no respect of persons and as before I observ'd from Aristotle is a Mind without Affection Now the nature of a Dispensation is to favour some to set some at liberty from the obligation of the Law and is a kind of praeterition of others leaving them still under the tye and obligation and obnoxious to the Penalty if they transgress Whereas in a well govern'd Kingdom there ought to be Unum pondus and Una Mensura in distributive as well as commutative Justice It was part of the Oath that was taken by King William the First who is commonly stiled the Conquerour that he would Aequo jure Anglos Francos tractare Which Oath favours nothing of a Conquest nor does it run in the stile of a Conquerour And it is the Oath of a Judge at this day That he shall truly serve the King and his People c. That he shall do Right to every Person notwithstanding the King's Letters that is notwithstanding any Non Obstante It is a Maxim in Law Quo modo aliquid Ligatur eo modo dissolvitur Now a Law being made by Consent of all should not be Dissolv'd again but by the like Consent that is by Authority of the King and Parliament who have the Legislature Dr. Willet in his Synopsis Papismi makes a Difference between a Toleration and a Dispensation That of Moses in case of Divorces was a Tolleration A Dispensation says he must be of as high a Nature as the Institution None but the Law-Maker can Dispence with the Law not he that hath but a share in the Legislature And from hence I shall take occasion to assert and shall endeavour to make good my Assertion by Law that the Lawful Power of Dispensing with an Act of Parliament that concerns the Publick is only in the hands of those that have the Legislative Power I confine my self to such Acts only as concern the Publick as the present Act we have now to do with does in a very high degree And therefore I hold that none can Dispence with such a Law but the King and Parliament and such as they entrust with it I shall begin to prove this by an Act of Parliament which is the highest Resolve and Authority in our Law It is in the Preamble of the Act of 25 Hen. 8. c. 21. the Statute of Dispensations and the Preamble of a Statute is Law as well as the enacting part or body of the Law. It is in effect a Declaration of what was Law before at least it shews the Opinion and Judgment of the Law-Makers which is of high Authority It first utterly disowns and renounces the Pope's long usurped Claim and Pretence of Dispensing with any Person within this Realm even in Matters Spiritual tho' by him practis'd for many Years I desire to observe upon this that long usage by an Usurpation gives no lawful Right But I would further observe too that where it hath been long admitted and used it is in such Case reasonable for none but the Supream Court to undertake it and declare against it In the next place this Act of Parliament does affirm That this Realm of England is subject to no Laws but such as have been made and taken by sufferance of the King and his Progenitors and the People of this Realm at their free Liberty by their own Consent to be used amongst them and have bound themselves by long Use and Custom to the observance of them as to the customed and ancient Laws of this Realm Originally establish'd as Laws of the same by the said Sufferance Consents and Customs And none otherwise This shews the Original of our Common Law. This likewise clearly proves that whatever is imposed upon the People without their Consent hath not the Authority of a Law And it cannot be shewn that ever the People did consent to this Power or Practice of Granting Dispensations But it plainly appears that our Acts of Parliament are so far from approving or countenancing of it that they have often fenced against it altho' in vain hitherto And tho' the Usage have been very Ancient as I have shewn yet that gives it no lawful Authority for this Preamble declares those only are Laws binding to the People that have been Originally establish'd as Laws The Word Originally refers no doubt to our very Primitive Institution which is Common Law or at least to a time so ancient as that the Original cannot be traced out nor shewn and then it shall be presum'd to be the Common Law. Now I have I hope clearly evinced that the very first invention and practice of Dispensations by the Bishop of Rome is not time out of mind nor can the Usage of it here by imitation of the Pope reach up to a Prescription in the judgment of our Law nor by the Rules of it For Sir Edward Cook in his first Instit. Fol. 115. treating of a Prescription and the nature of it says That if there be any sufficient proof of Record or Writing to the contrary albeit it exceed the Memory of any Man living yet it is within the Memory of Man in a legal sence it had its Original since the beginning of the Reign of our