be prov'd that what we maintain is Agreeable to the Course of Natural Causes e'er we ought to think or imagin that God will have any hand in it And if we can prove this we need no Immediate or particular Recourse to God's favouring us by doing This or That to make good our Argument 4. I must deny too consequently to my former Doctrine that Sensible Qualities are nothing in the Objects but Powers to produce various Sensations in us unless it be meant that they have Powers to send out such Effluviums into the Brain by the Senses as imprint their very Natures in our Mind and not barely to produce Motions in our Nerves Nor can I conceive why the Ideas of the Secondary Qualities should have nothing like them existing in the Bodies themselves nor be Resemblances of them If this be true why are they call'd Ideas which either signifies Resemblances or Nothing Again since the Bodies are put to cause them how can we think they are nothing like them Can any Man think the Effect is nothing like the Cause when every Effect can be nothing but a Participation of the Cause or something coming into the Subject from the Efficient which was in it some way or other before Lastly If these Secondary Qualities be compounded of the Primary ones viz. of Solidity Extension Figure and Mobility in our Understanding why should not those Primary Qualities in re as well compound those Secondary ones in the Thing or out of our Understanding And if they do as 't is evident they must since they are all there then why are not those Secondary Ideas full as like those Secondary or Compounded Qualities found in the Thing as the Primary Ideas were like the Primary Qualities in the same Thing and consequently resemble them as well as the others did their proper Originals I much doubt that the Author rather consulted his Fancy in this particular than his good Reason And because those Effluviums or the Figures of Parts which cause our Sensations are too Subtile and Indiscernable to cause Distinct Phantasms of themselves as the Primary ones did but are of a Confus'd Uniformness in Appearance he judges hence they are Nothing like the others Whereas Reason will inform Reflecters that since Colour is nothing but the Surface of a Body as 't is apt to reflect Light the manner of Reflexion found in the Surface of a White Thing which is apt to reflect much Light is to our Reason and in our Notion such as it was in the Thing imprinting it and consequently every thing Acting as it is such as came from it Whence those who by Reflex Thoughts and using their Reason do go about to explain or define the Nature or Notion of Whiteness do make it consist in such a Reflexion of Light bringing Effluviums with it from a Surface so advantagiously Figur'd And so the Notion of Whiteness is the same in the Thing and in the Understanding viz. those Effluviums thus Figur'd or Modified however the Appearance of it in the Fancy reaches not the true Nature of the Thing as 't is White which indeed Fancy never does 5. The Reason why the Pain which we feel is not in the Thing that Caus'd it and Sensible Qualities are so is because these last are Proper Univocal and Immediate Effects of Bodies sending out Effluviums of their own Natures but Pain being an Affection of the Soul springing from a Perception that its dear Compart is hurt and disorder'd is an Improper Remoter and Equivocal Production The Altering Disordering or Spoiling the Temperature or Continuity of the Bodily Parts due to their Nature is as was shewn the Immediate and Proper Effect of those Offensive Agents but 't is Accidental to their manner of Operating that they cause Pain or Pleasure even remotely and it lights only that sometimes they do this because the Subject or the Body in which they produce these their proper Effects haps to be Identified with a Knowing Nature only which is properly capable to Grieve or be Delighted when a Harmful or Pleasing Impression is made on the Body which is Part of the Man and in some sort himself The like is to be said of Manna and other such Instances The Alterations or Disorder made in the Guts and Stomach are Natural Proper and Immediate Effects of it but the Pain ensuing thence which is a Spiritual Disposition of the Mind is a Remote Accidental and Improper Effect of it 6. By this Time Mr. Locke sees that I agree with him that the Bodies in Nature have a Power in them to cause our several Sensations and that this Power is that which we call such a Quality of it But I disagree with him that they are only Powers to cause such a Motion and affirm it is a Power when duly Circumstanced with other Requisites as with Light to convey Visible Qualities Moisture Gustable ones c. to send out Effluviums of their own Nature to the Brain which therefore are Inherent in and Proper Parts of those Objects whether they cause Actual Sensation or no. The Sun sends out his Beams which scatter'd thinly at this remote distance from the Fountain are therefore one of Mr. Locke's Secondary Qualities which we call Light yet contracted by a Burning-Glass they perform the Proper Effect of Fire Burning whence we ought to conclude they are of the Nature of Fire Can we then deny or doubt but that the Body of the Sun which communicates or sends them out is it self Fire or that being such those Rays and the Sun have no Similitude with one another Or that when they strike the Eye they stop there and are not carry'd into the Brain Hippocrates tells us that Omnes partes corporis sunt permeabiles meaning that they are pervious to the Humours which are gross Things in comparison of the Sun-Beams How can it then be doubted but that they reach the Fancy and thence the Soul and imprint their Notions or Natures there And tho' some may deny they are the same in the Mind as they are in Nature yet can it with any Shew of Reason be deny'd they are at all like the Cause that produced them The like Discourse holds in all other Sensible Qualities to what Sense soever they belong 7. To close this Discourse I am apt to think that Mr. Locke intended to oppose those who hold that the Sensible Qualities are a little kind of Distinct Entities Next I declare that tho' the Thing has accidentally a Power in it to make it self perceiv'd yet taking the Thing as an Object as he does it is but Improperly called a Power and not Properly as are our Powers or Faculties of Seeing Hearing Knowing c. are For the Act being the End for which the Power was given the Faculties or Powers are better'd and perfected by being reduced to Act and so there is a real Ground for their being Related to the Object Whereas neither the Object or Thing nor
could it have this Power to alter the Natures of things or turn them from Corporeal into Spiritual when as yet it had no Knowledge at all in it as before those Species were refined and fitted to be received in it it had none Lastly Are those Species they put when purify'd perfectly like the Thing or imperfectly If perfectly like then they are the same with it as our Notions are and so the Thing it self is in the Soul and then those Species of theirs are to no purpose for the Thing being there in Person as it were there can need no Proxy of Species to stand for it nor can it bear any Sense to call the Thing a Species of it self If they be imperfectly like the Thing they are no more but Resemblances of it and then 't is already abundantly demonstrated that the Thing can never be known by them So that they could make nothing cohere how our first Rudiments or Materials of Knowledge could get into the Soul or how the Thing could come to be known by them 5. The Ideists on this Occasion have taken two ways and both of them very short ones which is to skip over all those Difficulties at one Leap The Cartesians tell us in one Word That God gave the Soul her Ideas or as some of them say some of them at the same time he gave her her Being and that by having those Ideas in her she comes to know and so by making this quick work the Question is at an End This is soon said but not so easily proved Some Rubs I have put in the way of this Pretence to hinder its Currency in the Preface to my Method and in the Book it self as Occasion presented and shall add many more in case their Opposition shall invite me to it But what needs any more since Mr. Locke has already Confuted that Position beyond possibility of any Rational Reply Other Ideists there are who think it their best Play to abstract totally from that hard Question and finding by Experience that they have Ideas and Resemblances in their Head when they know they content themselves with That without proceeding to examin distinctly what they are or how they bring us to the Knowledge of the Things in Nature These Men do certainly act more prudently than the former for 't is much more wise and safe in order to the Common Good of Learning to wave an obscure Point totally than by advancing false Positions in a matter of universal Concern in Philosophy to affirm what cannot be maintain'd Tho' I must declare that I cannot see but that such a Fundamental Point which influences the whole Body of Science ought not to be pretermitted For which reason I have thought fit to lay the Grounds for it in the two first Lessons of my Method reserving a more particular Account of it till further Occasion should be presented which seems to offer it self at present 6. Yet I do not judge this Opportunity so pressing or proper as to oblige me to treat such a large Point fully or to set my self to demonstrate and smooth every Step I take in this untrodden and rugged way This of right belongs to that part of Metaphysicks that treats of the Nature of the Soul and particularly as it is the Form of such an Animal Body which may not improperly be called Physicks or Animasticks Besides it were too great a Boldness to pretend to pursue such an abstruse Point quite thorough with Evident Demonstration Yet I think I may promise my Readers that the Positions I shall lay down orderly to clear it will have that Coherence amongst themselves and be so Agreeable to the Natures of Things and to the Maxims of divers other Sciences that it will be hard in just Reason to find any considerable Flaw in it I take my Rise from the remotest Principles that can concern that Point and these are my Thoughts 7. It belongs to the Divine Wisdom to carry on the Ordinary Course of his World by Causes and Effects and on the Matter 's side by Dispositions to further Productions Thus Wood is heated by Degrees e're it becomes Fire and breaks out into a Flame and in the Generation of every thing in Nature there are are many Previous Alterations of the Matter ere it acquires Another Form or becomes Another Thing 8. Wherefore it belongs also to the same Wisdom and Goodness of God as he is the First Cause that if in the Ordinary Course of the World the Subject be dispos'd for something that cannot be compassed by the Power of Second Causes to step in to Nature's Assistance and help her immediately by his own Hand Thus when the Individuality is compleated that is when the Potentiality of the Matter is Ultimately Determin'd and Particulariz'd by Second Causes so that it is become distinct from all other Entities or apt to be This and so fitted for Existence which Existence Second Causes cannot give God whose Generous Bounty stands ever ready to bestow unenviously on his Creatures all the Good they are capable of does give them Existence immediately by himself 9. Therefore if there can be such a Disposition in the Brain of an Embryo that grown riper it is apt as far as is on the Matters side to act Comparatively which is the Disposition for Rationality And that this cannot be done but by having a Form in it of a Superior or Spiritual Nature which Second Causes cannot produce it is certain God will by himself assist it by infusing such a Form 10. There can be such a Disposition in the Brain of an Embryo to work Comparatively that is to Judge and Discourse since we experience that we do this actually now in part by the means of the Brain or something that 's near it or belongs to it 11. Wherefore since this cannot be done without having those Materials in us of which Compounded or Compared we are to Judge and Discourse which we call Simple Apprehensions or Notions it follows that there must be such a Disposition in some Bodily Part as to convey into the Soul such Notions 12. Wherefore since Bodies in their whole Quantity or Bulk cannot be convey'd by the Senses into the Brain the Author of Nature has order'd that all Bodies upon the least Motion of Natural Causes Internal or External which is never wanting should send out Effluviums or most minute and imperceptible Particles which may pass through the Pores of those Peruious Organs called the Senses and so be carried to the Brain 13. This Natural Compound called Man is truly One Thing and not aggregated of more Things Actually Distinct since the Form called the Soul did tho' not so Naturally yet as necessarily follow out of the Disposition of the Matter taking it as Seconded and its Exigency and Deficiency supply'd by the First Cause as the Form of Fire or of any other Body in Nature does out of the
of Humane Nature which abhors Contradiction reclaims vehemently against such an unnatural Depravation of Common Sense as to take is while thus express'd for is not yet taking the meaning of the Word Existence as it is disguised by another Word which is by consequence Equivalent to it those Deserters of Humane Nature the Scepticks do take occasion from the altering the Expression to misapprehend even what is Self-evident For 't is the same Sense when we speak affirmatively to say a thing is True or Certain as to say it is since nothing can be True or Certain that is not and therefore when these Men talk of Moral and Probable Truth and Probable or Moral Certainty which mincing Expressions mean possible not to be so they in effect say that what is may whilst it is possibly not be Which manners of Expression tho' they may seem to some but a meer Unconcerning School-Speculation and Unreflecting Men may think it deserves no other Note but that of being Ridiculous yet I judge my self obliged to declare that it is moreover most enormously Mischievous and that it quite perverts and destroys by a very immediate Consequence the Nature and Notion of all Certainty and Truth whatsoever and of Being too and quite overthrows all possibility of Knowing any thing at all Had they said I think it true or certain none would blame them rather 't is a Credit for such Men even to think heartily there is any Truth or Certainty at all in Philosophy but to joyn as they do Moral or Probable to Truth and Certainty as a kind of Mode affecting them is to clap these most unconsociable Things Light and Darkness into one Dusky Compound to abet Nonsense and palliate Ignorance 4. The Notion immediately next in order to Existence as that which has the very least Potentiality that can be in the Line of Being is that of Ens or Thing Wherefore the meaning of that word can be no other but that of Capable to be for no Created Thing has Actual Being or Existence in its Essential-Notion but of its own Nature may be or not be as besides what 's proved in my Method is seen in the very Notion of Creature which signifies That which has its Being from Another which therefore can of its self be only Capable of Being That the Notion of Ens is distinct from that of Existence is demonstrated elsewhere and is farther evident hence that the Notion of what has Existence must be different from what 's had by it or from Existence it self All Mankind has this Notion of Thing in them for they experience that every Thing can exist by seeing it does so and they know also they are not of themselves whether they hold a first Being or no because they do generally see that Causes produced them Wherefore all that can be said or thought of the word Ens is that it signifies the Thing precisely as 't is Capable of Being 5. Whence follows that the Abstract Terms Entity or Essence do properly signify A Capacity of Being which is the Abstract Term of Capable of Being Tho' Entity is often us'd as a Concrete for the Thing it self Moreover Essence is the Total Form of Ens its Suppositum or Subject which adequately and intirely constitutes it such as Humanitas is the Total Form of Homo I call it the Total Form to distinguish it from the Partial Form of Body which with the Matter its compart do compound the entire Notion or Total Form of Corporeity 6. To understand which more clearly we are to Note that the Notion and Signification of the word Matter signifies the Thing or Body precisely as it is a Power to be a Thing and Form signifies the same Thing according to that in it which determins it to be a Thing Actually We are to reflect too that Power and Act considered in the Line of Being are the same as Matter and Form only the Former words are purely Metaphysical because they express the parts of Ens as Ens in regard no other conceptions