notorious untruth as namely that the execution of justice punitive is unnaturall unto God and that is out of Lament 3. 33. He doth not afflict willingly nor grieve the children of men Thus you take Scripture hand over head to serve your turne But I pray consider is it possible that God should doe any thing against his will men may have reluctations and conflicts in them and doe things volentes nolentes is such a condition possible to be found in the nature of God Yet in this case Aristotle hath defined the action to be simply voluntarie and done willingly If God be represented sometimes unto us as it were fluctuating like men betweene different resolutions of executing either mercy or justice as in the Prophet How shall I give thee up Ephraim how shall I deliver thee Israel how shall I make thee as Admah how shall I set thee as Zeboim mine heart is turned within me and my repentances are rowled together like as he is represented unto us as well in the shape of the members of our body as of the passions of our minde we have cause rather to take notice hereby of the goodnesse of God in condescending thus far to our infirmities to make us the better acquainted with him and the more sensible of his favour then hereby to take occasion to fashion God like unto our selves either in body or minde Yet the meaning of the Prophet is plaine enough namely that God comes not to afflict his children unlesse he be provoked by sinne and herein he differeth from earthly parents who sometimes chasten their children for their owne pleasures but God as hee doth not but in case he is provoked so he doth it for our profit as the Apostle telleth us in the same place To doe a thing willingly hath the same signification with the Latine phrase animi causa that is when nothing is the cause thereof but a mans owne will as Causabon observes out of Seneca de beneficiis 4. whose opinion was Neminem adeo à naturali lege descivisse hominem exuisse ut animi causa malus sit You further say that Nothing can provoke good men to execute punitive justice upon offenders but the good of others deserving either better or not so ill which might grow worse and worse through evill doers impunity I pray consider doe parents chastise their children for the good of others and not for the good of the children themselves God himselfe chastiseth his owne children all manner of wayes and is this for the good of others that deserve better or not so ill and not rather for the good of those his owne children themselves No chastising for the present is joyous saith the Apostle but grievous but afterwards it bringeth forth the quiet fruit of righteousnesse to them that are exercised thereby Marke I pray To them that are exercised thereby he doth not say that this fruit is brought forth to others As for the torments in the world to come who is the better for them unlesse they tend to the improvement of joy in those blessed ones while they behold in others that miserie which onely by the grace of God themselves have escaped For as for any other welfare of the Saints of God or any welfare at al of the damned crew or avoidance of grievances that is procured by the damnation of the wicked if you know it is well but I assure you it is more then I can divine of Yet doe we not say that God hath pleasure in the torture either of men or devils but onely in the demonstration of his owne glorious justice towards them and in the magnifying of his mercy so much the more toward his Saints You say It goeth against the nature of God to punish the workes of his owne hands A vile speech and withall senselesse and no marvell if when men prostitute all honesty and the feare of God in opposing manifest truth they lose their wits also and fall upon most unsober meditations For what a vile speech is it to say that any worke of God goeth against his nature who as the Apostle professeth worketh all things according to the counsell of his will Then againe what a senselesse speech is it to insinuate that it were not so contrary to GODS nature to deale thus with those creatures which were not the workes of his owne hands but being the works of his owne hands you say it is against his nature to punish them A wonderfull assertion and wherat the most barbarous people might be astonished in the consideration of the impiety shall I say or the insulsity thereof or both rather namely that it should be against Gods nature to punish sinners For it is well known that God punisheth none other nor ever did Christ Iesus the Sonne of God onely excepted And what a field have you here to expatiate in if you list to aggravate the unnaturalnesse of any action in God And with as little sobriety doe you amplifie that unnaturalnesse in God by the consideration of man especially as who you say is more deare to him then any childe is to his Father So then to punish others you are willing to grant not to be so unnaturall an action in God as the punishing of man And I pray what are those other creatures Are they inferiour as Oxen and Sheepe and all these never sinned yet is it not unnaturall to punish them if punishment may have place as being taken for the afflicting of them where there is no sinne For God gives us leave to weare them out with plowing carying riding for our necessity for our dâ—light yea to set one creature upon another the greyhound upon an hare upon a deere the hauke upon a partridge or phesant or wilde fowle No unnaturalnesse doe we exercise in all this such is the liberty which God hath given unto us But yet to punish man though a sinner for he punisheth no other this how greatly say you doth it goe against the nature of God It seemes you cannot tell how greatly neither can I helpe you herein For I doe not see how it is against his nature at all But you seeme to give a reason in saying that God is loving kindnesse it selfe But I pray consider is he not justice it selfe also as well as loving kindnesse and is it against the nature of Iustice to punish sinners no nor against his loving kindnesse neither For I hope that no attribute of God is contrary to another though according to their different notions some actions are more suitable to the one then to the other And why man should have more speciall consideration here then Angels I know no reason For if you say that God is the father of man in as much as he hath created him by the same reason he may be the father of the ignoblest creature that is To say that God is the father of man in as much as hee made him after his
