Matth. 7. 16. There are some operations peculiar to lyons some to Bees c. 1 mean that are proper to the whole kind DIFFERENCE V. The name of the genus may be given to the species but the name of the integral cannot be given to the member because the genus is totum essentiale communicating his whole nature and all his essential properties and operations to his species and the names of things are sutable to their natures Homo the name of a man is given to Socrates Plato c. but the name o man is not given to his finger or toe for a member hath but part of the nature of the whole in it Obj. Pars similaris hath the name of the integrum a drop of water is water Answ. A drop of water is species Aqua and haec aqua are genus and species as Mr Hooker speaks That aqua and haec aqua are genus and species may appear Res. 1. Where there is an essentiall predication of the whole of his part there is genus and species But in aqua and haec aqua there is an essential praedication of the whole of his part Ergo The reason is because genus onely is totum essentiale partibus Res. 2. Haec aqua hath some genus But this water hath no genus but water Therefore this water hath water for his genus Res. 3. If two drops of water are ejusdem generis then aqua is their genus But two drops of water are ejusdem generis Ergo It is not absurd that there should be many thousand spâ—cies of water in one pailful and many thousand sands in one handful and many thousand Bees in one hive DIFFERENCE VI Genus est {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} prius speciâ—bus membra intâ—gro priora the genus is before his species in priority of nature and the member before the inâ—corum The reason is because genus is a note of the causes integrum of the effect the causes are in order of nature before the effect and the effect after the causes The genus is essentiall to his parts giving causes to the species the members are essential to the integral communicating essence to it the more universal general or common any thing is the more priority of nature it hath Animal est prius homine est eâ—im termiais commâ—nior quà m homo homo before Socrates As genus is prius so it is notius naturâ Claritas generis non dependet à claritate specici sed 〈◊〉 sâ—se commnniâ—at singulars may be better known to us but universais are by nature beâ—ter known then specials Homo is better known then Socrates or Plato Animal better known then any of them and substance better then that ens à primo is better known then any of them all because it drawes neerer to ens primum which is notissimum maximè intelligibilâ— Prius notius naturâ eadem sunt But the members are before the integral in order of nature for that is made up of the members and therefore cannot be before them A house cannot be before the foundation and superstruction A tree cannot be before the root body and branches Mr Hooker p. 255. in his rational discourse about the nature of integrum made it appear as clear as the Sun that the members which make up and constitute the whole are in order of nature before it Yet Mr Hudson p. 219. seemeth to plead for the priority of an integral affirming that the nature of the Church Catholike visible in respect of the particulars is like to the priority of a Kingdom to the parts of it or of a corporation in respect of the parts of it Which is not meant saith Mr Hudson in a mathematical or techtonical consideration for so the particular buildings are prima and the whole city Orta Yet saith he so M. Hooker understands me Answ. Mr Hooker speaks not of a city only in respect of the artificial buildings but he speaketh of a civil body or corporation and a politicial Kingdom which bodies politick and corporations hold correspondence with a city having many houses and buildings in it which houses and buildings are in nature before the whole city which is the effect arising from those causes So likewise the members of every body politick are in nature before the entire body it self which is made up of those causes A city in a techtonical consideration may be first in intention perfection and dignity as well as a civil or ecclesiastical corporation Mr Hudson speaks as if a city attended in a techtonical consideration could not be first intended For Mr Hudson opposeth these which is not meant saith Mr Hudson in a techtonical consideration but in regard of intentions c. But it is a common rule that which is first in intention is last in execution contrà The finishing and compleating the whole city is last in execution in a techtonical consideration why may it not be first in intention but no integral body is first in essence Mr Hudson p. 219. affirms that the integral Church is first in essâ—nce which I confess is above the reach of my shallow reason for the members give essence to the whole that is matter and form and the integrum receives essence from them being a symbol of the effect And how is it possible to conceive that that should be first in essence that is last in essence receiving his essence from the essence of the parts Neither can any integrum be first cognitione distinctâ noscibilitate perfectâ it may be notius nobis analytically but not notius naturâ genetically When we analyse the frame and workmanship of god we meet with the effects and go from them to the causes which we perceive by their effects but the causes are better knowne by nature because as Res sese habent in esse ita in cognosci the