in the Line of Being can possibly be framed of a Body but as it is Determinable or Determinative which are the very Notions of Power and Act whereas Matter and Form tho' in Bodies they signify the same as the former seem rather to incline to the parts of such an Ens or Body Physically consider'd 7. To show literally what 's meant by this saying that Matter and Form constitute the compleat Ens or make the Subject capable of Existing I discourse thus Nothing as 't is Indeterminate or Common to more can be ultimately Capable to be v. g neither a Man in Common nor a Horse in Common can possibly exist but This Man or This Horse Whatever therefore does determin the Potentiality or Indifferency of the Subject as it is Matter or which is the same a Power to be of such or such a Nature which is what we call to have such a Form in it does make it This or That and consequently disposes it for Existence Wherefore since the particular Complexion of the several Modes and Accidents do determin the Power or Matter so as to make it Distinct from all others it does by Consequence determin it to be This and so makes it Capable of Existing that is an Ens or Thing I enlarge not upon this Point because I have treated it so amply in the Appendix to my Method to Science 8. Hence is seen what is or can with good Sense be meant by that Metaphysical or Entitative part called by the Schools the Substantial or Essential Form which they say does with the Matter make up that compound Ens call'd Body and that in Literal Truth it can be nothing else but that Complexion of the Modes or Accidents which conspire to make that peculiar or primigenial Constitution of every Body at the first Instant of its being thus ultimately Determin'd to be This. For this Original Temperature of the Mixt or Animal being once settled by the Steady Concurrence of its Causes whatever Particles or Effluviums or how many soever which are Agreeable to it do afterwards accrue to it are so digested into or assimilated to its Nature that they conserve nourish and dilate and not destroy it Whereas if they be of an opposit Nature they alter it from its own temperature and in time quite destroy and corrupt it To explicate which more fully let us consider how the Causes in Nature which are many times of a Different sometimes of a Contrary Temper to the Compound do work upon a Body and how they make as they needs must preternatural Dispositions in it till when those Disagreeable Alterations arrive to such a pitch as quite to pervert the former Complexion of Accidents which we call its Form a new Form or new Complexion succeeds determining the Matter to be Another Thing till it self also wrought upon in the same Manner comes to be Corrupted and so makes
all likewise that is all Bodies or the whole Nature of Body that is the Entire Bulk of Body must be Continued And therefore 't is as great a Contradiction that some Bodies or some Parts of Body should not be Continued or which is the same that there should be a Vacuum as that Triangularity should be in some one Body and yet it should not be Triangular that Whiteness should be in a Wall and yet it should not be White or Unity in a Thing and yet it self should not be Unum This is my Way of Demonstrating against Vacuum within the World to prove and not suppose the World Full or Continued which I draw out of the Abstract Notion of Quantity or of Body consider'd as Quantitative and out of those Notions most Intimately and Essentially Connected with it Which why it should not be as Evident as any Demonstration in Mathematicks or why we cannot draw as clear a Demonstration from the Nature of Quantity in Common as we can from the Nature of such a Quantity I desire any Man who is so wise as to know that all Science and Demonstration do consist in the Connexion of Terms to inform me I say any such Man for if he knows not This it is Impossible he should know any Thing at all in Philosophy or even in Logick and so he is not worth discoursing with 6. Hence is seen that it is impossible that a Sucker in a Pump may draw up Water and yet the next Body not follow We may Fancy it if we please but our Fancy cannot change the Natures of Things It cannot make Continuity not to be Continuity Quantitative Unity not to be such an Unity nor Quantity not to be Quantity any more than his Solidity can be Non-Solidity or the Parts of Body penetrate one another Had Mr. Locke had a Notion of Space taken indifferently from Body and something that 's not Body as we have of Sensitiveness from Man and Brute he might in that Case have fram'd an Abstract Notion of it Common and Indifferent to Body and Vacuum for then it had been grounded on the Thing and had been a solid and true Notion but since he had the Idea or Notion of Space from Body only and therefore as was largely prov'd above it could be of nothing else but of Body thus Modified it must be confin'd to Body with which as all Modes are it is Identified and therefore the Idea or Notion of it can never be applicable to what is not a Body REFLEXION Fourth ON The Seventh and Eighth CHAPTERS 1. HAving already shewn that our only Simple Notion is that of Existence I have no Occasion to make any Remarks on his 7th Chapter but that 't is highly Commendable in the Author to reduce his Speculations to Piety and Contemplation This being not only our Duty but that Best End to which all Solid Speculation naturally leads us 2. As for his 8th Chapter I grant that all the Ideas or Notions we have are Positive in the Understanding at least in part but the Reason of it is because they do all of them include the Thing as 't is thus consider'd without which we could have no Ideas of Privations or Negations at all For Non-Ens formally as such or as totally Excluding Ens can have no Intelligibility nor consequently any Notion by which we can understand it And Privations differ from Negations only in this that they include in their Notion a Capacity of the Subjects having such or such a Mode annex'd to its not having it which Capacity clearly Connotates the Thing since there cannot be a Capacity without some Thing that is Capable or has that Capacity Add that I see not how Ideas being Resemblances an Idea consider'd by us as a Positive real Being can ever resemble or represent Privations they being of at least Subcontrary Natures What I hold is that when we conceive a Thing as having some Privation in it the Idea of it is partly Positive partly Privative and the Material Part of it is the Thing the Formal as Privative or as thus Modify'd For Ideas I mean Notions of Privations without including the Thing are Unconceivable and Impossible as whoever looks into their Definition will discern clearly Of this Nature in Common are all the Notions we have of the Modes or Accidents no Notion being truly or perfectly Positive but that of Ens or Thing I cannot grant that our Ideas or Notions or even Phantasms are caus'd in us by meer Motions continued from our Senses to the Brain or the Seat of Sensation but must judge for the Reasons alledg'd above that this is perform'd by those Imperceptible Bodies there spoken of or by the Effluviums themselves convey'd thither and afterwards lodged there In embracing which Opinion of our Knowledge being wrought by meer Motions made by the Objects his Excellent Wit suffers it self to be led astray by our Moderns His Reason which I conceive is also theirs is because it is not more impossible to conceive that God should annex such Ideas to such Motions than Pain to a piece of Steel dividing the Body with which that Idea has no Resemblance How unlike a Reason this is appears at first fight and I am sure this Parallel has no Resemblance at all with the Thing it is brought for I know of no Annexing the Idea of Pain to a piece of Steel but must think 't is a most highly extravagant Conceit The Business passes thus in Nature A piece of Steel being Denser and withall sharp is a proper Cause of Dividing the Body the Dividing of it is a proper Cause of its being disorder'd and render'd unable to assist the Soul or the Man in his necessary Operations This breeds naturally a Conception in the Soul or the Man that he is hurt which Naturally produces in the Knower who is highly concern'd in it Grief or Pain So that all is here carry'd on by a Train of proper Causes to proper Effects and needs no Annexing by God more than to conserve the Order of Second Causes which himself has establish'd On the other side there is no Natural Resemblance of such a Motion to such an Idea as is confess'd nor is the former a Proper Cause of the other which puts them to have recourse to this Voluntary Annexion to them by God Add that it is an odd kind of Argument to alledge that it is not impossible to conceive that God may do this or that without proving he has done it Nor is it at all allowable in Philosophy to bring in a Deus è Machinâ at every turn when our selves are at a loss to give a Reason for our Thesis Nor is it to be expected that God will alter the Nature of Things for the Interest of any Man's Tenet but since his Wisdom in his Ordinary Government of the World carries on the Course of it according to the Nature of Second Causes it must first
all its parts Continued or Coherent as Duality does make a Stone and a Tree formally Two or Rotundity in a Body makes it Round or any other Formal Cause is engag'd by its very Essence to put its Formal Effect which would induce a Clear Contradiction if it should not 10. 'T is not in this Occasion only but in many others too that Great Scholars puzzle their Wits to find out Natural Causes for divers Effects the true Reason for which is only owing to Trans-natural ones or from these Altissimae Causae which only Metaphysicks give us and it happens also not seldom that Men beat their Brains to find out Efficients for that which depends only on Formal Causes whose most certain Causality depends on no Second Causes but only on the First Cause God's Creative Wisdom which establish'd their Essences to be what they are Let any one ask a Naturalist why Rotundity does formally make a Thing Round and you will see what a Plunge he will be put to not finding in all Nature a Proper Reason for it The same in other Terms is the Ground of Mr. Locke's Perplexity how Extended Parts do cohere to which the properest and most Satisfactory Answer is because there is Quantity in them which is Essentially Continued and so does Formally give Coherence of Parts to Body its Subject By the same means we have a Clear Reason afforded us why Bodies impell one another which Mr. Locke thinks is Inexplicable For putting one Body to be thrust against another the Body that is Passive must either be shov'd forwards or there must necessarily be Penetration of Parts unless perhaps at first the Impulsive Force be so slight and leisurely that it is able to cause only some Degree of Condensation Every thing therefore acting as it is if the Body or the Quantity of it be Extended or have one Part without the other and therefore it be impossible its Parts should be penetrated or be one within the other the Motion of the Passive Body must necessarily ensue 11. To proceed Mr. Locke makes account we have as clear a Knowledge of Spirits as we have of Bodies and then argues that we ought no more to deny the Existence of Those than of These Which I should like well did he maintain and prove first that the Nature of Bodily Substances is clearly Intelligible But to make those Notions which are most Essential and Proper to Bodies and most Obvious of all others viz. their Entity or Substance and their Extension to be Unintelligible and then to tell us that The Idea of Spiritual Natures are as Clear as that of Bodily Substance which he takes such pains to shew is not Clear at all is as I conceive no great Argument for their Clearness nor their Existence neither but rather a strong Argument against both The Parallel amounting to this that we know not what to make either of the one or of the other 12. As for the Knowledge we have of Spiritual Natures my Principles oblige me to discourse it thus We can have no Proper or Direct Notions of Spiritual Natures because they can make no Impressions on our Senses yet as was shewn above our Reflexion on the Operations and Modes which are in our Soul make us acknowledge those Modes are not Corporeal and therefore that the Immediate Subject of those Modes our Soul is not a Body but of another nature vastly different which we call Spiritual Our Reason assures us also by demonstrating that the first Motion of Bodies could neither proceed immediately from God nor from our Soul which presupposes both that and many other Motions to her Being that there must be another sort of Spiritual Nature distinct from our Soul from which that Motion proceeds which therefore being Active and so in Act it self is not a Compart but a Whole and Subsistent alone which we call Angels Their Operations prove they have Actual Being and therefore a fortiori they are capable to be or Things Whence we must correct our Negative Expressions of them by our Reason and hold they are Positive Things all Notions of Thing being Positive Farther we can as evidently discourse of those Beings or Things tho' Negatively express'd as we can of any Body v. g. if an Angel be Non-quantus we can demonstrate it is Non-extensus Non-locabilis c. and from its having no Matter or Power which is the Ground of all Potentiality and Change 't is hence collected that 't is a Pure Act and therefore that once Determin'd it is Immutable at least Naturally Lastly I affirm that this presupposed we can discourse far more clearly of Spirit than of Bodies For there are thousands of Accidents belonging intrinsecally or extrinsecally to every Individual Body whence all our Confusion and Ignorance of it comes whereas in a Pure Spirit there are only three or four Notions viz. Being Knowledge Will and Operation for us to Reflect on and Manage and therefore the Knowledge of them is as far as this Consideration carries more Clearly attainable than is the Knowledge of Bodies REFLEXION Fourteenth ON The 24th 25th 26th and 27th CHAPTERS 1. THE 24th Chapter Of the Collective Ideas of Substance gives me no Occasion to reflect Only when he lays as it were for his Ground that the Mind has a Power to compare or collect many Ideas into one I am to suppose he means that the Mind does not this of her self alone without the Joint-acting of the Body as has been often prov'd above for otherwise the whole or the Man cannot be said to be the Author of that Action 2. The 25th Chapter gives us the true Notion of Relation and very clearly express'd which he seconds with divers other Solid Truths viz. That some Terms which seem Absolute are Relatives that Relation can be only betwixt two Things and that All things are capable of Relation What I reflect on is that he gives us not the true Difference between Real and meerly Verbal Relations nor the true Reason why some Relative Terms have and others have not Correlates He thinks the Reasons why we call some of them ExtrinsecalDenominations which is the same with Verbal Relations proceed from Defect in our Language or because we want a Word to signifie them Whereas this matters not a Jot since we can have the Idea or Notion of Relation in our Minds if we have good Ground for it whether we have a Word to signifie it or no or rather if we have a Real Ground for it we shall quickly invent either some one Word or else some Circumlocution to express it Let us see then what our Principles in this Affair say to us 3. Relation is not here taken for our Act of Relating for then it would belong to another common Head of Notions call'd Action but for the Thing as it is referred by our Comparative Power to another Wherefore there must be some Ground in the Thing for our thus referring in
