rule which all the former inductions can afford is this There can bee no reall effect whether artificiall naturall or supernaturall without an efficient Nothing which now is not or sometimes was not could possibly bee made without some agent or maker betweene every naturall Agent and its patient betweene every Artificer and his worke there alwayes results a mutuall relation of efficient and effect But this rule will not abide the turning Betweene every efficient and its proper effect there alwayes results a mutuall relation of agent and patient if by this terme patient wee understand a matter or subject praeexistent to the exercise of the agents efficiencie 4 The usuall division of Agents into artificiall naturall and supernaturall supposeth a three-fold diversitie in their objects betwixt which there is this proportion As nature alwayes affordeth art a compleat naturall subject to worke upon so the supernaturall agent or supreme efficient exhibits that imperfect substance or matter unto nature which shee brings unto perfection Nature doth so unto Art as it is done to her by a benefactor supernaturall Vnto this observation upon the former division wee can adde no more nor can any more be required besides a just proofe that there is an agent supernaturall which sometimes had no matter at all to worke upon but made even Nature her selfe and the passive capacitie or subject whereon shee workes of no worke or matter praeexistent The matter it selfe and nature it selfe are the immediate effects of his active force or efficiencie Now to beate the Naturalist at his owne weapon wee are to make proofe of this assertion by full induction and strength of reason grounded upon experiments in every subject wherein the Naturalist can instance First it is universally true of all the workes as well of Nature as of Art which now are perfect and sometimes were not so that they did not make themselves but had respectively their severall makers or efficient causes which brought them unto that perfect estate and condition which now they have The most perfect works of nature cannot put themselves into a perfect artificiall forme without the help of some Artificer Stones doe not naturally grow into Statues nor trees into the pictures or Images of men or birds Brasse and Copper with other metalls conceived in the bowells of the earth doe not either by themselves or by the help of naturall causes which produce them cast or mould themselves into Guns or Bullets The Earth and Water doe not worke themselves into the live-substance of plants or vegetables but are first wrought and as it were kneaded together by the heate of the Sunne first altered then incorporated into the substance of such trees by the vegetative faculty which is actually resident and praeexistent in the trees or plants which are nourished by them There is no sublunarie substance which did not take beginning either entirely and together or piece-meale and successively The elementall bodies of the ayre and water were not totally the same a thousand yeares agoe that now they are both continue the same they were by equivalencie of succeeding parts or daily addition by new generation Now successive generation supposeth an end or destruction of that that was a beginning of that which succeedes in its place and the beginning of every thing supposeth a beginner or cause efficient to give it being The race or continuation of more perfect sublunary substances as of vegetables and moving creatures remaines the same not by equivalency of succeeding parts but by a totall production of distinct individualls And every distinct individuall tree or liuing creature hath its immediate and proper efficient as well as its materiall cause nothing can give it selfe a distinct numericall being 5 What is the reason then why the workes of nature which are perfected in their kinde by their proper efficients as trees come to full growth cannot transforme themselves into bodies artificiall without the worke of the Artificer What is the reason why the imperfect masse wherein the seeds of nature are contained cannot grow up into a perfect or compleate body naturall without the efficiencie of some other in the same kinde already compleate Fortes creantur fortibus Nature makes nothing perfect but by the help of some Agent formerly made perfect Doth the perfection of bodies artificiall by an indispensable Law of necessitie require a perfect worke of nature praeexistent to the operation of Art and doth this perfect worke of nature bee it brasse wood or stone by a like indispensable Law of necessitie require an imperfect masse or matter praeexistent to the naturall Agents or efficients which mould or kneade it into its perfect or specificall forme And shall not this imperfect masse with all its severall Elements or ingredients that can be required to the perfection of any naturall body more necessarily require some precedent efficient cause of its imperfect being or existence This cannot be conceived for if these imperfect substances whereof any naturall body is made could eyther give beginning of being to themselves or have it from no cause efficient they should bee in this respect much more perfect than the more perfect workes of nature in that they eyther make themselves or have no maker Vpon this principle of nature or from this impossibilitie in nature That any visible work whether naturall or artificiall should either give it selfe being or have its being from no cause precedent did Tully rightly argue that as a man comming into an house wherein were no live creatures saue Rats and Mice could not conceive that either the house did make it selfe or had no other maker besides these Rats and Mice which were found in it So neither can it be imagined that this visible spheare wherein the workes of Art and Nature are daily seene and doe daily begin to be and expire could either make it selfe or have beeing of it selfe without beginning without a Maker super-artificiall or an efficient supernaturall Every part of this Vniverse considered alone is a worke of nature but the exquisite harmony betweene them is a worke more then Artificiall All that nature can adde to art or art to nature is but a shadow of that great Artificers skill which composed the severall workes of nature into so excellent a forme and tuneth their discording qualities into such exact harmony The induction of Tully is more briefly but more pithily and expressely gathered by our Apostle Heb. 3. ver 4. Euery house is builded by some man but hee that built all things is God But if every house bee built by some man how is God said to build all things shall every builder of an house be a God No but whatsoever man doth build God doth likewise build For except the Lord doth build the house they labour in vaine that are builders of it Psalm 127. 1. Better it were to bee idle or to doe nothing then either to be laborious in building houses or watchfull in guarding Cities strongly
built unlesse the Lord doe afford not onely his concurrence but his blessing to the labours of the one and to the watchfulnesse of the other But in this argument wee may expatiate without impeachment of digression from the matter or of diversion from our ayme in the following Treatise of divine providence 6. This present Treatise requires an induction sufficient to prove that every visible or sublunarie substance aswell the common matter whereof all such things are made as the severall formes which are produced out of it have an efficient cause precedent to their making or production For the seuerall formes or bodies generable which are constituted by them the induction is as cleare to every mans sense or understanding as any mathematicall induction can bee The naturalist is neither able nor disposed to except against the universalitie of it or to instance in any sublunarie bodie which hath not a true efficient cause or an agent precedent from whose efficacie its physicall or essentiall forme was either made or did result The question onely remaines about the efficiencie or production of the prime or common matter Seeing it is the mother of generation wee will not vexe the Naturalist by demanding a generative cause efficient of its beeing but that it must have some cause efficient wee shall enforce him to grant from a generall Maxime most in request with men of his profession The Maxime is That the philosophicall progresse from effects to their causes or from inferiour to superiour causes is not like Arithmeticall or geometricall progressions it cannot bee infinite Wee must at length come to one supreme cause efficient which in that it is supreame is a cause of causes but no effect and being no effect nor cause subordinate to any other Agent it can have no limit of Beeing it can admit no restraint in working Whatsoever we can conceive as possible to have limited Beeing or beginning of such Beeing must haue both frō it by it Now if the perfect workes of nature bodies sublunarie of what kind soever suppose a possibilitie physicall included in the prime and common matter before they have actuall Being if it imply no contradiction for them to have beginning of Beeing it will imply no contradiction that the prime mater it selfe or imperfect masse whereof they are made should have a beginning of its imperfect beeing That Physicall beeing which it hath doth presuppose a logicall possibilitie of beeing as it is that is no contradiction for it sometimes to be and sometimes not to haue beene This supreame cause or agent which as we suppose did reduce the logicall possibilitie of the prime matter of sublunary bodies into Act cannot be the heavens or any part of the hoast of heavē neither the sun moon nor stars For albeit the Sun be the efficient cause by which most workes of nature in this sublunarie part of the world are brought to perfection yet is it no cause at all of that imperfect masse or part of nature on which it workes Vnlesse it had some matter to worke upon it could produce no reall or solid effect by its influence light or motion how ever assisted with the influence of other stars or planets Yet must this prime matter have some cause otherwise it should be more perfect than the bodily substances which are made of it For they all stand in neede both of this prime matter as a cause in it kinde concurrent to their production and of the efficiencie of the Sunne or other coelestiall Agents to worke or fashion the materialls or Ingredients of which they are made If either this common matter of sublunary substances or the Sunne which workes upon it had no superiour cause to limit their beeing or distinguish their offices both of them should bee infinite in Beeing both infinite in operation Now if the matter were infinite in beeing the Sunne or other coelestiall Agents could have no beeing but in it or from it For if the Sunne were infinite in operation the matter it selfe could bee nothing at all no part of nature unlesse it were a worke or effect of the Sunne Infinitie in beeing excludes all possibilitie of other Beeing save in it and from it And infinitie in operation supposeth all things that are limited whether in beeing or operation to bee its workes or resultances of its illimited efficacie CHAP. 7. Shewing by reasons philosophicall that aswell the physicall matter of bodies sublunary as the celestiall bodies which worke upon it were of necessitie to have a beginning of their Beeing and Duration 1 FOr further demonstration that as well the Sunne which is the efficient generall as the prime matter which is the common mother of bodies sublunary had a beginning of beeing there can be no meane eyther more forcible or more plausible then another Maxime much imbraced and insisted upon by the great Philosopher to wit that as well the efficient as the materiall cause derive the necessitie of their causalitie from the end or finall cause unto which they are destinated The Sunne doth not runne its daily course from East to West or make its annuall progresse from North to