more immediate â—â—use doth intervene between the predicate â—nd the subject as that which is rational is â—â—sible a man is rational 12. In a most perfect demonstration where â—â—e middle term is the material or formal inâ—rnal cause of the subject and efficient of the â—â—fect by emanation the major proposition 〈◊〉 immediate in respect of the cause but not â—f the subject as that which is rational is â—sible The conclusion is immediate in respect 〈◊〉 the subject but not of the cause as a â—an is risible The minor is immediate in reâ—â—ect of the cause and the subject both as a â—an is risible 13. In a most perfect demonstration wherâ— the middle term is not the internal cause of thâ— subject though both the major and conclusioâ— be immediate yet the minor is not immediate in respect of the cause This happen in every chief demonstration from the external cause as also where we proceed from one affection predemonstrated to the demonstration of another such as are all mathematical demonstrations for the most part aâ— Zab. de medio demonst c. 7. 14. The relative conditions to be observed in reference to the conclusion are three first that the premisses be the cause of the conclusion secondly that they be before thirdly that they be more known than the conclusion 15. The premisses may be said to be thâ— cause of the conclusion as the medium is thâ— cause why an affection is not only the cauâ—â— why the conclusion is known but the cauâ—â— why it is true and as the medium is before aâ— affection not in time but nature so the truâ—â— of the premisses is first in nature before thâ— truth of the conclusion Lastly as the medium is more known than an affection not bâ— a confused knowledge and in respect of us but by a distinct knowledge and accordinâ— to nature so are the premisses more knowâ— than the conclusion because we by reason 〈◊〉 the premisses receive the conclusion with full assent of mind we must needs assent to that more than to the premisses for according to Aristotle That for which another is such as it is must needs it self be more such Lib. 1. post cap. 2. 16. Premissâ—s are of two sorts Axiomes and Theses 17. An Axiome is a proposition of whose â—ruth no body can be ignorant the signification of the words being known 18. A Thesis is a proposition whose truth doth not sufficiently appear by knowing only the signification of the words but by the judgment of the senses or any other declaration and it â—s either a Definition or an Hypothesis 1. A Definition is that by which we shew what a thing is An Hypothesis is that by which we shew whether the thing be or not 20. The medium of a demonstration ought to be the next cause of the predicate and that either efficient or final and the efficient either internal or external 21. A cause may be said to be the next either absolutely or in his own kind here it is understood to be the next absolutely that it is such a cause as doth produce the effect and without which that effect cannot be For as much as there are four kinds of causes and in every kind some one the next of the four next causes there is but one that is the next absolutely 22. Moreover it is required that this next cause should be the cause of the predicate but it is necessary that it should be the cause of the subject also for the question is not whether there be a subject for this is supposed but whether there be a predicate or whether it be inherent in the subject 23. This next cause must be either the efficient or the final for when the predicate is an accident it hath neither matter not form properly so called The final cause is used in those things which are made for other such as are mediums and natural instruments actions also and habits if any such can be demonstrated The efficient cause is used in all the rest Sometimes it falls out that the next efficient cause is also the form oâ— matter of the subject and these kind of demonstrations are indeed the most excellent but do not make a different species of themselves but these things will be more clearly understood by the examples following 1. Every rational creature is capable 〈◊〉 knowledge Every man is a rational creature Therefore every man is capable of knowledge In this demonstration the medium rational is the internal efficient cause of the predicate and form of the subject 2. Every terrestial thing doth sink in water Ebene is terrestial Therefore Ebene doth sink in water Here the medium is the internal efficient cause and matter of the subject 3. Whatsoever doth consist of matter and form hath three dimensions Every body doth consist of matter and form Therefore every body hath three dimensions Here the medium is the internal efficient cause of the predicate and both the form and matter of the subject 4. That which hath three dimensions will not admit of another body in the same place with it self But every body hath three dimensions Therefore c. Here the medium is the internal efficient cause of the predicate and propriety of the subject 5. That which by the interposition of the earth cannot be enlightened by the Sun-beams doth suffer an Eclipse of the Sun-light But the Moon the earth being interposed cannot be enlightened by the Sun-beams Therefore the Moon c. Here the medium is the external efficient cause of the predicate 6. Whoso is made for the contemplation of Heavenly things ought to have his countenance lift up Man is made for the contemplation of Heavenly things Therefore c. Here the medium is the final cause of the predicate 24. Sometimes it so comes tO pass that one and the same question may be demonstrated both by the efficient and final cause so you may demonstrate that a living creature doth sleep either because the common â—ense is overcome by vapours and that the â—assage of the external senses are obstructâ—d and this is a demonstration from the â—ficient cause or that the animal spirits may be â—efreshed and strengthened and this is a demonstration from the final cause CHAP. VIII Of an Imperfect Demonstration or the Demonstration What. HAving hitherto spoken of the principal Demonstration or the Demonstration â—hy the next is the less principal or the â—emonstration What and which leaveth an â—mperfect knowledge and is twofold the â—ne is from the effect the other from a remote â—ause The first of these collecteth the cause from â—ome sensible effect for example Every thing that is risible is rational Every man is risible Therefore every man is rational Here the medium is the next effect and the predicate is the cause of the conclusion 2. The second of these demonstrations collecteth the effect from some remote cause for example That which hath not a sensitive soul doth not breath A Plant hath not a sensitive
species and this is either hardly removed from the subject and is called a habit as vertue or easily removed from the subject and is called disposition as a disposition unto vertue 5. An innate or inbred quality is such a quality as is natural and this Aristotle maketh the second species this maketh the subject apt and fit for action and is some natural faculty or power as risibility is a faculty naturally belonging unto man 6. A Patible quality is such a quality as doth affect the senses and causeth passion in them and that either by it self or by accident 7. A Patible quality affecting the sense by it self Aristotle maketh the third species and is that which either affecteth the body or the mind 8. A Patible quality which doth by it self affect the body is either such a quality as cannot be easily moved as whiteness or such a quality as may be easily removed and is some passion of the body as blushing 9. A Patible quality which doth of it self affect the mind is also either hardly removed as inveterate anger or easily removed as some sudden passion of love or hatred 10. A Patible quality which doth affect the senses or causeth passion by accident Aristotle maketh the fourth species and this is external proportion either in things natural and then it is the form of the thing or in things artificial and then it is the Figure 11. To the first species of quality do all the habits of the body belong as health sickness and all kind of diseases and all infused habits as faith charity and the gift of tongues with all disciplines