King Richard the First that is in the time of King John and King Henry the Third But that which makes it much the stronger is that this Declaration of the King and Parliament against such Dispensations and Laws introduc'd without the King and Peoples Consent does conclude with Negative Words viz. and not otherwise and is exclusive of all other that is that nothing is Law without their Consent And this Statute of Dispensations proceeds further to shew where the true and lawful Power of Granting Dispensations is vested in these words viz. It stands with natural Equity and good Reason that in all Laws humane within this Realm the King and both Houses representing the whole State of the Realm have full Power to Dispense and to Authorize some Person to Dispense with those and all other humane Laws of this Realm and the same Laws to abrogate annull amplifie and diminish as it shall be seen unto the King the Nobles and the Commons of the Realm present in Parliament meet and convenient for the Wealth of the Realm and then it does dispose of the Power of Dispensation in Matters Ecclesiastical to the Archbishop of Canterbury some whereof are to be confirm'd by the King and others that may be good without the King 's confirming And altho' the body or enacting part of this Statute extend only to Causes Ecclesiastical yet the Preamble does reach expresly to all humane Laws This Statute of 25th of Henry the Eighth was made in the time of such a King as we all know by reading our Histories stood highly upon his Prerogative and would never have consented to such a Declaration concerning the Power of Dispensing if it had been a special Prerogative in the Crown and had there
now mentioned It is but an Opinion against a Solemn Resolution of all the twelve Judges I find that some who had transgress'd that Act of 23 H. 6. and had continued above one Year in that Office of Sheriff soon after the making of that Act did not think themselves secure against the Penalty of that Act by any Non obstante from the King but procur'd an Act of Parliament to indempnifie them for what they had done for by another Act made the 28th of the same King Henry the Sixth it is ordain'd that the Sheriffs for the Year then last past should be quit and discharged against the King and his People of the Penalties of the 200 l. which they incurr'd by the Statute of 23 H. 6. by Exercising the Office of Sheriff longer than a Year from the day next after the day of all All-Souls on which day by the Statute a new Election was to have been made I have one great Authority more and that is of an Act of Parliament too which in my judgment clearly proves against this Resolution of the twelve Judges in the time of 2 H. 7. that the King had no such Prerogative to dispence with the Sheriff's continuing in his Office longer then a Year But that the only dispensing Power was in the King and Parliament as I have affirm'd and in the King when any Special Act of Parliament shall for a time limitted enable him so to dispence And it is an Act in the time of a wise and powerful King who would not lose his Prerogative where he had right to it It is the Statute of 9 H. 5. c. 5. in the Statutes at large this Statute recites the Statute of 14 E. 3. whereby it was ordain'd that no Sheriff should continue in his Office above a Year And it recites further that whereas at the making of that Statute there were divers valiant and sufficient persons I suppose it is ill translated valiant and it should have been men of value in every County of England to exercise the said Office well towards the King and his People But by reason of divers Pestilences within the Realm and Wars without the Realm there was not now such sufficiency of such persons It is therefore ordained that the King by Authority of this Parliament of 9 H. 5. may make the Sheriffs through the Realm at his will until the end of four Years notwithstanding the said Statute made 14 E. 3. or any other Statute or Ordinance made to the contrary Here the King is entrusted with the Power and that but for a short time in the very Case of continuing Sheriffs in their Offices longer than a Year and that in a case of great and absolute necessity and this by a Special Act of Parliament which plainly shews he could not do it by any Prerogative he had of dispensing for then he would never have taken it under an Act of Parliament What ground therefore the Judges had in the second Year of Henry the Seventh to adjudge it to be a Prerogative in that King I cannot see and that Resolution is the leading Case to all the Opinions that have been delivered in the Point since that time and the Opinions still justifie themselves by that one first Resolve and cite that for their great Authority That Opinion seems to be delivered upon a sudden Question put to the Judges by the King's Council not argued nor deliberated on nor upon any Case that came Judicially before them and the Judges there take notice only of two ancient Statutes viz. 28 E. 3. c. 7. 