the Bodies being in a convenient State All this happens to the Soul and Body naturally and mechanally that is without her having any part in it nothing but her Consent being her own real Work This Consent we must regulate preserve and keep free in spite of all the Struggle and Attempts of the Passions We ought to submit our Liberty to none but God and to yield to nothing but to the Voice of the Author of Nature to inward Evidence and Conviction and to the secret Reproaches of our Reason We ought never to consent but when we plainly see we should make an ill Use of our Liberty in with-holding our Consent This is the principal Rule to be observ'd for the avoiding of Errour God only makes us evidently perceive That we ought to yield to what he requires of us to him alone therefore we ought to devote our Services There is no Evidence in the Allurements and Caresses in the Threats and Frightnings caused in us of the Passions they are only confused and obscure Sensations to which we must never yield up our selves We must wait till all those false Glimpses of the Passions vanish till a purer Light illuminates us till God speaks inwardly to us We must enter within our selves and there seek him that never leaves us that always enlightens us He speaks low but his Voice is distinct his Light is weak but pure But no his Voice is as strong as 't is distinct and his Light is as bright and active as 't is pure But our Passions continually keep us from home and by their Noise and Darkness hinder us from being instructed by his Voice and illuminated by his Light He speaks even to those that ask him no Questions and those whom Passions have carried farthest from him fail not yet many times to hear some of his Words but loud threatning astonishing Words sharper than a two-edged Sword piercing into the inmost Recesses of the Soul and discerning the Thoughts and Designs of the Heart For all things are open to his Eyes and he cannot see the unruly Actions of Sinners without lashing them inwardly with smarting Reproofs We must then re-enter into our selves and approach near him we must interrogate him listen to him and obey him for by always listning to him we shall never be deceived and always obeying him we shall never be subjected to the Inconstancy of the Passions and the Miserie 's due to Sin We must not like some pretenders to Wit whom the Violence of Passion has reduced to the Condition of Beasts who having a long time despised the Law of God seem at last to have retained no Knowledge of any other than that of their infamous Passions We must not I say imagine as do those Men of Flesh and Blood that it is following God and obeying the Voice of the Author of Nature to give up our selves to the Motions of Passions and to comply with the secret Desires
have it so and consequently HE whose essential and necessary Will is always conformable to ORDER Which Will remaining immutably the same the Establish'd Order was subverted by the first Man's Disobedience because for the demerits of his Sin it was consonant to Order that he should be Lord of nothing It is not reasonable that the Sinner should suspend the Communication of Motions that the Will of God should conform to his or that any exceptions should be made to the Law of Nature on his Behalf In so much that Man is subject to Concupiscence his Mind depends on his Body he feels in himself indeliberate Pleasures and involuntary and rebellious Motions pursuant to that most just and exact Law which unites the two Parts of which he is compos'd Thus the formal Reason of Concupiscence no less than that of Sin is nothing real and positive being no more in Man than the loss of the Power he had to wave and suspend to the Communication of Motions on some occasions Nor are we to admit any positive Will in God to produce it For this loss which Man has sustain'd was not a consequence of Order or of the immutable Will of God which never swerves from it and is constantly the same but only a consequence of Sin which has rendred Man unworthy of an Advantage due only to his Innocence and Uprightness Wherefore we may say that not God but Sin only has been the Cause of Concupiscence Nevertheless God Works all that is Real and Positive in the Sensations and Motions of Concupiscence for God does every thing but all that has nothing of Evil. 'T is by the general Law of Nature that is by the Will of God that sensible Objects produce in Man's Body certain Motions and that these Motions raise in the Soul certain Sensations useful to the preservation of the Body or the Porpagation of the Species Who then dare presume to say these things are not good in themselves I know it is said that Sin is the Cause of certain Pleasures But do they that say it conceive it Can it be thought that Sin which is nothing should actually produce something Can nothing be suppos'd to be a real Cause However 't is so said but possibly for want of taking due pains of seriously considering what they say or because they are unwilling to enter on an Explication that is contrary to the Discourses they have heard from Men who it may be talk with more Gravity and Assurance than Reflexion and Knowledge Sin is the Cause of Concupiscence but not of Pleasure as Free Will is the Cause of Sin though not of the natural Motion of the Soul The Pleasure of the Soul is good as well as its Motion or Love and there is nothing good but what God does The Rebellion of the Body and the guilt of Pleasure proceed from Sin As the Adherency of the Soul to a particular Good or its Rest proceeds from the Sinner But these are only Privations and Nothings whereof the Creature is capable Every Pleasure is Good and likewise in some measure makes happy the Possessour at least for the time of the Enjoyment But it may be said to be evil because instead of elevating the Mind to Him that is the true Cause of it through the Errour of our Intellectual and corruption of our Moral Part it prostrates it before sensible Objects that only seem to produce it Again it is evil in as much as it is Injustice in us who are Sinners and consequently meriting rather to be punish'd than rewarded to oblige God pursuant to his Primitive Will to recompense us with pleasant Sensations In a word not to repeat here what I have said in other places it is evil because God at present forbids it by Reason of its alienating the Mind from himself for whom he hath made and preserves it For that which was ordain'd by God to preserve Righteous Man in his Innocence now fixes sinful Man in his Sin and the Sensations of Pleasure which he wisely establish'd as the easiest and most obvious Expedients to teach Man without calling off his Reason from his true Good whether he ought to unite himself with the invironing Bodies at present fill the Capacity of his Mind and fasten him on Objects incapable of acting in him and infinitely below him because he looks upon these Objects to be the true Causes of the Happiness he enjoys occasionally from them THE SECOND ILLUSTRATION UPON THE First CHAPTER of the First BOOK Where I say That the Will cannot diversly determine its Propensity to Good but by commanding the Vnderstanding to represent to it some particular Object IT must not be imagin'd that the Will commands the Understanding any other Way than by its Desires and Motions there being no other Action of the Will nor must it be believ'd that the Understanding obeys the Will by producing in it self the Ideas of Things which the Soul desires for the Understanding acts not at all but only receives Light or the Ideas of Things through its necessary Union with Him who comprehends all Beings in an intelligible manner as is explain'd in the Third Book Here then is all the Mystery Man participates of the Sovereign Reason and Truth displays it self to him proportionably to his Application and his praying to it Now the Desire of the Soul is a Natural Prayer that is always heard it being a natural Law that Ideas should be so much readier and more present to the Mind as the Will is more earnest in desiring them Thus provided our Thinking Capacity or Understanding be not clogg'd and fill'd up by the confus'd Sensations we receive occasionally from the Motions occurring in our Body we should no sooner desire to think on any Object but its Idea would be always present to our Mind which Idea Experience witnessing is so much more present and clear as our Desire is more importunate and our confus'd Sensations furnish'd to us by the Body less forcible and applicative as I have said in the foregoing Illustration Therefore in saying that the Will commands the Understanding to represent to it some particular Object I meant no more than that the Soul willing to consider that Object with Attention draws near it by her Desire because this Desire consequently to the efficacious Wills of God which are the inviolable Laws of Nature is the Cause of the Presence and Clearness of the Idea that represents the Object I could not at that time speak otherwise than I did nor explain my self as I do at present as having not yet prov'd God the sole Author of our Ideas and our particular Volitions only the occasional Causes of them I spoke according to the common Opinion as I have been frequently oblig'd to do because all cannot be said at once The Reader ought to be equitable and give Credit for some time if he would have Satisfaction for none but Geometricians pay always down in hand THE ILLUSTRATION UPON THE
their Operation So likewise in point of free Causes I believe that God incessantly gives the Mind an Impression towards Good in General and that he moreover determines this Impression towards particular Goods by the Idea's or Sensations that he gives us as I have explain'd in the first Illustration which is the same with what the Divines intend by affirming That God moves and prevents our Wills Thus the Force which puts our Minds in Motion is the Will of God which Animates us and inclines us towards Good For God Creates not Beings to constitute the moving force of Minds for the same Reason that he Creates none to be the moving force of Bodies The Wills of God being of themselves Efficacious He need but Will to do And we ought not to multiply Beings without necessity Besides whatever is real in the determinations of our Motions proceeds likewise from the Action of God in us as appears from the first Illustration But all we Act or produce is by our Wills that is by the Impression of the Will of God which is our moving force For our Wills are Efficacious no farther than they are of God as mov'd Bodies impel not others but in as much as they have a moving force that translates them which is no other than the Will of God which Creates or preserves them successively in different places Therefore we Act no otherwise than by the Concourse of God and our Action consider'd as Efficacious and capable of producing any Effect differs not from his but is as say most Divines the self same Action eadem numero actio Now all the Changes which arrive in the World have no other Natural Cause than the Motions of Bodies and Volitions of Minds For First by the General Laws of the Communications of Motions the invisible Bodies which surround the visible produce by their various Motions all these divers Changes whose Cause is not apparent And Secondly by the Laws of Union of our Soul and Body when circumambient Bodies Act upon our own they produce in our Soul a multiplicity of Sensations Idea's and Passions Thirdly Our Mind by its Volitions produces in it self infinite different Idea's for they are our Volitions which as Natural Causes intend and Modifie our Mind Their Efficacy nevertheless proceeds from the Laws which God has establish'd And Lastly when our Soul acts upon our Body she produces several Changes in it by vertue of the Laws of her Union with it and by means of our Body she effects in those about it abundance of Changes by vertue of the Laws of Communication of Motions So that the Motions of Bodies and the Volitions of Minds are the only Natural or Occasional Causes of Natural Effects which no Man will deny who uses any Attention supposing only he be not prepossest by those who understand not what they say who fancy perpetually to themselves such Beings as they have no clear Idea's of and who offer to explain things which they do not understand by others absolutely incomprehensible Thus having shown that God by his Concourse or rather by his Efficacious Will performs whatever is done by the Motions of Bodies and the Wills of Minds as Natural or Occasional Causes it appears that God does every thing by the same Action of the Creature Not that the Creatures have of themselves any Efficacious Action but that the Power of God is in a manner Communicated to them by the Natural Laws which God has establish'd on their account This then is all that I can do to reconcile my Thoughts to the Opinion of those Divines who defend the necessity of immediate Concourse and hold that God does All in all things by an Action no ways differing from the Creatures For as to the rest of the Divines I think their Opinions utterly indefensible and especially that of Durandus together with the Sentiments of some of the Ancients refuted by St. Austin who absolutely deniâ—d the necessity of God's Concurrence pretending that Second Causes did all things by the Power which God in their Creation gave them For though this Opinion be less intricate and perplex'd than that of other Divines yet to me it seems so repugnant to Scripture and so suitable to Prejudices to say no worse of it that I think it altogether unwarrantable I confess that the School-Men who make God's immediate concourse to be the same Action with that of the Creatures do not perfectly agree with my Explication and all those that I have read except Biel and Cardinal d' Ailly are of Opinion That the Efficacy which produces Effects proceeds from the Second Cause as well as the First But as I make it indispensable for me to speak nothing but what I clearly conceive and always to take the side that best comports with Religion I think I am not liable to blame for deserting an Opinion which to many Men seems still more inconceiveable as they strive more to comprehend it and for establishing another which agrees perfectly not only with Reason but also with the Sacredness of our Religion and Christian Morality which is a Truth already prov'd in the Chapter that 's the Subject of these Reflexions However 't is not inconvenient to say something to it that I may fully verifie what I have said upon the present Question Both Reason and Religion evince That God will be Lov'd and rever'd by his Creatures Lov'd as Good and Rever'd as Power Which is such a Truth as it would be Impiety and Madness to doubt of To love God as he requires and deserves we must according to the First Commandment both of the Law and Gospel and by Reason it self as I have somewhere shown Love Him with all our Strength or with the whole extent of our Loving Capacity 'T is not sufficient to prefer Him before all things unless we moreover Love Him in all things For otherwise our Love is not so perfect as it ought to be and we return not to God all the Love that he gives us and gives us only for Himself in whom every one of His Actions Center So to render to God all the Reverence that is due to Him 't is not enough to adore Him as the Supreme Power and fear Him more than His Creatures we must likewise fear and adore Him in all His Creatures all our respects must perpetually tend towards Him to whom alone Honour and Glory are to be ascrib'd Which is what God Commands us in these Words Thou shalt Love the Lord thy God with all thy Heart and with all thy Soul and with all thy Strength And in these Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God and Him only shalt thou serve Thus the Philosophy that convinces us that the Efficacy of Second Causes is a Fiction of the Mind that the Nature of Aristotle and some other Philosophers is a Chimera that none but God is Strong and Powerful enough not only to Act on our Soul but even to give the
the Grace of the Creator XXXVI In the establish'd Order of Nature I can see but two Occasional Causes which shed Light on Minds and so determine the General Laws of the Grace of the Creator one which is in us and depends in some measure on us the other which is found in the Relation we have with surrounding Objects The former is nothing but the diverse Motions of our Will the second is the Occurrence of sensible Objects which act on our Mind in consequence of the Laws of Union of our Soul with our Body XXXVII We are taught by our own inward Consciousness That the Love of Light produces it and that Attention of Mind is a Natural Prayer by which we obtain Instruction of God for all the Enquirers of Truth who apply themselves to Truth discover it in proportion to their Application And if our Prayer were not interrupted nor our Attention disturb'd if we had any Idea of what we ask and should ask it with a competent Perseverance we should not fail to obtain whilst we were capable of receiving it But our Prayers are continually interrupted unless Self-interess'd our Senses and Imagination muddy and confound all our Ideas And â—hough the Truth we consult answers our Enquiries the confus'd Noise of our Passions deafens us to its Answers or makes us speedily forget them XXXVIII If it be consider'd that Man before the Fall was animated with Charity and possess'd with all that was requisite to his Perseverance in Innocence and that by his Perseverance and Application he ought to merit his Reward 't will easily be conceiv'd that the several Desires of his Will were establish'd the Occasional Causes of the Light receiv'd in his Understanding otherwise his Distraction had not been voluntary nor his Attention meritorious But Nature however corrupted is not destroy'd God has not desisted to will what he once will'd And the same Laws still subsist Therefore our manifold Volitions are still the Occasional or Natural Causes of the Presence of Ideas to our Mind But because the Union of the Soul with the Body is chang'd into a Dependence on it by a Natural Consequence of Sin and the immutable Will of God as I have explain'd elsewhere our Body at present disturbs our Ideas and speaks so loud in favour of its respective Goods that the Mind but seldom consults and distractedly listens to Internal Truth XXXIX Moreover Experience daily teaches us that our Conversation with Understanding Persons is capable of instructing us by raising our Attention that Preaching Reading Converse a thousand Occurrences of all sorts may raise some Ideas in us and likewise inspire us with good Thoughts The Death of a Friend is doubtless capable of putting us in Mind of Death unless some great Passion takes us up And when a Preacher of great Natural Endowments undertakes to demonstrate a most simple Truth and convince others of it it must be own'd that he may persuade his Hearers and even move their Conscience give them Fear and Hope and raise in them such other Passions as put them in a less State of Opposition to the Influence of the Grace of Jesus Christ. Men being made for a sociable Life 't was requisite they should mutually communicate their Thoughts and Motions 'T was fit they should be united in Mind as well as Body and that speaking by the Voice to their Ears and by Writing to their Eyes they should infuse Light and Understanding into one anothers Minds XL. But Light whatever way produc'd in us whether by particular Desires or fortuitous Instances as the Occasional Causes of it may be call'd Grace especially when it nearly relates to Salvation though it be but a Consequence of the Order of Nature because since Sin God owes us nothing and all the Good we have is merited for us by Jesus Christ in whom our very Being subsists But this kind of Grace though merited for us by Jesus Christ is not the Grace of our Lord but that of the Creator since Jesus Christ is not usually the Occasional Cause of it but the Cause of it is discoverable in the Order of Nature XLI There are still several other Natural Effects which we might reasonably look upon as Graces For Example Two Persons have at the same time two Desires of Curiosity The one to go see an Opera the other to hear a celebrated Preacher If they satisfie their Curiosity he that goes to the Opera shall find such Objects as according to his present Disposition of Mind shall raise in him Passions that will damn him whilst the other shall find in the Preacher so great Force and Light that the Grace of Conversion working in him at that moment shall be able to save him Which suppos'd Let but a shower of Rain or any other Accident happen that may stay them at home Though the Rain be a Natural Effect as depending on the Natural Laws of the Communication of Motions yet it may be said to be a Grace in respect of him whose Damnation it prevents and a Punishment to him whose Conversion it hinders XLII Grace being conjoin'd to Nature all the Motions of our Soul and Body have some relation to Salvation This Man is sav'd by having in a State of Grace made a false Step which happily broke his Neck and another is damn'd by having on some Occasion misfortunately avoided the Ruines of a falling House We know not what is for our Advantage but we well know there is nothing of it self so indifferent but has some reference to our Salvation because of the Mixture and Combination of Effects depending on the General Laws of Nature with others that depend on the General Laws of Grace XLIII As therefore Light points out to us the True Good the Means to obtain it our Duties to God in a word the Ways we are to follow it is sufficient to cause those who are animated with Charity to do good to merit new Graces and to conquer some Temptations as I shall explain in another Place so I think we may lawfully give it the Name of Grace though Jesus Christ be only the Meritorious Cause of it And whereas External Graces which have no immediate Influence on the Mind come nevertheless into the Order of Predestination of Saints I consider them also as True Graces In a word I see not why we may not give the Name of Grace to all Natural Effects when relating to Salvation subservient to the Grace of Jesus Christ and delivering us from some Hindrances to his Efficacy Yet if others will not agree with me I shall not contend with them about Words XLIV All these Graces if we may be allow'd to call them so being those of the Creator the General Laws of these Graces are the General Laws of Nature For we must still observe that Sin has not destroy'd Nature though it has corrupted it The General Laws of the Communications of Motions are always the same and those of the Union of the Soul
either very grateful or disagreeable to it Such as are Pain or Titillation great Cold or vehement Heat and in general all such as are not only attended with Traces in the Brain but moreover with some Motion of the Animal Spirits towards the Internal Parts of the Body such a Motion as is proper to excite the Passions as shall be explain'd in another place The faint and languishing Sensations are such as affect the Soul very little and are neither very Pleasant nor very Disagreeable to her as moderate Light all Colours weak and ordidinary Sounds c. Lastly The Middle kind betwixt the Vigorous and Faint I call such sorts of Sensations as moderately affect the Soul as a great and glaring Light a loud and mighty Sound c. But it is observable that a Weak and Languid Sensation may become a Middle one and proceed to be a Vigorous and Lively one The Sensation for instance a Man has of Light is faint when the Light of a Flambeau is but glimmering or remote but this Sensation may become a Middle one upon the approaching of the Flambeau nearer us It may lastly grow most strong and lively by holding the Flambeau so close to the Eyes as to dazle them or suppose a Man beholds the Sun Thus the Sensation of Light may be Vigorous or Faint or neither but Moderate according to its different Degrees Let us see then the Judgments the Soul passes upon these three sorts of Sensations wherein we may observe that she almost ever blindly and implicitly follows the sensible Impressions or the Natural Judgments of the Senses and that she is delighted if I may so term it to diffuse her self upon the Objects she considers by dismantling her own Being to cloath and adorn External Objects The first of these Sensations are so Vigorous and Powerful that the Soul must whether she will or not acknowledge they do in some measure belong to her So that she not only judges them to be in the Objects but believes them also to be in the Members of her Body which she considers as a Part of her Self Thus she judges that Heat and Cold are not only in the Fire and Ice but in her own Hands also As to the Languid Sensations they so little concern the Soul that she concludes they do not belong to her that they are neither in her self nor in her Body but in Objects only And for this Reason it is we devest our own Soul and our own Eyes of Light and Colours to cloath and beautifie the Objects that are without us though Reason teaches us that the Idea we have of Matter does not include them in it And Experience visibly manifests that we ought equally to judge them in our Eyes as on the Objects since we see them no less upon the one than the other as I have experimentally prov'd by the Eye of an Ox plac'd in the hole of a Window Now the Reason why Men do not so readily perceive Colours Smells Tasts and all other Sensations to be the Modifications of their Soul is because we have not any distinct Idea of the Soul For when we know a thing by the Idea that represents it we know clearly the Modifications it is capable of All Men whatever agree that Rotundity for instance is a Modification of Extension because all Men know what Extension is by a clear Idea that represents it Thus because we know not the Soul by its Idea as I shall explain hereafter but only by an Internal Sensation that we have of it we can't understand by a simple View but by the force of Reasoning only whether Whiteness Light Colours Sounds and other faint and languishing Sensations are the Modifications of our Soul or not But as to the lively Sensations as Pain and Pleasure we easily judge that they are within us because we feel them sensibly affect us and there is no need of our knowing them by their Ideas to understand that they belong to us As for the Middle Sensations the Soul seems dubious and at a Fault about them For on one hand she is willing to follow the Natural Judgments of the Senses and thereupon she removes as far from her as possible this kind of Sensations to bestow them upon the Objects But on the other hand 't is Impossible but she must feel within her self and be conscious that they belong to her especially when these Sensations come up near to those which I have named the Strong and Lively whereupon let us see how she behaves her self in respect of the Judgments she makes concerning them If she is smartly touch'd with the Sensation she judges it to be in her own Body as well as in the Object If the Sensation affects her but a very little she judges it only in the Object If the Sensation be of a Middle sort betwixt those we call the Strong and the Weak the Soul then knows not what to think of it whilst she judges only by the Senses For instance If a Man sees a Candle at a good competent distance the Soul judges the Light to be only in the Object if he puts it very near his Eyes the Soul judges the Light to be not only in the Candle but likewise in the Eyes but if he withdraws about a foot from it the Soul is at a pause without determining whether or not the Light be in the Object only But she is never so wise as to think as she ought to do that Light neither is nor can be any Property or Modification of Matter and that it is only within her self because she never thinks of imploying her Reason in discovering the Truth of the Matter but only her Senses which never can discover it nor indeed were given us for any other use than the Preservation of the Body Now the cause why the Soul makes no more use of her Reason that is of her pure Intellection in considering an Object which may be perceiv'd by the Senses is this that the Soul is not at all mov'd or concern'd on the account of those things she perceives by pure Intellection but on the contrary is most nearly touch'd by things Sensible For the Soul applies her self intensely to that which affects her most but is too careless to apply her self to things that work in her no Concernment Thus she almost universally suites her Free Judgments to the Natural Judgment of her Senses To judge aright then of Light and Colours as of all other sensible Qualities we must carefully distinguish between the Sensation of Colour and the Motion of the Optick Nerve and we must find out by our Reason that Motions and Impulsions are Properties of Bodies and therefore may possibly be found both in Objects and in the Organs of our Senses but that Light and Colours which we see are Modifications of our Soul very different from the other and of which we have quite different Idea's For it is evident that a Peasant for instance sees
amiss to declare that no fault is to be found with these Terms of Form and Essential Difference Honey is doubtless Honey by its Form and thus it is that it differs essentially from Salt but this Form or this Essential Difference consists only in the different Configuration of its Parts 'T is this different Configuration which makes Honey to be Honey and Salt to be Salt And though it be accidental to Matter in general to have the Configuration of the parts of Honey or Salt and so to have the Form of Honey or Salt yet it may be said to be essential to Honey or Salt that they may be what they are to have such or such a Configuration in their parts just as the Sensations of Cold of Heat of Pleasure and Pain are not essential to the Soul but only to the Soul which feels them in as much as by these Sensations she is said to feel Heat Cold Pleasure and Pain CHAP. XVII I. Another Instance taken from Morality which shews that our Senses offer us nothing but false Goods II. That GOD alone is our true and proper Good III. The Origine of the Error of the Epicureans and Stoicks I HAVE I think brought sufficient Arguments to prove that this Prejudice That our Sensations are in the Objects is a most fruitful Principle of Errors in Natural Philosophy It is my Business at present to bring others drawn from Morality wherein the same Prejudice joyn'd with this other That the Objects of our Senses are the true and sole Causes of our Sensations is most highly dangerous There is nothing so common in the World as to see Men devoted to sensible Goods some love Musick some Banquetting and others have a Passion for other things Now this is the way of Reasoning these Men must have taken to perswade themselves that these Objects are their Goods All the pleasant Tasts we are delighted with in Feasting the Sounds which gratifie the Ear and those other Pleasures we are sensible of upon other occasions are doubtless contain'd in sensible Objects or at least these Objects give us the Sensation of them or lastly are the only means of Conveying them to our Senses Now it is impossible to doubt that Pleasure is good and Pain evil We receive a Conviction from within and consequently the Objects of our Passions are most real goods to which we must cleave if we will be happy This is the Reasoning we generally fall into almost without being aware of it Thus because we believe that our Sensations are in Objects or that the Objects are of themselves capable of giving us the Sensation of them we consider these things as our own Goods though we are infinitely exalted above them since they are able to act only upon our Bodies and to produce some Motion in their Fibres but are incapable of acting upon our Souls or making us sensible either of Pleasure or Pain Certainly if our Soul acts not upon her self on occasion of what happens in the Body it is GOD alone who hath that Power And if she be not the Cause of her own Pleasure and Pain according to the Diversity of the Vibrations of the Fibres of her Body as it is most highly probable she is not since she feels Pleasure and Pain without consenting thereunto I know no other Hand potent enough to make her sensible thereof except that of the Author of Nature Certainly it is GOD alone who is our true Good He only is able to fill us with all the Pleasures we are capable of enjoying and it is only by the Knowledge of Him and Love of Him He has resolv'd to make us sensible of them Such as He has affixt to the Motions which happen in our Body to make us the more sollicitous for its Preservation are very little in themselves very weak as to their Capacity and very short in their Duration Notwithstanding in the estate Sin has reduc'd us to we are as it were become their Vassals But those which He shall make His Elect sensible of in Heaven will be infinitely greater since He hath Created us that we might know and love Him For whereas ORDER requires the Perception of the greatest Pleasures in the Possession of the greatest Goods GOD being infinitely above all other things the Pleasure of those who shall enjoy Him will certainly exceed all other Pleasures What we have said of the Cause of our Errors in respect of Good gives us a sufficient Knowledge of the falsity of the Opinions the Epicureans and Stoicks embrac'd touching the Sovereign Good The Epicureans placed it in Pleasure and because a Man is sensible of this no less in Vice than in Vertue and more generally in the former than in the other it has been commonly thought they let loose the Reins to all sorts of Sensible Pleasures Now the first cause of their Error is this That judging falsly there is something pleasant and agreeable in the Objects of their Senses or that they were the real Causes of the Pleasures they felt and being moreover convinc'd by an Internal Sensation which they naturally had that Pleasure was good for them at least for the time wherein they enjoy'd it they let themselves loose to all sorts of Passions from which they had no Apprehensions of receiving any dammage in the Consequence Whereas they ought to have consider'd that the Pleasure they reap'd from sensible things could not exist in those things as their true Causes nor any other way and consequently that sensible Goods could not be Goods in respect of the Soul and they should have thought of the things we have already explain'd The Stoicks on the other hand being perswaded that sensible Pleasures were only seated in and fitted for the Body and that the Soul ought to have a peculiar Good of her own plac'd Felicity in Vertue see then the Origine of their Errors Viz. They believ'd that Sensible Pleasure and Pain were not in the Soul but in the Body only and made use of this their false Judgment as a Principle for other false Conclusions as that Pain was not an Evil nor Pleasure a Good That the Pleasures of the Senses were not Good in their own Nature that they were common to Men and Beasts c. Notwithstanding it is easie to see that though the Epicureans and Stoicks were in the wrong in many things they were in the right in some for the Happiness of the Blessed consists only in a perfect and accomplish'd Vertue that is to say in their Knowledge and Love of GOD and in a most exquisite Pleasure that never fails to accompany them Let it then be well remembred That External Objects contain nothing either Pleasant or Troublesome in themselves that they are not the Causes of our Pleasures that we have no reason either to fear or love them but it is GOD alone whom 't is our duty to fear and our duty to love since 't is only He that has Power
is the Identity of time for our having had certain thoughts at the instant of our having certain new Traces in the Brain is oftentimes sufficient for our having a-fresh the same thoughts as often as these Traces are re-produc'd in our Brain If the Idea of GOD has been offer'd to my Mind at the same time my Brain receiv'd an Impression from the sight of these three Letters Jah or from the sound of the same word 't is enough that the Traces produc'd by the sound or sight of these Characters be re-printed to cause me to think on GOD nor can I think of GOD but some confus'd Traces of the Characters or sounds that the thoughts I had of GOD were attended with will be re-produc'd in my Brain For the Brain being never empty of Traces there are constantly such as are somewhat related to what we think of though these Traces are frequently very imperfect and confus'd The second Cause of the Connection between Idea's and Traces and which ever supposes the former is the Will of Men. This Will is necessary to the intent this Connection of Idea's with the Traces may be regulated and accommodated to use For were not Men naturally inclin'd to a mutual Agreement about affixing their Idea's to Sensible Signs this Connection of Idea's would not be only absolutely useless to society but would moreover be very irregular and extreamly imperfect And that first because Idea's have never any strong Connection with the Traces except when the Spirits being agitated and fermented make the Traces deep and permanent So that since the Spirits are only agitated by the Passions had Men no Passion for communicating their own thoughts and participating those of others it is plain that the exact Connection of their Idea's to particular Traces wou'd be very weak since they would never use themselves to those exact and regular Connections were it not to become intelligible one to another Secondly the repeated concurrence of the same Idea's with the same Traces being necessary to make so strong a Connection as may be durable and lasting since a first meeting unless attended with a violent Motion of the Animal Spirits cannot confederate them so strongly as is requisite it is manifest that should not Men contrive to agree it would be the greatest chance in the World for the same Traces and the same Idea's to meet a second time Thus the Will of Men is necessary to regulate the Connection and Alliance of the same Traces with the same Idea's though this Will of Agreeing is not so much the result of their Choice and Reason as an Impression of the Author of Nature who has dispos'd and made us all for the Benefit of each other and given us a strong Inclination to unite in Mind as much as we are united in our Bodies The third Cause of the Connection of Idea's with the Traces is the Nature or the constant and immutable Will of the Creator There is for instance a Natural Connection and independent on our Will between the Traces produc'd by a Tree or a Mountain which we see and the Idea's of a Tree or a Mountain between the Traces produc'd in our Brain by the cry of a Man or an Animal suffering Pains and whose Plaints we hear by the mein of a Man's Countenance that threatens or fears us and the Idea's of Pains Strength Weakness and also the Sensations of Pity Fear and Courage which are occasion'd in our selves These Natural Connections are of all others the strongest they are generally alike in all Mankind and they are absolutely necessary to the Preservation of Life And this is the Reason they have no dependence on our Will For if the Connection of Idea's with Sounds and certain Characters is weak and very different in different Countries 't is because it depends on the weak and changeable Will of Men. And the Reason why it depends thereon is because this Connection is not absolutely necessary to their Living but only to their Living as Men who ought to form themselves into Civil and Rational Societies It is here very observable that the Connection of Idea's which represent things Spiritual distinct from us with the Traces of our Brain is not Natural nor possible to be so And consequently that it is or may be different in all Men since it has no other cause than their own Will and the Identity of time whereof I have spoken before On the Contrary the Connection of Idea's of all things material with certain particular Traces is Natural and consequently there are particular Traces which excite the same Idea in all Mankind It cannot be doubted for instance but all Men have the Idea of a Square upon sight of a Square because that Connection is Natural but it may be very well doubted whether all Men have the Idea of a Square when they hear the word Square pronounc'd because that Connection is altogether arbitrary We ought to think the same thing of all those Traces that are connected with the Idea's of things of a Spiritual kind But because the Traces which have a Natural Connection with Idea's give the Mind concern and application and consequently render it attentive the generality of Men are very ready at comprehending and retaining sensible and palpable Truths that is to say the Relations which Bodies have to one another And on the other hand because the Traces which have no other Connection with Idea's than that which the will has effected between them strike not vigorously on the Mind all Men in general find it very difficult to comprehend and harder yet to retain abstracted Truths that is to say the Relations which are between things which come not within the Verge of Imagination But when these Relations are any whit compounded they seem absolutely incomprehensible especially to those who are not us'd to them because they have not strengthened the Connection between these abstract Idea's and their Traces by a perpetual Meditation And though others have perfectly comprehended them they forget them again in a little time because the Connection is hardly ever so strong as the Natural 'T is so true that all the difficulty Men have to comprehend and retain things Spiritual and Abstract proceeds from the difficulty they find to corroborate the Connection of their Idea's with the Traces of the Brain that when they find the means of Explaining by material Relations those that are between things Spiritual they make them easily understood imprinting them in such manner on the mind as not only to be strongly convinc'd of them but also to retain them without any trouble The general Idea we have given of the Mind in the first Chapter of this Work is perhaps a sufficient Proof of what I say On the contrary when the Relations that are between material things are so exprest that there is no necessary Connection between the Idea's of these things and the Traces of their Expressions they are difficultly comprehended and easily forgotten Those for
when absent it disappears and the presence of the Object almost always is found in company with the Idea that represents it to us However if Men were not rash and inconsiderate in their judgments they ought only to conclude from the Idea's of things being present to their Mind whenever they will have them that according to the order of Nature their Will is for the most part necessary to their having these Idea's but not that the Will is the True and Principal Cause that exhibits them to the Mind much less that the Will produces them out of nothing or in the manner they explain it Nor is there any more Reason for concluding that Objects emit Species that resemble them because the Soul has seldom any Perception of them but when they are present but only that the Object is for the most part necessary to the Idea's being present to the Mind Lastly They ought not to conclude that the Bowl in motion is the principal and true Cause of the motion of another which it meets in its way since the first has no power of moving it self They can only judge that the Collision of the two Bowls is an occasion to the Author of the motion of Matter to execute the decree of his Will which is the universal Cause of all things by communicating to the other Bowl a part of the motion of the first that is to speak more clearly by willing that the latter should acquire as much motion as the former lost for the impellent force of Bodies can be nothing but the Will of him that preserves them as will be made appear in another place CHAP. IV. That we perceive not Objects by means of Idea's Created with us That GOD does not produce them in us every moment we have need of them THE third Opinion is of those who pretend That all Idea's are Created with us For our better discovering how little likelihood there is in this Opinion we must consider that there are in the World many quite different things whereof we have Idea's But to mention only simple Figures it is certain that the number of them is infinite and even if we fix only on an Ellipsis 't is not to be doubted but the Mind can conceive an infinite number of Ellipses of a different Species inasmuch as it can conceive that one of its Diameters may be lengthened to Infinity the other remaining constantly the same So since the Height of a Triangle may be augmented or diminish'd to Infinity the side which serves for the Base being still the same we conceive there may be infinite Triangles upon the same Base of a different Species And moreover which I desire may be well consider'd here the Mind in some manner perceives that infinite number though it can imagine but a very few and a Man cannot at one and the same time have particular and distinct Idea's of many Triangles of a different Species But that which should be most especially attended to is that this general Idea the Mind has of an infinite number of Triangles of a different Species is a sufficient proof that if we cannot conceive by particular Idea's all these different Triangles in a word if we cannot comprehend Infinity 't is not for want of Idea's or because Infinity is not present to our Mind but meerly for want of the Mind's Capacity and Comprehension If a Man should apply himself to the considering the Properties of all the diverse Species of Triangles and even should eternally pursue this sort of Study he would find new and particular Idea's in an endless succession But his Mind would tire under the unprofitable Disquisition What I have now said of Triangles may be apply'd to Figures of five six an hundred a thousand or ten thousand sides and so up to infinity And if the sides of a Triangle being capable of infinite Relations with each other can make Triangles of infinite Species it is easie to be seen that the Figures of Four Five or of a Million of sides are capable of much greater Differences as being subject to a far greater number of Relations and Combinations of their sides than simple Triangles The Mind then discerns all these things and has Idea's of them all And 't is certain these Idea's will never be exhausted though it should imploy infinite Ages in the consideration of one Figure only and if it perceives not these infinite Figures all at once or if it comprehend not infinity 't is only because its Capacity is too short and limited It has then an infinite number of Idea's What said I an infinite number It has so many infinite numbers of Idea's as there are different Figures Insomuch that there being an infinite number of different Figures the Mind must have an infinity of infinite numbers of Idea's for the Knowledge of Figures only Now I demand of them Whether 't is probable that GOD has created so many things with the Mind of Man For my own part it can never enter into my Head especially since it might be done in another most simple and easie manner as we shall see by and by For whereas GOD acts always by the most simple means it seems unreasonable to explain our manner of knowing Objects by admitting the Creation of an infinity of â—eings when the difficulty may be resolv'd in a way more easie and natural But what if the Mind had a Magazine of all the Idea's necessary to its Perception of things It would be still extreamly difficult to explain how the Soul could make choice of them to represent Objects to her self how for instance she could bring it about to perceive the Sun when it were present to the Eyes of the Body For since the Image the Sun imprints in the Brain is nothing like the Idea we have of it as has been formerly prov'd and since likewise the Soul perceives not the Motion the Sun produces in the Fund of the Eye and in the Brain it is not conceivable how among such an infinite number of Idea's which she had she could exactly divine which it was necessary to represent for the imagining or seeing of the Sun It cannot then be said that the Idea's of things were created with us and that this is sufficient for our perceiving the Objects that are round about us Nor can it be said that GOD produces every moment so many new Idea's as we perceive different things This is sufficiently refuted by what has been said in this Chapter Besides it is necessary we should actually have in our selves the Idea's of all things at all times since at all times we can Will the conceiving all things Which we could never do unless we had already a confus'd Perception of them that is unless we had an infinite number of Idea's present to our Mind For to conclude we cannot Will the Thinking on Objects whereof we have no Idea CHAP. V. That the Mind perceives neither the Essence nor the Existence of
the same Inclinations I know likewise that GOD will never make Spirits undesirous of Happiness or that can be desirous of being Miserable But I know it with evidence and certainty since 't is GOD that teaches me for who could inform me of the Designs and Wills of GOD but GOD Himself But when the Body is a partner in that which occurrs within me I am almost ever deceiv'd if I measure others by my self I feel Heat I see a thing of such a Size or such a Colour I have such or such a Tast upon the application of certain Bodies to my Palate and I am deceiv'd if I judge of others by my self I am subject to particular Passions I have a kindness or aversion to this or that thing and I judge that others have the like but my Conjecture is often false Thus the Knowledge we have of other Men is very obnoxious to Error if we judge of them only from the Sensations we have of our selves Whether there are any Beings different from GOD our selves Bodies and Pure Spirits is unknown to us We can hardly perswade our selves there are and after we have examin'd the Reasons of some Philosophers who pretend the contrary we have found them false Which has confirm'd us in the Notion we had taken up that all Men being of the same Nature we have all the same Idea's as having all need of the Knowledge of the same things CHAP. VIII I. The intimate Presence of the indefinite Idea of Being in general is the cause of all the disorderly Abstractions of the Mind and the most part of the Chimera's of the Vulgar Philosophy which hinder many Philosophers from acknowledging the solidity of true Principles of Physicks II. An Instance concerning the Essence of Matter THAT clear intimate and necessary Presence of GOD I mean that presence of Being without any particular Limitation of Being infinite and in general to the Mind acts stronglier upon it than the preâ—ence of all finite Objects It is impossible to divest it self absolutely of this general Idea of Being since 't is impossible to subsist out of GOD. Perhaps it may be said that the Mind can separate it self from him because it can think on particular Beings But this is a mistake For the Mind in considering any Being in particular does not so much separate and recede from GOD as approach nearer some of His Perfections if I may be permitted so to speak by removing farther off from others However it doth not distance it self in that manner as quite to lose sight of them but is ever in a Capacity of seeking them out and approaching near them They are ever present to the Mind yet the Mind perceives them not but in an unexplicable confusion by reason of its Littleness and the Greatness of the Idea of Being A Man may indeed be some time without thinking on himself but he cannot as I think subsist a moment without thinking on Being and even at the time a Man believes he thinks of nothing he is necessarily full of the indeterminate and general Idea of Being But because the things which are customary to us and which don 't affect us alarum not the Mind with any vehemence nor oblige it to make reflection on them this Idea of being so great so vast so real and positive as it is is so familiar to us and makes so little impression that we fancy that we hardly see it that we make no reflection on it and consequently judge there is little reality in it and that 't is only form'd from a confus'd collection of all particular Idea's though on the contrary it is in this and by this only we perceive all Beings in particular Though that Idea which we receive through our immediate union with the WORD of GOD never deceives us of it self as do those we derive from the union we have with our Body which represents things to us otherwise than they are yet I scruple not to say That we make so bad use of the best things that the indelible presence of this Idea is one of the principal Causes of all the disorderly Abstractions of the Mind and consequently of all that Abstract and Chimerical Philosophy which explains all Natural Effects by the general terms of Act Power Cause Effect Substantial Forms Faculties Occult Qualities Sympathy Antipathy c. For 't is certain these Terms and a great many others excite no other Idea's in the Mind than indeterminate and general Idea's that is Idea's which readily offer themselves to the Mind without any trouble and application on our own part Let a Man read with all Attention possible all the Definitions and Explications given of Substantial â—orms let him do his best to search wherein consists the Essence of all these Entities which the fruitful Imagination of Philosophers produces in such multitudes at pleasure that they are forc'd to divide them and subdivide them over and over again and I dare engage that he shall never excite in his Mind any other Idea of all these things than that of Being and of Cause in general For let us take a view of the customary proceedings of Philosophers They observe some new Effect and presently imagine some new Entity must produce it The Fire heats there is then in the Fire some Entity to produce this Effect which differs from the Matter the Fire is compos'd of And because Fire is capable of many different Effects as of separating Bodies Pulverizing Vitrifying Drying Hardning Softning Dilating Purifying and Enlightning them c. therefore they liberally bestow on Fire so many Faculties or real Qualities as it is capable of producing different Effects But if we reflect on all the Definitions they give of these Faculties we shall find they are nothing else but Logical Definitions which raise no other Idea's than that of Being and Cause in general which the Mind refers to the Effect that is produc'd So that a Man is nothing the wiser when he has studied them never so long For all that is got by this sort of Study is the imagining we know better than others what indeed we know much worse not only because we admit many Entities that never were but also in being prepossess'd we make our selves incapable of conceiving how 't is possible for Matter all alone as that of Fire in being mov'd against Bodies differently dispos'd to produce all the different Effects we see Fire produce It is manifest to all those who have read any thing That almost all the Books of Science and especially those which treat of Physicks Medicine and Chymistry and of all particular things of Nature are full of nothing but Argumentations founded on the Elementary and Secondary Qualities as Attractive Retentive Concoctive Expulsive and such like upon others which they term Occult upon specifick Vertues and many other Entities which Men frame and make up out of the general Idea of Being and out of the Cause of the Effect which they see
obligation to believe to serve for a Rule and Principle for the guiding our Reasonings in Philosophy where nothing but Evidence ought to perswade us We are not to change the clear and distinct Idea's of Extension Figure and Local Motion for the general and confus'd Idea's of Principle or of subject of Extension of Form of Quiddities and Real Qualities and of all those Motions of Generation Corruption and Alteration and others which differ from Local Motion Real Idea's will produce real Science but from general and Logical Idea's can proceed nothing but a random superficial and a barren Science Wherefore we ought with serious Reflection to attend to the distinct and particular Idea's of things for the discovering the Properties they contain and thereby study Nature instead of losing our selves in these Chimera's which are only the litter or off-spring of some Philosopher's Brains CHAP. IX I. The last general Cause of our Errors II. That the Idea's of things are not always present to the Mind when we would have them III. That every finite Mind is subject to Error and why IV. That we ought not to judge that there is nothing but Body and Spirit Nor that GOD is a Spirit according to our conception of Spirits WE have hitherto treated of such Errors as may have some occasional Cause assigned in the Nature of the pure Intellect or of the Mind consider'd as acting by it self and in the nature of Idea's that is to say in the manner of the Mind 's perceiving external Objects There remains only one Cause now to be explain'd which may be term'd the universal and general Cause of our Errors because we can conceive no Error that has not some sort of dependance on it The Cause is this That Nothing having no Idea to represent it the Mind is carried to believe that the things whereof it has no Idea have no Existence 'T is certain that the general Source of our Errors as we have often said is our Judgment 's having greater extent and latitude than our Perceptions For when we consider any Object we commonly take the prospect but on one side of it but we are not content to judge only of that side we have consider'd but we pronounce of it all entire And so it often fortunes that we are deceiv'd for though the thing be true on the part we have Examin'd it is commonly false on the other we have not and what we believe true is no more than probable Now 't is manifest that we should not judge thus absolutely on things as we do did we not think we had consider'd all the parts of them or suppose them all like that which we have examin'd So the general Cause of our Errors lies in this that having no Idea of the other Faces of the Object or of their difference with that which is present to our Thoughts we believe those other Faces don't exist or at least we suppose they have no particular difference This manner of acting we think reasonable enough For since Nothing cannot form any Idea in the Mind we have some pretence to believe that the things that form no Idea in the Mind at the time of our Examining them resemble Nothing And that which confirms us in this Opinion is our being perswaded by a sort of Instinct that the Idea's of things are due to our Nature and are in such wise subjected to the Mind that they are oblig'd to pay their attendance when the Mind commands them However if we would make a little Reflection upon the present state of our Nature we should hardly be so strongly bent upon believing all the Idea's of things so much at our beck and command Man as I may say is only Flesh and Blood since Adam's Transgression The least impression of his Senses and his Passions interrupts the strongest Application of his Mind and the current of the Spirits and Blood hurry it along with them and drive it continually upon sensible Objects In vain it strives to withstand the Torrent it is carried by and rarely it is that it thinks of resisting it so pleasant it finds it to follow and so troublesome to struggle against the stream The Mind therefore is discourag'd and dejected as soon as it has made an attempt to hold and fix it self upon a Truth and 't is absolutely false in the state we are in that the Idea's of things are present to the Mind as often as we would consider them And therefore we ought not to judge that things are not in being upon the only score of our having no Idea's of them But though we should suppose Man absolute Master of his Mind and its Idea's yet he would still be subject to Error by the necessity of his Nature For the Mind of Man is limited and every limited Mind is by Nature liable to Error The reason whereof is this that the least things have Infinite Relations betwixt them and require an Infinite Mind to comprehend them And therefore a limited Mind being unable to embrace and comprehend all these Relations after all that ever it can do a Man 's inclin'd to believe that those which he does not perceive don't exist especially when he does not consider the Weakness and Limitation of his Mind as 't is customary for him not to do And thus the Finiteness of the Mind alone brings along with it the Capacity of falling into Error Notwithstanding if Men even in this their state of Infirmity and Corruption made always good use of their Liberty they would never be deceiv'd And for this reason every one that falls into Error is justly blameable and deservedly obnoxious to punishment For no more is requisite for the avoiding Error than to judge only of what a Man sees and not to form compleat judgments on things before he is assur'd he has examin'd them in all their parts and this is possible for Men to do But they had rather subjugate themselves to Error than conform to the Rule of Truth and love to arbitrate without the trouble of Enquiry And so we need not wonder if they are guilty of infinite Errors and frequently stand chargeable with uncertain and unwarrantable Judgments All the Idea's for instance that Men have of Substance are those of Spirit and of Body that is of a thinking and extended Substance and thereupon they take upon them to determine that whatever exists is either of Body or Spirit This is not said as if I presum'd to affirm there were any Substance neither Body nor Spirit it being too hazardous to maintain those things exist whereof we have no Idea since 't is suppos'd that GOD who conceals not his Works from us would have given us some Idea of them Yet I think we ought to determine nothing concerning the number of the kinds of Beings which GOD has created from the Idea's we have of them Since absolutely speaking there may be Reasons why GOD should conceal them from us if
intreat those who interess themselves in the difference of others not to believe me on my bare word nor easily to imagine I am in the right I think I have Liberty to demand of them that they will carefully examine the Answers I have made to the Animadversions in that Preface and the Argumentations of the Animadverter in reference to the Book oppos'd so I think I may without offence to the Author of this Answer require of those who would judge of it not to imagine he has reason on his side upon a slight and transient reading of his Book I desire them not to judge of any of his Answers before having examined it with reference to this Preface and the preceeding Books Take here for an instance the first of his Answers which begins thus Vpon what the Author of the Search pretends the Animadverter imposes on him touching his Design 'T is not imposing on him to make his Book pass for a Collection of Observations thought by him useful to the discovery of Truth 'T is plain I have positively declared that I look upon his Book as a Collection of many Remarks c. If the Author had consider'd these words he would not have accus'd me of imposing on him for he could not deny but he had a Design of offering something serviceable to the discovery of Truth which is all that I attributed to him And lower Wherein I even prove that that is not to be imputed to him which he affirms I impose upon him Lastly he concludes this Article with these words 'T is therefore evident the Author of the Search cannot prove I impose on him unless he will maintain he had a Design of writing a Book altogether useless to the Search of Truth These Words might possibly make a Man imagine I had without Reason accus'd the Animadverter of imposing on me in the Design of the Search but whoever would but confront what he here says with the foregoing Preface or with what he has said himself pag. 9 10. of his Animadversions would I hope be of another mind That I may not give the trouble of turning to it these are my words Nevertheless as he is pleas'd to make me undertake a Design I do not execute that he may have the more to charge upon my Conduct so he goes to prove it was my Design to lay down a Method in that Book I do him no injury says he in looking on his Book as a Method to lay the Foundation of the Sciences For besides that the Title expresses so much he declares himself upon the Point in the following manner Let us examine the Causes and Nature of our Errours and since the Method of examining things by considering them in their Birth and Origin is the most regular and perspicuous and serves better than others to give us a thorough knowledge of them let us try to put it here in practice Methinks these words I do him no injury says he c. which I cite out of the Animadversions are clear enough and that a Man need but understand English to see that the Animadverter imposes on me a Design of giving a Method and pretends too to prove it by the Title of the Search as also by a passage of the same Book and yet he boldly concludes this Article with these words 'T is therefore evident the Author of the Search cannot prove I impose on him c. But what he has positively declar'd he look'd upon the Search after Truth as a Collection of many Observations I cannot deny says he but he had a Design of offering something useful to the discovery of Truth which is ALL mark that word I attribute to him Since he has a mind to be diverted see my Answer A Painter has drawn a Polyphemus and standing behind his Piece hears some Critick say Look here Gentlemen the Artist design'd to paint an Hercules but if you mind it it is a Polyphemus The Painter out of patience starts from behind the Scene and gives the Spectators to undrestand he had no Design of representing an Hercules and that he imposes on him The Critick surpriz'd addresses the Painter Sir why so angry what did you design to represent Polyphemus returns the Painter Strange Sir replies the Critick why do you say I impose on you I call these Gentlemen to witness that ALL that I said was you had drawn a Polyphemus upon which the Painter withdraws contented and says no more I think my self therefore obliged to rest silent upon such like Answers I have shewn by the Animadverter's own words that he imposes on me a Design of giving a Method in the first Book of the Search and that he likewise pretends to prove it I have cited the place of the Animadversions from whence I have taken my proof Nevertheless this Author affirms he does not impose on me that 't is evident I cannot prove it that he proves quite contrary that what I say he imposes on me is not to be imputed to me that ALL he atributes to me is a Design of offering something useful to the discovery of Truth In a word that he has positively declared he look'd on the Search as a Collection of many Observations as if from his regarding the Search as a Collection it were to be concluded I had no other Design I say no more then but hope this Example may keep Men from judging without examining I have taken the three first Pages of his Book and have not given my self the liberty of chusing which ought to be consider'd yet I intend not this for an Answer remembring the obligation I have laid on my self at the end of the preceding Preface and I had rather those who think I have not satisfied the Animadversions because I have answer'd but three Chapters at length should say this Book whereof I answer but three Pages remains without Reply than weary the World with Answers which tend only to the justifyng other Replies F. MALEBRANCHE's TREATISE Concerning the SEARCH after TRUTH TOME II. BOOK V. CHAP. I. Of the Nature and Original of Passions in general THE Mind of Man has two essential or necessary Relations extreamly different the one to God and the other to its Body As mere Mind it is essentially united to the Divine Word the Eternal Wisdom and Truth since it is only by that Union that 't is capable of thinking as is proved in the Third Book As a humane Mind it has an essential Relation to its Body since it is by Virtue of that Union that it imagines and perceives by its Senses as is explained in the First and Second Book We call the Mind Sense or Imagination when the Body is the natural or occasional Cause of its Thoughts and we call it Understanding when it acts by it self or rather when God acts in it or his Light illuminates it several different ways without a necessary Relation to what is done in the Body It 's even so with
affords us the Enjoyment of him as far as we are capable of it in this Life whereas the Blindness of the Mind and the Depravation of the Heart make our Imperfection and are the Results of the Union of our Soul and Body as I have proved in several Places shewing that we never know the Truth nor love the real Good when we follow the Impressions of our Senses Imaginations and Passions All this is evident and yet Men who all passionately desire the Perfection of their Being care but little to increase the Union which they have with God nay they are continually at work to strengthen and enlarge that which they have with sensible things The Cause of that surprizing Disorder cannot be too much explain'd The Possession of Good must naturally produce two Effects in the Possessour at once must render him more perfect and more happy however it does not always fall out so 'T is impossible indeed that the Mind should actually enjoy a Good without being actually more perfect but it may happen that it actually enjoys it without being actually happier Those that know Truth best and love most the most lovely Goods are always actually more perfect than those that live in blind Ignorance and disorderly Practice but they are not always actually happier It is even so with Evil it ought at once to make both imperfect and unhappy but though it always makes Men more imperfect yet it does not always make them more unhappy or at least makes them not unhappy proportionably to its making them imperfect Vertue is often bitter and distastful whereas Vice is sweet and pleasant so that it is especially by Faith and Hope that pious Men are truly happy whilst the wicked have the actual Enjoyments of Pleasures and Delights It ought not to be so indeed but however it is so Sin has brought forth that Disorder as I said in the foregoing Chapter and that Disorder is the principal Cause not only of the Corruption of our Morals but also of the Ignorance and Darkness of our Mind By that Disorder it is that our Imagination persuades it self that Bodies may be the Good of the Mind For Pleasure as I have often said is the sensible Character or Mark of Good But now of all the Pleasures we enjoy upon Earth the most sensible are those which we imagine to receive by the Body We judge though too inconsiderately without doubt that Bodies can be and are effectually our Good And 't is so hard to oppose the Instinct of Nature and to withstand the Arguments of the Senses that the design of it does not so much as come into our Mind We think not on the Disorders introduc'd by Sin We consider not that Bodies can act upon the Mind but as occasional Causes that the Mind cannot immediately or by it self enjoy any Corporeal thing and that all the ways it has of uniting to an Object are by its Knowledge and Love that God only is superiour to it can reward or punish it by Sensations of Pleasure or Pain that can enlighten and move it in a word act upon it Those Truths though most evident to attentive Minds are not however so powerful to convince us as is the deceiving Experience of a sensible Impression When we consider something as part of our selves or look on our selves as a part of that thing we judge it our Good to be united to it we love it and this love is so much the greater as the thing whereunto we think our selves united seems to be a more considerable part of the whole we make up together with it Now there are two sorts of Proofs which persuade us that a thing is part of our self viz. the Instinct of Sensation and the Evidence of Reason By the Instinct of Sensation I am persuaded that my Soul is united to my Body or that my Body makes part of my Being but I have no full Evidence of it since I know it not by the light of Reason but by the Pain or Pleasure I feel at the presence and impression of Objects My Hand is prick'd I suffer Pain thence I conclude that my Hand makes part of my self my Cloaths are rent and I endure nothing therefore I say my Cloaths are not my self my Hair is cut without Pain but cannot be pluck'd up without smart that puzzles the Philosopher and he knows not what to determine In the mean while this perplexity shows that even the wisest rather judge by the instinct of Sensation than by the light of Reason that such or such things belong or belong not to themselves For should they determine them by Evidence and the light of Reason they would quickly know that the Mind and the Body are two sorts of Beings altogether opposite that the Mind cannot be united to the Body by it self and that the Soul is wounded when the Body is struck only because of her Union with God 'T is then only by the Instinct of the Sensation that we look on our Body and all the sensible things to which we are united as part of our selves that is as belonging to that which thinks and feels in us For what is not cannot be known by evident Reason since Evidence discovers Truth alone But on the contrary 't is by the light of Reason that we know the Relation we have with Intellectual things We discover by a clear View of the Mind that we are united to God in a more strict and essential manner than to our Body that without him we are nothing and neither can doe nor know neither will nor be sensible of any thing that he is our All or if we may so speak that we make up a whole with him of which we are but an infinitely small part The light of Reason discovers us a thousand Motives to love God only and to dispise Bodies as unworthy of our Love But we are not naturally sensible of our Union to God nor persuaded that he is our All by the Instinct of sense 't is only the Grace of our Lord which produces in some Men that spiritual sense to help them to overcome the contrary Sensations by which they are united to their Body For God as the Author of Nature inclines Minds to the love of him by a Knowledge of Illumination and not of Instinct and in all probability 't is but since the Fall that God as the Author of Grace has superadded Instinct to Illumination because our light is at present so mightily impair'd as to be incapable of bringing us to God being besides continually weakn'd by contrary pleasure or instinct and rendred ineffectual We therefore discover by the light of the Mind that we are united to God and to the intellectual World which he contains and are convinced by Sensation that we are united to our Body and by it to the material and sensible World God has Created But as our Sensations are more lively moving frequent and lasting than our Illuminations so 't
true Judgments provided we only judge of what he says and as he says in Imitation only of our Lord as I hear I judge But let 's see how it is that our Passions seduce us that we may the easier resist them The Passions are so nearly related to the Senses that remembring what hath been said in the first Book it will not be difficult to explain how they lead us into Errour because the general Causes of the Errours of the Passions are altogether like to those of the Errours of the Senses The most general Cause of the Errours of the Senses is as we there have shewn our attributing to external Objects or to the Body the proper Sensations of our Soul annexing Colours to the Superficies of Bodies diffusing Light Sounds and Odours in the Air and fixing Pain and Titillation to those Parts of our Body that receive some Changes by the Motion of other contiguous Bodies Almost the same thing may be said of the Passions we too rashly ascribe to the Objects that cause or seem to cause them all the Dispositions of our Heart our Goodness Meekness Malice Sowreness and all the other Qualities of our Mind The Object that begets some Passion in us seemes afrer a sort to contain in it self the Passion produced in us when we consider it as sensible things seem to contain in themselves the Sensations which their Presence excites in us When we love any Person we are naturally inclin'd to believe that he loves us and can hardly imagine that he designs to hurt us or to oppose our Desires But if Hatred succeed in the place of Love we cannot Persuade our selves that he has any Affection for us we interpret all he does in the worst Sense we are always distrustful and upon our Guard though he thinks not upon us or perhaps intended to doe us Service In short we unjustly attribute to the Person that stirs up a passion in us all the Dispositions of our Heart and with as much Imprudence as we ascribe to the Objects of the Senses all the Qualities of our Mind Moreover by the same Reason that we believe other Men receive the same Sensations from the same Objects as we do we think they are agitated with the same Passions for the same Subjects if they are in a State of being susceptible of them We suppose them to love and desire the same things as we our selves do whence proceed secret Jealousies and Hatreds if the desired Good cannot be enjoyed entire by several for the contrary happens in Goods that can be possessed without Division by several Persons as Science Vertue the Sovereign Good and the like We also suppose that they hate fear or fly from the same things that we do whence proceed secret Plots or publick Associations according to the nature and state of the thing hated by which means we hope to rid our selves of our Miseries We therefore ascribe to the Objects of our Passions the Commotions they produce in us thinking that all other Men and even sometimes Beasts are agitated as we are and besides judge yet more rashly the Cause of our Passions which is often but imaginary is really in some Object When we have a passionate Love for any Body his Grimace and Faces are charming his Ugliness is not distastful his ill-composed Motions and Gestures are regular or at least natural If he never speak he is wise if he be a great Talker he is witty if he speak upon all adventures he 's Universal if he continually interrupt others it is because he 's full of Fire of Life and Spirit if he pretend to top and sway every where 't is because he deserves it Thus can Passion cover or dissemble the Imperfections of Friends and advantagiously set off their most inconsiderable Qualities But when that Friendship which only proceeds as other Passions do from the Agitation of the Blood and Animal Spirits comes to cool through want of Heat and Spirits fit to nourish it when Interest or some false Relation alters the Disposition of the Brain then Hatred succeeding Love is sure to represent to us in that Object of our Passion all the Defects that are capable of stirring up our just Aversion We perceive in him Qualities quite contrary to those we admired before We are asham'd of having lov'd him and the ruling Passion never fails to justifie it self and to ridicule that which it has follow'd The Power and Injustice of Passions are not included within such narrow Limits as those we have described but extend infinitely farther not only disguising their principal Object but also whatever has any reference to it They make us love not only the Qualities of our Friends but also most part of those of the Friends to our Friends And in those who are endued with any strength and extent of Imagination the Passions have so vast a reach and out-let that it is not possible to determine their Limits Those Things I have mention'd are such general and fruitful Principles of Errour Prejudice and Injustice that it is impossible to observe all the Consequences of them Most of the Truths or rather Errours entertained in some Places Times Commonalties and Families proceed from thence What is followed in Spain is rejected in France what is true at Paris is false at Rome what is certain amongst the Dominicans is uncertain amongst the Franciscans and what appears undoubted to the Black Fryars seems an Errour to the White The Dominicans believe themselves obliged to stick to St. Thomas Why Because that Doctor was one of their Order Whereas the Franciscans follow the Opinion of Scotus because he was a Black Fryar There are likewise Truths and Errours proper to certain Times The Earth turned two thousand Years ago then it remain'd unmovable till our Days wherein it has began to turn again Aristotle was formerly burnt and a Provincial Council approved by the Pope most wisely forbad his Physicks to be taught He was admired ever since and falls now again into Contempt Opinions that are now publickly received in the Schools were formerly rejected as Heresies and their Assertors excommunicated by the Bishops because Passions stirring up Factions Factions establish those sorts of Truths or Errours that are as inconsistent as the Principle they proceed from Men may indeed be indifferent as to the Unmovableness of the Earth or the Essence of Bodies consider'd in themselves but they are no longer so when they look on those Opinions as defended by their Adversaries Thus Hatred kept up by a confused sense of Piety breeds an indiscreet Zeal that kindles by degrees and at last produces such Events as are not so surprizing to all the World till a great while after their arrival We can hardly imagine that Passions should reach so far because we know not that their Impetuosity extends to whatever may satisfie them Perhaps Hâ—man would have done no harm to the Jewish People but because Mordecai a Jew forbore to salute him he