intelligibility and Cognoscibility of things followeth their Entity and being Mr Hudson p. 278 speaks well and truly cognitio sequitur ordinem naturae in se But how the Kingdom of England can be known without or before the knowledge of the distinct parts I am not able to conceive A man may indeed know the Policy Laws and Priviledges and not know all the severall Towns but the Towns are not the members of the Laws and Priviledges A man cannot know the body of Laws distinctly before he knows any of the particular Laws For it is certain that as the essence of a thing consists in his causes so the knowledge of the essence of a thing consists in the knowledge of the Causes The common place of causes is the fountain of all Science Scirique demum creditur cujus Causa teneatur ut merito dicatur à Poëtâ Foelix qui potuit rerum cognoscere Causas It is a speculative happiness and the â—oelicity of the understanding to know the Causes of things But there is but small happiness to see the
outside of the thing not understanding the essentiall Causes and ingredients into the essence and being of it A man may as well know the nature and essence of a thing distinctly without the knowledge of his distinct nature and essence as know a thing distinctly without knowledge of his Causes We have heard of some consectaries from the definition of Genus I shall observe two things from the definition of species specialissima which is that which cannot be divided into other species The first is that individuum est species The second is that though species specialissima cannot be divided into other species yet it may be divided into members 1. Individuum est species Every singular or individuall thing is a spâ—cies Touching this question I shall first explicate secondly confirm the Truth 1. The explication may be given in these following theses or positions THESIS I. The variation onely of scituation or Accidents is not sufficient to vary the species 1. Here I concurre with Mr Hudson p. 91. This man is an English man This English man is a Suffolk man This Suffolck man is an Ipswich man This praedication is denominatio Adjunctae personae à subjectis If a man remove his habitation from one Country to another or from one Land to another this make him not another species As it is sayd Coelum non animum mutant c. so I may say Coelum non speciem mutant qui trans mare currunt The place is but a Subject and not essentiall and cannot make an essentiall difference between a man and himself 2. Augmentation in stature old Age c. make not a specificall difference gradus non variant speciem 3. Variation of sex doth not vary the species the same person may be Mas foemina An Hermaphrodite or Androgyne is not two persons or species and yet is both man and woman 4. Various species must be various things between which there is an essentiall difference THESIS II. Various species must fall under the essential predication of some kind which is of a more general or comprehensive nature For species est pars gâ—neris and the Genus is totum partibus essentiale there must be therefore an essentiall praedication of something more general upon something more special as Homo est Animal Haec Aqua est aqua THESIS III. When we say Socrates est Homo there is an essentiall praedication of Homo which is more generall upon Socrates which is more speciall Homo is essentiall to Socrates and comprehends Socrates and Plato under him this Mr Hudson p. 89. grants freely THESIS IIII. Socrates and Plato are opposita opposite one to another they are disparata that is such things whereof one is opposed to many in like manner as a blew colour is opposed to red green c. in like manner Socrates is opposed to Plato Cicero Aristotle equally to one as well as to another Hence Socrates and Plato are not only diverse dissenting in some logical respect but opposite dissenting re ratione really and indeed they dissent in their own nature as they are things there is a bar in their nature they are set one against another that they can never be one and the same as black cannot be white Socrates and Plato are two one cannot be the other there is an essentiall difference between them THESIS V. Socrates and Plato are distinguisht one from another by their proper and essentiall formes As a man and a lyon differ in their common forme so Socrates and Plato in their proper form All opposition is firstly from the form hereby a thing is that which it is and is therefore by this distinguished from all other things All essentiall distinction and opposition is from the forms of things they differ not only accidentally but essentially one from the other and are distinguisht one from another by their essentiall forms THESIS VI The numericall difference between Socrates and Plato is an Argument of their specificall distinction it includeth and implieth an essentiall difference between things being distinguished by their proper individuall essentiall forms It is true that our intellectualls are so wounded by the Apostacy of the first man that it is exceeding hard for us to find out the forms of things we are forced many times to describe the forms of things by their accidents as we are constrained to describe the Elements by their proper qualities arising from their forms yet every one of them hath a proper forme The existence of every thing is from all the causes nothing can exist and be that which it is without its proper form And the difference of the