South to get it selfe heate or for the increase of its native force or vigour by change of Climates but for the propagation of vegetables for the continuance of life and health in more perfect sublunary substances If then wee can demonstrate that those vegetables or more perfect sublunarie bodies for whose continuall propagation for the continuance of whose life and well-fare the Sunne becomes so indefatigable in its course had a true beginning of beeing that the propagation is not infinitely circular the cause will be concluded that as well the common matter whereof they are made as the Sunne it selfe which produceth them had a beginning of beeing and operation from the same supreame cause which appointed the Sunne thus to dispense its heate and influence for the reliefe and comfort of this inferiour world To prove that these sublunarie more perfect bodies as vegetables c had a beginning of beeing or propagation no Argument can be more effectuall to the Naturalist or others that will take it into serious consideration than the discussion of that probleme which Plutarch hath propounded Whether the Egg were before the Hen or the Hen before the Egg. The state of the question will be the same in all more perfect vegetables or living Creatures which usually grow from an imperfect or weake estate to a more perfect and stronger Whether the Acorne were before the Oake or the Oake before the Acorne Whether the Lyon had precedencie of nature to the Lyons whelp or the Lyons whelp unto the Lyon The induction may be for eyther part most compleate in respect of all times and of all places if with the Naturalist wee imagine the world to have beene without beginning or without ending No Naturalist can ever instance in any more perfect feathered fowle which was not first covered with a shell or contained in
many perish 200 19 How God of a most loving Father becomes a severe inexorable Iudge 207 20 Whilest God of a loving Father becomes a severe Iudge there is no change or alteration at all in God but onely in men and in their actions Gods will is alwayes exactly fulfilled even in such as goe most against it How it may stand with the Iustice of God to punish transgressions temporall with torments everlasting 213 21 How Anger Love Compassion Mercy or other affections are in the Divine Nature 226 A TREATISE OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE AND ATTRIBVTES SECTION I. Of the one absolutely infinite and incomprehensible Essence in generall THe originall of Atheisme of errours or misperswasions concerning the Beeing or Attributes of the Divine Nature being in a former Treatise at large discussed the next enquiries which exact Method would in this Argument make are First how this truth of Gods being most certainly known by internall experience unto some may by force of speculative Argument bee made manifest unto others Secondly how his nature and attributes may be fitliest resembled My first resolution professed in the beginning of the discussing of the originall of Atheisme as yet restraines me for adventuring too farre in the former For whilest I view the progresse which I have purposed to debate this point upon my first entry into that Paradise of contemplation within whose territories I now encampe by syllogisticall force of argument seemeth to me as great an oversight as to entertaine an enemy more desperate then potent with a pitched battaile when as all his forts might by constant prosequution of advantages gotten be orderly taken each after other without possibility of any great losse or apparent danger Now the Atheists chiefe strength lying in a preconceived impossibility of a Creation and Resurrection the conquest of the whole truth will easily bee compassed after those weake holds bee as in due time they shall be utterly demolished Or in case after their overthrow he be of force to bid us battaile we shall be most willing to try our intended quarrell with him by dint of argument in the Article of the last Iudgement In the meane time wee may without danger of his checke proceed upon those advantages which the grounds of nature give us CHAP. I. How far we may seeke to expresse what by light of Nature or otherwayes may be conceived concerning the incomprehensible Essence or his Attributes FIrst if every particular man or bodie generable have precedent causes of their beings their whole generations must of necessity have some cause otherwise all should not be of one kinde or nature Now this progresse from effects unto their causes or betwixt causes subordinate cannot be infinite but as all progressive motion supposeth some rest or stay whence it proceedeth so must this progresse whereof I speake take beginning from some cause which hath no cause of its being And this is that incomprehensible Essence which wee seeke 2 But whereunto shall wee liken him Things compared alwayes agree in some one kind or have at least a common measure Is then this cause of causes contained in any predicamentall ranck of being Or can our conceipt of any thing therein contained be truly fitted unto him Or may his infinite and incomprehensible nature be rightly moulded within the circumference of mans shallow braine One thing it is to represent the infinite Essence another to illustrate this truth that he cannot be represented Though nothing can exactly resemble him yet some things there be which better notifie how farre he is beyond all resemblance or comparison then others can doe By variety of such resemblances as his works afford may our admiration of his incomprehensiblenesse bee raised higher and higher and with our admiration thus raised will our longing after his presence still be enlarged The nature of things finite and limited no Philosopher can so exactly expresse as Painters may their outward lineaments But as some sensible objects besides their proper shape or character imprint a kinde of dislike or pleasance in creatures sensitive so have our purest and most exact conceipts intellectuall certaine symptomaticall impressions annexed which inwardly affect us though we cannot outwardly so expresse them as they may imprint the like affection in others Hence it is that the more right resemblances we make to our selves of any thing the greater will be the symptomaticall impression of the latent truth some part or shadow whereof appeareth in every thing whereto it can truly be compared And though we cannot in this life come to a cleare view of that nature which we most desire to see yet is it a worke worthy our paines to erect our thoughts by varietie of resemblances made with due observance of decorum unto an horizon more ample then ordinary in whose skirts or edges wee may behold some scattered rayes of that glorious light which is utterly set unto men whose thoughts soare not without the circumference of this visible world for all we see with ouâ— bodily eyes is but an hemisphere of midnight darknesse to the habitation of Saints and seat oâ— blisse 3 The rule of decorum in all resemblances of things amiable or glorious is that as well the simple termes of comparison be sightly and handsome as the proportion betweene them exact Supposing the ods of valorous strength betweene Aiax and ordinary Trojanes to have beene as great as Homer would have us beleeve it was the manner of this Champions retreat being overcharged with the multitude of his Enemies could not more exquisitely be resembled than by a company of children driving an hungry hard-skinned Asse with bats or staves out of a corne-field or meadow The Asse cannot by such weaklings be driven so hard but he will feed as he goes nor could Aiax be charged so fiercely by his impotent foes but that he fought still as he fled The proportion is approved as most exact by a teacher of Poetry that was his Arts Master who notwithstanding with the same breath disallows the invention as no way applyable unto Turnus at least in the courtly censure of those times wherein Virgil wrote Be the congruity betweene the termes never so exquisite or pleasant the Asse notwithstanding is no amiable creature nor can wisedome or valour for his many base properties willingly brook comparison with him in any More fitly as this Author thinketh might Turnus his heroicall spirit have beene paralleld by a Lion which though unable to sustaine the fierce pursuit of many hunters yet cannot be enforced to any other march then Passant gardant 4 But wee must allow the Poet whose chiefe art is to please his Readers appetite with pleasant sauces more then with solid meates to bee more dainty and curious in this kinde than it is requisite the School-divine or Philosopher should be albeit neither of them need much to feare lest their discourses be too comely so solidity of truth bee the ground of their comelinesse No courtly Poet is more observant
of the former rule of decorum in their comparisons than the holy Prophets are Thus hath the Lord spoken unto mee saith Esaias cap. 31. vers 4. Like as the Lion and the young Lion roring on his prey when a multitude of shepheards is called forth against him hee will not bee afraid of their voice nor abase himselfe for the noise of them so shall the Lord of hosts come downe to fight for mount Sion and for the hill thereof Saint Austin hath noted three sorts of errors in setting forth the divine nature of which two go upon false grounds the other is altogether groundlesse Some saith he there be that seeke to measure things spirituall by the best knowledge which they have gotten by sence or art of things bodily Others doe fit the Deity with the nature and properties of the humane soule and from this false ground frame many deceiptfull and crooked rules whilest they endeavour to draw the picture or image of the immutable Essence A third sort there be which by too much straining to transcend every mutable creature patch up such conceipts as cannot possibly hang together either upon created or increated natures and these rove further from the truth then doe the former As to use his instance He which thinkes God to be bright or yellow is much deceived yet his errour wants not a cloke in as much as these colours have some being from God in bodies His errour againe is as great that thinkes God sometimes forgets and sometimes cals things forgotten to minde yet this vicissitude of memorie and oblivion hath place in the humane soule which in many things is like the Creator But hee which makes the Divine nature so powerfull as to produce or beget it selfe quite misseth not the marke onely but the Butt and shoots as it were out of the field for nothing possible can possibly give it selfe being or existence 5 But though in no wise wee may avouch such grosse impossibilities of him to whom nothing is impossible yet must we often use fictions or suppositions of things scarce possible to last so long till we have moulded conceipts of the Essence and Attributes incomprehensible more lively and semblable then can be taken either from the humane soule alone or from bodies naturall To maintaine it as a Philosophical truth that God is the soule of this universe is an impious errour before condemned as a grand seminary of Idolatry Yet by imagining the humane soule to be as really existent in every place whereto the cogitations of it can reach as it is in our bodies or rather to exercise the same motive power over the greatest bodily substance in this world that it doth over our fingers able to weild the Heavens or Elements with as great facility and speed as we doe our thoughts or breath We may by this fiction gaine a more true modell or shadow of Gods infinite efficacy then any one created substance can furnish us withall But whilest we thus by imagination transfuse our conceipts of the best life and motion which we know into this great Sphere which we see or which sute better to the immutable and infinite essence into bodies abstract or mathematicall we must make such a compound as Tacitus would have made of two noble Romanes Demptis utriusque vitiis solae virtutes misceantur The