whether of arts or sciences both speculative and practical as Logick Geometry Physicks Metaphysicks and Divinity and all both vertues and vices 12. To the second species of Quality belong all faculties proceeding from the essential forms of all substances as the faculty of willing speaking laughing in man of neighing and running in a horse and the vertue of herbs mettals and stones all occult qualities as sympathy and Antipathy and all influences of celestial bodies the temperament of the body and disposition of the mind and such like 13. To the third species of quality belong all objects of sense as of seeing tasting smelling hearing and feeling 14. To the fourth species of quality belong all Mathematical figures with all natural and artificial forms of bodies The Canons or rules of qualitie are three 1. Qualities only admit of contrarieties as heat and cold the contrariety of qualites is most discernable in the third species sometimes in the first but not so frequently in the second and fourth 2. Qualities do admit of degrees asf more and less but this doth not belong to all qualities 3. Things in reference unto their qualities may be said to be like or unlike CHAP. XI Of Action Action is an accident by which a subject is said to be doing and that by one of these three waies 1. By some intrinsick quality as fire by its beat acts in the water 2. Instrumentally as he that effects some thing with a sword or gun or such like 3. By the very formality of action and so it is to be taken in this predicament 2. Action as it is taken in this predicament is twofold immanent or transient 3. An immanent action is that which doth not cause any real change in the thing that suffers as understanding sâ—ght 4. A transient action is that which doth occasion a real change in the thing that suffers as heat cold c. The Canons or Rules of Action are three 1. Action doth admit of contrariety 2. Actions are capable of more and less These two rules are not proper unto actions in respect of themselves but by and for their qualities by means of which the Agent acteth nor are they agreeable to every action and this is most proper unto action 3. Every action doth of it self infer passion 5. Passion is an accident by which the subject is called patient or it is the effect and a certain reception of action for every passion is received not so much by the condition of the agent as by the disposition of the patient 6. Passion is either transmutative or intentional 7. A transmutative passion is that which maketh some real alteration in the patient and answereth unto a transient action 8. An intentional passion is that which terminateth the action without any real alteration in the patient and this answereth to an imminent action The Canons or Rules of Passion are three 1. Passion doth admit of Contrariety 2. Passion admitteth of more and less both these are to be understood as in the predicament of action hath been declared 3. Passion is of it self and immediate inferred from action and this is is most proper unto passion CHAP. XII Of Relation HItherto we have spoken of such predicaments as are absolute accidents come we now to that which is respective namely relation 2. Relation is a respective accident by which one thing is predicated of another or by some way may be referred unto another 3. Relation is twofold intentional or real 4. Intentional Relation is that by which some second intention is referred to another thus Genus and species the cause and the caused the subject and the accident are things that are related 5. Real relation is that by which the thing it self is referred unto another and this two-fold 1. Accidental when one thing is referred not in respect of its essence or nature but only by Accident as possessor and possession 2. Essential when one thing is referred unto another according to its nature and essence as Father and Son Master and servant 6. In every Relation two things are required the subject and the term 7. That is called the subject which is referred unto another and that the term to which the subject is referred The subject is called the Relate and the term is called the Correlate 9. The relate and correlate are mutually referred to one another and that by a double relation in which reciprocation that which is the subject of one relation is the term of the other and the contrary 10. In like manner that which is the relate in one relation is the correlate in the other and the contrary 11. Every relate or respective is founded in some absolute predicament as aequality in quantity likeness in quality Paternity in action 12. Relates and Correlates as they are such are both together in nature and knowledge and so do mutually put or take away one another as well in being as in knowing 13. Relates are taken two ways 1. Materially for those things with which the Relations do agree as a father is taken for the man begetting the Son for him that is begotten and so they are not together in nature for the father as a man must needs be before the son 2. Formally for that very relation which is in the subjects by which the terms are mutually referred to one another as the father
to his son and so they are in nature together 14. Knowledge and knowable are taken three ways 1. Both Actually thus that is called knowledge by which we actually know a thing that knowable which is actually known and so they are in nature together 2. Both potentially as that is called knowable which may be known and that knowledge which we may know and so also they are in nature together 3. One Actually and the other potentially and so knowledge is taken for that which we actually know and knowable for that which may be known and so they are not both together in nature The Canons or Rules of Relates are three 1. Relates admit of contrariety A Relate is not contrary to its Correlate but one Relate is contrary to another yet not in respect of themselves but in respect of their subjects This rule therefore doth not hold in all but in such relates only which have contrary foundations or subjects thus a friend and an enemy are contrary because the foundations of friendship and enmity to wit wishing well and wishing ill are contrary 2. Relates are capable of more and less this rule also holds in respect of the subject or foundation and therefore in those relates only which have a changable subject or foundation For when the subject or foundation is varied the Relation is intended or remitted For example unequal things are made more or less unequal when Quantity which is the subject of inequality is in one of the two more or less 3. Relates are convertible that is every Relate is referred to its reciprocal Correlate as a master is the master of a servant and a servant is the servant of some master CHAP. XIII Of the four last Predicaments HItherto I have spoken of the principal predicaments the less principal now follow and they are four When Where Situation Habit. 2. The Predicament When is an Accident by which finite things are said to be in time past present or to come The words belonging to this predicament make answer to such questions as are made by this word When as to day to morrow yesterday and the like The properties thereof is to accommodate time to persons things or Actions 3. The Predicament where is an Accident by which things finite are said to be in some place where is not the place it self but notes the manner or circumstance of place and maketh answer to such questions as are made by this word where as at home within without in this or that Countrey c. The property thereof is to accommodate place to persons things and actions 4. The Predicament of Situation is a certain Ordination of parts and generation or a placing of parts in Generation to make up situation a threefold habitude is required 1. Of the parts of some whole among themselves 2. Of the parts of some whole unto that whole 3. Of the parts and the whole in reference to place Yet every ordination of parts is not site or situation but that only which they have in the whole by Generation The propertie thereof is to be the nearest assistant unto substance of all the extrinsecal respective accidents All gestures and positions of body belong to this as standing sitting walking c. Not as they