42 E. 3. c. 9. both which barely forbid the Sheriffs to continue longer than a Year in their Office but no Penalty is imposed and the Earl of Northumberland's Case had a Non Obstante in it only to these two Statutes as appears by the Abridgement of that Case by Patent's Case 109. So that they did but ad pauca respicere de facili pronunciare But they do not take the least notice of the Statute of 23 H. 6. c. 8. which makes the disability nor do the Judges in that Case give that reason for their Judgment as Sir E. C. hath since found out to justifie it viz. His Prerogative inseparable c. Something may be observed from the time when that strange Resolution pass'd Judicis Officium est ut res ita tempora rerum querere It was in 2 Henry the Seventh in the beginning of the Reign of that King who stood high upon his Title and Power if we may believe a late Historian Mr. Buck. in his History of the Life and Reign of Richard the Third who in his Second Book fol. 54. discourses likewise of King Henry the Seventh and his Title to the Crown says of him That he seemed to wave all other Titles and stuck to that of his Sword and Conquest and at his Coronation he caused Proclamation to be made with these Titles Henricus Rex Anglioe Jure divino Jure humano June belli c. Which yet the Barons could not agree to tho' the King peremptorily avowed he might justly assume it having as a Conquerour entred the Land fought for the Crown and won it The Barons answered says the Historian as peremptorily That he was beholding to them both for his Landing and Victory But the more they opposed it the more he insisted upon it Now that King that made his Title by Conquest might carve out to himself what Prerogatives he pleased And who durst dispute it with him And this probably might have some influence upon that Resolution of the Judges being so early after his Claim viz. 2 H. 7. But I find Sir E Coke a Chief Justice of great Learning and of as great Integrity taking up the same Opinion It is in the Reports that go by the Name of Sir Coke's 12 Rep. fol. 18. No Act says he can bind the King from any Prerogative which is sole and inseparable to his Person but that he may dispense with it by a Non Obstante as a Soveraign Power to Command any of his Subjects to serve him for the Publick-weal and he instances in that of a Sheriff and quotes the Resolution of the Judges of 2 H. 7. and urges that of Judges of Assize that they may go Judges of Assize in the Counties where they were born or did inhabit if the King dispense with it by a special Non Obstante But he gives another instance which I presume none in these days will subscribe to and if he mistook himself in this instance he may be supposed to mistake and err in all the rest Purveyance says he for the King and his Houshold is incident solely and inseparably to the Person of the King And for this Cause the Act of Parliament of Henry the Third de tallagio non concedendo which barrs the King wholly of Purveyance is says he void If this be Law what a Case are the Subjects in that have given a
Recompence by a Revenue of Inheritance in part of the Excise to the King in lieu of Purveyances It is sober Advice given by Learned Grotius in his Book De Jure Belli pacis 82. Let us not says he approve of all things tho' delivered by Authors of greatest Name for they often serve the Times or their Affections and bend the Rules as occasion requires This Resolution of all the Judges in the Second of Henry the Seventh is again cited in Calvin's Case in Sir Coke's Seventh Report and there a Reason is given to justifie that Resolution which is not so much as touch'd upon in the Report itself of 2 H. 7. but it has been studied and found out since that Resolution viz. That an Act cannot barr the King of such Service of his Subject which the Law of Nature did give him And this is the main Reason insisted on in the late Judgment given in Sir Hales's Case as I am informed which is the only Case that I find which came to be argued upon the very point yet it was but lightly spoken to for that of 2 H. 7. which is the first of the kind was not upon a Case that came Judicially before the Judges but was upon a Consultation only with the Judges and without Argument Nor in any other Authorities that I have cited grounded upon that Resolution of 2 H. 7. did the Point directly come in question Judicially And Calvin's Case is the first that I find which offers this special Reason viz. That no Act of Parliament can restrain the King from commanding the Service of his Subject but it is an inseparable Prerogative in the King and as Sir E. C. speaks in his 12 Rep. Tho' an Act