imperfections of both being sifted from them their perfections onely must be ingredients in this compound Yet may we not thinke that the divine nature which we seeke to expresse by them consists of perfections infinite so united or compounded We must yet use a further extraction of our conceits ere wee apply them to his incomprehensible nature CHAP. 2. Containing two philosophicall Maximes which lead us to the acknowledgement of one infinite and incompreâ—ensible Essence VNto every Student that with observance ordinary will survey any Philosophicall tract of causes two maine springs or fountaines doe in a manner discover themselves which were they as well opened and drawne as some others of lesse consequence are wee might baptize most Atheists in the one and confirme good Christians in the other The naturall current of the one directly caries us to an independant cause from whose illimited essence and nature the later affords us an ocular or visible derivation of those generall attributes whereof faith infused giveth us the true taste and relish The former wee may draw to this head Whatsoever hath limits or bounds of being hath some distinct cause or author of being As impossible it is any thing should take limits of being as beginning of being from it selfe For beginning of being is one especiall limit of being 2 This Maxime is simply convertible Whatsoever hath cause of being hath also limits of being because it hath beginning of being for Omnis causa est principium omne causatum est principiatum Every cause is the active beginning or beginner of being and an active beginning essentially includes a beginning passive as fashionable to it as the marke or impression is to the stampe Or in plainer English thus Where there is a beginning or beginner there is somewhat begunne Where the cause is praeâ—xistent in time the distinction or limits of things caused or begun are as easily seene as the divers surfaces of bodies severed in place But where the cause hath onely precedence of nature and not of time as it falleth out in things caused by concomitance or resultance the limits or confines of their being seeme confounded or as hardly distinguishable as the divers surfaces of two bodies glued together Yet as wee rightly gather that if the bodies be of severall kindes each hath its proper surface though the point of distinction bee invisible to our eyes so whatsoever we conceive to have dependance upon another wee necessarily conceive it to have proper limits of being or at least a distinct beginning of being from the other though as it were ingrafted in it But whether we conceive effects and causes distinctly as they are in nature or in grosse so long as wee acknowledge them this or that way conceived to be finite and limited wee must acknowledge some cause of their limitation which as we suppose cannot be distinct from the cause of their being 3 Why men in these dayes are not Gyants why Gyants in former were but men are two Problems which the meere naturalist could easily assoyle by this reason for substance one and the same The vigour of causes productive or conservative of vegetables of man especially from which he receiveth nutrition and augmentation is lesse now then it hath beene at least before the Flood though but finite and limited when it was greatest Why vegetables of greatest vigour ingrosse not the properties of others lesse vigorous but rest contented with a greater numericall measure of their owne specificall vertues is by the former reason as plaine For in that they have not their being from themselves they can take no more then is
besides those which the Omnipotent was willing should be so made nor these any better either for substance or qualitie than his will was they should be Nor could any creature be enabled by his will out of nothing to make any thing which was not eminently contained in the nature of that creature to whom this power of creating is supposed to be by his will delegated For albeit some efficient or productive causes bring forth effects for substance or qualitie more excellent then themselves yet this they never doe this they cannot doe unlesse they worke upon some advantage which the subject or matter whereon they worke doth afford them But this advantage cannot be supposed in the production of any substance out of no subject or matter praexistent All the excellency which any effect or substance so produced can have must be intirely derived from its efficient And that can be no greater excellency or perfection than the efficient it selfe hath not altogether so great because it must be eminently contained in the perfection of its efficient if so be the efficient have any perfection or being left after the production of such an effect So that every efficient cause which is or can be supposed as an instrumentall cause of creation or as enabled to produce something out of nothing is thus farre limited that it can produce no effect more excellent that it selfe and being thus limited in it selfe and by dependance on an higher cause as well in its being as in its operation it cannot be conceived to bee Omnipotent For that includes as much as to be illimited in operation or which is all one to bee the operative power of the incomprehensible Essence or of Being infinite 3 But though to be able to make something out of nothing be not formally aequipollent to the attribute of Omnipotency yet can it not hence be concluded that any agent besides the one Omnipotent is either able or can be enabled to produce the least substance that is the least portion or matter ingredient to any bodily substance out of meer nothing To lay the first foundation or beginning of being of any finite substance is the sole effect of being it selfe and therefore of that which is truly infinite in operation Whatsoever is finite or limited can have no other kind of being than borrowed or participated And this kinde of being must bee immediately derived without intervention of any instrumentall cause from being not participated or borrowed but from increated and authentique being To create is to give actuall being or existance without the help or furtherance of any Contributer or Confounder Now if this power of creating could possibly bee delegated to any created substance it were possible for that which is created by it to have its being extra infinitum esse that is it should not be immediately and intirely contained in the infinite and incomprehensible Essence or Being For in this very supposall That one created substance might by power delegated from Omnipotency create another it is necessarily implied that the substance created should have its being intirely or part of its being immediately from the other which by power delegated is supposed to create it And having such being as it hath either intirely or in part immediately from the other it could not be immediately and intirely contained in the first cause of all things And if the least substance possible could have its Being not immediately and intirely from the first cause or supreame Efficient he could not bee actually and absolutely infinite in Being or Omnipotent in working For that onely is absolutely infinite or infinite in Being in which all things possible are immediately contained without whose incomprehensible Being nothing can have existence without whose immediate operation nothing can begin to be or exist These agitatiōs discussions may notifie unto us the strength soundness of that treble rule or fundamentall principle layd by others and before touched by us First it is peculiar unto Art to turne bodies already formed and perfected by nature into another fashion It is the property of nature and of naturall and finite Agents to worke the unfashioned or confused matter into some determinate forme or set kinde of being It is the prerogative of the Omnipotent Maker to afford naturall Agents the intire matter and stuffe whereon they worke and to bestow on them such being as they have whether that be materiall or immateriall celestiall or sublunary spirituall or bodily and to bestow i◠intirely without the helpe of any Co-efficient without the contribution of any stuffe or matter of any reallitie praeexistent SECTION II. Of Divine Providence in generall and how contingency and necessity in things created are subject unto it CHAP. 9. Of the perpetuall dependance which all things created have on the Almighty Creator both for their beeing and their operations 1 BVt will it suffice us to beleeve that as Art hath its proper subject made or fitted by Nature or as more perfect substances praesuppose an imperfect state in Nature so this imperfect state of nature or the subject on which naturall efficients do work was made of nothing without any coagency of Nature or Art by the sole power of the Almighty Father To beleeve all this is but the first part of our beleefe of this Article of Creation For better apprehending the intire object of our beleefe in this point we are to observe the difference betwixt the dependance which Art hath on nature or which workes artificiall have on the Artificer or which more perfect naturall substances have on the imperfect substances whereof they are made or on their naturall efficients and the dependance which both naturall Agents Patients which efficient causes as wel artificiall as naturall with their severall matters or subjects have on the Almighty Creator and Maker of all things First then nature or causes naturall after they have finished their proper works and fitted them for Art to worke upon do not cooperate with the Artificer in fashioning them to his ends or purpose The Artificer againe after he hath finished his worke doth not continually support preserve or apply it to those uses unto which it serves but leaves this unto their care for whose convenience it was made The Clocke-maker doth not tye himselfe to keep all the Clocks which he makes nor doth he which undertakes to keepe them binde himselfe to watch their motions perpetually or to observe them as curiously as Physitians doe their sicke Patients Againe the most perfect works of nature as vegetables and living things depend upon their causes whether materiall or efficient for the most part onely in fieri not in facto whilest they are in making or in perfecting not after they be made and perfected The Lyonesse doth not perpetually nourish her whelps with her owne substance nor doth the Raven continually provide for her young ones or any other creatures more kinde than they perpetually support or direct their brood in