signifie these actions but as they signifie the position and order of the parts in the whole or in some place 5. The predicament of Habit is an accident by which some garment or something like a garment is put about hanged upon or any other way joyned to a body The body having it is a substance the thing habiting is always some artificial form belonging to the fourth Species of Qualitie The Application of this to it is that which maketh this predicament The propertie thereof is always to be inherent in many in the habit and in him that hath it but in divers respects for it is in the body that hath it as in a subject in the habit or thing framed as in a cause To this belong all kind of garments whether they be such as are used for necessity as shoes for the feet and cloaths for the rest of the body or for distinction as a Mitre a Gown whether for Divines Lawyers or Citizens or for ornament as rings Jewells Deckings and the like CHAP. XIV Of Opposition HAving done with the Antepredicaments and the Predicaments themselves the Postpredicaments now follow and they are four Opposition Order Motion and Manner of having 2. Opposition is such a repugnancy of two simple terms as neither the one can agree with the other nor both of them with a third after one and the same manner 3. One of the opposites is either opposed to one or to many those oppositions where one is opposed to many are called Disparates as a man and a horse of which Aristotle in his Logick makes no mention nor are they to be reckoned amongst the kinds of opposition 4. Those oppositions where one is opposed to one are either of a thing and a thing or of a â—hing and not a thing 5. Opposition of a thing and a thing is either Relative or Contrary 6. Relative opposition is between the relaâ—ive terms as the relate and his correlate for though the relates do mutually depend upon one another in reference to their simple being yet are they opposed to one another in reference to their being in a subject as father and son but this is the least kind of opposition The conditions belonging to these are set down in the Predicament of Relation 7. Contrary opposition is between contrary â—erms And these are called contraries that being contained under the same Genus are at the greatest distance between themselves and mutually expell one another from the same subject that is capable of them as heat and cold 8. Contraries are of two sorts mediate and immediate 9. Immediate contraries are such as admit of no medium between them but the one of them is always in the subject that is capable of them as like and unlike health and sickness 10. Mediate contraries are such as do admit of some medium so that though one be expelled it is not necessary that the other should be in that subject from which the first is expelled as white and black The Canons or Rules of Contraries are these following 1. True contrarietie by it self is not to be found but in qualities by themselves and absolutely taken 2. Contraries in the highest degrees cannoâ— be in the same subject so what is hot in the highest degree cannot be cold at all but in remiss degrees they may both be in the same subject 3. One of the contraries being remitted the other is intended or heightened and the contrary for every subject capable of two contrary qualities must needs be filled up with the whole possible latitude of one of them 11. Opposition of a thing and not a thing is either privative or contradictory 12. Privative opposition is between Habit and privation And Habit is
the presence of a thing in a fit subject but privation is the absence thereof as sight is a habit blindness privation The Canons or Rules are three 1. Habit and privation are abâ—ut the same subject And hence privation cannot properly be but in that subject which is capable of the Habit a man therefore may be said to be blind but a stone cannot 2. Privative opposition requires determination of a certain time neither can privation be spoken of a subject but after the time that by its nature and fitness it might receive the habit as none can be said to be bald until the time that according to nature they should have hair 3. From privation to habit there is no regress naturally the privation being perfect that is such as doth take away the act and next beginnings of habit and leaveth nothing in the subject but the remote beginnings thereof thus he that is once quite blind cannot ordinarily and by natural means ever see again 13. Contradictory opposition is between contradictory terms And those things are said to be contradictory which are expresly contrary as affirmation and negation as a thing and not a thing a man and not a man The Canons or Rules are two 1. Contradiction is the first of all oppositions and so the measure of all the rest for in every opposition there is virtually included a contradiction and the opposition is to be thought so much the greater by how much it cometh nearer to a contradiction 2. Between contradictory things there is no medium neither of abnegation or of the subject and therefore one of the contradictory things is affirmed of a thing and not a thing nor of participation or of the form CHAP. XV. Of Order and of that which is said to be together before or after ORder is that according to which some thing is said to be before or after another thing or together with it 2. A thing may be said to be before or after another five several waies 1. In time 2. In nature 3. In disposition or order 4. In honour 5. In Causality 3. That is said to be first in time that is the most ancient thus Romulus was before Cato and the City Pergamus before that of Rome 4. That is said to be first in nature which cannot be reciprocally affirmed in consecution of existence as there is a man therefore there is a living creature but it doth not follow there is a living creature therefore there is a man a living creature therefore is in nature before a man and every Genus before its species 5. That is said to be first in order or disposition which is nearest the beginning Thus the Exordium in an oration is said to be before the proposition the proposition before the narration the narration before the confirmation the confirmation before the refutation the refutation before the conclusion and in every science or discipline that is first which is put in the first place and thus letters are before syllables 6. That is said to be first in honour or dignity that is the most worthy thus a King is before his Subjects a Father before his Son a Master before his Servant Gold before Silver and Vertue before Gold 7. That is said to be first in Causality which is any way the cause of another's existence thus the Sun is before Light 8. So many waies as a thing may be said to be before another it may also be said to be after 9. So many waies as a thing may be said to be before another it may be also said to be together with another but two of the waies are more usual than the rest together in time and together in nature 10. They are said to be together in time that are existent at the same time 11. Things may be said to be together two waies primarily and secundarily 12. They are said to be primarily together in time which begin to be at the same time and they are said to be secundarily together in time when the one begins to be before the other doth cease to be thus Aristotle and Plato are said to be cotemporaneous or together in time though Plato was born before Aristotle and did also die before him 13. Things may be said to be together in nature two ways first simply and absolutely and then in respect of some third 14. Things are said to be together simply and absolutely which are reciprocally together according to the consecution of existence but so that the one is not the cause of the others existence Thus the relate and correlate are together in nature and two effects depending upon the same next cause as risibility and docibility in man 15. Things are said to be together in respect of some third thing which under the same Genus are in division opposed to one another thus a man and a beast are said to be together in nature not simply and absolutely in respect of themselves but in respect of a living creature for a living creature is predicated of them both together