on a sudden design'd the destroying of the whole Nation that his Revenge might be the more splendid Two Men sue each other about a Piece of Land they ought only to produce in Court their Titles to it and to say nothing but what relates to the Case or to set it off fair However they seldom fail to slander one another to contradict each other in every thing to raise trifling Contestations and Accusations and to intricate the Suit with an infinity of Accessary Circumstances which confound the Principal In short the Passions reach as far as the sight of the Mind does in those that are affected by them I would say there is nothing to which we may suppose their Object to be related but their Motion will extend to it which is done after the following manner The Tracks of the Objects are so connected to each other in the Brain that it is impossible the Course of the Spirits should violently move any one of them without raising several others at the same time The principal Idea of the Thing perceiv'd is therefore necessarily accompanied with a vast number of accessary Ideas which increase more and more as the Impression of the Animal Spirits is more violent Now that Impression cannot but be very violent in the Passions because they continually hurry into the Brain abundance of such Spirits as are fit to preserve the Traces of the Ideas which represent their Object So that the Motion of Love or Hatred extends not only to the Chief Object of either Passion but also to all the Things that are found any ways relating to it because the Motion of the Soul in the Passion follows the Perception of the Mind as the Motion of the Animal Spirits in the Brain follows the Traces of the Brain as well those that excite the principal Idea of the Passion 's Object as those that are related to it And therefore we must not be surprized if Men carry their Hatred or Love to such a heighth and commit such strange and capricious Actions Every one of those Effects has its proper Cause though unknown to us because their accessary Ideas being not always like to ours we cannot rightly judge of them So that Men act always by some particular Reason even in those Actions that appear most extravagant to us CHAP. VII Of the Passions in particular And first Of Admiration and its ill Effects WHatever I have said hitherto of the Passions is general yet 't is no hard matter to draw particular Inferences from it If one do but reflect upon what occurs in his own Breast and upon the Actions of others he will discover at one View a greater number of those Truths than can be explain'd in a considerable time However there are so few who think of retiring into themselves and make any Attempt to that purpose that to quicken them and raise their Attention it will not be amiss somewhat to descend into Particulars It seems when we handle or strike our selves that we are almost insensible whereas if we be but never so little touched by others we receive such lively Sensations as awaken our Attention In a word as it never comes into our Mind to tickle our selves and if it did perhaps the Attempt would be unsuccessful So almost for the same Reason the Soul cares not to feel and sound her self is presently disgusted at that sort of Exercise and commonly is incapable of feeling or knowing all the Parts that belong to her till touch'd and made sensible to her by others So that it will be necessary for the facilitating some People in acquiring the Knowledge of themselves to mention some of the particular Effects of the Passions to â—each them by touching them of what Make and Constitution their Soul is of In the mean while those that shall read the following Thoughts must be forewarn'd that they will not always be touched to the Quick nor be aware that they are subject to the Passions and Errours of which I shall speak because particular Passions are not always the same in all Men. All Men indeed have the same natural Inclinations which referr not to the Body and likewise all those that relate to it when 't is in a very good Constitution But its various Tempers and frequent Alterations produce an infinite Variety in particular Passions To which diversity of Constitutions if that variety of Objects be added which cause very different Impressions upon those who follow not the same Employments and manner of Life it will plainly appear that such a Person who is lively touched by some Things in one Place of his Soul may be absolutely insensible as to many others so that we should commonly mistake should we always judge of the Commotions of others by what we feel in our selves I am not afraid of being deceiv'd when I assert That all Men would be happy for I fully and certainly know that Chinese and Tartars Angels and Devils in a word all Spirits whatsoever have an Inclination for Felicity Nay I know that God shall never produce any Spirit without that Desire I never saw either Chinese or Tartar so that I never learn'd it from Experience nor yet from my inward Consciousness which only teaches me that I would my self be happy God alone can inwardly convince me that all other Men Angels and Devils desire Happiness and he only can assure me that he will never create a Spirit that shall not care for Felicity For who else can positively assure me of what he does and even thinks And as he cannot deceive me so I may safely relie on what I learn from him And therefore I am certain that all Men would be happy because that Inclination is natural and independent on the Body It goes quite otherwise with particular Passions For because I love Musick Dancing Hunting Sweet-meats high-season'd Dishes c. I cannot certainly conclude that other Men have the same Passions Pleasure is doubtless sweet and grateful to Men but all find it not in the same Things The Love of Pleasure is a Natural Inclination not depending upon the Body and therefore general to all Men But the Love of Musick Hunting or Dancing is not general because the Disposition of the Body from which it proceeds being different in several Persons the Passions they produce are not always the same General Passions as Desire Joy and Sorrow are the Mean betwixt natural Inclinations and particular Passions They are general as well as Inclinations but they are not always of the same strength because the Cause which produces and feeds them is not always equally active There is an infinite Variety in the Degrees of Agitation of the Animal Spirits in their Plenty and Scarcity in their Solidity and Fineness and in the Relation betwixt the Fibres of the Brain and those Spirits And therefore it often happens that we touch not Men in any part of their Soul when we treat of particular Passions but if they chance to
a great Number but also differ by the different Perceptions and Judgments that cause or accompany them Those different Judgments of the Soul concerning Good or Evil produce different Motions in the Animal Spirits to dispose the Body in relation to the Object and consequently cause in the Soul Sensations that are not altogether like Whence it proceeds that some Passions are observ'd to differ from each other though their Commotions be not different In the mean while the Commotion of the Soul being the chief Thing observable in every Passion 't is better to refer them to the Three original Passions in which those Commotions are very different than to treat confusedly and disorderly of them in reference to the different Perceptions we may have of the Good and Evil that raises them For we may have so many different Perceptions of Objects in reference to Time to our selves to what belongs to us to the Persons or Things to which we are united either by Nature or Choice that it is wholly impossible to make an accurate Enumeration of them When the Soul perceives any Good which she cannot enjoy it may perhaps be said that she hopes for it though she desires it not However 't is plain that this her Hope is not a Passion but a simple Judgment And therefore 't is the Commotion that attends the Idea of any Good of which we take the Enjoyment to be possible that adopts Hope into a true Passion It is the same when Hope grows into Security For the latter is a Passion only because of the Commotion of Joy that mixes with that of Desire since the Judgment of the Soul that considers any Good as certain is a Passion but as much as it is a foregoing Taste of the Good that affects us Last of all When Hope diminishes and is succeeded by Despair 't is visible again that the latter is a Passion but because of the Commotion of Sorrow that mixes with that of Desire for the Judgment of the Soul that considers any Good as unattainable would not be a Passion should we not be actuated by that Judgment But because the Soul never looks upon Good or Evil without any Commotion and even without any Alteration in the Body we often give the Name of Passion to the Judgment that produces it confounding together whatever happens both to the Soul and Body at the sight of any Good or Evil For the Words Hope Fear Boldness Shame Impudence Anger Pity Derision Grief and the Names of all other Passions in common use are short Expressions made up of several Terms by which can be explain'd in particular whatever Passions contain We understand by the Word Passion the View of the Relation any thing has to us the Commotion and Sensation of the Soul the Concussion of the Brain and the Motion of the Spirits a new Commotion and Sensation of the Soul and lastly a Sensation of Pleasure that always attends the Passions and makes them grateful All these we commonly understand by the Name of Passions but sometimes it only signifies either the Judgment that raises it or only the Commotion of the Soul or the bare Motion of the Spirits and Blood or lastly something else that accompanies the Commotion of the Soul It is very useful for the Knowledge of Truth to abridge Ideas and Expressions but that often causes some considerable Errour especially when those Ideas are abridg'd by popular Use For we ought never to abridge them but when we have made them very clear and distinct by a great Application of Mind and not as 't is ordinarily done as to Passions and sensible Things when we have made them familiar to us by their Sensations and the mere Action of the Imagination which easily imposes on the Mind There is a great difference betwixt the pure Ideas of the Mind and the Sensations or Commotions of the Soul Pure Ideas are clear and distinct but 't is a hard Task to make them familiar whereas Sensations and Commotions are intimate with us but can never plainly and distinctly be known Numbers Extension and their Properties may be clearly known but unless we make them sensible by some expressive Characters 't is very difficult to represent them to our Mind because whatever is abstracted moves us not On the contrary the Commotions and Sensations of the Soul may easily be represented to the Mind though the Knowledge we have of them be but confused and imperfect for all the Words that raise them lively strike the Soul and make it attentive Thence it proceeds that we often imagine we rightly understand some Discourses that are altogether incomprehensible and that reading some Descriptions of the Sensations and Passions of the Soul we persuade our selves that we perfectly comprehend them because they strongly move us and that all the Words that reverberate upon our Eyes agitate our Soul The hearing of the very Names of Shame Despair Impudence c. straightway excite in our Mind a confused Idea and obscure Sensation that powerfully influences us and because this Sensation is very familiar to us and presents it self without any Trouble or Endeavour of the Mind we fancy it to be clear and distinct These Words however are the Names of compounded Passions and by consequence abridg'd Expressions which popular Use has made up of many confused and obscure Ideas Seeing we are oblig'd to employ such Terms as common Use has approv'd of the Reader should not be surpriz'd to meet with Obscurity and sometimes with a sort of Contradiction in our Words And if it were but consider'd that the Sensations and Commotions of the Soul that answer to the Terms us'd in such Discourses are not wholly the same in all Men because of their different Dispositions of Mind they would not so easily condemn us when they could not enter into our Opinions This I say not so much to prevent Objections against my self as that we may understand the Nature of the Passions and what we are to think of Books treating of such Matters After so many Cautions I shall not stick to say that all the Passions may be referr'd to the three Primitive namely Desire Joy and Sorrow and that it is specially by the different Judgments the Soul makes of Goods and Evils that such as relate to the same Primitive Passion differ from each other For Instance I may say that Hope Fear and Irresolution that is the Mean betwixt them both are Species of Desire That Boldness Courage and Emulation c. have a greater Relation to Hope than to all others and that Timidity Cowardise Jealousie c. are Species of Fear I may say that Alacrity and Glory Kindness and Gratefulness are Species of Joy caused by the Sight of the Good that we know to be in us or in those to whom we are united as Derision or Jeering is a sort of Joy commonly arising at the Sight of the Evil that befalls those from whom we are separated Lastly That Distaste
to supply the want of Application to insensible Truths it may be fit to express them in a sensible and moving manner 'T is for that Reason that Geometricians express by sensible Lines the Proportions that are betwixt several Magnitudes for by drawing Lines upon Paper they draw as I may say answerable Ideas upon their Mind and make them more familiar by Seeing them at the same time that they Conceive them Thus several very difficult Things may be taught to Children though they be not susceptible of abstracted Truths by reason of the Nicety of the Fibres of their Brain Their Eyes see nothing but Colours Pictures Images but their Mind considers the Ideas that answer those sensible Objects But we must take a special Care not to over-shadow the Objects which we will consider or represent to others with so much Sensibility that the Mind should be more taken up with it than with the Truth it self which is a most considerable and common Fault for we meet every day with Men that apply themselves only to what moves the Senses and express themselves in such a sensible manner that Truth is as stifled under a vain and pompous Apparel of their false Eloquence so that their Hearers being more affected with the Measure of their Periods and the Motions of their Figures than by the Reasons they alledge give way to be persuaded without so much as knowing what causes their Persuasion or what they are persuaded of And therefore we must so carefully moderate the Sensibility of our Expressions as only just to make the Mind attentive There is nothing more beautiful than Truth neither can we pretend to make it handsomer by daubing it with sensible Colours that have no Solidity in them and are pleasing but a short time We might perhaps make it more fine and delicate but should enerve and emasculate it So that we ought not to set it off with so much Lustre and Brightness that the Mind be more taken up with the Ornaments than with the Body it self this being to deal with it as some Persons do with themselves when loaded with such abundance of Gold and precious Stones they appear the least considerable part of the whole which they make up with their Clothes We must dress the Truth as are those Magistrates of Venice who are oblig'd to wear a plain Gown and a Cap to distinguish them from the Commonalty that Men may look on their Faces with Reverence and Attention without admiring their Apparel Lastly We must take care not to surcharge it with too great a Retinue of delightful Things that dissipate the Mind and obstruct its View lest we should give to any thing else the Honours due to it As it often happens to Princes who cannot be distinguish'd amongst the great Number of their Courtiers and Attendants who assume to themselves that Air of Greatness and Majestical Countenance which only becomes the Sovereigns themselves But to give a more considerable Instance I say that Truth must be proposed to others as it manifests it self The Sight of Men since the Fall of their Fore-fathers is too weak to look on Truth it self and therefore Sovereign Truth has made it self sensible by coming invested with our Humanity that it might attract our Thoughts enlighten our Mind and appear lovely to our Eyes So we may according to that Pattern adorn with something sensible the Truths we endeavour to understand our selves and to teach others that we may fix the Mind upon them which loves what is sensible and is not easily delighted by Things that flatter not the Senses The Eternal Wisdom has made it self sensible but not glittering and pompous becoming sensible not to fasten us to what is sensible but to raise us to what is intellectual and to condemn and sacrifice Sensibility in his own Person So we must make use in the Knowledge of Truth of something sensible but not too splendid that cannot indear too much the sensible Object but only keep open the Eye of our Mind in the Contemplation of mere intellectual Truths Such Sensibility should be employ'd as we may dissipate annihilate and willingly sacrifice upon the Sight of the Truth to which it has conducted us The Eternal Wisdom has offer'd it self to us from without in a sensible manner not to keep us abroad but that we may retire within our selves and that the Inner Man might intellectually consider it So we must in our Search of Truth make use of something sensible which may not keep us abroad gazing on its Lustre but make us enter into our selves and strengthen our Attention and Union to the Eternal Truth which only is able to rule the Mind and enlighten it upon any Subject whatsoever CHAP. IV. Of the Vse of Imagination to make the Mind attentive and especially of the Vsefulness of Geometry WE had need be very circumspect and cautious in the Choice and Use of those Helps that we may draw from our Senses and Passions to become attentive to the Truth because our Senses and Passions too vividly affect us and so much fill up the Capacity of the Mind that it often sees nothing but its own Sensations when it proposes to discover Things in their own Nature But as to those Succours which our Imagination may afford us they make the Mind attentive without fruitlesly dividing its Capacity and wonderfully help us to a clear and distinct Perception of Objects so that they are for the most part very useful as will be made plain by some Instances We know that a Body is moved by two or several different Causes towards two or several different Places whereunto it is equally or unequally driven by these Forces that the Force of the Motion perpetually increases or decreases according to some known Proportion We are asked what way that Body goes in what place it shall be at such or such a Moment with what degree of Celerity it shall be endued when 't is come to such a place and other like Questions 2. But if the Force that moves it towards B be equal to that which moves it towards C then divide the Lines AB and AC into the parts 1 2 3 4. I II III IV equally distant from A If the Force that moves it towards B be double of that which moves it towards C take in the Line AB Parts that are double of those that you cut in AC If that Force be subduple take them subduple if it be thrice greater or lesser cut them likewise thrice greater or lesser and so proportionably The Divisions of those Lines will represent to the Imagination the different Degrees of those moving Forces and withal the Space that they shall cause the Body to run over First That Line AXYE expresses the true Degrees of the compound Motion For we sensibly perceive that if each of the Forces which produce it can promote the Body a Foot in a Minute its composed Motion will be of two Foot in a Minute if both
loose and indefinite Notions engage not into Errour at least they are wholly unserviceable to the Discovery of Truth For though we know that there is in Fire a substantial Form attended with a Million of Faculties like to that of heating dilating melting Gold Silver and other Metals lightening burning roasting the Idea of that substantial Form with all its Faculties of producing Heat Fluidity Rarefaction will not help me to resolve this Question Why Fire hardens Clay and softens Wax There being no Connection betwixt the Ideas of Hardness in Clay and Softness in Wax and those of a substantial Form in Fire and its Faculties of Rarefaction Fluidity c. The same may be said of all general Ideas which are utterly insufficient for resolving any Question But when I know that Fire is nothing else but divided Wood whose Parts are in a continual Agitation by which alone it raises in me the Sensation of Heat and that the Softness of Clay consists in a Mixture of Water and Earth those Ideas being not general and confused but particular and distinct it will not be difficult to perceive that the Heat of Fire must harden Clay nothing being easier to conceive than that one Body may move another if it meet with it being it self in Motion We likewise easily perceive that since the Heat we feel near the Fire is caused by the Motion of the invisible Particles of Wood striking against our Hands Face c. if we expose Clay to the Heat of Fire the Particles of Water that are mixed with those of Earth being more thin and disunited and consequently more agitated by the Action and Impulse of the fiety Corpuscles than the gross Particles of Earth must be separated and expelled and the other remain dry and hard We shall perceive with the same Evidence that Fire must produce a quite contrary Effect upon Wax if we know that it is composed of Particles that are branched and almost of the same Bulk Thus may particular Ideas be subservient to the Enquiry after Truth whilst loose and undeterminate Notions are not only altogether unserviceable but also insensibly engage us into Errour For these Philosophers are not content to make use of those general Terms and uncertain Ideas which answer to them they moreover pretend that those Words signifie some particular Beings they give out that there is a Substance distinguished from Matter which is the Form of it and withal an infinite Number of little Beings really distinguished from that Matter and Form of which they suppose as many as they have different Sensations of Bodies or as those Bodies are supposed to produce different Effects However 't is visible to any attentive Person that those little Beings for instance that are said to be distinguished from Fire and suppos'd to be contained in it for the producing Heat Light Hardness Fluidity c. are but the Contrivances of the Imagination that rebells against Reason since Reason has no particular Idea that represents those little Beings When the Philosophers are asked What is the illuminating Faculty in Fire They only answer That 't is a Being which is the Cause that Fire is capable of producing Light So that their Idea of that illuminating Faculty differs not from the general Idea of Cause and the confused Idea of the Effect they see and therefore they have no clear Idea of what they say when they admit those particular Beings and so say what they not only understand not but what 's impossible to be understood CHAP. III. Of the most dangerous Errour in the Philosophy of the Ancients PHilosophers not only speak without understanding themselves when they explain the Effects of Nature by some Beings of which they have no particular Idea but also establish a Principle whence very false and pernicious Consequences may directly be drawn For supposing with them that there are in Bodies certain Entities distinguished from Matter and having no distinct Idea of those Entities 't is easie to imagine that they are the real or principal Causes of the Effects we see And this is the very Opinion of the vulgar Philosophers The prime Reason of their supposing those substantial Forms real Qualities and other such like Entities is to explain the Effects of Nature But when we come attentively to consider the Idea we have of Cause or Power of acting we cannot doubt but that it represents something Divine For the Idea of a Sovereign Power is the Idea of a Sovereign Divinity and the Idea of a subordinate Power the Idea of an inferiour Divinity yet a true Divinity at least according to the Opinion of the Heathens supposing it to be the Idea of a true Power or Cause And therefore we admit something Divine in all the Bodies that surround us when we acknowledge Forms Faculties Qualities Virtues and real Beings that are capable of producing some Effects by the force of their Nature and thus insensibly approve of the Sentiments of the Heathens by too great a Deference for their Philosophy Faith indeed corrects us but it may perhaps be said that the Mind is a Pagan whilst the Heart is a Christian. Moreover it is a hard Matter to persuade our selves that we ought neither to fear nor love true Powers and Beings that can act upon us punish us with some Pain or reward us with some Pleasure And as Love and Fear are a true Adoration it is hard again to imagine why they must not be ador'd For whatever can act upon us as a true and real Cause is necessarily above us according to Reason and St. Austin and by the same Reason and Authority 't is likewise an immutable Law That inferiour Beings should be subservient to superiour Whence that great Father concludes That the Body cannot operate upon the Soul and that nothing can be above her but God only The chief Reasons that God Almighty uses in the Holy Scriptures to prove to the Israelites that they ought to adore that is to love and fear him are drawn from his Power to reward or punish them representing to them the Benefits they have received from him the Punishments he has inflicted upon them and his Power that is always the same He forbids them to adore the Gods of the Heathens as such as have no Power over them and can doe them neither harm nor good He commands them to honour him alone as the only true Cause of Good and Evil Reward and Punishment none of which can befal a City according to the Prophet but what comes from him by reason that natural Causes are not the true Causes of the Hurt they seem to doe us and as it is God alone that acts in them so 't is He alone that must be fear'd and lov'd in them Soli Deo Honor Gloria Lastly The Sense of fearing and Loving what may be the true Cause of Good and Evil appears so natural and just that it is not possible to cast it off So that in that
false Supposition of the Philosophers which we are here endeavouring to destroy that the surrounding Bodies are the true Causes of our Pain and Pleasure Reason seems to justifie a Religion like the Pagan Idolatry and approve the universal Depravation of Morals Reason I grant teaches not to adore Onions and Leeks for instance as the Sovereign Divinity because they can never make us altogether happy when we have them or unhappy when we want them neither did the Heathens worship them with an equal Homage as their great Jupiter whom they fansied to be the God of Gods or as the Sun whom our Senses represent as the universal Cause that gives Life and Motion to all things and which we can hardly forbear to look on as the Sovereign Divinity if we suppose as the Pagan Philosophers that he Comprehends in his Being the true Causes of what he seems to produce as well upon our Soul and Body as upon all the Beings that surround us But if we must not pay a Sovereign Worship to Leeks and Onions they deserve at least some particular Adoration I mean they may be thought upon and loved in some manner if it be true that they can in some sort make us happy and may be honour'd proportionably to the good they doe us Surely Men that listen to the Reports of Sense think Pulse capable of doing them good otherwise the Israelites would not have bewailed the loss of them in the Wilderness or look'd on themselves as unhappy for being deprived thereof had they not fansied to themselves some great Happiness in the Enjoyment of them See what an Abyss of Corruption Reason plunges us into when it goes hand in hand with the Principles of Pagan Philosophy and follows the footsteps of the Senses But that the Falshood of that wretched Phylosophy and the Certainty of our Principles and Distinctness of our Ideas may not be longer doubted it will be necessary plainly to establish the Truths that contradict the Errours of the Ancient Philosophers or to prove in few words that there is but one true Cause since there is but one true God that the Nature and Force of every thing is nothing but the Will of God that all Natural things are not real but only occasional Causes and some other Truths depending on them It is evident that all Bodies great and little have no force to move themselves a Mountain a House a Stone a Grain of Sand the minutest and bulkiest Bodies imaginable are alike as to that We have but two sorts of Ideas viz. of Spirits and Bodies and as we ought not to speak what we conceive not so we must only argue from those two Ideas Since therefore our Idea of Bodies convinces us that they cannot move themselves we must conclude that they are moved by Spirits But considering our Idea of finite Spirits we see no necessary Connexion betwixt their Will and the Motion of any Body whatsoever on the contrary we perceive that there is not nor can be any Whence we must infer if we will follow Light and Reason That as no Body can move it self so no Created Spirit can be the true and principal Cause of its Motion But when we think on the Idea of God or of a Being infinitely perfect and consequently Almighty we are aware that there is such a Connexion betwixt his Will and the Motion of all Bodies that it is impossible to conceive he should will that a Body be moved and it should not be moved And therefore if we would speak according to our Conceptions and not according to our Sensations we must say that nothing but his Will can move Bodies The moving force of Bodies is not then in themselves this force being nothing but the Will of God Bodies then have no proper Action and when a moving Ball meets with another and moves it the former communicates nothing of its own to the latter as not having in it self the Impression it communicates though the former be the Natural Cause of the latter's Motion and therefore a natural Cause is not a true and real Cause but only an occasional which in such or such a Case determines the Author of Nature to act in such or such a manner 'T is certain that all things are produced by the Motion of visible or invisible Bodies for Experience teaches us that those Bodies whose parts are in greater Motion are always the most active and those that Cause the greatest Alterations in the World so that all the Forces of Nature are but the Will of God who Created the World because he will'd it who spake and it was done who moves all things and produces all the Effects we see because he has established some Laws by which Bodies Communicate their Motion to each other when they meet together and because those Laws are efficacious they and not the Bodies act There is then no Force Power nor true Cause in all the Material and sensible World Nor need we admit any Forms Faculties or real Qualities to produce Effects which the Bodies bring not forth or to divide with God his own Essential Force and Power As Bodies cannot be the true Causes of any thing so likewise the most Noble Spirits are subject to the same impotency on that respect They cannot know any thing unless God enlightens them nor have the Sensation of any thing unless he modifies them nor will unless he moves them towards himself They may indeed determine the Impression God has given them to himself towards other Objects but I doubt whether it can be call'd a Power For if to be able to sin is a Power it is such a one as the Almighty wants saith St. Austin somewhere If Men had of themselves the Power of loving Good it might be said that they have some Power but they cannot so much as love but because God Wills it and that his Will is Efficacious They love because God continually drives them towards Good in general that is towards himself for whom alone they are Created and preserved God moves them and not themselves towards Good in general and they only follow that Impression by a free Choice according to the Law of God or determine it towards false and seeming Goods according to the Law of the Flesh But they cannot determine it but by the sight of Good For being able to doe nothing without an Impression from above they are incapable of loving any thing but Good But though it should be supposed which is true in one sense that Spirits have in themselves the Power of knowing Truths and loving Good should their Thoughts and Will produce nothing outwardly it might still be said that they were impotent and unoperative Now it seems undeniable that the Will of Spirits is not able to move the smallest Body in the World it being evident there is no necessary Connexion betwixt the Will we may have of moving our Arm for instance and the Motion of the same Arm. It moves
if they were just and good And none perhaps could forbear laughing if instead of the Definitions which Aristotle gives of Hunger and Thirst when he says that Hunger is the desire of what is hot and dry and Thirst the desire of what is cold and moist we should substitute the Definitions of those words calling Hunger the desire of that which coacervates things of the same nature and is easily contained within its own Limits and difficultly within others and defining Thirst the desire of that which congregates things of the same and different natures and which can hardly be contained within its own bounds but is easily kept within others Surely 't is a very useful Rule to know whether Terms have been well defined and to avoid mistakes in reasoning often to put the Definition instead of the thing defined for that shews whether the words are equivocal and the Measures of the Relations false and imperfect or whether we argue consequently If it be so what Judgment can be made of Aristotle's Arguments which become an impertinent and ridiculous Nonsence when we make use of that Rule and what may also be said of all those who argue upon the false and confused Ideas of the Senses since that Rule which preserves Light and Evidence in all exact and solid Reasonings brings nothing but confusion in their Discourses 'T is not possible to lay open the foolish Capriciousness and Extravagance of Aristotle's Explications upon all sorts of matters When he treats of simple and easie Subjects his Errours are plain and obvious to be discover'd but when he pretends to explain very composed things and depending on several Causes his Errours are as much compounded as the Subjects he speaks of so that it is impossible to unfold them all and set them before others That great Genius who is said to have so well succeeded in his Rules for defining well knows not so much as which are the things that may be defined because he puts no Distinction betwixt a clear and distinct and a sensible Knowledge and pretends to know and explain other things of which he has not so much as a distinct Idea Definitions ought to explicate the Nature of things and the words of which they consist must raise in the Mind distinct and particular Notions But 't is impossible to define in that manner sensible Qualities as Heat Cold Colour Savour c. When you confound the Cause with the Effect the Motion of Bodies with the Sensation that attends it because Sensations being Modifications of the Soul which are not to be known by clear Ideas but only by internal Sensation as I have explain'd it in the third Book it is impossible to fix to those words Ideas which we have not As we have Distinct Ideas of a Circle a Square a Triangle and therefore know distinctly their Nature so we can give good Difinitions of them and even deduce from our Ideas of those Figures all their Properties and explain them to others by such words as are fixed to those Ideas But we cannot define either Heat or Cold in as much as they are sensible Qualities because we know them not distinctly and by Ideas but only by Conscience and inward Sensation Neither must we define the Heat that is without us by any of its Effects For if we substitute such a Definition in its place we shall find that it will only conduce to lead us into Errour For Instance if Heat be defined what congregates homogeneous things without adding any thing else we may by that Definition mistake for Heat such things as have no Relation to it For then it might be said that the Loadstone collects the Filings of Iron and separates them from those of Silver because 't is hot that a Dove eats Hempseed when it leaves other Grain because that Bird is hot that a covetous Man separates his Guineas from his Silver because he is hot In short there is no impertinency but that Definition would induce one into it were he dull enough to follow it And therefore that Definition explains not the nature of Heat nor can it be imploy'd to deduce all its properties from it since by literally insisting upon it we should draw ridiculous Conclusions and by putting it instead of the thing defined fall into Nonsense However if we carefully distinguish Heat from its Cause though it cannot be defined in as much as it is a Modification of the Soul whereof we have no Idea yet its Cause may be defined since we have a distinct Idea of Motion But we must observe that Heat taken for such a Motion causes not always in us the Sense of Heat For Instance Water is hot since its Parts are fluid and in Motion and most probably it feels warm to Fishes at least 't is warmer than Ice whose Parts are more quiet but 't is cold to us because it has less Motion than the Parts of our Body what has less Motion than another being in some manner quiet in respect of that And therefore 't is not with reference to the Motion of the Fibres of our Body that the Cause of Heat or the Motion that excites it ought to be defined We must if possible define that Motion absolutely and in it self for then our Definition will be subservient to know the Nature and Properties of Heat I hold not my self oblig'd to examine farther the Philosophy of Aristotle and to extricate his so much confus'd and puzling Errours I have shewn methinks that he proves not the Existence of his four Elements and defines them wrong that his Elementary Qualities are not such as he pretends that he knows not their Nature and that all the Second Qualities are not made of them and lastly that though we should grant him that all Bodies are compos'd of the four Elements and the Second Qualities of the First his whole System would still prove useless for the finding out of Truth since his Ideas are not clear enough to preserve Evidence in all our Reasonings If any doubt whether I have propos'd the true Opinions of Aristotle he may satisfie himself by consulting his Books of the Heavens and of Generation and Corruption whence I have exextracted almost all that I have said of him I would relate nothing out of his Eight Books of Physicks because some learned Men pretend they are but a mere Logick which is very apparent since nothing but rambling and undetermin'd Words are to be found in them As Aristotle often contradicts himself and that almost all sorts of Opinions may be defended by some Passages drawn out of him I doubt not but some Opinions contrary to those I have ascrib'd to that Philosopher may be prov'd out of himself And I shall not warrant for him but it is sufficient for me that I have the Books I have quoted to justifie what I have said of him and I care little whether those Books are Aristotle's or not taking them for such as I find them upon the
some concurrent Body 'T is true that something besides a Body may move it but as long as we have no distinct Idea of that Thing we must not admit it as a proper Means to discover what is searched after nor to explain it to others for to contrive a Cause which none clearly conceives is not to give account of an Effect We must not then trouble our selves to enquire whether there is or is not any other natural Cause of the Motion of Bodies besides the mutual Impulse but rather suppose that there is none and attentively consider what Bodies may meet with and move that Load-stone We presently see that it is not mov'd by the Magnet we keep in our Hands since it touches it not but because 't is mov'd only when that Magnet is brought near it and that it moves not of it self we must infer that it is mov'd by some small Effluviums or little Bodies that proceed from that Magnet and are driven to the other Load-stone To discover those Corpuscles we must not open our Eyes nor nearly consider that Magnet for our Senses might impose upon our Reason and make us judge that nothing proceeds out of it because we perceive it not Perhaps we should not reflect that we see not the most impetuous Winds nor several other Bodies that produce very surprizing Effects We must then keep close to that clear and intelligible Means and carefully examine all the Effects of a Load-stone to discover how that Magnet may continually vent so many little Bodies without diminishing for the Experiments we shall make will discover that the small Particles that evaporate at one side immediately re-enter through another and will serve to explain all the Difficulties that may be objected against the Method of solving this Question But it must be observ'd that this Medium must not be forsaken though we should not be able to answer some Objections proceeding from our Ignorance in several things If we desire not to examine why Load-stones remove from each other when their Poles of the same Name are in Opposition to each other but rather why they approach and endeavour to unite together when the North Pole of one is opposite to the South Pole of the other the Question will be more difficult and one Medium alone will not be sufficient to resolve it for it is not enough exactly to know the Relations betwixt the Poles of those two Load-stones nor to have recourse to the Medium propos'd in the fore-going Question for that Means seems only fit to hinder the Effect whereof the Cause is sought for Neither must we propose any of those Things that are not clearly known to be the natural and ordinary Causes of Corporeal Motion nor evade the Difficulty of the Question by the rambling and uncertain Notion of an Occult Quality in Load-stones by which they attract each other for the Mind cannot conceive any such Attraction in Bodies The Impenetrability of Bodies plainly convinces us that Motion may be communicated by Impulsion and Experience evidently proves that it is communicated that way But there is no Reason nor Experiment that clearly demonstrates the Motion of Attraction for when the true and certain Cause of the Experiments which are alledg'd to prove that sort of Motion is found out it is visible that what appear'd to be done by Attraction is produc'd by Impulsion We must not therefore insist upon any other Communication of Motion but that effected by Impulsion since this Way is sure and undeniable whereas all the others imaginable have at least some Obscurity in them But though it might be demonstrated that mere Corporeal Things have some other Principles of Motion besides the Concourse of Bodies this might not however be reasonably rejected but must rather be insisted upon preferably to all others it being the most clear and most evident and appearing so undeniable that we may confidently assert that it has always been receiv'd by all Nations and Ages in the World Experience shews that a Load-stone freely swimming upon the Water draws towards that which we keep in our Hands when their different Poles are opposite to each other we must then conclude that the Load-stone upon the Water is driven to it But as the Magnet we hold cannot drive the other seeing this other approaches it and that the free Load-stone only moves at the Presence of the other Magnet 't is plain that to resolve this Question by the receiv'd Principle of the Communication of Motions we must have recourse to two Means at least If we know that the Parts of the Air are in perpetual Agitation as those of all fluid Bodies use to be we shall not doubt but they continually strike against the Load-stone c which they surround but because they strike it equally on all sides they impel it one way no more than another as long as there is an equal Quantity of Air on all sides It being so 't is easie to judge that the Magnet C hinders lest there should be as much Air towards a as towards b which cannot be done but by its diffusing some other Corpuscles betwixt C and c and therefore there exâ—ale such Particles ouâ— of both Load-stones which filling up that Space and carrying away the Air about a make the Load-stone c less press'd on that side than on the other and it must by consequence approach the Magnet C since all Bodies move towards the side on which there is the least Pressure or Resistance But if in the Load-stone c about the Pole a there were not many Pores fit to receive the small Particles streaming out of the Pole B of the Magnet C and too small to admit those of the Air 't is plain that those small Particles being more agitated than the Air since they are to chase it from betwixt the Load-stones they would drive the Load-stone c and remove it from the Magnet C Therefore since the Load-stone c approaches to or removes from the Magnet C according as they are oppos'd by different or the same Poles we must needs infer that the Poles a and b of the Load-stone c are full of different Pores otherwise the small Particles issuing out of the Magnet C could not have a free Passage without impelling the Load-stone c at the side a nor would they repel it at the side b. What I say of one of these Load-stones must be understood of the other 'T is plain that we always learn something by that Method of Arguing from clear Ideas and undeniable Principles For we have discover'd that the Air which environs the Load-stone c was driven from thence by Corpuscles perpetually flowing out of the Pores of both Load-stones which Corpuscles find a free Passage at one side but are shut out at the other If we desir'd nearly to discover the Bigness and Figure of the Pores of the Load-stone through which those Particles pass we ought to make other Experiments but that would lead us to Subjects which we
of their Motion to the lesser which they met with and that the latter should rebound at the Encounter of the former without the like Loss of their own For otherwise the first Element would not have all the Motion that is necessary above the second nor the second above the third and so all his System would be absolutely false as is manifest to those who have a little consider'd it But in supposing that Rest has Force to resist Motion and that a great Body in Rest cannot be mov'd by another less than it self though most violently striking against it 't is plain that great Bodies must have much less Motion than an equal Mass of little ones since they may always by that Supposition communicate their own Motion but cannot always receive any from the lesser Thus this Supposition being not contrary to all that Monsieur des Cartes had laid down in his Principles from the beginning to the Establishment of his Rules of Motion and according very well with the Consequence of these same Principles he thought the Rules of Motion which he believ'd he had demonstrated in their Cause were sufficiently confirm'd by their Effects I agree with Monsieur des Cartes in the Bottom of the Thing that great Bodies communicate their Motion much easier than the lesser and that therefore his first Element is more agitated than the second and the second than the third but the Cause is manifest without recourse to his Supposition Little and fluid Bodies as Water Air c. can but communicate to any great ones an uniform Motion which is common to all their Parts The Water of a River can only communicate to a Boat a descending Motion which is common to all the little Parts the Water is composed of each of which Particles besides its common Motion has infinite others which are particular Which Reason makes it evident that a Boat for instance cannot have so much Motion as an equal Volume of Water since the Boat can only receive from the Water a direct Motion and common to all the Parts of it If twenty Parts of a fluid Body drive against any other Body on one side whilst there are as many urging it on the other it remains immoveable and all the Particles of the surrounding Fluid it swims in rebound without losing any thing of their Motion Therefore gross Bodies whose Parts are united one to the other can receive only a circular and uniform Motion from the Vortex of the encompassing subtile Matter This Reason seems sufficient to give us to understand why gross Bodies are not so much agitated as little ones and that it is not necessary to the explaining these things to suppose any Force in Rest to resist Motion The Certainty of Monsieur des Cartes's Philosophical Principles cannot therefore be of Use in proving or defending his Rules of Motion And we have Reason to believe that if Monsieur des Cartes himself had without Prepossession examin'd his Principles afresh at the same time weighing such Reasons as I have alledg'd he would not have believ'd the Effects of Nature had corroborated his Rules nor have fallen into a Contradiction in attributing the Hardness of hard Bodies only to the Rest of their Parts and their Elasticity to the Effort of the subtile Matter I now come to give the Rules of the Communication of Motion in a Vacuum which follow upon what I have before establish'd concerning the Nature of Rest. Bodies being not hard in a Vacuum since they are only so by the pressure of the subtile Matter that surrounds them if two Bodies meet together they would flatten without rebounding We must therefore suppose them hard by their own Nature and not by the pressure of the subtile Matter to give these Rules Rest having no Force to resist Motion and many Bodies being to be consider'd but as one at the Instant of their Collision 't is plain they ought not to rebound save when they are equal in their Bulk and Swiftness or that their Swiftness compensates for the Want of Bulk or their Bulk the Want of Swiftness And 't is easie from hence to conclude that they ought in all other Cases so to communicate their Motion as afterwards to proceed along together with an equal Pace Wherefore to know what ought to happen in all the different Suppositions of the Magnitude and Celerity of Colliding Bodies we need only add together all the Degrees of Motion of two or more which ought to be consider'd but as one in the Moment of their Concourse and afterwards divide the Summ of the whole Motion proportionably to the Bulk of each respective Body Hence I conclude that of the seven Rules of Motion Monsieur des Cartes has given the three first are good That the Fourth is false and that B ought to communicate its Motion to C in proportion to the bigness of the same C and after go along in Company so as if C be double to B and B have three Degrees of Motion it must give away two of them For I have sufficiently prov'd that Monsieur des Cartes ought not to have suppos'd in Rest a Force to resist Motion That the Fifth is true That the Sixth is false and that B ought to communicate half of its Motion to C. And that the Seventh is false and that B ought ever to communicate its Motion to C in proportion to the Magnitude and Motion of both B and C. But that if according to the Supposition C be double to B and have three Degrees of Motion whilst C has but two they must proceed together in Company C and B being but one Body at the time of their Collision and therefore we must add together the Degrees of Swiftness which are five and afterwards divide them in proportion to their bigness and so distribute 1 3 2 to B and 3 â…“ to C which is double to B. But these Rules though certain from what I have said are yet contrary to Experience since we are not in a Vacuum The chief of those Experiences which are contrary to what I have said about the Rules of Motion is the constant rebounding of hard Bodies when they meet one one way and another another or at least their not going in Company after their Encounter In Answer to which we must call to mind what we have formerly said of the Cause of Elasticity namely That there is a Matter of a strangely-violent Motion which continually passes into the Parts of hard Bodies and makes them so by its compressing both their outward and inward Parts For it will be easie from hence to see that at the time of Percussion two encountring Bodies drive and turn off the Current of this Matter from the places nearest to the stricken which Matter resisting with great Violence repells the two Bodies which strike against each other and restores its Passage which the Percussion had stopp'd up That which more clearly still proves my Opinion is
our Freedom on its respect But whereas this inward Sensation is sometimes absent from our Mind and we consult only what confus'd remains it has left in our Memory we may by the consideration of abstracted reasons which keep us from an inward feeling persuade our selves that 't is impossible for Man to be free Just as a Stoick who in want of nothing and Philosophizing at his Case may imagine that Pain is no Evil because the Internal Sense he has of himself does not actually convince him of the contrary and so he may prove like Seneca by reasons in one sense most true that 't is a contradiction for the wise man to be miserable But though our Self-consciousness were insufficient to convince us of our Freedom yet Reason might evince as much For since the light of Reason assures us that God acts only for himself and that he can give no Motion to us but what must tend towards him the Impression towards Good in general may be irresistible but 't is plain that that which we have for particular Goods must be necessarily free For if it were invincible we should have no Motion to carry us to God though he gives it only for himself and we should be constrain'd to settle on particular Goods though GOD ORDER and REASON forbid us So that Sin could not be laid at our door and God would be the real Cause of our Corruptions forasmuch as we should not be Free but purely Natural and altogether necessary Agents Thus though inward Sensation did not teach us we were free Reason would discover it was necessary for Man to be created so if we suppose him capable of desiring particular Goods and only capable of desiring them through the Impression or Motion which God perpetually gives us for himself Which likewise may be prov'd by Reason But our capacity to suffer Pain cannot be prov'd this way but can only be discover'd by Conscience or inward Sensation and yet no Man can doubt but a Man is liable to suffer Pain As we know not our Soul by any clear Idea we have of it as I have before explain'd so 't is in vain to try to discover what it is in us that terminates the Action which God impresses or that yields to be conquer'd by a resistible Determination and which we may change by our Will or by our Impression towards all Good and our Union with him who includes the Ideas of all Beings For in short we have no clear Idea of any Modification of our Soul Nothing but our Internal Sense can teach us that we are and what we are and this only must be consulted to convince us we are free And its Answers are clear and satisfactory enough upon the Point when we actually propose to our selves any particular Good for no Man whatever can doubt whether he be invinsibly inclin'd to eat of a Fruit or avoid some slight inconsiderable Pain But if instead of hearkning to our Inward Sensation we attend to abstracted Reasons which throw us off the Contemplation of our selves possibly losing sight of them we may forget that we are in Being and trying to reconcile the prescience of God and his absolute power over us with our Liberty we shall plunge into an Errour that will overturn all the Principles of Religion and Morality I produce here an Objection which is usually made against what I have been saying which though but very weak and defective is strong enough to give a great many trouble to evade The Hating of God say they is an Action which does not partake of Good and therefore is all the Sinner's God having no part in it And consequently Man acts and gives himself new Modifications by an action which does not come from God I Answer That Sinners hate not God but because they freely and falsly judge that he is Evil for Good consider'd as such cannot be the Object of Hatred Therefore they hate God with that very Motion of Love he influences them with towards Good Now the Reason why they conclude he is not Good is their making an undue use of their Liberty for being not convinc'd with irresistible Evidence that he is not Good they ought not to believe him Evil nor consequently to hate him In Hatred two things may be distinguish'd viz. the Sensation of the Soul and Motion of the Will This Sensation cannot be Evil for it is a Modification of the Soul and has neither Moral Good nor Ill in it Nor is the Motion more corrupt since it is not distinguishable from that of Love For External Evil being only the privation of Good 't is manifest that to fly Evil is to fly the privation of Good that is to pursue Good Wherefore all that is real and positive even in our Hatred of God himself has nothing Evil in it and the Sinner cannot hate God without an abominable abuse of the action which God incessantly gives to incline him to the Love of Him God works whatever is real in the Sensations of Concupiscence and yet is not the Author of Concupiscence AS the Difficulties that are rais'd about Concupiscence are near akin to those before explain'd I think it convenient to shew that God is not the Author of Concupiscence though it be he that works all in us even in the production of sensible Pleasure It ought I think to be granted for the Reasons produc'd in the Fifth Chapter of the First Book of the preceding Treatise and elsewhere that by the natural Laws of the Union of the Soul and Body Man even before the Fall was inclin'd by preventing Pleasures to the use of sensible Goods and that as often as such and such Traces were delineated in the principal part of his Brain such and such Thoughts arose in his Mind Now those Laws were most Proper and Equitable for the Reasons I there have given Which being suppos'd as before the Trangressions all things were perfectly well order'd so Man had necessarily that Power over his Body as that he could prevent the production of these Traces when he would Order requiring that his Mind should have the Dominion over his Body Which Power of his Mind precisely consisted in this that according to its different Desires and Applications it stopt the Communication of Motions which were produc'd in his own Body by circumambient Objects over which his Will had not an immediate and direct Authority as over his proper Body And it cannot I think be conceiv'd how he could hinder the Formation of the Traces in his Brain any other way Therefore the Will of God or the general Law of Nature which is the true Cause of the Communication of Motions depended on some occasions upon the Will of Adam For God had that consideration for him that he produc'd not without his consent new Motions in his Body or at least in the principal part to which his Soul was immediately uniâ—ed Such was the Institution of Nature before the Sin ORDER would
of the Body is the Cause but of gross Vices such as Intemperance and Vncleanness and not of those which are call'd Spiritual as Pride and Envy and I am persuaded there is that Correspondence between the Disposition of our Brain and those of our Soul as that there is not perhaps any corrupt Habit in the Soul but what has its Principle in the Body St. Paul in several places terms by the Name of the Law the Wisdom the Desires and the Works of the Flesh whatever is contrary to the Law of the Spirit He speaks not of Spiritual Vices He reckons amongst the Works of the Flesh Idolatry Heresies Dissentions and many other Vices which go by the Name of Spiritual To give way to Vain-glory Wrath and Envy is in his Doctrine to follow the Motions of the Flesh. In short It appears from the Expressions of that Apostle That all Sin proceeds from the Flesh not that the Flesh commits it or that the Spirit of Man without the Grace or Spirit of CHRIST can do good but because the Flesh acts upon the Spirit in such a manner that the latter works no evil without being sollicited to it by the former Hear what St. Paul says in the Epistle to the Romans I delight in the law of the Lord after the inward Man But I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members And a little lower So then with my mind I my self serve the law of God but with the flesh the law of sin He speaks after the same manner in several places of his Epistles So that Concupiscence or the Rebellion of the Body not only disposes us to Carnal of shameful Vices but likewise to those which are thought to be Spiritual I here shall endeavour to prove it by a sensible manner When a Man 's in Conversation it is certain as I think that some Tracks are machinally produc'd in his Brain and Motions excited in his Animal Spirits that beget in his Soul corrupt Thoughts and Inclinations Our Thoughts on these Occasions are not naturally conformable to Truth nor our Inclinations to Order They rise in us for the Good of the Body and of the present Life because 't is the Body that exites them So they obliterate the Presence of God and the Thoughts of our Duty out of our Mind and tend only to recommend us to other Men and make them consider us as worth their Affection and Esteem Therefore this secret Pride which kindles in us on such Occasions is a Spiritual Vice whose Principle is the Rebellion of the Body For Example If the Persons in whose Presence we are are rais'd to Honorary Posts and Titles the Lustre of their Grandeur both dazzles and dejects us And as the Traces which their Presence imprints on our Brain are very deep and the Motions of the Spirits rapid they radiate as I may say through all the Body they spread themselves on the Face and give a sensible Testimony of our Reverence and Fear and our most latent Sentiments Next These Traces by the sensible Expressions of our inward Motions work upon the Person that observe us whom they dispose to Sentiments of Candour and Civility by the Traces which our respectful and timorous Deportment machinally produce in his Brain which Traces rallying on his Face and disarm him of that Majesty which appear'd in 't and give the rest of his Body such an Air and Posture as at length rid us of our Concern and re-embolden us Thus by a mutual and frequent Repercussion of these sensible Expressions our Air and Behaviour at last settles in that fashion which the governing Person wishes But as all the Motions of the Animal Spirits are attended with Motions of the Soul and the Traces of the Brain are pursu'd by Thoughts of the Mind 't is plain that since we are depriv'd of the Power of expunging these Traces and stopping these Motions we find our selves sollicited by the over-ruling Presence of the Person to embrace his Opinions and submit to his Desires and to be wholly devoted to his Pleasure as he indeed is dispos'd to study ours but in a very different manner And for this Reason worldly Conversation quickens and invigorates the Concupiscence of Pride as dishonest Commerce feasting and enjoying sensible Pleasures strengthen Carnal Concupiscence which is a Remark very necessary for Morality 'T is of great Use and Advantage that there are Traces in the Brain which incessantly represent Man to himself to make him careful of his Person and that there are others which serve to make and preserve Society since Men are not made to live alone But Man having lost the Power of erasing them when he pleas'd and when convenient they perpetually provoke him to Evil. As he cannot hinder their representing him to himself he is continually sollicited to Motions of Pride and Vanity to despise others and center all things in himself And as he is not Master of those Traces which importune him to keep up Society with others he is agitated by Motions of Complaisance Flattery Jealousie and the like Inclinations as it were in spight of him Thus all those which go by the Name of Spiritual Vices derive from the Flesh as well as Vnchastness and Intemperance There are not only in our Brain Dispositions which excite in us Sensations and Motions with reference to the Propagation of the Species and the Preservation of Life but it may be a greater Number that stir up in us Thoughts and Passions with respect to Society to our own private Advancements and to those of our Friends We are by Nature united to all surrounding Bodies and by them to all the things that any way relate to us But we cannot be united to them save by some Dispositions in our Brain Having not therefore the Power of withstanding the Action of these natural Dispositions our Union turns into Dependence and we grow subject through our Body to all kind of Vices We are not pure Intelligences all the Dispositions of our Soul produce respective Dispositions in our Body and those in our Body mutually excite others like them in our Soul Not that the Soul is absolutely incapable of receiving any thing except by the Body but because as long as She is united to It she cannot admit any Change in her Modifications without making some Alteration in the Body 'T is true she may be enlightned or receive new Ideas and the Body need not have any hand in it but that 's because pure Ideas are not Modifications of the Soul as I have prov'd in another place I speak not here of sensible Ideas because these include a Sensation and every Sensation is a mode of the Souls existing The Second OBJECTION against the Eleventh and Twelfth Articles If Original Sin descends by reason of the Communication which is found between the Brain of the Mother and that of
her Infant the Mother is the cause of the Sin and the Father has no part in it Yet St. Paul teaches us that by Man came sin into the World He does not so much as speak of the Woman Therefore c. ANSWER David assures us that his Mother conceiv'd him in iniquity and the Son of Syrach says Of the Woman came the beginning of Sin and by her we all dy Neither of them speak of Man St. Paul on the contrary says that by Man Sin entred into the World and speaks not of the Woman How will these Testimonies accord and which of the two is to be justify'd if it be necessary to vindicate either In discourse we never attribute to the Woman any thing peculiar to the Man wherein she has no part But that is often ascrib'd to the Man which is proper to the VVoman because her Husband is her Master and Head We see that the Evangelists and also the Holy Virgin call Joseph the Father of Jesus when she says to her Son Behold thy Father and I have sought thee sorrowing Therefore seeing we are assur'd by Holy Writ that Woman has subjected us to Sin and Death it is absolutely necessary to believe it nor can it be thrown upon the Man But though it testifies in several places that 't is by Man that Sin enters into the World yet there is not an equal necessity to believe it since what is of the Woman is commonly attributed to the Man And if we were oblig'd by Faith to excuse either the Man or the Woman it would be more reasonable to excuse the former than the latter However I believe these forecited passages are to be litterally explain'd and that we are to say both the Man and Woman are the true causes of Sin each in their own way The Woman in that by her Sin is communicated it being by her that the Man begets the Children and the Man in that his Sin is the cause of Concupiscence as his action is the cause of the fecundity of the Woman or of the communication that is between her and her Infant It is certain that 't is the Man that impregnates the Woman and consequently is the cause of that communication between her Body and the Child's since that communication is the Principle of its Life Now that Communication not only gives the Child's Body the dispositions of its Mother's but also gives its Mind the dispositions of her Mind Therefore we may say with St. Paul that by one Man sin entred into the world and nevertheless by reason of that communication we may say that Sin came from a Woman and by her we all dye and that our Mother has conceiv'd us in Iniquity as is said in other places of Scripture It may be said perhaps that though Man had not sinn'd yet Woman had produc'd sinful Children for having her self sinn'd she had lost the Power God gave her over her Body and thus though Man had remain'd Innocent she had corrupted the Brain and consequently the Mind of her Child by reason of that communication between them But this surely looks not very probable For Man whilst righteous knowing what he does cannot give the Woman that wretched fecundity of conceiving sinful Children If he remains Righteous he wills not any Children but for God to whom Infant Sinners cannot be well pleasing for I suppose not here a Mediator I grant however that in that case the Marriage had not been dissolv'd and that the Man had known his Wife But it is certain that the Body of the Woman belong'd to her Husband since it was taken out of his and was the same Flesh. Duo in carne una It is moreover certain that Children are as much the Fathers as the Mothers Which being so we can't be persuaded that the Woman would have lost the Power over her Body if her Husband had not sinn'd as well as she For if the Woman had been depriv'd of that Power whilst the Man remain'd Innocent there had been this Disorder in the Universe that an upright Man should have a corrupt Body and sinful Children Whereas it is against Order or rather a contradiction that a just God should punish a perfectly Innocent Man And for this reason Eve feels no involuntary and rebellious Motions immediately after her sin as yet she is not asham'd of her Nakedness nor goes to hide her self On the contrary she comes to her Husband though naked as her self her Eyes are not yet open'd but she is still as before the absolute Comptroller of her own Body Order requir'd that immediately after her Sin her Soul should be disturb'd by the rebellion of her Body and by the shame of her own and her Husband's nakedness for there was no reason that God should any longer suspend on her behalf the Laws of the Communication of Motions as I have said in the seventh Article But because her Body is her Husband 's who is as yet Innocent she is not punish'd in this Body but this punishment is deferr'd till the time that he should eat himself of the Fruit which she presented him Then it was they both began to feel the rebellion of their Body that they saw they were naked and that shame oblig'd them to cover themselves with Fig-leaves Thus we must say that Adam was truly the cause of Original Sin and Concupiscence since it was his Sin that depriv'd both himself and his Wife of their power over their Body by which defectiveness of power the Woman produces in the Brain of her Child such tracks as corrupt its Soul at the very instant of its Creation OBJECTION against the Twelfth Article 'T is but random divining to say the communication between the Mother's and the Infant 's Brain is necessary or useful to the conformation of the foetus For there is no such Communication between the Brain of an Hen and that of her Chickens which notwithstanding are perfectly and compleatly form'd ANSWER I answer that in the seventh Chapter of the Second Book I have sufficiently demonstrated that Communication by the use I make of it in explaining the Generation of Monsters as also certain natural Marks and Fears deriv'd from the Mother For 't is evident that a Man who swoons away at the sight of a Snake because his Mother was frighted with one when she bore him in her Womb could not be subject to that Infirmity but because formerly such Traces had been imprinted on his Brain as these which open upon seeing a Snake and that they were accompany'd with a like Accident And herein I am no Diviner for I do not venture to determine wherein that Communication precisely consists I might say it was perform'd by those Fibres which the Foetus shoots into the Matrix of the Mother and by the Nerves wherewith that part is very probably fill'd and in saying so I should no more divine than would a Man who had never seen the Engines call'd La Samaritaine in affirming
we value our selves above others that do not and sometimes look upon them as Ignorant The Pains we have taken to master him interess us in his Defence For by venerating this Author and procuring the Veneration of others we justifie our own studies and as we find pleasure in justifying our selves so we must not fail to praise and defend him with Earnestness and Zeal and by lively and sensible ways These Reasons and some others of less force are sufficient I think to let us know that the obscurity of Tertullian is no disadvantage to him in the Opinion of some Persons and that likely they would have less admir'd him if the Truths which are scatter'd over his Works were reduc'd to their more simple and clear Ideas Mathematical Truths and Relations are always Sum'd up in their Exponents that is in the most simple terms that express them and are disengag'd from all perplexing and obscuring Dependencies For Geometricians love naked Truth and desire not to convince by Impression but by Light and Evidence But what would become of most of Tertullian's Thoughts were they reduc'd to their Exponents by the Rules of Logical Geometricians and should we see them strip'd of all that sensible Pomp which dazles Reason Yet if we would judge solidly of this Author 's Reasonings we ought to make the Experiment However I do not pretend that Tertullian ought to have written with Geometrical Plainness Figures which express our sentiments and motions with respect to the Truths we expose to others are absolutely necessary and I think that more especially in discourse of Religion and Morality we ought to Employ those Ornaments which procure all the reverence that is due to Truth and those Motions which actuate the Soul and incline her to vertuous Actions But we are not to dress up and adorn a Phantasm without substance and reality nor excite Motions when there 's no occasion and if we will vigorously impress on our Hearers Conviction and Certitude 't is necessary that the Conviction should relate to something true and solid We must neither convince nor be convinced without knowing evidently distinctly precisely why we do the one or suffer the other We ought to know both what we say and what we think and only to Love Truth and Knowledge without putting out the Eyes of others after we have made blind our selves THE ILLUSTRATION UPON THE Nature of IDEAS Wherein I explain how we see all things in God both Truths and Laws Eternal I Hoped that what I had said upon the nature of Ideas was sufficient to have shown that God only enlightens our understanding But I have found by Experience that there are Persons incapable of a competent Attention to conceive the Reasons I have given of this Principle Abstracted reasons are incomprehensible to the greatest part of Men but that which is sensible awakens them and fixes and keeps open the Eye of their Mind They cannot consider nor consequently comprehend what comes not under the Senses nor Imagination Which thing I have often said nor can I too often repeat 'T is plain that Bodies are not visible of themselves that they cannot act upon our mind nor represent themselves to it This has no need of proof but is discover'd by a bare perception and is infinitely more certain than that Bodies communicate their Motion when they meet But it is not certain save with those who silence their Senses to listen to their Reason Therefore all Mankind believe that Bodies impel each other because the Senses tell them so but they do not believe that Bodies are of themselves absolutely invisible and incapable of acting on the Mind because the Senses do not tell them this but seem to say the contrary Nevertheless there are some whose reason is so steadfast and resolv'd as to rise up to the most abstract Truths They contemplate them with attention and couragiously resist the Impression of their Senses and Imagination But the Body insensibly weighing down the Mind they relapse these Ideas vanish and whilst the Imagination stirs up more sensible and lively the former are beheld as Apparitions that only cause mistrust and fear of delusion We are easily apt to distrust those Persons or things we are not familiar with and which have not afforded us any sensible pleasure For 't is Pleasure that wins the Heart and Familiarity that cures our Trouble and disquiet of Mind Wherefore those who are not us'd to Metaphysical and abstract Truths are very prone to believe we purpose to seduce them when we only labour to instruct them They look with a suspicious Eye and a kind of dread upon Ideas which have nothing charming and sensible and the Love they bear to their own Repose and Felicity speedily rids them of so vexatious a Contemplation which seems incapable of contenting them If the Question before us were not of the greatest Importance the Reasons I have given and some others not necessary to be produc'd would oblige me to say no more of it for I foresee that whatever I can say upon this subject will never enter the Heads of some People But this Principle That there is none but God who enlightens us and that this illumination is effected by the manifestation of an immutable and necessary Reason or Wisdom seems to me so conformable to Religion that I think my self indispensably oblig'd to Explain it and maintain it to the utmost of my Power I had rather be call'd a Visionist Enthusiast and all the fine Names that the Imagination which in little Souls is always Sarcastical uses to oppose to reasons it cannot comprehend or defend it self against than to grant that Bodies are capable of instructing me that I am my own Master Reason and Light and that to be thoroughly inform'd in all things I need only consult my self or other Men who perhaps may fill my Ears with a loud noise but certainly cannot infuse Light and Knowledge into my Mind Here then are some farther Reasons for the Opinion I have establish'd in the Chapter belonging to this Illustration No body will deny that Man is capable of knowing Truth and the least intelligent Philosophers acknowledge that he partakes of a certain Reason which they don't determine And therefore they define him animal Rationis particeps For there is no body but knows at least confusedly that the essential difference of Man consists in his necessary union with Universal Reason though it be not commonly known who it is that includes this Reason and little Care is taken to discover it I see for Example that two times two are four and that a Friend is preferable to a Dog and I am certain there is no Man in the World but sees this as well as I. Now I discover not these truths in the Mind of others no more than others do in mine Therefore there is necessarily an Vniversal Reason which enligntens me and all intelligent Beings For if the Reason I consult were not the same as that
incident to the Corporeal World which is an Opinion sufficiently now receiv'd among Men of Letters But let their Opinion about it be what it will that matters not much since it seems much easier to conceive that a Body drives another when it strikes it than to comprehend how Fire can produce Heat and Light and educe from the power of matter a substance that was not in it before And if it be necessary to acknowledge that God is the True Cause of the different Communications of Motion by a much stronger reason we should conclude that none but He can Create and Annihilate real Qualities and substantial Forms I say Create and Annihilate For it seems to me at least as difficult to educe from matter a substance that was not in it or to reduce it into it again whilst yet there nothing remains of it as to create it or Annihilate it But I stick not to the Terms And I make use of those because there are no other that I know of which express without Obscurity and Ambiguity the changes suppos'd by the Philosophers to arrive every moment by the force of second Causes I had some scruple to set down here the other Arguments which are commonly urg'd for the Force and Efficacy of natural Causes For they appear so weak and trifling to those who withstand Prejudices and prefer their Reason before their Senses that I can scarce believe methinks that Reasonable Men could be perswaded by them However I produce and answer them since there are many Philosophers who urge them ARGUMENT I. If second Causes did not Operate say Suarez Fonseca and some others Animate things could not be distinguish'd from Inanimate since neither one nor the other would have an inward principle of their Actions ANSWER I answer that Men would have the same sensible proofs that have convinc'd them of the distinction they make between things Animate and Inanimate They would still see Animals do the same Actions as eat grow cry run bound c. and would discern nothing like this in Stones And this one thing makes the vulgar Philosophers believe that Beasts live and that Stones do not For we are not to fancy that they know by a clear and distinct view of Mind what is the Life of a Dog 'T is their Senses which regulate their Decisions upon this Question If it were necessary I could prove here that the principle of the Life of a Dog differs not from the principle of the Motion of a Watch. For the Life of Bodies whatever they be can consist but in the Motion of their Parts And we may easily judge that the same subtil matter which causes the Fermentation of the Blood and Animal Spirits in a Dog and which is the principle of his Life is no perfecter than that which gives Motion to the Spring of a Watch or which causes the Gravitation in the Weights of a Clock which is the principle of their Life or to speak as others do of their Motion It behoves the Peripateticks to give those whom they stile Cartesians a clear Idea of what they call the Life of Beasts Corporeal Soul Body which Perceives and Desires Sees Feels Wills and then we shall clearly resolve their Difficulties if after that they shall persist in raising them ARGUMENT II. It were impossible to discover the Differences or Powers of the Elements So that Fire might refrigerate as Water and nothing would be of a settled and fix'd Nature ANSWER I answer That whilst Nature remains as it is that is to say whilst the Laws of the Communication of Motions remain constantly the same it is a Contradiction that Fire should not burn or separate the Parts of certain Bodies Fire cannot refrigerate like Water unless it becomes Water for Fire being only Fewel whose Parts have been violently agitated by an invisible surrounding Matter as is easie to demonstrate it is impossible its Parts should not Communicate some of their Motion to approaching Bodies Now as these Laws are constant the Nature of Fire its Virtues and Qualities are unchangeable But this Nature and these Vertues are only Consequences of the General and Efficacious Will of GOD who does all in all things Therefore the Study of Nature is in all respects false and vain when we look for other true Causes than the Wills of the ALMIGHTY I confess that we are not to have recourse to God or the Universal Cause when we require the Reason of particular Effects For we should be ridiculous to assert for Instance That GOD dries the Ways or Freezes the Water in the River We must say The Air dries the Earth because it moves and bears off the Water with it that dilutes it Or that the Air or the subtil Matter Freezes the River in Winter because at that time it communicates not sufficient Motion to the Parts that constitute the Water In a Word we must if we can assign the Natural and particular Cause of the Effects propos'd to Examination But because the Action of these Causes consists in the moving Force which actuates them which moving Force is the Will of GOD which create them we ought not to say they have in themselves a Force or Power to produce any Effects And when in Reasoning we are at last arriv'd to a general Effect of which we seek the Cause 't is no good Philosophy to imagine any other than the general And to feign a certain Nature a first Moveable and universal Soul or some such Chimera whereof we have no clear and distinct Idea would be to argue like an Heathen Philosopher For Example when we are ask'd whence it comes that some Bodies are in motion or that the agitated Air communicates its Motion to the Water or rather whence proceeds the mutual Protrusion of Bodies Motion and its Communication being a general Effect on which all others depend we cannot answer I do'nt say like Christians but Philosophers without ascending to God who is the Universal Cause Since 't is His Will that is the moving Force of Bodies and that regulates the Communication of their Motions Had he will'd there should be no new Production in the World he would not have put its Parts in motion And if hereafter He shall will the Incorruptibility of some of the Beings he had made he shall cease to will the Communication of Motions in point of those Beings ARGUMENT III. 'T is needless to Plow to Water and give several preparatory Dispositions to Bodies to fit them for what we desire from them For GOD has no need of preparing the Subjects on which he Works ANSWER I answer That GOD may do absolutely all he pleases without finding any Dispositions in the Subjects he works upon But he cannot do it without a Miracle or by Natural ways that is by the General Laws of the Communication of Motions which he has constituted and which he almost always follows in his Actings GOD never multiplies his Wills without Reason