that they shall worke agreably he setteth them going in working agreably to their natures the one contingently the other necessarily So that whatsoever the will of God is shall fall out contingently the same falleth-out in such sort as it might have fallen out otherwise if good so as it might have fallen out woorse bene marred if ill yet so as it might have fallen out better bene amended And the eleventhe Article of Irelande having professed that God from all eternity did by his unchangeable counsayle ordeyne whatsoever in time shoulde come to passe addethe herunto by way of explication that so this was ordeyned as therby no violence is offered to the wills of reasonable creatures neyther the liberty nor contingency of second causes is taken away but established rather So that the opinions which you make bold to supplant or prevent are opinions of your owne makinge not of others maynteyninge And to sett an ende to his owne fancyes every man may take liberty when he pleasethe without any great paynes takinge about argument to overthrowe them SECT I. IN the first Section and before the first Chapter accordinge to exact method as you professe in reference unto your former Discourse you propose two thinges to be enquired 1. How this truthe of Gods being most certenly knowne by internall experience unto some may by force of speculative argument be made manifest unto others Secondly how his nature and attributes may be fitliest resembled The latter of which two I shoulde never have expected in a Philosophicall or Theologicall discourse Yet I will prescribe to none but give every vessell leave to vent his owne humour to be delivered of such notions wherwith his braynes have bene conceaved If we have any use to make of them we may if none we are litle the woorse for that Every beinge hathe three passions denominating it For there is a truthe of it there is a goodnes of it there is an unity of it Therfore allso all these are to be founde in the beinge of God But it seemeth not to be your meaninge to speake of this truthe which is a passion of beinge a simple terme but rather of the truthe of this proposition There is a good to witt howe it may be made manifest by speculative argument you desire to inquire grantinge it to be most certenly knowne by internall experience unto some wherby unles you understande our Christian Faithe I discerne not your meanninge Vpon the first point you will not have us to looke for much as yet and the reason you give is enoughe to put us out of expectation of any thinge at all For allbeit a desperate enimy despayring of his life Is therby the more animated to sight yet an Adversary in discourse by evidence of argument brought to despayre of maynteyning his Tenet is not therby the more provoked to dispute And therfore I see no iust restraynt to hinder you from bestowinge your best ability upon this argument even in this place And your selfe confesse that notwithstandinge all this you may proceede upon such advantages as groundes of nature give you And your mayne purpose extendes no further CHAP. I. YOVR first Argument is not like to strike your enimye with any great feare or despayre Arguments weake or weakely prosecuted weakneth the cause maynteyned strengthenethe the cause oppugned And first it is not handsomly caryed thus If every particular generation hath causes then all generations have some cause implyinge that every generation hath many causes all have but one But cary it howe you will it is not capable of any sound inference It is true Every generation hath his cause therfore all generations have causes But what causes only the same causes which every one hathe a part aggregated together For as you make an aggregation of particular generations so the cause of this aggregation inferred can be but an aggregation of the particular causes of particular generations So that nothing at all is concluded here hence distinct from the praemises much lesse the being of the Godhead herby evidenced Then your second inference is as wilde when you adde Otherwise all shoulde not be of one kinde or nature For there is no congruity in affirming the whole by aggregation to be of the same kinde or nature with every particular For every particular is unum per se consistinge ex actu potentia But the whole by aggregation is unum per accidens consisting of many particulars each wherof is unum per se heaped together not by any naturall union vnited into one As we doe not say the bushel of corne is of the same kinde with every particular grayne as allso it cannot be sayde to be of a diverse kinde in any congruitie allthough there were diverse kindes of graynes therin But rather an heape of graynes whether of the same kinde or of diverse kindes Agayne you propose your argument not only of the generation of Man who is of one kinde but of all generable bodies who are well knowne to be of diverse kindes therfore why should you accoumpt it any absurdity for all these to be not of one kinde or nature Furthermore when you make shewe of such an Inference as this All must have some cause otherwise they be not of one kinde or nature you doe herby imply that All that have some cause are in a fayre way to be of the same kinde or nature which upon consideration you will finde to be utterly untrue For all creatures have some cause yet are they not any thing the more of one kinde or nature Allthoughe they have not only some cause but the same cause allso namely God Like as though thinges have different causes yet it followeth not that they are of different kindes As all mise are of the same kinde though some are bred equivocally some univocally so of lise and diverse others For although Averroes were of opinion that mise bred equivocally mise bred univocally by generation were of different kindes therupon maynteyned that such as were bred equivocall did never propagate their like by generation yet I doe not thinke you are of that opinion it being contrary to manifest experience And to us it is manifest who believe the creation that the first creatures were not produced by way of generation yet did propagate their like were of the same kinde with creatures propagated from them But Averroes was an Atheist even amongst Arabians denyed all creation I am sory you are so unhappy in defendâ—nge truthe especially such a truthe as the being of God but thâ— best is that truthe needethe no mans defense I hope you will proove nothing more happy in defending errours Yet I deny not but that the greatest Divines doe conclude that there is a first cause that is God because the progresse from effects to causes from causes infâ—rior to causes superior cannot be infinite According wherunto your argument shouldâ— have proceeded thus In