and not of one first and another after In this a Synonymous Genus is distinguished from a homonymous or aequivocal Genus because this is not predicated of its several species together but of one first and another after CHAP. XVI Of Motion COncerning Motion four things are to be considered 1. The Praecognita 2. The Definition 3. The several kinds 4. The Rules belonging to it 2. The Praecognita are either such as concern the definition or such as concern the division thereof 3. The Praecognita concerning the definition of motion are three 1. The subject in which it is 2. The two terms from which and to what 3. The measure or instant time and from these three every motion must be defined 4. The Praecognita concerning the division of motion or the several kinds of it are also three 1. Motion is taken two waies viz. either generally for any mutation whether it be in time or in an instant and thus it comprehendeth Generation and Corruption or specially for some mutation which is made and measured by time thus it comprehendeth these four species augmentation diminution alteration and location and not Generation Corruption 2. Motion as it is divided here is motion generally taken and as it comprehendeth all these mutations 3. Motion although it be put as a post-predicament yet it is also in a predicament but in a diverse manner it is in the predicament of position as it is in its own nature but here as it is taken in reference to its terms from which and to what 5. Motion in the general is thus defined Motion is a mutation made in the subject viz. either in the first matter or in the body from one term to another either in time or in an instant 6. Motion is twofold instantaneous or successive 7. Instantaneous motion is that which is made in an instant and this is Generation or Corruption 8. Generation is an
it by some other Synonymous word more generally known 5. A real Definition is that which sheweth what the thing is and this is twofold perfect imperfect 6. A real a perfect Definition is that which doth explain the thing by essential attributes whether they be such as constitute the thing and then it is a Definition of the substantial form which doth most exactly explain the nature of its species as a man is a rational living creature Or such as do partly constitute the thing and partly produce the same necessarily and then it is a Definition of the accidents and this is threefold 1. Formal which consists of the Genus and the subject of the accident for the subject of the accident is as it were the form as Thunder is a noise in the clouds 2. Causal which doth demonstrate the nature of the thing defined and it is the next cause of the accident either efficient or final 3. Both formal and causal which sheweth the Genus subject and cause of the thing defined as if an Eclipse of the Moon be thus defined it is a privation of light in the Moon by the interposition of the earth The Genus is privation the difference or form is the subject viz. the Moon and the efficient cause is the interposition of the earth 7. A real but imperfect definition otherwise called a description is that which explains the nature of the thing by certain accidental attributes it doth consist of a Genus or something which doth supply the place of a Genus and of proper and common accidents which supply the place of the difference as a man is a living creature that is risible hath two feet And because our knowledge begins from the accidents therefore this kind of description is most in use with all The Canons or Rules are 1. In every science you are to begin with the definition of the name thereof 2. A description may be sutable as well to the substantial as the accidental part of any thing 3. A Species only is defined by a formal definition 4. An accident only is defined by a causal definition or by a formal and a causal both 5. A definition consisting of the form and cause both doth differ from a Demonstration in the disposition of the terms only 6. Every descriptive definition whether formal or formal and causal both is an oration CHAP. II. Of Division DIvision is the resolving of the whole into parts And this is either of some ambiguous word into its several significations or of the whole into its parts 2. Now the whole is either simple or aggregate 3. Division of the whole simply and properly so called is threefold 1. Vniversal into its subjective parts or of the General into the specials as to divide animal into man and beast 2. Essential which resolves the whole into essential parts and this is either of a species into its Genus and difference or of some spefical nature into its matter and form as a â—an into soul and body 3. Integral which resolveth the whole inâ—o integral parts and this is the division of some individual either into its sensible or material parts 4. Division of the aggregated whole into â—s parts and by accident is four fold 1. When the subject may be divided by its accidents as men are learned or unlearned 2. When an accident may be divided by â—ts subjects as Feavers are in the spirits or in the humours or in the solid parts 3. When an accident may be divided by â—ccidents as good is either profitable honest â—r pleasant 5. When things may be divided by their â—bjects as sight by colours hearing by â—ound 6. When causes may be divided by their â—ffects and the contrary as Heavenly heat â—s from the Sun and Elementary from fire The Canons or Rules are these 1. An ambiguous word must be explained before it can define any thing 2. Vnless the ambiguity be explained in the beginning the errour will be afterward the greater 3. In the simple dividing of the whole tâ—â— members dividing should be equal to and agreâ— with the whole 4. The members dividing should be disjoineâ— from one another 5. Division doth consist of as few members or parts as the nature of the whole will bear 6. In any Division the whole must be of a larger extent than any one of the parts CHAP. III. Of a Syllogism A Syllogism is an oration in which some things being taken for granted something else not granted before is proved or inferred from them and this is twofold perfect or imperfect 2. A perfect Syllogism is an argumentation in which from two premises disposed rightly and according to rule some conclusion doth necessarily follow as every man is an animal every thing that hath reason is a man therefore every rational thing is an animal 3. A perfect Syllogism is twofold Categoriâ—l and Hypothetical 4. A Categorical Syllogism is that in â—ich all the propositions are categorical and â—â—is is also twofold Common and Expositoâ— 5. A common categorical Syllogism is that in which the Medium is a common name 〈◊〉 every sound may be heard every voice is a found therefore every voice may be heard 6. An Expository Categorical Syllogism is that in which the Medium is a singular â—â—me as Sorates is learned Socrates is an Athenian therefore some Athenian is learnâ—â— 7. An Hypothetical Syllogism is that in â—hich one or more of the propositions are Hypoâ—â—etical as if Socrates be a man he is an aâ—imal but Socrates is a man therefore he 〈◊〉 an animal 8. To make a common Categorical Sylloâ—sm two things are required matter and â—rm 9. The matter of a Syllogism is either remote or next 10. The remote matter of a Syllogism is â—hat matter of which it is remotely made â—s the three terms in every proposition callâ—d the major extreme the minor extreme and the middle term or argument 11. The major extreme is that which is in the major proposition and in the conclusion but never in the minor 12. The minor extreme is that which is in the minor proposition and in the conclusion but never in the major 13. The middle term or argument is that which is in the major and minor propositions but never in the conclusion 14. The next or immediate matter of a Syllogism is that of which the Syllogism is immediately made as the three propositions of which the first is called the major the second the minor and the third the conclusion 15. The form of a Syllogism is the right disposing of the matter both next and remote and this comprehendeth two things figure and mode 16. A figure is that which shews how the middle term may be fitly placed which may be done three waies or by three figures 17. The first figure maketh that which is the subject in the major proposition to be the predicate in the minor 18. The Second figure maketh that which is the predicate in the major proposition to