is because his Wisdom which in this respect is an Abyss to our apprehensions Wills it so Lastly 't is because this Conduct is more worthy of God than could be any other more favourable for the Reprobate For even they are condemn'd hy an Order as worthy our Adorations as that whereby the Elect are sanctified and sav'd And nothing but our Ignorance of Order and our Self-love make us blame a Conduct which the Angels and Saints eternally admire But let us return to the proofs of the efficacy of second Causes ARGUMENT V. If Bodies had not a certain Nature or Force to act with and if God did all things there would be nothing but what was Supernatural in the most ordinary effects The distinction of Natural and Supernatural which has been so well receiv'd in the World and establisht by the universal approbation of the Learn'd would be Chimerical and Extravagant ANSWER I answer that distinction is absurd in the Mouth of Aristotle since the Nature he has establisht is a meer Chimera I say that distinction is not clear in the mouth of the Vulgar part of Men who judge of things by the Impression they make upon their Senses For they know not precisely what they mean when they say the Fire burns by it's Nature I say that this distinction may pass in the mouth of a Divine if he means by natural Effects the consequences of the General Laws which God has settled for the production and preservation of all things And by supernatural Effects those which are independent on these Laws In this sense the Distinction is true But the Philosophy of Aristotle together with the Impression of the senses makes it as I think dangerous because it may divert from God the too respectful admirers of the Opinions of that wretched Philosopher or such as consult their senses instead of retiring into themselves to consult the Truth And therefore that distinction is not to be made use of without an Explication St. Austin having us'd the word fortune retracted it though there are few that could be deceiv'd by it St. Paul speaking of meats offer'd to Idols advertises that an Idol is nothing If the Nature of the Heathen Philosophy be a fiction if that nature be nothing it should be precaution'd for that there are many who are abus'd by it And more than we suppose who inconsiderately attribute to it the Works of God who are taken up with this Idol or fiction of the Humane mind and pay it those Honours which are only due to the Divinity They are willing to let God be Author of Miracles and some Extraordinary effects which in one sense are little worthy of his Greatness and Wisdom and they refer to the Power of their Imaginary nature those constant and regular Effects which none but the Wise know how to admire They suppose too that this so wonderful disposition which all living Bodies have to preserve themselves and beget their like is a production of their Nature For according to these Philosophers the Sun and Man beget a Man We may still distinguish between supernatural and natural Order several ways For we may say that the supernatural relates to future Goods that it is establish't upon consideration of the merits of CHRIST that it is the first and principal in the designs of God and other things enough to preserve a distinction which they are vainly apprehensive should fall to the ground ARGUMENT VI. The main proof which is brought by the Philosophers for the Efficacy of second Causes is drawn from the will and liberty of Man Man wills and determines of himself But to Will and Determine is to Act. 'T is certainly Man who commits Sin God not being the Author of it any more than of Concupiscence and Error Therefore Man acts ANSWER I have sufficiently explain'd in several Places of the Treatise about the Search of Truth what is the Will and Liberty of Man and especially in the first Chapter of the first Book and in the first Illustration upon it so that it is needless to repeat it again I acknowledge Man Wills and Determines himself in as much as God causes him to Will incessantly carries him towards good and gives him all the Idea's and Sensations by which he determines his Impression I know likewise that Man alone commits Sin But I deny that therein he does any thing For Sin Errour and even Concupiscence are nothing I have explain'd my self upon this Point in the first Illustration Man wills but his Volitions are impotent in themselves they produce nothing and God works all notwithstanding them For 't is even God that makes our Will by the Impression he gives us towards Good All that Man has from himself are Errour and Sin which are nothing There is a great difference between our Minds and Bodies that are about us I grant Our Mind in one sense Wills Acts and Determines it self Our own inward Consciousness is an evident Conviction If we were destitute of Liberty there could be no future Recompence and Punishment for 't is our Liberty that makes our Actions good or bad and without it Religion would be but a Phantasm and a Dream But that which we cannot see clearly is That Bodies have a force of Acting This it is we cannot comprehend and this we deny when we deny the Efficacy of Second Causes Even the Mind acts not in that measure which is imagin'd I know that I will and that I Will freely I have no Reason to doubt of it which is stronger than that inward feeling I have of my self Nor do I deny it but I deny that my Will is the true Cause of the Motion of my Arm of the Idea's of my Mind and of other things which accompany my Volitions For I see no Relation between so different things Nay I most clearly see there can be no Analogy between my Will to move my Arm and the Agitation of some little Bodies whose Motion and Figure I do not know which make choice of certain Nervous Canals amongst a Million of others unknown to me in Order to cause in me the Motion I desire by a World of Motions which I desire not I deny that my Will produces in me my Idea's I cannot see how 't is possible it should for since it cannot Act or Will without Knowledge it supposes my Idea's but does not make them Nay I do not so much as know precisely what an Idea is I cannot tell whether we produce them out of nothing and send them back to the same nothing when we cease to perceive them I speak after the Notion of some Persons I produce you 'll say my Idea's by the Faculty which God gives me of Thinking I move my Arm because of the Union which God has establish'd between my Mind and Body Faculty Vnion are Logical Terms of loose and indeterminate Signification There is no particular Being nor Mode of Being which is either Faculty or Vnion Therefore
least Motion to Matter This Philosophy I say perfectly Accommodates with Religion whose end is to Unite us to God in the strictest Bonds 'T is Customary with us to Love only those things which are capable of doing us some Good This Philosophy therefore Authorises only the Love of God and Condemns the Love of every thing else We ought to fear nothing but what is able to do us some Evil. Therefore this Philosophy approves the fear of God and absolutely Condemns all other Thus it justifies all the just and Reasonable Motions of our Soul and Condemns all those that are contrary to Reason and Religion For we can never justifie the Love of Riches the desire of Greatness the Extravagance of Debauchery by this Philosophy by the Principles whereof the Love for Bodies is absurd and ridiculous 'T is an indisputable Truth 't is a Natural Opinion 't is even a Common Notion that we ought to Love the cause of our Pleasure and to Love it proportionably to the Felicity it either Actually does or is able to possess us with 'T is not only just but as it were necessary that the cause of our happiness should be the Object of our Love Therefore this Philosophy will teach us to Love God only as being the only Cause of our Felicity That surrounding Bodies cannot Act upon that we Animate and consequently much less upon our Mind That 't is not the Sun which enlightens us and gives us Life and Motion Nor that fills the Earth with Fruits and Beautifies it with Flowers and supplies us with Food and Nourishment This Philosophy seconding the Scripture teaches that 't is God alone who gives us Rain and Regulates the Seasons that fills our Bodies with Food and our hearts with Joy that he alone is able to do us good and thereby has given a perpetual Testimony of what he is though in the ages passed he suffer'd all Nations to walk in their own ways According to the Language of this Philosophy we must not say that 't is Nature that fills us with good nor that it is God and Nature together But that it is God alone speaking thus without Ambiguity for fear of deceiving the Ignorant For we must distinctly acknowledge one cause of our happiness if we we make it the only Object of our Love 'T is likewise an undeniable Truth That we ought to fear things that are able to harm us and to fear them in Proportion to the Evil they can do us But this Philosophy teaches us that God only can do us evil that 't is he as says Isaiah who forms the Light and creates Darkness who makes Peace and creates Evil and there is no Evil but what he does as says the Prophet Amos. Therefore it is he only that is to be fear'd We must not fear either Plague or War or Famine or our Enemies or even Devils themselves But God alone We ought to shun the Sword when we see a Blow a coming we are to fly the Fire and avoid a ruinous House that 's ready to crush us but we must not fear these things We may fly from those Bodies which are the Occasional or Natural Causes of Evil but we must fear God as the true Cause of all the misfortunes of Sinners and hate only Sin which necessarily provokes the cause of our Happiness to become the Cause of our Misery In a Word all the Motions of our Mind must center upon God since he alone 's above it and the Motions of our Body may relate to the Bodies round it This is what we learn from that Philosophy that admits not the Efficacy of Second Causes But this Efficacy being suppos'd I cannot see but we have reason to fear and Love Bodies and that to regulate our Love by Reason we need but prefer God before all things the First and Vniversal to every Second and Particular Cause We can see no need of Loving him with all our Strength Ex totâ mente ex toto corde ex totâ animâ ex totis viribus as says the Scripture Yet when a Man contents himself in preferring God to all things and adoring him with a Worship and a Love of Preference without making a continual Effort to Love and Honour him in all things It often fortunes that he deceives himself that his Charity vanishes and is lost And that he is more taken up with sensible than the supream Good For should it be demanded of the greatest Sinners and even Idolaters whether they preferr'd the universal to particular Causes they would make no scruple to answer amidst their Debauches Errours and Extravagance that they are not wanting to their essential Duty and that they are very sensible of what they owe to God 'T is acknowledg'd that they are deceiv'd But take away the Efficacy of Second Causes and they have no probable Pretext left to justifie their Conduct and Behaviour whilst if it be granted them they will think and Discourse with themselves in the following manner when blinded by their Passions and attentive to the Testimony of their Senses I am made for Happiness Neitheir can I nor indeed ought I to supersede my Love and Respect for whatever can be the Cause of my Felicity Why then must not I Love and respect sensible Objects if they be the true Causes of the Happiness I find in their Enjoyment I acknowledge the Sovereign Being as only worthy of Sovereign Worship and I prefer Him before all the World But since I see not that He requires any thing from me I enjoy the Goods he affords by Means of Second Causes to which he has subjected me And I pay not my Gratitude to him which perhaps would be to his Dishonour As he gives me no Blessing immediately and by himself or at least without the Assistance of his Creatures 't is a Sign he requires not the immediate Application of my Mind and Heart at least that he desires the Creatures should partake with him in the Acknowledgments and Resentments of my Heart and Mind Seeing he has communicated Part of his Power and Glory to the Sun has environ'd him with Splendour and Majesty and has given him the Supremacy in all his Works and seeing from the Influence of this great Luminary we receive all the necessary Blessings of Life Why should we not employ a part of this indebted Life in rejoicing in his Light and testifying the Sense we have of his Greatness and his Benefits Wou'd it not be the most shameful Ingratitude to receive from that excellent Creature abundance of all things and yet to shew no Sense of Gratitude to him for them And should we not be unspeakably blind and stupid to be unmov'd with Fear and Veneration in Respect of him whose Absence freezes us to Death and whose too near Approach can burn and destroy us I say it again that God is preferable to all things and infinitely more estimable than his Creatures But we are to fear and Love
were true that God acted by particular Wills since Miracles are such only from their not happening by General Laws Therefore Miracles suppose these Laws and prove the Opinion I have establish'd But as to ordinary Effects they clearly and directly demonstrate General Laws or Wills If for Instance a Stone be dropp'd upon the Head of Passengers it will continually fall with equal speed not distinguishing the Piety or Quality or Good or Ill Disposition of those that pass If we examine any other Effect we shall see the same Constancy in the Action of the Cause of it But no Effect proves that God acts by particular Wills though Men commonly fancy God is constantly working Miracles in their Favour That way they would have God to act in being consonant to their own and indulgent to Self-love which centers all things on themselves and very proportionate to their Ignorance of the Complication of Occasional Causes which produce extraordinary Effects naturally falls into Mens Thoughts when but greenly studied in Nature and consult not with sufficient Attention the abstract Idea of an Infinite Wisdom of an Universal Cause of a Being Infinitely Perfect CONCERNING Nature and Grace DISCOURSE II. Of the Laws of GRACE in particular and of the Occasional Causes which regulate and determine their Efficacy PART I. Of the Grace of JESVS CHRIST I. SINCE none but GOD can act immediately and by himself on Minds and produce in them all the various Motions they are capable of 'T is he alone who sheds his Light within us and inspires us with certain Sensations which determine our diverse Volitions And therefore none but he can as a True Cause produce Grace in our Souls For Grace or that which is the Principle or Motive of all the Regular Motions of our Love is necessarily either a Light which instructs us or a confus'd Sensation that convinces us that God is our Good since we never begin to love an Object unless we see clearly by the Light of Reason or feel confusedly by the tast of Pleasure that this Object is good I mean capable of making us happier than we are II. But since all Men are involv'd in Original Sin and even by their Nature infinitely beneath the Majesty of God 'T is Jesus Christ alone that can by the Dignity of his Person and the Holiness of his Sacrifice have access to his Father reconcile him to us and merit his Favours for us and consequently be the meritorious Cause of Grace These Truths are certain But we are not seeking the Cause which produces Grace by its own Efficacy nor that which merits it by its Sacrifice and Good Works We enquire for that which regulates and determines the Efficacy of the General Cause and which we may term the Second Particular and Occasional III. For to the end the General Cause may act by General Laws or Wills and that his Action may be regular constant and uniform 't is absolutely necessary there should be some Occasional Cause to determine the Efficacy of these Laws and to help to fix them If the Collision of Bodies or something of like Nature did not determine the Efficacy of the General Laws of the Communication of Motions it would be necessary for God to move Bodies by particular Wills The Laws of Union of the Soul and Body become efficacious only from the Changes befalling one or other of these two Substances For if God made the Soul feel the Pain of pricking tho' the Body were not prick'd or though the same thing did not happen in the Brain as if it were he would not act by the General Laws of Union of the Soul and Body but by a particular Will If Rain fell on the Earth otherwise than by a necessary Consequence of the General Laws of Communication of Motions the Rain and the Fall of every Drop that composes it would be the Effect of a particular Will So that unless Order requir'd it should rain that Will would be absolutely unworthy of God 'T is necessary therefore that in the Order of Grace there should be some Occasional Cause which serves to fix these Laws and to determine their Efficacy And this is the Cause we must endeavour to discover IV. Provided we consult the Idea of intelligible Order or consider the sensible Order which appears in the Works of God we shall easily discover that Occasional Causes which determine the Efficacy of General Laws and are of use in fixing them must necessarily be related to the Design for which God has establish'd them For Example Experience evidences that God has not made and Reason certifies that he ought not to make the Courses of the Planets the Occasional Causes of the Union of our Soul and Body He ought not to will that our Arm should be mov'd in such or such a manner or that our Soul should feel the Tooth-ake when the Moon shall be in conjunction with the Sun if so be this Conjunction acts not on the Body God's Design being to unite our Soul to our Body he cannot in prosecuting that Design give the Soul Sensations of Pain save when there happen some Changes in the Body repugnant to it Wherefore we are not to seek out of our Soul or Body the Occasional Causes of their Union V. Hence it follows that God designing to form his Church by Jesus Christ could not according to that Design seek the Occasional Causes which serve to settle the General Laws of Grace by which the Spirit of Jesus diffus'd through his Members communicates Life and Holiness to them except in Jesus Christ and in the Creatures united to him by Reason Thus the Rain of Grace is not deriv'd to our Hearts by the diverse situations of the Stars nor by the Collision of certain Bodies nor even according to the different Courses of the animal Spirits which give us Motion and Life All that Bodies can do is to excite in us Motions and Sensations purely Natural For whatever arrives to the Soul through the Body is only for the Body VI. Yet as Grace is not given to all that desire it nor as soon as they desire it and is granted to those who do not ask it it thence follows that even our Desires are not the Occasional Causes of Grace For this sort of Causes have constantly and most readily their Effect and without them the Effect is not produc'd For Instance the Collision of Bodies being the Occasional Cause of the Change which happens in their Motion if two Bodies did not meet their Motions would not alter and if they alter'd we may be assur'd they met The general Laws which shed Grace upon our Hearts find nothing therefore in our Wills to determine their Efficacy as the general Laws which regulate the Rains are not founded on the Dispositions of the Places rain'd upon For it indifferently rains upon all Places on hollow and manur'd Grounds even on the Sands and the Sea it self VII We are therefore reduc'd to confess that
as Jesus Christ alone can merit Grace for us so it is he alone that can administer Occasions to the General Laws by which it is distributed to Men. For the Principle or Foundation of these General Laws or that which determines their Efficacy being necessarily either in us or in Jesus Christ since it is certain that it is not in us it must needs be found in him VIII Besides when Man had sinn'd did it behoove God to have any more regard to his Desires Being we are all in a disorder'd State we can no longer be an Occasion of God's shewing us Favour But a Mediatour was needful not only to give us Access towards God but to be the Occasional Cause of the Favours we hope from him IX Whereas God had a Design of making his Son the Head of his Church it was requisite he should constitute him the Occasional or Natural Cause of the Grace which sanctifies it For 't is the Head which communicates Life and Motion to the Limbs and with that Prospect God permitted Sin For if Man had continued in Innocence as his Will had been meritorious of Grace and even of Glory so the inviolable Laws of Order would have requir'd that God should have appointed in Man the Occasional Cause of his Perfection and his Happiness In so much that Jesus Christ would not have been the Head of the Church or at most had been but the Head of those Influences which all the Members might have easily dispens'd with X. If our Soul were in our Body before it was form'd and if by her diverse Volitions all the Parts which compose it were rang'd and postur'd with how many various Sensations and different Motions would she be touch'd upon consideration of all the Effects which were to follow her Volitions Especially if she were extremely desirous of forming the most vigorous and best made Body pobssile XI Now Holy Scripture does not only say that Jesus Christ is the Head of the Church but also that he begets it and fashions it and gives it increase that he suffers merits acts and influences continually in it The Zeal which Jesus Christ has for his Father's Glory and the Love he bears to his Church constantly suggest to him the Desire of making it the most ample the most magnificent and the perfectest that can be Therefore as the Soul of Jesus has not an infinite Capacity and yet would endow his Church with infinite Beauties and Ornaments we have all reason to believe that there is in his holy Soul a continual Chain of Thoughts and Desires with reference to the mystical Body which he constantly forms XII Now they are these continual Desires of the Soul of Jesus that tend to sanctifie his Church and render it worthy of his Father's Majesty which God has establish'd the Occasional Causes of the Efficacy of the general Laws of Grace For we are taught by Faith that God hath given his Son an absolute Power over Men in constituting him Head of his Church which yet cannot be conceiv'd unless the several Volitions of Jesus Christ are follow'd by their Effects For 't is manifest I should have no Power over my Arm if it mov'd when I would not have it and remain'd dead and motionless when I desir'd to move it XIII This Sovereign Power Jesus Christ has merited over Men as also that Quality of Head of the Church by the Sacrifice he offer'd upon Earth on full Possession of which Right he entred after his Resurrection 'T is now that he is High Priest of future Goods and that He by his diverse Desires prays indefatigably for Men to the Father And since his Desires are Occasional Causes his Prayers are always heard His Father denies him nothing as the Scripture assures us and yet his Prayers and Desires are necessary to obtain Because Occasional Physical Natural Causes for these three Terms have here the same Signification have no Power of themselves and all the Creatures even Jesus Christ consider'd as Man are in themselves but Weakness and Impotence XIV Therefore the Soul of Jesus having a Succession of various Thoughts with reference to the diverse Dispositions whereof Souls in general are capable has these Thoughts attended with certain Desires relating to the Sanctification of these Souls Which Desires being Occasional Causes of Grace ought to shed it on those Persons in particular whose Dispositions resemble that which the Soul of Jesus Christ actually thinks on and this Grace ought to be so much stronger and more abundant as his Desires are more strong and lasting XV. When a Person considers any Part of his Body that is not form'd as it ought to be he naturally has certain Desires relating to it and to the Use he would make of it in a sociable Life which Desires are prosecuted with certain insensible Motions of the Animal Spirits and tend to the posturing or proportioning it in a due manner When the Body is quite form'd and the Flesh is grown solid and consistent these Motions cannot change the Contexture of the Parts but only give them certain Dispositions which we call Corporeal Habits But when the Body is not completely form'd and the Flesh is extremely soft and tender these Motions which accompany the Desires of the Soul not only give the Body particular Dispositions but also change its Construction Which is sufficiently manifest in Children unborn For they are not only mov'd with the same Passions as their Mothers but also receive on their Bodies the Marks of these Passions from which their Mothers are always exempt XVI The Mystical Body of Jesus Christ is not yet grown into a Perfect Man nor will be till the Accomplishment of Ages but he continually is forming it For he is the Head which gives all the Members their increase by the Efficacy of his Influence according to the proportion convenient for each to the end it may be form'd and edified by Charity Which are Truths we are taught by St. Paul Now since Jesus Christ has no other Action than the diverse Motions of his Will 't is necessary that his Desires should be follow'd with the Influence of Grace which only can form him in his Members and give them that Beauty and Proportion which ought to be the Eternal Object of Divine Love XVII The diverse Motions of the Soul of Jesus being the Occasional Causes of Grace we need not wonder if it be sometimes given to the greatest Sinners or to Persons that make no use of it For the Soul of Jesus desiring to raise a Temple of a vast Extent and of infinite Beauty may wish that Grace may be given to the greatest Sinners and if in that Moment Jesus Christ thinks actually on the Covetous for Instance the Covetous shall receive Grace Or Jesus Christ wanting for the Construction of his Church Minds of a certain Character commonly not attainable but by those who suffer certain Persecutions whereof the Passions of Men are the natural
Principle In a word Jesus Christ needing Minds of particular Dispositions for the causing particular Effects may in general apply to them and by that Application infuse into them sanctifying Grace As the Mind of a Projector thinks in general of square Stones when these Stones are actually necessary to his Building XVIII But the Soul of Jesus being not a general Cause we have reason to think it has often particular Desires in regard to particular Persons When we intend to speak of God we must not consult our selves and make him act like us but consider the Idea of a Being infinitely perfect and make God act according to that Idea But in speaking of the Action of the Soul of Jesus we may look into our selves and make him act like particular Causes For Example We have reason to believe that the Conversion of St. Paul was owing to the Efficacy of a particular Desire of Jesus Christ. And we are to look upon the Desires of the Soul of Jesus which have a general respect to Minds of a certain Character as particular Desires though they comprehend many Persons because these Desires change daily like those of particular Causes But the general Laws by which God acts are always the same because the Wills of God ought to be firm and constant by reason that his Wisdom is infinite XIX The diverse Desires of the Soul of Jesus distributing Grace we clearly conceive why it is not equally dispers'd to all Men and why bestow'd on some more abundantly at one time than another For his Soul not thinking on all Men at once cannot at the same time have all the Desires whereof it is capable So that he acts not on his Members in a particular manner except by successive Influences as the Soul moves not at once all the Muscles of our Body For the Animal Spirits are unequally and successively distributed into our Members according to the various Impressions of Objects the diverse Motions of our Passions and the several Desires we freely excite within us XX. True it is that all the Righteous constantly receive the Influence of their Head which gives them Life and that when they act by the Spirit of Jesus Christ they merit and receive new Graces though it be not necessary that the Soul of Jesus should have any particular Desires as the occasional Causes of them For Order which requires that every Desert should be rewarded is not an arbitrary but a necessary Law and independent from any occasional Cause But though he who performs a meritorious Action may be rewarded for it whilst the Soul of Jesus has no actual Desires relating to him yet 't is certain that he merited not this Grace but by the Dignity and Sanctity of the Spirit which Christ has communicated to him For Men are not well-pleasing to God nor able to do good but in as much as they are united to his Son by Charity XXI It must be farther acknowledg'd that those who observe the Counsels of Jesus Christ out of an Esteem they have for them and through the Fear of future Punishment sollicite as I may say by their Obedience the Charity of Christ to think on them though they act from a Principle of Self-love But their Actions are not the Occasional Causes either of Grace since it does not infallibly follow them or even of the Motions of the Soul of Jesus in their Favour since these Motions never fail to communicate it Thus only the Desires of Jesus Christ as Occasional Causes have infallibly their Effect because God having constituted him Head of the Church ought by him only to communicate his sanctifying Grace to his Elect. XXII Now we may consider in the Soul of Jesus Christ Desires of two sorts viz. Actual Transitory and Particular that have but a short-liv'd Efficacy and Stable and Permanent which consist in a setled and constant Disposition of the Soul of Jesus Christ with relation to certain Effects which tend to the Execution of his Design in general If our Soul by its various Motions communicated to our Body all that was necessary to its Formation and Growth we might distinguish in her two kinds of Desire For it would be by the actual and transitory Desires that she would drive into the Muscles of the Body the Spirits which gave it a certain Disposition with reference to present Objects or to the actual Thoughts of the Mind But it would be by stable and permanent Desires that she would give to the Heart and Lungs the natural Motions by which Respiration and the Circulation of the Blood were perform'd By these Desires she would digest the Aliments and distribute them to all the Parts that needed them in as much as that sort of Action is at all times necessary to the Preservation of the Body XXIII By the actual transitory and particular Desires of the Soul of Jesus Grace is deriv'd to unprepar'd Persons in a manner somewhat singular and extraordinary But 't is by his permanent Desires that it is given regularly to those who receive the Sacraments with the necessary Dispositions For the Grace we receive by the Sacraments is not given us precisely because of the Merit of our Action though we receive them in Grace but because of the Merits of Jesus Christ which are freely applied to us in consequence of his permanent Desires We receive in the Sacraments much more Grace than our Preparation deserves and it suffices to our receiving some Influence from them that we do not oppose and resist it But 't is abusing what is most Sacred in Religion to receive them unworthily XXIV Amongst the actual and transitory Desires of the Soul of Jesus there are certainly some more durable and frequent than others and the Knowledge of these Desires is of greatest Consequence in Point of Morality Doubtless he thinks oftner on those who observe his Counsels than on other Men. His Motions of Charity for Believers are more frequent and lasting than those for Libertines and Atheists And as all Believers are not equally prepar'd to enter into the Church of the Predestinate the Desires of the Soul of Jesus are not equally lively frequent and durable on the account of them all Man more earnestly desires the Fruits that are fittest for the Nourishment of his Body he 〈◊〉 oftner on Bread and Wine than on Meats of difficult Digestion So Jesus Christ designing the Formation of his Church ought to be more taken up with those who can most easily enter than on others which are extremely remote The Scripture likewise teaches us that the Humble the Poor the Penitent receive greater Graces than other Men because the Despisers of Honours Riches and Pleasures are the fittest for the Kingdom of Heaven Those for Example who have learn'd of Jesus Christ to be meek and humble in Heart shall find Rest to their Souls The Yoke of Christ which is insupportable to the Proud will become easie and light by the Assistances of Grace For God
if God caus'd it to rain on this Meadow by a particular Benevolence to the Owner this Rain would not fall on the River where 't is insignificant since it could not fall there without a Cause or Will in God which has necessarily some End VII But we have still more Reason to think an Effect is produc'd by a general Will when this Effect is contrary or even useless to the Design which we are taught by Faith or Reason the Cause propos'd For Instance The End which God proposes in the various Sensations he affords the Soul in our tasting different Fruits is that we may eat those which are fit for Nourishment and reject the rest I suppose thus Therefore when God gives a grateful Sensation at the Instant of our eating Poisons or empoison'd Fruits he acts not in us by particular Wills So we ought to conclude since that agreeable Sensation is the Cause of our Death whilst the End of God's giving us diverse Sensations is to preserve our Life by a convenient Nourishment for I once more suppose thus For I speak only with reference to the Grace which God gives us doubtless to convert us so that 't is visible God showers it not on Men by particular Wills since it frequently renders them more Culpable and Criminal For God cannot have so Fatal a Design God gives us not therefore agreeable Sensations by particular Wills when we eat poisonous Fruits But because a poisonous Fruit excites in our Brain Motions like those produc'd by wholsome Fruits God gives us the same Sensations by reason of the general Laws which unite the Soul to the Body that she might be wakeful for its Preservation So likewise God gives not those who have lost an Arm Sensations of Pain relating to it but by a general Will For 't is useless to the Body of this Man that his Soul should suffer Pain relating to an Arm that 's lost 'T is the same case with Motions produc'd in the Body of a Man in the Commission of a Crime Finally supposing we are obliged to think that God scatters his Rain upon the Earth witâ— Intent to make it fruitful we cannot believe he distributes it by particular Wills since it falls upon the Sands and in the Sea as well as on plow'd Lands and is often so excessive on seeded Ground as to extirpate the Corn and frustrate the Labours of the Husbandman Thus it is certain that Rains which are useless or noxious to the Fruits of the Earth are necessary Consequences of the general Laws of the Communications of Motions which God has establish'd for the producing better Effects in the World supposing which I again repeat that God cannot will by a particular Volition that Rain should cause the Barrenness of the Earth VIII Lastly When an Effect happens which has something extraordinary 't is reasonable to believe it is not produc'd by a general Will. Nevertheless 't is impossible to be sure of it If for Example in the Procession of the Holy Sacrament it rains on the Assistants save on the Priests and those which carry it we have reason to think this proceeds from a particular Will of the universal Cause yet we cannot be certain because an occasional intelligent Cause may have this particular Design and so determine the Efficacy of the general Law to execute it IX When the preceding Marks are not sufficient for us to judge whether a certain Effect is or is not produc'd by a general Will we are to believe it is if it be certain there is an Occasional Cause establish'd for the like Effects For Example We see it rain to some Purpose in a Field we do not examine whether this Rain falls or not in the great Roads we know not whether it be noxious to the bordering Grounds nay we suppose it only does good and that all the attending Circumstances are perfectly accommodated to the Design for which we are oblig'd to believe that God would have it rain Nevertheless I say that we ought to judge this Rain is produc'd by a general Will if we know that God has setled an Occasional Cause for the like Effects For we must not have recourse to Miracles without Necessity We ought to suppose that God acts herein by the simplest ways and though the Lord of the Field ought to return Thanks to God for the Bounty yet he ought not to imagine it was caus'd in a miraculous manner by a particular Will The Owner of the Field ought to thank God for the Good he receives since God saw and will'd the good Effect of the Rain when he establish'd the general Laws whereof it is a necessary Consequence and that it was for the like Effects they were establish'd On the contrary if the Rains are sometimes hurtful to the Earth as it was not to render them unfruitful that God establish'd the Laws which make it rain since Drought suffices to make them barren 't is plain we ought to thank God and to adore the Wisdom of his Providence even when we do not â—eel the Effects of the Laws establish'd in our Favour X. But to conclude when we cannot be certified by the Circumstances which accompany certain Effects that there is an Occasional Cause establish'd to produce them 't is sufficient to know they are very common and relate to the principal Design of the general Cause in order to judge they are produc'd by a general Will. For Example The Springs which water the Surface of the Earth are subservient to the principal Design of God which is that Mâ—n should not want things necessary to Life I suppose so Besides these Fountains are very common therefore we ought to conclude they are foâ—m'd by some General Laws For as there is much more Wisdom in executing his Designs by Simple and General Means than by Complicated and Particular as I think I have sufficiently prov'd elsewhere We owe that Honour to God as to believe his way of acting is general uniform constant and proportion'd to the Idea we have of an infinite Wisdom These are the Marks by which we are to judge whether an Effect be produc'd by a general Will. I now come to prove that God bestows his Grace on Men by general Laws and that Jesus Christ has been establishâ—d the Occasional Cause to determine their Efficacy I begin by the Proofs of Holy Scripture XI St. Paul teaches us That Jesus Christ is the Head of the Church That he constantly influences it with Spirit and Life That he forms the Members and animates them as the Soul animates the Body or to speak still more clearly the Holy Scripture teaches us two things The first that Jesus Christ prays continually for his Members The second that his Prayers or Desires are always heard Whence I conclude that he was constituted by God the Occasional Cause of Grace and likewise that Grace is never given to Sinners but through his Means The Occasional Causes have constantly and readily
their Effect The Prayers and diverse Desires of Jesus Christ with reference to the Formation of his Body have likewise most constantly and speedily their Accomplishment God denies his Son nothing as we learn from Jesus Christ himself Occasional Causes produce not their Effect by their own Efficacy but by the Efficacy of the General Cause 'T is likewise by the Efficacy of the Power of God that the Soul of Jesus Christ operates in us and not by the Efficacy of Man's Will 'T is for this Reason that St. Paul represents Jesus Christ as praying to his Father without Intermission For he is oblâ—gâ—d to Pray in order to Obtain Occasional Causes have been establish'd by God for the determining the Efficacy of his General Wills and Jesus Christ according to the Scripture has been appointed by God after his Resurrection to govern the Church which he had purchas'd by his Blood For Jesus Christ became the Meritorious Cause of all Graces by his Sacrifice But after his Resurrection he entred 〈◊〉 the Holy of Holies as High Priest of future Goods to appear in the Presence of God and to endue us with the Graces which he has merited for us Therefore he himself applies and distributes his Gifts as Occasional Cause he disposes of all things in the House of God as a well-beloved Son in the House of his Father I think I have demonstrated in the Search after Truth that there is none but God who is the true Cause and who acts by his own Efficacy and that he communicates his Power to Creatures only in establishing them Occasional Causes for the producing some Effects I have proved for Example That Men have no Power to produce any Motion in their Bodies but because God has establish'd their Wills the Occasional Causes of these Motions That Fire has no power to make me feel Pain but because God has establish'd the Collision of Bodies the Occasional Cause of the Communication of Motions and the violent Vibration of the Fibres of my Flesh the Occasional Cause of my Pain I may here suppose a Truth which I have proved at large in the Third Chapter of the Second Part of the Sixth Book and in the Illustration upon the same Chapter and which those for whom it was principally written don't contest Now Faith assures us that all Power is given to Jesus Christ to form his Church All Power is given unto me in Heaven and in Earth Which cannot be understood of Jesus Christ as to his Divinity for as God he has never received any thing And therefore it is certain that Jesus Christ as to his Humanity is the Occasional Cause of Grace supposing I have well proved that God only can act on Minds and that Second Causes have no Efficacy of their own Which those ought first to examine who would understand my Sentiments and give a Judgment of them XII I say farther that no one is sanctified but through the Efficacy of the Power which God has communicated to Jesus Christ in constituting him the Occasional Cause of Grace For if any Sinner were converted by a Grace whereof Jesus Christ was not the Occasional but only the Meritorious Cause that Sinner not receiving his New Life through the Efficacy of Jesus Christ would not be a Member of the Body of which Jesus Christ is the Head in that manner explain'd by St. Paul by these Words of the Epistle to the Ephesians That we may grow up into him in all things who is the Head even Christ from whom the whole Body fitly join'd together and compacted by that which every Joint supplieth according to the effectual working in the measure of every Part maketh increase of the Body unto the edifying it self in Love Which Words not only say Jesus Christ is the Meritorious Cause of all Graces but likewise distinctly signifie that Christians are the Members of the Body whereof Jesus Christ is the Head that 't is in him we increase and live with an entire new Life that 't is by his inward Operation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that his Church is form'd and that thus he has been constituted by God the sole Occasional Cause who by his several Desires and Applications distributes the Graces which God as the True Cause showers down on Men. 'T is on this Account St. Paul says Christians are united to Jesus Christ as their Root Rooted and built up in him 'T is for the same Reason that Jesus Christ compares himself to a Vine and his Disciples to the Branches that derive their Life from him I am the Vine ye are the Branches On the same Grounds St. Paul affirms that Jesus Christ lives in us and that we live in him that we are rais'd up in our Head that our Life is hidden with Jesus Christ in God in a word that we have already Life Eternal in Jesus Christ. All these and many other Expressions of like nature clearly manifest that Jesus Christ is not only the Meritorious but also the Occasional Physical or Natural Cause of Grace and that as the Soul informs animates and consummates the Body so Jesus Christ diffuses through his Members as Occasional Cause the Graces he has merited to his Church by his Sacrifice For my part I cannot see how these Reasons can be call'd in question or upon what Grounds a most edifying Truth and as ancient as the Religion of Jesus Christ can be treated as a dangerous Novelty I grant my Expressions are novel but that 's because they seem to me the fittest of all others distinctly to explain a Truth which can be but confusedly demonstrated by Terms very loose and general These words Occasional Causes and Natural Laws seem necessary to give the Philosophers for whom I wrote this Treatise of Nature and Grace a distinct Understanding of what most Men are content to know confusedly New Expressions being no farther dangerous than involving Ambiguity or breeding in the Mind some Notion contrary to Religion I do not believe that Equitable Persons and conversant in the Theology of St. Paul will blame me for explaining my self in a particular manner when it only tends to make us Adore the Wisdom of God and strictly to unite us with Jesus Christ. First OBJECTION XIII 'T is Objected against what I have establish'd That neither Angels nor Saints of the Old Testament receiv'd Grace pursuant to the Desires of the Soul of Jesus since that Holy Soul was not then in Being and therefore though Jesus Christ be the meritorious Cause of all Graces he is not the Occasional Cause which distributes them to Men. As to Angels I Answer That 't is very probable Grace was given them but once So that if we consider things on that side I grant there is nothing can oblige the Wisdom of God to constitute an Occasional Cause for the Sanctification of Angels But if we consider these blessed Spirits as Members of the Body whereof Jesus Christ is the Head or suppose them
and absolute Lord of all things by right of Generation These Truths are evident as we are assur'd by Jesus Christ himself who says that his Father has given him power to judge Men because he is the Son of Man So we ought not to think that Scripture Expressions which make Jesus Christ the Author of Grace must be understood of him consider'd in his Divine Person For if so I confess I should not have prov'd him the Occasional Cause since he would be the True Cause of it But whereas it is certain that the Three Persons of the Trinity are equally the True Cause of Grace because all the External Operations of God are common to them all my Proofs are undeniable since Holy Scripture says of the Son and not of the Father or the Holy Spirit that he is the Head of the Church and that in this Capacity he communicates Life to the constituent Members of it Second OBJECTION XIV 'T is God who gives the Soul of Jesus Christ all the Thoughts and Motions relating to the Formation of his Mystical Body So that if on one hand the Wills of Jesus Christ as Occasional or Natural Causes determine the Efficacy of the General Wills of God on the other 't is God himself who determines the several Wills of Jesus Christ. And thus it comes to the same thing For in brief the Volitions of Jesus Christ are always conformable to those of his Father I grant that the particular Volitions of the Soul of Jesus Christ are always conformable to the Wills of his Father not as if there were any particular Wills in the Father which answer to those in the Son and determine them but only that the Volitions of the Son are always conform'd to Order in general which is the necessary Rule of the Will of God and of all those who love him For to love Order is to love God 't is to will what he wills 't is to be Just Wise Regular in our Love The Soul of Jesus desires to form to the Glory of his Father the largest most sumptuous and accomplish'd Temple possible Order demands this since nothing can be made too great for God All the several Thoughts of this Soul perpetually intent on the Execution of its Design proceed likewise from God or the Word to which it is united But its various Desires are certainly the Occasional Cause of these various Thoughts for it thinks on what it wills Now these diverse Desires are sometimes entirely free and probably the Thoughts which excite them do not invincibly determine the Soul of Jesus Christ to apply her self to the Means of executing them For in brief 't is equally advantageous to the Design of Jesus Christ whether it be Peter or John that causes the Effect which the Regularity of his Work requires 'T is true the Soul of Jesus is not indifferent in any thing that relates to his Father's Glory or that Order necessarily demands but is entirely free in all the rest there is nothing extraneous to God which invincibly determines his Love Thus we ought not to wonder if Jesus have particular Wills though there be not the like Wills in God to determine them But let it be granted that the Volitions of Jesus Christ are not free and that his Light invincibly carries him to will and to will always in a determinate manner in the Construction of his Church But it is Eternal Wisdom to which his Soul is united that must determine his Volitions We must not for that Effect suppose Particular Wills in God But all the Wills of Jesus Christ are Particular or have no Occasional Cause to determine their Efficacy as have those of God For the Soul of Jesus Christ having not an infinite Capacity of Thinking his Notices and consequently his Volitions are limited Therefore his Wills must needs be Particular since they change according to his diverse Thoughts and Applications For probably the Soul of Jesus Christ otherwise imploy'd in Contemplating and tasting the infinite Satisfactions of the True Good methinks ought not according to Order desire at once to think on all the Ornaments and Beauties he would bestow upon his Church nor on the different Ways of executing each of his Designs For Jesus Christ desiring to render the Church worthy of the infinite Majesty of his Father would gladly perfect it with infinite Beauties by Ways most conformable to Order He must then constantly change his Desires there being but one infinite Wisdom who can fore-see all and prescribe himself General Laws for the executing his Designs But the future World being to subsist eternally and to be infinitely more perfect than the present it was requisite that God should establish an Occasional Cause Intelligent and Enlightned by Eternal Wisdom to remedy the Defects which should unavoidably happen in the Works that were form'd by General Laws The Collision of Bodies which determines the Efficacy of the General Laws of Nature is an Occasional Cause without Understanding and Liberty and therefore 't is impossible but there must be Imperfections in the World and Monsters produc'd which are not of such account as that the Wisdom of God should descend to remedy them by Particular Wills But Jesus Christ being an Intelligent Occasional Cause illuminate with the Wisdom of the Word and susceptible of Particular Wills according to the particular Exigencies of the Work he forms 't is plain that the future World will be infinitely more perfect than the present that the Church will be without Spot or Wrinkle as we are taught by Scripture and that it will be a Work most worthy of the Complacency of God himself 'T is in this manner that Eternal Wisdom renders as I may say to his Father what he had taken from him For not permitting him to act by Particular Wills he seem'd to disable his Almighty Arm But becoming incarnate he so brings it to pass that God acting in a manner worthy of him by most Simple and General Laws produces a Work wherein the most Illuminate Intelligences cannot observe the least Imperfection PROOFS founded on REASON XV. Having demonstrated by the Authority of Scripture that the diverse Motions of the Soul of Jesus Christ are the Occasional Causes which determine the Efficacy of the General Law of Grace by which God would have all Men sav'd in his Son 't is necessary to shew in general by Reason that we are not to believe God acts in the Order of Grace by Particular Wills For though by Reason separate from Faith it cannot be demonstrated that God has constituted the Wills of Man-God the Occasional Causes of his Gifts yet it may without Faith be shewn that he distributes them not to Men by Particular Wills and that in two manners a priori and a posteriori that is by the Idea we have of God and by the Effects of Grace For there is nothing but serves to prove this Truth First then for the Proof of a priori A wise Being
different Prospects and make other Discoveries of Truths sometimes they push on certain Enquiries which we out of Laziness have neglected or for want of Strength and Courage have deserted And upon this Prospect of Benefiting my self and some others I run the hazard of being an Author But that my Hopes may not prove abortive I throw in this Precaution That a Man should not be presently discourag'd though he meet with things that run counter to Common Opinions which he has all his Life long believ'd and found generally approved by all Men in all Ages of the World For they are These Universal Errours I more especially strive to extirpate Were Men throughly enlightned Universal Approbation would be an Argument but the case is quite contrary Let him therefore be once for all re-minded that nothing but Reason ought to preside over the Judgments we pass on all Humane Opinions which have no relation to Faith of which GOD alone informs us in a quite different way from that of our discovering Natural things Let him Retire into himself and press near to that Light which perpetually shines Within to the end his Reason may be more and more enlightned Let him industriously avoid all those too lively Sensations and all the Commotions of the Soul which fill the Capacity of the Mind For the least Noise or Glimmering of Light sometimes disturbs the View of the Mind And therefore 't is good to avoid all these things though not absolutely necessary And if after all the struggles he can make he finds himself unable to withstand the continual Impressions that his Body and the Prejudices of Childhood make upon his Imagination recourse to Prayer is needful that GOD may afford those Supplies wherewith his own Strength cannot furnish him Never failing still to resist his Senses For that ought to be the perpetual Employment of those who in imitation of St. Austin have a great love for Truth The CONTENTS of the First Volume CHAP. I. 1. OF the Nature and Properties of the Understanding 2. Of the Nature and Properties of the Will and wherein its Liberty consists Page 1 CHAP. II. 1. Of our Judgments and Reasonings 2. That they depend upon the Will 3. The Use which should be made of its Liberty on their account 4. Two General Rules for the avoiding Error and Sin 5. Some Necessary Reflexions on those Rules 4 CHAP. III. 1. The Answers to some Objections 2. Observations vpon what has been said concerning the Necessity of Evidence 7 CHAP. IV. 1. Of the Occasional Causes of Error whereof there are five Principal 2. The General Design of the whole Work 3. The Particular Design of the First Book 9 CHAP. V. Of the Senses 1. Two ways of Explaining how they were corrupted by Sin 2. That 't is our Liberty and not our Senses which is the true Cause of our Errors 3. A Rule for avoiding Error in the use of our Senses 10 CHAP. VI. 1. Of the Errors of Sight in respect of Extension absolutely consider'd 2. A Continuation of these Errors about Invisible Objects 3. Of the Errors of Sight touching Extension relatively considered 13 CHAP. VII 1. Of the Errors of Sight about Figures 2. We have no Knowledge of the least of them 3. The Knowledge we have of the Greater is not exact 4. An Explication of some Natural Judgments which prevent our Deception 5. That these very Judgments deceive us in some particular Junctures 18 CHAP. VIII 1. That our Eyes are incapable of informing us of the Quantity or Swiftness of Motion considered in it self 2. That Duration which is necessary to our Knowledge of the Quantity of Motion is unknown to us 3. An Instance of the Errors of Sight about Motion and Rest 19 CHAP. IX A Continuation of the same Subject 1. A General Demonstration of the Errors of our Sight concerning Motion 2. That the Distance of Objects is necessary to be known in order to judge of the Quantity of their Motion 3. The Mediums whereby we know the Distances of Objects are examin'd 21 CHAP. X. Of our Errors about Sensible Qualities 1. The Distinction of the Soul and Body 2. An Explication of the Organs of the Senses 3. To what part of the Body the Soul is immediately united 4. An Instance to explain the Effect which Objects have upon our Bodies 5. What it is they produce in the Soul and the Reasons why the Soul perceives not the Motions of the Fibres of the Body 6. Four things which are generally confounded in every Sensation 25 CHAP. XI 1. The Error we fall into concerning the Action of Objects against the external Fibres of our Senses 2. The Cause of this Error 3. An Objection and Answer 28 CHAP. XII 1. Of our Errors concerning the Motions of the Fibres of our Senses 2. That we have no Perception of these Motions or that we confound them with our Sensations 3. An Experiment that proves it 4. Three kinds of Sensations 5. The Errors that accompany them Ibid. CHAP. XIII 1. Of the Nature of Sensations 2. That a Man knows them better than he thinks he does 3. An Objection and Answer 4. Why a Man imagines he has no Knowledge of his own Sensations 5. That it is an Error to think all Men have the same Sensations of the same Objects 6. An Objection and Answer 31 CHAP. XIV 1. Of the false Judgments that accompany our Sensations and which we confound with them 2. The Reasons of these false Judgments 3. That Error is not in our Sensations but only in these Judgments 35 CHAP. XV. An Explication of the particular Errors of the Sight which may serve as an Exemplar of the general Errours of our Senses 37 CHAP. XVI 1. That the Errors of our Senses serve us instead of General and very Fruitful Principles from whence to draw false Conclusions and these Conclusions again become other Principles in their turn 2. The Origine of Essential Differences 3. Concerning Substantial Forms 4. Of some other Errors of the School-Philosophy 38 CHAP. XVII 1. Another Instance taken from Morality which shews that our Senses offer us nothing but false Goods 2. That God alone is our true and proper Good 3. The Origine of the Error of the Epicureans and Stoicks 39 CHAP. XVIII 1. That our Senses make us liable to Error even in things which are not sensible 2. An Example taken from the Conversation of Men. 3. That Sensible Manners are not to be regarded 41 CHAP. XIX Two other Examples 1. The first concerning our Errors about the Nature of Bodies 2. The second concerning those which respect the Qualities of the same Bodies 42 CHAP. XX. The Conclusion of the First Book 1. That our Senses are given us only for the Preservation of our Body 2. That we ought to doubt of the Reports they make 3. That 't is no little thing to doubt as we ought to do 44 Book the Second CHAP. I. 1. A General Idea of the Imagination 2. That it
includes two Faculties an Active and a Passive 3. A general Cause of the Changes which happen in the Imagination of Men and the Foundation of the Second Book 45 CHAP. II. 1 Of the Animal Spirits and the Changes they are sâ—â—ject to in general 2. That the Chyle entring the Heart occasions a Change in the Spirits 3. That Wine does the same thing 47 CHAP. III. That the Air imploy'd in Respiration causes some change in the Animal Spirits 48 CHAP. IV. 1. Of the Change of the Spirits caus'd by the Nerves which go to the Heart and Lungs 2. Of that which is caus'd by the Nerves which go to the Liver to the Spleen and Viscera 3. That all that is perform'd without the Concurrence of our Will but yet it cannot be done without a Providence 49 CHAP. V. 1. Of Memory 2. Of Habits 51 CHAP. VI. 1. That the Fibres of the Brain are not subject to so sudden Changes as the Spirits 2. Three different Changes incident to the three different Ages 53 CHAP. VII 1. Of the Communication there is between the Brain of a Mother and that of her Infant 2. Of the Communication that is between our Brain and the other Parts of our Body which inclines us to Imitation and to Compassion 3. An Explication of the Generation of Monstrous Children and the Propagation of the Species 4. An Explication of some Irregularities of the Understanding and of some Inclinations of the Will 5. Concerning Concupiscence and Original Sin 6. Objections and Answers 54 CHAP. VIII 1. The Changes which happen in the Imagination of an Infant after his Birth by his accompanying with his Mother his Nurse and other Persons 2. Some Instructions for their good Education 61 The Second Part. CHAP. I. 1. Of the Imagination of Women 2. Of the Imagination of Men. 3. Of the Imagination of old Men 64 CHAP. II. That the Animal Spirits generally run in the Tracks of Ideas that are most familiar to us which is the Reason of our preposterous Judgments 66 CHAP. III. Of the mutual Connexion between the Ideas and the Traces of the Brain and of the mutual Connexion there is between Traces and Traces Ideas and Ideas 68 CHAP. IV. 1. That Men of Learning are the most subject to Error 2. The Causes why Men had rather be guided by Authority than make use of their own Reason 71 CHAP. V. Two pernicious Effects Reading has upon the Imagination 72 CHAP. VI. That Men of Learning generally are so opinionated with an Author that their principal Drift is the knowing what he held without caring to know what ought to be held 74 CHAP. VII Of the Prepossession of Commentators 76 CHAP. VIII 1. Of the Inventors of new Systems 2. The last Error of Men of Learning 79 CHAP. IX 1. Of Effeminate Minds 2. Of Superficial Minds 3. Of Men of Authority 4. Of the Experimental Philosophers 81 The Third Part. CHAP I. Of the Disposition we have to imitate others in all things which is the Original of the Communication of those Errors that depend on the Power of Imagination 2. Two things that more especially increase this Disposition 3. What that strong Imagination is 4. That there are several kinds of it Of Fools and of those that have a strong Imagination in the Sense 't is here taken 5. Two considerable Imperfections of Men of a strong Imagination 6. Of the Power they have to persuade and impose on others 84 CHAP. II. General Instances of the Strength of Imagination 87 CHAP. III. 1. Of the Force of some Authors Imagination 2. Of Tertullian 90 CHAP. IV. Of the Imagination of Seneca 91 CHAP. V. Of Montagne's Book 95 CHAP. VI. 1. Of Witches in Imagination and of Wolf-men 2. The Conclusion of the two First Books 99 Book the Third CHAP. I. 1. Thought is only essential to the Mind Sensation and Imagination are only the Modifications of it 2. We know not all the Modifications our Soul is capable of 3. They are different from our Knowledge and our Love nor are they always Consequences of them 101 CHAP. II. 1. The Mind being limited cannot comprehend any thing of an Infinite Nature 2. It s Limitation is the Origine of a great many Errors 3. And especially of Heresies 4. The Mind must be submitted unto Faith 105 CHAP. III. 1. The Philosophers dissipate or dissolve the Force of the Mind by applying it to the Subjects including too many Relations and depending on too many things and by observing no Method in their Studies 2. An Instance taken from Aristotle 3. That Geometricians on the contrary take a good Method in the Search of Truth Especially those who make use of Algebra and Analyticks 4. That their Method increases the Strength of the Mind and that Aristotle's Logick lessens it 5. Another Fault of Learned Men 107 CHAP. IV. 1. The Mind cannot dwell long upon Objects that have no relation to it or that include not something of Infinity in them 2. The Inconstancy of the Will is the Cause of that want of Application and consequently of Error 3. Our Sensations take us up more than the pure Ideas of the Mind 4. Which is the Source of the Corruption of our Morals 5. And of the Ignorance of the Vulgar sort of Men 109 Second Part concerning pure Understanding CHAP. I. 1. What is meant by Ideas That they really exist and are necessary to our perceiving all material Objects 2. A Particularization of all the ways possible for us to perceive external Objects 112 CHAP. II. That material Objects emit not Species which resemble them 114 CHAP. III. That the Soul has no power to produce Ideas The cause of the Error Men are guilty of upon this Subject 115 CHAP. IV. That we perceive not Objects by means of Ideas created with us That God does not produce them in us every moment we have need of them 117 CHAP. V. That the Mind perceives neither the Essence nor the Existence of Objects by considering its own Perfections That none but God sees them in that manner 118 CHAP. VI. That we see all things in God 119 CHAP. VII 1. Four different manners of Perception 2. How it is that we know God 3. How we know Bodies 4. How we know our own Souls 5. How we know the Souls of other Men and pure Spirits 122 CHAP. VIII 1. The intimate Presence of the indefinite Idea of Being in general is the cause of all the disorderly abstractions of the Mind and the most part of the Chimeras of the vulgar Philosophy which hinder many Philosophers from acknowledging the solidity of true Principles of Physicks 2. An Instance concerning the Essence of Matter 124 CHAP. IX 1. The last general Cause of our Errors 2. That the Ideas of things are not always present to the Mind when we would have them 3. That every finite Mind is subject to Error and why 4. That we ought not to judge that there is nothing but Body and Spirit nor that God is a
that account we judge it is equally distant from us And thus upon the same grounds we conclude the Stars with the Azure which appears in the Heaven are rang'd in the same just distance in a vault perfectly convex since our Mind ever supposes Equality where it discovers no Inequality which yet it ought not positively to admit unless there be evident conviction for it I shall not here insist longer on the Errors of our Sight in respect of the Figures of Bodies since a Man may be sufficiently instructed in any Book of Opticks That Science in effect does only instruct us how to put fallacies on our Eyes and its whole drift and artifice consists meerly in finding means of making us form those Natural Judgments I have been speaking of at a time when they are most impertinent and unseasonable And this cheat may be acted in so many different ways that of all the Figures that are in the World there is not any single one but may be painted in a thousand different fashions so that the Sight must unavoidably be deceiv'd But this is not the proper place of explaining these things more throughly What I have said is sufficient to let us see we should not give over-much credit to the Testimony of our Eyes even in their Representations of the Figures of Bodies though in point of Figures their reports are much more faithful than in any other occasion CHAP. VIII I. That our Eyes are incapable of informing us of the Quantity or Swiftness of Motion considered in it self II. That Duration which is necessary to our Knowledge of the Quantity of Motion is unknown to us III. An Instance of the Errors of Sight about Motion and Rest. HAVING already discover'd the most Fundamental and General Errors of our Sight touching Extension and its Figures I come now to correct those in which this same Sight ingages us about the Motion of Matter And this has no great difficulty in it after what I have already said of Extension For there is so necessary a relation and dependence betwixt these two things that if we are deceiv'd in the Magnitude of Bodies we must as certainly be deceiv'd in their Motion too But that I may advance nothing but what is clear and distinct it is necessary to take off whatever is equivocal from the word Motion For this Term has generally two significations The first denotes a certain Power or Force which we imagine in the Body mov'd and which we suppose the cause of its Motion The second is the Translation or continued Conveyance of a Body either in its removal from or approaching to another which we consider as at rest When I say for Instance That a Boul has communicated its Motion to another the word Motion is to be understood in its first signification But if I say simply that I see a Boul in a great Motion it is to be taken in the second In a word the Term Motion signifies at once both Cause and Effect which are yet two things altogether different I am perswaded that Men are under most palpaple and most dangerous mistakes concerning the Force that gives this Motion and Translation to the Bodies mov'd Those fine Terms Nature and Impress'd Qualities are good for nothing but to shelter the Ignorance of the Falsly Learned and the Impieties of the Libertine as I could easily demonstrate But this is not a place proper to discourse of the Power that moves Bodies since that is not of a visible Nature and I am only speaking here of the Errors of our Eyes I defer it till a time when it will be more â—easonable Motion taken in the second sense that is for the Translation of a Body in its removal from another is something of a visible kind and the Subject of this Chapter I have I think sufficiently demonstrated in the sixth Chapter that our Sight does not acquaint us with the Quantity or Magnitude of Bodies in themselves but only with the mutual relation they stand in to each other and especially to our own From whence I infer that we are incapable of knowing the true and absolute Magnitude of their Motion that is of their swiftness or slowness but only the relation these Motions have to one another and more especially to the Motion ordinarily incident to our own Body Which I thus prove It is certain that we know not how to judge how great the Motion of a Body is but by the Length of the Space the Body has ran over Thus our Eyes not informing us of the true Length of the Space describ'd by the Motion it follows that 't is impossible for us to know the true Quantity of the Motion This Argument is only a Corollary of that which I have said of Extension and all the force it has proceeds from its being a necessary Conclusion of what I have there Demonstrated I shall now give one which depends on no Supposition I say then that supposing we were able clearly to discover the true Quantity of the Space describ'd it would no way follow that we could know the Quantity of Motion also The Greatness or the Swiftness of Motion includes two things The first is the Translation or Conveyance of a Body from one place to another as from Paris to St. Germains The second is the Time that necessarily goes to the making this Conveyance Now it is not enough to know exactly how far Paris is distant from St. Germains to know whether a Man has gone it with a Quick or a Slow Motion But it must moreover be known how much time he has imploy'd in his Journey Granting then that the Length of the Journey may be truly known I utterly deny we can have an exact knowledge by our Sight or indeed any other way whatever of the Time that is spent in the passage and of the true Quantity of Duration This is sufficiently evident in that at certain times one Hour seems to us as long as four and on the contrary at other times four Hours slip insensibly away When for Instance a Man's Mind is fill'd with Joy Hours seem no longer than a Moment because then the time passes away without thinking of it But when a Man is dejected with Grief and lies under some sensible Pain or Affliction every day is thought an entire Year The reason of which difference is That in this case the Mind is weary of its Duration because it is Painful The more it applies it self to the thought of it the more it discovers it and thereby finds it longer than in the season of Mirth and Joy or some diverting Imployment which as it were carries the Soul out of it self to fix her closer to the Object of her Joy or her Diversion For as a Man finds a piece of Painting so much larger by how much he stands to consider all the little things represented in it with greater attention or as he finds the head of a Fly considerably
is perpendicularly over our Heads and 't is upon that account her Diameter grows greater in her Ascent above the Horizon because then she 's approaching nearest us The reason then that we see her Greater when she rises is not the Refraction of her Rays meeting with the Vapours which proceed from the Earth since the Image which is at that time form'd from those Rays is lesser but 't is the Natural Judgment we make of her Remoteness occasion'd by her appearing beyond those Lands which we see at a vast Distance from us as has been before explain'd and I am amaz'd to find Philosophers asserting that the reason of this Appearance and Delusion of our Sences is harder to be discover'd than the greatest Aequations of Algebra This Medium whereby we judge of the Remoteness of any Object by knowing the Distance of the things betwixt us and it is often of considerable use when the other means I have spoke of are wholly insignificant for by this last Medium we can judge that certain objects are many Leagues distant which we cannot do by any of the other And yet if we strictly survey it it will be found in several things deficient For first we can only make use of it about things upon the Earth since it can be but very rarely and then very unprofitably imploy'd upon those in the Air or in the Heavens Secondly it cannot be made use of on the Earth but about things a few Leagues distant In the third place we ought to be certain that there are neither Mountains nor Valleys nor any thing of the like nature betwixt us and the Object that hinders us from applying the afore-said Medium Lastly I am perswaded there is no body but has made sufficient Tryals upon the Subject to be convinc'd that it is a thing extreamly difficult to judge with any certainty of the Remoteness of Objects by a sensible View of the things lying betwixt us and them and we perhaps have dwelt two long upon it These then are all the Means we have to judge of the Distance of Objects in which since we have found considerable Imperfections we cannot but conclude that the Judgments that are grounded upon them must needs be very Precarious and Uncertain Hence it is easy to manifest the truth of the Propositions I have advanc'd The Object C was suppos'd considerably remote from A Therefore in many Instances it may be advanc'd on towards D or may have approach'd towards B and no one can discover it because there is no infallible Means whereby to judge of its Distance Nay it may recede towards D when it is thought to approach towards B because the Image of the Object is sometimes augmented and inlarged upon the Retina whether it be because the Air betwixt the Object and the Eye occasions a greater Refraction at one time than at another whether it proceeds from some little Tremlings which happen in the Optick Nerve or lastly that the Impression which is caus'd by an unexact Union of the Rays upon the Retina is diffus'd and communicated to the parts which ought to receive no Agitation from it which may proceed from any different causes Thus the Image of the same Objects being larger on these occasions gives the Soul reason to believe the Object approaches nearer The like may be said of the other Propositions Before I conclude this Chapter I would have it observ'd That it is of great concern to us in order to the Preservation of our Life to have a nicer Knowledge of the Motion or Rest of Bodies in Proportion to their Nighness to us and that it is a thing useless and insignificant to know exactly the truth of these things when happening in places very remote For this evidently shews that what I have generally advanc'd concerning all the Sences how they never Discover things to us as they are absolutely and in their own Nature but only in Relation to the Preservation of our Body is found exactly True in this particular since we know the Motion or Rests of Objects proportionably better as they approach nearer to us and are incapable of judging of them by the Sences when they are so remote as to seem to have no Relation at all or very little to our Body as for instance when they are five or six hundred Paces distant if they be of a Moderate Bigness or even Nearer than this when they are Lesser or somewhat farther off when they are proportionably Greater CHAP. X. Of our Errors about sensible Qualities I. The Distinction of the Soul and Body II. An Explication of the Organs of the Senses III. To what part of the Body the Soul is immediately united IV. An Instance to explain the Effect which Objects have upon our Bodies V. What it is they produce in the Soul and the Reasons why the Soul perceives not the Motions of the Fibres of the Body VI. Four things which are generally confounded in every Sensation WE have seen in the fore-going Chapters that the Judgments we form upon the Testimony of our Eyes concerning Extension Figure and Motion are never exactly true And yet it must not be allow'd that they are altogether false they contain so much Truth at least as this amounts to that there are Extension Figures and Motions whatever they be which are extrinsical or without our selves I confess we often see things that have no Existence nor ever had and it ought not to be concluded that a thing is Actually without us from our Seeing it without us There is no necessary Connexion between the Presence of an Idea to the Mind of a Man and the Existence of the Thing represented by the Idea Which is manifest enough from the Consideration of what happens to Men in a Dream or a Delirium And yet we may safely affirm that ordinarily Extension Figures and Motions are without us when we see them so These things are not in the Imagination only but are Real And we are not deceiv'd in believing them to have a Real Existence and wholly independent on our Mind tho' it be a very hard thing to prove it It is certain then that the Judgments we form concerning the Extension the Figures and Motions of Bodies contain some Truth But 't is another case in point of those Judgments we make concerning Light Colours Tasts Smells and all other Sensible Qualities For Truth has nothing to do with them as shall be made manifest in the remainder of this First Book We make not here any Distinction between Light and Colours because we suppose them to have no great Difference and that they cannot be separately Explain'd We shall likewise be oblig'd to speak of other Sensible Qualities in general at the same time we shall treat of these Two in particular because they may be accounted for upon the same Principles The things which follow demand the greatest Attention imaginable as being of the highest Importance and very different as to their
Usefulness from those of the foregoing Discourse We instantly suppose a Man to have made some Reflections upon two Idea's which he finds in his Soul one that represents the Body and the other which represents the Mind and that he is able easily to distinguish them by the positive Attributes they contain In a word that he is very well satisfi'd that Extension is a different thing from Thought Or we will suppose he has read and meditated on some places of St. Austin as the 10th Chapter of the 10th Book Concerning the Trinity the 4th and 14th Chapters of his Book concerning The Quantity of the Soul at least Mr. Des-Cartes's Meditations especially that Part which treats of the Distinction of the Soul and Body or lastly Mr. Cordemoy's sixth Dissertation concerning the Difference of the Soul and Body We suppose farther that he is acquainted with the Anatomy of the Organs of the Senses and knows that they consist of little Threads or Fibres which derive their Origine from the middle of the Brain that they are dispers'd through all the Members wherein there is Sensation and being continued without any Interruption are terminated upon the External parts of the Body that whilst a Man is awake and in health one of the Extremities cannot be mov'd but the other will be mov'd in the same time because they are always somewhat Intense and upon the stretch the same thing which happens to a Cord that is intense one part whereof cannot be mov'd but the other must receive some Vibration 'T is farther necessary to know that these little Threads or Fibres may be mov'd by two several ways either by that end that is external to the Brain or by the end which terminates in the Brain If these Fibres are externally agitated by Objects acting on them and this Agitation be not communicated so far as the Brain as it happens in Sleep the Soul receives no fresh Sensation from them at that time But if these Fibres are moved in the Brain by the course of the Animal Spirits or by any other cause the Soul has a Perception of something though the Parts of these Fibres which are without the Brain and are dispers'd throughout all the Parts of the Body are quiet and undisturb'd as it happens when a Man 's asleep It will not be amiss to observe here by the way that Experience certifies us it is not impossible to feel Pain in those parts of our Body which have been intirely cut off Because the Fibres of the Brain which correspond to them being Vibrated in the same manner as if those Parts were actually wounded the Soul feels in those Imaginary Parts a most real Pain For all these things are a palpable Demonstration that the Soul immediately resides in that Part of the Brain in which all the Organs of the Senses terminate and centre I mean that in this Part she receives the Sensation of all the Changes that there occur in reference to the Objects that have caus'd them or have us'd to cause them and she has no Perception of any thing happening in any other Part but by the Intervention of the Fibres which terminate therein This being laid down and well understood it will be no hard thing to discover how Sensation is effected which is necessary to be explain'd by some particular Instance When a Man thrusts the Point of a Needle into his hand this Point moves and separates the Fibres of the Flesh. These Fibres are extended from that Place to the Brain and whilst he is awake they are so Intense that they can receive no Concussion or Vibration but it is Communicated to those in the Brain It follows then that the Extremities of the Fibres in the Brain must be in like manner mov'd If the motion of the Fibres of the Hand is Moderate that of the Fibres of the Brain will be so too and if this Motion is violent enough to break something in the Hand it will be more forcible and violent in the Brain Thus if a Man holds his Hand to the Fire the little parts of the Wood whereof it continually throws out innumerable quantities with great violence as Reason upon the defect of our Sight demonstrates beat against the Fibres and communicate a Part of their Agitation to them If that Agitation be but moderate that of the Extremities of the Fibres in the Brain which answer to the Hand will be moderate also And if this Motion be violent enough in the Hand to separate some Parts of it as it happens when it is Burnt the Motion of the Internal Fibres of the Brain will be proportionably stronger and more violent This then is what occurs in our Body when Objects strike upon us we must now see what happens to our Soul She is principally Resident if we may be permitted so to speak in that Part of the Brain where all the Fibres of our Nerves are centred She is seated there in order to cherish and preserve all the Parts of our Body and consequently it is necessary she should have notice of all the Changes that occur therein and that she be able to distinguish those which are adapted and agreeable to the Constitution of her Body from the contrary since it would be to no use or purpose for her to know them absolutely and without Relation to the Body Thus though all the Changes of our Fibres do in true speaking consist merely in the Motions of them which are generally no farther different than according to the Degrees of more or less yet it is necessary for the Soul to look upon these Changes as Essentially different For though they differ very little in themselves they ought however to be consider'd as Essentially different in reference to the Preservation of the Body The Motion for instance that produces Pain has rarely any considerable difference from that which causes Titillation There is no necessity there should be any Essential Difference betwixt these two Motions but it is necessary there should be an Essential Difference betwixt the Titillation and the Pain which these two Motions cause in the Soul For the Vibration of the Fibres which accompanies Titillation certifies the Soul of the good Constitution of her Body and assures her it has Strength enough to resist the Impression of the Object and that she need not be under any Apprehensions of its being injur'd by it But the Motion which accompanies Pain being somewhat more violent is capable of breaking some Fibre of the Body and the Soul ought to be advis'd of it by some Disagreeable Sensation so as to be aware of it for the future Thus though the Motions which are occasion'd in the Body are no farther different in themselves than according to the Degrees of more or less yet being consider'd with Relation to the Welfare and Preservation of our Life they may be said to differ Essentially 'T is upon this account our Soul has no Perception