proper form is no less then the difference of the common form but rather greater Look how much greater the similitude and agreement is between Singulars in regard of their common forms so much greater is the difference of their proper forme The difference and opposition of contraries is the greatest and strongest and yet they communicate in the same genus these are more opposite one to another then things that are not under the same genus white and black are more opposite then white and bitter c. Gravia bella fratrum To differ so numerically is to differ formally to differ in number is to differ in forme for number is an affection or proper adjunct following the essence Socrates and Plato have two distinct forms hence they differ in essence hence they have two distinct essences and beings hence they are two one cannot be the other they cannot be both one and the same hence they differ numerically one from the other Where there is one humanity and essential forme of man there is one essence of man and one man and where there are two humanities and essentiall proper individuall forms of man there are two men hence they differ numerically and one is not the other or the same with the other Socrates is not Plato but is numerically different from him Socrates is one and Plato is another As London is one city and York another The difference of number is nothing but the difference of the proper and individuall forme and to differ in number is to differ in forme two men have two different forms two Lyons have two different formes If Socrates and Plato or any other individuall men differing in number should not differ in essence and forme they should differ only accidentally one from the other as one man differs from himself or as Socrates in his old age differs from Socrates in his youth being the same man and differing onely in accidents not in essence Socrates should be Plato and Plato Socrates And when Alexander rides Bucephalus Aristotle sits in the same saddle and it were impossible not to set the saddle upon the right horse for every horse is the same essentially and he that stealeth one horse he stealeth all the horses in the world because the essence of the one is the same with the essence of
the causes of the species and species answerably the effects of the genus Genus is not a câ—usarum essentialâ—um commnnium and imitates exactly the nature of those causes as an essential cause argueth his effect so genus argueth his species Hence 1. Genus gives esse to his species as every cause to his effect the species had never been if it had not been for genus Sublato genere tollitur species take away animal and homo will not be there will be no man in the world Homo gives being to Socrates and Socrates will not be cannot be without homo and as Rachel said give me children or else I dy so genus saith give me species or else I dy Posito genere necessariò ponitur aliqua species If homo be in the world there will be Iohn Thomas or some other Individuals or species of that kind 2. The genus communicates matter and form to his parts as the parts did give matter and form to the Integrum so the genus gives matter and form to the species because it is a note of the common essential causes which are matter and form it therefore gives matter and common form to the species 3. The genus communicates his whole essence to his species his whole matter and form Though it doth not bestow upon the species all which they have yet it is so free-hearted that it bestoweth his whole essence and nature and all that it hath within it self upon the species Hence the whole essence of the genus is in the species his whole matter and form as whole animality the whole matter and form of living creature is in homine Bruto in man and beast There is nothing in the genus besides his universality which is not in the species Humanity with his whole matter and form is in Socrates and Plato 4. The genus communicates the same essence to all his species It is a note of the common essential causes and therefore imparts it self impartially and equally to every one of his species is common to all all have one and the same common nature in them The same common humane nature is in Socraâ—es Plato and all Individuals Parubus essentiale essential to its parts Totum est majus qualibet suâ— partâ— the whole containeth the single parts as greater then any one of them but containeth all as being equal to them There is no totum consisting of one part though the entire nature of the genus be in every species yet not the universal nature Totum genus non est nisi in cunctis speciebus one species cannot make up a genus Animal was not made up compleat and perfect till homo was created We have finished the explication of the definition of genus the kind and have heard how kind it is if I may so speak to all his species We must now declare briefly what respect species beareth to genus in taking his part Species est pars generis The species is a part of its kind the special is a part of the general Species of the old verb Spâ—cie to see or behold It signifieth properly the â—utward face countenance or a sight non tulit hanc speciem he could not abide to see that sight a thing seen or looked upon Graece {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} of {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} video to see It signifieth a visible shape fashion shew appearance image or representation {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} the fashion of his Countâ—nance was altered Luke 9. 