given nor can the natures whence they are propagated convey them a better title of being then themselves have This as the seale communicates his fashion to the waxe so doth the limited force or vertue of causes alwayes imprint bounds and limits upon their effects If further it be demanded why the Elements having the opportunity of mutuall vicinity to wreake their naturall enmities or hostilities doe not each trespasse more grievously upon other as why the restlesse or raging water swallowes not up the dull earth which cannot flye from any wrong or violence offered or why the Heavens having so great a prerogative by height of place largenesse of compasse and indefatigable motion do not dispossesse the higher Elements of their seat The naturalist would plead the warrant of Natures Charter which had set them their distinct bounds and limits by an everlasting undispensable law Yet is nature in his language alwaies an internall or essentiall part of some bodies within which it is necessarily confined As the nature of the Heavens hath not so much as liberty of egresse into neighbour Elements nor the proper formes of these upon what exigence or assaults soever made against them in their territories so much as right of removall or flitting into lower Elements Or in case it be pretended that these particular natures have a nature more generall for their president yet this whether one above the rest or an aggregation onely of all the rest is still confined to this visible world and both so hidebound with the utmost sphere that they cannot grow greater or enlarge their strength So that nature taken in what sense the Naturalist lists cannot be said so properly to set bounds or limits to bodies naturall as to bee bounded or limited in them Or to speake more properly Nature her selfe did not make but is that very domestique law by which they are bounded and therefore in no case can dispense with it And in that she is a law for the most part but not absolutely indispensable shee necessarily supposeth a Lawgiver who if he have no Law set him by any superiour as we must of necessity come in fine to some one in this kinde supreame hee can have no such limits or bounds as he hath set to nature and things naturall He neither is any part of this visible frame which we see nor can he be inclosed within the utmost sphere And thus by following the issue of the former fountaine we are arived in the latter which fully discovered opens it selfe into a boundlesse Ocean Whatsoever hath no cause of being can have no limits or bounds of being 4 And Being may bee limited or illimited two wayes Either for number of kindes and natures contained in it or for quantity and intensive perfection of every severall kinde Of things visible we see the most perfect are but perfect in some one kinde they possesse not the entire perfection of others and that perfection whereof they have the just propriety is not actually infinite 〈◊〉 finite and limited Whatsoever thus is it was as possible for it not to have beene and is as possible for it not to be as to be but of this or that kinde not all that is or hath being Even those substances which we call immortall as the heaven of heavens with all their inhabitants be they Angels or Archangels Principalities or Thrones enjoy the perpetuall tenour of their actuall existence not from their essence but from the decree of their Maker Manent cuncta non quia aeterna sunt sed quia defenduntur curâ regentis Immortalia tutore non egent haec conservat artifex fragilitatem materiae vi sua vincens Seneca Epist 58. All things continue in being not because they are eternall but because they are defended by the providence of their Governour Things immortall need no guardian or protector But the maker of all things preserveth these things which we see continue in being overmatching the frailty of the matter by his power In this mans philosophy nothing which is made can be by nature immortall though many things be perpetually preserved from perishing Nothing which is immortall can bee made He grossely erred if hee were of the same opinion with some others of the Ancient that God had a desire to make things immortall but could not by reason of the frailty or untowardlinesse of the matter But that things made out of the matter or made at all could be immortall by nature he rightly affirmed For to be immortall in his language is to be without beginning without dependance And what so is hath an eternall necessity of existence Absolute necessity of existence or impossibility of non-existence or of not being alwayes what it is and as it is implies an absolute necessity of being or of existence infinite which cannot reside save only in the totality or absolute fulnesse of all being possible The greatest fulnesse of finite existence conceiveable cannot reach beyond al possibility of non-existence nor can possibility of non-existence and perpetuall actuall existence be indissolubly wedded in any finite nature save only by his infinite power who essentially is or whose essence is to exist or to be the inexhaustible fountaine of all being The necessary supposall or acknowledgement of such an infinite or essentially existent power cannot more strongly or more perspicuously be inferred than by the reduction of known effects unto their causes of these causative entities whose number and ranks are finite into one prime essence whence al of them are derived it self being underivable frō any cause or essence conceivable In that this prime essence hath no cause of being it can have no beginning of being And yet is beginning of being the first prime limit of being without whose precedence other bounds or limits of being cannot follow 5 If that which Philosophers suppose to be the root of incorruption in the heavens can brooke no limits of duration but must bee imagined without end or beginning why should it content it selfe with limits of extension seeing duration is but a kinde of extension seeing motion magnitude and time by their rules in other cases hold exact proportion Things caused as induction manifesteth are alwayes limited and moulded in their proper causes Nor are there two causes much lesse two causalities one of their being another of their limitation or restraint to this or that set kinde of being For whatsoever gives being to any thing gives it the beginning of being As Sophroniscus was the true cause why Socrates was in that age wherein he lived not before or after why he was a man not a beast an Athenian not a Barbarian Quicquid dat formam dat omnia consequentia formam whatsoever gives forme of being to any thing gives all the appurtenances to the forme is a Physicall Maxime which supposeth another Metaphysicall Quicquid dat esse dat proprietates esse That which gives being unto any thing gives likewise the properties of such being as
it hath Now limits of being are essentiall properties of that essence or being wherin they are found And distinct bounds or limits are included in the distinct forme of being which every thing hath from its cause Actuall essence or existence it selfe is distributed to every thing that hath cause of being as it were sealed up in its proper forme or kind of being It is as possible to put a new fashion upon nothing as for any thing that is to take limits or set forme of being from nothing That which hath nothing to give it being can have nothing to give it limits or bounds of being And as no entity can take its being or beginning of being from it selfe so neither can it take bounds or limits from it selfe but must have them from some other The prime essence or first cause of all things that are as it hath no precedent cause of existence nor can it be cause of existence to it self so neither can it have any cause of limits without it selfe nor can it be any cause of limits to it selfe It remaines then that it must bee an essence illimited and thus to be without bounds or limits is the formall effect or consequence of being it selfe or of that which truly is without any cause precedent to give it being or make it what it is 6 So essentially is the conceipt of being without bounds or limits included in our conceipt of being without cause precedent that if we should by way of supposition give any imaginary entity leave to take beginning or possession of being from it selfe without the warrant of any cause precedent to appoint or measure it out some distinct portion or forme of being thus much being once by imagination granted wee could not by any imagination possible debarre this entity from absolute necessity of being for ever after whatsoever it listed to be or from being all things rather than any one thing Of the Heathens many did hold an uncreated Chaos praeexistent to the frame of this Vniverse and Philosophers to this day maintaine an ingenerable matter which actually is not any body but indifferent to be made every body Let us but suppose First the one or other of them to be as Homogeneall in it selfe as the ayre or water Secondly to be able to actuate or Proteus-like to transforme it selfe into a better state than now it hath without the helpe of any agent or efficient and then as it could have no cause so can there bee no reason given to restraine it from taking all bodily perfection possible to it selfe And if it bee true which some teach that this prime matter hath neither proper quantity nor quality what should hinder it to take both without measure supposing it might bee its one carver of those endowments Or imagine there were such a vacuity where the world now is as we Christians beleeve there was before it was made and onely one of Democritus casuall Atoms or some meere possibility or appetite of the matter left free venire in vacuum to give it selfe full and perfect act without curbe or restraint of any superiour power or sharer to cry halfe mine with it or make claime to the nature of any actuall entity lost it being supposed to be able to take any one nature upon it what should either hinder or further it to assume the nature of earth rather than of water or of these two rather than of any other Element or of any simple bodies rather than of mixt or compounded substances or of bodily substances rather than spirituall or of all these rather than of their metaphysicall eminences and perfections Or whilst we imagine it without cause of existence or beginning no reason imaginable could confine it to any set place of residence or extension no cause could bee alledged why it should take possession of the center rather than of the circumference of this Vniverse as now it stands or of both these rather than of the whole sphere or of the whole sphere rather than of all extensive space imaginable Only the very supposition of taking beginning though without cause doth put a limit to its duration because this kinde of beginning being but imaginary depends upon our imagination as upon its true cause And yet even thus considered me thinks it should extend its existence both waies and draw a circular duration to the instant where it beginnes Or not imagining the beginning let us imagine it only to have true present being without any cause precedent to push it forward or superiour guide to appoint it a set course and it is not within the compasse of imagination why the duration of it should not reach as farre the one way as the other as farre beyond all imagination of time past as of time to come why it should not comprehend all duration imaginable by way of present possession or supereminent permanency without admission of any deflux division or succession for continuation of its existence 7 If it bee objected that any thing may follow from supposition or imagination of impossibilities the reply is easie The objection is either false or true in a sense which no way impeacheth but rather approves that kinde of arguing True it is there is almost nothing in nature so impossible as it may not be the possible consequent of some impossibility supposed or granted but of every particular impossibility supposed or imagined the possible consequences are not infinite neither such nor so many as we list to make them they are determinate by nature Now we cannot conceive it to be in nature more impossible for a meere logical possibility really and truely to take beginning of actuall being onely from it selfe then it is for that which is supposed imagined thus to take beginning to be restrained either to any determinat kind or part of being or to bee confined to any set place or residence Or if any mislike these imaginarie models let him now he hath givē us leave to make them and vouchsafed to looke upon them utterly cancell or deface them The everlasting edifice to whose erection they are destinated is this Such as we cannot cōceive that not to be which we conceive to take beginning of being from it selfe without any cause precedent such of necessity must we conceive and beleeve him to bee indeed who neither tooke beginning from himselfe nor had it given by any but is the beginning of being the sole maker of all things that bee being himselfe without beginning without dependance o◠any cause without subordination to any guide to appoint his kinde to limit his place or prescribe his time of being He is in all these and whatsoever branch or portion of being imaginable truely and really infinite the quintessence or excellency of all perfections whether numericall or specifical incident to al sorts or degrees of Beings numerable CHAP. 1. Of infinity in Beeing or of absolute infinitie and the right definition of it by the ancient