makes the King's Patent void and tho' the King be restrained to grant a Non Obstante by the express words of the Act and tho' the Grantee is disabled by the Act to take the Office yet the King says Sir Edward Coke may by his Royal Soveraign Power of Commanding command a man by his Patent to serve him and the Weal-Publick in the Office of Sheriff for Years or for Life And this the King may do for such Causes as he in his Wisdom shall think meet and profitable for himself and the Common-weal of which he himself is solely Judge says Sir E. C. So tho' the King and Parliament have adjudged and declared by a Law such a person or such a sort of persons to be altogether unfit for such a Service or Office. As for Example They have adjudged Papists who own a Forreign Authority and Jurisdiction and who hold Doctrines destructive and contrary to the Religion Established in this Kingdom to be very unfit and uncapable of being entrusted with the maintaining of the Government and the Religion Established by Law in this Kingdom Yet according to late Opinions and Resolutions tho' the King himself by the Advice of his Great Council have so adjudged and declared yet he may do otherwise and he may employ a Papist to defend the Protestant Religion and he is the sole Judge of the fitness of Persons for his Service This is the Discourse this is the Argument and Reason used Will this Reason be allowed of shall the King be the sole Judge of the Persons fit to serve him in all Cases and is it an inseparable Power and Prerogative in the Person of the King I shall put a Case wherein the Judges depart from this Opinion and appear to be of another mind In the Lord Anderson's Reports the 2d Part 118. It is there said If an Office in the King's-Bench or Common-Pleas be void and the placing of the Officer belongs to the King if the King grant it to a person not able to execute it the Grant is void as 't is there held by many of the Justices And there a Case is cited out of 5 E. 4. rot 66. where one Tho. Wynter was placed by the King in the Office of Clerk of the Crown in the King's-Bench The Judges before the King himself did declare him to be Inhabilem ad Officium illud pro commodo Regis populi sui Exercendum and he was laid by and one Roger West at the commendation of the Judges was put in Will any man presume to say the person is unfit when the King who is the sole Judge of the fitness of persons to serve him hath adjudg'd him fit yes the Judges in a Case that concerns the Courts where they sit it seems will controul the King 's own judgment and judge the person inhabilis and hold the Grant void in such case To compare our present Case with this The King and Parliament by a Law have adjudged the Papists unfit to be entrusted with the Government and with the preserving of the Reform'd Religion but says the Judges if the King without the Parliament judge otherwise his judgment shall prevail why not as well in the case of an Office in the Courts at Westminster which does belong to the King to dispose of as in an Office that immediately concerns the Safety of the King and Kingdom and the great concernment of Religion So here is one Command of the Kings set up in opposition to another Command of the King. A Command of the King upon private advice or it may be possible gained from him by surprize by an importunity or an undue solicitation against a serious solemn deliberate Command of the King upon advice with his great Council and with the Consent of the whole Kingdom this is the very Case before us This is against all reason and against the Examples of the greatest wisest and most absolute of Kings and Princes who commanded their Judges to have no regard to any Commands of theirs that were contrary to Law. Vinius the Civilian in his Commentary on the Imperial Institutes fol. 16. gives this Rule Rescripta Principum contra Jus vel utilitatem publicam Elicita à Judicibus improbari etiam ipsorum Imperatorum constitutionibus jubentur Princeps non creditur says he aliquid velle contra utilitatem publicam concedere 21 H. 8. c. 13. sect 10 11 27. Dispensations for Pluralities contrary to Act are declared to be void Hob. 82 149 146 155. The King is never by Law supposed ill affected but abused and deceived for Eadem praesumitur mens Regis quae est Juris Grotius de Jure belli pacis 112 113. Amongst the Persians the King was Supreme yet he took an Oath at his entrance and it was not lawful for him to change certain Laws made after a particular form If the King Establish the Decree and Sign the Writing it may not be changed according to the Law of the Medes and Persians which altereth not as we read in the Book of Daniel 6 Dan. 8. 12 15. By the Act of 2 E. 3. c. 8. it is accorded and established that it shall not be commanded by the Great Seal nor the little Seal to disturb or