of the Vibrations which are excited by Objects in the Fibres of our Flesh It would be of very little use for her to know them nor could she from thence receive sufficient Light to judge whether the things about us were capable of Destroying or Maintaining the oeconomy of our Body But she feels her self touch'd with Sensations essentially different which shewing precisely the Qualities of Objects as they are related to her Body make her most exactly sensible in what capacity these Objects are in to hurt it We may farther consider That in case the Soul had no Perception but of that which happen'd in her Hand when it were burnt if she saw nothing there but the Motion and Separation of some Fibres she would not much concern her self about it Nay she might probably sometimes out of an Humour or a Frolick take some satisfaction in doing it like those Freakish kind of Men who divert themselves in their Passions or Debauches in breaking all things they light upon Or as a Prisoner would not be much concern'd to see the Walls batter'd down about him that confin'd him but rather would be glad of it upon the hopes of a Deliverance So if we had no other Perception than of the Separation of the Parts of our Body when we were burnt or hurt in any manner we should soon be perswaded that our Happiness was not confin'd to a Body which prevented our Injoying those things which ought to make us Happy and so should be glad of seeing it destroy'd Hence it is apparent that the Author of the Union of our Soul and Body hath with greatest Wisdom ordain'd That we should be sensible of Pain whenever any Change happen'd to our Body capable of incommoding it as when a Needle pierced the Flesh or the Fire separated some parts of it and that we should be sensible of a Titillation or an agreeable Heat when these Motions were moderate without perceiving the Truth of that which occur'd in our Body or the Motions of the Fibres we have been speaking of First because in the Sensation of Pleasure and Pain which are things far more different than in Degree we distinguish with greater Ease the Objects which occasion them Secondly because this way of Informing us whether the Uniting our selves with the Bodies that encompass us or the Separating from them be most convenient is the shortest and the speediest and takes up the capacity of the Mind the least which is only made for GOD himself Lastly because Pleasure and Pain are Modifications of our Soul which she feels with Relation to her Body and which more nearly affect her than would the Knowledge of the Motion of some Fibres belonging to it this obliges her to be more sollicitous about them And this is a Reason of the most strict Union betwixt the two Constituent Parts of Man From all which it is manifest that the Senses are given us for the Preservation of our Body only and not for the Discovery of the Truth What hath been said concerning Titillation and Pain ought universally to be understood of all other Sensations as we shall see hereafter I chose to begin with these two Sensations rather than others because they are more Strong and Lively and Proper to make my Meaning more Sensibly conceiv'd It is at present a very easie thing to shew That we fall into infinite Errors concerning Light and Colours and generally concerning all Sensible Qualities as Cold Heat Smells Tasts Sound Pain and Titillation and if I would stand to make a particular Enquiry into all those we fall into about all the Objects of our Senses whole Years would not suffice to make a Deduction of them because they are in a manner Infinite It will be sufficient therefore to speak of them in general In almost all Sensations there are four different things which Men confound with one another because they happen altogether and as it were in the same Instant And this is the Principle of all the Errors of our Senses The first is the Action of the Object that is in Heat for instance the Impulsion or Motion of the little parts of the Wood against the Fibres of the Hand The Second is the Passion of the Organ of Sense that is to say the Agitation of the Fibres of the Hand caused by that of the little Parts of Fire which Agitation is communicated to the Brain because otherwise the Soul would have no Sensation of it The Third is the Passion the Sensation or Perception of the Soul that is What every one Feels in himself when he is near the Fire The Fourth is the Judgment the Soul makes that what she feels is both in her Hand and in the Fire Now this Judgment is Natural or rather is only a Compound Sensation But this Sensation or this Natural Judgement is for the most part attended with another Free or Voluntary Judgement which is so customary for the Soul to make that she is almost incapable of preventing it Here then are four things of a very different Nature as may be seen which Men are not nice enough to distinguish but are apt to confound because of the strict Union of the Soul and Body which hinders them from making an exact distribution of the Properties of Matter and of the Mind 'T is notwithstanding easie to discover That of these four things which occur within us in the Sensation of an Object the two first belong to the Body and the two last appertain to the Soul only provided a Man has any whit meditated on the Nature of the Soul and Body as he ought to have done as I before suppos'd him But these things demand a particular Explication CHAP. XI I. The Error we fall into concerning the Action of Objects against the External Fibres of our Senses II. The Cause of this Error III. An Objection and Answer IN this and the three succeeding Chapters I shall treat of these four things above-mention'd which I said us'd to be confounded and taken for a simple Sensation and I shall only give a general Explication of the Errors we fall into because if I would descend to Particulars there would never be an end of them But I hope however to put the Mind of those who will seriously consider what I am about to say in a condition of discovering with a great deal of Ease all the Errors our Senses can make us Subject to But in order to this it is demanded That they would attentively Meditate as well upon the following Chapters as upon that they have last been Reading The first of the things we confound in each of our Sensations is the Action of Objects upon the External Fibres of our Body It is certain a Man makes hardly any Difference betwixt the Sensation of the Soul and that Action of Objects which is so plain as not to need any farther Proof The generality of Men imagine that the Heat for instance which they Feel is in
the Fire which causes it that Light is in the Air and Colours are upon colour'd Objects They have no Thought of any Motions of Imperceptible Bodies which are the Cause of these Sensations It is true they do not judge that Pain is in the Needle which pricks them in like manner as they judge that Heat is in the Fire But the reason of it is That the Needle and its Action are visible but the little parts of the Wood that proceed from the Fire and their Motion against our Hands are altogether invisible Thus seeing nothing that strikes upon our Hands when we warm our selves and yet feeling Heat in them we Naturally judge this Heat to be in the Fire for want of discovering any thing in it besides So that it is generally true that we attribute our Sensations to the Objects themselves when we are Ignorant of the Causes of these Sensations And because Pain and Titillation are produc'd by Sensible Bodies as by a Needle or a Feather which we both see and touch we for this Reason do not conclude that there is any thing in these Objects like the Sensations which they cause in us And yet I confess that we do not fail to judge Combustion is not in the Fire but only in the Hand though it proceed from the same cause i. e. the Action of the little parts of the Wood as well as Heat which yet we attribute to the Fire But the Reason of this is That Combustion is a Species of Pain For having often judg'd that Pain is not in the external Body which produces it we are induc'd to form the same Judgement of Combustion That which is another Reason of our Judging in this manner is that Pain or Combustion most strenuously applys our Soul to the consideration of the parts of her Body and this Intension of the Soul turns off her thoughts from any other thing Thus the Mind attributes the Sensation of Combustion to the Object that is most present and nigh her self And because we find presently after that the Combustion has left some visible marks in the part in which we felt the Pain this is a Confirmation of the Judgement we have made that Combustion is in the Hand But this is no Impediment why we should not embrace this general Rule That we are accustom'd to attribute our Sensations to Objects when-ever they act upon us by the Motion of some Invisible Parts And upon this ground it is that we usually believe Colours Light Smells Tasts Sounds and some other Sensations to be in the Air or in the External Objects which produce them for as much as all these Sensations are produc'd in us by the Motions of some Imperceptible Bodies CHAP. XII I. Of our Errors concerning the Motions of the Fibres of our Senses II. That we have no Perception of these Motions or that we confound them with our Sensations III. An Experiment that proves it IV. Three kinds of Sensations V. The Errors that accompanie them THE second thing that occurs in every Sensation is the Vibration of the Fibres of our Nerves which is communicated to the Brain And we err in confounding always this Vibration with the Sensation of the Soul and in judging there is no such Vibration at all when we have no Perception of it through the Senses We confound for instance the Vibration excited by the Fire in the Fibres of our Hand with the Sensation of Heat And we say the Heat is in the Hand But because we are insensible of any Vibration caus'd by Visible Objects in the Optick Nerve which is in the Fund of the Eye we think this Nerve is not vibrated at all nor cover'd with the Colours that we see On the contrary we judge these Colours are spread only on the surface of the External Objects Yet it is manifest by the following Experiment that the Colours are as strongly and lively express'd on the Fund of the Optick Nerve as in visible Objects For take but the Eye of an Ox just kill'd and strip off the Coats that are opposite to the Pupill and situate near the Optick Nerve putting a piece of very transparent Paper in their room This done place the Eye in the hole of a Window so as the Pupill may be towards the Air and the hind-part of the Eye in the Chamber which should be close shut up and darken'd all over And upon this the Colours of Objects that are out of the Chamber will appear to be spread upon the Fund of the Eye but painted topsy-turvy If it fortunes that the Colours are not lively enough on the account of the too little distance of the Objects represented in the Fund of the Eye the Eye must be lengthened by constringing the sides of it or shortned if the Objects are too remote We see by this Experiment that we ought to judge or perceive that Colours are in the Fund of the Eye in like manner as we judge that Heat is in our Hands if our Senses were given us for the Discovery of Truth and if Reason conducted us in the Judgments we make upon the Objects of our Senses But in accounting for this inconsistent Variety of our Judgements about Sensible Qualities it it must be consider'd That the Soul is so intimately united to her Body and moreover has contracted so much Carnality since the Fall that she attributes a great many things to the Body which are only peculiar to her Self and can hardly any longer distinguish her self from it Insomuch that she does not only attribute to it all the Sensations we are at present speaking of but also the Force of Imagination and even sometimes the Power of Reasoning For there have been a multitude of Philosophers stupid and senseless enough to believe the Soul was nothing else but the more refin'd and subtle part of the Body A Man that shall read Tertullian considerately will be but too sensibly convinc'd of what I say since he subscribes to this Opinion after a great number of Authors whose Authority he alledges This is so true that he endeavours to prove in his Book Concerning the Soul that we are oblig'd by Faith Scripture and particular Revelations to believe the Soul a Corporeal Being I design not a Refutation of his Notions because I have suppos'd a Man to have read some of St. Austin's or Mr. Des-Cartes's Works which will sufficiently discover the Extravagance of these Thoughts and confirm and corroborate the Mind in the Distinction of Extension and Thought of the Soul and Body The Soul then is so blind as not to know her self nor discern that her own Sensations do belong to her But to explain this it is necessary to distinguish in the Soul three kinds of Sensations some Vigorous and Lively others Faint and Languishing and lastly a Middle sort between these two The Vigorous and Lively Sensations are such as surprize and quicken the Mind with a sort of Violence as being
sensibly manifest let us suppose some Particular Body whose Nature some Person is in Search of Let us see what a Man would do who has a mind to know what Honey or Salt is The first thing this Man would do would be to examine the Colour the Taste and Smell and the other sensible Qualities of them What are the Properties of Salt and what of Honey Wherein they agree and wherein they differ and the Analogy there may be betwixt these and those of other Bodies Which done he would doubtless reason and infer much after this manner supposing he laid this down as an uncontroverted Principle That our Sensations were in the Objects of our Senses Whatever I have a Sensation of in Tasting Seeing and in Handling Salt and Honey is in the Salt and in the Honey But it is certain that what I sensibly perceive in the Honey essentially differs from what I sensibly perceive in the Salt The whiteness of the Salt differs more doubtless than according to the degrees of more or less from the Colour of the Honey and the Sweetness of the Honey from the pungent Taste of the Salt and consequently there must be an essential difference betwixt Salt and Honey since all that I am sensible of both in the One and the Other not only differs according to more or less but has an essential Difference This is the first step this Gentleman would make For doubtless he could not judge there was an essential Difference between Salt and Honey did he not think the Sensible appearances of the One essentially differ'd from those of the Other that is to say That the Sensations he has of Honey essentially differr'd from those he has of Salt for as much as he only judges of them by the Impression they make upon the Senses Hence he looks upon this his Conclusion as a new Principle from whence he deduces other Conclusions in like manner Seeing then Salt and Honey and other Natural Bodies differ essentially from one another it follows that those are grosly deceiv'd who would have us believe That all the difference which is found in Bodies consists only in the different Configuration of the little parts that go to their Constitution For since Figure is not essential to a figured Body let the Figure of these little parts which they imagine in the Honey change how they will the Honey will still continue Honey even though the parts of it should take the Figure of the little parts of Salt And thus there must of necessity be some substance or other which being joyn'd to the first Matter that is common to all different Bodies must cause an essential difference betwixt them This then is the second Advance this Gentleman would make and the happy Discovery of Substantial Forms Those fruitful substances which cause every thing we see in Nature though they have no subsistence of themselves except in the Imagination of our Philosopher But let us see the Properties which he goes so liberally to bestow on this Being of his own Creation for doubtless he will rob all other Substances of their most essential Properties to cloath this Creature of his withall Since then there is found in every Natural Body two Substances which go to its Composition the one which is common to Honey and Salt and all other Bodies and the other which makes Honey to be Honey and Salt to be Salt and all other Bodies to be what they are it follows that the first of them which is Matter having no Contrary and being indifferent to the Reception of all Forms must remain without Force and Action since it has no occasion to defend it self But as to the others which are the Substantial Forms they have need always of being attended with Qualities and Faculties for their own defence They must necessarily be always upon their guard for fear of being surpriz'd They must be labouring continually for their Preservation and extending their Dominion over the bordering Matters and pushing their Conquests as far as possibly they can because if they were forceless or should desist from their Activity the other Forms would fall upon them by surprize and forthwith reduce them to Nothing They must then be always fighting and nourishing these Antipathies and irreconcilable Hatreds against their Rival Forms which are continually seeking to destroy them Let it happen that a Form should seize the Matter of another Let the Form of a Carcass for instance seize the Body of a Dog it is not enough for this Form to rest satisfy'd in the Annihilation of the Form of the Dog she must gratifie her Hatred and Revenge with the Destruction of all the Qualities which have sided with her Enemy The Hair of the Carcass must immediately turn white with the whiteness of a new Creation the Blood must be red with the redness which was never dreamt of and the whole Body must be surrounded with Qualities faithful to their Mistress whom they must defend according to the small strength and capacity which may be supposed in the Qualities of a dead Body which in their turn must quickly perish too But because it is impossible to be always in Battel and all Bodies have a place of Rest the Fire for instance must undoubtedly have its Centre where it ever strives to go by its own Levity and Natural Inclination in order to Rest to burn no longer and also to resign its Heat which it preserv'd here below meerly for its own safety and defence These are a small part of the Consequences which are deduced from this last Principle that there are Substantial Forms which Consequences we have brought in Our Philosopher somewhat too frankly and airily concluding for generally others say the same things in a more serious strain than he hath done here There are still infinite other Consequences which Philosophers daily infer according as their Humour and Inclination leads them or according as they are determin'd by the Fruitfulness or Barrenness of their Imagination for this is all the Difference that is between them I shall not stand here to ingage these Imaginary Substances others have sufficiently examin'd them They have made it evidently appear that there were never Substantial Forms in Nature and that they serve for no other use than to infer abundance of False Ridiculous and even Contradictory Conclusions I am satisfy'd to have discover'd their Origine in the Mind of Man and to have shewn that they are at present altogether owing to that Prejudice common to all Men That Sensations are in the Objects of their Senses For if what I said before be consider'd with any attention namely that it is necessary for the Preservation of our Bodies we should have Sensations essentially differing though the Impressions which Objects make upon our Bodies differ very little it will manifestly appear he his much in the wrong who imagines such wide differences in the Objects of our Senses But by the way I think it not
Custom Why Men by use of Speaking obtain so great a Dexterity at it as to pronounce their Words with an incredible swiftness and even without considering them as is but too often customary with those who say the Prayers which they have been us'd to several Years together And yet many things go to the Pronunciation of one Word many Muscles must be mov'd at once in a certain time and a definite Order as those of the Tongue the Lips the Throat and Diaphragm But a Man may with a little Meditation give himself satisfaction upon these Questions as upon many others very curious and no less useful and it is not necessary to dwell any longer upon them It is manifest from what has been said that there is a great affinity between the Memory and Habits and that in one sense the Memory may pass for a Species of Habit. For as the Corporeal Habits consist in the Facility the Spirits have acquir'd of passing into certain places of our Body So the Memory consists in the Traces the same Spirits have imprinted in the Brain which are the cause of that Facility we have of Recollecting and Remembring things In so much that were there no Perceptions affix'd to the courses of the Animal Spirits and the Traces they leave behind them there would be no difference between the Memory and the other Habits Nor is there greater difficulty to conceive how Beasts though void of Soul and incapable of any Perception may remember after their way the things that have made an Impression in their Brain than to conceive how they are capable of acquiring different Habits and after what I have explain'd concerning the Habits I see no greater difficulty to represent to a Man's self how the Members of their Body procure different Habits by degrees than how an Engine newly made cannot so easily be play'd as after it has been some time made use of CHAP. VI. I. That the Fibres of the Brain are not subject to so sudden Changes as the Spirits II. Three different Changes incident to the three different Ages ALL the Parts of Animate Bodies are in a continual Motion whether they be Solid or Fluid the Flesh no less than the Blood There is only this difference between the Motion of one and the other that the Motion of the parts of the Blood is sensible and visible and that the Particles of the Fibres of our Flesh are altogether Imperceptible There is then this difference between the Animal Spirits and the Substance of the Brain That the Animal Spirits are very rapidly mov'd and very fluid but the Substance of the Brain has some Solidity and Consistence So that the Spirits divide themselves into little Parts and are dispers'd in a few Hours by transpiring through the Pores of the Vessels that contain them and others often succeed in their Place not altogether like the former But the Fibres of the Brain are not so easie to be dissipated there seldom happen any considerable Alterations in them and their whole Substance can't be chang'd but by the successive tract of many Years The most considerable Differences that are found in the Brain of one and the same Person during his whole Life are in his Infancy in his Maturity and in his Old Age. The Fibres in the Brain in a Man's Child-hood are soft flexible and delicate A Riper and more consummate Age dries hardens and corroborates them but in Old Age they grow altogether inflexible gross and intermix'd with superfluous Humours wich the faint and languishing Heat of that Age is no longer able to disperse For as we see that the Fibres which compose the Flesh harden by Time and that the Flesh of a young Partridge is without dispute more tender than that of an old one so the Fibres of the Brain of a Child or a young Person must be much more soft and delicate than those of Persons more advanc'd in Years We shall understand the Ground and the Reason of these Changes if we consider that the Fibres are continually agitated by the Animal Spirits which whirl about them in many different manners For as the Winds parch and dry the Earth by their blowing upon it so the Animal Spirits by their perpetual Agitation render by degrees the greatest part of the Fibres of Man's Brain more dry more close and solid so that Persons more stricken in Age must necessarily have them almost always more inflexible than those of a lesser standing And as for those who are of the same Age your Drunkards which for many Years together have drank to excess either Wine or such Intoxicating Liquors must needs have them more solid and more inflexible than those who have abstain'd from the use of such kind of Liquors all their Lives Now the different Constitutions of the Brain in Children in Adult Persons and in Old People are very considerable Causes of the Difference observable in the Imaginative Faculty of these Three Ages which we are going to speak of in the following Chapters CHAP. VII I. Of the Communication there is between the Brain of a Mother and that of her Infant II. Of the Communication that is between our Brain and the other Parts of our Body which inclines us to Imitation and to Compassion III. An Explication of the Generation of Monstrous Children and the Propagation of the Species IV. An Explication of some Irregularities of the Vnderstanding and of some Inclinations of the Will V. Concerning Concupiscence and Original Sin VI. Objections and Answers IT is I think sufficiently manifest that there is some kind of Tye and Connection between us and all the rest of the World and that we have some Natural Relations to or Correspondencies with all things that encompass us which Relations are very advantagious both as to the Preservation and welfare of our Lives But all these Relations are not equally binding There is a closer Connection betwixt us and our Native Country than China we have a nearer Relation to the Sun than to any of the Stars to our own Houses than that of our Neighbours There are invisible Ties that fasten us with a stricter Union unto Men than Beasts to our Relations and Friends than Strangers to those on whom we have our Dependence for the Preservation of our Being than to such as can neither be the Objects of our Hopes or Fears That which is more especially remarkable in this Natural Union betwixt us and other Men is That it is so much greater by how much we stand more in need of their Kindness or Assistance Relations and Friends are intimately united to one another We may say that their Pains and Miseries are common as well as their Pleasures and Happiness For all the Passions and Sentiments of our Friends are communicated to us by the Impression their Mein and Manner and the Air of their Countenance make upon us But because we may absolutely live without them the Natural Union betwixt them and us is
according to the first Supposition saw it with the like Application and Commotion The Mother being sensibly smitten imitated the Picture at least in outward posture according to the second Supposition For her Body being compleatly form'd and the Fibres of her Flesh hard enough to withstand the torrent of the Spirits she could not possibly imitate it or become perfectly like it in all things But the Fibres of the Infant 's Flesh being extreamly soft and consequently capable of being moulded into any Figure the rapid course of the Spirits produc'd in his Flesh all that was necessary to render him entirely like the Image which he saw And the Imitation to which Children are the most dispos'd was almost as perfect as it possibly could be But this Imitation having given the Body of the Child a shape too extraordinary was the occasion of its Death There are many other Instances to be met with in Authors of the Power of the Mother's Imagination and there is nothing so odd or extravagant but they sometimes miscarry of For they not only bring forth Deform'd and Mis-shapen Children but the Fruits they have long'd to Eat as Apples Pears Grapes and the like The Mother strongly imagining and impatiently longing to Eat Pears for instance the Infant receives the same impatient Longings and strong Imaginations and the current of the Spirits actuated with the Image of the desir'd Fruit diffusing it self through the little Body which by reason of it flexibility and softness is readily dispos'd for a change of its Figure the poor Infant is fashion'd in the shape of the thing it too ardently desires But the Mother suffers not in her Body by it because it is not soft and plyable enough to receive the Figure of the thing imagined and so she cannot imitate or make her self entirely like it Now it ought to be suppos'd that this Correspondence I have been explaining and which is sometimes the cause of such great Disorders is an unuseful thing and an inconvenient Ordinance in Nature On the contrary it seems to be very advantagious to the Propagation of an Humane Body and the Formation of the Foetus and it is absolutely necessary to the Transmitting several Dispositions of the Brain which ought to be different at different Seasons and in different Countries For it is necessary for instance that Lambs in particular Countries should have their Brain altogether dispos'd for the avoiding and flying Wolves by reason of their abounding in those places and being very formidable Creatures to them It is true this Communication between the Mother's and the Infant 's Brain is sometimes attended with unlucky Consequences when the Mothers suffer themselves to be transported with some outragious Passion Notwithstanding it seems to me that without this Communication Women and other Creatures could not easily Propagate their Young Ones in the same Species For though some Reason may be given for the Formation of the Foetus in general as Monsieur Des-Cartes has happily enough attempted yet it is most difficult without this Communication of the Mother's Brain with that of the Infant to explain why a Mare does not produce a Calf and a Hen an Egg which contains a little Partridge or some other Bird of a new Species And I am of opinion that those who have thought much upon the Formation of the Foetus will agree in the same Notion 'T is true that the most reasonable Opinion and that which is most agreeable to Experience touching that very difficult Question about the Formation of the Foetus is this That Infants are already wholly form'd even before the Action whereby they are conceiv'd and that their Mothers only bestow upon them the ordinary Growth in the time of their being big with them Nevertheless this Communication of Animal Spirits and of the Brain of the Mother with the Spirits and Brain of the Infant seems however to be serviceable in regulating this Growth and determining the parts imploy'd in its Nourishment to the posturing themselves almost in the same manner as in the Body of the Mother That is in rendring the Infant like to or of the same Species This is manifest enough by the Accidents which occur when the Imagination of the Mother is disordered and some tempestuous Passion changes the Natural Disposition of her Brain For then as we have just explain'd this Communication alters the Natural Formation of the Infant 's Body and the Mother proves Abortive sometimes of her Foetus so much more resembling the Fruits she longed for as the Spirits find less Resistance in the Fibres of the Infant 's Body We deny not however but GOD Almighty without that Communication we have been mentioning might have dispos'd all things necessary to the Propagation of the Species for infinite Ages in so exact and regular a manner that Mothers should never have miscarried but have always born Children of the same Bigness and Complection and perfectly alike in all things For we ought not to measure the Power of GOD by our weak Imagination and we are ignorant of the Reasons which might have determined Him in the Construction of his Work We daily see that without the help and assistance of this Communication Plants and Trees produce regularly enough their like and that Birds and many other Animals stand in no need of it for the Breeding and Hatching of their Young ones when they brood upon Eggs of a different Species as when a Hen sits on the Eggs of a Partridge For though we have reason to suppose that the Seeds and Eggs have originally contain'd in them the Plants and Birds which proceed from them and that the little Bodies of these Birds may have receiv'd their Conformation by the Communication before-mentioned and the Plants have receiv'd their's by another Communication which is equivalent yet this perhaps would be but a Conjecture But though it should be more than Conjecture yet we ought in no wise to judge by the things which GOD has made what those are which it is possible for Him to make Yet if it be consider'd that Plants which receive their Growth from the Action of their Mother-plant resemble it much more than those which proceed from the Seeds that the Tulips for instance which arise from the Root are of the same colour with their Mother-Tulip and that those which are deriv'd from the Seed are generally very different It cannot be doubted but that if the Communication of the generating Plant with the generated is not absolutely necessary to make it of the same Species it is always necessary to make it of the same Likeness So that though it were fore-seen by GOD that this Communication of the Mother's Brain with the Brain of her Child would sometimes be the occasion of the Death of the Foetus and the Generation of Monsters by reason of the disorderly Imagination of the Mother Yet this Communication is so admirable and so necessary for the Reasons I have alledg'd and for several others
It daily happens that an unexpected Event that has any thing terrible in its circumstances deprives of their Senses Men of a Mature Age whose Brain is not so susceptible of new Impressions who are experienc'd in the World who can make a Defence or at least are capable of taking up some Resolution Children at their first Arrival in the World suffer something from every Object that strikes upon their Senses wherewith they are not yet acquainted All the Animals they see are Creatures of a new Species on their Regard since nothing of what they see at present was ever seen by them before They are destitute of Strength and void of Experience the Fibres of their Brain are of a most fine and flexible temper How then is it possible their Imagination should continue whole when expos'd to the Impressions of so many different Objects 'T is true the Mothers have somewhat pre-accustomed their Children to the Impressions of Objects by having already imprinted them in the Fibres of their Brain before they left the Womb and this is the reason they receive much less damage when they behold with their own Eyes what they in some manner have perceived already with their Mother's 'T is farther true that these adulterate Traces and wounds their Imagination receives upon the sight of so many Objects to them frightful and terrible close up and heal again in time for as much as being unnatural the whole Body is against them and all the parts conspire to their Destruction as has been seen in the preceding Chapter And this is the cause that all Men in general are not Fools from their Cradles But this hinders not but that there may be ever some Traces so strong and deep impress'd as can never be effac'd but will remain as long as Life it self If Men would make serious Reflections upon what happens in their own Breast and contemplate their own Thoughts they would not want an Experimental Proof of what I have said They would generally discover in themselves some secret Inclinations and Aversions which are not in others whereof there seems no other Reason to be given than these Traces of our Infancy For since the causes of these Inclinations and Aversions are peculiar to us they have no foundation in the Nature of Men and since they are unknown to us they must needs have acted on us at a time when our Memory was not yet capable of registring the circumstances of things which might have assisted us in calling them again to Mind and that time could be only that of our tenderest Age. Monsieur Des-Cartes has acquainted us in one of his Epistles that he had always a particular fancy for all Squint-ey'd People and having diligently search'd into the Cause of it at length understood this Defect was incident to a young Maid he lov'd when he was a Child the Affection he retained for her diffusing it self to all others that any way resembled her But 't is not these little irregularities of our Inclinations which subject us most to Error 'T is our having universally or almost universally our Mind adulterate in something or other and our being generally subject to some kind of Folly though perhaps we are not aware of it Let a Man but examine carefully the Temper of those People he converses with and he will easily be perswaded into this Opinion and though himself be an Original for others to Copy after and be look'd upon as such yet he will find all others to be Originals too and all the difference to consist in the Degree of more or less Now one of the Causes of the different Characters of Mens Minds is doubtless the difference of Impressions received by them in their Mother's Womb as has been manifested touching peculiar and unusual Inclinations because these being Species of Folly that are settled and permanent for the most part they cannot have their Dependence on the Constitution of the Animal Spirits which is of a flux and alterable Nature And consequently they must needs proceed from the Base and Spurious Impressions made in the Fibres of the Brain at such time as our Memory was incapable of preserving the Remembrance of them that is in the beginning of our Lives Here then is one of the commonest Causes of the Errors of Mankind I mean that Subversion of their Brain caused by the Impression of External Objects in making their Entrance into the World and this Cause does not so suddenly cease as may be possibly imagined The ordinary Commerce Children are oblig'd to have with their Nurses or even with their Mothers that frequently have had no Education puts the last hand and gives the finishing stroke to the corruption of their Mind These silly Women entertain them with nothing but Fooleries with ridiculous Tales and frightful Stories Their whole Discourse to them is about things sensible and they deliver it in a way most proper to confirm them in the false Judgments of their Senses In a word they sow in their Minds the Seeds of all the Follies and Weaknesses themselves are subject to as of their extravagant Fears and Apprehensions their ridiculous Superstitions and other the like Feeblesses of Mind Which is the Reason that not being accustomed to search for Truth nor to taste and relish it they at last become incapable of discerning it and of making any use of their Reason Hence they become timerous and low-spirited which Temper for a long time sticks by them For there are many to be seen who when fifteen or twenty Years old retain the Character and Spirit of their Nurse 'T is true Children seem not to be greatly qualified for the Contemplation of Truth and for abstract and sublime Sciences because the Fibres of their Brain being extreamly fine are most easily agitated by Objects even the most weak and least sensible that can be and their Soul necessarily admitting Sensations proportioned to the Agitation of these Fibres leaves Metaphysical Nations and pure Intellection to apply her self wholly to her Sensations And thus Children seem improper for and incapable of an attentive Application to the pure Idea's of Truth being so frequently and so easily drawn off by the confus'd Idea's of their Senses Yet in Answer to this it may be said First that 't is easier for a Child of seven Years old to be freed from the Errors his Senses lead him to than for a Man at sixty who all his Life long has been mis-guided by the prejudices of Childhood Secondly that a Child though incapable of the clear and distinct Idea's of Truth is at least capable of being admonish'd that his Senses deceive him upon all occasions and if he cannot be taught the Truth he should not however be encouraged and fortified in his Errors Lastly the youngest Children though never so taken up with Pleasant and Painful Sensations yet learn in little time what Persons more advanc'd in Years cannot in much longer as the Knowledge of the Order and Relations
to their Passions which proceed from the Commotion of the Animal Spirits I shall not explain these things more at large because it is easie to judge of this Age by the others before treated of and to conclude that Old Men have more difficulty than others at conceiving what is said to them that they are more zealously devoted to their Prejudices and Ancient Opinions and consequently are more confirmed and strengthened in their Errors in their corrupt Habits and other things of like Nature 'T is only to be advertis'd That the state of Old Age is not precisely determined to Sixty or Seventy Years that all Old Men are not Dotards and that those who have pass'd the Sixtieth Year are not always delivered from the Passions of Youth and that we ought not to draw too general Consequences from the Principles establish'd CHAP. II. That the Animal Spirits generally run in the Tracks of Idea's that are most familiar to us which is the Reason of our preposterous Judgments I Have I think explain'd in the fore-going Chapters the various Changes happening in the Animal Spirits and in the Constitution of the Fibres of the Brain according to different Ages Wherefore supposing a Man to have meditated a little upon what has been said upon that Subject he must necessarily have a distinct Knowledge enough of the Imagination and of the most common Natural Causes of the differences observable between the Minds of Men since all the Changes happening in the Imagination and the Mind are only the Consequences of those which are to be found in the Animal Spirits and the Fibres that compose the Brain But there are many particular and such as we may call Moral Causes of the Changes which happen in the Imagination of Men namely Their different Conditions their various Employments and in a word their several ways of Living which deserve to be attentively consider'd because these sorts of Changes are the Causes of a numberless multitude of Errors every Man judging of things with reference to his own Condition We think it not so much our Business to stand to explain the Effects of some less customary Causes such as great Diseases surprizing Misfortunes and other unexpected Accidents which make very violent Impressions in the Brain and which sometimes totally subvert it because these things are of very rare occurrence and besides the Error such sort of Persons fall into are too gross to be contagious since they are palpable and discernible to all Mankind But that we may perfectly comprehend all the Changes the different conditions and states of Life produce in the Imagination 't is absolutely necessary to be call'd to mind that our Imagining Objects is only the framing Images thereof to our Selves and that these Images are nothing but the Traces delineated by the Animal Spirits in the Brain that we Imagine things so much stronglier as these Traces are more deep and better cut and as the Animal Spirits more frequently and violently pass through them that these Spirits by their frequent course so plain and open the Passage as to enter the same Tracks with greater readiness than any other neighbouring parts through which they either have not pass'd or not so frequently This is the most ordinary Cause of the Confusion and Falsity of our Idea's For the Animal Spirits which were directed by the Action of External Objects or even by the orders of the Soul to the production of certain Traces frequently produce others which indeed have some resemblance with them but are not altogether the Traces of these same Objects nor those the Soul desir'd to represent because the Animal Spirits finding some Resistance in the parts of the Brain through which they ought to pass are easily diverted to throng into the deep Traces of Idea's which are most familiar to us Here are some very gross and sensible Instances of these things When those who are not extraordinary short-sighted behold the Moon they see in her two Eyes a Nose and a Mouth in a word it looks to them as if they saw a Face tho there be nothing in her of what they fancy they perceive Many Persons see in her quite another thing And those who believe the Moon to be such as she appears would quickly be undeceived did they but behold her with Telescopes though of a moderate size or did they only consult the Descriptions Hevelius Riccioli and others have made Publick Now the Reason why a Man usually sees a Face in the Moon and not those irregular Blotches that are in her is because the Traces of a Face which are imprinted in the Brain are very deep for that we frequently look on Faces and with great Attention So that the Animal Spirits meeting with opposition in the other parts of the Brain easily swerve from the Direction the Light of the Moon impresses on them when a Man beholds her to accomodate themselves to the Traces whereunto Nature has affix'd the Idea's of a Face Besides that the apparent Magnitude of the Moon differing not much from a common head at a certain Distance She by her Impression forms such Traces as have Connection with those which represent a Nose a Mouth and Eyes and so she determines the Spirits to take their course in the Traces of a Face There are some who discern in the Moon a Man on Horse-back or something else than a Face because their Imagination having been briskly smitten with some particular Objects the Traces of these Objects open at any thing that bears the least Analogy to them 'T is upon the same grounds we Imagine we see Chariots Men Lions and other Animals in the Clouds when there is any little resemblance between their Figures and these Animals and all Men especially those who are used to Designing see sometimes Heads of Men on Walls whereon there are many irregular stains 'T is for the same Reason still that the Spirits of Wine entering without any Direction of the Will into the most familiar Traces make Men betray their Secrets of the greatest concernment and that when a Man sleeps he usually dreams of Objects he has seen in the Day-time which have form'd very great Traces in the Brain because the Soul is ever representing those things whereof she has the greatest and deepest Traces But see other Examples of a more complex kind A Distemper is new and it makes such havock and destruction as amazes all Men. This imprints Traces so deep in the Brain that this Disease is never absent from the Mind If this Disease be call'd for instance the Scurvy all Diseases must presently be call'd Scurvy the Scurvy is new therefore all new Distempers is the Scurvy The Scurvy is accompany'd with a dozen Symptoms whereof many are common to other Distempers that matters not If a sick Person fortunes to have any one of the Symptoms he must needs be sick of the Scurvy and other Distempers are never suspected or thought of that have the same Symptoms 'T is
zealous Patrons and Defenders of certain Novelties in Divinity which ought to be had in abhorrence For 't is not their Terms and Language we disapprove which as unknown as they were to Antiquity are Authoriz'd by Custom 'T is the Errors they diffuse and support by the help of this Equivocal and confus'd Dialect which we condemn In point of Divinity we ought to be fond of Antiquity because we ought to love the Truth which Truth is found in Antiquity And all Curiosity ought to cease when once we have taken hold of Truth But in point of Philosophy we ought on the contrary to love Novelty for the same Reason that we ought always to love the Truth that we ought to retrieve it and ought to have an Indefatigable Curiosity for it If Plato and Aristotle were believed Infallible a Man should perhaps apply himself to the understanding of them only But Reason opposes the Belief of it Reason on the contrary would have us judge them more ignorant than the New Philosophers since in the Age we live in the World is two thousand Years older and has learned greater Experience than it had in the days of Aristotle and Plato as we have already said And the New Philosophers may know all the Truths the Ancients have left us and find out and add a great many more to them Yet Reason will not have us believe these New Philosophers any more than the Old upon their bare Word It bids us on the contrary examine attentively their Thoughts and withhold our consent till there is no longer room for doubting without being ridiculously prepossess'd with the Opinion of their vast Knowledge or the other specious Qualities of their Mind CHAP. VII Of the Prepossession of Commentators THIS Prepossession is no where apparent in so strange and excessive a degree as in the Commentators on an Author because the Undertakers of this Task which seems too low and servile for a Man of Sense imagine their Authors merit the Praise and Admiration of all the World They look upon them as part of themselves and fancy they are Body and Soul to one another and upon this View Self-love admirably plays its part They artfully accumulate Encomiums on their Authors they shed Light and Radiations round them they load them with Glory as knowing they shall have it themselves by reflection and rebound This great and lofty Idea not only magnifies Aristotle and Plato in the Mind of many of the Readers but imprints a respect in them for all that have Commented upon them and some of of them had never Deified their Authors had they not fancy'd themselves incircl'd as it were in the Rays of the same Glory Yet I will not say that all Commentators are so liberal in their Panegyricks on their Authors out of hopes of a Return some of them would start at such an Apprehension if they would consider a little They are sincere and well-meaning in their Praises without any Politick design and without thinking what they do but Self-love thinks for them and without their being aware of it Men are insensible of the heat that is in their Heart though it gives Life and Motion to all the other parts of their Body They must touch and handle themselves to be convinc'd of it because this Heat is Natural The cause is the same in respect of Vanity which is so congenial to the Mind of Man that he is insensible of it and though 't is this as a Man may say that gives Life and Motion to the greatest part of his Thoughts and Designs yet it often does it in a manner imperceptible by him He must handle and feel and sound himself inwards to know that he is vain 'T is not sufficiently understood that 't is Vanity which is the First mover in the greatest part of Humane Actions and though Self-love knows this well enough it knows it only to disguise it from the rest of Man A Commentator then being some ways related and allied to his Author that he works upon Self-love never fails to discover in him notable Subjects for Praise and Incense with design to make them redound to the advantage of the Offerer And this is perform'd in so Artificial so Subtil and Delicate a manner as to be wholly Imperceptible But this is not the proper place of exposing all the Wiles of Self-love and Interest Nor is the Prejudicate Esteem Commentators have conceiv'd for their Authors and the Honour they do themselves in praising them the only Reason of Sacrificing to them Custom is another Motive and because they think the Practise necessary There are Men who have no great Esteem either for certain Sciences or Authors who notwithstanding fall zealously to writing Comments on them because either their Imployment Chance or perhaps a capricious Humour has engag'd them in the Attempt and these too think they are under an Obligation to be excessive in the Praises of the Sciences and Authors which they work on whe nat the same time the Authors are Silly and Impertinent and the Sciences Ignoble and Useless And indeed what can be more ridiculous than for a Man to undertake to Comment on an Author whom he thought Impertinent and to write Seriously on a Subject he believ'd to be Insignificant and Useless 'T is necessary therefore to the Preserving his Reputation to Praise both the Authors and Sciences though both one and the other are Contemptible and nothing worth and the fault of Undertaking an ill work must be mended with another Which is the Reason that when Learned Men Comment on different Authors they fall into Absurdities and Contradictions Upon this Account it is that almost all prefaces have as little of Truth in them as good Sense If a Man Comments upon Aristotle he is the Genius of Nature If a Man writes upon Plato 't is the Divine Plato They hardly ever Comment upon the works of Plain Men but 't is always of Men wholly Divine of Men who have been the Admiration of their Age and who have been bless'd by Providence with Light and Understanding above the rest of Mankind 'T is the same thing too with the matter they treat on 'T is always the finest the most exalted and most necessary of all other But that I may not be credited upon my bare word I will deliver here the way where in a Famous Commentator among the Learned treats the Author that he Comments on I mean Averroes who speaks of Aristotle He says in his Preface upon the Physicks of that Philosopher that he was the Inventor of Logick Moral Philosophy and Metaphysicks and that he has carried them to the top of their perfection Complevit says he quia nullus eorum qui secuti sunt eum usque ad hoc tempus quod est mille quingentorum annorum quidquam addidit nec invenies in ejus verbis errorem alicujus quantitatis talem esse virtutem in individuo uno miraculosum extraneum existit haec
to be able to pronounce it incapable of any thing more than Knowledge and Love This indeed might be maintain'd by those who attribute their Sensations to external Objects or to their Body and who would have their Passions to be in their Hearts For indeed if we rob the Soul of all her Passions and Sensations all that we leave discoverable in her is no more than a consequence of Knowledge or of Love But I cannot conceive how those who are retriev'd from those Delusions of the Senses can perswade themselves that all our Sensations and our Passions are nothing but knowledge and Love I would say Species of confus'd Judgments the Soul passes upon Objects with reference to the Body which she Animates I cannot conceive how a Man can affirm Light Colours Odors and the like to be Judgments of the Soul for it seems to me on the contrary that I distinctly perceive Light Colours Smells and the other Sensations to be Modifications quite different from Judgments But let us make choice of more lively Sensations and such as the Mind is most taken up with and see what these Persons say of Pain and Pleasure They will have these Sensations with several most considerable Authors to be only the consequences or dependences of the Faculties we we have of Knowing and Willing and that Pain for instance is only the Regret the Opposition and Aversion the Will has to what she knows hurtful to the Body which she loves Now to me this seems evidently to confound Pain with Sorrow but so far is Pain from being a Consequence of the Knowledge of the Mind and the Action of the Will that on the contrary it precedes them both If you put for example a burning Coal in the Hand of a Man asleep or that was warming his Hands behind him I know not how it can be with any probability affirm'd that this Man first knew there happen'd in his Hand some Motions contrary to the good Constitution of his Body that hereupon his Will oppos'd them and that his Pain was the Consequence of that Knowledge of his Mind and Opposition of his Will On the contrary it is in my Opinion undoubtedly certain that the first thing this Man perceiv'd as soon as the Coal touch'd his Hand was Pain and that the Knowledge of the Mind and Opposition of the Will were only the Consequences of it though they were truly the Cause of the Sorrow which succeeded the Pain But there 's a vast difference between this Pain and the Sorrow it produces Pain is the first thing the Soul is sensible of it is not preceded by any Knowledge nor can ever be agreeable and welcome of it self Whereas Sorrow is the last thing the Soul feels it is ever preceded with Knowledge and is always pleasant of it self This is evidently manifest from the Pleasure that attends the Sorrow a Man 's affected with at the direful Representations of the Theatre for this Pleasure increases with the Sorrow but Pleasure never increases with Pain The Comedians who study the Art of Pleasing know well that they must never lay the Stage in Blood because the sight though of a fictitious Murder would be too Terrible to be Pleasant But they are not afraid of touching the Spectators with a deep Sorrow because Sorrow is ever agreeable when there 's occasion to be mov'd with it There is then an Essential difference between Sorrow and Pain and it can no wise be said that Pain is nothing but the Knowledge of the Mind together with an Opposition of the Will As to all the other Sensations such as are Smells Tasts Sounds Colours the generality of Men do not think they are the Modifications of their Soul But on the contrary judge they are diffus'd upon the Objects or at least that they are only in the Soul as an Idea of a Square or a Circle that is are united to the Soul but are not the Modifications of it and the Reason of their judging thus is that this kind of Sensations do not much affect them as I have shewn in the Explication of the Errors of the Senses It ought then I think to be concluded That we know not all the Modifications incident to our Soul and that besides those which she has by the Organs of Senses it is impossible for her to have infinite others which she has never experimented nor ever shall till deliver'd from the captivity of her Body And yet it must be confess'd that as Matter is not capable of infinite different Configurations but because of its Extension so the Soul is not capable of different Modifications but on the account of Thought it being manifest that the Soul would be incapable of the Modifications of Pleasure Pain and even of those that are indifferent to her were it not for her being capable of Perception or Thought It is sufficient then to know that Thought is the Principle of all these Modifications If any one will have something in the Soul previous to Thought I shall not dispute it with him But as I am assur'd that no One has any Knowledge of his Soul but by Thought or by being inwardly conscious of what passes in his Mind so I am certain that if any One would reason about the Nature of the Soul he ought only to consult that Internal Sensation which constantly represents her to himself such as she is and not to imagine against the conviction of his own Conscience that she is an invisible Fire a subtile Air Harmony or the like CHAP. II. I. The Mind being limited cannot comprehend any thing of an infinite Nature II. Its Limitation is the Origine of a great many Errors III. And especially of Heresies IV. The Mind must be submitted unto Faith SO then that which we immediately discover in the Thought of Man is its being limited to a very narrow compass from which consideration may be drawn two very important Conclusions As first that the Soul cannot perfectly know Infinity Secondly that she can have no distinct Knowledge of many things at once For as a piece of Wax is incapable of admitting at the same time a great number of different Figures so the Soul is incapable of knowing at the same time a multitude of things And as again a piece of Wax cannot be square and round at the same time but only semi-square and semi-circular and the more different Figures it has the less perfect and distinct they will be so the Soul cannot perceive many things at once and her Thoughts will be so much more confus'd as they are more numerous Last of all as a piece of Wax which had a thousand Faces and on each Face a different Figure would be neither square nor round nor oval nor could a Man say what Figure it was of So it sometimes happens that a Man has such a multitude of different Thoughts that he fancies he thinks of nothing at all which is exemplify'd in those that fall into
Religion against Hereticks give frequent occasion to the same Hereticks of adhering obstinately to their Errors and treating the mysteries of Faith as Humane Opinions The Working and Agitation of the Mind and the Subtilties of the School are no fit means to make Men sensible of their own Weakness and to inspire them with that Spirit of Submission requisite to make them humbly resign to the Decisions of the Church On the contrary these Subtil and Humane Reasonings may kindle a secret Pride in their Heart and dispose them to imploy their Mind to evil purpose by framing a Religion suitable to its Capacity And so far are we from seeing Hereticks convinc'd by Philosophic Arguments and the Reading of Books purely Scholastical so as to acknowledge and condemn their Errors that on the contrary we find them daily taking constant occasion from the Weakness of some School-men's Arguings to turn the most Sacred mysteries of our Religion into Jest and Raillery which indeed are not establish'd on any Reason and Explications of Humane Derivation but only on Authority of the Word of GOD written or unwritten that is transmitted down to us by way of Tradition And indeed 't is impossible for Humane Reason to make us comprehend how one GOD is in Three Persons How the Body of our LORD can be really present in the Eucharist and how 't is consistent for Man to be free whilst GOD knows from all Eternity all that Man shall do The Reasons that are brought to prove and explain these things are such for the generality as convince none but those who are willing to admit them without Examination but look ridiculous and extravagant to Men minded to oppugn them and that are not settled in the Belief of the Foundation of these mysteries Nay it may be said that the Objections that are form'd against the Principal Articles of our Faith and especially against the mysteries of the TRINITY are so strong as cannot possiby admit of any clear evident and satisfactory Solution such I mean as one way or other does not shock our weak and staggering Reason These mysteries being in truth incomprehensible The best way of converting Hereticks is not then to accustom them to the Exercise of Reason by urging to them only uncertain Arguments deduc'd from Philosophy because the Truths we would instruct them in come not under the Scrutinity of Reason Nor is it always convenient to use Argument in Truths that can be made out by Reason as well as Tradition as the Immortality of the Soul Original Sin the necessity of Grace the corruption of Nature and some others for fear least the Mind having once tasted the Evidence of Argument upon these Questions will not acquiesce in those which are only prov'd by Tradition On the other hand they should be taught to quit their own Reason by making them sensible of its Weakness its Limitation and its Disproportion to our mysteries and when the Pride of their mind shall be humbled and brought down it will be easie to introduce them into the Sentiments of the Church by representing to them her Authority or explaining to them the Tradition of all Ages if they are capable of understanding it But whilst men are continually calling of their Sight from the Weakness and Limitation of their Mind their Courage will be puffed up with an indiscreet Presumption they will be dazled by an abusive Light and blinded with the love of Glory and so Hereticks will be continually Hereticks Philosophers obstinate and opinionated And Men will never leave disputing on all things they can dispute on as long as Disputation pleases them CHAP. III. I. The Philosophers dissipate or dissolve the force of their Mind by applying it to Subjects including too many Relations and depending on too many things and by observing no Method in their Studies II. An Instance taken from Aristotle III. That Geometricians on the contrary take a good Method in the Search of Truth Especially those who make use of Algebra and Analyticks IV. That their Method increases the strength of the Mind and that Aristotle's Logick lessens it V. Another Fault of Learned Men. MEN not only involve themselves in a multitude of Errors by being busied with Questions partaking of Infinity whilst their Mind is Finite but by over-matching their Mind which is but of a narrow Reach with those of a vast Comprehension It has been already said That as a piece of Wax was incapable of receiving many perfect and very distinct Figures so the Mind was incapable of receiving many distinct Idea's that is of perceiving many things distinctly at the same time Whence 't is easie to conclude that we should not apply our selves at first to the finding out occult Truths the Knowledge whereof depends on too many things some of which are unknown to us or not so familiar as they should be For we ought to study with order and make what we know distinctly serviceable to the Learning we know not or what we know but confusedly And yet the most part of those who take to any Study trouble not themselves so much They never make trial of their forces nor enter into themselves to try how far the reach of their Mind will go 'T is a secret Vanity and a disorderly Desire of Knowledge and not Reason which regulates their Studies For without consulting their Reason they undertake the fathoming the most hidden and inscrutable Truths and the resolving Questions which depend on such a multitude Relations that the most quick and piercing Mind would to the discovering their Truth with an absolute Certainty require several Ages and infinite Experiments to build upon In Medicine and Morality there are a vast many Questions of this nature all the Sciences of Bodies and their Qualities as of Animals Plants Mettals and their Properties are such Sciences as can never be made sufficiently evident or certain especially unless they are cultivated in in another manner than has been done and the most simple and least compos'd are began with on which those other depend But Men of study care not to be at the pains of a methodical Philosophy They are not agreed about the certainty of the Principles of Physics They frankly confess they know not the Nature of Bodies in general nor their Qualities And yet they fancy themselves able for instance to account for Old Men's Hairs growing White and their Teeth becoming Black and such like Questions which depend on so many Causes as 't is impossible to give any infallible Reason of them For to this 't is necessary to know wherein truly consists the Whiteness of Hairs in particular the Humours they are fed with the Strainers which are in the Body to let these Humours through the Conformation of the Root of the Hairs or of the Skin they pass through and the difference of all these things in a Young Man and an Old which is absolutely impossible or at least extreamly difficult to be known Aristotle for instance
six hours a day they sometimes study six different things 'T is visible that this fault proceeds from the same Cause as the others I have been speaking of For there is great probability that if those who studied in this manner knew evidently how disproportion'd it was to the Capacity of their Mind and that it was more apt to fill it with Error and Confusion than with true Science they would not let themselves be transported with the disorderly motives of their Passion and Vanity For indeed this is not the way to be satisfy'd in our pursuits but the most ready means to know nothing at all CHAP. IV. I. The Mind cannot dwell long upon Objects that have no Relation to it or that include not something of Infinity in them II. The Inconstancy of the Will is the Cause of that want of Application and consequently of Error III. Our Sensations take us up more than the Pure Idea's of the Mind IV. Which is the Source of the Corruption of our Morals V. And of the Ignorance of the Vulgar sort of Men. THE Mind of Man is not only subject to Error for want of being Infinite or for being of less Extent than the Objects of its Consideration as has been explain'd in the two last Chapters But because it is Inconstant and nothing Resolute in its Action and unable to keep the View fixt and steady on the Object long enough to examine all the parts of it The better to conceive the Cause of this Inconstancy and Levity of the Mind we must know that the Will is the Directress of its Action that the Will applies it to the Objects which it loves and that the same Will is it self in perpetual fluctuation and disquietude whereof I assign this to be the Cause 'T is not to be doubted but GOD is the Author of all things and has made them only for Himself and that he draws the Heart of Man towards him by a Natural and Invincible Impression which he perpetually influences him withal 'T is impossible for GOD to have will'd that there should be any Will that did not love Him or that lov'd Him less than any other Good if there could be any other besides Himself it being impossible for Him to ordain that a Will should not love that which was supreamly Amiable or should love that more which was less lovely And thus Natural Love must needs carry us to GOD as proceeding from GOD and nothing being able to stop the motions thereof unless GOD Himself that impresses them There is then no Will whatever but necessarily follows the motions of this Love The Righteous and the Wicked the Blessed and the Damned love GOD with this Love and 't is this Love in one sense that is the Cause of the Misery of the latter For this Natural Love we have for GOD being the same thing with the Natural Impression which carries us towards Good in general towards Infinite Soveraign Good 't is manifest that all Minds love GOD with this Love since there is no other that is the Universal the Infinite the Soveraign Good For lastly All Spirits and even the Divels passionately desire to be Happy and to possess the Soveraign Good and they desire it without Choice Deliberation and Liberty by the bent and necessity of their Nature Being therefore made for GOD for an Infinite Good for a Good that comprehends in Himself all Goods the Natural Motion of our Heart can never stop till we arrive to the possession of this Good The Will then labouring thus with a perpetual thirst being toss'd and agitated with Desires Eagerness and Restless longings for that Good it is not in Possession of cannot but with much Uneasiness suffer the Mind to dwell any time upon Abstract Truths which don't affect it and which it judges incapable of making it Happy It therefore pushes the Mind forward continually to the Research of other Objects and when in this hurry and agitation communicated to it by the Will it meets with any Object that carries the Mark of Good I mean that by approaching the Soul makes it sensible of some internal Delight or Satisfaction then this Thirst of the Heart rises anew these Desires Eagernesses and Fervencies are re-kindled and the Mind oblig'd to wait on them fixes it self only on the Object that either is or seems to be the cause of them to approximate it to the Soul that regales and feeds upon it for some time But the Emptiness of the Creatures being unable to fill the Infinite Capacity of the Heart of Man these little Pleasures instead of extinguishing its Thirst only provoke and inflame it and give the Soul a foolish and vain Hope of being satisfy'd in the multiplicity of Earthly Pleasures which produces a far greater Inconstancy and an inconceivable Levity in the Mind which ought to make the Discovery to the Soul of all these Goods It 's true when the Mind falls by chance upon an Object of an Infinite Nature or which includes something great and mighty in it its unsettledness and casting about ceases for some time For finding that this Object bears the badge and character of that which the Soul desires it dwells upon it and closes in with it for a considerable time But this closing and adhesion or rather obstinacy of the Mind to examine Subjects infinite or too vast and unweildy is as useless to it as that Levity wherewith it considers those that are proportion'd to its Capacity since 't is too weak to accomplish so difficult an Enterprise and in vain it endeavours to effect it That which must render the Soul happy is not as I may speak the Comprehension of an Infinite Object this she is not capable of but the Love and Fruition of an Infinite Good whereof the Will is capable through the Motion of Love continually impress'd on it by GOD Himself Which being thus we need not wonder at the Ignorance and Blindness of Mankind because their Mind being subjected to the Inconstancy and Levity of their Heart which incapacitate it from considering any thing with a serious Application is unable to penetrate into a subject any whit perplex'd and difficult For in short the Attention of the Mind is to intelligible Objects what a steady View of the Eyes is to those of Sight And as a Man that can't fix his Eyes on the Bodies that are about him can never see them well enough to distinguish the differences of their least parts and to discover all the Relations those little parts have to one another So a Man who cannot fix the Eye of his Mind upon the things desir'd to be known can never have a sufficient Knowledge to distinguish all the parts and to observe all the Relations that may possibly be between themselves or themselves and other subjects Yet it is certain that all our Knowledge consists in a clear View of the Relations things stand in to one another So that when it happens as
we not only can see from one end of the same Point abundance of most large and even immense Objects There is moreover not any Point in all these great Spaces of the World from whence we cannot discover an almost inexhaustible number of Objects and even Objects as big as the Sun the Moon and Heavens There is not then any Point in the great Circumference of the World wherein the Species of all these things ought not to center which is contradictory to all appearance of Truth The second Reason is taken from the Change these Species undergo It is certain the nearer an Object is the greater the Species ought to be since we see the Object greater Now we cannot see what 't is that can lessen this Species and what become of the Parts that compos'd it when it was greater But that which is still more difficult to conceive according to their Notion is how in beholding an Object with Magnifying-glasses or a Microscope the Species grows on a suddain five or six hundred times bigger than it was before for 't is still harder to be seen from what adventitious Parts it can increase so mightily in an instant The third Reason is that in looking on a perfect Cube all the Species of its faces are unequal and yet we fail not to see all its faces equally square And so in beholding in a Picture Ovals and Parallelograms which can only send forth Species of a similar Figure we see notwithstanding Circles and Squares For this makes it manifestly clear that there is no necessity the Object we behold should produce Species like it self in order to our seeing it Lastly it is not conceivable how it is possible for a Body that is not sensibly exhausted to send constantly Species from out of it self on every side how it can continually fill with them so very capacious Spaces all round about and that with an incomprehensible swiftness For an Object that lay hid in the very instant of its Discovery may be seen many millions of Leagues on all sides And what seems much stranger yet is that the Bodies which have a great deal of Action as the Air and some others have not force enough to extrude from them their representative Images which the grossest and least active Bodies can do as Earth Stones and almost all hard Bodies But I shall not spend more time in producing all the Reasons that oppugn this Opinion because that would be an endless work the least Essay of Thought furnishing out an inexhaustible number of them These we have already urg'd are enough and even more than were necessary after what has been said relating to this Subject in the first Book whâ—n we explain'd the Errors of the Senses But there being such a multitude of Philosophers devoted to this Opinion I thought it necessary to say something of it to put them upon reflecting on their own Thoughts CHAP. III. That the Soul has no Power to produce Idea's The Cause of the Error Men are guilty of upon this Subject THE second Opinion is theirs who believe that our Souls have the Power of producing the Idea's of the things they would contemplate and that they are mov'd to the producing them by the impressions Objects make upon the Body though these impressions are not Images representative of the Objects they are caused by They pretend it is in this that Man is made after the Image of GOD and participates of his Power That as GOD has created all things out of nothing and can annihilate them again and thence create others wholly new so Man has the Power of Creating and Annihilating the Idea's of all things as he pleases But there 's very good reason to suspect all these Opinions that elevate Man so high as being Notions which commonly derive from his vain and haughty Heart and which the Father of Lights never vouchsafed to give him This Participation of the Power of GOD which Men boast of having whereby to represent Objects and to do many other particular Actions is a Participation which seems to draw in something of Independency as 't is ordinarily explain'd But 't is likewise a Chimerical Participation which Men's Ignorance and Vanity have caus'd them to imagine For they are under a greater Dependance on the Goodness and Mercy of GOD than they suppose But this is not the place to give an Explication of these things Let us only try to make it visible that Men have not the Power of forming the Idea's of the things they perceive No Man can doubt but that Idea's are real Beings seeing they have real Properties that they differ one from another and that they represent quite different things Nor can it reasonably be doubted but they are of a Spiritual Nature and very different from the Bodies represented by them All which seems strong enough to raise a doubt whether the Idea's by means whereof we perceive Bodies are not of a nobler extract than the Bodies themselves And in earnest the Intelligible World ought to be perfecter than the Material and Terrestrial as we shall see in the process of our Discourse and then in affirming that Men are impower'd to frame all Idea's as they please we incur the danger of maintaining that Men have power of making Beings more noble and more perfect than the World which GOD has created But this reflection never enters our Heads by reason of our imagining an Idea to be nothing because not obvious to the Senses or if we look upon it as a Being 't is a Being so slender and contemptible that we fancy it annihilated as soon as absent from the Mind But though it should be true that Idea's were only little pitiful despicable Beings they are however Beings and Beings Spiritual And Men having not the Power of Creating have not consequently the Power of Producing them For the Production of Idea's in the manner they explain it is a true Creation and though they endeavour to palliate and soften the Presumption and Harshness of this Opinion in saying that the Production of Idea's supposes something antecedent and Creation supposes nothing yet they bring no Reason to solve the Knot of the difficulty For it ought well to be heeded That there is no greater difficulty in producing Something out of Nothing than in producing it by presupposing another thing out of which it could not be made and which could contribute nothing to its Production There is no greater difficulty for instance in the Creation of an Angel than in the Production of an Angel from a Stone Because a Stone being a Being of a quite opposite kind cannot be any ways serviceable to the Production of an Angel But it may contribute to the Production of Bread of Gold c. because Stone Gold and Bread are only the same Extension of a diverse Configuration and all these are Material things Nay it is even harder to produce an Angel out of a Stone than to produce it out
to have any other Principal End of his Actions than Himself This is a common Notion with all Men capable of any Reflection and Holy Scripture will not suffer us to doubt that GOD has created all things for Himself It is necessary then not only that our Natural Love I mean the Motion he produces in our Mind should tend towards him but also that the Knowledge and the Light he gives it should discover something to us which is in Him For all that comes from GOD can have no other End but GOD. If GOD has made a Mind and given it the Sun for its Idea or for the immediate Object of its Knowledge GOD we should think had made that Mind and the Idea of that Mind for the Sun and not for Himself GOD cannot therefore make a Mind for the Knowledge of his Works were it not that this Mind should in some sort see GOD in contemplating his Works So that it may be said that unless we saw GOD in some manner we should see nothing at all just as we should love nothing at all except we lov'd GOD that is except GOD continually impress'd on us the love of Good in general For that Love being our Will we are unable to love any thing or will any thing without Him since we cannot love particular Goods but by determining towards these Goods the motion of Love that GOD gives us for Himself Thus as we love not any thing but by means of that necessary Love we have for GOD so we know nothing but through that necessary Knowledge we have of Him all the particular Idea's which we have of the Creatures being only the Restrictions of the Idea of the Creator as all the Motions of the Will towards the Creatures are only Determinations of the Motion towards the Creator I suppose there is no Theologist but will agree with me in this that the Impious love GOD with this Natural Love I speak of And St. Augustin and some other of the Fathers maintain'd it as a thing undoubted that the Wicked see in GOD the Rules of Morals and eternal Truths So that the Opinion I am explaining ought not to trouble any body Ab illa incommutabili luce Veritatis etiam impius dum ab ea avertitur quodammodo tangitur Hinc est quod etiam impii cogitant aeternitatem multa rectè reprehendunt rectéque laudant in hominum moribus Quibus ea tandem regulis judicant nisi in quibus vident quemadmodum quisque vivere debeat etiamsi nec ipsi eodem modo vivant Vbi autem eas vident Neque enim in sua natura Nam cum proculdubio mente ista videantur eorumque mentes constet esse mutabiles has verò regulas immutabiles videat quisquis in eis hoc videre potuerit ..... Vbinam ergo sunt istae regulae scriptae nisi in libro lucis illius quae veritas dicitur unde lex omnis justa describitur ...... in qua videt quid operandum sit etiam qui operatur injustitiam ipse est qui ab ea luce avertitur à qua tamen tangitur There are in St. Augustin infinite passages of the like Nature whereby he proves that we see GOD even in this Life through the Knowledge we have of eternal Truths Truth is uncreated immutable immense eternal and above all things It is true independently and by it self and is beholden to nothing else for its Perfection It renders the Creatures more perfect and all Spirits are naturally solicitous to know it nothing can have all these Perfections except GOD therefore Truth is GOD. We see immutable and eternal Truths therefore we see GOD. These are the Reasons of St. Augustin My own are somewhat different and I would not unjustly usurp the Authority of so Great a Man to countenance my Opinion 'T is my thoughts then that Truths even those which are eternal as That twice two are four are not so much as absolute Beings so far am I from believing them to be GOD. For 't is manifest that this Truth consists only in the Relation of Equality which is between twice two and four We do not say then with St. Augustin That we see GOD in seeing eternal Truths but in seeing the Idea's of these Truths for Idea's are real but the Equality between Idea's which is the Truth has nothing real in it When for instance we say the Cloth we measure is three Ells long The Cloth and the Ells are real but the Equality between the three Ells and the Cloth is no real Being but only a Relation intervening between them In saying Twice two are four the Idea's of the Numbers are real but the Equality between them is only a Relation And thus according to our own Opinion we see GOD in seeing eternal Truths not that these Truths are GOD but because the Idea's on which these Truths depend exist in GOD and perhaps too St. Augustin understood it so We are perswaded also that we know changeable and corruptible Truths in GOD though St. Augustin speaks only of the immutable and incorruptible since there is no need of subjecting GOD to any imperfection on this account nothing being more requir'd than that GOD gives us a Manifestation of what He has in Himself which relates to these things But when I say that we see in GOD material and sensible Things special Notice should be taken that I don't say We have the Sensations of them in GOD but only that they proceed from GOD who acts upon us For GOD perfectly knows sensible things but not by any Sensation In perceiving any thing of a sensible Nature two things occur in our Perception Sensation and Pure Idea The Sensation is a Modification of our Soul and 't is GOD who causes it in us which he is able to cause though He has it not Himself because he sees in the Idea he has of our Soul that it is capable of it As to the Idea which is found joyn'd to the Sensation that is in GOD and we see it because he is pleas'd to discover it to us And GOD joyns the Sensation to the Idea when the Objects are present to the intent we may believe them so and may enter into the Sentiments and Passions that we ought to have with relation to them We believe lastly that all Spirits see the eternal Laws no less than other things in GOD but with some difference They know the Divine Order and the Eternal Truths and even the Beings GOD has made according to this Order and these Truths through the Union they necessarily have with the WORD or the WISDOM of GOD who enlightens them as we have before explain'd But 't is through the impression they without intermission receive from the Will of GOD which carries them towards Him and strives as I may so say to conform their Will entirely like His own that they know this Order to be a Law I mean that they know the Eternal Laws