all things againe are in his power as strength or force to move our limbes is in our sinewes or motive faculty The perfections of all things are truly said to be in Him in as much as whatsoever is or can bee done by their efficacy or vertue Hee alone can doe without them Hee could feed all the beasts of the field without grasse heale every disease without herbe mettall or other matter of medicine by his sole word not uttered by breathing or any other kinde of motion not distinct from his life or essence Hee is life it selfe yet is not his life supported by any corporeall masse or praeexistent nature nor clothed with such sense as ours is for sense in as much as it cannot be without a corporeall organ is an imperfect kind of knowledge Paine hee cannot feele as we doe because that tendeth to destruction which is the period of imperfection yet what soever paine any sensible or materiall object can inflict upon us He alone can inflict the same in an higher degree The measure of paine likewise which we feele by sense He knows much better without sense or feeling of it But when wee say all things are in Him after a more excellent manner than they are or can bee in themselves Wee must not conceipt a multitude or diversity of excellencies in his Essence answering to the severall natures of things created We must not imagine one excellencie sutable to elementary bodies another to mixt a third to vegetables a fourth to sense c. one to the humane nature another to the Angelicall And if Plato meant there were as many severall Idaea's eternally extant whether in the first cause of things or without Him as there were substances specifically distinct one from another his opinion may neither be followed nor approved by any Christian In all these Divine Excellency as one face in many glasses of different frame is diversly represented being in it selfe more truly one than any other entity that is termed one or then any bond of union betweene things united Of natures extant some to our capacity represent Him better some worse not the meanest or basest but is in some sort like Him not the most excellent creature that is not all the excellencies of all can so fully represent his nature as an Apes shadow doth a Mans body But what in other cases would seeme most strange infinite variety best sets forth the admirable excellency of his indivisible unity 3 Touching the question proposed Whether he were one excellency or all excellencies whether he were one perfection or all perfections Respondent ultima primis The answer is in a manner given in the beginning of this Discourse Though hee that saith God is all perfections excepts none yet hee includes onely perfections numerable and participated And to say He were onely one perfection implyes onely perfection limited and therefore perfection borrowed not independent Or admitting there be a meane betweene all or some perfections and one perfection which may fitly be expressed by all perfection yet he that should thus say God is the universall unity or totality of perfection had need to distinguish acurately of universality and totality and define Vniversale ante rem more exquisitely than the Platonickes doe that he may acquit his meaning from suspition of such totality or universality as ariseth not onely by aggregation of parts but whose extent is no more than equall to all its parts For every other universall or whole is fully equalized by all the parts taken together whereas the Divine Nature infinitely exceeds all particular natures or perfections possible though in number they could be infinite It is then if any man list so to speake such a totality or universality as cannot bee augmented much lesse made up by multiplication of any other perfection though prosecuted in infinitum neither diminishable or exhaustible by multiplicity or division of particulars derived from it But whether wee consider this His infinite Essence in it selfe or as it eminently containes all things possible the incomprehensibility of it is in both respects more fully intimated exprest it cannot be by indefinite formes of speech than by addition of any definite termes whether of singularity universality or totality Hee speakes more fully and more safely that saith God is being it selfe or perfection it selfe than he that saith he is the onely being or all being the onely perfection or all perfection the totality of being and of perfection So all plurality be excluded we expresse his being and perfection best by leaving them as they truly are without all quantity 4 That all plurality not onely of Idaeall perfections answering to the natures of things numerable or created but of internall perfections whose different titles necessarily breed plurality of conceits in us must be excluded from the true orthodoxall intellectuall apprehension of the illimited Essence may from the former maine principle be thus evinced In that Hee is without beginning without end without all cause of being without dependence we cannot imagine or at least our understanding must correct our imaginations if they shall suggest his power to bee as the stemme wisedome goodnesse and other like atributes as branches growing from his being or essence as from the Root For if his Being or Essence be absolutely independent it is absolutely illimited and being such what could limit or restraine it from being life from being power from being wisedome from being goodnesse from being infinitely whatsoever any thing that hath being is He that affirmes any of these attributes to bee what another is not or divine Essence not to bee identically what all those are must grant as well the Attributes as the Essence to be finite and limited If power in God have a being distinct from wisedome and wisedome another being distinct from goodnesse one must needs want so much of infinite being as another hath of proper being distinct from it and at the best they can bee but infinite secundùm quid or in their ranke Againe if any of them be what Essence identically is not Essence cannot bee infinite because wisedome power and being have their severall beings distinct from it And the nearer these come whether severally or joyntly considered to the nature of true infinity the more naked and impotent they leave their mother-Essence if we once grant Essence and them to bee distinct as Parents and children or as root and branch or to what use should powerlesse Essence serve to support these branches of infinity this it could not doe without infinite power And those branches if they need a root or supportance their being must needs bee dependent and therefore limited 5 From the former definition of absolute infinity Infinitum est extra quod nihil est We may conclude that unlesse all power unlesse all wisedome unlesse all goodnesse unlesse all that truly is or can possibly be supposed to have true being bee identically contained in Gods Essence He could not be
desires Venter non habet aures The Belly pinched with hunger must be satisfied with meat so must the thirsty throat bee with drinke before the eares can sucke in the pleasant sound of musicke or the eye feed it selfe with fresh colours or proportions Too much pampering bodily senses starves the minde and deepe contemplation feedes the mind but pines the body Of making many Bookes saith Salomon there is no end and much study is a wearinesse of the flesh The more Knowledge we get the greater capacity wee leave unsatisfied so that we can never seize upon the intire possession of our owne selves and contemplation as the wise King speaketh were vanity did we use the pleasures of it any otherwise thā as pledges or earnest of a better life to come And albeit man in this life could possesse himselfe as intirely as the Angels doe their Angelicall Natures yet could not his entitative goodnesse or felicity be so great as theirs is because the proper patrimony which he possesseth is neither so ample nor so fruitfull God alone is infinite in being infinitely perfect and he alone infinitely enjoyes his intire being or perfection The tenure of his infinite joy or happinesse is infinitely firme infinitely secured of being alway what it is never wanting so much as a moment of time to inlarge or perfect it by continuance uncapable of any inlargement or increase for the present But this entitative or transcendentall goodnesse is not that which wee now seeke whereto notwithstanding it may lead us For even amongst visible creatures the better every one is in its kind or according to its entitative perfection the more good it doth to others The truest measure of their internall or proper excellencies is their beneficial use or service in this great Vniverse whereof they are parts What Creature is there almost in this whole visible Sphere but specially in this inferiour part which is not beholden to the Sunne from whose comfortable heat Nothing as the Psalmist speakes can bee hid It is at least of livelesse or meere bodies in it selfe the best and fairest and farre the best to others And God as it seemes for this purpose sends forth this his most conspicuous and goodly messenger every morning like a bridegroome bedeckt with light and comelinesse to invite our eyes to looke up unto the Hils whence commeth our Helpe upon whose tops he hath pitched his glorious Throne at whose right hand is fulnesse of pleasures everlasting And from the boundlesse Ocean of his internall or transcendent joy and happinesse sweet streames of perpetuall joy and comfort more uncessantly issue than light from the Sunne to refresh this vale of misery That of men the chiefe inhabitants of this great Vale many are not so happy as they might be the chiefe causes are that either they doe not firmely beleeve the internall happinesse of their Creator to be absolutely infinite as his other attributes are or else consider not in their harts that the absolute infinitie of this his internall happinesse is an essentiall cause of goodnesse in it kinde infinite unto all others so farre as they are capable of it and capable of it all reasonable creatures by creation are none but themselves can make them uncapable of happinesse at least in succession or duration infinite Goodnesse is the nature of God and it is the nature of goodnesse to communicate it selfe unto others unto all that are not over growne with evill of which goodnesse it selfe can be no cause or author CHAP. 12. Of the infinitie and immutability of Divine goodness communicative or as it is the patterne of morall goodnesse in the creature 1 THe father of Epicures wil have more than his sonnes to consent with him that imbecility and indigence are the usuall parents of Pitie Bountie Kindnesse or other like branches of communicative humane goodness Whilest we ned not others helpe we little think in what need they stand of ours The Prince in his jollity can hardly compassionate the beggers misery nor knowes the Begger how to bemone decayed Nobles whose condition is more miserable than his owne though so it seemes not unto him who would thinke he had fully conquered want were hee but furnished with such supplies of meat drinke and clothing as these have alwayes ready at hand That sympathy which in livelesse or reasonlesse creatures naturally flowes from similitude of internal qualities seldome breaks forth in men but either from experimentall remembrance of what lately hath or from apprehension of what shortly may befall themselves sight of the like afflictions in others as wee have lately felt revives the phantasmes or affections which were companions of our mourning and by so pitying of our owne former plight we pity them 2 But albeit Epicurus observation may seeme in a manner universall whilest applyed to its proper subject Man in his corrupt state yet when he transcends à genere ad genus from our corruptible nature to the divine nature which is immortall his inference is of the same stampe with those fooles inductions that concluded in