suitable to the power of so infinite an Agent And consider finite thinges are able to produce finite thinges equall unto themselves why then may not God being infinite produce something that is infinite It may be answeared that the experience of producinge equalls to the producers themselves is true only in the way of generation And so God allso in the way of eternall and incomprehensible generation producethe a Sonne equall to himselfe yea the same with himselfe as touching his nature But this is grounded upon a mystery of faithe which hathe no evidence unto reason naturall For allthoughe by reason meditation on Gods woorkes we may atteyne to the knowledge of God as touching the unity of his nature yet can we not therby atteyne to the knowledge of God as touchinge the Trinity of persons Adde unto this that diverse have not only believed but undertaken to proove allso that God is able to produce that which is infinite in extension eyther in quantitie continuall or discrete And Hurtado de Mendosa a Spanishe Iesuite and a late Writer is most eager in the mayntenance of this So farre of are your propositions from caryinge evidence in their for heads Yet you suppose an argument which is very inconsequent For you suppose that whatsoever hath cause of beinge hath allso a beginninge of beinge and that in time But this is notably untrue unto us Christians For the Sonne and Second person in the Trinitie hathe a cause of his beinge to witt the Father Likewise the H. Ghost hathe not only a cause but causes of his beinge to witt bothe the Father and the Sonn for he proceedethe from them bothe yet hathe he not such beginninge of beinge as you speake of For bothe he and the Sonne are everlasting like unto the Father Your second reason is woorst of all as when you say For omnis causa est principium omne causatum est principiatum For in the meaning of this proposition causa and principium are taken for voces synonymae woordes of the same signification not signifying two thinges the one wherof is consequent unto the other And what sober Scholer would affirme that omnis causa est principium as principium signifiethe the beginninge of beinge wheras indeede it is the cause of beginninge of beinge to its effect rather then formally to be stiled the beginninge of beinge it selfe That which followethe of the limits of thinges more easily or more hardly discerned accordinge as the cause is founde to be preexistent in time or no is an assertion as wilde as the similitude wherby you illustrate it and all nothing to the purpose to proove that whatsoever hathe cause of beinge hathe allso limits of beinge thoughe still you proceede ambiguously without distinction eyther of beinge or of the limits therof For first where the cause is not preexistent in time as in things risinge by concomitance or resultance yet the effects are as easily seene to be limited as when the cause is preexistent in time as for example the light of the Sunne and the light of the candle which flowe from those bodies by naturall emanation was as easily seene to be limited the first time it was as after the light is a long time hid from us and afterward appeares agayne unto us Secondly what if the limits be not seene what I say is that to the purpose Angells are invisible yet we knowe their natures are limited Thirdly what thinke you of the World hathe it limits or no You thinke no doubt it hathe yet was not God the cause therof preexâ—stent in time but only in eternitie For before the World no time had any existence Agayne suppose the Wolrd had bene made from everlasting which some Scholemen have helde to be possible in this case God shoulde have no preexistence eyther as touching time actuall or as touchinge time possible Yet I hope that limits of the World even in that case had bene as discernable to Aristotle as nowe they are to you As for the similitude wherby you illustrate it that rather sheweth howe in such cases when effects doe rise by way of concomitance or resultance they are hardly distinguished from their causes then how their limits are hardly discernable Yet what shoulde moove you thus to amplify howe hard it is to discerne such effects from their causes I knowe not For what hardnes I pray is there in discerninge light to be different from the body of the Sunne that gives it or from the body of a Candle or of a Glowewoorme or of some kinde of rotten wood or from the scales of some fishes that cast light in the darke Yet is all this nothinge pertinent to the confirmation or illustration of the last proposition propounded by you Howe farre dependance upon a cause dothe inferre limits of beinge upon the thinge dependinge I have allready spoken What meant you to distinguishe of the consideration of effects and causes accordinge to the consideration of them eyther distinctly or in grosse unles it be to puzle the Reader as much as you confound your selfe when eftsoones you manifest that you speake of them bothe as they have causes which is to consider them only as effects For that notion alone hathe reference to a cause But whether this dothe inferre that they are limited I have allready therupon delivered my minde 3. Hence you proceede to the solution of newe problemes and that as a mere naturalist Why men in these dayes are not Gyants why Gyants in former times were but men And the reason you give is because the vigour of causes productive or conservative of vegetables of man especially from which he receavethe nutrition and augmentation is lesse nowe then it hathe bene at least before the flood The latter of your two questions is wilde For what doe we understand by Gyants but men of a Gyantlike stature is it a sober question to aske howe it commethe to passe that men of an huge stature are but men For suppose men were of never so vast a proportion of parts as great as the Image that Nabucliodonosor sett up in the playne of Dura or as great as the Colossus at Rhodes shoulde not men notwithstandinge be men still and neyther Angells nor beasts much lesse eyther inferior to the one or superior to the other If the heavens were infinite as some conceave that an infinite body may be made by God yet shoulde those heavens be heavens still and a body still Neyther dothe it followe that therfore those Gyants were men still because the matter of nutrition and augmentation was finite limited For thoughe they had bene turned into Woolves or other beastes the matter of nutrition had bene limited still yet in such a case they had ceassed to be men As touchinge the stature of men so much lessened in these dayes in comparison unto former times I no way like the reason therof assigned by you First because it caryethe no evidence with it you give