as little as possibly it can 'T is upon this account it is easily perswaded that the Essences of things are in Indivisibili and that they are like Numbers as we have said before for that then it requires only one Idea to represent all the Bodies that go under the name of the same Species If you put for example a Glass of Water into an Hogshead of Wine the Philosophers will tell you the Essence of Wine still remains the same and the Water is converted into Wine That as no number can intervene between three and four since a true Unity is indivisible so 't is necessary the Water should be converted into the Essence or Nature of the Wine or that the Wine should lose its own That as all Numbers of Four are perfectly alike so the Essence of Water is exactly the same in all Waters That as the Number Three Essentially differs from the Number Two and cannot have the same Properties so two Bodies differing in Specie differ Essentially and in such wise as they can never have the same Properties which flow from the Essence and such like things as these Whereas if Men consider'd the true Idea's of things any thing attentively they would not be long a discovering that all Bodies being extended their Nature or Essence has nothing in 't like Numbers and that 't is impossible for it to consist in Indivisibili But Men not only suppose Identity Similitude or Proportion in the Nature the Number and essential Differences of Substances but in every thing that comes under their Perception Most Men conclude that all the fix'd Stars are fastned as so many Nails in the mighty Vault of Heaven in an equal distance and convexity from the Earth The Astronomers have for a long time given out that the Planets rowl in exact Circles whereof they have invented a plentiful number as Concentric Excentric Epicycles Deferent and Equant to explain the Phenomena that contradict their Prejudice 'T is true in the last Ages the more Ingenious have corrected the Errors of the Ancients and believe that the Planets describe Ellipses by their Motion But if they would have us believe that these Ellipses are regular as we are easily inclin'd to do because the Mind supposes Regularity where it perceives no Irregularity they fall into an Error so much harder to be corrected as the Observations that can be made upon the Course of the Planets want Exactness and Justness to shew the Irregularity of their Motions which Error nothing but Physicks can remedy as being infinitely less observable than that which occurs in the Systeme of exact Circles But there is one thing of more particular occurrence relating to the Distance and Motion of the Planets which is that the Astronomers not being able to discover an Arithmetical or Geometrical Proportion that being manifestly repugnant to their Observations some of them have imagin'd they observ'd a kind of Proportion which they term Harmonical in their Distances and Motions Hence it was that an Astronomer of this Age in his New Almagistus begins a Section intitul'd De Systemate Mundi Harmonico with these words There is no Man that 's never so little vers'd in Astronomy but must acknowledge a kind of Harmony in the motion and intervals of the Planets if he attentively considers the Order of the Heavens Not that he was of that Opinion for the Observations that have been made gave him sufficiently to understand the extravagance of that imaginary Harmony which has yet been the Admiration of many Authors Ancient and Modern whose Opinions are related and refuted by Father Riccioli It is attributed likewise to Pythagoras and his Followers to have believ'd That the Heavens by their Regular Motions made a wonderful Melody which Men could not hear by reason of their being us'd to it As those says he that dwell near the Cataracts of the Waters of Nile hear not the noise of them But I only bring this particular Opinion of the Harmonical Proportion between the Distances and Motions of the Planets to shew that the Mind is fond of Proportions and that it often imagines them where they are not The Mind also supposes Uniformity in the Duration of things and imagines they are not liable to Change and Instability when it is not as it were forc'd by the Testimonies and report of Sence to judge otherwise All Material things being extended are capable of Division and consequently of Corruption And every one that makes never so little reflection on the Nature of Bodies must sensibly perceive their Corruptibility And yet there have been a multitude of Philosophers who believ'd the Heavens though Material were Incorruptible The Heavens are too remote from our Eyes to discover the Changes which happen in them and there seldom any great enough fall out to be seen upon Earth which has been sufficient warrant to a great many Persons to believe they were really incorruptible What has been a farther confirmation of their Opinion is their attributing to the Contrariety of Qualities the Corruption incident to Sublunary Bodies For having never been in the Heavens to see how things were carried on there they have had no Experience of that contrariety of Qualities being to be found therein which has induc'd them to believe there were actually no such thing And hence have concluded the Heavens were exempt from Corruption upon this Reason That what according to their Notion corrupts Sublunary Bodies is not to be found in the higher Regions of the World 'T is plain that this Arguing has nothing of solidity for we see no Reason why there may not be found some other Cause of Corruption besides that contrariety of Qualities which they imagine nor upon what grounds they can affirm There is neither Heat nor Cold neither Drought nor Moisture in the Heavens that the Sun is not hot nor Saturn cold There is some probability of Reason to say That very hard Stones and Glass and other Bodies of like Nature are not corrupted since we see they subsist a long time in the same Capacity and we are near enough to observe the Changes that should happen to them But while we are at such a Distance from the Heavens as we are it 's absolutely against all Reason to conclude they don't corrupt because we perceive no contrary Qualities in them nor can see them corrupting and yet they don 't only say they don't corrupt but that they are unchangeable and incorruptible And a little more the Peripateticks would maintain That Celestial Bodies were so many Divinities as their Master Aristotle did believe them The Beauty of the Universe consists not in the Incorruptibility of its parts but in the Variety that is found in them and this great Work of the World would have something wanting to its Admirable Perfection without that Vicissitude of things that is observ'd in it A Matter infinitely extended without Motion and consequently rude and without Form and without Corruption might perhaps manifest
Well-being depend in truth on GOD alone and not on Men and that real Greatness which shall make them everlastingly happy consists not in the Rank they bear in the imagination of others as impotent and miserable as themselves but in an humble Submission to the Will of GOD who being just will not fail to reward such as persevere in the Order he has prescrib'd them But Men not only desire actually to possess Science and Vertue Dignities and Riches but lay out their whole Endeavours that they may at least be thought really to possess them And if it may be said of them That they are more sollicitous to be Truly Rich than to be thought so we may say too they are less careful to be Truly Vertuous than to appear so for as was handsomly said by the Author of the Moral Reflexions Vertue would not go far unless Vanity bore her Company The Reputation of being Rich Learned Vertuous produces in the Imagination of those about us or that are of nearest Concernment to us very advantageous Dispositions on our behalf it lays them prostrate at our feet actuates them on our account and inspires them with all the Motions that tend to the preservation of our Being and the augmentation of our Greatness which makes Men careful to preserve their Reputation as a Good they have need of to live conveniently in the World All Men then have an Inclination for Vertue Science Honours and Riches and for the Reputation of possessing these Advantages We will now make it appear by some Instances how these Inclinations may engage us in Errour and will begin with the Inclination for Vertue or for the Appearance of it Those who seriously labour to become Vertuous employ most of their Thoughts and Time in the learning Religion and the exercise of Good Works They desire with St. Paul to know only CHRIST Crucify'd the Remedy of the Disease and Corruption of their Nature They wish for no more Light than is requisite to their living as becomes Christians and to discover their Duties And next they study only to grow fervent and punctual in Devotion and so trouble not themselves with those Sciences which seem barren and insignificant to their Salvation Which Conduct is not to be blam'd but highly esteem'd Happy should we think our selves exactly to have serv'd it as we repent the not having sufficiently persu'd it But what is reprovable is That there being undoubtedly Sciences purely Humane of greatest Certainty as well as Use which take off the Mind from sensible things and accustom or prepare it insensibly to relish the Truths of the Gospel Some pious Persons too liberally condemn them without Examination as either unprofitable or uncertain True it is that most of the Sciences are very uncertain and useless 'T is no Mistake to think they contain only very insignificant Truths No body 's oblig'd to study them and 't is better to despise them altogether than to be charm'd and dazl'd with them However we may affirm That the Knowledge of some Metaphysical Truths is most necessary The Knowledge of an Universal Cause or of the Existence of a GOD is of indispensible necessity since even the Certainty of Faith depends on the Knowledge which Reason affords of the Existence of a GOD We ought to know that 't is His Will that constitutes and governs Nature that the Strength and Power of Natural Causes is merely his Will in a word that all things depend on GOD all manner of ways Again 't is necessary to know what is Truth the means to distinguish it from Errour The Distinction betwixt Bodies and Spirits and the Consequences that may be drawn from it as the Immortality of the Soul and many others of like nature which may be infallibly known The Knowledge of Man or of one's Self is a Science that cannot reasonably be despis'd It is stor'd with infinite things absolutely necessary to be known in order to an Accuracy and Penetration of Mind And if it may be said that a gross and stupid Man is infinitely superiour to Matter because he knows that he exists which Matter does not know Those who are acquainted with the Nature of Man are certainly much above the Ignorant and Stupid because they know what they are which the others don't But the Science of Man does not only merit our Esteem because it exalts us above others but much more for abasing us and humbling us before GOD. This Science throughly acquaints us with the Dependence we have on him in all things even in our most customary Actions It manifestly discovers the Corruption of our Nature disposes us to have recourse to him who alone can cure us to fasten upon him to distrust our selves and quit our Self-adherencies and Engagements and furnishes us with several other very requisite Dispositions of Mind to fit us for the Grace of the Gospel Nor can a superficial Tincture and a general Knowledge at least of Mathematicks and Nature be dispens'd with Those Sciences should be learn'd when we are young as disengaging the Mind from things sensible and preventing its growing soft and effeminate they are very useful to the Conduct of Life and even bring us to GOD the Knowledge of Nature doing it directly of it self and that of Mathematicks collaterally by the Disgust it infuses for the false Impressions of the Senses The Vertuous and Religious would do well not to dis-esteem these Sciences nor look on them as uncertain or useless till they are certain they have study'd them so throughly that they can pass a sound Judgment on them There are others enough which they are at liberty to despise as peremptorily as they please They may sentence to the Flames the Heathen Poets and Philosophers the Rabbins with some Historians and a multitude of Authors on whose Stock many set up for Fame and Learning and we shall easily forgive them But let them not condemn the Knowledge of Nature as contrary to Religion since Nature being rul'd by the Will of GOD the True Knowledge of it gives us to understand and admire the Divine Power Greatness and Wisdom For last of all it is probable that GOD has form'd the Universe that Spirits might be employ'd in studying it and by that study be brought to know and reverence its Author So that those who condemn the study of Nature seem to be Opposers of the Will of GOD but that they would have it thought that since the Fall the Humane Mind is incapacitated for that study Nor let it be said that the Knowledge concerning Man puffs up the Mind and renders it vain and arrogant because those who are suppos'd to understand Humane Nature best though frequently they understand it very little are intolerably proud and presumptuous For 't is plain that no Man can be well acquainted with himself but he must be sensible of his Weakness and his Misery So then it is not true and solid Piety that so commonly condemns what it does not
see not GOD as we see and touch this Fruit nay we do not so much as think on him nor perhaps on our selves And so we judge not that GOD is the true Cause of that Sweetness nor that it is a Modification of our Soul but impute both the Cause and Effect to the Fruit we eat What I have said of Sensations relating to the Body may be understood of those which have no relation to it such are those which are incident to pure Intelligences A Spirit contemplates it self and finds nothing wanting to its Happiness or Perfection or else sees that it is not in possession of what it desires Upon the View of its Happiness it feels Joy upon the sight of its Misery it feels Sorrow It immediately imagines that 't is the sight of its Happiness which produces in it self this Sensation of Joy because this Sensation still accompanies this Perception and fancies likewise that the sight of its Misery is what produces in it the Sensation of Sorrow because the latter is a constant Attendant of the former The true Cause of these Sensations which is GOD alone does not appear to it nor does it it may be think on GOD. For GOD acts in us in an imperceptible manner GOD rewards us with a Sense of Joy when we find our selves in the state we ought to be in to the intent we may continue in it that our Anxiety may cease and that we may fully enjoy our Happiness without suffering the Capacity of our Mind to be taken up with any thing else But he produces in us a Sensation of Sorrow when we know we are not in our convenienâ— state to the end we may not stay in it but restlesly seek out for the Perfection which we want For GOD continually drives us towards Good when we know that we do not possess it but gives us a powerful Check when we see we are fully possess'd of it Wherefore 't is evident to me that the Sensations of Intellectual Joy and Sorrow no less than Sensible are not the voluntary Productions of the Mind Our Reason then should constantly teach us to discover that invisible Hand which fills us with Good and which lies disguis'd to our Mind under Sensible Appearâ—nces This Hand we are to adore and to love and also to fear since though it loads us with Pleasures it can likewise over-whelm us with Pains We ought to love it with a Love of Choice an enlightned Love a Love worthy of GOD and our selves Our Love is worthy of GOD when it proceeds from our Knowledge of his being Amiable and this Love is worthy of our selves for that being Reasonable Creatures we ought to bestow our Love on that which Reason teaches us is worthy of it But we love sensible Things with a Love unworthy our selves and undeserv'd by them whilst being reasonable we love them without any Reason for it as not clearly knowing them to be lovely and on the contrary knowing they are not But we are betray'd by Pleasure to the Love of them the blind and irregular Love of Pleasure being the true Cause of the false Judgments of Men in Subjects of Morality CHAP. XI Of the Love of Pleasure with Reference to Speculative Sciences I. How it disables us from discovering Truth II. Some Instances OUR Inclination for Sensible Pleasures being misgovern'd is not only the Original of those dangerous Errours we are guilty of in Subjects of Morality and the general Cause of the Corruption of our Manners but likewise one of the main Causes of the Depravation of our Reason And it insensibly engages us in most gross but less dangerous Errours in point of Subjects purely Speculative because it disables us from bringing a sufficient Attention to comprehend and judge well of things that do not affect us We have spoken several times already of the Difficulty we find to apply our selves to Subjects somewhat Abstract the Subject of our Discourse requiring it As towards the End of the First Book where we shew'd that Sensible Ideas more affecting the Soul than Ideas purely Intellectual she was more taken up with the out-side manners than the Things themselves So again in the Second where treating of the Tenderness of the Fibres of the Brain we shew'd whence the Softness of certain Effeminate Minds proceeded Lastly in the Third when speaking of the Attention of the Mind it was necessary to shew that it was very careless of things Speculative but very attentive to such as affected her and made her feel Pleasure or Pain Our Errours have most commonly several Causes contributing to their Rise so that it ought not to be thought it is for want of Order that we repeat almost the same things and assign several Causes of the same Errours it is really because they have so many I still speak of Occasional Causes for we have often declar'd they have no other true and real Cause than the wrong use of our Liberty which wrong use consists in our not using it so much as we might as we have explain'd at the beginning of this Treatise We are not therefore to be blam'd if in order to make it fully conceiv'd how for Instance the Sensible Manners Things are involv'd in surprize and lead us into Errour we were oblig'd by way of Anticipation to speak of our Inclination for Pleasures in the other Books which seems fitter to have been reserv'd for this wherein we purposely treat of the Natural Inclinations and the same may be said of other things in other places All the harm that will come of it is this that we may dispense with many things here which we had been oblig'd to explain if it had not been done elsewhere All things in the Humane Nature are so link'd and twin'd to one another that we find our selves often as it were over-whelm'd with the Number of things necessary to be said at the same time to set our Conceptions in an open and clear Light We are sometimes forc'd to let things go unseparated which Nature has join'd together and to proceed against our own prescrib'd Method when this Method throws us in Confusion as it inevitably does on some Occasions And yet after all it is impossible to make others take in all our Conceptions All that can commonly be pretended to is to put others in a Capacity of discovering with Pleasure and Ease what we have discover'd our selves with great Pains and Fatigation And since 't is impossible to make any Discovery without Attention our Studies should be chiefly employ'd on Means of making others Attentive This is what we have essay'd to do though we must acknowledge but weakly perform'd and we are the willinger to confess we have been defective that the Confession may provoke our Readers to supply themselves what is wanting in us to make them attentive in order to penetrate the Bottom of Subjects which deserve to be thorowly consider'd Infinite are the Errours wherein our Inclination for Pleasures and in general
Sin found Fruits pleasant to the sight and grateful to the Taste if we rightly consider the words of the Holy Scripture nor shall we come to think that the Oeconomy of the Senses and Passions which is so wonderfully contrived and adapted to the preservation of the Body is a Corruption of Nature instead of its Original Institution Doubtless Nature is at this present corrupted the Body acts too violently upon the Mind and whereas it ought only to make an humble Representation of its wants to the Soul it domineers over her takes her off from God to whom she ought to be inseparably united and continually applies her to the search of such sensible things as tend to its preservation She is grown as it were material and terestrial ever since her Fall the Essential Relation and Union that she had with God being broken that is to say God being withdrawn from her as much as he could be without her destruction and annihilation A thousand disorders have attended the absence or departure of him that preserv'd her in Order and without making a longer Enumeration of our Miseries I freely confess that Man since his Fall is corrupted in all his parts That Fall however has not quite destroyed the Work of God for we can still discover in Man what God at first put in him and his immutable Will that constitutes the Nature of every thing was not changed by the Inconstancy and Fickleness of the Will of Adam Whatever God has once will'd he still wills and because his Will is efficatious brings it to pass The Sin of Man was indeed the Occasion of that Divine Will that makes the Dispensation of Grace but Grace is not contrary to Nature neither do they destroy each other since God is not opposed to himself that he never repents and that his Wisdom being without Limits his Works will be without End And therefore the Will of God that constitutes the Dispensation of Grace is superadded to that which makes the Oeconomy of Nature in order to repair and not to change it There are then in God but these two general Wills and the Laws by which he governs the World depend on one or other of them It will plainly appear by what follows that the Passions are very well order'd if considered only in reference to the Preservation of the Body though they deceive us in some very rare and particular Occasions which the universal Cause did not think fit to remedy Thence I conclude That the Passions belong to the Order of Nature since they cannot be ranked under the Order of Grace 'T is true that seeing the Sin of the first man has deprived us of the Help of an always-present God and always ready to defend us It may be said That Sin is the Cause of our excessive adhesion to sensible things because Sin has estranged us from God by whom alone we can be rid of our Slavery But without insisting longer upon the Enquiry after the first Cause of the Passions let us examine their Extent their particular Nature their End their Use their Defects and whatever they comprehend CHAP. II. Of the Vnion of the Mind with sensible things or of the Force and Extent of the Passions in general IF all those who read this Work would be at the pains to reflect upon what they feel within themselves it would not be necessary to insist upon our Dependency upon all sensible Objects I can say upon this Head but what every one knows as well as I do if he will but think on it and was therefore very much inclined to pass it over But Experience having taught me That Men often forget themselves so far as not to think or be aware of what they feel nor to enquire into the Reason of what passes in their own Mind I thought it fit to propose some Considerations that may help them to reflect upon it And even I hope That those who know such things will not think their Reading ill bestowed for though we do not care to hear simply rehearsed what we very well know yet we use to be affected with Pleasure at the hearing of what we know and feel together The most honourable Sect of Philosophers of whose Opinions many Pretenders boast still now a-days will persuade us That it is in our power to be happy The Stoicks continually say We ought only to depend upon our selves we ought not to be vexed for the Loss of Dignities Estates Friends Relations we ought to be always calm and without the least Disturbance whatever happens Banishment Injuries Affronts Diseases and even Death are no Evils and ought not to be feared and a thousand Paradoxes of that Nature which we are apt enough to believe both because of our Pride that makes us affect Independency as that because Reason teaches us that most part of the Evils which really afflict us would not be able to disturb us if all things remained in good Order But God has given us a Body and by that Body united us to all sensible things Sin has subjected us to our Body and by our Body made us dependent upon all sensible things It is the Order of Nature it is the Will of the Creatour that all the Beings that he has made should hang together And therefore being united to all things and the Sin of the first Man having made us dependent on all Beings to which God had only united us there is now none but he is at once united and subjected to his Body and by his Body to his Relations Friends City Prince Country Cloaths House Estate Horse Dog to all the Earth to the Sun the Stars and the Heavens It 's then ridiculous to tell Men that it is in their power to be happy wise and free It is to jeer them seriously to advise them they ought not to be afflicted for the Loss of their Friends or Estates For as it were absurd to exhort Men not to feel Pain when they are beaten or not to be sensible of Pleasure when they eat with an Appetite so the Stoicks are either unreasonable or not in good earnest when they cry That we ought not to be sorry for the Death of our Father the Loss of our Goods our Banishment Imprisonment and the like nor to be glad of the happy Success of our Affairs since we are united to our Country Goods Friends c. by a Natural Union which at present has no dependence on our Will I grant that Reason teaches us we are to undergo Banishment without Sorrow but the same Reason likewise teaches us we ought to endure the cutting off our Arm without Pain because the Soul is superiour to the Body and that according to the light of Reason her happiness or misery ought not to depend upon it but 't is ridiculous to argue against Experience which in this occasion will convince us that things are not so as our Reason intimates they ought to be The Philosophy of
alteration of the Countenance of his Enemy the Animal Spirits of that Enemy receive a new determination of which they were not capable a moment before and this Machinal Motion of Compassion which he yields to inclines the Soul to yield to the Pleas of Charity and Mercy Because a Man taken up with a Passion cannot without a great plenty of Spirits produce or preserve in his Brain an Image of his Misery lively enough nor a Concussion sufficiently strong to give his Body an extraordinary and constrain'd Disposition the corresponding Nerves within the Body receive upon his sight of the Evil the Concussions and Agitations that are necessary to infuse into all the Vessels that communicate with the Heart fit Humours to the producing such Spirits as the Passion requires For the Animal Spirits spreading through the Nerves that go to the Liver Spleen Pancreas and all the other Viscera agitate and shake them and by their Agitation force out such Humours as those parts keep in reserve for the Wants and Exigencies of the Machine But if those Humours always flowed in the same manner into the Heart if they received an equal Fermentation in different times and the Spirits that are made of them regularly ascended into the Brain we should not see such hasty Changes in the Motions of the Passions For instance the sight of a Magistrate would not stop of a sudden the extravagant Transports of an enraged Person persuing his Revenge and his Face all fiery with Blood and Spirits would not in an instant turn pale and wan for fear of Punishment So to hinder those Humours that are mixed with the Blood from entering the Heart constantly in the same manner there are Nerves that surround all the Avenues thereof which being compressed or dilated by the Impression that the sight of the Object and the strength of the Imagination produce in the Spirits shut up or open the way to those Humours And lest the said Humours should undergo the same Agitation and Fermentation in the Heart in divers times there are other Nerves that cause the Beatings of it which being not equally agitated in the different Motions of the Spirits drive not the Blood with the same force into the Arteries Other Nerves spread through the Lungs distribute the Air to the Heart by constringing or relaxing several Branches of the Trachea used in Respiration and order the Fermentation of the Blood proportionably to the Circumstances of the predominant Passion Last of all to regulate with the greatest Accuracy and Readiness the Course of the Spirits there are Nerves surrounding the Arteries as well those that end in the Brain as those that carry the Blood into the other parts of the Body so that the Concussion of the Brain which accompanies the unexpected Sight of some Circumstance for which 't is convenient that the Motions of the Passion should be alter'd suddenly determines the Course of the Spirits to the Nerves thus surrounding the Arteries that by their Contraction they may shut up the Passage to the Blood that ascends into the Brain and by their Dilatation lay it open to that which runs into all the other Parts of the Body When those Arteries that carry the Blood to the Brain are free and open and on the contrary those that disperse it through the rest of the Body are strongly bound up by these Nerves the Head must all be full of Blood and the Face appear all fiery but some Circumstance altering the Commotion of the Brain that caused that Disposition in the Nerves the Arteries that were strait bound are loosened and on the contrary the Arteries of the Brain strongly contracted Then is the Head emptied of Bloud the Face covered with Paleness and the small quantity of Blood which issues from the Heart and which the Nerves before mentioned admit into it as the Fewel to keep in Life descends most or all into the lower parts of the Body the Brain wants Animal Spirits and all the rest of the Body is seized with Weakness and Trembling To explain and prove the Particulars of what we have mentioned it would be necessary to give a general Knowledge of Physicks and a particular of the Humane Body but those two Sciences are still too imperfect to be treated of with as much Accuracy as I could Wish besides that should I proceed farther in this Matter it would carry me too far from my Subject and therefore I only design here to give a gross and general Idea of the Passions and am satisfied provided that this Idea be not false Those Concussions of the Brain and Motions of the Blood and Spirits are the fourth thing to be found in every Passion and produce the fifth namely the sensible Commotions of the Soul At the very Instant that the Animal Sprits are driven from the Brain into the rest of the Body to produce such Motions as are fit to keep up the Passion the Soul is carried towards the good perceived and this more or less strongly according as the Spirits come down from the Brain with more or less vehemence for 't is that Concussion of the Brain which agitates the Soul and the Animal Spirits The Motion of the Soul towards Good is so much stronger as the View of Good is more sensible and apparent and the Motion of the Spirits that proceed from the Brain and flow into the other parts of the Body is the more violent as the Vibration of the Fibres of the Brain caused by the Impression of the Object or of the Imagination is more forcible because that Concussion of the Brain occasioning a more sensible and lively View of Good necessarily makes the Commotion of the Soul in the Passions to increase proportionably to the Motion of the Spirits Those Commotions of the Soul are not different from those that immediately follow the Intellectual View of Good which we have mentioned before only they are stronger and livelyer because of the Union of the Soul and Body and the sensibleness of the View that produces them The sixth thing to be met with is the Sensation of the Passion the Sensation of Love Hatred Desire Joy or Sorrow This Sensation is not at all different from that which has been spoken of only 't is livelyer because the Body has a greater share in it but 't is always attended with confused Sensation of Satisfaction that makes all the Passions grateful which is the last thing to be found in each of them as has been already hinted The Cause of this last Sensation is such At the sight of the Object of a Passion or of any new Circumstance part of the Animal Spirits are driven from the Head to the outward Parts of the Body to put it in the Disposition that the Passion requires together with which some other Spirits make a violent descent into the Heart Lungs and other Viscera to draw from thence the necessary Supplies as has been already sufficiently explained Now the Body is never in
is not strange that our Sensations should agitate us and quicken our love for sensible things whereas our Light dissipates and vanishes without producing any zeal and ardency for Truth 'T is true that several Men are persuaded that God is their real Good love him as their All and earnestly desire to strengthen and increase their Union with him But few evidently know that by meditating on the Truth we unite our selves to God as far as natural strength can attain that it is a sort of Enjoyment of him to contemplate the true Ideas of things and that that abstracted view of some general and immutable Truths on which all the particulars depend are flights of a Mind that sequesters it self from the Body to unite it self to God Metaphysicks speculative Mathematicks and all those universal Sciences which regulate and contain the particular as the Universal Being comprehends all particular Beings seem to be Chimerical to most Men as well to the pious as to those that do not love God So that I dare hardly make bold to say that the study of those Sciences is the most pure and perfect Application to God that the Mind may be naturally capable of and that it is by the sight of the Intellectual World which is their Object that God has produced and still knows this sensible World from which Bodies receive their Life as Spirits live from the other Those that purely follow the Impressions of their Senses and motions of their Passions are not capable of relishing the Truth because it flatters them not And even the Vertuous who constantly oppose their Passions when they proffer them false Goods do not always resist them when they conceal from them the Truth and make it despicable because one may be pious without being a Man of parts To please God we need not exactly know that our Senses Imagination and Passions always represent things otherwise than they are since it appears not that our Lord and his Apostles ever intended to undeceive us of several Errours upon this matter which Descartes has discover'd to us There is a great difference betwixt Faith and Understanding the Gospel and Philosophy the greatest Clowns are capable of Faith but few can attain to the pure Knowledge of Evident Truth Faith represents to vulgar Men God as the Creator of Heaven and Earth which is a sufficient motive of Love and Duty towards him whereas Reason knowing that God was God before he was Creator not only considers him in his Works but also endeavours to contemplate him in himself or in that immense Idea of the infinitely perfect Being which is included in him The Son of God who is the Wisdom of his Father or the Eternal Truth made himself Man and became sensible that he might be known by Men of Flesh and Blood by gross material Men that he might instruct them by that which was the Cause of their Blindness and draw them to the love of him and disengage them from sensible goods by the same things that had enslav'd them for having to doe with Fools he thought fit to take upon him a sort of Folly whereby to make them wise So that the most pious Men and truest Believers have not always the greatest Understanding They may know God by Faith and love him by the help of his Grace without understanding that he is their All in the sense Philosophers understand him and without thinking that the abstracted Knowledge of Truth is a sort of a Union with him We ought not therefore to be surprized if so few Persons labour to strengthen their natural Union with God by the Knowledge of Truth since to this there is required a continual opposition of the Impressions of the Senses and Passions in a very different way from that which is usual with the Vertuous who are not always persuaded that the Senses and Passions abuse them in the manner that has been explain'd in the foregoing Books The Sensations and Thoughts in which the Body has a share are the sole and immediate Cause of the Passions as proceeding from the Concussion of the Fibres of the Brain raising some particular Commotion in the Animal Spirits And therefore Sensations are the only sensible proofs of our dependence on some things which they excite us to love but we feel not our Natural Union with God when we know the Truth and do not so much as think upon him because he is and operates in us so privately and insensibly as to be imperceptible to our selves And this is the Reason that our natural Union with God raises not our Love for him But it goes quite otherwise with our Union to sensible things All our Sensations prove it and Bodies appear before our Eyes when they act in us Their Action is visible and manifest Our Body is even more present to us than our Mind and we consider the former as the best part of our Selves So that our Union to our Body and by it to sensible Objects excites in us a violent Love which increases that Union and makes us depend on things that are infinitely below us CHAP. VI. Of the more general Errours of the Passions with some particular Instances 'T IS the part of Moral Philosophy to discover the particular Errours concerning Good in which our Passions engage us to oppose irregular affections to restore the Integrity of the Heart and to rule the Course of our Life But here we chiefly aim at giving Rules to the Mind and finding out the Causes of our Errours in reference to Truth so that we shall not proceed farther in those Matters that relate to the Love of true Good We are tending to the Instruction of the Mind and only take the Heart in the way in as much as the Heart is its Master We search into Truth it self without a special Respect to our selves and we consider its Relation with us only because that Relation is the Spring of Self-love's disguising and concealing it from us for we judge of all things by our Passions whence it is that we mistake in all things the Judgments of Passions never agreeing with the Judgments of Truth 'T is what we learn in these excellent Words of St. Bernard Neither Love nor Hatred know how to make a Judgment according to Truth Will you hear a true Judgment As I hear I judge says our Lord he says not as I hate as I love or as I fear Here you have a Judgment of Hatred We have a Law say the Jews and by that Law he ought to die Here a Judgment of Fear If we let him alone say the Pharisees the Romans shall come and take away our Place and Nation Here another of Love as that of David speaking of his Parricide Son Spare the young Man Absalom Our Love Hatred and Fear cause us to make false Judgments only Nothing but the pure Light of Truth can illuminate our Mind nothing but the distinct Voice of our common Master can cause us to make
be touched they are violently moved On the contrary the mentioning of general Passions and Inclinations never fail to affect us but so weakly and faintly that we are scarce sensible of it I mention this lest any should judge of what I say by his own Commotions that he either has or shall receive from my Discourse but rather that he should judge of it by considering the Nature of the Passions I speak of Should we purpose to handle all the particular Passions and distinguish them by the Objects that raise them it is plain the Task would be endless and we should only repeat the same thing The former because the Objects of the Passions are infinite the latter because we should be constantly engag'd in the same Subject The particular Passions for Poetry History Mathematicks Hunting Dancing are but one general Passion For for example the Passions of Desire or Joy for whatever pleases are not different Passions though delightful Objects in particular differ much And therefore the Number of Passions must not be multiplied by the Number of Objects which are infinite but only by the principal Relations they may have to us And so it will appear as we shall explain it hereafter that Love and Hatred are the Mother-Passions which produce no other general Passions besides Desire Joy and Sorrow that the particular Passions are made up only of those Three primitive and more or less compounded according to the number of accessary Ideas that attend the principal Idea of the Good or Evil which has rais'd them or as the Good and Evil are more or less circumstantiated with reference to us If we remember what has been said of the Connection of Ideas and that in all great Passions the Animal Spirits being extreamly agitated stir up in the Brain all the Traces any ways related to the moving Object we shall own that there is an infinite Variety of different Passions which have no particular Names and cannot be explain'd but by saying they are inexplicable If the primitive Passions of the Complication of which others are made up were not susceptible of more or less it would not be difficult to determine the Number of all the Passions but that number of complicated Passions must needs be infinite because one and the same Passion having infinite Degrees may by its Conjunction with others be infinitely complicated so that there were perhaps never two Men affected with the same Passion if by that Name be understood an even Mixture and Likeness of all the Motions and Sensations that are occasionally rais'd in us upon the presence of some Object But as more or less do not alter the Species so it may be said that the Number of Passions is not infinite because the Circumstances that attend Good or Evil which excite the Passions are not innumerable But let us explain our Passions in particular When we see any thing the first time or when having seen it several times accompanied with some Circumstances we see it again attended with others we are surprized and admire it Thus a new Idea or a new Connection of old Ideas raises in us an Imperfect Passion which is the first of all and nam'd Admiration I call it imperfect because 't is not excited either by the Idea or Sense of Good The Brain being then struck in some unusual Places or in a new manner the Soul is sensibly moved and therefore must needs strongly apply her self to what is new in that Object for the same Reason that a bare Tickling the Soale of the Feet raises a very lively and moving Sensation in the Soul rather by the Novelty than by the Strength of the Impression There are other Reasons of the Application of the Soul to new Things but I have explain'd them where I speak of the Natural Inclinations Here we consider the Soul only as related to the Body in which respect the Commotion of the Spirits is the natural Cause of her Application to new Things In Admiration strictly taken we consider things only as they are in themselves or as they appear and look not on them as related to us or as good or bad Hence it comes that the Spirits disperse not through the Muscles to give the Body the Disposition that is required for persuing Good or shunning Evil and shake not the Nerves that go to the Heart and other Viscera to hasten or retard the Fermentation or Motion of the Blood as it happens in other Passions All the Spirits go the Brain to print a lively and distinct Image of the surprizing Object that the Soul may consider and know it again whilst the rest of the Body remains in the same posture and as unmovable For as there is no Commotion in the Soul so there is no Motion in the Body When the admired Things appear great Admiration is always follow'd with Esteem and sometimes with Veneration whereas it is always accompanied with Contempt and sometimes with Disdain when they appear little The Idea of Grandeur causes a great Motion of the Spirits in the Brain and the Tracks that represent it are kept very long And likewise a great Motion of the Spirits raises in the Soul an Idea of Greatness and powerfully fixes the Mind on the Consideration of that Idea On the contrary the Idea of Littleness produces but an inconsiderable Motion of Spirits in the Brain and the Traces representing it are soon blotted out And likewise a small Motion of Spirits raises in the Soul an Idea of Meanness and stays the Mind but little on the Consideration of that Idea Those things deserve to be taken notice of When we consider our selves or something united to us our Admiration is always accompanied with some moving Passion which however only agitates the Soul and the Spirits that go to the Heart because there being no Good to seek nor Evil to avoid the Spirits disperse not themselves through the Muscles to dispose the Body to some Action The Contemplation of the Perfection of our Being or of something belonging to it naturally produces Pride or Self-esteem Contempt of others Joy and some other Passions The Contemplation of our own Grandeur causes Haughtiness that of our Strength Valour or Boldness and that of any other Advantage naturally raises some other Passion which is still a kind of Pride On the contrary the Conâ—ideration of some Imperfection of our Being or of something belonging to it naturally produces Humility Contempt of our selves Reverence for others Sorrow and some other Passions The â—ight of our Littleness causes Pusilanimity that of our Weakness Timidity and that of any Disadvantage whatsoever naturally raises some other Passion which is still a kind of Humility But neither that Humility nor that Pride are properly Vertues or Vices being only Passions or involuntary Commotions which yet are very useful to Civil Society and even in some Cases absolutely necessary for the preservation of the Life or Goods of those that are actuated by them 'T is necessary
Tediousness Regret Pity Indignation are so many kinds of Sorrow caused by the Consideration of something displeasing But besides those Passions and several others I pass by which particularly relate to some of the Primitive Passions there are yet many others whose Commotion is almost equally compounded either of Desire and Joy as Impudence Anger and Revenge or of Desire and Sorrow as Shame Regret and Vexation or of all Three together when Motives of Joy and Sorrow meet And though these last Passions have no particular Names that I know of they are however the most common because in this Life we scarce ever enjoy any Good without a Mixture of Evil nor suffer any Evil without Hopes of being freed of it and enjoying Good And though Joy be altogether contrary to Sorrow yet it allows of its Company and even admits it an equal Sharer in the Capacity of the Soul as Volent when the Sight of Good and Evil divide its Capacity as Intelligent All the Passions therefore are Species of Desire Joy and Sorrow and the chief difference betwixt those of the same sort must be taken from the different Perceptions or Judgments that cause or accompany them So that to become learned in the Nature of Passions and to make of them the most accurate Enumeration possible it is requisite to enquire into the different Judgments that may be made of Good and Evil. But as we especially intend to find out the Cause of our Errours we need not so much to insist upon the Judgments that precede or cause the Passions as upon those that follow them and which the Soul makes of Things when she is agitated by some Passion because those last Judgments are the most liable to Errour Such Judgments as precede and cause the Passions are almost ever false in something because they are for the most part grounded upon such Perceptions of the Soul as consider Objects in relation to her and not as they are in themselves But the Judgments that follow the Passions are false all manner of ways because such Judgments being only made by the Passions are only grounded upon the Perceptions the Soul has of Objects as relating to her or rather to her own Commotion In the Judgments that precede the Passions Truth and Falshood are join'd together but when the Soul is agitated and judges by every Inspiration of the Passion Truth vanishes and Falshood remains to be the Principle of so many more false Conclusions as the Passion is greater All Passions justifie themselves continually offering to the Soul the moving Object in the fittest way for preserving and increasing her Commotion The Judgment or the Perception that causes it gets still new Forces from the Increase of the Passion and the Passion likewise augments proportionably as the Judgment that produces it in its turn is strengthen'd Thus false Judgments and Passions join in Confederacy for their mutual Preservation And should the Heart never cease sending up Spirits for keeping open the Tracks of the Brain and supplying the Expences which that violent Sensation or Commotion make of the same Spirits Passions would perpetually increase and never allow us to be sensible of our Errours But as all our Passions depend on the Fermentation and Circulation of the Blood and that the Heart can never furnish as many Spirits as are necessary for their Preservation they must needs expire when the Spirits diminish and the Blood grows cool again Though it be an easie matter to discover the ordinary Judgments of Passions yet 't is not a thing to be neglected there being few Subjects that deserve more the Application of an Enquirer after Truth who endeavours to free himself from the Dominion of the Body and will judge of every thing by true Ideas We may instruct our selves in this Matter two ways either by pure Reason or by our inward Consciousness when we are agitated by some Passion For Instance Experience teaches us That we are apt to judge of those we love not to their Disadvantage and to spit all the Venom of our Hatred at the Object of our Passion We also know by Reason that as we cannot hate but what is Evil so 't is necessary for the preservation of Hatred that the Mind should represent to it self the worst part of its Object For 't is sufficient to suppose that all Passions justifie themselves and give such a Disposition first to the Imagination then to the Mind as is fit to preserve their own Commotion directly to conclude what are the Judgments which all the Passions cause us to make Those that are endued with a strong and lively Imagination that are extremely sensible and much subject to the Motions of Passions may perfectly inform themselves of those things by their own inward sense and it often comes to pass that they speak of them in a more pleasing and instructing manner than others whose Reason over-tops their Imagination yet it follows not that those that discover best the Springs of Self-love that penetrate farthest into Man's Heart and more sensibly discover its Recesses are always the greatest Understandings This only proves that they are livelier quicker of Imagination and sometimes more malicious than others But those that without consulting their inward Sense make use only of their Reason to enquire into the Nature and Effects of Passions though they be not always so quick-sighted as others are always more rational and less obnoxious to Errour because they judge of things as they are in themselves They see very near what Men posseâ—t with Passions can doe as they suppose them more or less agitated but do not rashly judge of the Actions of others by what they would doe themselves in such Occasions for they well know that Men are not equally sensible to the same things nor alike susceptible of involuntary Commotions and therefore 't is not by consulting our Sensations which the Passions create in us but by listening to Reason that we must treat of the Judgments that accompany them lest we should draw our own Picture instead of discovering the Nature of Passions in general CHAP. XI That all the Passions justifie themselves What Judgments they cause us to make in their Vindication WE need no long deduction of Arguments to demonstrate That all Passions justifie themselves That Principle is sufficiently evident both by our internal Consciousness of our selves and the Behaviour of those we see agitated by them and therefore we need only barely propound it to consider it as we should do The Mind is such a Slave to the Imagination that it always obeys when the Imagination is over-heated and dares not answer when the same is incensed because it meets with Abuses when it resists and is always rewarded with some Pleasure when it humours that imperious Faculty Even those whose unruly Imagination persuades them they are transmuted into Beasts find out Reasons to prove they must live as Beasts do walk Four-footed eat Grass and imitate every Action that is purely
engages us to apply our selves to Subjects that are very disgusting First because that Passion is very dangerous to the Conscience Secondly because it insensibly draws us into ill Studies that have more Lustre than Use or Truth in them and Lastly because it is very difficult to moderate it and that we often become its Fool and Property and instead of enlightning the Mind we only strengthen the Concupiscence of Pride which both corrupts our Moral Powers and darkens our Understanding with an undissolvable Obscurity For it must be consider'd how That Passion insensibly increases settles and fortifies it self in the Heart of Man and when it is too violent instead of helping the Mind in the Search of Truth it strangely blinds it and even persuades it that Things are just as it desires they should be Sure it is there would not be so many false Inventions nor imaginary Discoveries were not Men's Heads giddy'd by the ardent Desire of appearing Inventors For the firm and obstinate Persuasion wherein several Persons have been to have found for Instance the Perpetual Motion the Quadrature of the Circle the Duplication of the Cube by ordinary Geometry in all likelihood proceeded from an extraordinary Desire of seeming to have perform'd what others have vainly attempted And therefore 't is fitter to excite in us such Passions as are so much more useful to our searching out of Truth as they are more strong and wherein the Excess is not to be fear'd Such are the Desires of making a good Use of our Mind of freeing our selves from Prejudices and Errours of getting a sufficient Light to behave our selves in our Condition and such others as neither engage us into fruitless Studies nor carry us on to rash and inconsiderate Judgments When we have begun to taste the pleasure of making use of our Mind to be sensible of the Profit that arises from it have freed our selves of violent Passions and have disrelish'd sensible Pleasures which always prove the Masters of or rather the Tyrants over Reason in those that indiscreetly give up themselves to them we need not other Passions but such as we have spoken of to become attentive upon the Subjects on which we desire to meditate But most Men are not in that Condition they have neither Taste nor Understanding nor Curiosity for any thing but what affects the Senses their Imagination is corrupted by an almost infinite Number of deep Traces which raise none but false Ideas and as they depend upon all the Objects that resort to the Senses and Imagination so they always judge by the Impression they receive from them that is with reference to themselves Pride Debauchery the various Engagements the restless Desires of Advancement which are so common amongst the Men of the World darken the Sight of Truth and stifle in them the Sense of Piety because they separate them from God who alone is able to enlighten as he alone is able to govern us For we cannot increase our Union with sensible Things without diminishing that which we have with intellectual Truth since we cannot be at the same time strictly united with Things so different and opposite Those whose Imagination is pure and chaste that is whose Brain is not fill'd up with deep Traces that fasten them to visible Things may easily unite themselves to God listen attentively to the Truth that speaks to them and even forbear the Use of the most just and rational Passions But as to those that live amongst the Great who depend upon too many things and whose Imagination is soil'd by the false and obscure Ideas of sensible Objects they cannot apply themselves to the Truth unless they be born up by some Passion strong enough to countervail the Weight of the Body that carries them down and to imprint Traces on their Brain that may make a Revulsion upon the Animal Spirits However as every Passion can only by it self perplex our Ideas they ought to use that Help but so far as Necessity requires and all Men ought to study themselves that they may proportionate their Passions to their Weakness It is no hard matter to find a Method of raising in us such Passions as we desire since the Knowledge we have given in the foregoing Books of the Union betwixt Soul and Body has sufficiently open'd the way to it In a word no more is requir'd than to think attentively upon those Objects that by the Institution of Nature are able to raise the Passions Thus we may almost at any time excite in our Hearts whatever Passion we have occasion for but because we can easier excite them at any time than suppress them or remedy the Disorders they cause in the Imagination we must be very sober and cautious in employing them Above all we must take care not to judge of Things by Passion but only by the clear Sight of the Truth which is almost impossible when the Passions are somewhat lively they ought only to raise our Attention but they never fail of stirring up their proper Ideas and violently driving the Will to judge of Things by those Ideas that affect it rather than by the pure and abstracted Ideas of Truth that make no Impression upon it So that we often make Judgments which last no longer than the Passion because they are not produced by the clear Sight of the immutable Truth but by the Circulation of the Blood True it is that Men are wonderfully obstinate in some Errours which they maintain as long as they live but then those Errours have other Causes than the Passions or at least depend on such as are permanent and lasting proceeding from the Constitution of the Body from Interest or from some other durable Cause For Instance Interest being a Motive of a continual standing produces a Passion that never dies and the Judgments that arise from it are very long liv'd But all the other Sentiments of Men which depend upon particular Passions are as inconstant as the Fermentation of their Humours They say one while this another while that and yet what they say is commonly conformable to what they think And as they run from one counterfeit Good to another by the Motion of their Passion and are disgusted at it when that Motion ceases so they run from one false System into another and ardently assert a false Opinion when Passion makes it probable which the Passion ebbing they afterwards forsake By their Passions they taste of every Good without finding any really so and by the same Passions see all Truths without discovering any thing absolutely true though in the time of their Passion what they taste seems to them the Sovereign God and what they see an undeniable Truth The Senses are the second Spring whence we can draw Succours to make the Mind attentive Sensations are the very Modifications of the Soul and differ from the pure Ideas of the Mind the former raising a much stronger Attention than the latter So that 't is plain that
Water that feels warm to the Hands will seem cold if we wash with it any Part near the Heart Salt that is savoury to the Tongue is pricking and smarting to a Wound Sugar is sweet and Aloes very bitter to the Tongue but nothing is either sweet or bitter to the other Senses So that when we say a Thing is cold sweet bitter c. that same has no certain Signification Secondly Because different Objects can cause the same Sensation Plaister Bread Snow Sugar Salt c. are of the same Colour and yet their Whiteness is different if we judge of 'em otherwise than by the Senses And therefore when we say that Meal is white we say not any thing distinctly significative The third Reason is Because such Qualities of Bodies as occasion Sensations altogether different are however almost the same whereas such as excite very near the same Sensation are often very different The Qualities of Sweetness and Bitterness differ but little in Objects whereas the Sense of Sweet essentially differs from that of Bitter The Motions that cause Smart and Tickling differ but in more or less and yet the Sensations of Tickling and Smart are essentially different On the contrary the Sharpness of Fruit differs not so much from Bitterness as Sweetness does however that sharp Quality is the farthest from Bitterness that possibly can be For a Fruit that is sharp for being unripe must undergo a great many Changes before it grows bitter from Rottenness or too much Ripeness When Fruits are ripe they taste sweet and bitter when over-ripe Bitterness and Sweetness therefore in Fruits differ but in degree of more and less which may be the Reason why they seem sweet to some Persons whilst they taste bitter to others Nay there are those to whom Aloes seem as sweet as Honey The same may be said of all sensible Ideas so that the Words Sweet Bitter Salt Sowre Acid c. Red Green Yellow c. of such and such a Smell Savour Colour c. are all equivocal and raise no clear and distinct Idea in the Mind However School-Philosophers and the vulgar part of Men judge of all the sensible Qualities of Bodies by the Sensations they receive from them Nor do the Philosophers only judge of these sensible Qualities by their own Sensations of them but also judge of the Things themselves from the Judgments they have pass'd about sensible Qualities For from their having had Sensations of certain Qualities essentially different they judge that there is a Generation of new Forms producing those fantastick Differences Wheat appears yellow hard c. Meal white soft c. Thence upon the Testimony of their Eyes and Hands they infer That those Bodies are essentially different unless they chance to think on the Manner of the Transmutation of Wheat into Flower For Meal is nothing but bruised and ground Corn as Fire is only divided and agitated Wood as Ashes are but the grossest Parts of the divided Wood without Agitation as Glass is but Ashes whose Particles have been polished and rounded by the Attrition caus'd by the Fire And so in other Transmutations of Bodies 'T is therefore evident that sensible Words and Ideas are altogether unserviceable to a just stating and clear resolving of Questions that is to the Discovery of Truth Yet there are no Questions how intricate soever they may be by the equivocal Terms of the Senses but Aristotle and most part of other Philosophers pretend to resolve them in their Books without the foregoing Distinctions and without considering that they are equivocal by Errour and Ignorance If for example those Persons who have employed the best part of their Life in reading Ancient Philosophers and Physicians and have wholly imbib'd their Spirit and Opinions are ask'd whether Water be wet whether Fire be dry Wine hot the Blood of Fishes cold Water rawer than Wine Gold perfecter than Mercury whether Plants and Beasts have Souls and a thousand like undetermin'd Questions they rashly answer by consulting only the Impressions of Objects upon their Senses or the Tracks the reading of Authors has left upon their Memory They never think those Terms are equivocal 't is a Wonder to them they should need a Definition and they cannot endure those that endeavour to let 'em understand that their Procedure is too quick and that they are seduced by their Senses and though they are never at a loss for Distinctions to perplex the most evident Things yet in these Questions in which Equivocation needs so much to be removed they find nothing to distinguish If we consider that most of the Questions of Philosophers and Physicians contain some equivocal Terms like to those that have been spoken of we shall not doubt but that those Learned Gentlemen that could not define them were unable to say any Thing solid and real in the bulky Volumes they have compos'd Which is in a manner sufficient to overthrow most of the Opinions of the Ancients It is not so with Des Cartes he perfectly knew how to distinguish those Things He ne'er resolves any Question by sensible Ideas and whoever shall be at the pains to read him shall see that he clearly evidently and almost ever demonstratively explains the chief Operations of Nature by the sole and distinct Ideas of Extension Figures and Motion The second sort of equivocal Words that is much in request amongst Philosophers contains all those general Terms of Logick by which any Thing may be easily explain'd without so much as knowing it Aristotle was the Man that made the most of it his Books are full of nothing else and some are but a mere Logick He proposes and resolves all Things by the specious Words of Genus Species Act Power Nature Form Faculty Quality Causa per se Causa per accidens His Followers can hardly understand that those Words signifie Nothing and that one is not more learned than he was when he has heard that Fire dissolves Metals by its dissolving Faculty that a Man digests not because his Stomach is weak or because his Concoctive Faculty does not operate as it should do I grant that those who use such general Terms and Ideas for the Explication of all Things commonly fall not into so many Errours as those that only employ such Words as raise the confused Ideas of the Senses The School-Philosophers are not so liable to be deceived as some opinionative and dogmatical Physicians who build Systems upon Experiments the Reasons of which are unknown to them because the School-men talk so generally that they do not venture much out of their Depth Fire heats dries hardens and softens because it has the Faculty of producing those Effects Sena purges by its purgative Quality Bread nourishes by its nutritious Quality These Propositions are not liable to mistake for a Quality is that which denominates a Thing by such a Name Master Aristotle's Definition is undeniable But he speaks true only because he says nothing and if his rambling
indeed whenever we will it and we may be call'd in that sense the natural cause of the Motion of our Arm yet natural Causes are not true but only occasional as acting by the mere force and efficacy of the Will of God as we have already explain'd For how is it possible for us to move our Arm To perform this 't is requir'd we should have Animal Spirits and send them through certain Nerves towards certain Muscles to swell up and contract them for so that Motion is perform'd as some pretend though others deny it and assert that the Mystery is not yet discover'd However it be most Men know not so much as that they have Spirits Nerves and Muscles and yet move their Arms with as much and more dexterity than the most skilful Anatomists Men therefore will the moving their Arm but 't is God that is able and knows how to doe it If a Man cannot overthrow a Tower yet he knows what must be done to effect it but not one amongst them knows what the Animal Spirits must doe to move one of his Fingers How should they then move the whole Arm of themselves These things appear very evident to me and I suppose to all thinking Persons though they may be incomprehensible to others such as are only used to the confused voice of the Senses But Men are so far from being the true Causes of the Motions produc'd in their Body that it seems to imply a Contradiction they should be so For a true Cause is that betwixt which and its Effect the Mind percieves a necessary connexion for so I understand it But there is none besides the infinitely perfect Being betwixt whose Will and the Effects the Mind can perceive a necessary Connexion and therefore none but God is the true Cause or has a real Power of moving Bodies Nay it seems unconceivable that God should communicate this Power either to Angels or Men And those that pretend that the Power we have of moving our Arm is a true Power must by Consequence grant that God can give Spirits the Power of creating annihilating and doing all possible things in short that he can make them Almighty as I am going to pove God needs not Instruments to act 't is enough he should Will the Existence of a thing in order to its Existing because it is contradictory that he should will a thing and his Will should not be fulfilled And therefore his Power is his Will and to communicate his Power is to communicate his Will so that to communicate his Will to a Man or an Angel can signifie nothing else but to will that whenever that Man or Angel shall desire that such or such a Body be moved it may actually be moved In which Case I see two Wills concurring together that of God and that of the Angel and to know which of them is the true Cause of the Motion of that Body I enquire which is the Efficacious I see a necessary Connexion betwixt the Will of God and the thing willed in this Case God wills that whenever the Angel shall desire that such a Body be moved it be really so There is then a necessary Connexion betwixt the Will of God and the Motion of that Body and consequently God is the true Cause of that Motion and the Will of the Angel is only occasional Again to make it more evidently manifest let us suppose God wills it should happen quite contrary to the Desire of some Spirits as may be thought of the Devils or some other wicked Spirits in Punishment of their Sins In that Case it cannot be said God communicates his Power to them since nothing happens of what they wish However the Will of those Spirits shall be the natural Cause of the produced Effects as such a Body shall be removed to the Right because they wish it were moved to the Left and the Desires of those Spirits shall determine the Will of God to act as the Will of moving the Parts of our Body determine the first Cause to move them and therefore the Desires of all finite Spirits are but occasional Causes If after all these Reasons it be still asserted that the Will of an Angel moving a Body is a true and not a bare occasional Cause 't is evident that the self-same Angel might be the true Cause of the Creation and Annihilation of all things since God might as well communicate to him his Power of Creating and annihilating Bodies as that of moving them if He should will that they should be created and annihilated in a word if he will'd that all things should be performed according to the Angel's Desires as he wills that Bodies be moved as the Angel pleases if therefore it may be said that an Angel or Man are true Movers because God moves Bodies as they desire that Man or Angel might likewise be call'd true Creatours since God might create Beings on occasion of their Will Nay perhaps it might be said that the vilest of Animals or even mere Matter is the real Cause of the Creation of some Substance if it be supposed with some Philosophers that God produces substantial Forms whenever the Disposition of Matter requires it And lastly since God has resolved from all Eternity to create some certain things at some certain times those Times might also be called the Causes of the Creation of such Beings with as much right as 't is pretended that a Ball meeting with another is the true Cause of the Motion that is communicated to it because God by his general Will that constitutes the Order of Nature has decreed that such or such Communication of Motions should follow upon the Concourse of two Bodies There is then but one true Cause as there is one true God Neither must we imagine that what precedes an Effect does really produce it God himself cannot communicate his Power to Creatures according to the Light of Reason He cannot make them true Causes and change them into Gods But though he might doe it we conceive not why he should will it Bodies Spirits pure Intelligences all can doe nothing 'T is he who has made Spirits that enlightens and moves them 't is he who has created Heaven and Earth that regulates all their Motions In fine 't is the Authour of our Being that performs our Desires Semel jussit semper paret He moves even our Arms when we use them against his Orders for he complains by his Prophets That we make him subservient to our unjust and criminal Desires All those little Divinities of the Heathens all those particular Causes of Philosophers are Chimeras which the wicked Spirit endeavours to set up that he may destroy the Worship of the true God The Philosophy we have received from Adam teaches us no such things but that which has been propagated by the Serpent for ever since the Fall the Mind of Man is turned Heathen That Philosophy join'd to the Errours of the Senses has made
as their Motion will allow It must not seem strange that I now say that Metals have less force to continue their direct Motion than Earth Water and other less solid Bodies though I have formerly said that the most solid Bodies have more strengh than others to continue their direct Motion For the Reason why Metals are not so apt to continue to move as Earth and Stones is that Metals have less Motion in themselves it being true however that of two Bodies unequal in solidity but moved with an equal swiftness that the most solid will have more force to pursue its Motion in a right Line because the most solid has then the greater Motion and that Motion is the Cause of strength But if we would understand the Reason why Bodies gross and solid are heavy towards the Center of Vortexes but light at a considerable distance from it we must know that these Bodies receive their Motion from the subtle matter that invirons them and in which they swim Now that subtle matter actually moving in a Circular Line and only tending to move in a right Line it only Communicates that Circular Motion to the gross Bodies it carries along with it and as to its tendency to remove from the Centre in a Right Line it only communicates that to them as far as it is a necessary sequel of the Circular communicated Motion For it must be observed that the Parts of the subtle matter tending to different sides can only compress the gross Body they convey since that Body cannot go several different ways at the same time But because the subtle Matter that lies about the Centre of the Vortex has a far greater Motion than that which it spends in circulating and because it communicates only its Motion Circular and common to all its Parts to the gross Bodies which it carries and that if these Bodies should chance to have more Motion than what is common to the Vortex they would soon lose that overplus by communicating it to the little Bodies they meet with thence 't is evident that gross Bodies towards the Centre of the Vortex have not so much Motion as the Matter in which they swim each part of which has its own particular and various Motion besides the Cicular and common Now if gross Bodies have less Motion they have less Tendency to move in a right Line and if they have less Tendency they are forc'd to yield to those that have more and consequently to approach the Centre of the Vortex that is in short they must be heavyer as they are more gross and solid But when solid Bodies are very remote from the Centre of the Vortex as the Circular Motion of the subtle Matter is then very great because it spends very near its whole Motion in wheeling about Bodies have then so much more Motion as they have more Solidity because they go as swift as the subtle Matter in which they swim and so they have more force to continue their direct Motion Wherefore gross Bodies at a certaine distance from the Centre of the Vortex are so much lighter as they are more solid This makes it apparent that the Earth is metallick towards the Centre and not so solid about the Circumference that Water and Air must remain in the Situation wherein we see them but that all those Bodies are ponderous the Air as well as Gold and Quick-silver because they are more solid and gross than the first and second Element This shews likewise that the Moon is at too great a distance from the Centre of the Vortex of the Earth to be heavy though it be solid that Mercury Venus the Earth Mars Jupiter and Saturn cannot fall into the Sun and that they are not solid enough to travel out of this Vortex as the Comets do that they are in Aequilibrio with the Matter in which they swim and that if a Musket Ball or a Cannon Bullet could be shot high enough those two Bodies would become little Planets or perhaps Comets that would not stay in any Vortex as being endued with a competent Solidity I pretend not to have sufficiently explain'd all the things I have mention'd or to have deduced from the simple Principles of Extension Figure and Motion all the possible Inferences I only intended to shew the Method Des Cartes has used in the discovery of Natural things that this Method and his Ideas may be compared with those of other Philosophers I design'd here no more and yet I may venture to assert that if one would supersede admiring the Virtue of the Loadstone the regular Motion of the ebbing and flowing of the Sea the noise of Thunder the Generation of Meteors in short if any desire to get a well-grounded Knowledge of Natural Philosophy as he can doe nothing better than to read and mediâ—ate his Books so he can doe nothing at all unless he follows his Method I mean unless he Reason as he did upon clear Ideas still beginning with the most simple and familiar Neither do I pretend that this Author is Infallible for I think I can demonstrate that he has been mistaken in several places of his works But 't is more advantageous for his Readers to believe that he hath been deceived than if they were persuaded that whatever he said was true A Man that should take him to be infalible would read him without Examination believe him without understanding what he says learn his Opinions as we learn History and would never form and perfect his Mind He himself advertises his Readers to observe whether he be deceived and to believe nothing of what he says but what the Evidence compells them to For he is not like those false pretenders to Science who endeavouring to Lord it over the Minds will be believed upon their own word and who instead of making Men the Disciples of the inward Truth by proposing only clear and distinct Ideas labour what they can to submit them to the Authority of Heathens and press upon Men incomprehensible Opinions by unintelligible Reasons The chief thing that is found fault with in Des Cartes's System is the manner in which he feigns that the Sun Stars Earth and all the Bodies that surround us have been produced forasmuch as it seems contrary to what Holy Writ teaches us of the Creation of the World since according to him one would say that the whole Universe has been formed of its own accord so as we see it now a-days to which several Answers may be made First As to the pretended Contrarieties betwixt Moses and Des Cartes those that assert it have not perhaps examin'd them both with as much Attention as those who have shewn by publick Writings that the sacred History of the Creation perfectly agrees with the opinion of that Philosopher But the chief Answer is that Des Cartes never pretended that things should ever have been made by degrees and as he describes them For at the first Article of the
to another more exact by which we might accurately know how much London is larger than that open place contained in it There are therefore several sorts of Questions First There are some in which we seek a perfect Knowledge of all the exact Relations of two or several things betwixt each other Secondly There are some in which we search after the perfect Knowledge of some exact Relation betwixt two or several things Thirdly There are some in which we enquire after the perfect Knowledge of some Relation nearly approaching to the exact Relation that is betwixt two or more several things Fourthly There are some in which we are content to find a general and indefinite Relation 'T is evident First That to resolve the Questions of the First sort and perfectly to know all the exact Relations of Magnitude and Quality betwixt two or more things we must have distinct Ideas perfectly representing them and compare them together in all the possible manners We may for Instance resolve all the Questions that tend to discover the exact Relations betwixt 2 and 8 because both Numbers being accurately known may be compared together as much as is necessary to know the exact Relations of their Magnitude and Quality We may know that 8 is 4 times 2 and that 8 and 2 are even but not square Numbers 'T is plain Secondly That to resolve Questions of the second sort and accurately to know some Relation of Magnitude or Quality which is betwixt two or more things 't is necessary and sufficient distinctly to know those Faces by which they must be compared to discover the enquired Relation For Instance to resolve such Questions as tend to discover some exact Relations betwixt 4 and 16 as that 4 and 16 are even and square Numbers it 's sufficient exactly to know that 4 and 16 can be divided into equal parts without Fractions and that both are the product of a Number multiplied by it self and 't is to no purpose to examine what is their true Magnitude It being plain that to know the exact Relations of Quality betwixt things a distinct Idea of their Quality is sufficient without thinking on their Magnitude and that to know the exact Relations of Magnitude we need not search after the true Quality an accurate Knowledge of their Magnitude being all that is required Thirdly It clearly appears that to resolve the Questions of the third sort or to know some Relation very near approaching the exact Relation that is betwixt two or several things it is enough nearly to know the Faces by which they must be compared to discover the Relation required whether it be of Magnitude or Quality For Instance I may evidently know that the √ 8 is greater than 2 because I may very near know the true Magnitude of the √ 8 but I cannot discover how much the √ 8 is greater than 2 because I cannot exactly find out the true Magnitude of the √ 8. Lastly 'T is evident that to resolve the Questions of the fourth sort or to discover general and undefinite Relations it is enough to know things in a manner propotion'd to the need we stand in of comparing them together to find out the required Relation So that 't is not necessary to the Solution of all sorts of Questions to have very distinct Ideas of their Terms or perfectly to know the things expressed by those words But our knowledge must be the more exact as the Relations we search after are more accurate and numerous For as we have said in imperfect Questions imperfect Ideas of the things consider'd are sufficient to resolve them perfectly that is as far as they reach And many Questions may be resolved even without any distinct Idea of their Terms as when we are ask'd whether Fire is capable of melting Salt hardning Clay resolving Lead into Vapours and the like we understand perfectly those Questions and may very well solve them though we have no distinct Idea of Fire Salt Clay c. Because the Querists only desire to know whether we are ascertained by sensible Experiments that Fire produces those Effects And therefore may receive a satisfactory Answer by a knowledge drawn from the Senses CHAP. VIII An Application of the other Rules to particular Questions QUestion 's are of two sorts some are simple and others compound The former may be solved by the bare Attention of the Mind to the Ideas of the words in which they are expressed but the Solution of the latter must be perform'd by comparing them to a third or to many other Ideas We cannot find out the unknown Relations that are express'd in the Terms of a Question by immediately comparing the Ideas of those Terms since they can neither be joined nor compared We must then have one or several mean Ideas that we may make such Comparisons as are necessary to discover those Relations taking a special Care that those mean Ideas be the more clear and distinct as the Relations enquired after are more exact and numerous That Rule is but a Consequence of the first but of an equal importance with it For if exactly to know the Relation of the things compared it is necessary to have clear and distinct Ideas of them It plainly follows from the same Reason that we must have an accurate knowledge of the mean Ideas by which we intend to make our Comparisons since we must distinctly know the Relation of measure with each of the things measured to find out their Relations I shall give some Instances of it When we put a piece of Cork or other small and light Vessel in the Water with a Loadstone in it and offer to the North Pole of that Stone the same Pole of another Magnet which we keep in our Hands we presently perceive that the former Load-stone flies back as though it were driven by a violent Wind. 'T is requir'd to discover the Cause of that Effect 'T is plain that to render a Reason of the Motion of that Load-stone it is not sufficient to know the Relations it has to the other for we might perfectly know them all and yet not understand how two Bodies could repel each other without meeting We must therefore examine what are the Things which we distinctly conceive capable according to the Course of Nature of moving Bodies for 't is requir'd to find out the natural Cause of the Motion of a Load-stone which is certainly a Body And therefore we must not have recourse to any Quality Form or Being which by a clear Knowledge we cannot conceive capable of moving Bodies neither must we ascribe their Effect to an understanding Agent since we are not assur'd that Intelligences are the ordinary Causes of the natural Motions of Bodies and know not so much as whether they can produce Motion We plainly know that it is a natural Law that Bodies should move each other when they meet We must then endeavour to explain the Motion of the Load-stone by the Means of