is demonstrated are made first by joyning the cause with the effect and then by joyning the cause with the subject In all these two things are to be considered the precognitions which precede the demonstration and the conditions which are to be observed in the demonstration it self 11. The Precognitions are two 1. That the thing is 2. what it is 12. In these precognitions the things which are evident and obvious unto all are so in the understanding only but the things which are not so evident but that they may be unknown are expressed in the very beginning of sciences 13. And if being delivered the learner doth presently believe them they are properly called fuppositions but if the learner either doubt of them or be of another opinion they are called postulata or things to which an assent is requested 14. The first of these precognitions viz. the Quod sit That the thing is includeth two things 1. That the thing sougt hath a being or a true existence and this answereth to the Question Is there such a thing 2. That the thing sought is the true predicate in a subject 15. The other of these precognitions namely the Quid sit What it is doth also include two things 1. The name or what the signification of the name is 2. The nature of the thing that is called by that name so that from these two precognitions four questions do arise of which two are simple and two compounded 16. The simple questions are those which do equally agree to accidents and to substances The first is made concerning the essence or existence by asking An sit whether it be or not The second maketh inquiry concerning the nature of it and asketh Quid sit What it is 17. The compounded questions cheifly agree with accidents the first asketh whether the predicate be in the subject as whether man be risible The other asketh why the predicate is in the subject as why is man risible 18. Of these four questions the third hath such reference to the fourth as the first hath to the second for then in simple terms when we know they have being we ask what the things are and in propositions when we know they have a being we inquire why they are 19. After these precognitions and questions the three praecognita are next to be considered namely the subject affection and cause 20. The subject is a simple term or less extream in the demonstration concerning which some accident is demonstrated by its next cause as a man concerning whom we must both know that he is and what he is First that he is or otherwise we seek the knowledg of him in vain for there is no knowledge of a thing that is not and then we must also know what he is not only in respect of his name but also of his nature for that must be the medium of the demonstration and we must know the medium at least confusedly before we can infer the conclusion The precognition of the things existence is called the Hypothesis of its nature the Definition 21. Passion is a proper Accident which is demonstrated of the subject by the proper cause it is always the greater extream which is predicated in the conclusion as Risibility the which is necessary to be foreknown in respect of the name what it is though not in respect of its nature and that it be considered how it is inherent for seeing it supplies the place of the subject it is in some sort called a substance Arist lib. 1. post cap. 27. but it is not foreknown That it is for that is the thing inquired after and which we are to find by demonstration 22. A Cause is that by which the passion or affection is demonstrated of its subject and is always the Major proposition of the demonstration as Every rational animal is risible that being known the conclusion is vertually known also as being vertually conteined in it but yet it is not actually known till the Minor be assumed which being known the Conclusion though after in nature yet is known at the same time also What the cause is cannot be foreknown because it is a compounded proposition and what a thing is is only of uncompounded but it ought to be known That it is or hath a true existence or else the Conclusion cannot be inferred from it CHAP. VII Of the Conditions to be observed in a perfect Demonstration A Demonstration is to be considered either in the respect of the matter or in respect of the form 2. In respect of the matter one kind of Demonstration sheweth why the predicate is inherent in the subject and that 1. By an immediate intrinsecal cause and this is either the before demonstrated matter or form or affection of the subject 2. By an immediate extrinsecal cause and this is either final or efficient by some transient action 3. Another kind of Demonstration in respect of the matter sheweth that the predicate is inherent in the subject and that either by the effect or by some remote cause 4. A Demonstration in respect of the form is to be considered 1. In quantity and so it is universal or particular 2. In quality and so it is affirmative or negative 3. In the manner of the proof and so it is either an ostensive demonstration or a demonstration reducing to some impossible thing 5. In the first of these kinds of demonstration called the demonstration Cur sit why a thing is the conditions to be observed do partly belong to the question partly to the cause or medium of the demonstration and partly to the premisses 6. Every question doth not admit of the first and most perfect kind of demonstration called why a thing is but such a question only as is true and hath a certain and immutable cause of its own truth 7. The conditions to be observed in the premisses of a demonstration are absolute or relative 8. Those are said to be absolute conditions which are suitable to the premisses considered absolutely and in themselves and those are said to be relative conditions which are suitable to the premisses in reference to the conclusion 9. The absolute conditions are two the first is that the propositions be necessarily true and reciprocal The second is that they be immediate or first 10. Demonstrative propositions must be true for that which is false cannot be known â—nd they must be necessarily so for from â—ropositions not necessarily true no necessary â—nclusion can be inferred unless by chance or â—ccident and they must be necessarily true in the â—ighest degree that is they must be reciproâ—l For they contein the next cause of the â—â—edicate which is such as that it is reciprocaâ—d with its effect 11. A proposition is said to be immediate â—o waies 1. In respect of the subject â—hen there is no more immediate subject beâ—ween the predicate and the subject as a â—an is rational a man is risible 2. In reâ—ect of the cause when no
predication in every proposition the which is not in a circle 2. In the Matter for the matter of a circle or middle term is uniform in both the demonstrations seeing it is the next cause of the major extream proving why a thing is but in regress the effect doth first demonstrate that there is a cause then after consideration had about the cause the cause doth demonstrate why there is an effect 3. In the end for in a circle the same thing is both beginning and end seeing it proceeds from a cause distinctly known to a cause distinctly known and returns from this to that but in regress the end is a distinct knowledge of the effect and the first progress is from an effect confusedly known to a cause to be confusedly known but from a cause confusedly known consideration being had we come to the distinct knowledg of the cause and from that once habituated and radicated in the understanding we return to the distinct knowledge of the effect 3. Conversion of a demonstration into a definition is when from the terms of a demonstration the definition of a proper accident is framed by transposition And the definition of a proper accident is twofold 1. Partial and that is either Nominal which consists of a Genus and a subject as an Eclipse in the defect of light in the Moon Causal which is the middle term in the most perfect demonstration shewing why there is an effect as an Eclipse is the interposition of the