certeyne universall nature mooves them contrarily to their speciall inclinations for mayntenance of the integritie of the whole and for avoydance of all vacuity I see no reason for that other assertion of yours that nature cannot sett boundes to bodies naturall but rather is limited in them What thinke you of the soules of men doe not these as other soules prescribe limits unto the matter Materia prima was accoumpted in our Vniversitie to have dimensiones in determinatas and that it receaved the determination therof from formes but by the operation of Agents in their severall generations I confesse nature it selfe is but the effect and instrument of God who is the God of nature as well as of grace But yet whether every thinge that hathe boundes of nature as the World hathe dothe herby evidence and inferre the creation therof is such a question wherin Aristotle and his followers did peremtorily maynteyne the negative and the Scripture it selfe do the impute unto faithe our acknowledgement of the Creation 4. Nowe we come to the scanninge of your second Principle Whatsoever hathe no cause of beinge can have no limits or boundes of beinge This in part hathe evidence of truthe thus Whatsoever hathe no efficient cause of beinge the same hathe no beginninge of beinge But if it proceede of limits of essence or of qualitie or of quantitie it requires helpe of reason to make it good For as many as denyed the World to have a beginninge denyed as it seemes that it had any cause of beinge and thought the beinge therof to be by necessitie of nature Yet did they maynteyne that the World had limits of quantitie and qualitie For they maynteyned that Infinitum magnitudine was absolutely impossible as Aristotle by name By your distinction followinge of diverse wayes wherby beinge may be limited you make no mention of limitation by havinge a beginninge therof which yet hathe bene the cheife if not only limit which hitherto you have mentioned Agayne why shoulde you make but two wayes confoundinge the limits of quantitie with the limits of intensive perfection in every several kinde It were too much in my judgement to confound limits of quantitie with limits of qualitie which yet are both accidentall But most unreasonable it seemes to confound eyther of these with intensive perfection of every severall kinde But howe will you accommodate the members of this distinction to the former proposition Allmightie God hathe no cause of beinge therfore he hathe no limits of beinge Nowe I pray apply this to the members of your distinction concerninge the kinde of limits of beinge Is he without limits in number why then belike he is numberles Yet indeede he is but one and can be but one in nature and in persons can be but three must needes be three Is he without limits in quantitio and so infinite therin But in very truthe he hathe no quantitie at all Is he without limits in qualities not materiall for such are not incident to him but spirituall so infinite therin Are there no boundes of the degrees of his goodnes why but consider in God there are no degrees no qualities at all As touching perfections created therof indeede we have severall kindes but none such are to be found in God Only because God is able to produce them therfore they are sayde to be eminently in God thoughe not formally But the like you may say as well of any materiall attribute as of spirituall For God can produce all alike Therfore all are eminently alike in God Of thinges visible the most perfect you say are but perfect in some one kinde It is true of invisible creatures as well as of visible but this kinde is to be understood of a kinde created But you may not say that God is perfect in all such kindes but rather in none of them For that were to be perfect in imperfections Gods perfection transcendes all created kindes and he is the Author of them producinge them out of nothing They that maynteyne the World to have bene eternall maynteyne it to have bene so by necessitie of nature And all such would peremtorily deny that it was possible for the World not to have bene and therfore in this discourse of yours it would have becommed you rather to proove the contrary then to suppose it Howe the Heaven of Heavens shoulde be accoumpted immortall I knowe not seing they are not capable of life And seing deathe properly is a dissolution of body and soule immortalitie must consist proportionably in an indissoluble conjunction of the body and the soule which is not incident to Angells much lesse to Heavens which have neyther bodies nor soules wherof to consist Neyther dothe Seneca in the place by you alleaged speake of Angells in my judgment but rather of the Species of thinges generable particulars thoughe subject to corruption beinge inabled for generation and therby for perpetuation of their kindes and consequently for the mayntenance of the World and that for ever It is well knowne that the Platonickes thoughe they maynteyned the World to have a beginninge yet denyed the matter wherof the World was made to have had any beginninge Of the same opinion were the Stoicks Their common voyce was De nihilo nihil in nihiluâ— nil posse reverti accordingly they might well conceave that God might be hindered in his operation by reason of the stubbornes and churlishnes of the matter so the censure of Muretus upon such Philosophers I conceave to be just Yet by your leave I doe not thinke that any creature capable of immortalitie in what sense soever applyable to Angells as well as unto men can be made immortall by nature Yet I doubt not but God can make creatures in such sort immortall by nature as that no second cause can make them ceasse to be For it is apparant that God hathe many such as namely the Angels and soules of men Yet still their natures are annihilable in respect of the power of God Neyther can I believe that to be immortall in Senecaes language was to be without beginninge For I doe not finde but that the Stoicks together with Plato conceaved that the World had a beginninge But in this respect he calleth them eternall I shoulde thinke because the World together with the kindes of thinges therin conteyned subject to corruption and generation in particulars should have no ende and that by the Providence of God We believe that nothinge is absolutely necessary but God But Aristotle believed the World allso to be everlasting without beginninge of absolute necessitie For that the World shoulde be created originally out of nothinge all Philosophers helde impossible and that the matter shoulde be everlastinge and of absolute necessity wherof the World was to be made that seemed impossible unto Aristotle and that upon good reason The creation therfore is to be justified against Philosophers by sound argument and not avouched only by bare contestation That which followethe