intend not to treaâ— of The Curious may consult des Cartes's Principles of Philosophy I only observe as an Answer to an Objection which will presently be made against this Hypothesis that is Why those small Particles cannot re-enter through the Pores from whence they came That besides that the Pores of the Load-stones may be suppos'd to be wrought like the Channelling of a Screw which may pruduce the propos'd Effect it may be said likewise that the small Branches of which those Pores are made bend one way to obey and yield to the Motion of the entring Particles whereas they stand on end and shut them out another way So that we must not be surpriz'd at this Difference betwixt the Pores of the Load-stone for it may be explain'd in several manners and the only Difficulty consists in chusing the best If we had endeavour'd to resolve the fore-mention'd Question beginning with the Corpuscles that are suppos'd to stream out of the Magnet C we should have found the same and likewise discover'd that Air is compos'd of an infinite Number of Parts that are in a perpetual Motion without which it would be impossible that the Load-stone c could approach the Magnet C. I insist not on the Explication of this because there is no Difficulty in it Here follows a Question more compound and complicate than the fore-going for the Solution of which 't is necessary to make use of many Rules 'T is ask'd Which may be the Natural and Mechanical Cause of the Motion of our Members The Idea of Natural Cause is clear and distinct when understood as I have explain'd it in the former Question But the Words Motion of our Members are equivocal and confus'd because there are several such Motions some being Voluntary others Natural and others Convulsive There are also different Members in the Humane Body and therefore according to the first Rule I must ask Of which of these Motions the Cause is requir'd from me But if the Question be left undetermin'd and to my Discretion I examine it after this manner I attentively consider the Properties of those Motions and discovering at first that Voluntary Motions are sooner perform'd than Convulsive I infer that their Cause is different and therefore that I may and must examine the Question by Parts for it seems to require a long Discussion I restrain then my self to consider only Voluntary Motions and because several of our Members are employ'd about them I content my self for the present with the Consideration of the Arm. I observe that it is compos'd of several Muscles which are most or all in Action when we raise soâ—ething from the Ground or remove it from one place to the other But I only insist upon one being willing to suppose that the others are very near fashion'd after the same manner I inform my self of its Texture and Shape by some Book of Anatomy or rather by the sensible Sight of its Fibres and Tendons which I cause to be dissected in my presence by some skilful Anatomist to whom I put all the Queries which in the sequel may exhibit to my Mind a Medium to find out what I seek for After such a serious Consideration I cannot doubt but the Principle of the Motion of my Arm depends on the Contraction of its Muscles which compose it I am likewise content lest I should puzzle my self with too many Difficulties to suppose according to the common Opinion that this Contraction is perform'd by the Animal Spirits which filling up the Ventricle of those Muscles may cause their Extremities to come nearer Now the whole Question concerning Voluntary Motion is reduc'd to this Point How the small Quantity of Animal Spirits which are contain'd in our Arm may at the Command of the Will so suddenly swell the Muscles as to afford a sufficient Strength to list up an Hundred Weight or more Upon an attentive Reflexion thereupon the first Means that offers it self to the Imagination is commonly that of a quick and violent Fermentation like to that of Gun-powder or of some Liquors fill'd with Volatile Salt when they are mix'd with others that are Acid or full of a fixed Salt A small quantity of Gun-powder is able when kindled to raise not only an Hundred Weight but even a Tower and a Mountain Earthquakes that overthrow Cities and shake whole Countries proceed from Spirits kindling under the Ground almost as Gun-powder So that supposing in the Arm such a Cause of the Fermentation and Dilatation of the Spirits it may be look'd upon as the Principle of that Force by which Men perform so sudden and violent Motions But as we ought to mistrust those Means that are offer'd to the Mind by the Senses and of which we have no clear and evident Knowledge so we must not easily admit this for it is not sufficient to give an Account of the Strength and Quickness of our Motions by a Comparison For this is both a confus'd and imperfect Account because we are here to explain a voluntary Motion and Fermentation is not so The Blood is exceedingly fermented in Fevers and we cannot hinder it The Spirits are inflam'd and agitated in the Brain but we cannot rule their Agitation nor lessen it by our Desire When a Man moves the Arm several Ways a Thousand Fermentations great and small swift and â—low ought to begin and what is harder to explain to end likewise in a Moment as often and as soon as it is desir'd if this Hypothesis were true Besides Those Fermentations ought not to dissipate all their Matter but need always be ready to take Fire When a Man has walk'd Twenty Miles how many Thousand times must the Muscles employ'd in walking have been fill'd and empty'd and what a vast quantity of Spirits would be requir'd if Fermentation should dissipate and deaden them so often And therefore this Supposition is insufficient to explain such Motions of our Body as entirely depend upon our Will 'T is plain that the present Question may be reduc'd to this Problem of Mechanicks To find â—ut by Pneumatick Engines a Means to overcome such a Force as an Hundred Weight by another Force though never so small as that of an Ounce Weight And that the Application of that small Force may produce the desir'd Effect at the Discretion of the Will The Solution of that Problem is easie and the Demonstration of it clear It may be solv'd by a Vessel which hath two Orifices one of which is a little more than 1600 times larger than the other in which the Pipes of two equal Bellows are inserted and let a Force precisely 1600 times stronger than the other be apply'd to the Bellows of the larger Mouth for then the Force 1600 times weaker shall overcome the stronger The Demonstration of which is clear in Mechanicks since the Forces are not exactly in a reciprocal Proportion with their Mouths and that the Relation of the weaker Force to the smaller Mouth is greater than
the Relation of the stronger Force to the larger Mouth But to solve this Problem by an Engine which sets better before the Eyes the Effect of the Muscles than the Former We must blow a little in a Foot-ball and hinder the Air from going out with a Sucker then put upon that Foot-ball half full of Wind a Stone of 5 or 600 weight or having set it on a Table lay on it a Board and on that Board a huge Stone or cause a heavy Man to sit upon the Board allowing him to hold by something that he may sit the faster upon the rising Foot-ball for if you blow again into it only with the Mouth it will raise the Stone that compresses it or the Man that sits upon it The Reason of this is that the Mouth of the Foot-ball is so small or at least must be suppos'd so in comparison to the Capaciousness of the Foot-ball that withstands the Weight of the Stone that by such means a very small is able to overcome a very great Force If we also consider that Breath alone is capable of violently driving a Leaden Ball through a long and strait Trunk because the Strength of the Breath is not dissipated but continually renew'd it will visibly appear that the necessary Proportion betwixt the Mouth and the largeness of the Foot-ball being suppos'd Breath alone may overcome a very considerable Force If we therefore conceive that the whole Muscles or each of the Fibres of which they are made have as this Foot-ball a competent Capacity to admit Animal Spirits that the Pores through which those Spirits flow are yet proportionably straiter than the Neck of a Bladder or the Aperture of the Foot-ball that the Spirits are detain'd in or driven through the Nerves almost as the Breath through a Trunk that the Spirits are more agitated than the Air of the Lungs and driven with a greater Violence to the Muscles than it is in a Bladder we shall perceive that the Motion of the Spirits which are dispers'd through the Muscles can conquer the Force of the heaviest Weight we carry and that if we cannot move other more ponderous this Want of Strength proceeds not so much from the Spirits as from the Fibres and Membranes of which the Muscles are compos'd which would burst should we make too great an Effort Besides If we observe that by the Laws of the Union betwixt Soul and Body the Motion of those Spirits as to their Determination depends on the Will of Man we shall see that the Motion of the Arm must needs be voluntary 'T is true that we move our Arm so readily that it seems at first sight incredible that the Course of the Spirits into the Muscles should be so swift as to effect that Motion But we ought to consider that those Spirits are extremely agitated always ready to pass from one Muscle into another and that a small quantity of that Spirituous Liquor may sufficiently swell them up so as to move them or to lift up from the Ground something very light For we cannot raise great Weights very readily because that Effort requires a great stretching and swelling of the Muscles which cannot be perform'd by the Spirits that are in the neighbouring or Antagonist Muscles and therefore some Time is requir'd to call in more Spirits to their help and in such a Quantity as that they may be able to withstand the Heaviness of the Weight Thus we see that those that are loaden cannot run and that a ponderous thing is not lifted up from the Ground so readily as a Straw If we consider that those that are of a fiery Temper or heated with Wine are quicker than others that amongst living Creatures those whose Spirits are more agitated as Birds move swifter than those in which Blood is colder as it is in Frogs and that in some of them as the Chamelion the Tortoise and some Insects the Spirits are so little agitated that their Muscles are not sooner fill'd than a Foot-ball would be by the Breath of a Man All these things being well observ'd may probably make our Explication acceptable But though that part of the Question propos'd which concerns Voluntary Motions be sufficiently resolv'd yet we must not assert that it is fully and perfectly or that nothing else in our Body contributes to those Motions besides what has been mention'd for most probably there are a Thousand Springs that facilitate them which will for ever be unknown even to those who give a better Guess upon the Works of God The second Part of the Question to be examin'd concerns the Natural Motions or those that have nothing extraordinary in them as Convulsions have but are absolutely necessary to the Preservation of our Machine and consequently altogether independent on our Will I first consider with all the possible Attention what Motions have those Conditions and whether they are perfectly alike And as I quickly perceive that they are for the most part different from each other lest I should perplex my self with too many things I shall only insist upon the Motion of the Heart which of all the inward Parts is the best known and its Motions the most sensible Whilst I examine its Construction I observe two Things amongst many others First That it is compos'd of Fibres as the other Muscles And Secondly That there are two remarkable Cavities in it And therefore I judge that its Motion may be perform'd by means of the Animal Spirits since it is a Muscle and that the Blood ferments and dilates in it since it has Cavities The first of these Judgments is founded upon what I have said before The second upon the Heart 's being much hotter than any other Parts of the Body and that it diffuses Heat together with Blood into all our Members and that those two Ventricles could neither be form'd nor preserv'd but by the Dilatation of the Blood So that they are subservient to the Cause that has produc'd them I can then give a sufficient Reason of the Motion of the Heart by the Spirits that agitate and the Blood that dilates it during the Fermentation For though the Cause I alledge of its Motion should not be true yet I plainly see that it is sufficient to produce it It may be that the Principle of Fermentation or Dilatation of Liquors is not so well known to all Readers as that I may pretend to have explain'd an Effect by generally shewing that it proceeds from Fermentation But all particular Questions are not to be resolv'd by ascending to the first Cause though that may be done too and a true System on which all particular Effects depend discover'd provided we only insist upon clear Ideas But that Way of Philosophizing is neither the exactest nor yet the shortest To comprehend this it must be observ'd that there are Questions of two sorts in the first it is requir'd to discover the Nature and Properties of some Thing in the others we only
desire to know whether a Thing has such or such Properties or if we know it has we desire only to discover what is the Cause of them To solve the Questions of the first sort we must consider Things in their Birth and Original and conceive that they are always produc'd by the most simple and natural Ways But the Solution of the others requires a very different Method for they must be resolv'd by Suppositions and then we must examine whether those Suppositions induce into any Absurdity or whether they lead to any Truth plainly and clearly known For instance We desire to discover the Properties of the Roulet or some one of the Conick Sections We must consider those Lines in their Generation and form them by the most simple and least perplexing Ways for that is the best and shortest Means to discover their Nature and Properties We easily see that the Subâ—endent of the Roulet is equal to the Circle whence it is form'd And if we discover not many of its Properties that way 't is because the Circular Line that produces it is not sufficiently known But as to Lines merely Mathematical the Relations of which may be more clearly known such as are Conick Sections 't is sufficient for the discovering a vast Number of their Properties to consider them in their Generation Only we must observe that as they may be produc'd by a Regular Motion several Ways so all sorts of Generation are not equally proper to enlighten the Mind that the most simple are the best and that it often happens notwithstanding that some particular Methods are fitter than others to demonstrate some particular Properties But when it is not requir'd to discover in general the Properties of a Thing but to know whether such a Thing has such a Property then we must suppose that it actually enjoys it and carefully examine the Consequences of that Supposition whether it induces into a manifest Absurdity or leads to an undeniable Truth that may serve as a Means to find out what is sought for That is the Method which Geometricians use to solve their Problems They suppose what they seek and examine what will follow of it they attentively consider the Relations that result from the Supposition they represent all those Relations that contain the Conditions of the Problem by Equations and then reduce those Equations according to the usual Rules so that what is unknown is found equal to one or several Things perfectly known I say therefore that when 't is requir'd to discover in general the Nature of Fire and of the different Fermentations which are the most universal Causes of natural Effects the shortest and surest Way is to examine them in their Principle We must consider the Formation of the most agitated Bodies the Motion of which is diffus'd into those that ferment We must by clear Ideas and by the most simple Ways examine what Motion may produce in Matter And because Fire and the various Fermentations are very general Things and consequently depending upon few Causes there will be no need of considering very long what Matter is able to perform when animated by Motion to find out the Nature of Fermentation in its very Principle and we shall learn withall several other Things altogether requisite to the Knowledge of Physicks Whereas he that would in such a Question argue from Suppositions so as to ascend to the first Causes even to the Laws of Nature by which all things are form'd would make a great many of them that should prove false and unprofitable He might perhaps discover that the Cause of the Fermentation is the Motion of an invisible Matter communicated to the agitated Parts of Matter For 't is sufficiently known that Fire and the various Fermentations of Bodies consist in their Agitation and that by the Laws of Nature Bodies receive their immediate Motion only from their meeting with others that are more agitated So that he might discover that there is an invisible Matter the Motion of which is communicated to visible Bodies by Fermentation But 't is morally impossible that he should ever by his Suppositions find out how all that is perform'd which however is not so hard to do when we examine the Formation of Elements or of Bodies of which there is a greater Number of the same Nature as is to be seen in Monsieur des Cartes's System The Third Part of the Question concerning Convulsive Motions will not be very difficult to solve if we suppose that there are in our Bodies Animal Spirits susceptible of Fermentation and withall Humours so piercing as to insinuate themselves into the Pores of the Nerves through which the Spirits are diâ—â—us'd into the Muscles provided always that we pretend not to determine the true Texture and Disposition of those invisible Parts that contribute to these Convulsions When we have separated a Muscle from the rest of the Body and hold it by the two Ends we sensibly perceive that it endeavours to contract it self when prick'd in the Middle 'T is likely that this depends on the Construction of the imperceptible Parts of which it is made which are as so many Springs determin'd to some certain Motions by that of Compunction But who can be sure he has found out the true Disposition of the Parts employ'd in the Production of that Motion and who can give an uncontroverted Demonstration of it Certainly that appears altogether impossible though perhaps by long thinking we might imagine such a Construction of Muscles as would be fit to perform all the Motions we know them to be capable of we must not therefore pretend to determine the true Construction of the Muscles However because it cannot be reasonably doubted but that there are Spirits susceptible of some Fermentation by the Mixture of a very subtile heterogeneous Matter and that acriminious and pungent Humours may creep into the Nerves that Hypothesis may be suppos'd Now to proceed to the Solution of the Question propos'd We must first examine how many sorts of Convulsive Motions there are and because their Number is indefinite we must insist on the Principal the Causes of which seem to be different We must consider in what Parts they are made what Diseases precede and follow them whether they are attended with Pain or free from it and above all what are the Degrees of their Swiftness and Violence for some are very swift and violent others are very swift but not violent a third sort are violent and not swift and others again are free from both these Symptoms Some finish and begin afresh perpetually others keep the Parts rigid and unmoveable for some time and others deprive us of their Use and altogether deform them All this being well weigh'd it will be no hard matter to explain in general after what has been said concerning Natural and Voluntary Motions how the Convulsive are perform'd For if we conceive that some Matter capable of fermenting the Spirits mixes with those contain'd in
a Muscle it must needs swell up and produce in that part a Convulsive Motion If that Motion may easily be resisted 't is a sign that the Nerves are not yet obstructed by any Humour since we may empty the Muscle of the Spirits that have enter'd into it and determine them to swell up the opposite Muscle But if we cannot do it we must conclude that pungent and piercing Humours have some part at least in that Motion Even it may often happen that those Humours are the only Cause of Convulsions since they may determine the Course of the Spirits to some certain Muscles by opening some Passages that convey them and shutting others Besides that they may contract the Tendons and Fibres by penetrating their Pores When a very ponderous Weight hangs at the end of a Rope it may considerably be rais'd by only wetting that Cord because the Particles of Water penetrating as so many little Wedges betwixt the Threads of the Rope shorten it by dilating it So the piercing and pungent Humours insinuating into the Pores of the Nerves contract them stretch the Parts to which they are tied and produce in the Body Convulsive Motions that are extremely slow violent and painful and and often leave the Part sadly distorted for a long time As to the Convulsive Motions that are very swift they are caus'd by the Spirits but it is not necessary that those Spirits should receive any Fermentation 't is enough that the Conduits through which they pass be more open at one side than at the other When all the Parts of the Body are in their natural Situation the Animal Spirits diffuse themselves equally and readily through them according to the Necessities of the Machine and faithfully perform the Orders of the Will But when Humours disturb the Disposition of the Brain alter or variously move the Apertures of the Nerves or penetrate into the Muscles they agitate their Springs and the Spirits diffusing into those Parts after a new and unusual manner produce extraordinary Motions without the Consent of the Will However we may often by a strong Resistance hinder some of those Motions and insensibly diminish the Traces that produce them even when the Habit is wholly form'd Those that look carefully to themselves find little Difficulty in preventing Grimaces unbecoming Gestures and a sourish Countenance though their Body have a Disposition to them and may even conquer them when strengthen'd by Habit but with a great deal more Difficulty for such Dispositions should always be oppos'd in their Birth and before the Spirits have traced out a Way not easie to be stopp'd up The Cause of those Motions is often in the agitated Muscle and proceeds from some pungent Humour or fermenting Spirits but we must judge that it is in the Brain especially when the Convulsions agitate not one or two parts of the Body but most or all and withall in several Diseases which alter the natural Constitution of the Blood and Spirits 'T is true that one Nerve often having different Branches which disperse through Parts of the Body very remote as into the Face and Bowels it sometimes happens that a Convulsion the Cause of which lies in a Part to which some one of those Branches resorts may have Communication with those to which other Branches reach without proceeding from the Brain and without a Corruption of the Spirits But when the Convulsive Motions are common to most Parts of the Body we must needs say either that the Spirits ferment in a very extraordinary manner or that the Order and Disposition of the Parts of the Brain is disturb'd or that it proceeds from both Causes together I shall not insist any longer upon this Question because it grows so compound and depending on so many things when we enter into Particulars that it cannot easily be made serviceable to a clear Explication of the Rules we have given There is no Science which may supply us with more Examples to shew the Usefulness of those Rules than Geometry and especially Algebra since these two Sciences make a perpetual Use of them Geometry plainly discovers the Necessity always to begin with the most simple Things and which include the least Number of Relations It always examines those Relations by Measures that are clearly known it takes off whatever is unserviceable to discover them it divides into Parts Compound Questions disposes those Parts and examines them in order In short The only Fault to be found in this Science is as I have observ'd elsewhere that it affords no convenient Means to abridge Ideas and discover'd Relations So that though it regulates the Imagination and makes the Mind exact yet it increases not its Extent very much neither does it give a Capacity to discover very compound Truths But Algebra continually teaching to abridge and in the shortest Way imaginable Ideas and their Relations extremely improves the Capacity of the Mind for nothing so compound can be conceâ—v'd in the Relations of Magnitudes but the Mind may discover it in time by the Means it affords when we know the Way that ought to be taken The fifth Rule and the following which speak of the Method of abridging Ideas concern only that Science for none else has a convenient Way of abridging them so that I shall not insist upon their Explication Those who have a great Inclination for Mathematicks and desire to give their Mind all the Force and Extent it is capable of and to put themselves into a State of discovering without a Tutor an infinite Number of new Truths will perceive if they earnestly apply themselves to Algebra that the Usefulness of that Science as to the Enquiry after Truth proceeds from its observing the Rules we have prescrib'd But I must advertise that by Algebra I especially understand that which des Cartes and some others have made use of Before the Conclusion of this Book I shall set down an Example somewhat at large to shew the Usefulness of the whole Treatise I shall represent by it the Advances of a Man who in the Discussion of an important Question endeavours to free himself from Prejudices I shall at first make him fall into some Faults that they may excite the Remembrance of what has been said elsewhere But at last his Attention leading him to the Truth enquir'd after I induce him speaking positively and as one who pretends to have solv'd the Question he examin'd CHAP. IX The last Instance to shew the Vsefulness of this Treatise wherein the Cause of the Vnion of Parts in Bodies and withall the Rules of the Communication of Motion are examin'd BOdies are united together three different Ways by Continuity Contiguity and in a third manner that has no particular Name because it seldom happens I shall call it by the general Term of Union By Continuity or by the Causes of it I understand somewhat or other which causes the Parts of a Body to hold so strongly together that we must use violence
to separate them for which Reason they are look'd upon as a Whole By Contiguity I understand that whatever it is which makes me judge that two Bodies touch one another immediately so as that there is nothing betwixt them though I judge not that they are strictly united because I may easily separate them By the third Word Union I understand something or other which makes two Glasses or two Marble-Stones whose surfaces are well rub'd and polished upon each other to adhere together so as that though they can easily be separated by making them glide over one another yet we find some resistance when we endeavour to do it in another manner Now these two united Glasses or Marble-stones cannot be said to be continuous because they are not conceived as a Whole since they may easily be separated some certain way Neither is this a Contiguity though it be something very like it because those two pieces of Glass or Marble are strictly enough united and even more than the Parts of soft and liquid Bodies as those of Butter and Water These Words being thus explained we must now enquire after the Cause that unites Bodies and the difference betwixt Continuity Contiguity and the Union of Bodies taken in this particular Sense I shall first seek the cause of Continuity or that I don't know what which unites the Parts of a Body and links them so strictly together that violence must be used to separate them and that they are look'd upon as making together but one Whole I hope that this Cause being found out it will prove no hard task to discover the rest It seems now necessary to me that this I don't know what which binds even the smallest Parts of that piece of Iron I hold in my Hands should be something very powerful since I must use a very great Force to break off a small Part of it But am not I extremely mistaken for may not that difficulty I find in breaking the least piece of this Iron come from my Weakness and not from the Resistance of the Iron And indeed I remember I have formerly used a greater violence than I now do to break a piece of Iron like this and if I fell sick it might happen that my utmost endeavours could not perform it I see therefore that I must not judge absolutely of the firmness with which the Parts of Iron are joyned together by the endeavours I make to dis-unite them but only judge that they stick very strictly to each other in relation to my little Strength or that they hang more firmly together than the Parts of my Flesh since the Sense of Pain I feel in using too much Force advertises me I shall sooner disunite the Parts of my Body than those of the Iron Thence I conclude That as I am not absolutely strong nor weak so Iron and other Bodies are not absolutely hard or flexible but only in reference to the Cause that acts upon them And that my Endeavours cannot be a Rule to measure the Degrees of Force that must be used to overcome the Resistance and Hardness of Iron since Rules must be unvariable whereas those Endeavours vary according to the Time the plenty of Animal Spirits and the Hardness of Flesh for after all I cannot always produce the same Effects by the same Endeavours This Consideration frees me from a Prejudice that made me imagine strong Bands to unite the Parts of Bodies which Bands perhaps are not in being and I hope it will not be unprofitable hereafter for I am wonderfully apt to judge of all things with relation to my self and to follow the Impressions of my Senses of which I shall more carefully beware But let us proceed Having thought some Time and search'd with some Application the Cause of this strict Union without being able to discover it I find my self inclin'd by my own natural Laziness to judge as several others do that it is the Form of Bodies that preserves the Union betwixt their Parts or the Friendship and Inclination they have for such as are alike to them And to form other judgements of like nature nothing being more convenient than sometimes to suffer our selves to be seduc'd and to become Learned on a sudden with little Expence But I intend to believe nothing but what I know nor to suffer my self to be cast down by my own Laziness nor to yield to bare Glimpses Let us therefore lay aside those Forms and Inclinations of which we have no distinct and particular but only confused and general Ideas which methinks we only frame with reference to our Nature and the Existence of which several Persons and perhaps whole Nations do not own But methinks I see the Cause of this strict Union of the Parts which make up hard Bodies without admitting any thing in it but what all the World grants or at least what all the World distinctly conceives to be possible For every one distinctly conceives that all Bodies are composed or may be composed of small Parts It may then be that some shall be crooked and branched and be able as many little Fetters strongly to hold others or that they shall be so intricated amongst each others Branches that it will not be easie to disunite them I am so much the apter to yield to this Thought as I see visible Parts of the gross Bodies hold and bind one another this way But I can scarce sufficiently mistrust my Prejudices and Impression of my Senses I must therefore more strictly examine this Matter and enquire after the Reason why even the minutest and last solid Parts of Bodies in short even the Parts of every one of these little Bands hang together For they cannot be united by other smaller Bands since I suppose them to be solid Or if I say they are united in that Manner it will reasonably be ask'd What unites these others together and so in infinitum I am again extremely apt to say that this Column is hard by its Nature or that the small Fetters of which hard Bodies are made up are Attoms the Parts of which cannot be divided as being the Essential and last Parts of Bodies and essentially crooked branched or of a perplex'd Figure But I freely own this is not solving the Difficulty and that laying aside my Prejudices and the Illusions of my Senses I should be in the wrong to have Recourse to an abstracted Form and to embrace a Phantasm of Logick for the Cause I enquire after I mean I should be in the wrong to conceive as something real and distinct the rambling or indefinite Idea of Nature or Essence which expresses nothing but what is known to us and so to take an abstracted universal Form for the Physical Cause of a real Effect for there are Two things which I cannot too much mistrust The first is The Impression of my Senses and the other My Readiness to take abstracted Natures and general Ideas of Logick for real and particular by
which two Principles of Errour I remember to have been often seduc'd For to return to the Difficulty in hand 't is not possible to conceive how those little Fetters should be indivisible by their own Essence and Nature nor consequently how they should be inflexible since on the contrary I conceive them most divisible nay necessarily divisible by their own Essence and Nature For the Part A is most certainly a Substance as well as B and consequently 't is plain that A may exist without B since Substances may exist without one another otherwise they would be no Substances It cannot be said that A is no Substance for 't is plain that that is not a bare Mode whereas every Being is either a Substance or the Mode of a Substance And therefore since A is not a Mode it is a Substance and may exist without B and much more the Part A exists separately from B so that this Fetter is divisible into A and B. Moreover if this Fetter were indivisible or crooked by its own Nature and Essence there would happen a thing quite contrary to what we see by Experience for not one Body could be broken Let us suppose as before a Piece of Iron composed of many Fetters perplexed within one another and A a B b to be two of them I say it will not be possible to disintangle them and consequently to break the Iron For to break it the Fetters that make it up must be bent which however are supposed inflexible by their own Nature and Essence If they be not supposed inflexible but only indivisible by their own Nature the Supposition would be unserviceable for solving the Question For then the Difficulty will be Why those little Fetters obey not the Force that is used to bend a Bar of Iron Neither must they be supposed indivisible if they be not supposed inflexible For if the Parts of those Fetters could change their situation in reference to one another 't is visible that they might be separated since there is no Reason why if one part may be somewhat removed from the other it could not be entirely removed And therefore whether these little Fetters are supposed indivisible or inflexible the Question cannot be solved by that means for if they be only supposed indivisible a Piece of Iron must be broken without trouble and if they be supposed inflexible it will be impossible to break it since the little Fetters that make up the Iron being intricated within one another it will be impossible to disintangle them Let us therefore solve the Difficulty by clear and undeniable Principles and find the Reason why that little Band has two Parts A B so firmly united to one another 'T is needful I perceive to divide the Subject of my Meditation into Parts that I may examine it the more exactly and with less Intention of Thought since I could not at first at a single view and with the whole Attention I am capable of discover what I enquired after This I might have done at the beginning for when the Subjects of our Meditation are somewhat abstruse 't is always the best way to consider them by parts and not fruitlessly weary our selves with the vain Hopes of meeting happily with the Truth What I enquire after is The Cause of the strict Union betwixt the minute Parts that make up the little Fetter A B. Now I conceive only distinctly three Things that can be the Cause sought for viz. The very Parts of that little Fetter or the Will of the Author of Nature or lastly invisible Bodies surrounding such little Bands I might yet alledge as the Cause of these things the Form of Bodies the Qualities of Hardness or some occult Quality the Sympathy betwixt Parts of the same Species c. but since I have no distinct Idea of those fine things I neither must nor can ground my Reasonings thereupon so that if I find not the Cause I search after in those things of which I have distinct Ideas I will not fruitlessly trouble my self with the Contemplation of such rambling and general Notions of Logick and shall forbear speaking of what I understand not But let us examine the first of these things that may be the Cause why the Parts of that small Band are so firmly joined viz. the very Parts of which it is made up When I only consider the Parts of which hard Bodies are composed I am inclined to believe That no Cement which unites the Parts of that Fetter can be imagin'd besides themselves and their own Rest for of what Nature could it be It cannot be a thing subsisting of it self since all those minute Parts being Substances for what Reason should they be united by other Substances but themselves Neither can it be a Quality different from Rest because there is no Quality more contrary to Motion that may separate those Parts but their own Rest but besides Substances and their Qualities we know not any other sorts of things 'T is true that the Parts of hard Bodies remain united as long as they are in Rest one by another and that when they are once in Rest they remain of themselves in the same state as long as they can but this is not what I enquire after and I know not how too I came to mistake the Subject I endeavour here to discover why the Parts of hard Bodies have so great a strength to remain in Rest one by another that they withstand the Force that is used to move them I might however answer my self that every Body has truly Force of continuing fix'd in its present state and that this Force is equal whether in Motion or Rest But that the Reason why the parts of hard Bodies remain in Rest by one another and that we can difficultly move and separate them is our not imploying sufficient Motion to overpower the Rest. This is probable but I am seeking Certainty if it be to be found and not bare Probability And how can I know with Certainty and Evidence that each Body has this Force to continue in the state it 's in and that this Force is equal both as to Motion and Rest since Matter on the contrary seems indifferently passive to either and altogether destitute of Force Let us have recourse then with M. des Cartes to the Will of the Creatour which is it may be that Force which Bodies seem to have in themselves which is the second thing above mention'd suppos'd capable of preserving the Parts of this little Fetter we speak of so closely link'd to one another Certainly 't is possible that God may will every Body should remain in its present state and that his Will should be the Force which unites their Parts to one another as I otherwise know his Will to be the Moving Force which puts Bodies in Motion For since Matter is incapable of moving it self I have Reason methinks to conclude it is a Spirit and even the Author
of Nature which puts it and preserves it in Motion by preserving it successively in different places by his bare Will in as much as an Almighty Being acts not with Instruments and his Will is necessarily follow'd by Effects I acknowledge then it 's possible that God may will that every thing remain in its present state whether it be Motion or Rest and that his Will may be the natural Power which Bodies have of remaining in the state they once have obtain'd And if so we must like M. des Cartes measure that Power conclude what ought to be the Effects of it and give Rules for the Force and Communication of Motions upon the Collision of different Bodies in proportion to their Magnitude since we have no other way of coming to the knowledge of that general and immutable Will of God who makes the different Power these Bodies have of acting upon and resisting one another consist in their different Magnitude and Swiftness But however I have no infallible proof that God wills by a positive Will that Bodies remain in Rest and one would think it sufficient for God to will the Existence of Matter not only to cause it to exist but to exist in Rest. The case is not the same with Motion since the Idea of a Matter mov'd certainly includes two Powers to which it is related viz. that which created and also that which mov'd it But the Idea of a Matter in Rest includes only the Idea of a Power which has created it whilst there is no necessity of any other Power to put it in Rest since if we barely conceive Matter without thinking on any Power we shall necessarily conceive it in Rest. Thus it is I conceive things for I am to judge by my Ideas and my Ideas tell me Rest is but the privation of Motion For God need but cease to will the Motion of a Body to make its Motion cease and to cause it to Rest. But I remember I have heard from many very ingenious Persons that Motion seem'd to them as much the privation of Rest as Rest the privation of Motion And some will not doubt to affirm for Reasons I can't comprehend that Motion seems rather a privation than rest I do not distinctly call to Mind the Reasons they alledge however this ought to make me suspicious lest my Ideas should be false For though most Men say what they please upon Subjects that seem of little moment yet I have Reason to believe the Persons I speak of were pleas'd to speak what they thought wherefore I must still examine my Ideas more carefully To me it seems a thing of undoubted Certainty and the Gentlemen before mention'd won't deny it that 't is the Will of God which moves Bodies The Force then which that Bowl I see in Motion has is the Will of God that moves it what now is God requir'd to do to stop it Must he Will by a positive Will that it should Rest or is it sufficient to cease to will its Motion 'T is plain that if God but cease to will the Motion of this Bowl the cessation of its Motion and consequently Rest will succeed the cessation of the Will of God For the Will of God which was the Force that moved the Bowl desisting that Force desists and the Bowl will be no longer mov'd Therefore the cessation of the moving Force produces Rest Rest then has no Force to cause it but is a bare privation that supposes no positive Will in God Thus we should admit in God a positive Will without any Reason or Necessity if we ascribed to Bodies any Force to remain in Rest. But to overthrow this Argument if possible Let us now suppose a Bowl at Rest as before we suppos'd it in Motion what must God do in order to agitate it Is it enough that he ceases to will its repose if so I have hitherto made no advance for that Motion will be equally the privation of Rest as Rest of Motion I suppose then that God desists to will the Rest of this Bowl but supposing it I see it not put in Motion and if any others do I desire them to inform me with what degree of Motion it is carried Certainly 't is impossible it should be mov'd or have any degree of Motion and 't is impossible to conceive any degree of Motion in it barely from our conceiving that God ceases to will it should be at Rest because it goes not with Motion as it does with Rest. Motions are infinitely various and are susceptible of more and less but Rest being nothing one cannot differ from another One and the same Bowl which moves twice as fast at one time as at another has twice as much Force or Motion at one time as at another But it cannot be said that the same Bowl has Rest double at one time to its Rest at another There must therefore be a positive Will in God to put a Bowl in Motion or to give it such a Force as it may move it self with But he need only cease to will it should be mov'd to cause its Motion to desist that is to make it Rest. Just as to the creating a World it is not enough that God cease to will its non-existence unless he likewise positively will the manner it shall exist in But in order to annihilate it there is no need of God's willing it should not exist since God cannot will Nothingness by a positive Will but barely that he cease to will its Being I consider not here Motion and Rest according to their relative Capacity for 't is manifest that resting Bodies have as real Relations to those about them as Bodies in Motion I only conceive that Bodies mov'd have a moving Force and that others at Rest have no Force at all to persevere in it because the Relations of mov'd to the circumambient Bodies perpetually changing they need a continual Force to produce these Changes it being indeed nothing but these Changes that cause all that Novelty we observe in Nature but there is no need of Force to do nothing When the Relation of a Body to those surrounding it is constantly the same there is nothing done and the Continuance of that Relation I mean the Action of the Will of God which preserves it is not different from that which preserves the Body it self If it be true as I conceive That Rest is but the Privation of Motion the least Motion or that of the least Body mov'd will include a greater Force or power than the Rest of the greatest Body and so the least Force and the least Body suppos'd to be mov'd in a Vacuum against another never so great and bulky will be capable of moving it since the largest Body at Rest will have no power of resisting the least Body that shall strike against it Therefore the Resistance which is made by the Parts of hard Bodies to hinder their Separation necessarily proceeds from
to grant that we ought not to consider a Vessel on the Water as at Rest. I grant likewise that all the parts of the environing Water are â—ubservient to the new Motion imprinted by the Waterman though it be but too visible by the decrease of the Boat 's Motion that they resist it more on the side where it makes than on the other whence it is driven Notwithstanding which supposition I say that of all the Parts of Water in the River according to M. Des Cartes there are none which can promote the Motion of the Vessel except those which immediately touch it on the side it is driven on For according to that Philosopher The Water being fluid all the parts that go to its Composition act not conjointly against the Body we would move but only those which touching it conjointly bear upon it But those which conjointly bear upon the Vessel and the Boat's-man together are twenty times more inconsiderable than the Boat 'T is plain therefore from the Explication given by M. Des Cartes in this Article concerning the difficulty we find to break a Nail between our Fingers that a little Body is capable of moving one much bigger than it self For in short our Hands are not so fluid as Water and when we would break a Nail there are more parts that act jointly in our hands than in the Water which pushes against a Vessel But here 's a more sensible Experiment Take a Plank well smooth'd or any other very hard Plain drive in it a Nail half way and set this Plain in a somewhat inclining posture then place a Bar of Iron an hundred times thicker than the Nail an Inch or two above it and letting it slide down it will not break it Mean time it is observable that according to Des Cartes all the parts of the Bar as being hard and solid act jointly upon the Nail If therefore there were no other Câ—ment than Rest to unite the parts of the Nail the Bar of Iron being an hundred times bigger ought by the Fifth Rule of M. Des Cartes and according to Reason communicate somewhat of its Motion to the part of the Nail it fell upon that is to break it and pass on even though this Bar should slide with a very gentle Motion Therefore we must seek some other Cause than the Rest of Bodies that makes them hard and capable of resisting the violence that is offer'd to break them since Rest has no Force to withstand Motion And I am persuaded these Experiences are sufficient to evince that the abstracted Proofs we have given are not false We must then examine the third Thing we supposed before might be the cause of the strict Union found between the Parts of hard Bodies namely an invisible Matter which surrounds them and which being rapidly mov'd pushes most violently the external and internal Parts of these Bodies and constringes them in such a manner as requires greater strength to separate them than has that invisible and extremely agitated Matter Methinks I might reasonably conclude that the Union of the constituent Parts of hard Bodies depends on an invisible Matter which surrounds and compresses them since the two other things supposed possible Causes of this union have been discover'd not to be truly so For since I meet with Resistance in breaking a Piece of Iron which Resistance proceeds not from the Iron nor the Will of God as I think I have proved it must necessarily proceed from some invisible Matter which can be no other than that which immediately surrounds and compresses it Nevertheless I shall give some positive Proofs of this Opinion after I have more largely explain'd it by some Instance Take a Globe of any hard Metal which is hollow within and divided in two Halfs join them together with a little Bond of Wax at the place of their Union and then extract the Air these two half Globes will be so firmly join'd to one another that two Teams of Horses fastned to the Rings on the opposite sides of the Globe shall not separate them provided they be large in proportion to the Number of Horses when yet if the Air be suffer'd to enter one Man shall separate them with a great deal of Ease From this Experiment 't is easie to conclude that what united the two Hemispheres to one another was the Pressure of the surrounding Air upon their outward and convex Surface whilst there was no Compression in their concave and inward parts so that the Action of the Horses which drew the two Hemispheres on either side could not conquer the Resistance made by innumerable little Parts of Air by their pressing these two Halfs But the least Force is capable of dividing them when the Air entring in the Copper Globe drives against the Concave and inward Surfaces as much as the external Air presses against the outward and convex Take on the contrary the Bladder of a Carp and put it in a Vessel from which the Air is pump'd this Bladder being full of Air will crack and burst because then there is no exteriour Air to resist that within the Bladder 'T is likewise for the same Reason I have given of the first Experiment that two Glass or Marble Plains ground and polish'd upon one another so cling together that Violence must be us'd to separate them one way because the two parts of the Marble are press'd and constring'd by the external Air that surrounds them and are not so strongly press'd by that between I might produce infinite other Experiments to prove that the gross Air which surrounds Bodies strongly unites their Parts But what I have said is enough to give a distinct Explication of my Thoughts upon the present Question I say then that what causes the Parts of hard Bodies and the little Fetters before-mentioned to hang so closely united to each other is there being other little Bodies infinitely more agitated than the course Air we breath which bear against them and compress them and that which makes it so hard to separate them is not their Rest but the Agitation of these little surrounding Bodies So that that which resists Motion is not Rest this being but the Privation of it and has no Force at all but some contrary Motion This simple Exposition of my Opinion perhaps seems reasonable yet I foresee that many Persons will not easily be induc'd to yield to it Hard Bodies make so great Impression on the Senses when they strike us or when we use Violence to break them that we are inclin'd to believe their Parts more strictly united than they really are And on the contrary the little Bodies which I have said encompass them and to which I have ascribed the Force of causing this Union making no Impression on our Senses seem too weak to produce so sensible an Effect But to take away this Prejudice which bottoms on the Impressions of our Senses and on the Difficulty we find to imagine Bodies more little
and agitated than those we daily see 't is to be consider'd that the Hardness of Bodies is not to be measur'd with relation to our Hands or the Endeavours we are able to make which are different at different times For indeed if the greatest Force of Men be nothing in comparison with that of the subtle Matter we should be much to blame to believe that Diamonds and the hardest Stones cannot derive their Hardness from the Compression of those little rapid Bodies which environ them Now we may visibly discover how inconsiderably weak is Humane Force if it be consider'd that Man's Power of moving his Body in so many manners proceeds from a very moderate Fermentation of the Blood which somewhat agitates the smaller Parts of it and so produces the Animal Spirits For 't is the Agitation of these Spirits which makes the Strength of the Body and gives us the Power of making those Endeavours which we groundlesly regard as something great and mighty But it must be observ'd that this Fermentation of our Blood is but a small Communication of that subtle Matter 's Motion we have been speaking of For all the Fermentations of visible Bodies are nothing but Communications of Motion from the Invisible since every Body receives its Agitation from some other 'T is not therefore to be wonder'd if our Force be not so great as that of the same subtle Matter we receive it from But if our Blood fermented as much in our Heart as Gun-Powder ferments and is agitated when Fire is put to it that is if our Blood receiv'd as great a Communication of Motion from the subtle Matter as Gun-Powder receives we might do extraordinary things with a great deal of Ease as break a Bar of Iron overturn an House c. provided we suppose a competent proportion between our Members and our Blood so violently agitated We must therefore rid our selves of our Prejudice and not following the Impression of our Senses imagine that the Parts of hard Bodies are so strongly united to one another because of the Difficulty we find to break them But if moreover we consider the Effects of Fire in Mines the Gravity of Bodies and several other natural Effects which have no other Cause then the Commotion of these insensible Corpuscles as is prov'd by M. Des Cartes in many places of his Works we shall manifestly discover that it does not exceed their Force to unite and bind together the Parts of hard Bodies so powerfully as we find them For in short I fear not to affirm that a Cannon-Bullet whose Motion seems so extraordinary receives not the thousandth part of the Motion of the subtle Matter which surrounds it My Assertion will not be doubted of if it be consider'd First That the Gun-Powder is not all inflam'd nor at the same instant Secondly That though it were all on Fire in the self-same Moment yet it floats a very short time in the subtle Matter and Bodies swimming but a little while in others can receive no great Motion from them as may be seen in Boats when riding in a Stream which receive their Motion by degrees Thirdly and principally That each part of the Powder can receive but a collateral Motion which the subtle Matter yields to For Water only communicates to the Vessel the direct Motion which is common to all the parts of it which Motion is generally very inconsiderable in respect of the others I might still prove to M. Des Cartes's Followers the Greatness of the subtle Matter 's Motion by the Motion of the Earth and the Heaviness of Bodies from whence might be drawn very certain and exact Proofs if that were necessary to my Subject But in order to have one sufficient Proof of the violent Agitation of the subtle Matter to which I ascribe the Hardness of Bodies it suffices without seeing Des Cartes's Works to read attentively what I have written in the second Chapter of the fourth Book towards the End Being now deliver'd from our Prejudices which induc'd us to believe our Efforts very potent and those of the subtle Matter which surrounds and constringes hard Bodies very feeble being likewise satisfied of the vehement Commotion of this Matter by what has been said of Gun-Powder 't will be no hard Matter to discover that 't is absolutely necessary that this Matter acting infinitely more on the Surface than the Inside of the hard Bodies it encompasses and compresses should be the Cause of their Hardness or of the Resistance we feel when we endeavour to break them But since there are always many Parts of this invisible Matter passing through the Pores of hard Bodies they not only render them hard as I have before explain'd but are also the Causes that some are springing and elastical that others stand bent and others still are Fluid and liquid and in short are the Cause not only of the Force which the Parts of hard Bodies have to remain close by one another but of that likewise which the parts of fluid Bodies have to separate or which is the same thing are the Cause of the Hardness of some Bodies and the Fluidity of others But whereas 't is absolutely necessary to know distinctly the Physicks of M. Des Cartes the Figure of his Elements and of the parts which constitute particular Bodies to account for the stiffness of some and the flexibility of others I shall not insist upon explaining it Such as have read the Works of that Philosopher will easily imagine what may be the cause of these things whereas it would be a difficult task for me to explain it and those who are unaquainted with that Author would have a very confus'd Notion of the Reasons I might offer Nor shall I stand to resolve a vast number of Difficulties which I foresee will be urg'd against what I have been establishing because if those who propose them have no knowledge of true natural Philosophy I should but tire and confound them instead of satisfying them But if they were Men of Science I could not answer them without a long train of diagrams and reasoning Wherefore I think it best to intreat those who shall find any Difficulty in what I have said to give this Discourse a more careful perusal not doubting but if they read it and consider it as they ought all their Objections will fall to the Ground But after all if they think my Request inconvenient let them sit still there being no great danger in the Ignorance of the Cause of the Hardness of Bodies I speak not here of contiguity for 't is manifest that contiguous things touch so little that there 's always a good quantity of subtle Matter passing between them which endeavouring to continue its Motion in a right Line hinders them from uniting As to the union found between two Marbles that have been polish't one upon another I have already explain'd it and 't is easie to see that though the subtle Matter passes constantly between the
two parts as close as they are yet the Air cannot get in and therefore 't is that which compresses and constringes the two parts together and makes them so difficult to be disunited unless we glide them over one another For all this it is manifest that the Continuity Contiguity and Union of two Marbles would be one and the same thing in a vacuum for neither have we different Ideas of them so that it would be to talk without understanding our selves to make them differ absolutely and without any regard to the surrounding Bodies I now come to make some Reflexions upon M. Des Cartes's Opinion and the Original of his Errour I call his Opinion an Errour because I can find no sincere way of defending what he has said upon the Rules of Motion and the Cause of the Hardness of Bodies towards the end of the second Part of his Principles in several places and that he seems to have evidently prov'd the Truth of the contrary Opinion This great Man most distinctly conceiving that Matter could not naturally move it self but that the moving Force of all Bodies was nothing but the general Will of the Author of Nature and that therefore the Communications of their Motion upon their mutual Collision must come from the same Will yielded to be carry'd away with this Notion That the Rules of the different Communication of Motions must be fetch'd from the Proportion found between the different Magnitudes of Colliding Bodies it being impossible to penetrate into the Designs and Will of God And whereas he concluded that every thing had the Force to persevere in its present State whether it were in Motion or Rest because God whose Will constituted this Force acts always in the same manner he inferr'd that Rest had an equal Force with Motion Thus he measur'd the Effects of the Power of Rest by the Greatness of the Body it resided in as well as those of Motion And hence he gave the Rules of the Communication of Motion which are seen in his Principles and the Cause of the Hardness of Bodies which I have endeavour'd to refute 'T is a hard matter not to submit to the Opinion of Monsieur des Cartes when we contemplate it on the same side For once more since the Communication of Motions proceeds only from the Will of the Author of Nature and that we see all Bodies continue in the State they have once been put in whether it be Motion or Rest it seems that we ought to seek for the Rules of the different Communications of Motion upon the Concourse of Bodies not in the Will of God which is unknown to us but in the Proportion that is found between the Magnitudes of these same Bodies I do not therefore admire that Monsieur des Cartes should light upon this Notion but I only wonder he did not correct it when having push'd on his Discoveries he found out the Existence and some Effects of the subtile Matter which surrounds all Bodies I am surpriz'd to find him in the 132d Article of the Fourth Part attribute the Elastick Force of certain Bodies to the subtile Matter and yet not ascribe to it their Hardness and the Resistance they make to our Endeavours to bend and break them but only to the Rest of their Parts For I think it evident that the Cause of the Elasticity and Stiffness of some Bodies is the same with that which impowers them to resist the Violence that is us'd to break them For indeed the Force which is employ'd in breaking a piece of Steel has but an insensible Difference from that which is us'd to bend it I mean not to multiply Reasons here which one might give for the proving these things nor to answer some Difficulties possible to be urg'd about Bodies which are not sensibly springing and yet are difficultly bent For all these Difficulties vanish if we consider that the subtile Matter cannot easily make new Tracks in Bodies which break in bending as in Glass and temper'd Steel which it can easier do in such Bodies as are compos'd of branchy Parts and that are not brittle as in Gold and Lead And Lastly that there is no hard Body but has some kind of Elaterium 'T is a hard matter to persuade one's self that Monsieur des Cartes did positively believe the Cause of Hardness to be different from that which makes the Elasticity and what looks most likely is that he made not sufficient Reflexion on that matter When a Man has for a long time meditated on any Subject and is well satisfied about that of his present Enquiry he commonly thinks no farther on it he believes that the Conceptions he had of it are undeniable Truths and that it is needless to examine them any more But a Man has so many Things in him which disrelish his Application provoke him to precipitate Judgments and subject him to Errour that though his Mind remains apparently satisfied yet it is not always well instructed in the Truth Monsieur des Cartes was a Man like us No greater Solidity Accuracy Extent and Penetration of Thought is any where to be met with than in his Works I confess but yet he was not infallible Therefore 't is very probable he remain'd so settl'd in his Opinion from his not sufficiently reflecting that he asserted something in the Consequence of his Principles contrary to it He grounded it on very specious and probable Reasons but such notwithstanding as being not capable of themselves to force his Consent he might still have suspended his Judgment and consequently as a Philosopher he ought to have done it It was not enough to examine in a hard Body what was in it that might make it so but he ought likewise to have thought on the invisible Bodies which might give it Hardness as he did at the End of his Philosophical Principles when he ascrib'd to them the Cause of their Elasticity He ought to have made an exact Division and comprehensive of whatever might contribute to the Hardness of Bodies It was not enough to have sought the Causes of it in the Will of God he ought also to have thought on the subtile Matter which surrounds these Bodies For though the Existence of that violently agitated Matter was not yet proved in the place of his Principles where he speaks of Hardness it was not however rejected he ought therefore to have suspended his Judgment and have well remember'd that what he had written concerning the Cause of Hardness and of the Rules of Motion was fit to be revis'd which I believe was neglected by him or at least he has not sufficiently consider'd the true Reason of a thing very easie to be discover'd and which yet is of greatest Consequence in Natural Philosophy I thus explain my self Monsieur des Cartes well knew that to the Support of his System the Truth of which he could not reasonably suspect it was absolutely necessary that great Bodies should always communicate some
this That if two Bowls of Lead or of any other less Elastick Matter meet they rebound not after their Collision but proceed almost according to the Rules before establish'd which they keep to so much more exactly as they are less springing Bodies therefore rebound after their Percussion because they are hard that is as I have explain'd because there is an extremely agitated Matter which compresses them and which passing through their Pores with an extreme Violence repel the Bodies which strike against them But it ought to be suppos'd that the Percutient Bodies break not those which they dash against by a Motion over-powering the Resistance the little Parts of the subtile Matter are capable of making as when we discharge a Musket against a piece of Wood. 'T is true the subtile Matter compresses soft Bodies and passes with a rapid Course through their Pores no less than through those of hard and yet these soft Bodies have no Elasticity The Reason whereof is this that the Matter passing through soft Bodies can with a great deal of Ease open it self new Passages by reason of the Minuteness of the Parts composing them or of some other particular Configuration proper for that Effect which hard Bodies will not admit by reason of the Largeness and Situation of their Parts which are contrary to the same Thus when a hard Body strikes another that is soft it alters all the Roads the subtile Matter us'd to pass through which is commonly visible as in a Musket-Bullet which flattens when it is smitten But when a hard Body strikes against another like it it either makes none or very few new Paths and the subtile Matter in its Pores is oblig'd to return upon the same Ground or else must repel the Body which blocks up its little Avenues Lastly It seems evident that every mov'd Body continually endeavouring to tend in a Right Line and declining from it as little as is possible when it meets Resistance ought never to rebound since by that Motion it extremely deviates from a Right 'T is necessary therefore either that Bodies should grow flat or that the stronger should conquer the weaker and make it bear it company But because Bodies are springing and hard they cannot go in company since if A pushes a a repels A and so they must recede from one another Notwithstanding if two Bodies were in a Vacuum though never so hard they would go in company because having no Body to surround them they could have no Elastick Force the Striker making no Resistance to the Striking but Air Gravitation c. resisting the great Motion which the striking Body gives the stricken the stricken resists the striking and hinders it from following For Experience teaches us that Air and Gravity resist Motion and that this Resistance is so much greater as the Motion is more violent 'T is easie to discover from what I have been saying how it comes to pass that in the Percussion of different Bodies encompass'd with Air or Water c. sometimes the Smiting rebounds sometimes communicates all its Motion and remains as it were unmoveable and sometimes it follows the Smitten but always with less Degrees of Swiftness if one or other of them be not perfectly soft For all this depends on the Proportion that is found between the Magnitude the Hardness and the Weight of one and the other supposing them mov'd with an equal Swiftness If they are very hard the Smiting rebounds more because the Elaterium is stronger If the Smiting is very little the Smitten very large and weighty the Smiting rebounds still much because of the Weight and the great Mass of Air surrounding the Smitten which withstands the Motion Last of all If the Force of the Hardness is as it were abated by the little Volume of Air answering the Littleness of the stricken Body or the contrary it may happen that the Smiting may remain as immoveable after the Percussion We need therefore but compare the Hardness of percutient Bodies and the Air which the Percuss'd ought to agitate anew at the time of Percussion whereby to move to give a pretty exact Conjecture concerning what must happen in the Percussion of different Bodies I still suppose an equal Swiftness in the striking for the Air more resists a great Motion than a little one and there is as much Motion in a Body twice as little as in another when proceeding twice as fast as that other Thus the Smitten being driven as fast again may be consider'd as having a Volume of Air twice as big to repel in order to its moving But it ought still to be observ'd that at the Moment of one Body's striking another the Parts of this same Body have two contrary Motions for those on the Fore-side have a backward Tendency by reason of the Collision when at the same time those behind tend forwards on the Account of the first Motion and 't is that Counter-motion which flattens soft Bodies and is the Cause that some hard Bodies break in pieces but when Bodies are very hard this Counter-stroke which vibrates some of the Parts and makes a sort of Trepidation in them as appears from the Sound they give always produces some Changes in the Communication of Motion which are very difficult to be known for many Reasons and 't is in my Mind to little purpose to examine them in particular Would a Man meditate on all these things I believe he would easily answer some Difficulties which might still be rais'd upon the Subject but if I thought that what I have said were insufficient to shew that Rest has no Force to resist Motion and that the Rules of the Communication of Motions given by Monsieur des Cartes are in part false I would here make out that it is impossible by his Supposition to move our selves in the Air And that which makes the Circulation of Motion in Fluid Bodies possible without recurring to a Vacuum is that the first Element easily divides it self in several different manners the Repose of its Parts having no Force to resist Motion The CONCLUSION of the Three last BOOKS I Have if I mistake not sufficiently shewn in the Fourth and Fifth Books that Men's natural Inclinations and Passions frequently occasion their falling into Errour because they induce them more to a precipitate Judgment than a careful Examination of Things I have shewn in the Fourth Book that our Inclination for Good in general is the Cause of the Restlesness of the Will that this Restlesness of the Will puts the Mind in continual Agitation and that a Mind continually agitated is utterly unfit for the Discovery of any the least intricate and hidden Truths That the Love of new and extraordinary Things frequently prepossesses us in their behalf and that whatever bears the Character of Infinite is capable of confounding our Imagination and mis-leading us I have explain'd how our Inclination for Greatness Elevation and Independency insensibly engage us in a falsly-pretended
it to circumambient Objects and so remove us from the Divine Light which would penetrate and illuminate us Nor does Man give himself new Modifications For the Motion of Love which God constantly imprints on us is neither augmented nor diminish'd whether we do or do not actually love I mean whether this natural Motion of Love be or be not determin'd by some Idea of our Mind Nor does this Motion cease by its Acquiescence in the Possession of Good as Motion of Bodies ceases by their Rest. There is great likelihood that God pushes us at all times alike with an even Force towards him for he pushes us on towards Good in general as fast as we are capable and we are at all times equally capable because our Will or our natural Capacity of Willing is always equal to it self Thus I say the Impression or natural Motion which carries us towards Good never encreases or diminishes I confess we have no clear Idea nor indeed inward Sensation of the Evenness of that Impression or natural Motion towards Good But this comes from our not knowing it by Idea which I have formerly prov'd and from our not being conscious of our Faculties whilst they do not actually operate We feel not what is natural and common and always the same in us as the Heat and Beating of the Heart We are even insensible of our Habits and whether we are deserving of the Love or Wrath of God We have perhaps infinite Faculties which are perfectly unknown to us For we are not inwardly conscious of all that we are but only of all that we feel Had we never felt Pain nor desir'd particular Goods we could not by our Self-Consciousness have told whether we are capable of feeling Pain or of willing those Goods It being our Memory and not our internal Sense which teaches us we are capable of feeling what we do not feel or of being mov'd by such Passions as do not actually agitate us There is nothing therefore that can hinder our believing that God draws us towards him with an equal Force though in a very different manner and that he preserves in our Soul an equal Capacity of willing or one and the same Will as he preserves in Matter collectively taken an equal quantity of Motion But though this should not be certain yet I can't see how it can be said that the Augmentation or Diminution of the Natural Motion of our Soul depends on us since we cannot be the Cause of the Extent of our own Will It is moreover certain from what I said before That God produces and preserves in us all that 's real and positive in the particular Determinations of the Motion of our Soul namely our Ideas and Sensations For this it is which determines our Motion towards Good in general to particular Goods but not in an irresistible manner because we have a tendency to go farther Hence all that is done on our part when we sin is our not doing all we yet have the power to do by means of our impression towards Him who comprehends all Goods for all our Power is deriv'd from our Union with Him who works all in us Now the principal cause of our sinning is that preferring Enjoyment to Examination by reason of the Pleasure accruing to our Enjoying and the Pain attending our Examining we desist to employ the Motion which is given us for the pursuit and disquisition of Good and we dwell upon the enjoyment of things which we should no more than make use of But if we observe the Matter nearly we shall see that in this there is nothing real on our part but only an intermission and cessation of Enquiry which corrupts as I may say the Action of God in us but yet can never destroy it So then when we do not sin What is it we do We do all that God does in us for we do not confine to a particular Good or rather a False one the Love which God impresses on us for the True And when we sin What do we do then Nothing For we love a false Good to which God does not carry us by an irresistible impression we cease to persue the true Good and frustrate the Motion God gives us towards it Now whilst we love a particular good only or against ORDER we receive as great an impression of Love from God as if we did not fix upon it Moreover this particular Determination which is neither necessary nor invincible is given us of God and therefore in sinning we produce no new Modification in our selves However I own that when we sin not but resist Temptation we may be said in one sense to give our selves a new Modification because we chuse to think on other things than the seeming Goods wherewith we are tempted But all that we then do is produc'd by the Action which God puts in us that is either by our Motion towards Good in general or by our Will assisted by Grace I mean enlightned by Knowledge and forwarded by a preventing delectation For in fine If the willing different things be suppos'd to be giving different Modifications I deny not but in this Sense the Mind may diversly modifie it self by the Action it receives from God But 't is always to be observ'd that this Action deriv'd into us from God depends upon our selves and is not irresistible with respect to particular Goods For upon the presentation of a particular Good we are inwardly conscious of our Liberty on its behalf as we are of our Pleasure and Pain when they sensibly affect us And the same Reason convinces us we are Free that convinces us we Exist for 't is the inward consciousness or feeling of our own Thoughts that give us to know we have a Being And if at the same time that we are sensible of our Liberty with respect to a particular Good we ought to doubt of it for want of having a clear Idea thereof we ought no less to doubt of our Pain and our Existence at the time of our Misery since we have no clear Idea either of our Soul or Pain It goes quite otherwise with our inward Sensation or Conscience than with our outward Senses The latter always deceive us in something when we follow their reports but the former never deceives us 'T is by the outward Senses I see Colours on the surface of Bodies that I hear Sound in the Air that I feel Pain in my Hand and their Testimony deceives me if I rely upon it But 't is by my inward Sensation that I see Colour that I hear Sound that I suffer Pain and I err not in believing I see when I see hear when I hear and suffer when I suffer provided I stop and go no farther These things are too self-evident to be longer insisted on Therefore being inwardly conscious of our Liberty at the time of a particular Good 's being present to the Mind we are not to be doubtful of