their hearts There was no God The divine nature saith he is not penetrable by mercy or pity Why so Will you heare a bruit make Enthymems Because these finde no entrance into the hearts of men but through some breach of defect or indigence It is well this slow-bellyed evill beast could grant mans nature not to bee altogether so bad or cruell as want might not tame it and make it gentle and kinde But would not bruit qeasts so they might speake disclaime his conclusion that true felicity or fulnesse of all contentment possible should make the divine nature worse than want and misery doth the humane Surely there is somewhat else amisse in that which is made better by defect Nor could wealth and honour make the mighty unmindefull of others but by making them first forget themselves The externalls whereon our desires fasten so captivate the humane soule that she cannot doe as she would or as nature teacheth her but these strings being cut she followes her native sway And in a good sense it was most true which a Master of a better sect than Epicurus founded hath taught Nemo sponte malus 3 Lust in old Age Pride in Beggars and shifting in men overflowing with wealth seeme to transcend the nature of sinnes and are monsters in corrupted nature because not begotten by temptations they in a manner beget themselves yet scarce shall we finde an old man so prone to Lust a rich man so delighted in shuffling an Epicure so addicted to his pleasure or any at all so ill affected either in himselfe or towards other that being askt wold not professe his desire to deserve well of others to be liberall to be upright compassionate just and bountifull For though continuāce in bad custome induce in a sort another nature yet can it not transport any man so farre beyond himselfe or miscarry his thoughts so much but he shall feele
fully consonant to Gods owne words to Ionah Chap. 4. 10 11. Then said the Lord thou hast had pitie on the Gourd for the which thou hast not labored neither madest it to grow which came up in a night and perished in a night And should not I spare Nineveh that great City wherein are more than sixscore thousand persons that cannot discerne between their right hand and their left hand and also much cattle Amongst great men many oppresse their tenants but what Lord would spoile his proper inheritance whereto no other can be intituled or eate out the heart of that ground which hee cannot alienate or demise What Architect would deface his owne worke unlesse the image of his unskilfulnesse whereof the Creator cannot bee impeached be so apparant in it as he cannot but blush to behold it Or who would leave a goodly foundation bare or naked unlesse he be unable to reare it up without injustice Now seeing the Entitative Good of proper being is the foundation of that true happinesse which flowes from more speciall participation of Gods presence wheresoever he hath laid the one it is to all that rightly consider his Wisedome Truth and Goodnesse an assured pledge of his will and pleasure to finish it with the other As his nature is immutable so are his gifts without repentance The current of his joyfull beneficence can admit no intermission much lesse admixture of any evill Sorrow woe and misery must seeke some other Originall they have no hidden vent or secret issue from the Ocean of Ioy and Happinesse 9 As the fountaine of bodily light cannot send forth darknesse but uniformly diffuseth light and light onely throughout this visible Sphere so cannot the infinite Ocean of true felicity send forth any influence but such as is apt to cherish the seeds of joy and happinesse wherewith every creature capable of them was sowne in its first creation And as it is the property of light propagated or diffused from the Sunne to make such bodies as are capable of its penetration as Glasses Chrystall Pearle c. secondary fountains of light to others so doth the influence of divine goodnesse inspire all that are conformable to his will with desire of doing to others as he hath done to them that is of being secondary authors or instruments of good to all But such as wilfully strive against the streame of his over-flowing goodnesse or boysterously counterblast the sweet and placide spirations of celestiall influence become creators of their owne woe and raise unto themselves those stormes wherein they perish Yet so essentiall it is unto this infinite Fountaine of goodnesse however provoked to send forth onely streames of life and such is the vertue of the streames which issue from him that as well the evill and miseries which miscreants procure unto themselves as their mischievous intentions towards others infallibly occasion increase of joy and happinesse unto all that give free passage unto their current And this current of life which issueth from this infinite Ocean never dryes up is never wasted by diffusion The more it is dammed or quarved by opposition of the sonnes of darkenesse the more plentifully it overflowes the sonnes of light All the good which one refuseth or putteth from thē returnes in full measure to the other But if the miseries which wicked spirits or their conforts either suffer themselves or intend to others worke good to those that receive the influence of infinite goodnesse might he not without prejudice or imputation inspire these castawayes with such mischievous thoughts or at least intend their woe and misery as these are occasions or meanes of others happinesse or of his glory Wee are indeed forbid to doe evill that good may ensue but if it bee his will to have reprobates doe or suffer evill for the good of his chosen shall not both bee good as willed by him whose will in that hee hath absolute dominion over all his creatures is the rule of goodnesse CHAP. 13. In what sense or how Gods infinite will is said to be the rule of goodnesse 1 BAd was the doctrine and worse the application or use which Anaxarchus would have gathered from some Hieroglyphicall devices of Antiquity wherein Iustice was painted as Iupiters assistant in his Regiment Hereby saith this Sophister unto Alexander then bitterly lamenting the death of his dearest Friend Clytus whom he had newly slaine in his temelent rage your Majesty is given to understād that the decrees of great Monarchs who are a kinde of Gods on earth must bee reputed Oracles of Iustice and their practices may not bee reputed unjust either by themselves or by others But this sophisticall inversion of these Ancients meaning was too palpable to please either the wiser or honester sort of Heathen though living in those corrupt times For albeit many of them conceived of Iupiter as of a great King subject to rage and passion yet all of them held Iustice for an upright milde and vertuous Lady ready alwayes to mitigate never to ratifie his rigorous decrees alwayes tempering his wrath with equity The true Iehovah as he needes no sweet-tongued consort to moderate his anger as Abigail did Davids so hath he no use of such Sophisters as Anaxarchus to justifie the equity of his decrees by his Omnipotent Soveraignty or absolute dominion over all his creatures 2 To derogate ought from his power who is able to destroy both soule and body in hell fire I know is dangerous to compare the prerogatives of most absolute earthly Princes with his would be more odious Yet this comparison I may safely make He doth not more infinitely exceed the most impotent wretch on earth in power and greatnesse than he doth the greatest Monarch the world hath or ever had in Mercy Iustice and Loving-kindnesse nor is his will the rule of Goodnesse because the designes thereof are backt by infinite power but because holines doth so rule his power and moderate his will that the one cannot enjoyne or the other exact any thing not most consonant to the eternall or abstract patternes of equity His will revealed doth sufficiently warrant all our actions because we know that he wils nothing but what is just and good but this no way hindereth but rather supposeth Iustice and Goodnesse to be more essentiall objects of his will than they are of ours And therefore when it is said Things are good because God wils them this illative infers only the cause of our knowledge not of the goodness which we know and the logicall resolution of this vulgar Dialect would be this We know this or that to be good because Gods will revealed commends it for such But his will revealed commends it for such because it was in it nature good for unlesse such it had bin he had not willed it These principles though unquestionable to such as fetch their Divinity from the Fountaine will perhaps in the judgement of others that never taste it but
destinated them 2 But to returne unto the force or efficacie of induction that wee say is neyther so cleare nor so facile in matters physicall or morall as it is in the Mathematiques Now the reason why perfect inductions are so difficultly made in matters naturall is because the subject of naturall Philosophy is not so simple or uncompounded as Mathematicall bodies or figures are and yet are naturall bodies subject to greater varietie of circumstances more obnoxious to alteration by occurrences externall then abstract lines or motionlesse figures or bodies are The cunningest Alchymist albeit hee could exactly temper his furnace to all the severall degrees of heate that any fewell of what kinde soever could afford cannot by any fire or by any degree of heate which issues from it hatch the most imperfect bird that flyes yet if he should hence inferre that no birds could bee hatched by any kinde of heate daily experience would convince his assertion of falshood and his induction although it consisted of ten thousand instances or experiments taken from the heate of the forge or furnace to be altogether lame A man mighty try the like conclusion of hatching birds in all the sands that this Iland affords upon the eggs of all the fowles that breed in it or about it and finde their barrennesse and unaptnesse for bringing forth any flying Creature to bee as great as it is for bringing forth wheate or other corne And I am perswaded the compost of this our soyle is an unapt to bring forth the former effects as our sands are Yet if any man should hence make this generall induction that no sand or compost could performe this midwifery to the conception of any fowles his errour might bee confuted by the Ostriches which have beene hatched in the sands of Arabia and by some compost in Aegypt which performes that office unto young chickens which brood-hens doe with us No man in his time or since he died hath beene either more accurate or more industrious in observing the externall causes of sicknesse and health then Hippocrates was And no question but he was as carefull to take his observations or frame his generall rules from multitude of experiences as any Philosopher or Physitian hath beene Notwithstanding his observation concerning the nature and qualities of winds and the dependence of mens health or sicknesse upon them are farther out of date in France then an Almanacke made the last yeare for the meridian of London would be this yeare for the meridian of Mexico The same winds which in his Countrey or in Countries wherein hee made his observations were most healthfull are most noysome in some parts of France The diversitie of the soile whence windes in severall regions arise or passe through makes one and the same winde in respect of the point or quarter of heaven from whence it comes to produce quite contrary effects in severall religions or situations The East wind may in some regions dispose mens bodies to the Iaundice and yet purifie mens blood in other places not farre distant for latitude So may the South-wind in some regions taint mens bodies with consumptions coughs or other infirmities and yet bee healthfull in other regions not much distant for longitude Let then the meere Naturalist tyre himselfe and his Reader by long inductions or with multitude of experiments in agents subjects natural for supporting his generall