neyther universally true nor at all to any purpose you insist liberally in your followinge discourse You should proove that whatsoever hath limits of extension the same allso hath beginninge of duration which yet I deny not to be a truthe and demonstrable but of the demonstration herof your discourse hathe fayled hitherunto When you argue thus It is as possible to put a newe fashion upon nothing as for any thing that is to take limits or set forme of being from nothinge You corrupt the opinion of your opposites and not refure it For they that maynteyne the World had no beginninge doe allso maynteyne that it tooke no beginninge of the limits therof And as they doe not say the World tooke his beginninge from nothinge so neyther doe they say that the World tooke the beginninge of his limits or tooke his limits or forme from nothinge Nowe you by this forme of your dispute doe instruct Atheists howe to discourse against the creation of the World thus If God made the World out of nothing then he put a newe fashion upon nothinge But it is impossible that any newe fashion shoulde be put upon nothinge therfore it is impossible that God shoulde make the World out of nothinge Nowe in this Syllogisme the minor is most true For not any thinge can consist of nothing as the matter and of a fashion as the forme therof But the consequence of the major is most untrue For when we say that God made the World out of nothinge our meaninge is not that nothing was the matter wherof the World was made but only that it was the terminus a quo not materia ex qua As much as to say God made the World wheras nothing went before neyther had God any matter wheron to woorke when he made the World And Philosophers affirminge that the World had no beginninge doe therwithall deny that the World tooke eyther being or limits from any thinge You turne their negative into an affirmative so to corrupt their opinion in steade of confutinge it They thought it needed not any thinge to give it beinge or bounds of beinge least they shoulde be driven to affirme that somethinge coulde be made out of nothinge wheras they had rather maynteyne that the world ever had existence by necessitie of nature Neyther did they maynteyne that the world tooke limits or beinge from it selfe any more then from any other which you devise and impute unto them in steade of convictinge their Tenet of errour by force of argument in the way of naturall reason which you undertake And therfore havinge so weakely disprooved the everlastingnes of things limited you doe therby betray the weakenes of your proofe of Gods illimited condition from the everlastingnes therof 6. And yet as if you had confounded all the Philosophers that ever lived in the point of creation you proceede magnificently to suppose that the conceyte of beinge without limits is essentially included in the conceyte of beinge without cause precedent which if it were true then were it a truthe per se notae and consequently the creation of the world evident of it selfe even to common reason seinge it is supposed to have limits And agayne your discourse is so fashioned as if Philosophers maynteyned that the world tooke beginninge of it selfe which is untrue and indeede a thinge evidently impossible namely that any thinge shoulde take beginninge of it selfe And indeede if a thinge coulde give beinge to it selfe it might give what it lusted to it selfe if so be it had a lust which the Elements and Heavens have not Yet those Aristotle maynteyned to have bene from everlastinge not that they gave beginninge to themselves but that they tooke no beginninge from any thinge The reason wherof was because they coulde not conceave howe any thinge coulde be made out of nothinge a thing contrary to all naturall experience upon which kinde of ground your selfe but erst builded your discourse when you sayde thinges caused as induction manifestethe are allwayes limited and moulded in their proper causes Yet notwithstandinge upon this fiction of a thing able to give beinge to it selfe you dilate at large I grant that upon this fiction nothinge coulde restrayne it from takinge all bodily perfection possible to it selfe in case it had power to give beinge to it selfe But never any Philosopher maynteyned that it had power to give beinge to it selfe For they that maynteyned a Chaos precedinge the production of the world maynteyned that out of this Chaos God produced all thinges and not that the Chaos or ought els gave being to itselfe And Aristotle that denyed such an eternall Chaos maynteyned the world had no beginninge was farre from maynteyninge that the world gave beinge to it selfe Secondly I answeare that thoughe it shoulde thus receave all bodily perfection possible yet this shoulde not be infinite and without limits as you woulde have your Reader to suspect without proofe and indeede unles this be imagined t is nothing no the purpose The reason why in this case it shoulde not be infinite is this because all bodily perfection possible is but finite as they conceaved and therin conceaved nothing amisse So of quantitie or qualitie the impossibilitie of eyther to be without measure in bodies whose perfection is only finite is a sufficient hinderance from takinge eyther quantity or qualitie without measure In like sort let Vacuitie as you speake be left free to give it selfe full and perfect act let it take all possible perfection yet since all possible perfection of bodies is supposed to be only finite it will not followe that the perfection taken shall be without limits which yet you must proove otherwise your discourse is of no force to proove that whatsoever hathe nâ— cause of bringe distinct from itselfe is without limits Allthoughe the Philosophers that maynteyned the world or matter therof preexistent to be without beginninge driven herunto because they conceaved not how it was possible that any thinge shoulde be made out of nothinge yet did they never maynteyne that the one or the other gave being to it selfe Yet this fiction you pinne upon their sleeve to supply the weaknes of your discourse Much lesse coulde it enter into any sober mans conceyte that they gave power to a Vacuitie to give it selfe ful and perfect act seinge Vacuitie is starke nothinge which the Chaos was not but a materiall thinge thoughe merely passive and nothinge active But as for vacuitie that is neyther active nor passive as being starke nothinge And yet to this you adde a further solecisme in this your fiction as when you suppose this vacuitie to have power to assume eyther bodily substances or spirituall which the Chaos had not no not so much as in capacitie being wholy materiall wheras spirituall substances are immateriall And yet I confesse as you give unto that which is nothinge power to assume which it list eyther bodily or spirituall substances it may well be sayde that nothing hathe power indifferently