principal part of his Brain Order will'd it so and consequently He whose Will always conforms to Order and who can do nothing against It though He be Almighty Thus Man might on certain Occasions suspend the Natural Law of the Communication of Motions seeing he was not tainted with Concupisence nor did he feel in himself any involuntary and rebellious Motions VII But Adam lost that Power by sinning Order would have it so for it is not reasonable that in Favour of a Sinner and a Rebel there should be any other Exceptions to the general Law of the Communication of Motions than what are absolutely necessary to the Preservation of our Life and Civil Society Therefore the Body of Man being continually shaken by the Action of sensible Objects and his Soul agitated by all the Concussions of the principal part of his Brain he is become a dependent on the Body to which he was only united and over which he had a Sovereignty before his Fall VIII Let us see now how the first Man was capable of sinning It is natural to love Pleasure and to tast it and this was not forbidden Adam The Case is the same with Joy one may rejoice at the sight of his Natural Perfections That is not evil in it self Man was made to be happy and 't is Pleasure and Joy which actually beatifie and content Adam therefore tasted Pleasure in the use of sensible Goods and he felt a Joy upon viewing his own Perfections For 't is impossible to consider ones self as happy or perfect and not be possess'd with it He felt no such Pleasure in his Duty for though he knew God was his Good it was not in a sensible way as I have prov'd in several places So the Joy he might find in his Duty was not very sensible which being suppos'd we conclude That whereas the first Man had not an infinite Capacity of Mind his Pleasure or his Joy weakned its clear sight which gave him to know That God was his Good and that he ought only to love him For Pleasure is in the Soul and the Modification of it and therefore fills up our Capacity of Thought proportionably as it affect and works on us this is a thing which we learn by Experience or rather from that inward Sensation we have of our selves We may then conceive That the first Man having insensibly suffer'd the Capacity of his Mind to be possess'd or divided by the lively Sense of a presumptuous Joy or it may be some Love or sensible Pleasure the Presence of God and the Consideration of his Duty were eras'd from his Mind for neglecting couragiously to pursue his Light in the Search of his True Good so this Distraction made him capable of falling For his principal Grace and strength was his Light and the clear Knowledge of his Duty forasmuch as then he had no need of preventing Delights which are now necessary to oppose to Concupisence IX And it must be observ'd that neither the preventing Sense of Pleasure which Adam felt in the use of the Goods of the Body nor the Joy that possess'd him when reflecting on his own Happiness or Perfection was the true Cause of his Fall for he knew very well that none but God could give him that Sense of Pleasure or Joy and so he in Duty should have lov'd him only forasmuch as none merits our Love save the true Cause of our Felicity As nothing perturbated his Knowledge and Light whilst he strove to keep it pure and incorrupt so he might and ought to have expung'd from his Mind those Sensations which divided it and which endanger'd its falling off and losing sight of him who strengthened and enlightned it He ought to have well remembred that if God offer'd himself not to his Sense but only his Vnderstanding as his Good it was to afford him a readier way to merit his Reward by a continual Exercise of his Liberty Supposing then That Adam and Eve have sinn'd and consequently thereupon felt in themselves involuntary and rebellioâ—s Motions I say That their Children must needs be born Sinners and subject as they were to Motions of Concupiscence See my Reasons for it X. I have prov'd at large in the Chapter that occasion'd this Discourse that there is such a Communication between the Brain of the Mother and that of the Child that all the Motions and Traces excited in the former are stirr'd up in the latter Therefore as the Soul of the Infant is united to its Body at the very instant of its Creation it being the Conformation of the Body which obliges God in consequence of his general Will to inform it with a Soul 't is plain that at the very moment of this Soul's Creation it has corrupt Inclinations and turns towards the Body since it has from that same moment â—nclinations answerable to the Motions that are actually in the Brain it is united to XI But because it is a Disorder That the Mind should propend to Bodies and expend its Love upon them the Infant is a Sinner and in Disorder as soon as out of the Hands of his Maker God who is the Lover of Order hates him in this Estate notwithstanding his Sin is not free and eligible But his Mother conceiv'd him in Iniquity because of the Communication establish'd by the Order of Nature betwixt her Brain and the Brain of her Infant XII Now this Communication is very good in its Institution for several Reasons First Because useful and it may be necessary to the Conformation of the Foetus Secondly Because the Infant by this means might have some Intercourse with his Parents it being but reasonable that he should know to whom he was oblig'd for his Body which he animated Lastly He could not but by help of this Communication know external Occurrences and think of them as he should do Having a Body 't was fit he should have Thoughts relating to it and not be hood-wink'd to the Works of God amongst which he liv'd There are likely many other Reasons for this Communication than those I have given but these are sufficient to justifie it and to cover His Conduct from Censure and Reproach every Will of whom is necessarily conformable to ORDER XIII However there is no Reason that the Infant in spight of his Will should receive the Traces of sensible Objects If the Souls of Children were created but one moment before they were united to their Bodies if they were but an instant in a State of Innocence and Order they would have plenary Right and Power from the necessity of Order or of the Eternal Law to suspend that Communication just as the first Man before his Sin stopt when he pleas'd the Motions which arose in him Order requiring That the Body should be obedient to the Mind But whereas the Souls of Children were never well-pleasing to God it was never reasonable that God on their behalf should dispence with the Law of the Communication of Motions and
by these Sensations what he ought to do for the preservation of his Life But he was never willing to be perturbated by them in spight of his VVill. For that 's a Contradiction Moreover when he desir'd to apply himself to the contemplation of Truth without any distraction of Thought his Senses and his Passions kept an intire Silence Order would it should be so for that 's a necessary sequel of that absolute power he had over his Body I answer secondly that it is not true that the Pleasure of the Soul is the same thing with its Motion and its Love Pleasure and Love are modes of the Souls Existence But Pleasure has no necessary relation to the object that seems to cause it and Love is necessarily related unto Good Pleasure is to the Soul what Figure is to Body and Motion is to Body what Love is to the Soul But the Motion of a Body is very different from its Figure I grant that the Soul which has a constant Propeâ—sity to Good advances as I may say more readily towards it when instigated by a sense of Pleasure that when discourag'd by her suffering Pain as a Body when driven runs easier along if it have a Spherical than if it have a Cubical Figure But the figure of a Body differs from its Motion and it may be Spherical and yet remain at rest 'T is true in this case it goes not with Spirits as with Bodies those cannot feel a Pleasure but they must be in motion because God who only makes and preserves them for himself drives them perpetually on towards good But that does not prove that the pleasure of the Soul is the same thing as its Motion For two things though differing from each other may yet be always found inseparably together I answer lastly that although pleasure were not different from the Love or Motion of the Soul yet that which the first Man felt in the use of the goods of the Body did not incline him to the Loving Bodies 'T is true Pleasure carries the Soul towards the object that causes it in her But it is not the Fruit that we eat with Pleasure which causes the Pleasure in us Not Bodies but God only can act upon the Soul and in any manner make it happy And we are in an Error to think that Bodies have in them what we feel occasionally from their presence Adam before his Sin being not so stupid as to imagine that Bodies were the causes of his Pleasures was not carry'd to the love of them by the motions that accompany'd his Pleasures If pleasure contributed to the fall of the first Man it was not by working in him what at present it does in us But only by filling up or dividing his capacity of Thought it effac'd or diminish'd in his Mind the presence of his true good and of his Duty OBJECTION against the sixth Article What likelyhood is there that the immutable Will of God had a dependance on the will of Man and that on Adam's behalf there were exceptions made to the general Law of the Communication of Motions ANSWER At least it is not evident but such exception might be made now it is evident that immutable order requires the subjection of the Body to the Mind and 't is a contradiction for God not to love and will order for God necessarily loves his Son Therefore it was necessary before the Sin of the first Man that exceptions should be made in his favour to the general Law of the Communication of Motions This seems it may be of a too abstracted nature Here then is somewhat of a more sensible kind Man though a Sinner has the power of moving and stopping his Arm when he pleases Therefore according to the different Volitions of Man the Animal Spirits are determin'd to the raising or stopping some Motions in his Body which certainly cannot be perform'd by the general Law of the Communication of Motions If then the will of God be still submitted to our own why might it not be submitted to the will of Adam If for the good of the Body and of civil Society God stops the communication of motions in Sinners why would he not do the like in favour of a Righteous Man for the good of his Soul and for the preservation of the Union and Society with his God for whom only he was made As God will have no Society with Sinners so after the Sin he depriv'd them of the power they had to sequester themselves as it were from the Body to unite themselves with him But he has left them the Power of stopping or changing the communication of Motions with reference to the preservation of Life and of Civil Society Because he was not willing to destroy his Work having before the construction of it decreed according to St. Paul to re-establish and renew it in Jesus Christ. OBJECTION against the Seventh Article Man in his present state conveys his Body all manner of ways he moves at pleasure all the parts of it which are necessary to be mov'd for the prosecution and shunning of sensible good and evil and consequently he stops or changes every moment the natural communication of motions not only for trifles and things of little importance but also for things useless to Life and civil Society and even for Crimes which violate Society shorten Life and dishonour God all manner of ways God wills order it is true But will order have the laws of motions violated for the sake of Evil and kept inviolable on the account of Good Why must Man lose the power of stopping the motions which sensible objects produce in his Body since these Motions keep him from doing good from repairing to God and returning to his duty and yet retain the power of doing so much evil by his Tongue and his Arm and other parts of his Body whose motions depend upon his will ANSWER To the answering this Objection it must be consider'd that Man having sin'd ought to have return'd to his Original nothing For being no longer in Order nor able to retrieve it he ought to cease to Exist God loves only order the Sinner is not in order and therefore not in the Love of God The Sinner therefore cannot subsist since the subsistence of Creatures depends on the will of the Creator but he wills not that they should exist if he does not love them The Sinner cannot by himself regain lost order because he cannot justifie himself and all that he can suffer cannot atone for his offence He must then be reduc'd to nothing But as it is unreasonable to think that God makes a Work to annihilate it or to let it fall into a state worse than annihilation 't is evident that God would not have made Man nor permitted his Sin which he foresaw unless he had had in view the Incarnation of his Son in whom all things subsist and by whom the Universe receives a Beauty a Perfection
and greatness worthy of the Wisdom and the Power of its Author Man then may be consider'd after his Sin without a Restorer but under the Expectation of one In considering him without a Restorer we plainly see he ought to have no Society with God that that he is unable of himself to make the least approaches to him that God must needs repel him and severely use him when he offers to leave the Body to unite himself to him that is to say that Man after the Sin must lose the power of getting clear of sensible impressions and motions of concupiscence He ought likewise to be annihilated for the foremention'd Reasons But he expects a Restorer and if we consider him under that Expectation we see clearly that he must subsist He and his Posterity whence his Restorer is to arise and thus it is necessary that Man after his Sin preserve still the power of diversely moving all those parts of the Body whose motion may be serviceable to his Preservation 'T is true that Men abuse daily the power they have of producing certain motions and that their power of moving their tongue for Example several ways is the cause of innumerable Evils But if it be minded that power will appear absolutely necessary to keep up Society to comfort one another in the Exigences of thiâ— present Life and to instruct them in Religion which affords hope of a Redeemer for whom the World subsists If we carefully examine what are the motions we produce in us and in what parts of our Body we can affect them we shall clearly see that God has left us the power of our Body no farther than is necessary to the preservation of Life and the cherishing and upholding civil Society For example the Beating of the Heart the Dilatation of the Midriff the peristaltick motion of the Guts the Circulation of the Spirits and Blood and the diverse motions of the Nerves in the Passions are produc'd in us without staying for the order of the Soul As they ought to be much what the same on all occasions nothing obliges God to submit them now to the will of Man But the motions of the Muscles imploy'd in stirring the Tongue the Arms and Legs being to change every minute according to the almost infinite diversity of good or evil Objects all about us it was necessary these motions should depend on the will of Men. But we are to remember That God acts always by the simplest ways and that the Laws of Nature ought to be general and that so God having given us the power of moving our Arm and Tongue he ought not to take away that of striking a Man unjustly or of slandering or reproaching him For if our natural Faculties depended on our Designs there would be no Uniformity nor certain Rule in the Laws of Nature which however must be most simple and general to be answerable to the Wisdom of God and suitable to Order So that God in pursuance of his Decrees chuses rather to cause the Materiality of Sin as say the Divines or to make use of the Injustice of Men as says one of the Prophets than by changing his Will to put a stop to the Disorders of Sinners But he defers his revenging the injurious Treatment which they give him till the time when it shall be permitted him to do it without swerving from his immutable Decrees that is to say when Death having corrupted the Body of the voluptuous God shall be freed from the necessity he has impos'd on himself of giving them Sensations and Thoughts relating to it OBJECTION against the Eleventh and Twelfth Articles Original Sin not only enslaves Man to his Body and subjects him to the Motions of Concupiscence but likewise fills him with Vices wholly Spiritual not only the Body of the Infant before Baptism being corrupted but also his Soul and all his Faculties stain'd and infected with Sin Though the Rebellion of the Body be the principle of some grosser Vices such as Intemperance and Vncleanness yet it is not the Cause of Vices purely Spiritual as are Pride and Envy And therefore Original Sin is something very different from Concupiscence which is born with us and is more likely the Privation of Grace or of Original Righteousness ANSWER I acknowledge That Children are void of Original Righteousness and I prove it in shewing That they are not born upright and that God hates them For methinks one cannot give a clearer Idea of Righteousness and Vprightness than to say a Will is upright when it loves God and that it is crooked and perverse when it draws towards Bodies But if by Righteousness or Original Grace we understand some unknown Qualities like those which God is said to have infus'd into the Heart of the first Man to adorn him and render him pleasing in his sight it is still evident that the Privation of this is not Original Sin for to speak properly that Privation is not hereditarily transmitted If Children have not these Qualities 't is because God does not give 'em them and if God does not bestow them 't is because they are unworthy to receive them and 't is that Vworthiness which is transmitted and which is the Cause of the Privation of Original Righteousness And so that Vnworthiness is properly Original Sin Now this Unworthiness which consists as I have shewn in this That the Inclinations of Children are actually corrupt and their Heart bent upon the Love of Bodies this I say is really in them 'T is not the Imputation of the Sin of their Father they are actually themselves in a disorder'd State In like manner as those who are justify'd by JESUS CHRIST of whom Adam was the Type are not justify'd by Imputation But are really restor'd to Order by an inward Righteousness different from that of our LORD though it be he that has merited it for them The Soul has but two natural or essential Relations the one to God and the other to her Body Now 't is evident That the Relation or Union which she has with God cannot vitiate or corrupt her and therefore she is neither vicious nor corrupt at the first instant of her Creation but by the relation she has to her Body Thus one of the two must needs be said either that Pride and other which we call Spiritual Vices can be communicated by the Body or that Children are not subject to them at the moment of their Birth I say at the moment of their Birth for I do not deny but these ill Habits are easily acquir'd Though pure Intelligences had no other relation than to God and at the instant of their Creation were subject to no Vice yet they fell into Disorder But the Cause of it was their making a wrong use of their Liberty whereof Infants have made no use at all For Original Sin is not of a free Nature But to come to the Point I am of Opinion That they err who think that the Rebellion
we suppose there are some Fruits whose savour is capable of deceiving the most curious senses and which still retain their Natural perfection yet we ought not to believe this proceeded from Sin But only that from the great simplicity of Natural Laws by vertue of which the sense of Tast is form'd and perfected 't was impossible for it to have sufficient Niceness and Sagacity for all sorts of Eatables Besides that defect of sense would not be remediless because when the Mother had an aversion to dangerous Fruits she would communicate it to her Children not only when unborn but also when come into the World For Children only Eat what is given them by their Mothers and they Machinally and by the Air of their Countenance infuse into them an abhorrence for Fruits that are dangerous to be Eaten So that God has made sufficient Provision by our senses for the preservation of our Life and nothing can be better Order'd For as Order requires that the Laws of Union of our Soul and Body should be most Simple they must be of a very General Nature And God ought not to establish particular Laws for such instancess and emergences as most rarely happen Reason on such occasions must Help out the Senses For Reason may be employ'd in all things But the senses are determin'd to some Natural Judgments which are the most advantageous â—maginable as I have prov'd in the first Book Yet even these Judgments are sometimes fallacious because 't is impossible it should be otherwise without multiplying the most simple Laws of Union of the Body with the Soul If we consider Man as now he is under a State of Sickness we must confess his senses often deceive him even in things that relate to the preservation of his Life For the Oeconomy of his Machine being disturb'd in Proportion to it's disturbance irregular motions must unavoidably be excited in his Brain Nevertheless his senses are not so corrupted as is Ordinarily believ'd And God has so wisely provided for the preservation of Life by the Laws of Union of the Soul and Body that though these laws are extreamly simple they often suffice to restore us to our Health and it is much the surer way to follow them than to employ our Reason or certain Physicians that do not carefully study the disposition of their Patients For as a wound closes and heals up of its self when constantly cleans'd and lick'd as is done by Animals when wounded So Ordinary diseases are speedily dispers'd when we let them alone and exactly observe that course of Life which these Diseases as it were by instinct and Sensation put us upon Wine for example seems bitter to a Man in a Feaver and likewise is prejudicial to him in that Condition This same Man finds it agreeable to the Palate when he is in Health and then too it is Wholesome for him It sometimes even happens that Wine is most useful to the Sick that relish it provided their tast be not an effect of the Habit of drinking it and that their desire of it proceed from the present disposition of their Body That it cannot be doubted but that we are to consult our senses in Sickness for the way we are to take to the recovery of our Health Here follows my Opinion about what we ought to do 'T is requisite that the distemper'd Person should be extreamly attentive to those secret desires which sometimes arise in him on occasion of the actual disposition of his Body but above all take heed lest these desires should be the consequence of some preceding Habit. He must to that intent slacken as I may say the bent of Imagination or thinking on nothing that may determine it observe to what he is inclin'd and examine whether his present Inclination proceeds from the actual disposition of his Body Which done he ought to follow it but with much caution and reserve it being extreamly difficult to be assur'd whether these secret Inclinations are owing to the present State of Body and 't is sometimes good to have the advice of some Experienc'd Person upon it But if the Sick Person thus giving a loose to his Imagination as I have been saying finds nothing offer it self to his Mind he must remain quiet and use abstinence for this likely will quicken him to some desire or spend the humours that distemper him But if the disease increase notwithstanding his Abstinence and Rest 't is then necessary to have recourse to experience and the Physician He must give then an exact account of all to a Skillful one that knows if possible the Constitution of his Body He must clearly explain to Him the beginnings and progress of his Disease and the State of Body he was in before he fell into it that He may consult his Experience and Reason with reference to the Person to be cur'd by him And then though the Physician prescribe bitter Medicines and which are really sorts of Poison yet they must be taken because we Experimentally know that these Poisons stay not in the Body but drive out sometimes along with them the corrupt humours which are the cause of the Disease Here it is that Reason or rather Experience must over-rule the Senses provided the abhorrence of the recommended Potion be not of a fresh date For if this Aversion was Cotemporary with the disease it would rather be a Symptom of the Medicine 's being of the same Nature with the ill humours that caus'd the distemper and so perhaps would be augment and strengthen it Nevertheless I think it advisable before we venture upon strong Medicines and which we are much averse to to begin with those that are more gentle and natural As by Drinking a good quantity of Water or taking an easie Emetick if we have lost our Appetite and are not very hard to Vomit Water may attenuate the too condens'd humours and Facilitate the Circulation of the Blood into all the Parts of the Body And Vomitives cleansing the Stomach hinder the Nourishment we take in from corrupting and feeding any longer intermittent Feavers But I ought not to insist upon these things I am therefore of Opinion that we ought to follow the advise of the wise Physicians who are not too hasty and expeditious who are not too presumptuous upon the Recipe's nor too easie to give their Nostrums and Prescriptions For where one remedy does a Sick Man good there are a great many that do him harm As the suffering Persons are impatient and as it makes not for the Honour of the Physicians nor the profit of the Apothecary to visit the sick without prescribing to them so they visit too seldom and prescribe too often When therefore a Man is Sick he ought to request of his Physician that he would â—azard nothing but follow Nature and strengthen it iâ— he can He ought to let him know that he has more Reason and Patience than to take it ill that he visits him often without
giving him relief For on these occasions he sometimes does a great deal who does no mischief I conclude then that we must have recourse to Physicians and refuse not to obey them if we would preserve our Life For though they cannot be assur'd of restoring our Health yet sometimes they may contribute much for it by reason of the continual Experiments they make upon different Diseases They know indeed very little with any exactness yet still they know much more than our selves and provided they will give themselves the trouble of studying our constitution of carefully observing all the Symptoms of the Disease and diligently attending to our own inward Feeling we may hope from them all the Assistances that we may reasonably expect from Men. What we have said of Physicians may in a manner be apply'd to Casuists whom 'tis absolutely necessary to consult on some occasions and commonly useful But it sometimes happens not only to be most useless but highly dangerous to advise with them which I explain and prove 'T is commonly said that humane Reason is subject to Error but herein there is an equivocal sence which we are not sufficiently aware of For it must not be imagin'd that the Reason which Man consults is corrupted or that it ever misleads when faithfully consulted I have said it and I say it again that none but the Soveraign Reason makes us Rational None but the Supream Truth enlightens us nor any but God that speaks clearly and knows how to instruct us We have but one True Master even JESUS CHRIST Our LORD Eternal WISDOM the WORD of the Father in whom are all the Treasures of Wisdom and the Knowledge of God And 't is Blasphemy to say this Vniversal Reason whereof all Men participate and by which alone they are reasonable is subject to Error and capable of deceiving us 'T is not Man's Reason but his Heart that betrays him 'T is not his Light but his Darkness that hinders him from seeing 'T is not the Union he has with God which seduces him noâ— in one sence his Union with the Body But 't is the dependance he has on his Body or rather 't is because he will deceive himself and enjoy the Pleasure of Judging before he has been at the Pains of Examining 't is because he will rest before he arrives to the place of the Rest of Truth I have more exactly explain'd the cause of our Errors in many places of the preceding Book and I here suppose what I there have said Which being laid down I affirm it is needless to consult Casuists when it is certain that Truth speaks to us which we are sure it does when Evidence displays it self in the Answers that are made to our Enquiries that is to the attention of our Mind Therefore when we retire into our own Breast and in the silence of our Senses and Passions hear a Voice so clear and intelligible that we cannot be doubtful of the Truth of it we must submit to it let the World think of us what they please We must have no regard to custom nor listen to our secret Inclinations nor defer too much to the resolves of those who go for the Learned part of Men. We must not give way to be misguided by the false shew of a pretended Piety nor be humbled by the oppositions of those who know not the Soul which animates them But we must bear patiently their proud Insults without condemning their Intentions or despising their Persons We must with simplicity of heart rejoice in the Light of Truth which illuminates us and though its Answers condemn us yet ought we to prefer them before all the subtil Distinctions the Imagination invents for the justification of the Passions Every Man for Example that can enter into himself and still the confus'd noise of the Senses and Passions clearly discovers that every motion of Love which is given us by God must Center upon him and that God himself cannot dispense with the Obligation we have to Love him in all things 'T is evident that God cannot supersede acting for Himself cannot create or preserve our Will to will any thing besides him or to will any thing but what he Wills Himself For I cannot see how it is conceivable that God can Will a Creature should have more Love for what is less lovely or should Love Soveraignly as its end what is not Supreamly amiable I know well that Men who interrogate their Passions instead of consulting Order may easily imagine that God has no other Rule of his Will than his will it self and that if God observes Order 't is meerly â—ecause he will'd it and has made this same Order by a Will absolutely Free and Indifferent There are those who think there is no Order immutable and necessary by its Nature And and that the Order or Wisdom of God whereby he has made all things though the first of Creatures is yet it self a Creature made by a Free-Will of God and not begotten of his Substance by the necessity of his Essence But this Opinion which shakes all the Foundations of Morality by robbing Order and the Eternal Laws depending on it of their Immutability and overturns the entire Edifice of the Christian Religion by divesting JESUS CHRIST or the WORD of God of his Divinity does not yet so perfectly benight the Mind as to hide from it this Truth That God Wills Order Thus whether the Will of God Makes Order or Supposes it we clearly see when we retire into our selves that the God we Worship cannot do what plainly appears to us to be contrary to Order So that Order Willing that our Time or the Duration of our Being should be for him that preserves us that the Motion of our Heart should continually tend towards him who continually impresses it in us that all the Powers of our Souls should labour only for him by vertue of whom they act God cannot dispense with the Commandment he gave by Moses in the Law and repeated by his Son in the Gospel Thou shalt Love the Lord thy God with all thy Heart and with all thy Soul and with all thy Mind and with all thy Strength But because Order requires that every Righteous Person should be happy and every Sinner miserable and that every Action conformable to Order and every Motion of Love to God should be rewarded and every other contrary to Order or that tends not to him punish'd It is evident that whoever will be happy must constantly tend towards God and reject with abhorrence whatever stops or retards him in his course or Weakens his propension to the true good And for this he need not consult any Casuists For when God speaks 't is fit that Men should be silent And when we are absolutely certain that our Senses and Passions have no Voice in those resolves we hear in our most Secret and inward Reason we ought always respectfully to attend and submit to them Would we be
Experience of the ablest Physicians THE ILLUSTRATION UPON THE Third CHAPTER of the Fifth BOOK That Love is different from Pleasure and Joy THE Mind commonly confounds things that are very different when they happen at the same time and are not contrary to each other As I have shown by many Instances in this Work because herein chiefly consist our Errors in Respect of what passes within us Being we have no clear Idea of â—hat constitutes the Nature or Essence of our Mind nor of any of the Modification it can receive it often falls out that to our confounding different things they need but happen in us at the same time For we easily confound what we know not by a clear and distinct Ideâ— It is not only impossible clearly to conceive wherein consists the difference of our Internal Motions it is even difficult to discover any difference between them For to do this we must turn our Eyes inward and retire into our selves not to consider them with reference to Good and Evil which we do willingly enough But to contemplate our selves with an abstract and barren consideration which costs us great trouble and distraction of Thought We easily conceive that the Roundness of a Body differs from its Motion and though we know by Experience that a Bowl on a plane cannot be press'd without being mov'd and so Motion and Roundness are found together Yet we use not to confound them with one another because we conceive Motion and Figure by clear and distinct Ideas But 't is not so with Pleasure and Love which we almost always confound together Our Mind grows as it were Moveable by Pleasure as a Bowl by it's roundness and because it is never void of an impression towards Good it immediately puts it self in Motion towards the Objects which causes or seems to cause the Pleasure So that the Motion of Love happening in the Soul at the very time of it's feeling this Pleasure is sufficient to make her undistinguish or confound them because she has no clear Idea of her Love and Pleasure as she has of Figure and Motion And for this Reason some are perswaded that Pleasure and Love are not different and that I distinguish too many things in each of our Passions But that it may clearly appear that Pleasure and Love are two very different things I divide Pleasures into two sorts the one sort precedes Reason as are agreeable Sensations and go commonly by the Name of the Pleasures of the Body The other sort neither precede Reason nor the senses and are generally call'd the Pleasures of the Soul Such is the Joy that arise in us in pursuance of a clear knowledge of confus'd sensation we have of some Good that either does or shall accrue to us For Example a Man in tasting a Fruit which he does not know finds pleasure in eating it if it be good for Nourishment Which is a preceding or preventing Pleasure for since he feels it before he knows whether the Fruit be good 't is evident it prevents his Reason An Huntsman when hungry expects to find or actually finds something Eatable which gives him an actual sense of Joy Now this Joy is a Pleasure which follows the knowledge of his present or future good It is perhaps evident by this distinction of Pleasure into that which follows and that which prevents Reason that neither of them but differs from Love For preventing pleasure undoubtedly precedes Love since it precedes all Knowledge which some way or other is always suppos'd by Love On the contrary Joy or the Pleasure which supposes foregoing Knowledge presupposes likewise Love since Joy supposes either a confus'd Sensation or a clear Knowledge of the present or future Possession of what we Love For if we possess'd a thing for which we have no Love we should receive no Joy from it Therefore Pleasure is very different from Love since that which prevents Reason prevent and causes Love and that which follows Reason necessarily supposes Love as an Effect supposes the Cause Moreover if Pleasure and Love were the same thing there could be no Pleasure without Love nor Love without Pleasure otherwise a thing could be without it self Nevertheless a Christian Loves his Enemy and a well-educated Child his Father though never so irrational and unkind The Sight of their Duty the Fear of God the Love of Order and Justice causes them to Love not only without Pleasure but even with a sort of Horrour those Persons that are no ways delightful I own they sometimes have the Sense of Pleasure or Joy upon the Reflection that they perform their Duty or upon the Hopes of being rewarded as they do deserve But besides that this Pleasure is very manifestly different from the Love they bear to their Father and Enemy though perhaps it may be the Motive of it it sometimes is not so much as the Motive of their acting but 't is only an abstract View of Order or a Notion of Fear which preserves their Love In one sense it may be truly said they have a Love for these Persons even whilst they do not think of them For Love remains in us during the Avocations of Thought and in Sleep But I conceive that Pleasure has no longer a Substance in the Soul than she is aware of it Thus Love or Charity remaining in us without Pleasure or Delectation cannot be maintain'd to be the very same thing Since Pleasure and Pain are two contraries if Pleasure were the same with Love Pain would not differ from Hatred But 't is evident that Pain is different from Hatred because it often subsists without it A Man for Instance who is wounded unawares suffers a most real and cutting Pain whilst he is free from Hatred For he knows not even the Cause of his Pain or the Object of his Hatred or rather the Cause of his Pain not deserving his Hatred cannot raise it Thus he Hates not that Cause of his Pain though his Pain moves or disposes him to Hatred 'T is true he deservedly Hates Pain but the Hatred of Pain is not Pain but supposes it Hatred of Pain does not Merit our Hatred as does Pain For the former is on the contrary very agreeable in that we are pleased in Hating it as we are displeased in Suffering it Pain therefore not being Hatred the Pleasure which is contrary to Pain is not Love which is contrary to Hatred and consequently the Pleasure which is precedaneous to Reason is not the same thing as Love I prove likewise that Joy or the Pleasure which pursues Reason is distinguish'd from Love Joy and Sorrow being contraries if Joy were the same thing with Love Sorrow and Hatred would be all one But it is evident that Sorrow differs from Hatred because it sometimes has a separate Subsistence A Man for Example by chance finds himself depriv'd of things that he has need of this is enough to make him sorrowful But it cannot provoke him to Hatred Either
and the Accidental Form Accidents Others say that the Forms produce both other Forms and Accidents Others still that bare Accidents are not only capable of producing Accidents but even Forms But it must not be imagin'd that those for instance who say that Accidents can produce Forms by vertue of the Form they are join'd to understand it the same way For one part of them will have Accidents to be the very Force or Virtue of the Substantial Form Another that they imbibe into them the Influence of the Form and only act so by vertue of it A Third lastly will have them to be but Instrumental Causes But neither are these latter sort altogether agreed about what is meant by Instrumental Cause and the vertue they receive from the Principal Nor can the Philosophers compromise about the Action whereby second Causes produce their Effects For some of them pretend that Causality ought not to be produc'd since it is this which produces Others will that they truly act by their own Action But they are involv'd in so many Labyrinths in explaining precisely wherein this Action consists and there are so many different Opinions about it that I cannot find in my Heart to recite them Such is the strange variety of Opinions though I have not produc'd those of the Ancient Philosophers or that were born in very remote Countries But we have sufficient Reason to conclude that they are no more agreed upon the subject of second Causes than those before alledg'd Avicenna for instance is of Opinion that Corporeal Substances cannot produce any thing but Accidents This according to Ruvio is his Hypothesis He supposes that God produces immediately a most perfect Spiritual Substance That this produces another less perfect and this a third and so on to the last which produces all Corporeal Substances and Corporeal Substances Accidents But Avicembrom not able to comprehend how Corporeal Substances which cannot penetrate each other should cause alterations in them supposes that there are Spirits which are capable of acting on Bodies because they alone can penetrate them For these Gentlemen not admitting the Vacuum nor the Atoms of Democritus nor having sufficient knowledge of the subtil matter of M. des Cartes could not with the Gassendists and Cartesians think of Bodies which were little enough to insinuate into the pores of those that are hardest and most solid Methinks this diversity of Opinions justifies this thought of ours that Men often talk of things which they understand not and that the Power of Creatures being a Fiction of Mind of which we have naturally no Idea every Man makes it and imagines it what he pleases 'T is true this Power has been acknowledg'd for a Real and True by most Men in all Ages but it has never yet been prov'd I say not demonstratively but in any wise so as to make an impression upon an Attentive thinking Man For the confus'd Proofs which are built only upon the fallacious Testimony of the Senses and Passions are to be rejected by those who know how to exercise their Reason Aristotle speaking of what they call Nature says it is Ridiculous to go about to prove that Natural Bodies have an inward Principle of Motion and Rest because says he it is a thing that 's Self-Evident He likewise does not doubt but a Bowl which strikes another has the force of putting it in Motion This is witnessed by his Eyes and that 's enough for him who seldom follows any other Testimony than of the Senses very rarely that of his Reason and is very indifferent whether it be intelligible or not Those who impugn the Opinion of some Divines who have written against Second Causes say like Aristotle that the Senses convince us of their Efficacy And this is their first and principal Proof 'T is evident say they that the Fire burns that the Sun shines that Water cools and he must be out of his Senses who can doubt of it The Authors of the other Opinion says the great Averroes are out of their Wits We must say almost all the Peripateticks use sensible Proofs for their Conviction who deny this Efficacy and so oblige them to confess we are capable of acting on them and wounding them 'T is a judgment which Aristotle has already pronounc'd against them and it ought to be put in Execution But this pretended Demonstration cannot but create Pity For it gives us to know the Weakness of an Humane Mind And that the Philosophers themselves are infinitely more sensible than Reasonable It evinces that those who glory in being the Inquirers of Truth know not even whom they are to consult to hear any News of it Whether Soveraign Reason which never deceives but always speaks things as they are in themselves or the Body which speaks only out of Interest and with reference to the preservation and convenience of Life For in fine what prejudices will not be justified if we set up our Senses for Judges to which most of them owe their Birth As I have shown in The Search after Truth When I see a Bowl shock another my Eyes tell me or seem to tell me that it is the True Cause of the motion it impresses for the true cause that moves Bodies is not visible to my Eyes But if I interrogate my Reason I evidently see that Bodies having no Power to move themselves and their moving force being nothing but the Will of God which preserves them successively in different places they cannot communicate a Power which they have not nor could communicate if they had it For 't is plain that there must be Wisdom and that Infinite to regulate the communication of motions with that exactness Proportion and Uniformity which we see A Body cannot know that infinite multitude of impuls'd Bodies round about it and though we should suppose it to have knowledge yet it would not have enough so proportionably to regulate and distribute at the instant of protrusion the moving force it self is carried with When I open my Eyes the Sun appears to me splendidly glorious in Light And it seems not only to be visible it self but to make all the World so too Methinks 't is he that arrays the Earth with flowers and enriches it with Fruits That gives Life to Animals and striking by His Heat into the very Womb of the Earth impregnates Her with Stones Marbles and Metalls But in consulting my Reason I see nothing of all this And if I faithfully consult it I plainly discover the seducement of my Senses and find that God Works all in all For knowing that all the changes which accrue to Bodies have no other principle than the different Communications of Motions which occur in visible and invisible Bodies I see that God does all since 't is his Will that causes and his Wisdom that regulates all these Communications I suppose that Local Motion is the principle of Generations Corruptions Alterations and Universally of all the changes
but acts always by the simplest Ways and for that Reason he makes use of the Collision of Bodies in giving them Motion Not that this Collision is absolutely necessary to it as our Senses tell us but that being the Occasion of the Communication of Motions there need be but very few Natural Laws to produce all the admirable Effects we see For by this means we may reduce all the Laws of the Communication of Motions to one Viz. That percutient Bodies being considered as but one at the Moment of their Contact or Collision the moving Force is divided between them at their Separation according to the Proportion of their Magnitude But whereas concurrent Bodies are surrounded with infinite others which act upon them by Virtue and Efficacy of this Law however constant and uniform this Law be it produces a World of quite different Communications because it acts upon infinite Bodies which are all related to one another It is necessary to Water a Plant to make it grow because by the Laws of the Communication of Motions hardly any other than Watry Particles can by their Motion and by reason of their Figure insinuate and Wind up themselves into the Fibres of Plants and by variously fastning and combining together take the Figure that 's necessary to their Nourishment The subtil Matter which is constantly flowing from the Sun may by its agitating the Water lift it into the Plants but it has not a competent Motion to raise gross Earthy Particles Yet Earth and Air too are necessary to the Growth of Plants Earth to preserve the Water at their Root and Air to give this Water a Moderate Fermentation But the Action of the Sun the Air and Water consisting but in the Motion of their Parts in proper speaking GOD is the only Agent For as I have said there is none but He that can by the efficacy of his Will and by the Infinite Extent of his Knowledge cause and regulate those infinitely infinite Communications of Motions which are made every moment and in a Proportion infinitely exact and regular ARGUMENT IV. Can God resist and Fight against Himself Bodies justle strike and resist one another therefore Gods Acts not in them unless it be by his concourse For if it were he only that produc'd and preserv'd Motion in Bodies he would take care to divert them before the Collision as knowing well that they are impenetrable To what purpose are Bodies driven to be beaten back again why must they proceed to recoil Or what signifies it to produce and Preserve useless Motions Is it not an Absurdity to say that God impugns himself and that He destroys his Works when a Bull fights with a Lyon when a Wolf devours a Sheep and a Sheep eats the Grass which God makes to grow Therefore there are Second Causes ANSWER Therefore Second Causes do all and God does nothing at all For God cannot act against himself but Concourse is Action The concurring to contrary Actions is giving contrary Concourse and consequently doing contrary Actions To concur with the Action of Creatures that resist each other is to Act against himself To concur to useless Motions is to Act in vain But God does nothing needless or in vain he does no contrary Actions and therefore concurs not to the Action of Creatures that often destroy one another and makes useless Actions and Motions See where this proof of Second Causes leads us But let us see what Reason says to it God Works all in every thing and nothing resists him He Works all in all things in as much as his Will both makes and regulates all Motions And nothing resists him because he does what ever he Wills But let us see how this is to be conceiv'd Having resolv'd to produce by the simplest ways as most conformable to Order that infinite Variety of Creatures which we admire he will'd that Bodies should move in a right line because that is the most simple But Bodies being impenetrable and their Motions tending in Lines that oppose or intersect one another they must necessarily fall foul together and consequently cease moving in the same manner God foresaw this yet notwithstanding positively will'd the Collision or shock of Bodies not that he 's delighted in impugning himself but because he design'd to make use of this Collision as an Occasion for his establishing the General Law of the Communication of Motions by which he foresaw he must produce an infinite Variety of admirable Effects For I am perswaded that these two Natural Laws which are the simplest of all others Namely that All Motion tends to make it self in a right line and that in the Collision Motions are Communicated proportionably to the magnitude of the Colliding Bodies are sufficient to produce such a World as we see That is the Heaven and Stars and Planets and Comets Earth Water Air and Fire In a Word the Elements and all Unorganiz'd and inanimate Bodies For Organiz'd Bodies depend on many other Natural Laws which are perfectly unknown It may be living Bodies are not form'd like others by a determinate number of Natural Laws For there is great probability they were all form'd at the Creation of the World and that Time only gives them a necessary Growth to make them Visible to our Eyes Nevertheless it is certain they receive that Growth by the General Laws of Nature whereby all other Bodies are form'd which is the Reason that their Increase is not always Regular I say then that God by the first of Natural Laws positively Wills and consequently Causes the Collision of Bodies and afterwards imploys this Collision as an Occasion of establishing the Second Natural Law which regulates the Communication of Motions and that thus the actual Collision is the Natural or Occasional Cause of the Actual Communication of Motions If this be well consider'd it will be evidently acknowledg'd that nothing can be better Order'd But supposing that God had not so Ordain'd it and that he had diverted Bodies when ready to encounter as if there were a Vacuum to receive them First they would not be subject to that perpetual Vicissitude which makes the Beauty of the Universe For the Generation of some Bodies is perform'd by the Corruption of Others and 't is the contrariety of their Motion which produces their Variety Secondly God would not act in the most simple manner For if Bodies ready to meet should continue on their Motion without touching they must needs describe Lines curv'd in a thousand different Fashions and consequently different Wills must be admitted in God to determine their Motions Lastly if there were no Uniformity in the Action of Natural Bodies and that their Motion were not made in a right Line we should have no certain Principle for our Reasonings in natural Philosophy nor for our conduct in many Actions of our Life 'T is not a disorder that Lyons eat Wolves and that Wolves eat Sheep and Sheep grass of which God has had so
these Terms ought to be explain'd If you 'll say that the Union of my Mind and Body consists in God's willing That upon my Desire to move my Arm the Animal Spirits should betake themselves to the Muscles it is compos'd of to move it in the manner desir'd I clearly understand this Explication and receive it But this is exactly my own Assertion For if my Will determine that of God 't is evident that my Arm is mov'd not by my Will which is impotent of it self but by the Will of God which never fails of its Effect But if it be said The Union of my Mind and Body consists in God's giving me a Force to move my Arm as he has given my Body likewise a Force of making me feel Pleasure and Pain to the end I may be sollicitous for this Body and be concern'd for its Preservation certainly this is to suppose the thing in dispute and to make a Circle No Man has a clear Idea of that Force which the Soul has over the Body or the Body over the Soul nor knows very well what he says when he positively asserts it That Opinion has been embrac'd through Prejudice has been learn'd in Infancy and in the Age of Sense But Understanding Reason and Reflexion have no part in it which is manifest enough from what I have said in the foregoing Treatise But you 'll say I know by my inward Conscience of my Action that I really have this Force and therefore am not mistaken in believing it I answer That when I move my Arm I am conscious to my self of the Actual Volition by which I move it and I err not in believing I have that Volition I have moreover an inward Sense of a certain Effort or Endeavour which accompanies this Volition and it is to believ'd that I make this Endeavour Last of all I grant that I have an inward feeling of the Motion of my Arm at the instant of this Effort which suppos'd I agree to what is said That the Motion of the Arm is perform'd at the instant a Man feels this Effort or has a practical Volition of moving his Arm. But I deny that this Effort which is no more than a Modification or Sensation of the Soul which is given us to make us understand our Weakness and to afford us a confus'd and obscure Sensation of our Strength can be capable of moving and determining the Spirits I deny there is any Analogy or Proportion between our Thoughts and the Motions of Matter I deny that the Soul has the least Knowledge of the Animal Spirits which she imploys to move the Body Animated by her Last of all Though the Soul exactly knew the Animal Spirits and were capable of moving them or determining their Motions yet I deny that with all this she could make choice of these Ductus of the Nerves of which she has no Knowledge so as to drive the Spirits into them and thereby move the Body with that Readiness Exactness and Force as is observable even in those who are the least acquainted with the Structure of their Body For supposing that our Volitions are truly the moving Force of Bodies howbeit that seems inconceivable how can we conceive the Soul moves her Body The Arm for Example is mov'd by means of an inflation or contraction caus'd by the Spirits in some of the Muscles that compose it But to the end the Motion imprinted by the Soul on the Spirits in the Brain may be Communicated to those in the Nerves and from thence to others in the Muscles of the Arm the Volitions of the Soul must needs multiply or change in proportion to those almost infinite shocks or Collisions that are made by the little Bodies that constitute the Spirits But this is inconceivable without admitting in the Soul an infinite number of Volitions upon the least Motion of the Body since the moving it would necessarily demand an innumerable multitude of Communications of Motions For in short the Soul being but a particular Cause and not able to know exactly the degrees of agitation and the dimensions of infinite little Corpuscles which encounter upon the dispersion of the Spirits into the Muscles she could not settle a General Law for the Communication of these Spirits Motion nor follow it exactly if she had establish't it Thus it is evident the Soul could not move her Arm although she had the Power of determining the Motion of the Animal Spirits These things are too clear to be longer insisted on The case is the same with our Thinking Faculty We are inwardly conscious that we Will the Thinking on something that we make an effort to that purpose and that in the Moment of our desire and effort the Idea of the thing presents it self to our Mind but our inward Sensation does not tell us that our Will or Effort produces our Idea Reason does not assure us that it 's possible and only prejudice makes us believe that our desires are the causes of our Ideas whilst we experiment an hundred times a Day that the latter accompany or pursue the former As God and his Operations have nothing sensible in them and as we are not conscious of any thing but our desires that precede the presence of our Ideas so we do not think our Ideas can have any other cause than these desires But view the thing closely and we shall see no force in us to produce them neither Reason nor Conscience giving us any information thereupon I don't think my self oblig'd to transcribe all the other proofs employ'd by the patrons for the Efficacy of Second Causes Because they seem so trifling that I might be thoughts to design to render them Ridiculous And I should make my self so if I gave them a Serious Answer An Author for Example very gravely asserts in behalf of his Opinion Created Beings are true Material Formal Final Causes why must not they likewise be Efficient or Efficacious I fancy I should give the World little satisfaction if to answer this Gentlemans Question I should stand to explain so gross an Ambiguity and show the difference between an Efficacious cause and that which the Philosophers are pleas'd to call material Therefore I leave such arguments as these to come to those which are drawn from Holy-Writ ARGUMENT VII The Defenders of the Efficacay of Second Causes commonly alledge the following Passages to support their Opinion Let the Earth bring forth Grass Let the Waters bring forth the moving Creature that hath Life and Fowl that may fly c. Therefore the Earth and Water by the Word of God receiv'd the Power of producing Plants and Animals Afterwards God Commanded the Fowls and Fishes to multiply Be fruitful and multiply and fill the Waters in the Seas and let Fowl multiply in the Earth Therefore he gave them a Power of begetting their like Our Saviour in the fourth Chapter of St. Mark says the Seed which falls on good Ground brings forth
living in the Water God to let us understand that his Order constituted them in these Places produc'd them therein From the Earth he form'd Animals and Plants not that the Earth was capable of Generating or as if God had to that intent given it a force and Vertue which it retains till now For we are sufficiently agreed that the Earth does not Procreate Horses and Oxen but because out of the Earth the Bodies of Animals were form'd as is said in the following Chapter Out of the ground the Lord form'd every Beast of the field and every Fowl of the Air. The Animals were form'd out of the gound formatis de humo animantibus says the Vulgar Latin and not produc'd by it Therefore when Moses had related how Beasts and Fish were produc'd by Vertue of the Command which God gave the Earth and Water to produce them he adds that it was God that made them lest we should attribute their Production to the Earth and Water And God CREATED great Whales and every living Creature that moveth which the WATERS BROVGHT FORTH abundantly after their kind and every winged Fowl after his kind and a little lower after he had spoken of the formation of Animals he adjoyns And GOD MADE the Beast of the Earth after his kind and Cattel after their kind and every thing that creepeth on the Earth after his kind But 't is observable by the way That what the Vulgar Translates Producant aquae reptile animae viventis volatile super terram and our English Let the Water bring forth abundantly the moving Creature that hath Life and Fowl that may fly above the Earth the Hebrew has it Volatile VOLITET Let the Fowl fly above the Earth Which distinction shows as is evident from the fore-cited passage of the next Chapter that Fowls were not produc'd from the Water and that it was not Moses's design to prove that the Waters were truly empower'd to produce Fish and Fowl but only to denote the respective place design'd for each by the Order of God whether to live or to be produc'd in Et volatile VOLITET super Terram For commonly when we say that the Earth produces Trees and Plants we only mean to signifie that it furnishes Water and Salts which are necessary to the Germination and increase of Seeds But I dwell no longer on the Explication of these Scripture Passages which Literally taken make for Second Causes For we are so far from being oblig'd that it is sometimes dangerous to take Expressions in the Letter which are founded on common Opinion by which the Language is form'd For the vulgar part of Men speak of all things according to the Impressions of Sense and the Prejudices of Infancy The same Reason which constrains us to interpret Literally such Scripture Passages as directly oppose Prejudices gives us Reason to believe the Fathers never design'd ex proposito to maintain the Efficacy of Second Causes or the Nature of Aristotle For though they often speak in a manner that countenances Prejudices and the Judgments of Sense yet they sometimes so explain themselves as to manifest the disposition of their Mind and Heart St. Austin for instance gives us sufficiently to understand That he believed the Will of God to be the Force and Nature of every thing when he speaks thus We are wont to say but not truly that Prodigies are against Nature For the Nature of every Creature being but the Will of the Creator How can that which is done by the Will of God be contrary to Nature Miracles therefore and Prodigies are not against Nature but against what we know of it 'T is true St. Austin speaks in several places according to Prejudices But I affirm that that is no Argument for we are not Literally to explain but those Expressions which are contrary to them for which I have given the Reasons If St. Austin in his Works had said nothing against the Efficacy of Second Causes but had always favour'd this Opinion his Authority might be made use of to confirm it But if it should not appear that he had industriously examin'd that Question we might still have reason to think he had no settled and resolv'd Opinion about the Subject but was it may be drawn by the Impression of the Senses inconsiderately to believe a thing which no Man would doubt of before he had carefully examin'd it 'T is certain for example that St. Austin always speaks of Beasts as if they had a Soul I say not a Corporeal Soul for that Holy Father too well knew the distinction of the Soul and Body to think there were Corporeal Souls I say a Spiritual Soul for Matter is incapable of Sense And yet it would seem methinks more reasonable to employ the Authority of St. Austin to prove that Beasts have not a Soul than to prove they have For from the Principles which he has carefully examin'd and strongly establish'd it manifestly follows they have none as is shown by Ambrosius Victor in his Sixth Volume of Christian Philosophy But the Opinion that Beasts have a Soul and are sensible of Pain when we strike them being consonant to Prejudices for there is no Child but believes it we have still reason to believe that he speaks according to Custom and Vulgar Opinion and that if he had seriously examin'd the Question and once began to doubt and make reflexion he would never have said a thing so contrary to his Principles And thus though all the Fathers had constantly favour'd the Efficacy of Second Causes yet it may be no regard were due to their Opinion unless it appear'd that they had carefully Examin'd the Question and that their Assertions were not the results of common Speech which is form'd and founded upon Prejudices But the case is certainly quite contrary for the Fathers and such as were most Holy and best acquainted with Religion have commonly manifested in some places or other of their Works what was their Disposition of Mind and Heart in reference to the present Question The most Understanding and indeed the greatest number of Divines seeing that on one hand the Holy Scripture was repugnant to the Efficacy of Second Causes and on the other that the Impression of the Senses the publick Vote and especially Aristotle's Philosophy which was had in veneration by the Learned establish it For Aristotle believ'd God unconcern'd in the particulars of Sublunary Transactions That that change was below his Majesty and that Nature which he supposes in all Bodies suffic'd to produce all that was done below The Divines I say have so equally balanc'd these Two as to reconcile Faith with Heathen Philosophy Reason with Sense and to make Second Causes ineffective without the additional concourse of God Almighty But because that immediate concourse whereby God acts jointly with Second Causes includes great difficulties some Philosophers have rejected it pretending that in Order to their Acting there needs no more than
that God should continue to them their Vertue he endow'd them with in their Creation And since this Opinion is exactly agreeable with Prejudice because of the insensible Operation of God in Second Causes it is commonly embrac'd by the vulgar sort of Men and such as have more studied Ancient Naturalists and Physicians than Theology and Truth Most are of Opinion that God created all things at first and gave them all the Qualities and Faculties that were necessary to their preservation that he has for example given the first Motion of Matter and left it afterwards to it self to produce by the Communication of its Motions that admirable variety of Forms we see 'T is Ordinarily suppos'd that Bodies can move one another and this is said to be Mr. des Cartes's Opinion though he speaks expresly against it in the Thirty Sixth and Seventh Articles of the Second Part of his Philosophical Principles Since Men must unavoidably acknowledge that the Creatures depend on God they lessen and abridge as much as possible that dependance whether out of a secret Aversion to God or a strange and wretched stupidity and insensibility to his Operation But whereas this Opinion is receiv'd but by those who have not much studied Religion and have preferr'd their Senses to their Reason and Aristotle's Authority to that of Holy Writ we have no reason to fear its making way into the Mind of those who have any Love for Truth and Religion for provided a Man seriously examin'd it he must needs discover its falsity But the Opinion of God's Immediate Concourse to every Action of Second Causes seems to accord with those Passages of Scripture which often attribute the same Effect both to GOD and the Creature We must consider then that there are places in Scripture where 't is said that God is the only Agent I am the Lord that maketh all things that stretcheth forth the Heavens alone that spreadeth abroad the Earth by my self Ego sum Dominus says Isaiah faciens OMNIA Extendens coelos SOLVS stabiliens Terram NVLLVS Mecum A Mother Animated with the Spirit of God tells her Children it was not her that form'd them I cannot tell how you came into my Womb For I neither gave you Breath nor Life neither was it I that form'd the Members of every one of you But doubtless the Creator of the World c. Nescio qualiter in utero meo apparuistis singulorum membra NON EGO IPSA COMPEGI sed mundi Creator She does not say with Aristotle and the School of the Peripateticks that to her and the Sun they ow'd their Birth but to the Creator of the Universe Which Opinion that God only Works and forms Children in their Mothers Womb not being conformable to Prejudice and Common Opinion These Sentences according to the pre-establish'd Principle must be explain'd in the Literal Sense But on the contrary the Notion of Second Causes falling in with the vulgar Opinion and being Suited to the sensible impression the Passages which expresly make for the separate Efficacy of Second Causes must be reckon'd invalid when compar'd with the former Concourse therefore is insufficient to reconcile the different Texts of Scripture and all Force Power and Efficacy must be ascrib'd to God But though the immediate concurrence of God with Second Causes were fit to accommodate the disagreeing passages of Holy Writ yet after all it is a question whether it ought to be admitted For the Sacred Books were not compos'd for the Theologists of these times but for the People of the Jews So that if this People had not understanding or Subtilty enough to imagine a Concourse such as is admitted in School-Divinity and to agree to a thing which the greatest Divines are hard put to to explain it follows if I mistake not that the Holy Scripture which Attributes to God and even to God alone the production and preservation of all things would have betray'd them into Error And the Holy Pen-Men had stood chargeable with writing not only in an unintelligible but deceitful Language For in saying that God Work'd all they would have design'd no more than that God assisted to all things with his concourse which was not probably so much as thought on by the Jews Those amongst them who were not very great Philosophers believing that God Work'd all and not that he concurr'd to all But that we may pass a more certain judgement about this Concourse it would be requisite to explain with care the different Hypotheses of the School-Men upon it For besides those impenetrable Clouds and Obscurities which involve all the Opinions that cannot be explain'd and defended without loose and indefinite Terms there are upon this Matter so great a variety of Opinions that it would be no hard Matter to discover the cause of them But I design not to engage in a discussion that would be so wearisom to my self as well as the greatest part of Readers On the contrary I had rather try to show that my Opinions may in some thing accord with those of the greater number of Scholastick Divines though I cannot but say their Language looks very Ambiguous and confus'd To explain my self I am of Opinion as I have said elsewhere that Bodies for example have no Force to move themselves and that therefore their moving force is nothing but the Action of God or not to make use of a Term which has no distinct import their moving force is nothing but the Will of God always necessarily Efficacious which successively preserves them in different Places For I believe not that God Creates any particular Beings to make the moving force of Bodies not only because I have no Idea of such a kind of Being nor see how they could move Bodies But also because these Beings themselves would have need of others to move them and so in infinitum For none but God is truely Immoveable and Mover altogether Which being so when a Body strikes and moves another I may say that it Acts by the Concurrence of God and that this Concurrence is not distinct from its own Action For a Body meeting another moves it by its Action or its moving force which at bottom is nothing but the Will of God preserving the Body successively in different Places the translation of a Body being not it's Action or moving force but the Effect of it Almost all Divines say too that the Action of Second Causes is not different from that of God's Concurrence with them For though they have a various Meaning yet they suppose that God Acts in the Creatures by the same Action as the Creatures And they are oblig'd if I mistake not thus to speak For if the Creatures Acted by an Action which God Work'd not in them their Action consider'd as such would no doubt be independent But they acknowledge as it becomes them that the Creatures depend immediately on God not only as to their Being but likewise as to
his Creatures also For hereby we pay Legitimate Honour to their Creatour Merit his good Graces and oblige him to shower new Benefits upon us 'T is manifest he approves of the Honour that is given to his Creatures since they partake of his Power and all Power deserves to be honour'd But because Honour ought to be Proportion'd to Power and that the Power of the Sun and all other sensible Objects is such as derives to us all sorts of Goods 't is reasonable we should Honour them with all our Strength and next to God Consecrate to them all our Being These are the Natural Reasonings a Man would fall into that should ground upon the Prejudice of the Efficacy of Second Causes and probably such was the Arguing of the first Founders of Idolatry Take here his Sense of it who passes for the most Learned of all the Jews He Prefaces a a Treatise he wrote about Idolatry with these Words In the days of Enos Men fell into strange Illusions and the Wise Men of that Age quite lost their Sense and Reason Enos himself was one of those deluded Persons whose Errours were these Since God said they has created the Heavens and Stars to govern the World has constituted them on â—igh and invested them with Glory and Lustre and employs them in executing his Commands 't is just that we should honour them and pay them our Deference and Homage 'T is the Will of our God that Honour should be given to those whom he has exalted and enthron'd in Glory as a Prince requires that his Ministers should be â—onour'd in his Presence because the Honour which is given to them redounds to himself When once this Notion had entred their Head they fell to building Temples in Honour of the Stars gave them Sacrifice and Praises and even prostrated themselves before them thereby imagining to purchase the favour of Him that created them And this was the Original of Idolatry It is so Natural and just to have grateful Resentments in Proportion to the Goods we receive that almost all Nations have ador'd the Sun because they all concluded him the Cause of the Blessings they enjoy'd And if the Aegyptians ador'd not only the Sun and Moon and River Nile because its overflowing caus'd the Fertility of their Country but even the vilest of Animals 'T was as Cicero relates from the Emolument they receiv'd from them Therefore as we cannot and indeed ought not to Extirpate from Men's Minds their Natural Inclination for the true Causes of their Happiness 't is evident there is at least some danger in ascribing Efficacy to Second Causes though we conjoyn the necessity of an immediate Concourse which has methinks I know not what of incomprehensible purport and which strikes in as an after-game to justifie our imbib'd Prejudices and Aristotle's Philosophy But there 's no danger in speaking only what we see and of Attributing only to God Efficacy and Power since we see nothing but His Wills which have an absolutely necessary and indispensible connexion with Natural Effects I own that now adays Men are Wise enough to avoid those gross Errors of Heathens and Idolaters but I fear not to say our Mind is still dispos'd or rather our Heart is often bent like that of the Heathens and that there will ever be in the World some kind of Idolatry until the Day in which JESUS CHRIST shall restore up His Kingdom to God his Father having first destroy'd all Empire Dominion and Power that God may be All in all For is it not a kind of Idolatry to make a God of ones Belly as speaks S. Paul Is not he an Idolater to the God of Riches who labours Night and Day to acquire them Is this to render to God the Worship we owe Him Is this to adore Him in Spirit and in Truth to have our Hearts fill'd with some sensible Beauty and our Mind struck and dazled with the Lustre of some imaginary Grandeur Men fancying to themselves that Circumambient Bodies afford the pleasures they enjoy in the use of them Unite to them with all the Powers of their Soul and thus the Principle of their Corruption lies in the sensible Conviction of the Efficacy of Second Causes 'T is only Reason that assures them none but God Acts in them But besides that this Reason speaks so low that it is scarce Audible and that the Contradicting Senses cry so loud that their Clamour Stunns and Stupefies them they are yet farther confirm'd in their Prejudice by Reasons and Arguments that are so much dangerous as they have more External Characters and sensible marks of Truth The Philosophers but especially the Christian Philosophers ought to wage an uninterrupted War with Prejudices or the Judgements of their Senses and particularly those of so dangerous importance as that of the Efficacy of Second Causes And yet there are Men whom I extremely honour as I have just Reason who from I know not what Principle endeavour to confirm this Prejudice and to make so holy so pure and solid a Doctrine as this which owns no other true Cause than God pass for Superstitious and Extravagant Opinion They will not have us to Love and Fear God in all things but to Love and Fear all things with reference to God We ought say they to Love the Creatures since they are good to Love and respect our Father to give Honour to our Prince and Superiours since God Commands it Nor do I deny it but I deny that we are to Love the Creatures as our Goods though they be good or perfect in themselves I deny that we are to pay service and respect to Men as to our Masters Or to explain my self more clearly I say we must not serve our Master obey our Father or Prince with any other design than to serve and obey God S. Paul who became all things to all Men and was complaisant in all things for the Salvation of those he Preach'd to speaks thus Servants be obedient to them that are your Masters according to the flesh with fear and trembling in singleness of your Heart as unto CHRIST not with Eye-Service as Men pleasers but as the Servants of Christ doing the Will of God from the Heart with good Will doing Service AS TO THE LORD AND NOT TO MEN. And in another Epistle Not with Eye-Service as to MEN but in singleness of Heart fearing GOD. And whatever ye do do it Heartily AS TO THE LORD and NOT VNTO MEN. We must therefore obey our Father serve our Prince and Honour our Superiours AS UNTO GOD AND NOT UNTO MEN. This is manifest and can have no Evil consequences For hereby Superiours would always be more honour'd and better serv'd But I think it may be said That a Master who would be honour'd and serv'd as having in himself another Power than that of God would be a Devil and that those who serv'd him under that apprehension would be
The Soul of a Beast is a Substance distinct from its Body This Soul is Annihilated and therefore Substances may naturally be Annihilated Therefore though the Soul of Man be a Substance distinct from his Body it may be Annihilated when the Body is destroyed And thus the Immortality of the Humane Soul cannot be Demonstrated by Reason But if it be own'd to be most certain That no Substance can be naturally reduc'd to nothing the Soul of Beasts will subsist after Death and since they have no reward to hope for and are made for Bodies they must at least pass out of one to another that they may not remain useless in Nature Which seems to be the most reasonable Inference Now 't is Matter of Faith That God is just and Wise That he Loves not Disorder That Nature is corrupted That the Soul of Man is Immortal and that That of Beasts is Mortal Because indeed it is not a distinct Substance from their Body nor consequently capable of Knowledge and Love or of any Passions and Sensations like ours Therefore in the Stile of Monsieur de la Ville who condemns Men upon Consequences that he draws from their Principles the Cartesians may justly charge him with a Crime and all Mindkind besides for believing Beasts have Souls What would Monsieur de la Ville say if in his way of proceeding we should tax him of Impiety for entertaining Opinions from whence it might be concluded That God is not Just Wise or Powerful Opinions that overthrow Religion that are opposite to Original Sin that take away the only Demonstration Reason can give of the Immortality of the Soul What would he say if we should charge him with Injustice and Cruelty for making innocent Souls to suffer and even for Annihilating them to feed upon the Bodies which they Animate He is a Sinner but they are Innocent and yet for the Nourishment of his Body he kills Animals and Annihilates their Souls which are of greater Worth than his Body Yet if his Body could not subsist without the Flesh of Animals or if the Annihilation of a Soul should render his Body for ever Immortal this Cruelty as unjust as it is might perhaps be excusable But with what Pretence can he Annihilate Substances altogether innocent to sustain but a few days a Body justly condemn'd to Death because of Sin Would he be so little a Philosopher as to excuse himself upon the Custom of the Place he lives in But what if his Zeal should carry him into the Indies where the Inhabitants found Hospitals for Beasts and the Philosophers and the better and more gentile Part of them are so charitable to to the smallest Flies that for fear of killing them by Breathing and Walking they wear a fine Cloath before their Mouths and fan the Ways through which they pass Would he then fear to make innocent Souls to suffer or to Annihilate them for the Preservation of a Sinner's Body Would he not rather chuse to subscribe to their Opinion who give not Beasts a Soul more Noble than their Body or distinct from it and by publishing this Opinion acquit himself of the Crimes of Cruelty and Injustice which these People would charge upon him if having the same Principles he follow'd not their Custom This Example may suffice to shew that we are not permitted to treat Men as Hereticks and dangerous Persons because of Irreligious Consequences that may be deduc'd from their Principles when these Consequences are disown'd by them For though I think it would be an infinitely harder Task to answer the aforesaid Difficulties than those of M. de la Ville's yet the Cartesians would be very Ridiculous if they should accuse Monsieur de la Ville and others that were not of their Opinion of Impiety and Heresie 'T is only the Authority of the Church that may decide about Matters of Faith and the Church has not oblig'd us and probably whatever Consequence may be drawn from common Principles never will oblige us to believe that Dogs have not a Soul more Noble than their Body that they know not their Masters that they neither fear nor desire nor suffer any thing because it is not necessary that Christians should be instructed in these Truths ARGUMENT II. Almost all Men are perswaded That sensible Objects are the true Causes of Pleasure and Pain which we feel upon their Presence They believe that the Fire sends forth that agreeable Heat which rejoyces us and that our Aliments Act in us and give us the Welcome Sensations of Tasts They doubt not but 't is the Sun which makes the Fruits necessary for Life to thrive and that all sensible Objects have a peculiar Vertue by which they can do us a great deal of Good and Evil. Let us see if from these Principles we cannot draw Consequences contrary to Religion and Points of Faith A Consequence opposite to the first Principle of Morality which obliges us to love God with all our Strength and to fear none but Him 'T is a common Notion by which all Men Order their Behaviour That we ought to love and fear what has Power to do us Good and Harm to make us feel Pleasure and Pain to render us happy or miserable and that this Cause is to be lov'd or fear'd proportionably to its Power of Acting on us But the Fire the Sun the Objects of our Senses can truly Act on us and make us in some manner happy or miserable This is the Principle suppos'd we may therefore Love and Fear them This is the Conclusion which every one naturally makes and is the general Principle of the corruption of Manners 'T is evident by Reason and by the First of God's Commandments That all the motions of our Soul of Love or Fear Desire or Joy ought to tend to God and that all the Motions of our Body may be Regulated and Determin'd by encompassing Objects By the Motion of our Body we may approach a Fruit avoid a Blow fly a Beast that 's ready to devour us But we ought to Love and Fear none but God all the Motions of our Soul ought to tend to Him only we are to Love Him with all our strength this is an indispensible Law We can neither Love or Fear what is below us without disorder and corruption Freely to fear a Beast ready to devour us or to fear the Devil is to give them some honour to Love a Fruit to desire Riches to rejoyce in the light of the Sun as if he were the true cause of it to Love even our Father our Protector our Friend as if they were capable of doing us good is to pay them an Honour which is due to none but God in which sense it is lawful to Love none But we may and ought to Love our Neighbour by wisâ—ing and procuring him as Natural or Occasional Cause all that may make him happy and no otherwise For we to Love our Brothers not as if able to do