Judicious Decision of this Point Of the Extent of our Knowledge settles the Golden Mean between both I have endeavour'd in my Method B. 1. Less 2. to § 12. to establish from Clear Grounds the Just Pitch of our Knowledge in this State Mr. Locke does with his usual Candour attempt to do the same in his Way Concerning which I am to give him my Thoughts which are these 11. There is no doubt but we have less Knowledge than we might have had through our Want of some Notions as also for want of discerning the Agreement or Disagreement of them in the same Thing No doubt too but Intuitive Knowledge which is only of Self-evident Truths cannot reach to all that belongs to our Notions or Ideas and that we too often want proper Mediums to connect those Notions in order to Demonstration As also that our Sensitive Knowledge I suppose he means that which is had by Experiments does not reach very far otherwise our Senses giving us as we do both of us hold all the First Natural Notions we have I believe it cannot be deny'd but that they give us withall the Ground of all our Knowledge Whence I cannot see why he limits Sensitive Knowledge to the Notion of Existence onely or that our Senses do make us know onely that a Thing is For certainly our Senses do as well tell us the Wall is white as that the Wall is tho' in proper Speech it does neither but by means of our Mind comparing the Notions of the two Terms given us by the Object in order to the seeing their Co-existence in the Thing All they do is to give us our Notions which the Soul that is the Man according to his Spiritual Part compounds into a Proposition and so frames a Judgment of the said Co-existence or Inconsistency of those Terms or which is the same of what is signify'd by them in the same Thing Nor do I think Mr. Locke will much deny any of this however we may express our selves diversly 12. 'T is very true that our Experience gives us some Light to know what Qualities do belong to such Substances yet I cannot think it impossible to know this very often a priori by Demonstrative Reason tho' we do not know the Constitution of the Minute Parts on which those Qualities do depend much less do I judge that tho' we did not know them yet we could not discover any necessary Connexion between them and any of the Secondary Qualities he means those Qualities which are the Objects of our Senses Nor do I wonder Mr. Locke thinks thus because he does all along pitch his Thoughts on the Corpuscularian Hypothesis as on that which in some Men's Opinion goes farthest in an Intelligible Explication of the Qualities of Body Now my Judgment is that 't is demonstrable that the Principles of the Corpuscularians cannot possibly give Account of the Constitution either of the Minute Parts or of the least Atom nor consequently of any Body in Nature or which is the Proper Work of a Philosopher refund any Quality into its Proper Causes I mean such Causes as they can prove to be such or must be such however they may fancy them to be such by allowing to themselves Voluntary Suppositions for Principles I have shewn in my Appendix to my Method that the most Celebrated of the Corpuscularian Philosophers the Cartesians cannot know the Constitution of the most minute Part of any of their Elements since they can never tell us by their Grounds the Primary Qualities of their First Matter of which their three Elements and consequently all Natural Bodies are made To shew we can I will give a short Summary of the Aristotelian Doctrine in this particular truly represented and cleared from the Mis-conceits of some late School-men 13. 'T is confess'd and Evident that Quantity is the Primary Affection of Body of which re-modify'd as I may say all Qualities are made We can shew that by it Body is Divisible and therefore Quantity for that and and many other Reasons is Divisibility especially taking it as consider'd Physically however taking it as capable to be Measur'd Proportion'd and Figur'd as Mathematicians do it may not very unfitly be called Extension But take it as I said as affecting Bodies in order to Natural Action and Passion in which the Course of Nature consists as a Natural Philosopher ought to consider it and 't is Divisibility or a Capacity to be divided by those Causes Nor can the Greatest Cartesian deny this since he grants that the First Operation in Nature is the making their three Elements by Grinding as it were or dividing their First Matter Proceeding by immediate Steps we are to seek out the first Sorts of this Divisibility and this must be done by finding the most Simple Intrinsecal Differences of that or any other Notion which can only be more and less of the Common Notion Now more and less of Divisibility Consider'd in order to Natural Agents is the same as to be more easily and less easily Divisible by by those Agents which we call to be Rare and Dense Rarity therefore and Density do constitute the Simplest Sorts or Kinds of Bodies And since it is inconceivable that Matter should be divided at all by Second Causes but the Divider must be more Dense or more able to divide than the Matter that is to be divided by it it follows that Rare and Dense Bodies were originally such or that there were Created at first some sorts of Bodies that are more and others that were less divisible as is clearly express'd in the two first Verses of Genesis And Reason abets it for otherwise the Course of Nature consisting in Motion could never have been Connaturally made because had all the Parts of Matter been equally Divisible there could be no Reason why one part of the Matter should be the Divider rather than the other and so there could have been no Motion nor consequently any Course of Nature at all 14. By the Division of Rare Bodies by Dense ones and the Division of their first Compounds the Number of Parts increasing there naturally follow'd the various Size and the Grossness and Minuteness of those Parts as also their various Figures Situations c. All which contribute to compound the Species and Individuums Of these variously mingled and remingled all the rest are made From Simple Division two Things are made of one whence follows the Individual Diversity of Bodies according to the Notion of Substance or Ens. More Accidents are as was said before still taken in to make the Subaltern Genera and Species even to the lowest Sort or Kind and innumerably more of them to distinguish and constitute Individual Bodies 15. To come a little nearer our main Point unless those Qualities Rarity and Density which are the Primary ones be admitted the World could never have been form'd connaturally nor the Course of Nature carried on because as was now shewn in
that Supposition there would have been no Motion For Motion of Material Entities is perform'd by the Intervening of the Parts of the one between the Parts of the other and so Dividing it which is impossible unless the one had been Rarer or more yielding the other Denser or less yielding But this once settled 't is evident from the very Terms that there are Proper Causes both on the Agent 's and Patient's Side for the one's Dividing and the other's being Divided For the Rare being more Divisible than the Dense 't is demonstrable that the Dense being impell'd against the Rare by Motion which comes from a Superior Agent the Rare being more Divisible will give way and be divided by the Dense which is clearly impossible in the Corpuscularian Hypothesis which puts all Parts of their Matter to be equally Rare or Dense or rather as the Cartesians do neither Rare nor Dense all Qualities according to them being made by mingling their three Elements which Elements are themselves made by and presuppose the Motion of their First Matter Whereas yet it is impossible to conceive but those Parts of that Matter must be either Rare or else Dense at least to some Degree And as denying the Rarity and Density in the First Bodies does by making Motion impossible put the Course of Nature out of Frame both in its Beginning and Progress so it utterly destroys all Demonstration in Physicks which is grounded on Mediums from Proper Causes and Proper Effects 16. Passing over many Immediate Steps which shew how those Four Principal Qualities Heat Cold Moisture and Driness are made of Rarity and Density acted upon by the common Causes in Nature we come to shew how these two Primary Qualities do constitute many Secondary ones and how these last are refunded into the other as their Proper Causes and therefore are Demonstrable by them as by their Proper Mediums A few Instances may serve as Hints to explicate others That great Pellucidity in the Air is necessarily and properly refunded into its extream Divisibility or Rarity by which it becomes easily penetrable in all its Parts by those Spicula Ignea the Rays of the Sun and Opacity for the same Reason is the Proper Effect of Density which hinders its Subject from being penetrated or Divided by them whence also it is a Proper Cause of Repelling or Reflecting them Again Who sees not that Liquidity which makes its Subject easily yielding to be flatted evenly as we see in Ponds or driven to run into Cavities by the common Motion of Gravitation is a proper Effect of Rarity as Consistency is of Density Spissitude is a Constipation of Dense Parts or the Want of Pores to admit the Ingress of other Bodies Grossitude is clearly nothing but Density in a bigger Quantity of its Parts Friability is refunded into great Dense Parts and very large Rare ones Whence those Rare Parts which were they less would better cement those Parts together being now very large and withal very Divisible are easily divided and consequently the Body is soon shatter'd As we find in Dry Clods out of which while they were yet Wet Dirt those Parts which were Watry being drawn by Heat large Cavities are left which the Air now possesses On the other side Ductility and Malleability are the Effects of the very smallest Rare Parts finely compacted with the minutest Dense ones Those Small Dense Parts so closely woven and in a manner Contiguous keep the Rare from evaporating and the Rare by being such and interwoven with the Dense all over make the Compound yield to Expansion without Breaking being very small are not easily separable and yet tho' rarify'd farther by the subtilest Agent Fire they render it Fusible 17. Were these Principles which I rawly and briefly touch on here pursu'd by Learned Men with Immediate Consequences which true Logick assisting is far from impossible the Nature of those first-mixt Qualities and by their means of many others would not be very hard to explicate But if Men are resolv'd to neglect all Natural Principles and the Intrinsecal Constitution of the First Bodies in Nature and will needs run upon nothing but Mathematical Notions which pre-suppose those Principles nor could be found in Nature unless the other be first admitted or Division made Possible for neither Parts nor consequently Figures of Parts could be made without Division nor Division unless some Bodies were naturally apt to divide others to be divided that is unless some were Rare others Dense or if instead of demonstrating their Natural Principles by the Superiour Science they will needs have recourse to Voluntary Suppositions and violate the Nature of Causality and of the Deity it self by making him whose Proper Effect he being Essentially Self-existence is to give Existence or create to be the Proper and Immediate Cause of Motion and go about to prove Ignotum per Ignotissimum by supposing as they sometimes do that God wills this or that which is for the Interest of their Tenet and too hard to prove If I say Men are resolv'd to follow such Untoward Methods 't is no Wonder Science does not advance but the World is detain'd in Ignorance of many things which otherwise it might know Did Learned Men set themselves to carry forwards the Grounds of Nature in Euclides Physicus where they will find Demonstrations enow to farther Conclusions with the same Zeal as they do the Mathematicks I doubt not but the Evident Truths which would by Degrees disclose themselves would both encourage and enable them to make a farther Progress in Knowledge nor would the Science of Second Qualities about which Physical Demonstrations ought in great part be employ'd be held so Desperate But to leave these Discourses and apply my self to Mr. L. I cannot but wonder that amongst all his Ideas of Qualities he not so much as once mentions as far as I remember those two Chiefest ones of Rarity and Density tho' nothing is more obvious in the whole Course of Nature than these are Which with many other Reasons makes me think he had not seen or at least well weigh'd the true Aristotelian System which he might have seen in Sir Kenelm Digby's Treatise of Bodies and its Latin Preface as also in Institutiones Peripateticae but took it as represented by the Modern Schools For my self I must declare I verily judge that the Grounds I here insist on are the only true ones that a Natural Philosopher can have that they are Demonstrable and I do offer my self to maintain them to be such if it shall please any Learned Objector to attempt to show these Principles Faulty or that we build on any Supposition at all and not on what 's either Self-evident or easily and immediately Reducible to Self-evidence Which I believe no other Sect of Philosophers did ever so much as pretend to 18. To come to those Qualities which are the Formal Object of our Senses called by Mr. Locke Secondary Qualities I
being such as were we awake and had our rational fears about us we neither durst attempt nor could possibly perform without extream hazard But not to insist on these let us reflect on our selves even when perfectly awake and we shall discover that however we are set on work by Motives or Reasons yet we know not at all how the outward parts of our Body only which we experience in Brutes and ground the conceit of their having Knowledge upon them do perform any of their Operations What Man living though supposed the wisest much less the Generality knows how or by what passages he is to send Animal Spirits into the Muscles whence all our Motion proceeds or into what Muscles or what quantity of them is requisit to do such an Outward Action What Feats of Activity does a Rope-dancer show us How many ways does he distort wind turn poize stretch and ply the parts of his Body To do which the Animal Spirits are to be sent now into this now into that Muscle to move this or this or that Limb or Joint sometimes great quantity of them to make a vehement or quick Motion sometimes fewer to move them more moderately sometimes none at all into any of them when he has a mind to surcease all Motion and sit still Yet he knows no more than a Brute or a Stone does how he is to do any of this nor can give the least account how it is done All this is transacted by the wise Contrivance of the Body which is so framed as to be subservient to the Design the Man as he is Knowing and Rational had projected And the same is done in Brutes when either actual Impressions are made upon them from the Objects or those former Impressions are again excited in the Brain which done all the frisking motions of Pursuance and Avoidance which they perform do follow by a Course of Natural or Material Causes and withal according to those measures and degrees as are proportioned to the Efficacy of the first impellent Cause the Object in their Imagination the Agreeableness or Disagreeableness of which to the Nature of the Animal is that which sets all the Engine on work at first 11. Nor can the Objection bear any force that some Actions of Brutes resemble Reason even though it seems more then is found in Men since we experience that a Watch which is the work of an Artificer performs the Operations proper to it and tells us the time of the day with more exactness than the best Reason we have can do without such helps So that the Watches acting according to reason demonstrates indeed there was Reason in the Framer of it but argues none at all in the Engine it self Wherefore however the Actions of some Brutes may bear a show of Reason this can only argue that they are the workmanship of a Rational or Wise Maker but not that themselves acted knowingly or rationally while they did these Actions For my self I must declare that I have as much admired the wisdom shewn in the Action of a young Vine exerting and twisting its little Fingers about other things near it to support it self as it grew up as all the forementioned Circumstances weighed and abated at any Operation of a Brute and I doubt not but a Campanella who maintained that every thing in Nature had perception or some such other man of fancy would discourse and descant on it thus The poor week limber Vine knew and was well aware that not being able to support it self it would when it increast in length fall down flat on the ground and so be exposed to be trampled under foot and hurt and therefore did very prudently cling about other Vegetables or Poles near it to sustain it self and avoid that inconvenience And I dare affirm that we lose the best part of our Natural Contemplation by putting Brutes to have Knowledge for what wonder is there that such things as have a knowing Power in them should know or who admires it in a Man Whereas it justly raises our mind to high Admiration and Adoration of the Divine Artificer to see things which are made of meer Matter act with as much Wisdom and Prudence for their own preservation as the wisest Knower can by his best Wit of which he is so proud and sometimes with much more No doubt but the growth and operations of dull Vegetables do administer to devout Reflecters occasions of very high Contemplation and shall the Operations of sensitive Beings which are incomparably more excellent and more admirable as being the Top and Master-piece of this Material World afford little or none at all Now if their Nature be to have Knowledge in them and it be a thing common to all Creatures and expected that GOD should give to every thing what is its Nature there is little or no particular ground for our wonderment GOD has given Brutes a Knowing Power and that Power makes them know and there 's an end of our Admiration and consequently of our Contemplation and of that devout Admiration to which our Astonishment at the several Actions of those Natural Automata would otherwise raise us 12. I beg pardon for this long digression I thought fit to dilate thus largely on this point both because it is a very concerning and useful Preliminary as also to manifest how the using the word Idea hand over head as we may say and taking it Equivocally and indifferently for Phantasms and Notions leads this Great Man as it must needs have done every Man into great mistakes For Phantasms Beasts may indeed have they being no more but Effluuiums emitted from other Bodies and received by the portalls of the Senses into the Brain where the Animal Spirits stand readily waiting to move the Brute according as those Tinctures are agreeable or disagreeable to the Compound but Notions or which is the same Meanings or Apprehensions they cannot have for these being made by Direct Impressions upon our Spiritual part the Mind only which can mean or apprehend to judge they have any such would conclude they had a Spiritual and consequently an Immortal part in them which I am sure we shall both of us deny Besides had they Meanings or were capable of any they would be capable of the Meanings of our Words at least those amongst them which are most Docil and could Speak would not fail if well taught and educated to know much of our Language and Answer in some few occasions Pertinently which none of them ever did designedly and if they hap to do so by accident none thinks they meant as they spoke but all mankind laughs at the odd Chance as at a pleasant Jest. Those that teach them might point at the things when they pronounce their Names as Nurses do to little Infants and why might not Beasts learn them as well as Children at least learn as much in many years as they do in two or three Indeed some Words and