29. {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} neither have ye seen his shape Joh. 5. 29. the same word is translated appearance 1 Thes. 5. 22. The reason of the name is because the genus is seen in the species in them it appeareth and sheweth his face Species est the species is that is really existing in nature The genus subsâ—sts in his species and no where else it is no where else to be seen or found Homo is not to be seen but in Socrates or Plato Alexander or some other Individuals which are his spâ—cies The genus being granted doth necessarily imply the existence of the species Pars a part is that which is contained of the whole it is heâ—d together with some other part by the genus and hath alwaies some fellow or other for the genus cannot be divided into one part but into several parâ—s a species is but one piece of it If genus be the whole a species is a part if animal be the whole homo is a part Pars generis non integri Hereby it is distinguished from membrum for that respects the integral but species stands in reference to the genus and participates of his essence together with other species Aristotle gives the same definition of it Cicero saith it is pars quae generi subest It is pars generis subjectiva sub icitur generi in ordine gradu descensionis As man and beast are comprehended under animal as inferiour to animal contained under that head animal is before homo and above him in order of nature those species viz. Homo and Brutum are cast under animal as a more general head of Beings 2. The species is subject to the genus in predication make an axiome of genus and species and we shall see the species to be the subject more often then the genus as homo est animal Socrates est homo CHAPTER II. Concerning the distribution of Genus and Species GEnus est generalissimum aut Subalternum The Genus is most general or subalterne The Species is subalterne or most special The Genus is distributed into two kinds most general and subordinate the species is also divided into two kinds intermediate or most special God hath ranked things in order that there is a subordination of things one to another and one under another There must be extreams on either side somthing highest somthing lowest a most general and a most special and some between both The subalterne Genus and Species as they stand in respect to their superiours they are Species as they respect their inferiours they are kinds or generalls that is they receive their essence from their superiours and communicate it to their inferiours As man receiveth his essence from Animal a living creature and therefore is said to be his Species and again he communicates his essence with singular men whence he is called their Genus The highest Genus is most general the lowest Species is most special the intermediate kinds which come between these are the Genus of their inferiours and the Species of their superiours which by reason of this vicissitude and changing by courses and turns are called subalterne Genus generalissimum est cujus nullum est Genus The most general Genus is that of which there is no Genus Genus Generalissimum the most general Genus which in
be the whole the eye cannot be the whole body 1 Cor. 12 17. If the whole body were an eye where were the hearing If the whole body were hearing where were the smelling v. 18. But now God hath disposed the members every one of them in the body at his own pleasure v. 19. For if they were all one members where were the body v. 20. But now are there many members but one body A mutilated and maimed body cannot be a perfect and entire body M. Hudson will not affirm that a City may be preserved entire in one members for a City contains many Citizens there cannot be {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} of {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} multus where there is but one man M. Hudson consents to this that the nature of a flock is not reserved in one sheep or a Corporation in one man or that a swarm of Bees cannot be in one Bee Integrum is not made of one member as M. Hooker chap. 15. pag. 26. speaks I wonder to what end M. Hudson speaks of a flock and a sheep which are Integrum and membra when he would shew that the whole nature of the genus is not in una specie CONCLUSION V. Genus and Integrum are both existing and measurable by time and place I find M. Hudson clearly and fully expressing his judgement that Genus doth not exist and that it is not measurable by time and place I shall present some of his expressions concerning this business to the Reader viz. in page 78. he saith Universality is of another Nature being an abstract second Notion And again in the same page he hath these words Genus being a second Notion existeth not but in intellectu nostro habet fundamentum in rebus non existentiam for as it doth exist it is an integral and loseth his abstract nature wherein the Universality doth consist And again in page 88. Genus is a notion not existing I shall name but one place more in page 81. where he expresseth himself in these words That Totum which is measured by time and place is an Integral for Genus which is a notion is capable of neither of them By which c. it appears that M. Hudson apprehends that this is one main difference between genus and integrum that genus is a notion not existing nor