us good but as capable to enjoy together with us the true Good These Truths seem evident to me but Men strangely obscure them by supposing that the surrounding Bodies can Act on us as True Causes Indeed most Christian Philosophers acknowledge That the Creatures can do nothing unless God concur to their Action and that so sensible Objects being unable to Act on us without the Efficacy of the First Cause must not be lov'd or fear'd by us but God only on whom they depend Which Explication makes it manifest That they condemn the consequences which I have now deduc'd from the Principle they receive But if in imitation of Monsieur de la Ville's Conduct I should say 't was a slight and subterfuge of the Philosophers to Cloak their Impiety if I should urge them with the Crime of supporting Aristotle's Opinions and the prejudices of Sense at the expence of their Religion if piercing too into the inmost recesses of their Heart I should impute to them the secret desire of debauching Men's Morals by the defence of a Principle which serves to justifie all sorts of disorders and which by the consequences I have drawn from it overthrows the first Principle of Christian Morality Should I be thought in my Senses whilst I went to condemn most Men as impious upon the strength of the inferences I had deduc'd from their Premises Monsieur de la Ville will no doubt pretend that my Consequences are not rightly inferr'd but I pretend the same of his and to ruine them all I need but explicate some Equivocal Terms which I shall sometime do if I find it necessary But how will Monsieur de la Ville justifie the common Opinion of the Efficacy of Second Causes and by what sort of concourse will he ascribe to God all that is due to Him Will he make it clearly appear that one individual Action is all of God and all of the Creature Will he demonstrate that the Power of the Creature is not useless though without its Efficacy the sole Action of God would produce the same effect Will he prove that Minds neither ought to Love nor Fear Bodies though the latter have a true Power of Acting on the former and will he make multitudes of Converts hereupon among those whose Mind and Heart are taken up with sensible Objects from a confus'd Judgment they make that these Objects are capable of making them Happy or Miserable Let him confess then That if we might treat as Hereticks and profane Persons all that hold Principles from which Heretical and Impious Consequences may be drawn no Man what ever could secure his Faith from being suspected ARGUMENT III. The Consequence of the Principle propos'd by Monsieur de la Ville as a Point of Faith viz. That the Essence of Body consists not in Extension This negative Principle overthrows the only demonstrative and direct Proof we have of the Soul 's being a distinct Substance from the Body and consequently of her Immortality When this truth is receiv'd which I presume with many other Persons to have demonstrated which Monsieur de la Ville impugns as contrary to the decisions of the Church viz. That the Essence of matter consists in Extension in Length Breadth and Thickness It is easie to comprehend that the Soul or that which is capable of Thought is a distinct substance from the Body For it 's manifest that Extension whatever Division and Motion be conceiv'd in it can never arrive to Reason Will or Sense Wherefore that thinking thing which is in us is necessarily a substance distinct from our Body Intellectual Notices Volitions and Actual Sensations are Actually Modes of some substances Existence But all the Divisions incidental to Extension can produce nothing but Figures Nor all its various Motions any thing but Relations of Distance Therefore Extension is not capable of other Modifications Therefore our Thought Desire Sensations of Pleasure and Pain are Modes of a Substances Existence which is not a Body Therefore the Soul is distinct from the Body which being conceded we thus demonstrate her Immortality No substance can be Annihilated by the Ordinary strength of Nature For as nature cannot produce something out of nothing So she cannot reduce something into nothing Modifications of Beings may be Annihilated Rotundity of a Body may be destroy'd for that which is round may become square But this roundness is not a Being a Thing a Substance but only a Relation of Equality of distance between the terminating parts of the Body and that which is in the Center Which relation changing the Roundness is destroy'd but the substance cannot be reduc'd to nothing Now for the foremention'd Reasons the Soul is not a Mode of a Body's Existing Therefore she is immortal and though the Body be dissolv'd into a Thousand parts of a different Nature and the structure of its Organs broke to pieces since the Soul consists not in that structure nor in any other Modification of matter 't is evident that the dissolution and even the Annihilation of the substance of an humane Body were that Annihilation true could not Annihilate the substance of our Soul Let us add to this another proof of the immortality of the Soul grounded upon the same Principle Though the Body cannot be reduc'd to nothing because it is a substance it may notwithstanding die and all its parts may be dissolv'd Because Extension is divisible But the Soul being a substance distinct from Extension cannot be divided For we cannot divide a Thought a Desire a Sensation of Pain or Pleasure as we may divide a square into two or four Triangles Therefore the substance of the Soul is indissoluble incorruptible and consequently immortal because unextended But if Monsieur de la Ville supposes that the Essence of Body consists in something besides Extension how will he convince the Libertines that she is neither material nor mortal They will maintain that something wherein the Essence of Body consists is capable of thinking and that the substance which thinks is the same with that which is extended If Monsieur de la Ville denies it they 'll show that he does it without Reason since according to his Principle Body being something else than Extension he has no distinct Idea of what that can be and consequently cannot tell but that unknown thing may be capable of Thought Does he think to convince them by saying as he does in his Book that the Essence of Body is to have Parts without Extension Certainly they will not take his Word for it for finding it as hard to conceive parts without Extension as indivisible Atoms or Circles without two Semi-circles they must have more deference for him than he has for God himself For Monsieur de la Ville in the last part of his Book pretends that God himself cannot oblige us to belive contradictory things such as are the Parts of a Body without any Actual extension But the Libertines on their part would
be enquir'd why GOD who so loves the Glory he receives in the Establishment of His Church had not begun it many Ages before Thus it suffices to say That an Eternity ought to forego the Incarnation of the WORD to manifest why this Great Mystery was accomplish'd neither sooner nor later GOD then must have created the Universe for the Church and the Church for JESUS CHRIST and JESUS CHRIST that He might find in Him a Sacrifice and High-Priest worthy of the Divine Majesty We shall not doubt of this Order of the Designs of GOD if it be observ'd that He can have no other End of his Actions than Himself And if it be conceiv'd that Eternity does not belong to Creatures we shall acknowledge they were produc'd when 't was requisite they should be Which Truths suppos'd let us try to discover something in the Method GOD takes for the Execution of His Grand Design VII Were I not persuaded that all Men are no farther Reasonable than enlightned by Eternal Wisdom it would no doubt be great Temerity to speak of the Designs of GOD and offer to discover any of His Ways in the Production of His Work But whereas it is certain that the word Eternal is the Universal Reason of Minds and that by the Light which he continually sheds in us we may have some Communication with GOD I ought not to be blam'd for consulting that Light which though Consubstantial with GOD Himself fails not to answer those who know how to enquire of it by a serious Attention VIII However I confess that Faith teaches a great many Truths not discoverable by the natural Union of the Mind with Reason Eternal Truth answers not to all we ask since we ask sometimes more than we can receive But this must not serve for a Pretence to justifie our Laziness and Inapplication IX Vulgar Heads are soon wearied with the Natural Prayer the Mind by its Attention ought to make to inward Truth in order to receive Light and Understanding from it and thus fatigu'd by that painful Exercise they talk of it in a contemptuous manner They dishearten one another and cover their Weakness and Ignorance under the delusive Appearances of a counterfeit Humility X. But their Example is not to infuse into us that agreeable Vertue which cherishes Carelessness and Negligence in the Mind and comforts it under its Ignorance of most necessary Truths We must pray constantly to Him who enlightens all Men That he will bestow His Light upon us recompence our Faith with the Gift of Understanding and especially to prevent us from mistaking Probability and confus'd Sensations which precipitate proud Minds into Darkness and Errour for the Evidence which accompanies His Resolves XI When we design to speak of GOD with any exactness we must not consult our selves nor the vulgar part of Men but elevate our Thoughts above all Creatures and with great Reverence and Attention consult the vast and immense Idea of a Being infinitely perfect which representing the true GOD very different from what the Vulgar fancy Him to themselves we are not to treat of Him in popular Language Every Body is allow'd to say with the Scripture that GOD Repented Him that He created Man that He was Angry with his People that he deliver'd Israel from Captivity by the Strength of His Arm. But these or the like Expressions are not permitted Divines when they should speak accurately and justly Therefore 't is not to be wondred if in the Sequel of Discourse my Expression shall be found uncommon It ought rather to be carefully observ'd whether they be clear and perfectly adapted to the Idea which all Men have of an Infinitely Perfect Being XII This Idea of a Being infinitely perfect includes two Attributes absolutely necessary to the Creation of the World an unlimited Wisdom and an irresistible Power The Wisdom of GOD affords infinite Ideas of different Works and all possible Ways for the executing His Designs and His Power renders Him so absolutely Master of all things and so independent of all Assistances whatever that He need but Will to execute what he Wills For we must above all take notice that GOD needs no Instruments to work with that His Wills are necessarily efficacious in a Word that as His Wisdom is His own Understanding His Power is no other than His Will Among these innumerable Ways whereby GOD might have executed His Design let us see which was preferable to all other and let us begin with the Creation of this Visible World from which and in which He forms the Invisible which is the Eternal Object of His Love XIII An excellent Artist ought to proportion his Action to his Work he does not that by Ways compound which may be perform'd by more simple he acts not without End and never makes insignificant Essays Whence we are to conclude that GOD discovering in the infinite Treasures of His Wisdom an Infinity of possible Worlds as necessary Consequences of the Laws of Motion which he could establish was determin'd to the Creation of that which might be produc'd and preserv'd by the simplest Laws or which should be the perfectest that could be considering the simplicity of the Ways necessary to its Production and Preservation XIV GOD might doubtless have made a perfecter World than that we inhabit He might for Instance have caus'd the Rain which fecundates the Earth to have fallen more regularly on Plow'd Lands than in the Sea where it is not necessary But in order to this He must have chang'd the Simplicity of His Ways and have multiplied the Laws of the Communications of Motions by which our World subsists and so there would not have been that Proportion between the Action of GOD and His Work which is necessary to determine an infinitely wise Being to act or at least there would not have been the same Proportion between the Action of GOD and this so perfect World as there is between the Laws of Nature and the World we inhabit For our World imagine it as imperfect as you will is sounded on so Simple and Natural Laws of Motion as make it perfectly worthy of the infinite Wisdom of its Author And indeed I am of Opinion that the Laws of Motion necessary to the Production and Preservation of the Earth and all the Stars in the Heavens are reduc'd to these Two First That mov'd Bodies tend to continue their Motion in a right line Secondly That when two Bodies meet their Motion is distributed to each in proportion to their Magnitude so that after the Collision they ought to move with equal degrees of Celerity These two Laws are the Cause of all those Motions which produce that variety of Forms which we admire in Nature XVI 'T is own'd notwithstanding that the second is â—ever manifestly observable in the Experiments that can be made upon the Subject but that comes from our seeing only what happens in visible Bodies and our not thinking on the invisible that surround
produce in us contrary Pleasures and Aversions to those of Concupiscence Pleasures for the True and Aversions or Dislikes for sensible Goods Thus the Grace whereof Jesus Christ is the Occasional Cause and which he incessantly sheds on us as Head of the Church is not a Grace of Light though he has merited that Grace likewise for us and sometimes may communicate it as I shall say by and by But 't is a Grace of Sensation 't is the preventing Delectation which begets and nurses Charity in our Hearts For Pleasure naturally produces and cherishes the Love of those Objects which cause or seem to cause it 'T is likewise the Disgust which sometimes sensible Objects give us which create an Aversion to them and capacitate us to guide the Motions of our Love by Light or Knowledge XXXII We must oppose the Grace of Sensation to Concupiscence Pleasure to Pleasure Dislike to Dislike that the Influence of Jesus Christ may be directly opposite to the Influence of the First Man The Remedy must be contrary to the Disease that it may cure it For illuminating Grace cannot heat an Heart that is wounded by Pleasure this Pleasure must cease or another succeed it Pleasure is the Weight of the Soul and naturally bears it along with it and sensible Pleasures weigh it down to Earth In order to her determining her self these Pleasures must vanish or delectable Grace must raise her up towards Heaven and instate her well-nigh in Equilibrio Thus it is the New Man may war against the Old the Influence of our Head may resist that of our Progenitor and Jesus Christ may conquer in us all our Domestick Enemies The First Man being free from Concupiscence before his Sin needed not to be invited to the Love of the True Good by preventing Delectation He knew clearly that God was his Good and there was no Necessity he should have the Sense of it 'T was not fit he should be allur'd by Pleasure to the Love of him since nothing withstood this Love and he knew him perfectly deserving it But after the Sin the Grace of Delectation was necessary to counterpoize the continual Struggle of Concupiscence Therefore Light is the Grace of the Creator Delectation is that of the Restorer Light is communicated by Jesus Christ as Eternal Wisdom Delectation is given by him as Wisdom Incarnate Light in its Original was mere Nature Delectation has ever been Pure Grace Light after the Sin was granted us only for the Merits of Jesus Christ. Delectation is granted both for the Merits and by the Efficacy of the same Jesus Lastly Light is shed into our Souls according to our own several Volitions and various Applications as I shall explain by and by But the Delectation of Grace is infus'd into our Hearts according to the diverse Desires of the Soul of Jesus Christ. XXXIII 'T is true Pleasure produces Light because the Soul is more attentive to Objects that give her Pleasure Since most Men despise or neglect the Truths of Religion because abstract or unaffecting it may be said that the Delectation of Grace instructs them For that rendring these Truths more sensible they more easily learn them by the Attention they afford And for this Reason St. John says That the Unction we receive from Jesus Christ teaches all things and that those who have receiv'd it have need of no Instructor XXXIV Yet it must be observ'd That this Unction does not produce Light immediately and by its self it only excites our Attention which is the Natural or Occasional Cause of our Knowledge So we see that Men of the greatest Charity are not always the most Understanding All Men being not equally capable of Attention all the Receivers of the same Unction are not equally instructed by it Therefore though Light may be shed on the Soul by a supernatural Infusion and Charity often produces it yet we are always to look upon this kind of Grace but as a Natural Effect For ordinarily Charity produces not Light in the Mind save in proportion to the Inducement it gives the Soul to desire the Knowledge of what she loves For in fine the diverse Desires of the Soul are the Natural or Occasional Causes of the Discoveries we make on any Subject whatsoever But these things we must explain more at large in the Second Part of this Discourse PART II. Of the Grace of the CREATOR XXXV I Know but two Principles that directly and of themselves determine the Motion of our Love Light and Pleasure Light to discover our several Goods and Pleasure to make us tast them But there is a great difference betwixt Light and Pleasure the former leaves us absolutely to our selves and makes no Intrenchment on our Liberty It does not efficaciously carry us to Love nor produce in us Natural or Necessary Love but only induces us to carry our selves to the loving with a Love of choice the Objects it discovers or which is the same thing only causes us to determine to particular Goods the general Impression of Love God constantly gives us for the General But Pleasure effectually determines our Will and as it were conveys us to the Object which causes or seems to cause it It produces in us a Natural and Necessary Love weakens our Liberty divides our Reason and leaves us not perfectly to our own Conduct An indifferent Attention to the Sense we have of our internal Motions will convince us of these Differences Thus Man before the Sin being perfectly free and having no Concupiscence to hinder him from prosecuting his Light in the Motions of his Love and knowing clearly that God was infinitely amiable ought not to be determin'd by preventing Delight as I have already said or by any other Graces of Sensation which might have lessen'd his Merit and induc'd him to love by Instinct the Good which should only be lov'd by Reason But after he had sinned he besides the Grace of Light had need of that of Sensation to resist the Motions of Concupiscence For Man having an invincible Desire for Happiness cannot possibly sacrifice his Pleasure to his Light his Pleasure which makes him actually Happy and subsists in him in spight of his Resistance to his Light which subsists but by a painful Application of Thought and dies at the presence of the least actual Pleasure and lastly which promises no solid Happiness till after Death which to the Imagination seems a perfect Annihilation Light therefore is due to Man to conduct him in the quest of Happiness and belongs to Natural Order and supposes neither Corruption nor Reparation in Nature But Pleasure which relates to the true Good is pure Grace For naturally the true Good ought not to be belov'd otherwise than by Reason Therefore the Occasional Causes of the Graces of Sensation ought to be found in Jesus Christ because he is the Author of this Grace But the Occasional Causes of Light ought to be ordinarily found in the Order of Nature because Light is
they had committed in murthering our Saviour it was fit that Jesus Christ should come into the World about the Reign of Herod supposing that People by the necessary Consequence of the Order of Nature was to be divided about that time that Civil Wars and perpetual Seditions were to weaken them and that lastly the Romans were to ruine and disperse them with the total Destruction of their City and Temple 'T is true there seems to be something extraordinary in the Desolation of the Jews But as it shews greater Wisdom in God to produce so surprizing Effects by the most simple and general Laws of Nature than by particular Wills which are always Miracles I question whether on that Occasion we are to fly unto a Miracle But for my part I dispute it not here since 't is a Fact that we cannot easily nor need we explain our selves upon And I produce this Instance only to make some Application of my Principles and to make them more easily intelligible to others I have I think said enough of Nature and Grace to satisfie all equitable and moderate Persons about an infinite Number of Difficulties which disturb only their Minds who must needs judge of God by themselves For if Men would consult the Idea of an Infinitely Perfect Being of a General Cause of an Infinite Wisdom and if they would consent to the Principles I have establish'd conformable to that Idea I believe they would neither be surpriz'd nor offended at the Conduct of GOD and that they would change their Murmurs and Censures into Wonder and Adoration CONCERNING Nature and Grace DISCOURSE III. Of the Manner of GRACE's acting in us PART I. Concerning Liberty I. THERE is nothing more rude and unform'd than the Substance of Spirits if we separate it from God For what 's a Mind void of Understanding and Reason destitute of Motion and Love Yet it is the Word and Wisdom of God which is the universal Reason of Minds and 't is the Love whereby God loves himself that gives the Soul the Motion she has towards Good If the Mind knows Truth 't is by its Natural and Necessary Union with Truth it self If it is reasonable 't is so through supreme Reason Lastly If it be a Spirit or Intelligence 't is in one sense because its Substance is enlightned penetrated and perfected by the Light of God himself These Truths I have explain'd in another Place So likewise the Substance of the Soul is not capable of loving Good save by its Natural and Necessary Union with the Eternal and Substantial Love of the Supreme Good it advances not towards Good any farther than convey'd by God it is volent only from the Motion it continually receives from him it lives only through Charity and wills merely through the Love of Good which God makes it participate though it abuses it For in fine God making and preserving Minds only for himself inclines them towards him as long as he preserves their Being and communicates the Love of Good to them whilst they are capable of receiving it Now that natural and continual Motion of the Soul towards Good in general towards Good indefinite towards God is what I here call Will Since 't is that Motion which capacitates the Substance of the Soul to love different Goods II. This Natural Motion of the Soul towards Good in general is invincible for 't is not in our Power not to will to be happy We necessarily love what we clearly know and lively feel to be our Good All Minds love God by the Necessity of their Nature and if they love any thing else by a Free Choice of their Will 't is not because they seek not God or the Cause of their Felicity but because they are deceiv'd 'T is because perceiving by a confus'd Sensation that surrounding Bodies make them happy they consider them as good and by an Ordinary and Natural Consequence love them and unite to them III. But the Love of all these particular Goods is not naturally invincible Man consider'd in his Original State might supersede loving those Goods that fill'd not the whole Capacity of his Affection There being but one Good which includes all others he might sacrifice every other Love to the Love of this For God having made Minds only for himself cannot invincibly carry them to the loving any thing besides him or without relation to him Lastly our own inward Consciousness informs us that we can reject a Fruit though we are inclin'd to take it Now that Power of loving or not loving particular Goods the Non-invincibility which is found in the Motion which carries Minds to the loving what does not seem every way inclusive of all Goods That Power or Non-invincibility is what I call Liberty Thus placing the Definition instead of the thing defin'd that Expression our Will is free signifies that the Natural Motion of the Soul towards Good in general is not invincible in point of Good in particular To the Word Free the Idea of Voluâ—tary is commonly annex'd but in the Sequel of this Discourse I shall take the Word in the Sense I have observ'd as being the most Natural and Ordinary IV. The Word Good is equivocal and may signifie either Pleasure which makes formally happy or the true or seeming Cause of Pleasure In this Discourse I shall constantly take the Word Good in the second Sense because indeed Pleasure is imprinted on the Soul that she may love the Cause that makes her happy that she may advance towards it by the Motion of her Love and may strictly unite to it to be perpetually happy When the Soul loves nothing but her own Pleasure she in effect loves nothing distinct from her self For Pleasure is only a Condition or Modification of the Soul which renders her actually happy and content But whilst the Soul cannot be the Cause of her own Pleasure she 's unjust ungrateful and blind if she loves her Pleasure and forgets to pay the Love and Devotion which is due to the true Cause that produces it in her As none but God can act immediately and by himself on the Soul and make her sensible of Pleasure by the actual Efficacy of his all-potent Will so he alone is truly Good However I term the Creatures Good which are the seeming Causes of the Pleasures we feel occasionally from them For I am unwilling to deviate from the customary way of Speaking any farther than is necessary to explain my self clearly All Creatures though Good in themselves or Perfect with reference to the Designs of God are not Good with reference to us They are not our Good nor the true Cause of our Pleasure or Felicity V. The natural Motion which God constantly imprints on the Soul to carry it to love him or to make use of a Term which is the Abridgement of several Ideas and can be no longer equivocal or confus'd after the Definition I have given of it the Will is determin'd towards particular Goods either
exceeds Pleasure is a pure and reasonable Love XXX So likewise we must conclude that we always demerit when we love a false Good by the Instinct of Pleasure provided we love it more than we are invincibly forc'd For when our Liberty is naturally so straitned and our Capacity of Mind so little that we are carried in an irresistible manner then though we are corrupt and our Love be evil and against Order yet we don't demerit To demerit I mean to deserve to be punish'd we must pursue false Goods with more ardency or tend farther than Pleasure irresistibly carries us For we must observe that there is great difference between a Good and a Meritorious Action between a Corrupt and a Demeritoous The Love of the Blessed is Good but it is not Meritorious The Love of a Righteous Person is often deprav'd in his Sleep but it is not Demeritorious Whatever is conformable to Order is good and whatever is contrary to it is naught But there is nothing of Merit or Demerit save in the good or ill use of our Liberty save in that in which we are the Factors But we make a good use of our Liberty when we follow Light when we unconstrain'd and of our selves advance to the true Good or were at first determin'd by preventing Delectation or the Light of Reason when we sacrifice sensible Pleasures to our Duty and surmount Pain by the Love of Order On the contrary we make an ill use of our Liberty when we make Pleasure our Reason when we sacrifice our Duty to our Passions our Perfection to present Felicity the Love of Order to the Love of our selves and all this at a time when we might really have prevented it But I proceed to explain this still more clearly XXXI When two Objects are offer'd to the Mind and it determines it self about them I confess it never fails to take that side where most Reason and Pleasure appears or all things consider'd where most Good is to be found For the Soul not being able to will or love but through the Love of Good since the Will is nothing but the Love of Good or the Natural Motion of the Soul towards it she unavoidably loves what has most conformity with what she loves invincibly But 't is certain that when sensible Pleasure or something of like nature does not perturbate the Mind we may ever suspend the Judgment of our Love and not determine especially in point of false Good For the Soul can have no Evidence that false Goods are the true or that the Love of the former agrees perfectly with the Motion which carries us to the latter Therefore when a Man loves false Goods whilst his Senses and Passions leave his Reason entirely free he demerits Because then he may and ought to suspend the Judgment of his Love For if he stood any time to examine what was speedily to be done the false Good would appear in its own Colours the Pleasure which it seems to infuse into the Soul would vanish the Idea of some other Good would present it self to the Mind the Remorse of Conscience and perhaps the Delectation of Grace would change all the Dispositions of his Mind and Heart For the State of a Traveller has nothing certain A thousand different Objects are continually offer'd to the Mind and the Life of Man on Earth is nothing but a continual train of Thoughts and Desires XXXII At first Sight it seems that in point of the true Good we cannot suspend the Judgment of our Love for we cannot suspend our Judgment save when Evidence is not perfect Now we may see with the clearest Evidence that God is the true Good and that none but he can be good to us We know that he is infinitely more amiable than we can conceive But it is observable that though we cannot suspend the Judgment of Reason in respect of Speculative Truths when the Evidence is entire yet we may suspend the Judgment of our Love in point of Goods whatever Evidence there is in our Ideas For when Sense fights against Reason when Tast opposes Light when that is found sensibly bitter and disagreeable which Reason clearly represents as sweet and delectable we may suspend our Choice and follow either Reason or the Senses We may act and commonly do act against our Light because when we attend to the Sensation Light disappears unless we strive to retain it And because we are ordinarily more attentive to Sensation than to Light because Sensation is always more lively and agreeable than the most evident Knowledge XXXIII 'T is Pleasure which makes Minds actually happy Therefore we ought to enjoy Pleasure when we love the true Good Yet a Mind thinks on God draws nigh him by its Love and tasts no Satisfaction On the contrary God fills it sometimes with Bitterness and Drought he deserts it and repels it as I may say not that it may cease to love him but rather that its Love may be more humble more pure and meritorious Lastly he prescribes it certain things which render it actually miserable But if it approaches Bodies it finds it self happy in proportion to the Strictness of its Union to them Certainly this is perplexing to a Man never so intelligent since we are invincibly passionate for Happiness Therefore we merit much if following our Light we renounce our selves notwithstanding those discomforting Droughts if we sacrifice our actual Happiness to the Love of the true Good if living by Faith and relying on the Promises of God we remain inviolably bent upon our Duty Hence we clearly understand that Jesus Christ might merit his Glory though he knew the true Good in the highest Evidence because having an extreme Love for his Father he was entirely conformable to his Orders without being carried by preventing Pleasures because being steadily guided by his Light he suffer'd most violent Pains and sacrific'd the most lively and sensible Pleasures to his Charity For he took on him a Body like to ours that he might have a Victim to offer to God and that duly receiving through this Body as the Occasional or Natural Cause an abundance of various Sensations he might accomplish a perfect Holocaust to the Honour of the true Good by the enduring Pain and the Privation of sensible Pleasures XXXIV To the end every one may have a most perfect Idea of the Grace of Jesus Christ I think it requisite to add that it consists not in Delectation alone For all Grace of Sensation is the Grace of Jesus Christ. But of this Grace there are many Species and of every Species infinite degrees God sometimes casts Distast and Bitterness on the Objects of our Passions he weakens their sensible Charms or makes us hate or abhor them And this kind of Grace of Sensation makes the same Effect as preventing Delight It restores and fortifies our Liberty reinstates us almost in Equilibrio and thereby puts us in a Capacity of following our Light in the Motion of
full of Obscurity and Darkness are founded on the Ignorance we are in of the Properties of our Soul 'T is from our having as I have elsewhere proved no clear Idea of our Being and that what is in us which gives way to be conquer'd by a Determination not invincible is absolutely unknown to us Furthermore if I cannot clearly answer these Objections I can answer by others which to me seem more incapable of Solution I can from Principles oppos'd to mine deduce more harsh and unlucky Consequences than those which are presum'd to follow from Liberty such as I have suppos'd in us But I engage not on the Particulars of all this as taking no delight to walk in the dark and to lead others upon Precipices THE ILLUSTRATION OR CONTINUATION OF THE TREATISE CONCERNING Nature and Grace What is meant by acting by General and Particular Wills I. I Say that God acts by General Wills when he acts in consequence of the General Laws which he has establish'd For Example I say that God acts in me by General Wills when he gives me the Sense of Pain when I am prick'd since in pursuance of the General and Efficacious Laws of Union of my Soul and Body which he has constituted he makes me suffer Pain when my Body's ill dispos'd So when a Bowl strikes another I say God moves the stricken by a General Will because he moves it in pursuance of the General and Efficacious Laws of the Communications of Motions God having generally Ordain'd that at the Instant of Collision of two Bodies the Motion should be distributed between them according to certain Proportions and 't is by the Efficacy of that General Will that Bodies have the force of moving one another II. I say on the contrary that God acts by Particular Wills when the Efficacy of his Will is not determin'd by some General Law to the producing any Effect Thus supposing God should make me feel the Pain of pricking whilst there happen'd no Change in my Body or in any Creature whatsover which determines him to act in me by some General Law I say that then God acts by Particular Wills So again supposing a Body begins to move without being stricken by another or without any Alteration happening in the Will of Spirits or in any other Creature which determines the Efficacy of some General Laws I say that God would move that Body by a Particular Will III. According to these Definitions it plainly appears that so far from denying Providence I suppose on the contrary that God works all in all things that the Nature of the Heathen Philosophers is a Chimera and that to speak properly Nature is nothing but the General Laws which God has establish'd for the Construction or Preservation of his Work by the simplest ways by an Action always uniform constant perfectly worthy of an infinite Wisdom and an universal Cause But that which I here suppose though certain for the Reasons I have given in The Search after Truth is not absolutely necessary to what I design to prove For if it be suppos'd that God had communicated his Power to the Creatures in such a manner as that surrounding Bodies had a real and true Force by which they might act on our Soul and make her happy and miserable by Pleasure and Pain and that Bodies in Motion had in themselves a certain Entity which they call Impress'd Quality that they can communicate it to those about them and with that Celerity and Uniformity we observe it would be still equally easie to prove what I intend For then the Efficacy of the concurrent Action of the General Cause would be necessarily determin'd by the Action of the Particular Cause God for Instance would be oblig'd by these Principles to afford his Concourse to a Body at the Instant of Collision that it might communicate its Motion to others which is still to act by virtue of a General Law Yet I do not argue upon that Supposition as believing it utterly false as I have shewn in the Third Chapter and Second Part of the Sixth Book of The Search after Truth in the Illustration of the same Chapter and elsewhere Which Truths suppos'd here follow the Notes by which we may discover whether an Effect be produc'd by a General or Particular Will MARKS by which we may judge whether an Effect be produc'd by a General or Particular Will IV. When we see an Effect immediately produc'd after the Action of an Occasionl Cause we ought to judge it produc'd by the Efficacy of a General Will. A Body moves immediately after the Collision the Collision of Bodies is the Action of an Occasional Cause Therefore this Body moves by a General Will. A Stone falls on the Head of a Man and kills him and this Stone falls like all others that is continues its Motion almost in Arithmetical Proportion 1 3 5 7 9 c. Which suppos'd I say it moves by the Efficacy of a General Will or by the Laws of the Communications of Motions as is easie to demonstrate V. When we see an Effect produc'd without the Mediation of the known Occasional Cause we have reason to think it produc'd by a Particular Will supposing this Effect be not manifestly unworthy of its Cause as I shall say hereafter For Example When a Body 's mov'd without being smitten by another there 's great Probability it was mov'd by a Particular Will but yet we cannot be confident of it For on Supposition of a General Law that Bodies should move according to the several Volitions of Angels or the like 't is visible this Body might be put in Motion without Impulsion the particular Will of some Angel being in this case able to determine the Will of the general Cause to move it Thus we may be often positive that God acts by general Wills but we cannot have the like Assurance that he acts by particular Wills even in the most averr'd Miracles VI. Since we have not a competent Knowledge of the various Combinations of Occasional Causes to discover whether such and such Effects arrive in consequence of their Action and are not sufficiently Intelligent to discover for Instance whether such a Rain be Natural or Miraculous produc'd by a necessary Consequence of the Communication of Motions or by a particular Will we must judge an Effect is produc'd by a General Will when 't is visible the Cause did not propose it self a particular End For the Wills of Intelligences have necessarily an End general Wills a general End and particular Wills a particular Design Nothing can be more plain and evident For Example Though I cannot discover whether a Shower of Rain which falls on a Meadow falls in consequence of general Laws or by a particular Will of God I have reason to think it falls by a general Will if I see it fall as well on the neighbouring Grounds or on the River which bounds the Meadow no less than on the Meadow it self For
videbimus eum sicuti est Joh. Ep. 1. ch 3. v. 2. * Corpus quod corrumpitur aggravat animam Sap. 9.10 Terrena inhabitatio deprimit sensum multa cogitantem difficile aestimamus quae in terra sunt quae in prospectu sunt invenimus cum labore Sap. 9.15 †Deus intelligibilis lux in quo a quo per quem intelligibiliter lucent omnia 1. Sol. Insinuavit nobis Christus animam humanam non vegetari non illuminari non beatificari nisi ab ipsa substantia Dei August in Joh. Illa autoritas divina dicenda est quae non solum in sensibilibus signis transcendit omnem humanam facultatem sed ipsum hominem agens ostendit ei quousque se propter ipsum depresserit non teneri sensibus quibus videntur illa miranda sed ad intellectum jubet evolare simul demonstrans quanta hic possit cur haec faciat quam parvi pendat Aug. 2. de Ord. 9. * Tract in Joan. 27. Et si cognovimus secundum carnem Christum jam non secundum carnem novimus 2 ad Cor. Nolite putare quenquam hominem aliquid discere ab homine Admonere possumus per strepitum vocis nostrae si non sit intus qui doceat inanis fit strepitus noster Aug. in Joan. Auditus per me factus intellectus per quem Dixit aliquis ad cor vestrum sed non eum videtis Si intellexistis fratres dictum est cordi vestro Munus Dei est intelligentia August Johan Tract 40. Noli putare te ipsam esse lucem Aug. in Psal. Sicut audio sic judico judicium meum justum est quia non quaero voluntatem meam Johan cap. 5.30 Qui hoc videre non potest oret agat ut posse mereatur nec ad hominem disputatorem pulset ut quod not legit legat sed ad Deum Salvatorem ut quod non valet valeat Epist. 112. cap. 12. Supplexque illi qui lumen mentis accendit attendat ut intelligat Conf. Ep. Fund cap. 33. Nullo modo resistitur Corporis sensibus quae nobis sacratissima disciplina est si per eos inflictis plagis vulneribusque blandimur Ep. 72. * See the 6 th Book Of the Nature Properties of the Vnderstanding II. Of the Nature and Properties of the Will and of its Liberty * See the Illustrations * See the Illustrations I. Of our Judgments and Reasonings II. That Judgments and Reasonings depend upon the Will Geometricians love not Truth but only the Knowledg of Truth tho' it be otherwise said III. What use should be made of our Liberty that we never may be deceiv'd IV. General Rules for the avoiding Error and Sin A necessary Reflexion on the two Rules I. The Answer to some Objections II. Observations on what has been said concerning the necessity of Evidence See the Illustrations I. Of the Occasional Causes of our Errors and that there are five principal II. The General Design of the whole Work III. The particular Design of the first Book I. Two ways of explaining how our Senses were corrupted by Sin S. Gregor Homil. 39. upon the Gospels * Fr. Son â—â—ur †Fr. Son Esprit See the Illustrations Deus ab initio constituit hominem reliquit illum in manu Consilii sui adjecit mandata praecepta sua c. Ec. 15.14 A Remedy for the Disorder which Original Sin has caus'd in the World and the Foundation of Christian Morality * See the Illustrations II. That our Liberty not our Senses is the true cause of our Errors III. A Rule for avoiding Error in the use of our Senses I. Of the Errors of sight in respect of Extension absolutely consider'd * See the Journal of the Learned Nov. 12. 1668. Fr. Le germe * The Cicatricle or the Sperm of the Egg is a little white spot upon the Yolk See Malpigh de Formatione Pulli in Ova †See Swammerdam 's Miraculum naturae II. A Continuation of these Errors about Invisible Objects III. Of the Errors of sight touching Extension relatively consider'd I. Of the Errors of sight about Figures II. We have no knowledge of the least of them III. The knowledge we have of the greater is not exact IV. An Explication of some Natural judgments which prevent our deception V. That these very judgments deceive us in some particular junctures See the 9. Chapter towards the end See the 3 d. Ch. of the 2 d. Part of the 6 Book I. That our Eyes are incapable of informing us of the Quantity or Swiftness of Motion consider'd in it self II. That Duration which is necessary to our knowledge of the Quantity of Motion is unknown to us III. An Instance of the Errors of Sight in respect of Motion and Rest. I. A general Demonstration of the Errors of our Sight concerning Motion II. That the Distance of Objects is necessary to be known in order to judge of the Quantity of their Motion III. The Mediums whereby we know the Distances of Objects are examined The Soul does not make all those judgments I aâ—tribute to her these Natural judgments are nothing but Sensations and I only speak thus the better to explain things The second Medium whereby to judge of the Distance of Objctes The third Medium whereby to judge of the Distance of Objects The fourtâ— and fifth Mediums The sixth Medium whereby to judge of the Distance of Objects * Seethe Illustrations * I call by the Name of Idea here whatever is the Immediate Object of the Mind I. The Distinction of the Soul and Body II. An Explication of the Organs of the Senses III. The Soul is immediately united to that part of the Brain where the Fibres of the Organs of the Senses centre IV. An Instance to explain the effect which Objects have upon our Bodies V. What it is that Objects produce in the Soul and the Reasons why the Soul perceives not the Motions of the Fiâ—res of the Body This confus'd Reasoning or this Natural Judgement is only a Compound Sensation See what I have said before of Natural Judgements and the first Ch. of the 3 d. Book VI. Four things which are generally confounded in every Sensation I. Of the Error we fall into concerning the Action of Objects against the External Fibres of our Senses III. The Cause of this Error III. An Objection and Answer I. Of our Errors concerning the Motions or Vibrations of the Fibres of our Senses II. That we confound them with the Sensations of our Soul and sometimes have no Perception of them III. An Experiment that proves it IV. An Explication of three sorts of Sensations of the Soul V. The Errors that accompany the Sensations I. The Definition of the Sensations II. That a Man knows his own Sensations better than he thinks he does III. An Objection and Answer IV. From whence it proceeds that a Man imagines he has no knowledge of
his Sensations See the Illustrations upon the 7. Ch. of the 2 d. Part of the 3 d. Book V. That 't is an Error to think all Men have the same Sensations of the same Objects IV. An Objection and Answer This Pagraâ—h is wanting in some Editions and is obscure in the French and therefore has receiv'd some alteration that it might be perspicuous I. Of the false Judgments that accompany our Sensations and which we confound with them II. The Reason of these false Judgments III. That Error is not in our Sensations but only in these Judgments Brown Paper presently takes fire but the Glass must be larger or more convex to burn white Paper I. That the Errors of our Senses serve us instead of general and very fruitful Principles from whence to draw false Conclusions and these Conclusions again become other Principles in in their turn II. The Original of the Differences attributed to Objects That these Differences are in the Soul III. The Original of Substantial Forms IV. The Origine of all the other more general Errors of the School-Philosophy I. An Instance taken from Morality which shews that our senses offer us nothing but false goods I will explain in the last Book in what sense Objects act upon the Body II. That GOD only is our Good and that all sensible Objects cannot give us any sense of Pleasure III. The Origine of the Errors of the Epicureans and Stoicks I. That our senses make us liable to Error even in things which are not sensible II. An Example taken from the Conversation of Men. III. That Sensible and Agreeable Manners ought not to be regarded I. The Errors concerning the Nature of Bodies II. Errors concerning the Qualities and Perfection of Bodies I. That our Senses are given us only for the Preservation of our Body II. That we ought to doubt of the Reports which our Senses make of Things III. That 't is no little thing to doubt as we ought to do I. A General Idea of the Imagination * By a Natural Judgment whereof I have spoken in several places of the preceding Book II. Two Faculties in the Imagination an Active and a Passive III. A general cause of the Changes which happen in the Imagination and the foundation of the Second Book I. Of the Animal Spirits and the Changes they are subject to in general II. That the Chyle entring the Heart occasions a Change in the Spirits III. That Winâ— effects the same thing Vinum iuctator dolosus est Numquid non ultra est sapientia in Theman Jer. c. 49. v. 7. I. Of the Changes of the Spirits caus'd by the Nerves which go to the Heart and Lungs II. Of the Change of the Spirit caus'd by the Nerves which go to the Liver to the Spleen and other Viscera III. That these things are perform'd by the order of Providence without the concurrence of our Will I. Of the Mewory II. Of the Habits * I explain elsewhere wherein this Power consists See the Illustraâ—ions upon the Intellectual Memory and Habits I. That the Fibres of the Brain are not subject to so sudden Changes as the Spirits II. Three considerable Changes which happen in the Three different Ages of Man I. Of the Communication that is between the Brain of the Mother and that of her Infant II. Of the Communication between our Brain and the other Parts of our Body which incline us to Imitation and Compassion III. An Explication of the Generation of Monstrous Children and the Propagation of the Species * According to the first Supposition * According to the second Suâ—position IV. An Explication of some Irregularities of the Vnderstanding and Inclinations of the Will V. An Explication of Concupiscence and Original Sin Rom. Ch. 6.5.12 14 c. VI. Objections and Answers Se the Illustrations I. The Changes which happen in the Imagination of an Infant after his Birth by his accompanying with his Mother his Nurse and other Persons II. Instructions for the good Education of Children S. August Qui parcit virgae odit filium suum Prov. 13.24 I. Of the Imagination of Women II. Of the Imagination of Men in the Perfection of their Age. III. Concerning the Imagination of Old Men. I. Of the Vnion of the Soul and Body Three Causes of the Connection of Traces with Idea's II. Of the Mutual Connection of the Traces I. Mâ—n of Learning are the most subject to Errâ—r II. The Causes why Men had rather be guided by Authority than make use of their own Reason Clarus ob obscuram linguam Lucretius Veritas filia temporis non auâ—toritatis See the first Article of the preceding Chapter Praelectiones 13 in principium Elementorum Euclidis * In Quaâ—to I. Of the Inventors of new Systems II. A Considerable Error of Studious Men. I. Of Effeminate Minds II. Of Superficial Minds III. Of Men of Authority Opusc. 2. IV. Of such as make Experiments I. Of the Disposition we have to imitate others in all things which is the Original of the Communication of those Errors that depend on the Power of Imagination II. Two things that more especially increase the Disposition we have to imitate others III. What the Strong Imagination is IV. Two kinds of it V. Two considerable Imperfections of Men of a Strong Imagination VI. That Men of a Strong Imagination easily perswade Artic. 37. of the Religion of the Church of England Plutarch Mor. How to distinguish the Flatterer from the Friend Diodor. Sicul. Bibl. Lib. 3. See the Illustrations Chap. 2. 3. De Pallio Multos etiam vidi postquam bene aestuassent ut eum assequerentur nihil praeter sudorem inanem animi fatigationem lucratos ab ejus lectione discessisse Sic qui Scotinus haberi viderique dignus qui hoc cognomentum habere voluit adeo quod voluit a seipso impetravit efficere id quod obtabat valuit ut liquido jurare ausim neminem ad hoc tempus extitisse qui possit jurare hunc libellum a capite ad calcem usque totum a se non minus bene intellectum quam lectum Salm. in Epist. ded Comment in Tert. Epicurus ait Injurias tolerabiles esse Sapienti nos injurias non esse Sapientia hujus mundi stultitia est apud Deum Quod hominibus altum est abominatio est ante Deum Luc. 16. Beaux Esprits Esprits Forts 1. In Philosophia parum diligens 2. Velles eum suo ingenio dixisse alieno judicio 3. Si aliqua contempsisset c. Consensu Eruditorum quam Puerorum amore comprobaretur Quintil. lib 10. cap. 2. Apoc. 2. Conservus tuus sum c. Deum adora L. 3. Câ— 13 L. 2. Ch. 10 L. 1. Ch. 24 L. 2. Ch. 17 L. 12. Ch 17. L. 2. Ch. 12 L. 1. Ch. 22 I. Of Imaginary Witches Of Wolf-men II. The Câ—nclusion of the two first Book I. Thought only is essential to the Soul Sensation and Imagination are only the Modifications of it
* By the Essence of a thing I mean that which is first conceiv'd in it on which depend all the Modifications observ'd in it †Second Part of the Pure Mind Chap. 7. II. We know not all the Modifications our Soul is capable of * S. Aug. lib. 6. de Musica Des Cartes in his Man c. I. The Mind being limited cannot comprehend anything of an infinite Nature II. The limitation of the mind is the Origine of a great many Errors * Art of Thinking III. And especially of Heresies I. That the Philosophers want order in their Studies II. An Instance of the want of order in Aristotle Lib. 5. de generatione Anim. c. 1. III. That Geometricians take a good Method in search of Truth IV. That their Method increases the strength of the Mind and that Aristotle 's Logick diminishes it Book 6 in the 1 st Part concerning Method V. Another Fault of Learned Men. I. The Mind cannot dwell long upon Objects that have no Relation or that include not something of Infinity in them II. The Inconstancy of the Will is the Cause of that want of Application and consequently of Error III. Our Sensations take us up more than the Pure Idea's of the Mind See the 7 th Chap. of the Second Part of this Book IV. Which is the Source of the Corruption of our Morals * Namely a Natural Love for we cannot hate Pleasure by an Elective Hatred †Because Elective Love cannot be long without conforming to Natural Love I. What is meant by Idea's That they really exist and are necessary to our Perceiving all material Objects This Paragraph is in Italick because it may be passed over as being difficult to be understood unless a Man know what I think of the Soul and of the Nature of Idea's II. A Particularization of all the ways possible for us to perceivâ— External Objects If a Man has a mind to know how all the Impressions of Visible Objects tho' oppos'd can be communicated without weakning let him read Mr. Des-Cartes 's Dioptrics Tanto meliora esse judico quae oculis cerno quanto pro sui natura viciniora sunt iis quae animo intelligo Aug. 6.3 de Vera Religione See the 3 d. Ch. of the 2 d. Part concerning Method Dic quia tu tibi lumen non es Serm. 8. de verbis Domini 2 Cor. 3.5 Rom. 1.19 Jac. 1.17 Ps. 94.10 Joh. 1.9 Lib 14. de Trin. cap. 13. See the Illustrations Act. Apost c. 17.28 I. Four different manners of Perception II. How we know GOD Humanis mentibus nulla interposita natura praesidet Aug. lib. de vera Relig. c. 55. III. How we know Bodies IV. How we know the Soul See the Illustrations V. How we know the Souls of other Men. I. The intimate Presence of the indefinite Idea of Being in general is the cause of all the disorderly Abstractions of the Mind and the most part of the Chimaera's of the Vulgar Philosophy which hinder many Philosophers from acknowledging the solidity of true Principles of Physick II. Of the Essence of Matter If this Definition of the word Essence be admitted all the rest is absolutely demonstrated if it be not admitted 't is only a nominal Question wherein consists the Essence of Matter or rather it cannot be the subject of a Question I. The last general Cause of our Errors II. That the Idea's of things are not always present to the Mind when we would have them III. Every finite Mind is subject to Error IV. We ought not to judge that there is no created Being besides Body and Spirit nor that GOD is a Spirit according to the conception of Spirits Riccioli 2. Vol. Nemo est paulo eruditior in Astronomicis qui Coelorum ordinem contemplatus non agnoscat Harmoniam quandam in Planetarum intervallis motibus Journal of the Learned Aug. 9 1666. See the Illustrations I. Inclinations are as necessary to Spirits as Motions to Bodies II. God having no other Principal End of his Actions than himself gives no Motion to Spirits but what tends towards himself III. The Tendency Spirits have to Particular Goods proceeds from their Motion towards Good in general IV. The Original of the chiefest Natural Inclinations which will make up the Division of this Fourth Book I. The Inclination for Good in general is the Principle of the Restlesness of the Will II. And consequently of our Inadvertency and Ignorance III. The first Instance shewing that Morals are but little known by the generality of Men. 〈◊〉 39. de Natali Domini IV. The second Instance shewing that the Immortality of the Soul is controverted by some People V. That we are in extreme ignorance in point of Abstract things and which have but little reference to us I. Curiosity is natural and necessary II. Three Rules to moderate Curiosity III. A particular Explication of the first of these Rules Quis tam stulte curioâ—us est qui filium suum mitâ—at in Scholam ut quid Magister cogitet discat I. The Second Rule concerning Curiosity II. The Third Rule concerning Curiosity 2 Tim. 6.9 I. Of the Sâ—cond natural Inclination or of Self-love II. The Division of Self-love of Being and of Well-being or of Greatness and Pleasure I. Of the Inclination we have for whatever elevates us above others II. Of the false Judgments of some Religious Persons III. Of the false Judgments of the Superstitious and Hypocrites Of Voetius I. Of the Desire of seeming Learn'd II. Of the Conversation of the falsly Learn'd III. Of the Books of the Falsly Learn'd I. Pleasure ought to be shunn'd tho' it makes us happy 1 Cor. 15.16 II. It ought not to carry us to the loving Sensible Goods I. How it disables us from disvering Truth II. Some Instances Oper. Perf. * I speak according to common Opinion which is that the Chicken is form'd from the Egg though perhaps it is no more than nourish'd by it Col. 2.23 * Galilaeus put into the Inquisition for maintaining the Earth mov'd I. Of the Third Natural Inclination viz. The Friendship we have for other Men. * I speak as a Man For the Truest Earthly Grandeur consists only in the Imagination II. This Inclination makes us approve the Thoughts of our Friends and deceive them by undue Praises Chap. 4. E. 1. Page 9 10. Page 1. Page 10. Page 1. Page 20. Page 21. * Book 1. Ch. 9. B. 3. in several places Page 22. Page 9. Page 9. Page 6. Page 44. Page 47. Page 56 57. Page 62. Page 64. Page 80. Page 98. * Pref. Page 4. Page 12. (a) Page 1 The Animadverter's Answer * Book 1. Chap. 1. and elsewhere * Tunc beatum esse te judica cum tibi ex te gaudium omne nascetur cum in his quae homines eripiunt optant custodiunt nihil inveneris non dico quod malis sed quod velis Sen. Epist. 124. Rom. 7 23 24 * Before Sin that Sensation was not a pain but
Spirit according to our conception of Spirits 128 CHAP. X. Some Instances of Errors in Physicks wherein Men are engaged by supposing that the things which differ in their Nature their Qualities Extension Duration and Proportion are alike in all these things 130 CHAP. XI Instances of some Errors of Morality which depend on the same Principle 133 The Conclusion of the Three first Books 134 Book the Fourth CHAP. I. 1. Inclinations are as necessary to Spirits as Motions to Bodies 2. God gives no Motion to Spirits but what tends towards himself 3. The tendency Spirits have to particular Goods proceeds but from their Motion towards Good in general 4. The Original of our chiefest natural Inclinations which will make up the division of this Fourth Book 137 CHAP II. 1. The Inclination for Good in general is the Principle of the Restlesness of the Will 2. And consequently of our Inadvertency and Ignorance 3. The First Instance shewing that Morals are but little known by the generality of Men. 4. The Second Instance shewing that the Immortality of the Soul is controverted by some People 5. That we are in extreme Ignorance in point of abstract things and which have but little reference to us 139 CHAP. III. 1. Curiosity is natural and necessary 2. Three Rules to moderate it 3. An Explication of the first of these Rules 143 CHAP. IV. A Continuation of the same Subject 1. An Explication of the second Rule concerning Curiosity 2. An Explication of the Third 146 CHAP. V. 1. Of the second natural Inclination or of Self-love 2. The Division of it into love of Being and of Well-being or of Greatness and Pleasure 147 CHAP. VI. 1. Of the Inclination we have for whatever elevates us above others 2. Of the false Judgments of some Religious Persons 3. Of the false Judgments of the Superstitious and Hypocrites 4. Of Voetius Mr. Des Cartes's Enemy 148 CHAP. VII Of the Desire of Science and of the Judgments of the falsly Learned 151 CHAP. VIII 1. Of the Desire of seeming Learned 2. Of the conversation of the falsly Learn'd 3. Of their Works 153 CHAP. IX How the Inclination for Honours and Riches conduces to Error 155 CHAP. X. Of the Love of Pleasure with regard to Morality 1. That Pleasure is to be shunn'd though it make us happy 2. It ought not to carry us to the loving sensible Goods 156 CHAP. XI Of the love of Pleasure with reference to Speculative Sciences 1. How it disables us from discovering Truth 2. Some Instances 159 CHAP. XII Of the Effects which the Thoughts of Future Happiness and Misery are capable of producing in the Mind 163 CHAP. XIII 1. Of the third Natural Inclination viz. The Friendship we have for other Men. 2. It makes us approve the Thoughts of our Friends and deceive them by undue Praises 165 Tome II. Book V. CHAP. I. OF the Nature and Original of Passions in general Page 1 CHAP II. Of the Union of the Mind with sensible Things or of the Force and Extent of the Passions in general 3 CHAP. III. A particular Explanation of all the Changes happening either to the Body or Soul in every Passion 6 CHAP. IV. That the Pleasure and Motion of the Passions engage us in Errors and false Judgments about Good that we ought continually to resist them How to impugn Libertinism 10 CHAP. V. That the Perfection of the Mind consists in its Union with God by the knowledge of Truth and the love of Vertue and contrariwise That its Imperfection proceeds only from its dependency on the Body caused by the Disorder of the Senses and Passions 13 CHAP. VI. Of the more general Errors of the Passions with some particular Instances 16 CHAP. VII Of Passions in particular and first of Admiration and its ill Effects 18 CHAP. VIII A Continuation of the same Subject What good use can be made of Admiration and other Passions 24 CHAP. IX Of Love and Aversion and their principal Species 26 CHAP. X. Of Passions in particular and in general of the way to explain them and to know the Errors they cause 29 CHAP. XI That all the Passions justifie themselves What Judgments they cause us to make in their Vindication 31 CHAP. XII That such Passions as have Evil for their Object are the most dangerous and unjust and that those that have the least mixture of Knowledge are the most lively and sensible 34 Book the Sixth CHAP. I. The Design of this Book Two general ways to keep to Evidence in the Search of Truth which shall be the Subject of this Tract 36 CHAP. II. That attention is necessary to preserve Evidence in our Knowledge that the modifications of the Soul make her attentive but share and take up too much her Capacity of perceiving 37 CHAP. III. Of the use that can be made of the Passions and Senses to preserve the attention of the Mind 39 CHAP. IV. Of the use of Imagination to make the Mind attentive and especially of the usefulness of Geometry 41 CHAP. V. Of the means to improve the extent and capacity of the Mind That Arithmetick and Algebra are of absolute necessity to it 46 Book the Sixth Part II. CHAP. I. Of the Rules that are to be observed in the Search after Truth 50 CHAP. II. Of the general Rule that concerns the subject of our Studies That School Philosophers observe it not which is the cause of several Errors in their Physicks 51 CHAP. III. Of the most dangerous Error in the Philosophy of the Ancients 54 CHAP. IV. An Explication of the second part of the general Rule That the Philosophers observe it not but that Des Cartes has exactly followed it 57 CHAP. V. An Explication of the Principles of the Peripatetick Philosophy in which is shewn that Aristotle never observed the second part of the general Rule and his four Elements with the Elementary Qualities are examined 64 CHAP. VI. General and necessary Advices to proceed orderly in the Search after Truth and in the choice of the Sciences 70 CHAP. VII Of the use of the first Rule concerning particular Questions 74 CHAP. VIII An Application of the other Rules to particular Questions 79 CHAP. IX The last instance to shew the usefulness of this Treatise wherein the cause of the Union of parts in Bodies and withal the Rules of the Communication of Motion are examined 85 The Conclusion of the Three last Books 96 Illustrations upon the foregoing Books 98 F. Malbranche's Defence against the Accusation of Monsieur De la Ville 183 Of Light and Colours 193 The End of the Contents F. MALEBRANCHE'S TREATISE CONCERNING The Search after Truth BOOK the FIRST Concerning The ERRORS of the SENSES CHAP. I. I. Of the Nature and Properties of the UNDERSTANDING II. Of the Nature and Properties of the WILL and wherein the Liberty of the SOUL consists ERROR is the Vniversal Cause of the Misery of Mankind 't is the corrupt Principle that has Produc'd Evil in the World 'T is
this which breeds and cherishes in our Soul all the Evils that afflict us and we must never hope to establish a solid and real Happiness but by seriously labouring to avoid it We are taught by the Holy Scriptures that Men are only miserable because they are Sinners and Criminals and they would neither be Sinners nor Criminals did they not make themselves Slaves to Sin by taking part with Error If it be true then That Error is the Source of all the Miseries of Men 't is very reasonable that Men should endeavour to free themselves from it and certainly their Endeavour would not be altogether unprofitable and unrewarded though it met not with all the Success that they could wish If Men should not hereby become Infallible yet they would be much less subject to be Deceiv'd and though they obtain'd not an absolute Deliverance from their Evils they would however avoid a great part of them An intire Felicity ought not to be expected in this Life since in this Mortal State there can be no Pretensions to Infallibility but the Endeavour against Error should be earnest and continual because the Desire to being freed from Misery is incessant In a word as we fervently desire perfect Happiness without the hopes of it so we should ever industriously tend towards Infallibility without pretending to it It should not be imagin'd there is much Difficulty to be undergone in the Search of Truth 'T is but opening the Eyes becoming Attentive and exactly observing some Rules we shall give in the following Discourse An exactness of Thought has scarce any thing painful in it 't is not a slavery as the Imagination represents it and though we meet with some Difficulty at first yet we find Satisfaction enough to recompense our Pains for at last 't is this only which enlightens us and guides us into Truth But not to spend time in preparing the Mind of the Reader whom 't is much more just to believe sufficiently of himself dispos'd to the Search of Truth let us examine the Causes and Nature of our Errors and since the Method of examining things by considering them in their Birth and Origine is the most regular and perspicuous and serves better than others to give us a thorough Knowledge of them let us try to put it here in Practice The Mind of Man being neither Material nor Extended is undoubtedly a simple Substance indivisible and without any Composition of Parts Notwithstanding it has been the Custom to distinguish in it two Faculties namely the Vnderstanding and the Will which it is necessary in the first place to explain For it seems that the Notions or Idea's Men have of these two Faculties are not so clear or distinct as they ought to be But because these Idea's are very Abstract and fall not under the Imagination it seems not amiss to express them by the Resemblance they bear to the Properties belonging to Matter which being easie to be Imagin'd will render the Notions which may conveniently be apply'd to these two Words Vnderstanding and Will more distinct and also more familiar to Vs only this Caution must be observ'd that these Resemblances betwixt the Mind and Matter are not perfectly just And that these two kinds of Beings are only compar'd in order to make the Mind more Attentive and to make others as it were sensible of our meaning Matter or Extension contains in it two Properties or Faculties the first Faculty is that of receiving different Figures and the second is its capacity of being mov'd In like manner the Mind of Man includes two Faculties the first which is the Vnderstanding is that of receiving many Idea's that is of perceiving many things the second which is the Will is the Faculty of receiving many Inclinations or of Willing different things We will begin with an explication of the Resemblances the first of the Faculties belonging to Matter has to the first of the two Faculties appertaining to the Mind Extension is capable of admitting two kinds of Figures The one is only External as the Roundness of a piece of Wax the other is Internal and is peculiar to all the little parts the Wax is compos'd of for it is most certain that all the little parts which go to the Composition of a piece of Wax are of a Figure very different from those which constitute a piece of Iron Therefore I call that which is external barely Figure and I term the internal Figure Configuration which is peculiarly necessary to the Wax to make it what it is So likewise it may be said that the Idea's of the Soul are of two sorts taking the name of Idea in general for whatever the Mind immediately perceives The first give Us a Representation of something without Us as of a Square or an House c. The second represent to Us only what we find within Us as our Sensations Pain Pleasure or the the like For we shall make it plain hereafter that these last Idea's are only a manner of the Mind 's existing and for that reason I call them the Modifications of the Mind Thus also the Inclinations of the Soul might be call'd Modifications of the same Soul For it being manifest that the Inclination of the Will is a manner of existing of the Soul it might be term'd a Modification of the Soul just as Motion in Bodies being a manner of existing of those Bodies might be said to be a Modification of Matter Notwithstanding I do not term the Inclinations of the Will or the Motions of Matter Modifications for as much as both those Inclinations and those Motions have commonly a reference to something that 's external for the Inclinations stand related unto Good and the Motions have a reference to some separate Body But the Figures and Configurations of Bodies and the Sensations of the Soul have no necessary relation to any thing without For as a Figure is round when all the external parts of a Body are equally distant from one of its parts which we call the Centre without relation to any thing external so all the Sensasations we are capable of might have their subsistence though there were no outward object in the World Their being includes not any necessary relation to the Bodies which seem to cause them as we shall elsewhere prove and they are nothing but the very Soul modify'd in such or such a manner so that they are properly Modifications of the Soul Let me then take leave to name them so in order to explain my self The first and principal Agreement or Resemblance that is found betwixt the Faculty which Matter has of receiving different Figures and different Configurations and that which the Soul has of receiving different Idea's and different Modifications is this That as the Faculty of receiving different Figures and different Configurations in Bodies is intirely passive and contains nothing at all of Action so the Faculty of receiving different Idea's and different Modifications
Will being not equal even among the Damn'd it is plain they are not all equally opposite to Order and that they do not hate it in all cases unless in consequence of their Hatred to God For as no one can hate Good consider'd barely as such so no one can hate Order but when it seems to thwart his Inclinations But though it seem contrary to our Inclinations it nevertheless retains the force of a Law which Condemns and also punishes us by a Worm that never dies Now then we see what Order is and how it has the strength of a Law by that necessary Love which God has for himself We conceive how this Law comes to be general for all Minds God not excepted and why it is necessary and absolutely indispensible Lastly we conceive or we may easily conceive in general that it is the Principle of all Divine and Humane Laws and that 't is according to this Law that all Intelligences are judg'd and all Creatures dispos'd in the respective rank that belongs to them I acknowledge it is not easie to explain all this in particular and I venture not to undertake it For should I go to show the Connexion particular Laws have with the general and account for the agreement which certain manners of acting have to Order I should be forc'd to engage in Difficulties that it may be I could not resolve and which would lead me out of sight of my subject Nevertheless if it be consider'd that God neither has nor can have any other Law than his own Wisdom and the necessary Love he has for it we shall easily judge that all Divine Laws must depend on it And if it be observ'd that he has made the World with reference only to that Wisdom and Love since he acts only for Himself we shall not doubt but all natural Laws must tend to the Preservation and Perfection of this World according to indispensable Order and by their dependance on necessary Love For the Wisdom and Will of God regulates all things There is no need I should explain at present this Principle more at large what I have already said being sufficient to infer this Consequence That in the first institution of Nature it was Impossible for Minds to be subjected to Bodies For since God cannot act without Knowledge and against his Will he has made the World by his Wisdom and by the motion of his Love He has made all things by his Son and in his Holy Spirit as we are taught in Scripture Now in the Wisdom of God Minds are perfecter than Bodies and by the necessary Love God has for himself he prefers what is more perfect to what is less so Therefore it is not possible that Minds should be subject to Bodies in the first institution of Nature Otherwise it must be said that God in creating the World has not follow'd the Rules of his Eternal Wisdom nor the Motions of his natural and necessary Love which not only is inconceivable but involves a manifest contradiction True it is that at present the created Mind is debas'd below a material and sensible Body but that 's because Order considered as a necessary Law will have it so 'T is because God loving himself by a necessary Love which is always his Inviolable Law cannot love Spirits that are repugnant to him nor consequently prefer them to Bodies in which there is nothing evil nor in the hatred of God For God loves not Sinners in themselves Nor would they subsist in the Universe but through JESUS CHRIST God neither preserves them nor loves them but that they may cease to be Sinners through the Grace of CHRIST JESUS or that if they remain eternally Sinners they may be eternally condemned by immutable and necessary Order and by the Judgment of our LORD by vertue of whom they subsist for the Glory of the Divine Justice for without Him they would be annihilated This I say by the way to clear some difficulties that might remain touching what I said elsewhere about Original Sin or the general Corruption of Nature 'T is if I mistake not a very useful reflection to consider that the Mind has but two ways of knowing Objects By Light and by Sensation It sees them by Light when it has a clear Idea of them and when by consulting that Idea it can discover all the properties whereof they are capable It sees things by Sensation when it finds not in it self their clear Idea to consult it and so cannot clearly discover their properties but only know them by a confus'd Sensation without Light and Evidence 'T is by Light and a clear Idea the mind sees the Essences of things Numbers and Extension 'T is by a confus'd Idea or Sensation that it judges of the Existence of Creatures and knows its own What the Mind perceives by Light or by a clear Idea it perceives in a most perfect manner moreover it sees clearly that all the Obscurity or Imperfection of its Knowledge proceeds from its own Weakness and Limitation or from want of Application and not from the Imperfection of the Idea it perceives But what the mind perceives by Sensation is never clearly known not for want of any Application on part of the Mind for we always are very applicative to what we feel but by the defectiveness of the Idea which is extreamly obscure and confus'd Hence we may conclude that it is in God or in an immutable nature that we see all that we know by Light or a clear Idea not only because we discover by Light only numbers Extension and the Essences of Beings which depend not on a free Act of God as I have already said but also because we know these things in a very perfect manner and we should even know them in an infinitely perfect manner if our thinking Capacity were infinite since nothing is wanting to the Idea that represents them We ought likewise to conclude that we see in our selves whatever we know by Sensation However this is not as if we could produce in our selves any new modification or that the sensations or modifications of our Soul could represent the Objects on occasion whereof God excites them in us But only that our Sensations which are not distinguished from our selves and consequently cannot represent any thing distinct from us may nevertheless represent the existence of Beings or cause us to judge that they exist For God raising Sensations in us upon the presence of Objects by an action that has nothing sensible we fancy we receive from the Object not only the Idea which represents its essence but also the Sensation which makes us judge of its existence For there is always a pure Idea and a confused Sensation in the Knowledge we have of things as actually existing if we except that of God and of our own Soul I except the Existence of God For this we know by a pure Idea and without Sensation since it depends not on any cause and
is included in the Idea of a necessary Being as the Equality of Diameters is included in the Idea of a Circle And I except the Existence of our Soul because we are inwardly conscious that we Think Will and Feel and have no clear Idea of our Soul as I have sufficiently explained in the seventh Chapter of the second Part of the third Book and elsewhere These are some of the Reasons which we have to add to those already given to prove that all our Light is deriv'd to us from God and that the immediate and direct Object of our clear and evident notices is an immutable and necessary Nature Some Objections are usually made against this Opinion which I shall now endeavour to solve Against what has been said that none but God enlightens us and that we see all things in him OBJECTION I. OUR Soul thinks because it is her Nature God in creating her gave her the faculty of thinking and she needs nothing more But if any thing else is wanting let us stick to what Experience teaches us of our senses which is that they are the manifest causes of our Ideas 'T is an ill way of Philosophizing to argue against Experience ANSWER I cannot but admire that the Cartesian Gentlemen who with so much reason reject and scorn the general Terms of Nature and faculty should so willingly employ them on this occasion They cry out against a Man that shall say the Fire burns by its nature and converts certain Bodies into Glass by a natural Faculty And yet some of them fear not to say that the Humane Mind produces the Ideas of all things in it self by its nature and because it has a thinking faculty But be it spoken without offence these words are no more significative in their Mouths than in the Peripateticks I know very well that the Soul is capable of thinking But I know likewise that extension is capable of Figures The Soul is capable of Will as matter is of Motion But as it is false that matter though capable of figure and motion has in it self a force faculty or nature by which it can move it self and give it self now a round figure and anon a square one so though the Soul be naturally and essentially capable of Knowledge and Will it is false that she has Faculties whereby she can produce in her Ideas or motion towards good There is a great difference between being Moveable and self moving Matter is by its nature moveable and capable of Figures nor can it subsist without a figure But it neither moves it self nor shapes it self nor has it any faculty to do it The Mind is of its nature capable of motion and Ideas I acknowledge But it neither moves nor enlightens its self But 't is God that does all in Minds as well as in Bodies Can we say that God effects the changes that happen in matter and that he causes not those which occur in the Mind Is this to give to God the things that are his to leave these latter sort of Beings to their own management Is he not equally Lord of all things Is he not the Creator Preserver and true mover of Minds as well as Bodies Certainly he makes all both Substances Accidents Beings and Modes of Being For in short he knows all But he knows nothing but what he does We therefore streighten him in his Knowledge if we limit him in his Action But if it must be said that Creatures have such faculties as are commonly conceived and that natural Bodies have a Nature which is the Principle of their Motion and Rest as says Aristotle and his Followers This indeed overthrows all my Ideas but yet I will rather agree to it than say the Mind enlightens it self Men may say that the Soul has the force of moving diversly the Limbs of her Body and of communicating to them Sense and Life They may say if they please that it is she that gives heat to the Blood motion to the Spirits and to the rest of her Body its Bulk Situation and Figure Only let them not say that the Mind gives Light and Motion to it self If God works not all let us allow him at least to do what is Noblest and Perfectest in the World And if Creatures do any thing let them move Bodies and range and posture them as they think fit But let them never act upon Minds We will say if that will serve that Bodies move each other after they have been mov'd themselves or rather will sit down ignorant of the different Dispositions of matter as not concerning us But let not our Minds be ignorant whence proceeds the Light that enlightens them Let them know from what hand they receive all that can make them more happy or more perfect let them acknowledge their dependence in its whole extent and know that whatever they actually have God gives them every moment for as says a great Father upon another Subject 'T is a very criminal Pride to use the gifts of God as our own innate Perfections Above all let us take heed of imagining that the Senses instruct Reason that the Body enlightens the Mind that the Soul receive of the Body what it wants it self We had better believe our selves independent than to believe we truly depend on Bodies 'T is much better to be our own Masters than to seek for Masters among inferior Creatures But we had much better submit our selves to Eternal Truth which assures us in the Gospel that none else is our Instructor than to believe the Testimony of our Senses or of some Men who presume to talk to us as our Teachers Experience whatever may be said does not countenance prejudices For our Senses no less than our Teachers after the Flesh are only occasional causes of the Instruction which Eternal Wisdom infuses into our most inward Reason But because this Wisdom enlightens us by an insensible Operation we imagine it is our Eyes or the words of those that verberate the Air against our Ears who produce this Light or pronounce that intelligible Voice which instructs us And for this Reason as I have said in another place our LORD thought it not enough to instruct us in an intellible manner by his Divinity unless he condescended also to inform us in a sensible way by his Humanity thereby teaching us that he is every way our Master And because we cannot easily retire into our selves to consult him in Quality of eternal Truth immutable Order intelligible Light he has rendred Truth sensible by his Words Order Amiable by his Example Light Visible by a Body which breaks the force of its Lustre and after all we are still so ungrateful unjust stupid and insensible as to respect as our Masters and that against his express prohibition not only other Men but it may be the most insensible and vilest Bodies OBJECTION II. Since the Soul is more perfect than Bodies how comes it that she cannot include