Earth 2. Total which being made of the nominal and the causal both doth consist of a Genus a subject and the next cause as an Eclipse is the defect of llight in the Moon by reason of the interposition of the earth A nominal definition is the conclusion of the of the demonstration A causal is the beginning A total is an intire or whole demonstration differing in nothing from it but the placing of the terms for the thing defined is the greater extreme the lesser extreme the subject and the cause the middle term CHAP. X. Of a Topical Syllogism in the General HItherto we have spoken of a demonstrative Syllogism whose matter is necessary and the end a perfect knowledge come we now to a dialectical or topical Syllogism whose matter is probable and contingent and the end opinion 2. In a dialectical or topical Syllogism we are to consider of Problemes Propositions and the invention of arguments 3. A Probleme or Question is the thing of which it is probably discoursed and the conclusion of a Syllogism already made But that this Problem may be dialectical two conditions are required 1. That it be profitable either to life and then it is called a moral Probleme as whether pleasure be good or to knowledge and then it is called a Physical or a natural probleme as whether the world be eternal or to some thing that is subservient unto these and then it is called a Logical Probleme as whether division be a Syllogism 2. That it be doubtful in which either the common people do dissent from wise men as whether riches make men happy or the common people dissent among themselves as whether usury be lawful or the wise men dissent among themselves as whether the heart be the most noble part of man 4. The parts of a Probleme are the two terms of subject and predicate As concerning the subject I give no directions because a dialectical Syllogism is not restrained to any certain subject But the Predicates according to Aristotle are four Genus Definition Accident proper and common He adjoineth difference to Genus if it be more comprehensive than the species or to definition if it be reciprocated with the species if the species chanceth to be attributed in any Probleme it is reduced to Genus 5. Dialectical Propositions ought to be certain at least probable and not Paradoxes 6. That is said to be probable which not being absolutely true doth rather seem to be true than false There are five degrees of probability for that is said to be probable which seemeth to be true either to all to most men or unto wise men and that either to all of them or to the most or to the wisest of them 7. That is said to be a Paradox which is true though contrary to the vulgar opinion 8. For the invention of arguments we are to consider common places and rules 9. A place is a sense or commmon note by whose help an argument is found 10. A Rule or Canon is a proposition containing the reason of the consequence in a dialectical Syllogism 11. Arguments are of two sorts artificial and inartificial 12. Artificial arguments are such as from the consideration of the parts of the probleme are not found but by rules of art 13. Inartificial arguments are such as are found without any help of art and these are nothing but testimonies 14. Several men do reckon the order of these heads or places severally Aristotle reduceth all heads to the four predicates mentioned before some for the more plainness and distinction reckon up twenty and five and this number some contract to thirteen others to ten and perhaps they may without any inconvenience be reduced unto seven 1. The Cause and the Effect 2. The subject and the Accident 3. Dissentany and Comparison 4. Conjugates and Notation 5. The whole and its parts 6. Genus and Species 7. Definition and Division In every of these places I will in the proposed order shew you the Canons to be observed and the restrictions of them CHAP. XI Of the Topicks from the Cause and the Effect THere are four kinds of Causes efficient material formal and final there are several sub-divisions of them but these following are the most convenient to our purpose as 1. Into total as Gold is the cause of money the Sun of the day and partial as timber in the cause of a house nature of learning 2. Into a cause actually as a builder is the cause â—f an house and a cause potentially as an â—rchitect may build an house 3. Into a reâ—ote cause as a feast may be the cause of â—â—ckness and the next cause as crudity in â—he stomach is the cause of sickness 4. Into 〈◊〉 cause simply and by it self as the Sun is â—he cause of light and a cause by accident as â—he Sun of blindness The Canons or Rules of this Topick are â—hese 1. The cause being granted the effect cannot be denied and if the cause be taken away the effect is taken away also as if the Sun shine it must be day if the Sun doth not â—hine it is not day the former part of this Canon hath four limitations 1. In a remote cause as he that drinks wine is not alwaies made drunk 2. In a cause that is obstructed in its operation as heavy things do not alwaies descend because they may be hindered by some thing that holds them up 3. In a cause by accident as he that diggeth in
the earth doth not alwaies find gold 4. In a cause not sufficient of it self as he is not alwaies learned that is industrious nor that ground alwaies fertil that is well tilled because to both these more is required The latter part of this Canon hath three limitations 1. In a cause by accident as he that doth not dig into the earth may find a treasure 2. In a cause that may but is not as a building may stand though the Architect be dead 3. As oft as the effect may be produced by diverse causes as Socrateâ— may die though he doth not drink poyson 2. The effect being granted the cause is also granted and the effect being taken away the cause is taken away also The first part of this Canon hath three limitations 1. In an effect by accident as a treasure may be found though the earth be not digged 2. In an effect that doth remain after the cause as the house may remain though the builder be dead 3. In an effect that may be produced by diverse causes as a man may die though not by poyson The latter part hath also three limitations 1. In an effect by accident as a man may dig in the earth and not find a treasure 2. In an effect which was but is not as a building may be destroyed though the builder be living 3. In an effect produced by a free agent as there may be a Physician although he doth not cure any disease 3. Such as the cause is such is the effect and the contrary as if the tree be good the fruit will be good and the contrary both parts of this Canon have two limitations 1. In aequivocal causes and effects as the draught may be beautiful though the painter be deformed 2. In a material cause for some thing that is extrinsecal as ice is not fluid because water is so 4. That for which any thing is such is much more such it self as the air being hot by reason of fire doth argue that fire is much hotter than air This rule faileth 1. Where both are not such as wine which maketh a man drunk is not it self more drunk because drunkenness cannot be said to be in wine 2. Where it doth not receive more and less as a father is not more a man than a son although he be the cause why the son is a man for humanity doth not receive more and less 3. In a cause not sufficient of it self as a Master which maketh his schollar learned is not alwaies more learned than his schollar for by his ingenuity and industry it sometimes so comes to pass that the schollar is more learned than the master 5. The cause is in nature before the effect as reason before risibility and this never faileth for a final cause in which it only seems to fail although it be in act and execution after the effect yet it is before it in the intention of the agent for which only reason it is the cause CHAP. XII Of the Topicks from the Subject and the Accident WE do not here take the subject for substance in which the accident is inherent or accident for that which doth precisely and adequately adhere to the substance but subject is here taken for all that to which any thing not belonging to its essence is attributed An accident is here taken for every such attribute as number is the subject of equality