Dispositions properly Previous to that Form And therefore does as truly by Informing that Matter Make or constitute the Man One Thing as any other Corporeal Form does any Body in Nature 14. Therefore there must be some Chief Corporeal Part in Man which is immediately united with the Soul as the Matter with its Form and therefore is Primarily Corporeo-Spiritual and includes both Natures Whence when that Part is affected after its peculiar Nature Corporeally the Soul is affected after its Nature that is Spiritually or Knowingly which Part Cartesius thinks is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Glandula Pinealis 15. Therefore the Manner how and the Reason why those Corporeal Effluviums do come to affect the Soul and cause in her Spiritual Notions of the Thing is because of the immediate Identification of the Matter and Form in that part whence follows that the one cannot be affected but the other must be affected too after its Different manner proper to its Distinct Nature In the same manner abating the Diversity peculiar to each of those Natures as when the Matter of Wood is wrought upon the Form of it or the Complexion of Accidents making up one Thing with it does also suffer Change Whence by the way is seen the Reason of that received Maxim that Actiones Passiones sunt suppositorum So that 't is the whole Thing which acts or suffers tho' according to this or that Part of it and hence it is that the Whole Thing is conceiv'd tho' by an Inadequate Notion we conceive but but one Part of it as it were distinctly 16. This Part immediately inform'd by the Soul as 't is Spiritual which we will call the Seat of Knowledge must whatever it is be of a Temper the most Indifferent to all Bodies and to their several Modes as can be conceived and as far as Matter can bear Abstract from them all both that it may be connaturally more sensible of the Different Effluviums by which their several Natures are to be understood as also more fit to beget in the Soul Universal Notions such as are those of Ens or Being by which all the Negotiation of our Interiour Acts of Judging and Discoursing is managed Tho' I am apt to judge that those General Notions are also caus'd when the Impression is Confused or Indistinct as those of Ens or Being are and the same is to be said of the Rest in proportion Thus when we see a Thing a-far off and have but a Confused View of it it only appears to us to be something we know not particularly what or A Thing without making us know in the least what Kind of Thing or Body it is Afterwards coming nearer we discern it moves it self whence we gain the Notion of a Living Thing Then approaching still nearer we by a more distinct Impression know 't is a Horse And lastly when it is within convenient Distance to give us a perfectly Distinct View of it we know 't is such a Particular Horse of our own 17. That Part called the Seat of Knowledge must moreover be the most Sensible and the most Tender that can be imagin'd that as was said the least Effluviums may affect it And yet it must not be of a Glutinous Nature so as to entangle them and make them stick there but that reverberated thence they may light in some near adjacent place to serve by their renewed Impulses afterwards for the Use of Memory and to excite again former Knowledges as also as will be shewn to cause Reflex Acts. That it must not be in the least Glutinous appears hence evidently that did the Effluviums stick there we should whether we would or no perpetually contemplate or think of those Objects which would also hinder our Perception of others by mingling the former Effluviums with those which supervene 18. The orderly disposure of the world by Gradual steps arising from less perfect Natures to those which are more Noble and more Perfect does evince that this Part call'd the Seat of Knowledge is the most Supremely Noble production of Material things and nearest ally'd as it were to Spiritual Nature that can be imagin'd so that all the best Perfections that are to be found in Corporeal things are center'd in it Whence tho' it is too rude to affirm with a certain learned Physician that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is a baser part of Man's Body than the Intestinum Rectum yet I cannot approve of Cartesius his Conceit that it is a Glandule which is one of the Ignoblest parts we have but judge it has a peculiar Temperature of its own not only specifically distinct from other parts but that they are scarce in any degree to be parallell'd to it 19. Whether amongst its other Special Qualities it partakes of the Nature of those Bodies which in the dark do reflect Light and that the Glossy and Lively Appearances and Resemblances which we call Fancies or Phantasms do spring thence I leave to others to determin I think it is the Interest of those who make the Septum Lucidum to be the Seat of Knowledge to embrace that Opinion 20. Those Effluviums sent out from Bodies have the very Natures of those Bodies in them or rather are themselves Lesser Bodies of the Self-same Nature as the smallest imperceptible parts of Bread and Flesh are truly Bread and Flesh which are cut off by Natural Agents from the great Lump and therefore by Application of themselves they imprint the very Body it self or a Body of that Nature on that material part which is the Seat of Knowledge Whence the Soul being at the same time affected after her manner or Knowingly as that part was affected she has also the very Nature of that Body as far as the Sense exhibits it put in her by that conformable Impression when she has a Notion of it 21. Therefore those Effluviums striking the Seat of Knowledge and immediately as has been said falling off from it do affect it as a Thing distinct from the Mâ—n For they are not there as belonging at all to the Intrinsecal Constitution of the Body but as meer strangers to it Whence the Soul has the Nature of that Body in her and consequently is that Body as 't is another Thing from her which illustrates the Explication of knowing given formerly and that 't is to be another thing as it is another 22. The Reason why those Effluviums containing the Essence or Nature of the Bodies whence they flow do not breed a Notion in the Soul of their whole Essences is because they are convey'd to that part by many different Conduits the Senses which being diverse and each of them according to their circumstances apt to be affected diversely do therefore receive and imprint them after a different Manner For example those which by the smart motion of the Ayr do come in thro' the Drum of the Ear and consequently by the Auditory Nerve which
Philosophers think the Object being gone that Motion would quickly cease Nor could the same Motion be connaturally reviv'd but by the same Object which is seldom at hand to make it again as oft as we have occasion to remember as Experience shows us Much less could the Remembrance of Sounds or Tunes in Man or Birds be possibly explicated unless those repell'd Atoms lying in Order and striking afresh the Auditory Organ did repeat the same Impression they had formerly For to put Millions of Motions to continue perpetually playing in the Fancy and as they needs must interfering with one another would destroy all Harmony and breed a strange jarring Confusion Note that Reminiscence is oft-times made in us by using our Reason gathering or recollecting former Notions by others that orderly succeeded them in the same manner as we investigate Causes from their Effects Whereas in Brutes it is performed meerly by a new Appulse of the former Atoms to that part in which the Imagination consists which being the most supreme in the Animal has a Power to Agitate the Animal Spirits and move the Body agreeably to those Impressions as is found also in Man 29. The same Excitation of those particles thus imbu'd causes also Reflex Knowledge of our former Operations And indeed Reflexion on our past thoughts is the same as Remembrance of them for we can neither Reflect on a Thing without Remembring it nor Remember it without Reflecting on it But this Reflexion for the reason lately given must proceed from some Object or Cause Extraneous to the Soul that is from Effluviums in the Memory thus reexcited For it is to be noted that as Divines or rather Christian Faith tell us that Christ having two distinct Natures in the same Suppositum all his Operations proper to him as such were therefore Theanthropicae or such as were agreeable and belonging to both the Divine and Humane Natures So Man consisting of both a Corporeal and Spiritual Nature and thence being a Corporeo-Spiritual Thing all his Operations for the same Reason must be Corporeo-Spiritual Whence he has no Act purely Spiritual or uncompounded with the Co-operation of that Corporeal Part which receives those Effluviums call'd by us Fancy or without it's Concurrence Which gives us farther Light to see how our Soul cannot reflect on her own Operations but the Fancy must go along and by what 's said it will be easie to conclude from which of those parts the Operation must begin anew viz. from that part from which it did begin at first Hence came that Saying of the Schools That the Soul has Notions or knows Speculando Phantasmata which are pretty Fanciful Words and tho' they may perhaps have a good Meaning yet 't is very unphilosophically express'd For it makes the Soul to speculate which if it have any Sense at all signifies to know the Phantasms or Ideas in the Imagination when as yet she has no Knowledge in her at all All her Notions which are the first Elements of Knowledge being caus'd in her by those Effluviums previously to her Knowing either them or any thing else 13. From what 's said above 't is seen that those Direct Notions which are thus naturally imprinted are Common to all Mankind in the main however they may in each Man differ in some Degree and consequently the Words we agree on to express those Natural Notions are for the same reason Proper Words whereas those Notions made by meer Reflexion as are those of Spiritual Natures are therefore Improper as having no proper Phantasms to imprint them connaturally on the Mind whence also the Words that express them are such as are taken or Translated from Natural Objects and therefore they are Improper or Metaphorical 31. From this exact Distinctness of our Notions even to an Indivisible or from this that one of them is not another our Mind has an Appendage of a Negation tack'd to every Notion so that it becomes very familiar to her whence she can have a Negative Notion of every thing she conceives while the considers it as limited or reaching thus far and no farther or being This and no other Of which Nature are all the Modes of Ens they being limited Conceptions of it no Notion being perfectly Positive but that of Ens or Being 32. Hence the Soul can have also the Notions of Indivisibility Immortality Immensity and innumerable such like But it is very specially to be remark'd that we can have no Notions of those Negatives as taken abstractedly from the Thing or Subject for otherwise Non Entities formally as such might be the Object of the Understanding which is impossible for Nothing formally as such I add nor Vacuum can have no Effluviums sent from it to the Brain nor consequently any Intelligibility nor can any possible Notion be fram'd of it Wherefore Baldness signifies the Head quatenus having no Hair on it Blindness the Eye quatenus having no Sight Immensity the Thing quatenus not capable to be measured c. Hence 33. The Notion we have of Nothing or Non Ens is only that of Ens in it's whole Latitude with a Negation annexed to it in the same manner as in particular Entities Incorporeal signifies non Corpus or as Indivisible signifies Non-Quantum c. 24. Hence it is that we come to conceive and sometimes express Non Ens as an Ens as Grammarians do when they define a Noun to be the Name of a Thing and yet make Nihil which signifies Nothing a Noun Subjective and put Adjectives to it Whence Philosophers must take very great Care lest seduced by our manner of Conceiving Non-Ens as a Thing they come to fancy or judge it to be formally something as do the Asserters of Vacuum and too many others in like Occasions For then I beg their Pardon for my Plainness their Discourses upon it can be no wiser than are those Ingenious Verses made to shew how rare a Thing Nothing is nor indeed so wise For those Poets did this Ludicrously to shew their Wit but these do it Seriously and make account that in doing so they shew their Skill and Wisdom which I must think is meer Folly 35. The Notions of Genus Species Subject Predicate and generally of all Terms of Art which are not Fantastick but wisely conducing to clear and range our Notions in Order to gain Science are Nothing but several Abstract Notions of the Thing precisely considered according to some Manner of Being it has in our Understanding For Animal and Homo are evidently Abstract or Inadequate Notions of Peter taking him as he exists in Nature But when we call Animal a Genus or Homo a Species or when in this Proposition Petrus est Homo we say Petrus is the Subject and Homo the Predicate we speak of them precisely as they exist in the Understanding For in Nature or out of the Understanding there can be no Universals but only Individuals none