measurable by time and place but integrum exists and is measured by time and place Answ. I conceive and affirm that both of them genus as well as integrum are existing things measured by time and place and that both of them shew their faces in rerum Naturâ and that the Understanding finds neither of them lurking or lying hid in the bottomless pit of non existence The existence of integrum is so palpable and plain that M. Hudson hath no scruple about it suspects it not in the least measure but gives in his clear Testimony concerning the existence of it that he hath seen it standing out from all his causes and that time and place have taken measure of it or at least are able to do it he affirms that it is measurable by both Only I conceive that he offers some wrong and indignity to genus to deny it the same priviledge We shall therefore plead so far as the laws of Logick and ancienstatutes of reason will give in evidence for us and labour to demonstrate that existence is a priviledge duly belonging to genus and that he cannot be denyed it in the Court of Argumentation without the violation of the ruleâ— of reason In the touching or handling this cause we shall speak some things First By way of Explication Secondly By way of Confirmation of the Truth The Question being stated we shall give the Explication in several Propositions PROPOSITION I. Second Notions are as real as first Notions Argumenta orta are as real as prima arising Arguments are as real true existing things as the very first Arguments from whence they arise and have as real a Being and Entity as they Adam was the first man but all his sons are true men as well as himself So those Arguments which arise and spring from the first as their Ancestors or Predecessors are real Things or Beings as well as their Parents from which they descend Those which some call Nominal because the force of Arguing is in the name yet have a reality in them and are not meer fictions but here the force of Arguing lieth in the things themselves Definition is not a first Argument but is beholding to the first Arguments for his Birth Nativity and Breeding and hath derived his whole Existence and Being from them and yet is not a meer Notion crept into the Understanding of man before it was duely entred and enrolled into the Artificial Fabrick of Reason which is one of those Vestigia and Impressions which the first Being hath left behind him Those who read in the great book of the world and turn over those leaves and volumes may find the explication of the quiddity and being of things or the bounds of their being unfolded which is nothing else but their definition E. Gr. homo est animal rationale a man is a reasonable creature this is the definition of man Men and angels could never make this to be the definition of man but find it made before their eyes they gather it up with the hands of their understandings which they could never have gathered if there had been no such fruit growing in the garden of nature or in artificio rei Totum integrale is listed in the number of arising arguments being a symbol of the effect and yet is never so much as charged or accused by M. Hudson or any other that I have heard for non-reality or non-existence We have gained thus much already in pleading the cause of genus that his ortive or derivative nature is no prejudice at all to his real being and existence We cannot deny but that the impressions of other second notions have been extant many thousands of years and what reason have we if we desire to deal impartially to say that genus is not extant because it is a second notion For my part I cannot deny but that it is come abroad in the world as the impression of the first being who is author entium arâ—ium unless I had some spleen against this more then against other second notions to which this if it may have its right is not inferiour PROPOSITION II. Abstractio vel ' {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} est sejunctio {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} The abstraction of the {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} is that whereby the understanding can seperate and sever the arts one from another that are confounded in the {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} which is opus motu â—rtis factum As a Geometrician can take magnitude length breadth and thickness from a body
should then have a mighty dependance upon mens understanding For upon this account if there were no reasonable Creatures having understanding to catch and hold this bird it would imediately make use of its wings and flee as an Eagle out of the world and the compass of beings and vanish into just nothing All universalls would betake themselves to their flight they would all take their leave But if there should be but one rational creature produced in the world they would come flocking in thick and threefold and build their nests in his understanding and being well seated there would out of their emptiness pour out themselves as freely upon their species and make them as real beings as ever they were Genus gives and communicates being to other things i. e. to his species for genus est totum partibus essentiale The essential causes which constitute the essence are comprehended in the genus and the forme Homo est animal rationale Animal a living creature is essential to man It containes part of the essence of man For the definition layeth out all the