a beginninge so we believe it shall have an ende And consequently the producing of more individuall substances shall have an ende And wheras all Species and individualls formerly produced being put together doe make up a number only finite howe can this inferre that God is infinite especially if so be more Species might be produced then have bene produced For eyther it argueth a greater power to produce more and more kinds of things or no. If it dothe then the producing of those that are produced is no evidence of Gods greatest power If is dothe not then the number of thinges produced were they double to that they are or shall be cannot evidence that Gods power is infinite Agayne seinge God is yet in producing more and more we can have no evidence herby of Gods greatest power till he come to the ende of his workes therfore as yet we have herby no evidence of his greatest power or that his power is infinite thoughe perhaps the world may have to witt when God is come to the ende of his workinge Yet when that time is come wherein God shall cease from producinge newe all his workes put together being but finite howe can that consideration evince a power infinite Wherfore Hill that Atheist in his Philosophia Epicurea c. maynteyned that the World allready made was infinite because it was fitt as he thought that an infinite cause should have an effect correspondent and therfore saythe he the world must be infinite To proceede a litle further when the time shall come that God shall surcease to produce any newe thinge eyther in kinde or individuall the particulars produced put together from the beginninge of the world to that day shall be but finite and howe can this inferre a power infinite Nowe all this discourse of yours proceedes upon supposition that all thinges are produced by God and not only by course of nature but by such a cause as was first created and since maynteyned and governed and ordered by God which truthe was nothing evident to the greatest Philosophers that ever were And you well knowe that the creation of materia prima was denyed by them all And therfore I should conceave that the infinitenes of God is rather evidenced by his manner of producing things then by the number of thinges produced as namely by his creating of the World that of nothing For if God hathe power to give beinge unto that which hathe no beinge but only is capable of beinge as put the case to a man or Angell and that by his word will he is as well able to give being to any thinge conceavable that is capable of beinge by his word and will and Qui potest in omne possibile is est omnipotens He that can give beinge to any thinge that is possible to be he is Allmighty Agayne if God were finite in perfection of entity then it were easy to imagine a more perfect thing then God then that allso should have an existence For if the essence or existence of a nature lesse perfect shoulde be all one how much more should this be verified of a nature more perfect And consequently there shoulde be many Gods one different in perfection above another CHAP. IV. There is no pluralitie of perfections in the Infinite essence albeit the perfection of all thinges be in him Of the Absolute Identitie of the Divine essence and attributes AS for the argument which you propose We must eyther allowe the Gods to have bodies or deny them sense because sense is never founde without a body I see no great cause to mislike it especially if it be rightly proposed as it may be thus because sense to witt in proper speeche cannot be founde without a body For is not sense an organicall facultie that is such a facultie as cannot exercise its function without materiall instruments How you dispute in justifyinge your censure upon this argument let the Reader judge God the supreame Artificer can make Virtus formatrix you say doe more then Epicurus can by all his sense and reason and hence you conclude that therfore God hath both sense and reason Wheras you may as well proove that God hathe bodily substance in him both because he setts virtus formatrix on woorke in producing bodies and can doe more then we can withall our bodies and soules Therfore if you please you may in confidence of such illations proceede to say that God consists of a body and soule too The Psalmists Philosophy is a poore ground for you to builde on For you may as well conclude out of the Psalmist that God hathe eyes and eares and handes allso as when he say the The eyes of the Lord are over the righteous his eares are open unto their prayers The right hand of the Lord is exalted the right hand of the Lord hath done valiantly And if you are pleased to attribute sense unto God why doe you not attribute unto him feeling and smelling and tastinge allso Whatsoever we come to understand by our five senses why may not God understand the same without sense as well as Angells That God only is and all thinges numerable are but mere shadowes of his beinge are your owne principles and phrases to drawe conclusions from such groundes is to builde Castles in the Ayre You thinke to helpe it by sayinge that Hearing sight and reason are in God according to their ideall patternes or perfections you might have taken in three senses more as well and have sayde that smelling â—astinge and feelinge are in God according to Ideall patternes and perfections and justify Epicurus too in maynteyninge that the Gods have bodies For thoughe our Saviour sayde a Spirite hath not fleshe and bone yet you knowe howe to justifie that bodies and soules and fleshe and bone and braynes and senses yea and the basest thinge that is are in God to witt according to their ideall patternes and perfections For we make no question but that all these thinges are knowne to God and he is able to produce them no more doe you require in the next Section unto this that all thinges are in God yea materia prâ—a and all And this conceyte of yours you prosecute with a great deale more Rhetoricke then Philosophy or Logicke Certeinly not to be and not to have operation are farre more different betweene themselves then nihil agere and otium esse For these are formally the same the other are not For like 〈◊〉 to be and to worke are in themselves manifestly distinct so must be their negations allso so are not nihil agere otium esse 2. Your affectation of phrasifyinge more like a Rhetorician then a Philosopher makes you overlashe and cast your selfe upon resemblances without all proportion As when you say all thinges are in Gods power as strengthe to moove our limmes is in our sinewes or motive faculty Now in this I say is no proportion For seinge all thinges are