on his attributing Knowledge to Brutes about which I have been too large already He denies indeed that they have the power of Abstracting or of having General Ideas But if they have true Knowledge or any more than King David meant when he says The Sun knows his going down I see no reason why they may not have General Notions and Abstract and Compare too For if they have any Degree of Reason as he grants they have they may do all this and I am sure and have already shown their Outward Actions do as much countenance their having Reason as any signs they give us do shew that they cannot Abstract or have General Ideas since General Ideas as every good Reflecter may observe are nothing but Imperfect Ideas of the Thing and in a Thousand occasions the Object or Thing affords them no more but Imperfect or General Ideas and therefore they must have them I am much pleased with his Distinction between Wit and Judgment and I could wish that our Men of Fancy who affect to bring Religion and all they understand not to Drollery would apply it to themselves 2. The Author discourses very acutely how our Reason and Judgment are misguided by our not distinguishing our Notions exactly whence we may inferr that that part of Logick which teaches us how to distinguish them accurately and to keep them distinct is of exceeding great use and that the Study of it is to be earnestly pursu'd by all Pretenders to Science especially by new Beginners Of which I hope I have elaborately treated in the First Book of my Method 3. In order to the 12th Chapter there is no doubt but that we can unite several simpler Ideas or Notions into one and signify them by one Name but I deny that if we conjoin them otherwise than as they are or may be united in External Objects or in the Thing we can have any Complex Notions tho' we may have a Fancy of them or a kind of Imitation of some thing which once affected our Senses For since I cannot but think I have demonstrated that our Notion is the Thing as conceiv'd by us or the Thing existing in the understanding If I have any Complexion of more Simple Notions in my Mind not found to be united in the Thing the Idea in my Mind is not conformable to the Thing it self nor is it as I have prov'd it to be that Thing and then to what end should I have such an Idea as if I come to predicate it of the Thing the Proposition would be False which consequently would fill our mind with Falshoods Next as has been often prov'd formerly I deny the Soul can Unite or Act of her self or by her peculiar power tho' the Man may but is oblig'd to take what 's given her by Impressions on the Seat of Knowledge In which case what the Thing or Object by a Genuin Impression gives her is Orderly Solid and a Seed of true knowledge or Science but that which the Fancy gives her otherwise than as the Thing did directly imprint it is Disorderly Superficial and a Ground of Errour Indeed she is forc'd to apprehend whenever the Phantasms strike the Seat of Knowledge tho' their Motions and Complexions be never so Disorderly or even Monstrous Now whenever this is done Judicious Men direct their Eye to the Thing and examine whether the Conjunction of such or such Ideas is truly found in re or is agreeable to those Direct Impressions it had received thence which if it be the Soul entertains it after Examination and lets it sink into her it being the true nature of the Thing and so a Ground to Truth to see which her Essence was made If it be not she rejects it for it grounds a Contradiction to the Nature of the Thing which is the only Ground of Truth and makes or counterfeits it to be what it is not and it is directly against her Nature to admit Contradictory Judgments Now what Judicious Men by their recourse to the Thing thus reject those Unskilful Thinkers who are led by Fancy do admit and by this means their Souls become full of Phantastick Conceits which never can be brought to any Coherence or Connexion of Terms For no Terms can Cohere unless the Notions meant by each of them be really in the Thing it self and those Coherences made in the Mind by any other way or of any other Materials are far from Solid or True as we experience in People that are Splenetick or Enthusiaistck 4. Wherefore whenever the Ideas are connected otherwise than they are or may be in re the Object of that Act can have no Metaphysical Verity Unity nor consequently Entity in it the two former of which being Properties of Ens cannot be where Ens or Thing is not Whence the Objects of those Fantastick Acts is some non-Ens taken for an Ens which if pursu'd home by a good Logician must end in a Contradiction For example I can have Notions of Hircus and Ceruus aparted from one another but if I will unite them in my Mind otherwise than Nature exhibited them and take them conjoyntly as Fancy may and frame a a Complex Idea of a Hirco-Ceruus or Goat-Stag it must needs be perfectly Fantastical and Chimerical This will farther appear if we take one of Mr. L's Complex Ideas viz. Beauty consisting of a certain Composition of Figure and Colour Now if such Figure and Colour had not been found or might not be found united by Nature in the same Thing the Idea of it could not have been conformable to what 's in Nature or the Idea of any Reality but purely Fantastical and Counterfeit The same may be said of his Idea of Lead with its proper Qualities or of the Ordinary Idea of a Man describ'd here to be a Substance or Thing with Motion Thought and Reasoning join'd to it Which Qualities were they not join'd in the Thing they belong to or identify'd with it the Complex Ideas of them would be nothing but meer Groundless Fancies This Point is so Important that it will deserve to be clear'd as perfectly as possible I shall therefore allow it a more elaborate Explanation tho' I spend less Pains and Time in my other Reflexions When I consider an Individual Thing in Nature v. g. A Man according to the Notion of Being I have two Notions of him viz. That he is capable of Existing and that he actually Exists the former of which he has by means of Second Causes which by Determining the Matter gives him his Determinate Nature or Essence The other he has immediately from the First Being and I have a Complex Notion of him accordingly Next considering the same thing precisely as a Body or such an Ens as we call by that Name I find in it somewhat by which it is Corruptible or Changeable into another and somewhat by which it is Determin'd to be This sort of Thing or Body or
to be what it is And I conceive and call Body according to the former of these Considerations Power or Matter and according to the later Act or Form and I frame a Complex Idea of it as 't is a Body accordingly Hitherto I treat of the Thing as a Metaphysician and regard it only according to some Order it has to Being Proceeding further on and dividing still the common Line of Ens or what I am now arriv'd at Body by Intrinsecal Differences or by more and less of the Generical Notion of which Quantity or Divisibility is the Primary Affection or that of which all the other Modes are made I find that some Bodies must be more Divisible or Rare other less Divisible or Dense and by this means we approach something nearer to Natural or Physical Considerations of that thing as 't is call'd Body and the Science that treats of it as being immediately under Metaphysicks and immediately above Physicks may not unfitly be called Archi-Physical as giving the immediate Principles to Physicks This way of Considering Body grounds the Notions of Simple Bodies called Elements which differ in Nothing but Rarity and Density and also the Notions of Compound Bodies made up of those Simple ones So that now my former Complex Notions of Capable to be and Actual Being and of having Determinate and Indeterminate Respects to that Ens as it is Body call'd Form and Matter has annext to it in the Thing many Secondary Qualities made up of those Primary ones such as are Heat and Cold Moisture and Driness c. and so we are come to that Science call'd Physicks or Natural Philosophy and my former Complex Notion of such an Individuum takes in these Second Qualities over and above what it contain'd before Advancing farther we come to consider this Thing or Body with its Parts so diversify'd by those First and Second Qualities or so Organiz'd that one part the common Causes of the World suppos'd is able to work on another which kind of Thing we call Self-moving or Living And still proceeding on by a fâ—rther Complexion of such Parts we come to a Thing that is Sensitive or Moving it self by the least Effluviums affecting those tender Organs call'd the Senses All which give so many New Additions to my former Notion of that Individuum and make it more Complex Moreover we can find in this Sensitive Thing or this Animal now spoken of both as to its peculiar Matter and Form a Disposition to work comparatively that is to judge and reason or discourse and consequently to have in it a Knowing Power which is to be a Man And Lastly Such a peculiar Degree of this Power of Comparing which restrains the Specifick Notion of Man to be this Individual Man So that by this time such a Vast Assembly of Modes or Accidents the Croud of which make that most Complex Notion call'd the Suppositum so blindly confused do meet in my Complex Idea of this Individual Man that tho' I see he is a Thing and a Distinct Thing because I see he exists and operates Independently of all other Things yet I can have no Distinct and Clear Notion of his Essence but by taking it in pieces as it were both as to those several Considerations belonging to him according to the Line of Being as was now explain'd and also as to those Conceptions I make of him according to all the Physical Modes or Accidents which are in him Which Modes so to gain an exacter Knowledge of him as Affected with those Modes and the same may be said of all other Things we divide and sub-divide as we see agreeable to their Distinct Natures or Notions This Discourse may if well weigh'd be perhaps useful for many Ends. But to apply it to our present purpose All this Multitude of less Complex or more simple Ideas belonging to the Line of Substance are found Connected in this Individuum and did we add the least of them by our Mind which was not found Conjoin'd in the Thing my Notion or Idea of him would so far be Fantastick and False because there was nothing found in the Thing that answers to such a Complexion only which can make it Real but only in my Fancy counterfeiting such a Complexion and mis-informing my Understanding as it happens in the Illusive Representations made in those who are troubled with the Spleen Melancholy or Phrenzy as likewise in timerous People when they think they see Sprights or in Horses when they boggle Add that the Mind cannot of its self begin to act as was proved formerly but all New Acts or Excitation of Former Notions in her are the Acts of the whole Man and must naturally arise first from the Bodily Part or the Fancy either Imprinting Phantasms which it receives from the Objects orderly and genuinly on the Seat of Knowledge or Disorderly as its Irregular and Extravagant Motions happen to conjoyn them Whence we say that a Man who does not correct such incoherent Connexions by Judgment is led by Fancy or Caprichious 6. While we are discoursing about the manner how we come by all our Ideas whether Simple or Complex it would not perhaps be improper to set before the Reader 's view what is my Tenet the Cartesians and Mr. Lockes and how we differ The Cartesians do not own themselves at all beholding to outward Objects for their Ideas as least as some of them say for the chiefest ones but they say they are Innate or imprinted on the Soul by Gods immediate hand tho' some of them which makes the matter much worse chose rather to say they are Elicited or produced by the Soul it self upon such a Motion from without as also that they are re-excited by such Motions in which last Tenet Mr. Locke seems to agree with them But this Learned Author denies all Innate Ideas and holds that the Simple ones at least are caused by the Objects whether they be Internal or External but that the Complex Ideas are framed by the Mind which he conceives to have a virtue of Compounding them as she pleases Whereas my Principles force me to oppose them both and to hold That all Ideas whether Simple or Complex provided that by Ideas be meant Notions and not Imaginations are to be taken intirely from the Objects or Things in Nature as also that when we excite them a new something that is in Act it self must cause that Action because a meer Power to do any Thing whether in the Soul or out of it cannot determin it self to any Action in particular And if I may freely and impartially pass my Verdict between them I should frankly declare that Mr. Locke's way has far more of Nature in it and consequently is more Solid than the Cartesian in regard he holds all our Ideas are originally taken from the Outward Objects either emmediately as to his Simple Ideas or mediately as to those which are compounded of them by the Soul Whereas the
Will and consequently of its Acts of Love is an Appearing Good and the Lively Appearance of that Good is that which makes the Will prompt to act effectually whence since that which breeds Pleasure in us must needs appear Lively to be a Good to us there needs no more but to chuse wisely what is most Pleasant or most Agreeable to our True Nature Reason such as the best Spiritual Goods are and we may be sure by such a well-made Choice to arrive at that Best Greatest and Purest Pleasure Eternal Glory REFLEXION Twelfth ON The 21th CHAPTER 1. IN this Chapter of Power I find more to admire than confute The Author always Ingenious even when he errs has here much out done his former self Particularly his Explication of Freewill is generally speaking both Solid and Acute and his Doctrine that Liberty is consistent with a perfect Determination to Goodness and Virtue is both Learned and Pious Yet I am forced to disagree with him in some particulars In giving my Thoughts of which I will imitate Mr. Locke's laudable Method in making my Discourses Subservient and in shewing them to be Agreeable to Christian Principles 2. 'T is an excellent Thought that The Clearest Idea of Active Power is had from Spirit For Bodies can act no otherwise than as they are acted on themselves nor can the first mov'd Body that moves the rest push others forwards farther than it self is moved by something that is not Body or by some Spiritual Agent which therefore has the truest Notion of Agency in it without any Mixture of Patiency because the Body mov'd cannot react upon it Tho' therefore we may have by our Senses the Idea of Action and Passion from the Effects we see daily wrought by Natural Causes on fit Subjects yet the Clearest Idea of Action is given us by our Reason finding out that the Beginner of Corporeal Action is a Separated Spirit or pure Act and therefore not at all Passive from any other Creature nor from the Body it operates on by Reaction as is found in Corporeal Agents And our Reason gives us this Idea as it does many other Reflex ones by seeing clearly that neither can there possibly be Processus in infinitum amongst Corporeal Agents nor can they of themselves alone begin to move themselves nor move one another Circularly and therefore the First Corporeal Motion must necessarily be Originiz'd from some Pure Spirit or Angel Now Mr. Locke conceives that the Soul according to her Faculty call'd Will moving the Body gives him this clearest Idea of Active Power which Tenet I have in diverse places disprov'd formerly and shown that the Soul by reason of her Potential State here cannot principiate any Bodily Action nor the Man neither unless wrought upon by some External or Internal Agent which is in act it self 3. He Judges with good reason that the Vulgar mistake of Philosophers in making every Faculty or Power a Distinct Entity has caus'd much Obscurity and Uncertainty in Philosophy which humour of Multiplying Entities I am so far from abetting that perhaps he will think me to err on the other hand in making the Understanding and Will to be one and the same Power and affirming that they only differ formally in Degree He shows clearly how in proper Speech the Will is not Free but the Man unless it be signified with a Reduplication that by the Word Will is meant Man according to that Power in him call'd the Will For Powers as he discourses well belong only to Agents and are Attributes only of Substances and not of the Powers themselves Perhaps this reason of his will abet my position that the Understanding and Will are the same Power Those who make them two do this because they find in the Notion of Will only a Power of Acting and not of knowing and in the Notion of Understanding only a Power of knowing and not of Acting But the same Men make the Understanding direct the Will which they call a Blind Power by which they make one of those Powers formally as such to work upon the other as if the former were an Agent and the latter a Patient I add moreover that they do this with the worst Grace that is possible for what avails it the Will to be directed by the Understanding if it does not know how the Understanding directs it And to make the Will to know is to make it a knowing Power which is to make the Will tho' they never meant it to be the Understanding Not reflecting in the mean time when our Understanding is full of any Apparent Good the Man pursues it and so becomes or has in him a Principle or Power of Acting which is what we call Will. 4. Perhaps a Philosophical Discourse beginning from the Principles in this affair if exprest Literally and pursu'd home by Immediate Consequences may set this whole business in a Clearer Light and show us very evidently how Man determins himself to Action and therefore is Free as also how he is Predetermin'd to determin himself than any particular Reflexions on our own Interiour Which tho' they may oftentimes have some Truth in them yet not beginning from the bottom-Truths that concern the point in hand they can never be steady but are now and then liable to some Errours 5. Beginning then with the Animal part in Man and considering him barely as an Animal and wrought upon as other Animals are I discourse thus Particles agreeable to the Nature of the Animal being by the Senses convey'd into the Brain do if they be but Few lightly affect it and work no other effect but a kind of small Liking of it If more they make it as we say begin to Fancy it But if they be very many and sent from an Object very Agreeable or Good to such a Nature they will in proportion to their Multitude and Strength cause naturally a Tendency towards it and powerfully excite the Spirits so as to make the Animal pursue it that is they will become such a Principle of Action which in meer Animals we call Appetite To which Action that meer Animal is not carry'd thro' Choice or Freely but is naturally and necessarily Determin'd to Act for the Attainment of that Good in the same manner as Iron follows the Load-stone But if we consider this Animal as having now a Rational and Knowing Compart join'd to it things will be order'd after another manner For those Impressions are carry'd farther than the Region of the Brain even into the Soul it self which is endow'd with a Faculty of Reflecting upon those her Notions whence she gains exacter Knowledge of those Bodies that imprinted them Nor only so but she can reflect upon her own Operations too and know that she knows them by which means she comes acquainted with her own Nature and comes to see that Knowledge and Reason is that Nature of hers which she finds is a Nobler part of the