rule ex nihilo nihil fit Every thing is made of something yet his observation will reach no farther then to Agents or efficients visible or limited Albeit his experiments in this kind were infinite this inference neverthelesse No visible agent can make any thing of nothing therefore nothing can bee made of nothing by an invisible or supernaturall Agent would be more disjoynted then this following No heate of fire or of the Sunne in what degree soever can hatch liue-creatures ergo the heate of the Dam cannot hatch her young ones The difference betweene visible agents may be much greater then the difference betweene the heate or warmth of divers bodies No earthly bodies can produce heate in others but either by heate inherent in themselves or by motion yet this will not conclude that no celestiall bodie the Sunne for example can produce heat in bodies sublunary unlesse it selfe be inherently hot or at least not without motion It is more then probable that the Sunne is not formally or inherently hot and yet although it should stand still as once it did in its sphere above our horizon it would heat and warme us no lesse then now it doth whilst it moueth For cōclusion to make any perfect inductiō sufficient to support an vniversall rule from earthly bodies which shall conclude bodies Coelestiall or from agents sublunarie or uisible which shall as uniformely hold true in an agent invisible and supercoelestiall is more difficult then to twist ropes of loose sand That which the Naturalist should proove if hee would bee an Atheist or infidell in graine or oppose the truth of Scriptures with probabilitie is that there is no invisible or spirituall Agent And this is the point whereat the second objection aymes there can be no agent without a patient no exercise of Art or power without some matter or subject to worke upon CHAP. 6. The second objection of the Naturalist Every agent praesupposeth a patient or passiue subject to worke upon cannot bee proved by any induction The contradictorie to this Maxime proved by sufficient induction 1 ACtus agentium sunt in patiente bene disposito The efficacie of every Agent saith the Philosopher is in the patient fitly disposed to receive it And else-where hee determines it as a positive truth that every action is in the patient not in the Agent And this his position may bee ratified by perfect induction or experiments inpregnable for every action is an operation and every operation is so necessarily annexed vnto the effect produced that where the one is the other needes must be and every effect is in the patient or at least is the patient The softning of waxe the hardning of clay the revivall of vegetables of severall kindes are all actions proceeding from one and the same actuall force or unvariable influence of the Sunne The reason why the active force is but one and the same and why the actions or operations are many and much different is because the active force is in the Agent whereas the action or operation is in the patient and is diversly multiplied according to the diversitie and multitude of the patients We shall not need to question the universall truth of the former Maxime That every action is in the patient as some have done For it holds as true in Divinitie as in Philosophy most apparent in the subject whereof we treate Creation it selfe is an action a reall action yet not really in the Creator but in the Creature onely For no reall attribute can be in the Creator which was not in him
some more imperfect filme in any Bull which was not first a Calfe in any Lyon which was not first a whelp in any Oake which did not first spring from an Acorne unlesse he instance in painted Trees in brazen Bulls or artificiall Lyons Of live naturall substances it is universally true Omnia ortus habent suaque certa incrementa All have their beginning all their certaine increase or augmentation The induction again is for the other partie as compleate and perfect There never was a true Acorne which did not presuppose an Oake nor a Lyons whelp which did not presuppose a Lyon to beget it and a Lyonesse to bring it forth Now every productive cause every live-substance which produceth another by proper causalitie or efficiencie hath alwayes precedencie of nature and of time in respect of that which is produced by it The Lyon is in order of nature and of time before his whelp and yet is every Lyon wherein the Naturalist can instance a whelp before it be a Lyon so is the Oake in order of nature and of time before the Acorne and yet cannot the Naturalist instance in any Oake which was not an Acorne or plant before it grew to be an Oake If then eyther the race of Lyons or the propagation of Oakes had no beginning it would inevitably follow that Oakes had beene perpetually before Acornes and Acornes perpetually before Oakes That Lyons whelpes from eternitie had precedency or prioritie of time of Lyons and Lyons the like precedencie or prioritie of time of their whelps And if they had bin mutually each before other from eternitie according to prioritie of time and nature they must have beene mutually each after other How the Naturalist will be able to digest this circular revolution of prioritie and posterioritie in respect of the same individuall natures or what hee will say to these following inconveniences I cannot tell but desire to know Every whole or perfect Fish which the Naturalist hath heard or read of had beginning of its individuall Beeing from Spawne This induction is most compleate and perfect in the Schoole of Nature most irrefragable by the supposition of the Naturalist with whom wee dispute Every Fish hath a beginning from Spawne and that which hath a beginning from Spawne hath a beginning of its beeing No Fish or Spawne is or hath beene immortall or without beginning Now if it bee universally true that every particular Fish hath its beginning it implies an evident contradiction to say that the race of Fishes which consist onely of particular Fishes was without beginning There must in every race of Fishes be some first Fishes or first Spawnes before which there was none of the same kind frō which this mutual propagation did take its beginning And though this propagation be without end yet could it not be without beginning unlesse wee would grant that fishes are not onely of an incorruptible nature but of a nature infinite or eternall If there were no beginning of this mutuall propagation it would bee demanded whether the number of fishes or Lyons that shall bee granting what the Naturalists suppose that this propagation shall be endlesse can ever be as great as the number of those Fishes and Lyons that have beene Or whether the number of those that have beene may not be conceived to be more infinite or in another sort infinite than the number of those that shall be That the number of Fishes or Lyons which from this time forward may be suppose the world were never to end can be no otherwise infinite then potentially or successively onely or by addition because there shall never be any last Lyon or fish c. after which there shall bee no more the Naturalist will not denie For those Lyons or fishes which from this point of time shall be have as yet no actuall beeing nor have they before this time had any such beeing Whence it is cleare that their number can never be actually infinite but infinite onely by addition as continuate quantitie is by division But if fishes have beene produced from Spawne and Spawne from fishes without any beginning of time wee must of necessitie grant that there have beene Fishes Lyons Oakes c. propagated each from other for number actually infinite for every Fish which could produce Spawn had actuall beeing before it could yeeld Spawne every Spawne wherof any fish is made hath actuall beeing before any Fish can be made of it Whence if this propagation had beene without beginning their number must needes be actually infinite so infinite that there could have beene no more than have beene that there can be no more than now are That onely is actually infinite unto which nothing of the same kinde can be added If this mutuall propagation had beene from eternity the number of things propagated should have been actually infinite in every point of time imaginable It is impossible that any thing should be actually infinite from eternitie and not bee alike actually infinite throughout every part of time as infinite yesterday as to day or as it shall be to morrow It is againe impossible that any thing should be actually infinite in any part of time or by any succession of time which was not infinite from eternitie and before all times If wee shall suffer our imaginations of mutuall propagations to rove backward without an imagination or acknowledgement of some first beginning to stay or limit them our soules shall finde as little rest with lesse securitie as Noahs Dove did whilest the earth was overflowed with water if she had not returned to the Arke Vnlesse wee thus pitch upon a first beginning of time and all things temporall we shall not only make shipwracke of faith but drench our immortall soules in a bottomlesse lake or poole of absurdities even in nature 2 The conclusion arising from these premises is that albeit naturall reason or discourse could never have found out that which Moses hath written concerning the particular manner of the worlds creation as that it and all things in it all the severall originals of propagation were created in sixe dayes yet Moses his narrations can onely give satisfaction to such Problemes as men by light of nature may propose or cast but can never without the light of Gods word be able to assoyle By so much of this light as Moses in the first Chapter of Genesis holds out unto us wee may easily free our selves from perpetuall wandring in that inextricable maze of mutuall or circular precedencie betweene things generable and their generative efficients which the Naturalist can never avoid untill with us hee grant that which the Philosopher by the light of Nature did indefinitely teach Actus prior est potentia That which hath perfect beeing is simply and absolutely before that which proceedeth from it or is brought to perfection by it Thus Moses tells us Gen. 1. vers 11. That there was an earth before there was any grasse