essentiall causes Reason 6. If there be a community of nature and kindred between beings and general kinds of things in rerum naturâ genus is in rerum naturâ But there is community of nature and kindred between beings and general kinds of things in rerum natura Therefore genus is in rerum naturâ I shut up diverse arguments in one and conclude this question I know no exception against either of the propositions I see no ground to question the first for what is in the genus but community of nature and kindred between beings from the first If therefore some special things have the same nature in common one with another and if there be such neer affinity and kindred between beings there is genus in rerum naturâ If there be general kinds of things varia genera rerum there must be genus for what is genus but the general kinde The minor or second proposition may easily appear What is more evident then this that there is community of nature a kindred between beings and general kinds of things in nature Constant natures as Angels have the same Angelical nature in common one with another divided between them The Elements have one common nature being a kin i. e. of the same generall kinde one with another So likewise have the Elementaries which are made of them All living things are of a kindred Things that live the life of sense are of a neere kindred and those that live the life of reason together with the life of sense have a neer agreement of nature and are neer a kin one to another Iam. 3. 7. {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} {non-Roman} hath been tamed of the humane nature or of mankind as it is in our translation which are both one for the substance all mankind having the same humane nature in common So also there is a kindred of Arts as Cicero speaks he affirms that Poetry is a kin to Oratory because all Arts have a common Viâ—culum and bond and a certain kindred between them by which they are contained and held together c. And that there are diverse general and special kinds of things in nature appeares Gen 1. 11. 12 21 24. There are various kinds of trees as a Viâ—e Fig-tree c. and several kinds of Apple-trees under that general kind Several kinds of living creatures Fishes Birds Beasts and diverse sorts under one kind under the general kind of beasts there are Lyons Horses c. who can reckon up their manifold kinds There is Angel-kind mankind c. All these kinds of things are real things and all other kinds besides mankind were come into the world and had a real being and existence before the understanding of man was created and sitted to receive them They could not exist then in intellectu nostro where could they exist but in rerum natura We have heard of the agreement we are now to speak concerning the difference of totum universale and integrale DIFFERENCE I. The genus is a not of the causes the integrum is a note of the effect genus and species are notes of the causes and effects and integrum and membra are notes of the effect and causes The integrum is a Totum to which the parts are essential they give essence i. e. causes The essential causes are the matter and form therefore these parts give matter and forme to the whole Every member gives a portion of matter and forme and all members make up a common matter and forme of the whole and of the matter and forme of every part is made up the matter and forme of the whole the matter of the whole is made of the matter of the parts and the forme of the forme of the parts And as these contain the matter and forme of the whole so the Genus being essential to the parts containeth the matter and common forme of the species A perfect definition containes all the the essential causes of the thing which are the matter and form the general and proper nature the forme is exprest and the matter is included in the gâ—nus which containes the matter and common forme DIFFERENCE II. The Genus commâ—nicates his whole essence and his whole entire nature to the species Species habet naturam generis integram non universam The entire nature of the genus is in the Species and in this respect tota natura generis conservatur in unâ specie All the entire nature of man was preserved in Adam because the genus is essentiall to its parts it communicates his whole entire essence to every one of them It is not so in integrum there the parts did give their essence to the whole and not the whole to them There therefore the rule is quicquid convenit membrâ— convenit integro because the members were essential to it But the rule here is quicquid convenit generi convenit speciebus because the genus is essential to them And in this respect species recipit generis sui definitionem not in actu signato the definition of the genus is not the definition of the species we must not say species est Genus but in actu exercito as I said that is take any example of genus as Homo is Genus to his individuals and here the definition of homo is communicated to Peter Man is a reasonable creature Peter is a man therefore Peter is a reasonable creature Animal is indued with sense a lyon is animal therefore a lyon is indued with sense Mr Hudson p. 79. doth somwhat dissent from this his expressions are these Though it be said that tota natura generis conservatur in unâ specie and by this rule in uno individuo it must be fundamentaliter only non formaliter for there is no such universality formally in specie multo minis in individuo I