means to dim the Appearance those Objects would otherwise make lest if it be too Lively they should overcome the Motive Force of those Objects which are Spiritual But it is to be noted that the multiplying or frequently repeating those Reflex Impressions are not so necessary to every Person nor always the best For a Wise Judicious Christian who out of a Clear Sight of Spiritual Motives has by a thorow-Penetration of their Excellency and Preferribleness his Speculative Thoughts so Lively that they fix his Interior Practical Judgment to work steadily for the Attainment of Eternal Happiness is a far more Manly and Strong Christian than those who arrive at a high Pitch by the frequent Dints of Praying or other good Exercises almost hourly continued For those Well-knit Thoughts and Rational Judgments are as it were an Impenetrable Phalanx and being Connatural to our Reason no Assault can shock or break their Ranks Yet even in those firmest Souls Christian Discipline and Vigilance must be observ'd lest not having those strong Thoughts or Judgments still in readiness they be surprized by their Ghostly Enemy which I take to have been King David's Case when he first sinn'd 11. Secondly It is seen hence that Man determines himself to Action or is Free For 't is evident both to Reason and Experience that all those Thoughts Discourses Judgments and Affections he had in him before naturally or supernaturally are the Causes of the Determination of his Will Wherefore all these being Modes or Accidents belonging to him and Modes not being Distinct Entities from the Thing to which they belong but the Thing it self or the Man thus modify'd it follows that Man determines himself to Action or is a Free Agent 12. Thirdly Since Man has neither his Being his Powers his Actions nor consequently the Circumstances by which he came to be imbu'd with his good Thoughts from whence he has the Proposals of his true Good and of those incomparable Motives to pursue it from Himself but had all these from the Maker and Orderer of the World And since this Series of Internal and External Causes called in Christian Language God's Grace did produce this Determination of himself 't is manifest that he was Predetermin'd by God the First Cause thus to Determine himself as far as there was Entity or Goodness in his Action 13. Fourthly Since all our Powers are by the Intent of Nature ordain'd to perfect us and that Power called Freedom does not perfect any Man while he determines himself to that which will bring him to Eternal Misery it follows that the more he is Determin'd to Virtue and true Goodness the more Free he is Again Since a Man is Free when he acts according to the true Inclination of his Nature and the true natural Inclination of a Man is to act according to Right Reason that is Virtuously it follows that Freedom is then most truly such and the Man most truly Free when he is Determin'd to Virtuous Actions Whence Irrationality or Sin is by the Holy Ghost called Slavery which is opposite to Freedom From which Slavery the Mercy of God meerly and solely through the Merits of his Son our Redeemer has freed us 14. Fifthly We Experience that the Lively Proposal of Temporal and Eternal Goods when it arrives to that pitch that there is hic nunc such a Plenitude ex parte Subjecti of such Objects or Motives that it hinders the Co-appearance Co-existence and much more the Competition of the Contrary Motives does always carry the Will or the Man along with it For the Object of the Will being an Appearing Good and no other Good in that Juncture at least Considerably appearing because the Mind is full of the other it follows that the Inclination of the Will to Good in Common which Man is naturally determin'd to must needs carry the Soul no other as was said then Appearing Whence Mr. Locke's Position that Uneasiness alone is present and his Deduction thence that therefore nothing but Uneasiness determines the Will to act is shewn to be Groundless For an Appearing Good cannot but be always Present to the Soul otherwise it could not appear or be an Appearing Good 15. Sixthly Hence wrong Judgments arise either thro' Want of Information as when Men are not imbu'd with sufficient Knowledge of Eternal Goods or else thro' Want of Consideration whence by not perfectly weighing and comparing both they come to prefer Temporal Goods before Eternal ones 16. Lastly 't is to be noted that Sin does not always spring from False Speculative Judgments but from their being Disproportionate For 't is a Truth that Temporal Goods are in some sort Agreeable to us nor would they hurt us for loving them as far as they merit to be lov'd provided we did but love Eternal Goods as much as they deserve to be loved too Sin therefore is hence occasion'd that thro' too close and frequent a Converse with them we too much conceit and make vast Judgments of these Temporal Goods in proportion of what we make of Eternal ones And were not this so no Sin would remain in a bad Soul when separate or in a Devil nor consequently the proper Punishment of Sin Damnation because they know all Truths Speculatively Wherefore their Inordinate Practical Judgments in which Sin consists springs hence that they do not conceit or as we say lay to heart the Goodness of True Felicity because they over-conceit or make too-great Judgments of the Goodness found in some False Last End which they had chosen Yet these Disproportionate Judgments tho' Speculatively True are apt to beget wrong Practical Judgments and wrong Discourses or Paralogisms in the Soul of a Sinner to the prejudice of his Reason as has been shown in my METHOD Book 3 Less 10. § 18. 17. Mr. Locke's Discourse about Uneasiness lies so cross to some part of this Doctrine that it obliges me to examin it He endeavours to shew that Uneasiness alone and not Good or the Greater Good determines the Will to Act. His Position tho' new and Paradoxical is very plausible and taking it in one Sense viz. that there is always some Uneasiness when the Will is Alter'd in order to Action has much Truth in it and it seems to have much Weight also by his pursuing it so ingeniously Yet there is something wanting to render his Discourse Conclusive For 18. First If we look into Grounds and Principles they will tell us that 't is the Object of any Power which actuates or determines it and the Object of the Will cannot be Uneasiness All Uneasiness being evidently a Consequence following either from the not yet attaining the Good we desire and hope for or from the Fear of Losing it And if we should ask whether Uneasiness does affect the Will otherwise than sub ratione mali or because it is a Harm to the Man and Ease otherwise affect it than sub ratione Boni that
and consequently if the Relation be new or such a one as before was not there must be some Novelty in the Thing it self to ground it Whence follows that if there be such a Real Ground on the one side only and no Real Ground on the other there will be a Real Relation on the one side and no Real Relation on the other but only a Verbal one or an Extrinsecal Denominatien Answering or as it were Chiming Grammatically to the Term which is really Relative v. g. Our Powers of Seeing or Understanding any thing have a Real Relation to their proper Objects both because such Objects Specifie the Power or make it such a Power that is give it its peculiar or distinct Essence as also because the Power is by the Object actuated and determin'd to act that is the Power is intrinsecally Chang'd or otherwise than it was by means of the Object but the Object suffers no kind of Change nor is it at all Alter'd or otherwise than it was by being known or seen Whence the Intellective or Visive Powers are really Related to the Object but the Objects for want of a Real Ground are not really Related back to the Powers however the Words Understood or seen do Verbally answer to the Acts of Understanding and Seeing which is therefore call'd by the Schools in their barbarous Language Relatio dedici or an Extrinsecal Denomination For farther Light in this very necessary Particular I refer my Reader to my Method Book 1. Less 7. where if I flatter not my self he will find the Notion of Relation treated of very fully and clearly Especially I recommend to his Perusal the 9th 10th 11th and 12th Section where I discourse of that Unmutual Relation of the Measure to the Thing measured the exact Knowledge of which is far more useful than any other piece of this Subject however it lay out of Mr. Locke's Road to take notice of such Speculations as regard or not regard the Thing as their Ground 3. Reviewing his 26th Chapter of Cause and Effect c. I found that he acquaints us very exactly how we gain the Ideas of them by our Senses but he proceeds not to show us which yet he often does in other occasions in what the nature of Causality consists which is of the Chiefest use in Philosophy For what is the Learned part of the World the better for having those rudest Draughts or as Mr. L. well calls them materials of Knowledge Ideas or Notions or for knowing how we come by them in which he very frequently terminates his Enquiries if we do not by Reflexion and Reason polish and refine them and thence attain to true Knowledge of the Things from which we glean'd them or by what virtue they come to be Causes of such Effects What I conceive of Causality is that 't is the Power of Participating or Communicating some Thing or some mode of Thing to the Patient which was before some way or other in the Thing that caus'd it On which point I have no occasion to to dilate here particularly Only which concerns our present purpose I am to note that that which is thus communicated is the Real Ground on which the Real Relation of the Effect to its Cause is founded Whence follows that the Cause also when it has some Real Change by being reduced from the Imperfecter State of meer Power to the Perfecter one of Act or as we say gets something by producing such an Effect will have a Real Ground and Consequently a Real Relation to the Effect and not otherwise And hence it is that God our Creatour has no Real Relation to his Creatures tho' they have many to him because he is no otherwise nor better in the least by Creating them than he had been in Case he had not Created any thing at all and therefore there is no Ground in Him of a Real Correlation to them 4. The 27th Chapter of Identity and Diversity requires a deeper Consideration In order to which I know no more Compendious way to clear the Point in dispute between us than to fetch my Discourse from those Principles that concern it The Subject does indeed properly belong to Metaphysicks but I will endeavour to do what I can to avoid those Abstracted Mediums which are made use of in that Supreme Science And first as the Ground work of my Discourse I am to settle the Principle of Individuation or how a particular Thing or Substance comes to be what it is for this done it will be easily seen whence we are to take our Measures to judge when it continues the same and when it is to be another or a Different Thing from its former self I discourse thus nor will it be Tedious I hope to repeat often what is so Useful to be remember'd as being the sure Ground of all our Knowledge 5. All our Conceptions by which only we can discourse of Things are either of Res or Modus rei that is they are either the Notions of Substance or Thing precisely or else the Notions of Accidents Of these the Word Thing has a very Abstracted Notion and is perfectly Indifferent and Indeterminate to all Particulars Wherefore the Notion of such a Species or sort of Thing being as was said above more Determinate must have something superadded to it to determin it and compound or constitute it of such a Species which can be nothing but such a Complexion of Accidents or Modes there being as was said nothing else imaginable that can be added to the Notion of Thing Now Philosophers agreeing to call that which determins the common Notion of thing and so constitutes such and such Species or Kinds of Things A Substantial or Essential Form hence the Substantial Form of all the Sorts Kinds or Species of Natural Bodies can be nothing else but such a Complexion of Accidents as fit the Thing for such a kind of Operation in Nature And hitherto if I mistake not Mr. Locke and I may agree in the main however we may differ in the manner of Explicating our selves 6. Descending then to the Individuals it is evident that a Greater Complexion of Accidents is necessary to determine and constitute the several Individuums than would serve to constitute the Species for the Species or Kinds of Things are but few but the Individuums under those Kinds are Innumerable and therefore more goes to distinguish these from one another than was needful to distinguish or determine the other Whence it comes that we can never comprehend or reach all that belongs to the Suppositum or Individuum Wherefore it being a certain Maxim that what distinguishes does constitute this Medly of Innumerable Accidents which differences or distinguishes each Individuum from all the rest does also intrinsecally constitute those Individuums or is the Intrinsecal or Formal Principle of Individuation Moreover since nothing in Common or not ultimately determin'd to be This or That is capable of Existing
nor consequently in proper Speech a Thing it follows again that that Complexion of Acccidents which gave the Thing its Primigenial Constitution in the very first Instant it was thus ultimately Determin'd to be This or Different from all others of the same Kind did truly and properly Individuate it Note that this Discourse holds equally in Elementary Mix'd Living Vegetable and Animal Individuums allowing only for the smaller or greater Number of Accidents which goes to the constituting each of them respectively Why Mr. Locke who allows the Complexion of Accidents to constitute the Specifick Nature should not follow the same Principle in making a greater Complexion of the Modes Intrinsecally distinguish the Individuum from all others and so constitute It I cannot imagin it being so perfectly Consonant and necessarily Consequent to his own Doctrine and agreeable to Evident Principles 7. Applying then this Discourse to Man Since it is the constant Method of God's Wisdom as he is the Author of Nature to carry on the Course of it by Dispositions on the Matter 's side and therefore to adjust and fit that which Supervenes to what Pre-exists and especially to sute the Form to the Matter and since 't is evident that the Embrio pre-exists to the Infusion of the Soul as the peculiar Matter to its Form it follows that the Soul is adjusted to the Bodily or Animal Part and according to the Degree that part of it call'd the Fancy is better or worse fitted as far as is on its side to perform such Actions when it is ripe or more or less fit to work comparatively in which all Judging and Discoursing consists there will be infused a Soul apt to judge and discourse more perfectly or less perfectly according as the Matter requires And were it otherwise so that the Soul were apt to work more perfectly than the Body were able to go along with it first that greater Degree of Rationality in the Soul would be lost and in vain and next the Man God's Workmanship would be disproportion'd and in a manner Monstrous in his most Essential Parts Putting then those Parts orderly fitted to one another which can only be done as was shewn by suting the Supervening Part to that which pre-existed it follows necessarily that as the Bodily or meerly Animal Matter of Man the Embryo was in the Instant before the Soul was infused and the Man made individually different from all of the same Kind or from all other Embryo's and so was consequently just to such a Degree fit by the peculiar Disposition of its Brain as it s conjoin'd Instrument to act with the Soul comparatively so it is