make a conscience as well of their words as of their wayes herein perhaps especially faulty that they are too zealously sollicitous not to speake amisse make no scruple of entertaining these and the like inferences following as naturally descending from the former Maxime It is impossible ought should fall out otherwise than it doth all things in respect of God and his Omnipotent Decree are necessary Contingencie is but a solecisme of secular language or if any thing may without offence be termed contingent it must be reputed such onely with reference to second causes 2 Howbeit such good men as doe thus write and speake will give us leave I know to take it in the first place as granted that God is wiser than we are and knowes the nature of all things and their differences better than they or we doe This being granted we will in the second place suppose that Contingency is not a meere fictitious name of that which is not as Tragelaphus nor altogether Synonymall to Necessity The question about Contingency and of its difference from necessity is not such as one in merriment once proposed in schools An chimera calcitrans in vacuo terat calceos The very names of Contingency and Necessity to ordinary Latinists differ more than Ensis and Gladius than Vestis and Indumentum betwixt which perhaps the ancient Latine Artificers or Nomenclators knew some difference Yet was it impossible for them to know any thing which God knew not who out of all controversie knowes the true difference betweene Contingency and Necessity much better then we can doe For both of them are Entities of his making and serve as different Lawes to the diversity of his creatures or their different actions All the reasons that can be drawne from the immutability of Gods Decree to the contrary may with greater facility and strength of the same Decree be retorted than brought against us For God immutably decrees mutability Now who will say that things mutable are in respect of Gods decree or knowledge immutable The Heavens and other bodies moveable according to locall motion are truly moveable in themselves absolutely moveable not immoveable in respect of Gods decree or knowledge for he knowes them to bee moveable because he decreed them so to be hee doth not know them to be immoveable because he decreed them not to be such unlesse for a time by interposition of miracle It implies lesse contradiction to say Deus immutabiliter decernit mutabilia than to say which hath beene accounted an ancient orthodoxall Maxime Stabilis dat cuncta movere For Mobility is a branch of Mutability 3 Every thing in respect of Gods decree or knowledge is altogether such as God hath decreed it should be If then God hath decreed there should be contingency as well as necessity it is altogether as necessary that some events should be contingent as others necessary and as truly contingent as the other is necessary in respect of Gods decree Albeit to speake properly the natures of contingency and necessity consist not in meere relation or respect For in as much as both are immediate and reall effects of Divine Omnipotency both must have absolute being the being of neither is meerly relative Now if Contingency have a true and absolute being it is neither constituted in the nature of contingency by any respect or relation to second causes nor can any respect or relation to the first cause deprive it of that absolute nature which the Omnipotent efficacy of the cause of causes hath irrevocably bestowed upon it Briefly if Contingency be any thing it is that which it is by the Omnipotent Decree and being such it is altogether as impossible that some effects should not be absolutely contingent as that such effects as the Divine Decree hath appointed to bee necessary should not be at all Or if we would make impartiall inquiry into the originall of all things nothing without the precincts of the most glorious and ever blessed Trinity is absolutely necessary 4 By Contingency lest haply we might be mistaken we understand the possible meane betweene necessity of being and necessity of not being or of being such or of not being such or betweene necessity of doing and necessity of not doing or necessity of being done or necessity of being left undone This meane betweene necessity of doing and necessity of not doing is that which in agents intellectuall as in men and Angells wee call freedome of will or choice Vnto which freedome necessity is as contradictory as irrationability is to the nature of man and contingency as necessarily presupposed as life and sense are to reason Adde reason to contingency and we have the compleat definition of Free-will In those cases wherein the Creator hath exempted man from restraint of necessity his will is free The divine will it selfe is not free in those operations which are essentiall though most delectable God the Father is more delighted in the eternall generation of his Sonne so is God the Father and the Sonne in the eternall procession of the Holy Ghost than in the creation production or preservation of all the creatures Yet are not these or other internall operations of the blessed Trinity so free in respect of the divine nature as is the production of the world Whatsoever God decrees he decrees it freely that is so as he might not decree it Whatsoever he makes he makes it freely that is he so makes it as that it was not necessary for him to make it CHAP. 13. Contingency is absolutely possible and part of the object of Omnipotency as formall a part as necessity is 1 IT is an unquestionable rule in the Art of Arts that propositions for their forme not incompatible may from the necessity of their matter or subject become equivalent to propositions directly contradictory whose indispensable law or rule it is that if the one be true the other must needs be false they admit of no meane betwixt them Now there is no matter or subject in the world which is so absolutely necessary as the existence of the Divine Nature or the internall operations of the Trinity Whence it is that betweene these two propositions The generation of the Sonne is necessary the not generation of the Son is necessary there is no possible meane which can be capable of truth The first is so absolutely necessary and so necessarily true that the latter is eternally false But such is not the case or condition of these two propositions following The Creation or Existence of the World is necessary The not Creation or non existence of the World is necessarie These are not contradictories for their form nor equivalent to contradictories for their matter or subject and therefore may admit a meane betweene them To say the creation or existence of the world was absolutely necessary hath no truth in it for it had a beginning of existence and being and may have an end and the other extreame or contrary The not
the seat of Chance or Fortune in our way and to declare what is meant by these termes and whether such events as we say fall out by Fortune or Chance have any alliance with necessity In this discussion I hope wee shall arive at that point whereat the favourers of absolute necessity and the favourers of other opinions concerning Fate and Fortune more fluctuant will bee content to cast anchor Fortune saith Plutarch is a part of Chance as free-will or choise is of contingency Every casuall event is contingent but every contingent effect is not casuall or a chance 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 quasi 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The very name of Chance in Greek saith Aristotle implies as much as to be to no end or purpose yet this etymology under correction was no part of the Ancients meaning which gave the Greek name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to such events as we terme casuall unlesse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 frustra be referred onely as perhaps Aristotle intended to the efficient cause After a manner of speech not much unlike to this the Schoolemen say that is gratis dictum as wee would say freely spoken not for which a man takes no fee but for which he hath no just ground or reason And that in phrase of Scripture is said to bee done gratis or frustra which is done without just motives or provocation not that which is done or attempted to no end or purpose Oderunt me frustra and Oderunt me gratis They hated me without a cause or They hated me vainly are in some translations equivalent The word in the originall answers to both In analogy to this kinde of speech those events were said to fall out by chance or to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which in the opinion of such as gave this name had no efficient cause or at least none discernable but were supposed to move themselves or to take possession of such short beeing as they had without the assignement of any superiour power or of any constant or setled cause intruding themselves into the course of nature like unbidden guests sometimes as unwelcome as frost in summer sometimes as welcome as warme weather to such as want fire in winter 5 Fortune hath her authority placed onely in reasonable actions or deliberations yet not in all these but onely in such events as fall out either so farre beyond or contrary to mens intentions that they may be rather wondred at then expected If husbandmen should digge their Vineyards with purpose to finde Gold the fruitefull vintage thereon following though no part of their intentions could not so properly bâ—e ascribed to Fortune as if a husbandman intending onely to dig his Vineyard in hope of a plentifull vintage should finde store of Gold 6 The meaning of Plato of Aristotle and Plutarch may bee better perceived by fit instance then by large scholastique commentaries upon their severall definitions of Fortune Valerius Maximus and to my remembrance Plutarch hath a memorable storie of one Iason Phereus that was cured of an impostume in a fray or Duell The blow of an enemy was the cause of this mans health but by a rare and unusuall accident quite contrary to his intention that gave it and altogether beyond his expectation that received it His purpose was only to maintaine his reputation or revenge his wrongs either to wound or to be wounded without any hope or thought of curing his disease the danger wherof was not fully discovered til it was past But a more perfect Idaea or exemplarie forme of fortune good or bad then any historian relates the greeke Epigrammatist hath pictured for our contemplation The matter of the Epigram was in English thus A silly poore wretch being deprived of all meanes to live resolves to deprive himselfe of breath but whilest he sought a place convenient for acting this desperate purpose finding store of gold which another had hid he returned home againe leaving his halter in the place which was worse taken by him that hid the gold then meant by him that left it for he hanged himselfe in it for griefe of his losse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A poore wretch finding gold for ioy left 's halter in its steed Which he that left the gold for griefe did make his fatall threed To finde Gold was no part of that poore mans hopes whom despaire of like meanes to live by had made desirous of death the other had as little minde to dispatch himselfe when he came to visit the supposed stay and comfort of his life wherein his soule had solaced her selfe with the foole in the Gospell CHAP. 21. Of the proper subject and nature of Fate 1 THE most usefull issue which these or the like cases afford is this whether the event specified in them bee meerely casuall contingent or in some sort necessarie One and the same determination will as well befit the like quaestion concerning such events as are properly tearmed Fatall whose proper subject nature and definition we are more particularly to inquire after The first quaere which few meddle withall would bee this Whether fatall events participate more of contingencie then of necessitie But setting aside all comparison it sufficeth us that they truely participate of both but in different degrees or measures according to the diversitie of times Contingencie is alwayes as necessarily praesupposed to the production of events fatall as necessitie is included in them And as the proper forme or essence of Fates consists not in every sort of necessitie but in some peculiar branch thereof so neither is every Contingent subject a fit matter for receiving that forme or branch of necessitie wherein the nature of Fate consists and which giues denomination and being to events fatall I have heard many unthrifts upon the loosing of a faire game at Tables curse the Dice or cry vengeance upon ill luck but I never heard any Gamester frame such inditements either in verse or prose against Fates as were usuall amongst the heathens whose language in other cases is with our unthrifts most familiar Such pettie adventures as Cardes and Dice are as met all too base to be instampt with the inscription of Fate whose proper subject in publike affaires is matter either of tragedie or of triumph in private matter either of extraordinarie and unusuall prosperitie or of calamitie Most of Gods creatures are the subject of contingency mankind onely or humane societie is the the proper sphaere without whose circumference neither fortune or fatall events doe wander Yet is not every part of man subject to fate though man according to every part bee subject to that contingencie which is praesupposed to Fates Iustin Martyr though a professed enemy to Stoicall Fates and a most valiant champion a chiefe leader to all the rest which have defended the Christian truth against that sect being most potent in the infancie of Christianitie was not so nice as either to