that is it is an accident of an accident An accident may be divided many ways and so may a subject for an accident is 1. either proper or common 2. Separable or inseparable 3. Inherent or internal and adherent or external 4. And chiefly it is either accidental as weariness doth accompany a feaver a pale Moon rain and all prognosticating signs Concomitant as an Eclipse of the Full-Moon and consequent as a day to the twilight signs and circumstances do also belong to this Topick The Canons or Rules are five 1. The subject being granted the proper accident is also granted and being taken away the proper accident is taken away also and the contrary as if he be a man he is risible and the contrary and if he be not a man he is not risible nor the contrary This rule never faileth by reason of the reciprocation of the subject and the proper accident 2. The subject being granted the common accident is also granted but not the contrary as if it be snow it is white but if it be white it is not therefore snow The first part of â—his rule faileth in separable accidents as if â—t be water it is not therefore cold And the â—atter part faileth 1. In a proper accident â—he first way as if there be knowledge there â—s a man 2. In an individual accident as â—f there be this whiteness there is snow because an accident doth not change its subâ—ect 3. A common accident being taken away â—he subject is taken away but not the contraâ—y as if it be not white it is not snow but yet there may be white though there be no snow The first part faileth in a separable accident the latter in a proper accident the first way and in an individual accident and subject as in the former rule 4. The thing being granted the circumstance of time and place is granted and the circumstance being taken away the thing is taken away as if Milo did kill Clodius then Milo was living and present if he was neither living nor present he did not kill him This rule never faileth in any requisite circumstance necessarily 5. The antecedent concomitant consequent being granted the consequent concomitant and antecedent for every exigence is also granted to wit a concomitant in being an antecedent in being or that hath been a consequent in being or that will be and being taken away the other is taken away also as if there be an Eclipse there is a full Moon if there be a birth there was a conception if there be a twilight the Sun will rise This rule faileth 1. In a thing not cohering necessarily as he which is a Philosopher must not of necessity be therefore poor and if there be a Comet it doth not follow there must be war 2. In things cohering necessarily if there be not a mutual necessity for though it be true that if there be an Eclipse there is a Full Moon yet it doth not follow that if there be a Full Moon there must always be an Eclipse yet these things not necessary are of great force to beget belief especially if many of them shall be joined together in one Hence Astrologers Physiognomers and Orators do highly value this Topick in questions of fact especially CHAP. XIII Of the Topicks from Dissentany and Comparison DIssentanies are either Opposites or Disparates as a Horse and a Bull. There are four kinds of Opposites of which Book I. Chap. 13. Comparisons are either in respect of quality as like and unlike or in respect of quantity or also of
degrees as equal and unequal and whatever may be said to be more or less and equal All which have their several Rules or Canons Concerning Relative opposition the Canon is One of the relates being granted the other is granted also and one being taken away the other is taken away also as if there be a son there is a father c. This rule faileth 1. In accidental relations as it being granted that there is something knowable it doth not follow that there is a knowledge of it 2. If it be understood of the same subject as he which is the father of this man may not not not be at all but it is impossible that he should be the son of him of whom he is the father Concerning contrary opposition the Canons are these following 1. One of the contraries being granted the other is taken away as if water be warm it cannot be cold This rule faileth in remiss qualities for the water which is hot to six degrees is cold to two because the remission of quality is alwaies by admission of the contrary 2. One of the contraries being taken away the other doth remain as if water be not dry it is moist This rule faileth 1. In mediate contraries as Honey is neither white nor black but yellow 2. In an uncapable subject as a soul is neither white nor black nor hot nor cold 3. Contraries have the same Genus and subject as if white be a colour black is a colour also if love be a concupiscible faculty so is hatred This rule never fails 4. Contraries have contrary causes effects properties and next subjects as if grief be to be avoided pleasure is to be followed and if cold congeals heat dissolves This rule faileth 1. in the predications of a Genus or a Generical affection as because whiteness is a colour or visible it doth not follow that blackness is not a colour 2. If the nature of the subject will not bear it as because health is agreeable to living creatures it doth not follow that diseases are agreeable to things without life but rather the contrary 3. In causes by accident for if a good man doth love and defend his children it doth not follow that a wicked man must therefore hate and destroy his because to love his children is not so much from vertue as nature 4. In causes whose action is determined by the disposition of the matter for cold doth not therefore soften dirt because heat doth make it hard 5. The contrary of a greater good is a greater evil and the contrary as because that health is better than riches therefore sickness is worse than poverty This rule faileth where one of the good things is included in the other or supposed by it as it is more advantageous to be a Philosopher than to know letters but yet of the two Philosophy may be best spared The Canons of privative opposition are these two 1. The habit being granted privation is taken away and the contrary as if a man doth see he is not blind if he be blind he doth not see And this rule never faileth 2. The habit being taken away privation is granted and the contrary as he doth not see therefore he is blind He is not blind therefore he doth see This rule faileth 1. in an incapable subject as a stone doth not see and yet it is not blind 2. In a capable subject before the time in which it is capable and therefore though a whelp doth not see untill it be nine days old yet cannot it be said to be blind Of contradictory opposition there is one only never failing Canon One of the contradictories being granted the other is taken away and one being taken away the other is granted as if a wall be white it cannot be said to be not white if it be not white it cannot be said to be white The Disparates have but one Canon One of the Disparates being granted the rest are taken away as if Socrates be a man then he is neither a bull nor a stone This rule faileth in accidents when they are attributed unto subjects in the concrete for the same mess may be white and sweet The Canons of like and unlike proportional and unproportional are these Like and proportional do agree with like and proportionals dislike and unproportional do agree with dislike and unproportionals as if Plato be mortal Socrates is also mortal if the eye directs the body then reason should direct the mind This rule faileth unless it be understood reduplicatively that is of like as like for every like is also unlike or else it could not be like but the same and hence a Crow cannot be said to be rational because a Blackmore is so and so of the rest And here the respondent if he do except against the arguments founded on this Canon must shew in what the things propounded are like or unlike Probable propositions and things compared among themselves are said to be more and less and equal The Canons concerning comparison of things are general or special The general rules are these 1. That which is such by nature is more such than that which is so by participation as the Sun is lighter than the air 2. That which is by it self is more so than that which