impossible the Soul being proportion'd to that Matter as its Form that any two Souls should be perfectly Alike or Equal in Rationality or rather that any Two Men should have a Capacity of Knowing or Reasoning to the self-same Degree For were they equally Rational those two Men would be but one and the same Man Essentially or under the Notion of such a Species in regard that tho' they might have many Accidental Differences yet they would have nothing in the Line of such a Rational Ens or Man to distinguish them Essentially or make and constitute them formally Two such Entities or Things as we call Men or Rational Animals 8. This premis'd I come to examin Mr. L's Discourses upon this Subject He imagins Existence is the Principle of Individuation which can consist with no show of Reason For since Thing in Common cannot exist and therefore what 's Ultimately determin'd to be this Thing or an Individuum can only be capable of Actual Being 't is evident that the Individual Thing must in priority of Nature or Reason be first constituted such ere it can be capable of Existence Wherefore 't is impossible that Existence consider it how we will can be in any manner the Principle of Individuation the constitution of the Individuum being presupposed to it Again since as has been shown above the Notion of a Thing or an Individuum speaking of Creatures is Capable to be 't is impossible that Actual Being or Existence should constitute the Potentiality or Capacity of Being any more then the meer Power of walking can constitute or denominate a Man Actually walking Besides both Logick and Metaphysicks demonstrate that Existence it being the immediate Effect of the first Cause who is Essentially an Infinitly-Pure Actuality of Being is therefore the most Actual of any Notion we have or can have Wherefore since whatever does difference or distinguish Another must necessarily be more Actual than the Notion Distinguish'd it follows that Existence is of its own Nature a most perfectly uniform and Undistinguishable Effect that is one and the same in all Creatures whatsoever as far as concerns its own precise Nature or Notion For Reflexion will inform us clearly that whatever Notion is Distinguishable is Potential and that the Distinguishing Notion is more Actual than it Since then no Notion can be more Actual than is that of Existence it follows it cannot possibly be Distinguish'd at all Whence follows this Unexpected tho' Clear Consequence that if Existence does constitute the Individuality all the Individuums in the world as having one and the Self-same Constituter would be but one Individuum 9. Next Mr. L. fancies that the Existing of a Thing in the same Time and Place constitutes the Identity of a Thing and the being in several Times and Places constitutes its Diversity By which 't is easy to discern that he distinguishes not between the Extrinsecal Marks and Signes by which we may know the Distinction of Individuals and what Intrinsecally and Essentially constitutes or makes them differeut Things Who sees not that Time and Place are meerly Extrinsecal to the Notion of Substance or rather toto genere different from it as belonging to other Common Heads And therefore they are too Superficial Considerations for their Identity and Diversity which are Relations grounded on their Essence to consist in them Besides Time and Place are evidently no more but Circumstances of the Thing wherefore that very word Circumstance shows plainly that they cannot be Intrinsecal much less Essential to it and it evidences moreover that they suppose the Thing already constituted to which they are annext Tho' then Practical men may have light thence to distinguish Individuums yet it is very Improper for Philosophers or Speculative Reflecters to make the Entity of Things which grounds the Relations of Identity and Diversity to consist in these Outward Signes and Circumstantial Tokens 10. This Learned Gentleman conceives there must be a Different Reason for the Individual Identity of Man To make way to which he premises and would perswade us gratis that it is one thing to be the same Substance another the same Man and a third to be the same Person But I must forestall all his Subsequent Discourses by denying this Preliminary to them For speaking of one and the
of Substance The Essences are no otherwise Ingenerable but as they are from Eternity in the Divine Ideas nor Incorruptible but as they are either there or else in some Humane or Angelical Understanding out of which they can never be effaced Lastly What have Names or Words which are nothing but Articulate Air or Figur'd Ink excepting what is Annexed to them by our Minds to do with the Intrinsecal Natures of Things that they should be one Sort or Kind of Essences 13. This Learned Author justly complains that we have so few Definitions and my self have both resented it in my Preface to my Method and have also excited and encourag'd Learned Men to make good that Defect But till the Best and only Proper Way which I mention'd lately to make Definitions be allow'd and taken I am sure there will be no new ones made that will deserve that Name and those Few that are already made will still be exposed to the baffling Attacks of Fancy Aristotle was certainly the best Definer of any Philosopher yet extant yet his Definitions are excepted against by Witty Men and which is worse for no other Reason but because they are too Learned that is too Good Mr. Locke expresses here great Dis-satisfaction at two of them which to my best Judgment not all the Wit of Man can mend The First is of Motion which Aristotle defines to be Actus Entis in potentia quatenus in potentia Now I wonder not that Mr. Locke who in his large Chapter of Power never so much as mention'd the Idea of Power to be a Thing nor the Power to have such an Accident or Mode nor consequently the Idea of an Act answering to such a Power should conceit this Definition to be Gibberish However he came to pretermit them it is most manifest that we have Natural Ideas or Notions of both these We cannot see a Thing made actually of Another or Alter'd to be any way otherwise than it was but Nature obliges us to see and say that that Thing of which the new one was made could or had a Power to be It or have Another made of it Or when we see 't is anew made Hot Cold Round White Moved Placed c. but that it could or had a Power to become such ere it was Actually such These Ideas then of Act and Power are so Natural that Common Sense forces us to acknowledge them and Common Language must use them And 't is a strange Fastidiousness not to allow those Transcendent that is most Common and most Clear Words in Definitions whose Notions or Meanings Nature gives us and which Words or Equivalent Expressions Common Discourse forces us to use Yet in the Uncouthness of these Words to some Men's Fancies consists all the Difficulty which they so boggle at in this Definition The Ens or Body was only Capable or had a Power to be moved ere Motion came and now by Motion it is Actually moved It is evident then that Motion is the Act or which is the same the Formal Cause which reduced that Power into Act or formally denominated it moved Actually Act then was a Proper Genus as far as those most Common Notions can have one Now comes the Difference in potentia which is to determine what kind of Act Motion is To understand which we may reflect that a Body has many other Acts or as we conceive and call them Forms in it such as are Quantity Figure and all Qualities whatever as Roundness Length Breadth Health c. But they are not Acts of that Body as 't is in power to be otherwise than it is but as 't is actually such or such For they truly denominate it to be actually Round Long Healthful c. Whereas Motion being formally a meer Tendency to an Effect not yet produced constitutes and denominates a Body to be only in power to be what by that Motion it is to be afterwards For reflecting on all Motions whatever v. g. Generation Alteration Augmentation Sanation c. none of them affect the Subject or Body in order to what it has already fixedly but in order to a newly generated or rather producible Thing Quality Quantity Disposition Health c. which the Matter or Subject has only a Power to have or acquire by means of those respective Motions The last Words quatenus in potentia signifie that the Thing as affected with Motion is formally and precisely consider'd to be in power to be such or such and not at all as actually so Matter has the Notion of Power to be another Thing but in regard it is a kind of Compart constituting actually the stable and entire Ens the Thing or Body which has Matter in it cannot be said to be meerly in power to have Matter which it has Already Whereas by having Motion in it which is only the Way or Means to attain what Nature aims to produce it must be thus meerly and formally in Power to that to which it is Tending Wherefore this Definition most appositely fits the Notion of Motion by distinguishing it most perfectly from all other Sorts of Acts whatever without a Tittle conceivable in it that is Defective Superfluous or Disparate Yet this is here character'd to be Exquisite Jargon and a Famous Absurdity I should be glad to see how one of our new Philosophers would define Motion I doubt he would find it a puzzling Task to explicate its Formal and Proper Nature in regard that besides its being very General it is the Blindest and most Imperfect Notion we have and most approaching to Non-Entity being neither the Thing as it is in it self nor as it is yet another but hovering as it were between both And I am certain it is impossible to perform it without varying the Words used by Aristotle to others of the same Sense or even to give some tolerable Explication of it which can sute with its Formal Notion 14. The other Definition which Mr. Locke mislikes is that of Light which he says Aristotle defines The Act of a Perspicuous Thing as it is Perspicuous Now tho' Light be Fire were the Particles of it contracted into one closer Body as it is by a Burning-Glass yet the Rays of it thinly scatter'd have like all other Effluviums the Notion of a Quality or Mode of the Body they are receiv'd in and Modes or Accidents have their Analogical Essences from the manner they affect their Subjects The Question then is What is the Proper Subject of Light Mr. Locke's Principles deny the Sun is the Subject and put it to be onely the Cause of it Nor can an Opacous Body be the Subject of it for it affects not that Body it self but the Surface which reflects it and then it has the Notion of Colour 'T is left then that the Proper Subject of Light must be a Medium which is Perspicuous or which has a Power in it to let it pass through it to our Eyes and therefore
proceed 't is evident that of all other Notions that of Existence has the least Composition in it that can be Whence all Clearness of our Notions coming from their Distinctness and their Distinctness Springing from their Simplicity the formal Notion of Existence is the most Clear that is self-evident and therefore Inexplicable all Explications being of those Notions that can need it The Notion of Ens which signifies Capable to Exist has but a very little Composition and Consequently Confusion in it as consisting of Actual Being and the Power to it For the same Reason Corpus has more of Composition or Confusion in it than Ens Vivens than Corpus Animal than Vivens Homo than Animal and Socrates or the Individuum most of all There going still as was shown above more Notions to constitute and Compound each inferiour Notion than there does to constitute those above it whence still as they are more Compounded they are proportionably more Confus'd that is less Distinct or less Clear The Ideas or Notions of Individuals therefore or of particular Things are for the reason now given the most Unintelligible meaning by that Word the most impossible to be comprehended all at once This reflected on and it being shown above that both Nature and Art instruct us to divide our Notions into Common Heads and to proceed thus gradually to Inferiour ones 't is most evident that the only Proper and Natural way of distinguishing our Notions into Simple and Compounded is to be taken not from our Fancy what Ideas seem most Clear to us but from this Gradual Progression from Superiour to Inferiour Notions in regard there goes still more to compound the Inferiour Notions than there does to compound the Superiour Whence follows out of the very Terms that those must be more Compounded or less Clear these more Simple and more Clear 18. The same Rule holds and for the same Reason in all the Common Heads of the Modes or Accidents The Notion or Idea of the Supreme Genus has no Composition but that noted above which is common to them all of Connotating the Subject Whence it is the Simplest or least Compounded as involving both that of the Common Head and that of the Difference superadded to it Hence neither the Ideas of Motion nor Extension if by this Latter be meant as by distinguishing it from Motion it should seem Permanent Quantity are Simple Ideas but the Idea of Quantity is the Simple one and they being evidently such Kinds of Quantity viz. Permanent and Successive are clearly Compounded of Quantity and of the two Different Ideas which make them those two several sorts of it Much less is the Idea or Notion of Number or Figure Simple ones for the former is compounded of the Idea of Meer Quantity and of Discrete and the later of the Idea of Quantity and of such or such a manner of Terminating it And the same may be easily shown of all the rest of his Simple Ideas whatever excepting only that of Existence From these Principles I make the following Reflexions 19. First That the Ideas can never be in fault when we name things wrong but our own heedlesness or Disagreement about the Meanings for which such Words stand For our Common Notions are wrought by Natural Causes upon the same-natur'd Patients the Senses and thence upon the Soul Whence Notions are what they are invariably without their meddling or being concern'd with our Signifying them or applying them to these or these Words We have them from Nature the Signifying them by such and such Words comes from our Voluntary Designation and that is all can be said of them as Mr. L. has shown B. 2. Ch. 32. § 2. 20. Secondly Confused Ideas they being all Compounded may have fewer or more Distinct Ideas annext to their Subject according as we gain a farther Distinct Knowledge of the Object as is exemplified in Mr. L's frequent Instance of Gold In which case it is not a new Specifical Notion nor so much as a new Nominal Essence as Mr. L. calls it for let us discover never so many New Qualities in Gold every Man will call that Thing Gold still but the Additions or Appendages of New Distinct Notions tack't as it were to the Confused one or new Inadequate Notions approaching so many little steps nearer to the making it an Adequate one 21. Thirdly Since we know before-hand that every Thing has a Distinct Nature or Real Essence peculiar to its self we take those most Remarkable Accidents intrinsecally belonging to it to be that Essence especially if they do sufficiently distinguish it from all other Natures and when we find they do not we acknowledge our Judgment may be false we strive to correct it and suspend till we gain better Light yet still our Notions are inerrably what they are and faultless however it fares with our Judgment Nor does our Judgment exclude the yet-undiscover'd Modes from the Notion of the Thing but we include them all in the Lump or Confusedly Whence 't is the Real Essence of the Thing which is known tho' Imperfectly and Inadequately Thus we know a Man and a Horse to be two Things of different Species by divers manifest Qualities which never agree to both of them and therefore distinguish them and tho' 't is the whole or rather a Greater Complexion of Accidents which does constitute the Specifick Difference yet even that is known truly tho' imperfectly when we know it but in part especially as was said when it is sufficient to distinguish one from the other In the same manner as when I see but a Man's Hand or Face I am truly said to see the Man tho' Man signifies the whole which I see but in part The solid Reason of which is this Great Truth that There are no Actual Parts in any Compound whatever Whence follows that every Part is the Whole in Part or according to such a Part which is one of the Chiefest Principles that gives Grounds to the Science of Physicks and therefore is Demonstrable by the Superiour Science Metaphysicks 22. Fourthly Our former Discourse being well reflected on which shews that the most solid and certain way of Knowing which Notions are Simple which Compounded or Complex is not to be taken from the Easie Appearances to our Fancy or from seeming Experience but from their being more General or more Particular we may farther learn what Notions are Clear and which Obscure and how or why they are so For 't is manifest that all Confusion and Obscurity springs from Composition or the Involving many Notions as is evidently seen in Particular or Individual Bodies and all Distinctness or Clearness in our Notions from their involving few or none as is found in the most General Notions Add that if this Rule be observ'd the Order in our Complex Notions will be more Regular Whereas the other unmethodical way of making so many Simple Ideas places those Ideas at