Overbury saw manifestly that his refusall would have beene an occasion to bereave him of his Lieutenancy of the Tower which he had bought with a great summe of money This temptation prevailed with him wee commonly say The greater is the temptation the lesse is the sin So where small meanes of contentments are the greater is the temptation to discontent and to tast of the bitter fruits thereof But I doe not finde that the particular instances following doe any way savour of this member of your distinction You seeme to keepe your selfe wholly to the prosecuting of inequality of naturall propensions yet not that neither with such congruity as might justly be expected For first you prosecute the inequality of wealth and wit Wit is a naturall faculty I confesse I never heard it called a naturall propension till now But as for wealth it is neither propension nor faculty naturall nor at all naturall It is true I confesse that some mens wealth gets the start of wit as he observed that in a great audience sometimes said unto his auditors When I behold your wealth I wonder at your wit againe when I behold your wit I wonder at your wealth I confesse willingly that to abound in wealth is to abound in temptations unto sinne that fulnesse of bread is reckoned among the sins of Sodome that when Jeshurun waxed fat he spurned with the heele But the temptations herehence arising prevaile onely on them that want wit is an observation I have not beene acquainted with before neither am prone to beleeve it I never read this laid to the charge of Sardanapalus of the Assyrians or of Xerxes who as I remember it was that proposed a reward to him that could invent a new pleasure nor to Heliogabalus among the Romane Emperours Nero was luxurious enough I never heard it proceeded from want of wit for the first quinquennium of his reigne hee manifested himselfe to bee no foole Hercules servivit Omphale was it for want of wit That the Merchants sonne of whom it is reported that in one night at Venice he spent sive hundred pounds upon his five senses had his honesty beene answerable to his wit he had kept his reputation with the best And the Gentleman of the house of the Vaineys that in most luxurious manner wasted his estate and afterwards turned Turke I never heard defamed for want of wit Yet we commonly say many men have good wits but they are in fooles keeping And indeed a foole in Solomons computation doth usually stand for a knave And it is most true that such are most unwise as appeares by the issue for by such courses they shorten their dayes and send themselves with precipitation unto their graves there to grow greene before their heads bee gray and after they are gone their remembrance rots and they leave a very ill savour behinde them But I should thinke that dull fellowes are neither so inventious of mad courses nor of so active spirits to prosecute them as those whom God hath endued with better parts of understanding I grant men of great wits have not alwaies revenues answerable But I should thinke it is their pride rather then their wit that instigates them to injurious courses For when men cannot subject their minds unto their fortunes but labour to carve unto themselves fortunes answerable to their mindes this must needs expose them to lewd courses Yet a good wit I confesse to maintaine a bad cause may animate some more to molest and vexe and it is not the greatnes of revenues will free them from such exorbitant courses Though mens bodies overgrow their soules yet if they have not a spirit answerable they will prove but lubbers though great lubbers as great as Gog-Magog whom Corineus met withall at Dover when that great lubber like a timber log came tumbling topsie turvie over and over And it is a common saying that a short man needs not a stoole to give a great lubber a box in the eare though he that is weake had neede to be witty yet it is not alwaies true or for the most part that weake persons are wily and where wilinesse is found it is a temptation strong enough without weaknesse to move men to practise unlawfull policy where grace is wanting But to say that wilinesse shelters it selfe with craft is as much as to say it shelters it selfe with it selfe and if the distinction be put betweene the disposition of wilinesse that is within and wily crafty courses without well something else to wit mens private reaches and ends may be said to be sheltred hereby yet wilines cannot For like as wisdome is not sheltered but rather discovered laid open by wise courses folly by foolish courses so also wilines craftines by wily and crafty courses I see no reason to justifie that saying men love their wits more strongly when they perceive them set upon that which in it selfe is good And I give a reason for my negation though you give none for your affirmation for the more convenient the object is unto the appetite the more strongly doth the appetite affect it and the more convenient things are unto us the more wee love our selves for affecting them Now it is manifest that luxurious objects are more convenient to a luxurious appetite then objects temperate and avaritious courses more convenient to the appetite of an avaricious person then courses of liberality and generally to all men in the state of corruption the pleasures of sinne are more gratefull then the pleasure of righteous courses Nay a man regenerate may for good reason seeme not to be so strongly caried in his affections unto good as the wicked are in their affections unto evill my reason is because in the regenerate there dwels a flesh lusting against the spirit which remits and qualifies the fervour of his affection unto good whereas on the contrary in the wicked there is found no spirit lusting against the flesh to remit or qualifie the fervour or fury rather of their affection unto evill especially when they are fitted with most convenient objects to allure them Againe to doe good to the poore is not good in it selfe as you suppose we were wont to say in the Vniversity that Omnis actio est bona aut mala propter circumstantias and as I remember it was a saying of Bernard that vaine-glory clotheth the poore as well as charity And how can that bee a good will to the poore that practiseth to coosen others for the gratifying of the poore â—o may hee be said to beare a good will to Paul that robbeth Peter to pay Paul yet that which hee will leth is good to Paul I confesse but it is no good will to him that is such a pay master neither is it necessary it should proceed from any intention to satisfie Paul it may well proceed from other intentions No man is bound in conscience to hinder any mans welfare or his owne either no