is by accident 3. That which is more remote from the contrary is more than that which is nearer as the air is colder under the Poles than under the Tropick 4. That which makes more is more than that which maketh less as fire vehemently heating 5. That in which the cause is more inherent is more than that in which it is less as a young man is stronger than an old 6. That to which the definition or the mean is more agreeable is more than that to which it is less as that which doth more conduce to the end is more profitable and many more which do all fail unless there be a restriction of the rest being like for terms of comparison do almost exceed one another mutually and are exceeded Special rules concerning that which is more or less good are these 1. The more good things there are in any subject the better it is as peripatetick felicity is better than the Stoick 2. The more it is good to the better as Justice is better than fortitude 3. That which is desired for it self is better as peace is better than war 4. That which is in it self good is better as good laws are better than evil manners 5. That which is more durable is better as verture is better than beauty 6. That which is solitarily good is better as a competency is better than great riches 7. That which hath the more noble object is better as Divinity is better than Physick 8. That which leads to perfection is better than that which serves for necessity as seeing is better than feeling 9. That which is the nearer to the end is the better as the Harvest is better
on that which was last spoken of by some apt translation This dependence or connexion must be in this or the like form And this shall suffice to be spoken of this thing the next in order to be spoken of is c. How much such forms do help the memory is very had to be believed 7. A Natural Method is either Total or Partial 8. A Total Method is that in which a whole sience is methodically ordered or disposed And this is either Synthetical or Analytical 9. A Synthetical or Compositive Method is that which begins with the first and most simple principles and so proceeds to those which do arise from or are composed of these first principles And according to this Method we are to write or speak of all speculative arts 10 An Analytical or Resolutive Method is that which begins with the end and so proceed still lower and lower till we come to the first anâ— most simple beginnings And according tâ— this Method we are to write or speak of all Practical arts 11. A Partial Method is that by which any part of any art or science is methodically ordered or disposed Or by which any particular Theam or Subject is handled by it self In this Method we are to consider that as it is a part of a Total Method it ofttimes so falls out that in handling a part of some science we ought to observe the Analytical Method if the whole science be to be handled in a Synthetical and the contrary that is in such a science in which the whole is too handled in an Analytical Method a part thereof must be handled in a Synthetical As for example if we were to write of all Physicks we must write in a Synthetical Method but if we were to write of that part which concerns a living body it were fit to observe the Analytical Method beginning first with the actions which are the ends of life then proceeding to the causes and principles which are the faculties of the soul the temperaments and the Organical parts of the living body And as some particular Theam or Subject is to be handled by it self we are to consider That in simple Theams we are first to explain the name by shewing the Etymology and explaining the words that are Synonymous thereunto either in the same or in other languages if it may any thing conduce to the explanation of the Theam propounded next to the name we are to consider the nearest Genus and Causes and if the Theam be an accident the Subject and Object also and hence the Definition thereof must be composed To the Definition we must add the adjuncts and effects c. But in compounded Theams first the question must be rightly stated and then the proper and genuine sense must be â—nfirmed by good reason and proof of â—hese things I have already spoken more at large in my Art of Rhetorick 12. An Arbitrary Method is that which not regarding the natural order is fitted for such a confused knowledge as may be most taking with the people or sute best with their capacities If we are to speak to sober judicious knowing men there is no question but that we ought to speak of things in their natural order but if we have to do with the common sort of people and such as are guided more by sense than reason we are to consider of their capacities and to speak of things not as they are in their natural order but as they are or may be best apprehended by them And thus much concerning Method which is the fourth and last Logical Instrument and with this I shall conclude these my Logical Precepts Soli Deo Gloria FINIS Books sold by Thomas Passenger at the Three Bibles on London-Bridge A Mirror or Looking-glass for Saints and Sinners shewing the justice of God on the one and his mercy towards the other Set forth in some thousand of examples by Sam. Clark late Minister of Bennet-Finck London in 2 volumns in folio Royal and Practical Chymistry by Oswaldus Crollius and John Hartman faithfully rendred into English folio price 10. s. Gods revenge against murther by John Reynolds containing thirty Tragical stories digested into six Books newly reprinted folio price 10 s. Lord Bacons Natural history folio price 8 s. Sandy's Travels containing a description of the Turkish Empire of Egypt and the Holy Land of the remote parts of Italy and Islands adjoining folio price 8 s. Markham's Master-piece Roman Antiquities by Tho Godwin quarto price 2 s. 6 d. The famous History of the destruction of Troy in three books quarto price 3 s. Valentine and Orson price 18 d. Etymologicum parvum by Francis Gregory octavo price 3 s. Chymical essays by John Begumis price 18 s. Spiritual Antidotes against sinful contagion by Tho. Dolittle price 18 d. Pools Dialogue betwixt a Papist and a Protestant twelves price bound 1 s. Monasticon Favershamiense or a description of the Abby of Faversham octavo price bound 18 d. The Christians Crown of glory or Holiness the way to hapiness octavo price bound 18 d. The path way to health price bound 18 d. The compleat Academy or Nursery of complements bound 1 s. The book of knowledge in three parts price 10 d. The book of palmistry in octavo price bound 18 d. The Wise Virgin being a narrative of Gods dealing with Martha Hatfield price bound 18 d. The pilgrim's port or the weary man's rest in the grave in twelves price bound 1 s. Books Printed for and sold by Ben. Hurlock over against St. Magnus Church on London Bridge near Thames-street MAriners Magazine folio price bound twelve shillings Newton's Logarithms folio price bound 10 s. Norwood's tryangles quarto price bound 4 s. Collins Sector on a quadrant quarto price bound 3 s. and 6 d. Collins plain scale quarto price bound 4 s. Seamans companion quarto price bound 2 s. 6 d. Safeguard of Sailers quarto price bound 2 s. 6 d. Geometrical Seaman price bound 2 s. Petiscus doctrine of tryangles quarto price bound 5 s. Phillips advancement quarto price bound 3 s. 6 d. Seamans Kallendar quarto price 1 s. 4 d. Seamans practice quarto price 1 s. 4 d. â—mans Dictionary quarto price 1 s. 4 d. â—amans glass quarto price 1 s. Seamans secrets quarto price 1 s. Compleat ship wright quarto price 1 s. Compleat Modellist quarto price 6 d. Pilots Sea mirror quarto price 1 s. Mathematical Manual octavo price bound â— s. 6 d. Mariners compass rectifyed octavo price bound 2 s. Norwoods Epitomy octavo price bound 1 s. 6 d. Saints anchorhold twelves price bound 1 s. Newtons Institutions in twelves price bound 2 s. 6 d. Newtons Tables in twelves price bound 2 s. 6 d. Newtons Geometrical Trigonometry in twelves price bound 1 s. Carpenters Rule in twelves price bound 1 s. Mariners divine Mate twelves price bound 6 d. Seamories Architecture quarto price bound â— s. Salionstals navigator quarto price 1 s. 4 d. Pathway to sayling quarto price 10 d. â—â—w shining light quarto price 1 s. 4 d. 〈◊〉 Quadrant in octavo price 6 d.