Yet if you marke it well this which in this case is called power will finally be resolved not so much into power as into impotency For it is not to be presumed that our Saviour had lesse power then another man because he could not sinne or the Angels since their confirmation then they had before or that men in their glorified condition shall be more impotent then before And indeed confirmation of integrity and innocency doth not abolish power but onely rectifie the use of it and establish that rectitude in the use of power Yet there is a denomination of power attributed to man and denyed unto God as when we say man can transgresse God cannot But the ground of this is not the want of power in God and a surplusage of power in man but onely this that a man is capable of restraint from a superiour power God is not For to say that man can transgresse is as much as to say that man can doe that which he is forbidden to doe or from the doing whereof he is restrained But this cannot be affirmed of God as who hath no superior power to restraine him Your next sentence is full of non-sense as when you say It is more shamefull then impossible for rich men to lye or coozen or for Magistrates to oppresse and wrong their inferiours albeit the ones riches or others power were infinitely encreased without internall encrease of their fidelity For the better opening whereof I will resolve it into its parts And they are two considered apart without comparison The first is this It is shamefull for rich men to lye and coozen for Magistrates to oppresse and wrong albeit the ones riches and the others power were infinitely encreased without internall encrease of their fidelity Now I say there is plaine non-sense in this and that in divers respects First in saying it is is shamefull for rich men to lye and coozen albeit their riches be never so much encreased for the coherence by vertue of the particle albeit doth imply thatit is a shamefull course for them to lye though never so much provoked thereunto This I say should be the sense But your sentence hath a quite contrary sense For whereas according to the most convenient sense it should run thus It is a shamefull course for a man to lie and coozen though he be never so poore poverty indeed being usually a provocation unto lying and coozening as wee reade Prov. 30. 9. you pronounce it in a quite contrary sense thus It is a shamefull thing for a rich man to lye and coozen though he be never so rich Secondly your adversative is as unreasonable in respect of the latter part of it which is this Albeit he be without encrease of internall fidelity As much as to say it is a shamefull thing for a rich man to lye and coozen though hee be never a whit the more honest for his riches and t is like unto his speech that said of a swine It was a creature which though it was polluted yet it was not cleane as if there were an opposition between being polluted and being not cleane so you imply an opposition betweene being never the more honest and doing that which was shamefull Whereas indeed he that doth shamefull things is hoc ipso never a whit the more honest The solecisme is the same applyed to the Magistrate as touching the latter part not as touching the former because their power and authority may seeme to countenance them in dealing more hardly with inferiours then if they were not in magistracy would seeme fit The second part is this It is possible for rich men to lye and coozen though they were rich and never a whit the more honest It is possible for the Magistrate to oppresse and wrong though they were never so powerfull and never a whit the more honest Here the solecisme is alike in both as touching the latter part For you imply by the forme of the sentence that want of honesty were some hindrance to lying and coozening some hindrance to oppressing and wronging But as touching the former part the solecisme is most foule in the speech concerning the Magistrate as when you imply that the great power the Magistrate hath is an hindrance to his possibility of oppressing and wronging his inferiours whereas it appeares manifestly that rather it is a furtherance thereunto But it is impossible for God to speake an untruth or to do wrong Before I have shewed that to have a power to transgresse is to imply a being in subjection to a superiour power that restraineth him and consequently such a power is resolved into weaknesse and impotency In speciall to speake untruth implyeth lesse power then to speake truth for to speake truth implyeth knowledge of truth And to know truth is a thing of more power then to be ignorant of truth But it may be you propose this of lying which is to speak contrary to a mans knowledge but this is not power to doe ought For the speaking of this or that is not the lying but lying is a denomination of the act of speaking arising from the contrariety of the speech to the knowledge or intentions of the mind So that if he speake the same thing in his dream or if another delivereth the same words yet is it no lying In a word power to doe ill or peccabilitas which is per naturam doth no more rellish of true power then impoccabilitas per gratiam doth savour of impotency and weaknesse But God you say cannot speake untruth The truth is God cannot speake at all in proper speech for God hath no tongue to be the interpreter of his heart But God doth inspire his servants with truth and move them to speake it or to write it And it is impossible hee should inspire with falshood man himselfe would never speake falshood but alwayes truth if hee might advantage himselfe as much with telling truth as telling untruth Now though a man sometimes promotes his ends by false courses yet it is absurd to thinke that God needs false courses to promote his ends seeing he is almighty As for the doing of wrong it is well knowne that if hee should command Abraham to sacrifice his sonne and see him execute it or command Sampson to sacrifice himselfe by dying with the Philistins he shall doe no wrong either to the one or to the other or by making Prince Iob as poore as poore Iob in destroying his substance his children and last of all striking his body with a sore boile yet shall hee not doe any wrong to Iob. Nay were Iob as innocent as Adam was in his creation or as the elect Angels are now in their confirmation and should deale so with them as he did with Iob yet should they have just cause to say as Eli did He is the Lord let him doe what seemeth good in his sight Arminius confesseth that the most innocent creature God can