think be better elucidated than by reflecting on what those who write of the Excellency of Poesie and Poets use to say in Commendation of those Daedalean Artists They tell us that a Poet has that Name from the Greek Noun 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies A Maker The Reason they give for this Appellation is that whereas other Artists have their Materials given to their Hands to work upon by shaping it into an Artificial Form the Poet alone is the Maker as well of his Matter as the Contriver of its Form So that the Ideas he has in his Head of his Heroes his Lovers his Ladies and of Virtuous Persons are indeed as Mr. Locke calls his Archetypes and regard not whether such Incomparable Patterns he has invented did ever exist in Nature or no nor is it to his purpose Yet still as Mr. Locke says well that his Complex Ideas are made of Simple ones so by the leave of those Self-magnifiers the Poet could never have had those Excellent Ideas of his Heroes or their great Actions had he not been pre-imbu'd with Natural Notions which he joins together ingeniously and exalts them to a high Pitch so to make them Exemplars for others to imitate Rather he only adds Superlative or Extraordinary Degrees to what he finds in Nature Whence 't is manifest he regards not what is but what should be quite contrary to the Duty of a Philosopher who is to take his Complex Notions from Things just as he finds them complicated in Nature and then discourse upon them by his Reason and not to stand coining new Complex Ideas which Nature never gave him What therefore I most dislike here in Mr. Locke is that he seems not to reflect on what it is which makes some Ideas or Notions more Simple than others viz. Their being more Abstracted or Universal for this frees them from the Partnership of more-compounded Differences and the Complexion of Multitudes of Accidents which still as they descend lower are requisit to distinguish the Kinds of Things by which means they become more Simple or less compounded whence the Supreme Heads of the Ten Predicaments are the Simplest Notions of all others except that of Existence Did Mr. Locke rate the Simplicity and Complexion of his Ideas from this certain and well-grounded Rule there might an easie Accomodation be made between his Doctrin and mine as to this Particular But his Zeal against the Cobweb Schemes some Modern School-men had woven transported him to ravel that Excellent Frame of Notions which both Nature and Art had given us and as Cartesius and others have done to model all Philosophy upon a new tho' less Solid or rather far from Solid Foundation 9. That I may say as much as I can in behalf of the Ideists it may be alledg'd that they find by Experience Things are as their Ideas do represent them and that they Succeed as we by means of our Ideas do Forecast them Therefore Real Knowledge may be had by means of Ideas I answer First That this Agreement they have between what 's in the Mind and out of it would equally nay better be explicated were the Things themselves in the Mind and not the Ideas and therefore it can be no Argument for the Reality of their Knowledge by Ideas only Besides I deny that when their Ideas are not true Natural Notions but Fancies they experience them or any Effect of them as in Vacuum or Duration before or after the World Secondly I answer That Experience only helps them by giving them Knowledge and Knowledge according to them can only be had by means of Ideas wherefore they must either prove by other Grounds that Similitudes can give us Knowledge of the Things or they do petere Principium beg the Question and prove idem per idem For if meer Representations can give us no true Knowledge Experience which only assists us by giving us Ideas is quite thrown out of doors and may all be Fantastical All is wrong and falls short if the First Ground of our Knowledge be Incompetent and Insignificant Besides Experience gives us both Phantasms which are Material Representations and our Notions too which are Spiritual but Experience is not duely qualify'd to tell us which is the one and which is the other tho' this be of the highest Concern in our Case All it can do is to inform us that we are affected by some Agent working on our Senses Nay of the two it more inclines us to embrace Phantasms for Notions for those do make upon us the more Sensible Impression and cause a more lively Representation To distinguish perfectly between this False and True Ground of Knowledge is of the most weighty Importance of all other Points of Philosophy whatsoever and yet I must complain that not the least Care as far as I have observ'd is taken any where in this Treatise to distinguish them and particularly not in this Chapter which had been the proper Place to treat of that Subject But on the contrary as I have shewn above they are carelesly Confounded And I must declare that without settling this Point well we can never have any Certainty what Knowledge is Real what Fantastick Or when we do truly know when onely seem to know But there is not a Word here to that purpose 10. As for the Monsters and Changelings here spoken of I think Philosophers should have nothing to do with Lusus Naturae or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which are besides the ordinary Course of Nature but with the Common Course of Causes or Nature it self My Judgment is too that People should be very wary in Killing any Monsters that approach to Humane shape and that it were fitter there should be Hospitalls to breed them till perfect Observations were made concerning them The Novelty of the sight would invite Spectators and bear their Charges Unless perhaps there may be danger lest the Imaginations of the Apprehensive Sex who see such Uncouth Shapes or hear frequent Talk of them should by that occasion breed more of them What concerns us is to look to our Principles and not to be misled from them by reflecting on such odd preternatural Productions as I must think Mr. Locke is when he thinks Changelings to be something between a Man and a Beast The Division of Animal into Rational and Irrational is made by such Differences as are perfectly Contradictory to one another between which there can no more be any Third or Middle than there can be a Medium between is and is not If then that odd Birth be Rational let the shape be as Distorted as it will it is truly a Man if it be not let it look never so like a Man 't is a Brute When 't is the one when the other may hap in some odd cases to be Doubtful and then it belongs to the Prudence of Intelligent Men to decide it or if they cannot it becomes us in Christian Prudence to act
Sensation our own Existence as well as that of any other Body whatever I doubt not but Mr. Locke will grant they would Since then the Embryo in the Womb lies in a Roundish Posture why may not one part of it by touching another or operating upon it cause in us as soon as the Soul which has a Capacity of Receiving Notions is in it a Notion of our own Existence by way of Sensation Especially since Operation is nothing but the Existence of the Agent Body press'd or imprinted as it were upon another by Motion Certainly it becomes us who deny Innate Ideas to shew how all our First Notions do come into us by Impressions on the Senses and not to say rawly that some of them come by Intuition which is the Way of Knowing Proper to Angels whose Knowledges are all Innate and none of them Acquir'd either by Sense or Discourse for they have neither This I say is certainly best for the Interest of our Tenet of which Intuition gives but a slender Account I believe Mr. Locke proceeds upon this that he finds he not only does but must as firmly assent to the Proposition Ego sum as he does to the most Evident Proposition whatever nor can he at all doubt of it nor can it need Proof But my Judgment is that this Introversion and Studying our own Interiour is a very Fallacious Guide and will often lead us astray if we keep not a steady Eye attentively bent to our Principles which he seems here to neglect For many Positions need no Proof and force our Assent and yet their Certainty may depend on Different Causes 10. The 12th Chapter treats of the Improvement of our Knowledge which Mr. Locke says does not depend on Maxims But First he mistakes the Use of General Maxims They are not made for the Vulgar or Beginners to gather Knowledge by them tho' it may be observ'd that Men of all sorts do naturally use them when they sute their purpose nay sometimes make Proverbs of them Nor was this Maxim a Whole is bigger than a Part ever intended for Boys or to teach them that their Hand is bigger than their Little Finger or such like but being premised to the ensuing Proofs they are occasionally made use of by Learned Men in the Process of their Discourse to clinch the Truth of the Point when it needs it by their Self-Evidence In the same manner as my self have very frequently had recourse to Metaphysical Principles and made use of them in my Preliminaries and Reflexions as Occasion presented to make my Discourses Evident and to rivet the Truths I advance in the Minds of my Readers as any Attentive Peruser of them may easily observe He speaks against our Receiving Principles without Examination and of Principles that are not Certain that is against such Sayings as are no Principles for if they can either need or admit of Examination or if they be not Certain none but meer Fops will let them pass for Prinples Yet tho' Mr. Locke does thus oppose Maxims and Principles 't is notwithstanding very evident that himself must make use of some Maxims and Principles all the while he disputes aganst their Usefulness otherwise he cannot discourse at all or his Discourse can have no Force In the same manner as he that wrastles with another must either fix his Foot on some Firm Ground or he will fall himself instead of overthrowing his Adversary Let us then examin his Principles He alledges that the Knowledge of the Certainty of Principles depends only upon the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our Ideas This then is one of his Principles both because it runs through good part of his 3d and 4th Books as also because 't is Equivalent to this Universal All Certainty of Principles depends c. Now this is so far from Self-evident that it needs Examination enough and is one of those I judge not Certain and therefore can be no Ground or Principle at all Nor is it possible it should unless the Word Idea be cleared to mean Spiritual Notions in our Mind and not meer Resemblances or Material Representations in our Fancy to clear which tho' the whole Treatise needs it no Provision is made but on the contrary those two vastly different things are rather carelesly confounded as is shewn in my First Preliminary Another Principle seems to be this None ought with a Blind and Implicit Faith to Receive and Swallow Principles This is of Universal Influence and Self-Evident and therefore in all Points well qualify'd for a Principle For Principles were not Principles if they needed either Faith or Deductions of Reason to make them go down since they ought to be Evident by their own Light But what Good can this do to any but to such as have renounc'd Common Sense even to Ridiculousness And perhaps Mr. Locke had some such weak Writers in his Eye when he advanc'd this cautious Position as a Warning to Learners 11. Now the General Maxims and Principles on which the Learned Part of the World has hitherto proceeded can onely be overthrown if they must needs be so by other Principles more Evident than themselves are or else it will be but a drawn Match and so they may hope still to stand as the Lawyers phrase it in their full Force Effect and Vertue We are to consider then what Principle Mr. Locke has substituted in their room when they are discarded for 't is a very ill Case to be left without any Principles at all 'T is this All Knowledge of the Certainty of Principles and consequently the Way to improve our Knowledge is to get and fix in our Minds Clear Distinct and Compleat Ideas as far as they are to be had and annex to them Proper and Constant Names Now if the Ideas must be Clear the Terms must be very Simple and consequently as was shewn above General ones and this will force us back upon General Maxims which it was intended we should avoid as good for little To be Distinct if we go to work like Artists we must distinguish those General and Common Notions which will bring us back into the old Road of those Ten Common Heads called Predicaments and consequently of Genus Species and Differences which was lately dislik'd I suppose because it was too much travell'd in and beaten tho' I think such a Common Path should not be left because some may have here and there laid a Block or Briar in the way Lastly Compleat Ideas as he grants are not to be had of the Species much less of the Individuums And as for Names 't is not we that are to annex them but the Common Usage of the Vulgar or of the Generality of Learned Men in case they be Artificial ones for these are they who gave them their Constant and Proper Signification Whence is seen that so many Difficulties are involv'd in this one Thesis or Principle besides what is said
tampering of Second Causes and their Never-uniform Circumstances The Natural Perfection then of a Rational Creature being to arrive certainly or without missing at Knowledge and Truth which cannot be had without Evidence hence 't is his true Nature to be guided in his Way to acquire those Interiour Perfections of his Mind onely by Evidence without which he is liable to fall every Step he takes into the Precipice of Errour Nay 't is so clear a Truth that Man 's true Nature is onely to be guided in his Interiour Assents by Evidence that even in our Outward Actions which do not directly concern the perfecting our Soul and in which we can have no Evidence of their Success or of the Good they will certainly do us yet still we must unless we will incurr the Note of Folly have Evidence that it is better to act or better to venture otherwise we shall clearly act with some Precipitancy and against our true Nature Reason 16. Besides it is extream hard to take Right Measures of Probability Every Measure is a Certain Standard whereas Probabilities are not capable of any but like desultory Ignes-fatui whiffle now to this side now to that doubling and re-doubling so that none can take their just Dimension or Proportion They vary every Day oft-times every Hour and what 's more Probable this Minute may by some new Circumstance lately come to our Knowledge become less Probable the next perhaps Improbable Even the Highest Probabilities are not exempt from this Frailty and Fickleness I may think my House will certainly stand nor do I see any Reason to make the least Doubt of it A prudent Neighbour whom I take to be more Judicious than my self in such Things spies a Flaw or Crack near the Foundation which he thinks weakens it which makes it now Improbable it will stand and Probable it will fall Hereupon I send for an expert Master-Builder who has ten times the Skill of the other and he assures me that late Formidable Crack is nothing at all to the Firmness of the Foundation and therefore it will certainly stand Which said the Motive shifts Faces again and it becomes very Probable it will not fall Amongst School-men some hold that the Opinion of Three Doctors makes a Point Probable some think the Opinion of Two is sufficient some say One who has maturely weigh'd the Point will serve and in the mean time perhaps it is scarce Probable at most but Probable that any of these say True But then these Later say that it is certain that what Seven Learned Men agree in is Probable Let then these Seven Learned Men agree that what some One very Learned Man whom they nominate says makes the Thing Probable that One Man has the Virtue of all the Seven center'd in him and therefore that one single Learned Man's Opinion makes it Probable enough in all Conscience Where then shall we fix the Bounds or whence take any Certain Measures of Greater and Lesser Probabilities Whoever peruses and considers well the several Sorts of Probable Motives enumerated in my Method B. 3. L. 2. § 10. and by Mr. Locke here in his 15th and 16th Chapters will see tho' we have not reckon'd up half of them by reflecting on their Variety and their Crossness to one another abating the several Degrees of each how insuperable a Task it is to settle any fix'd Limits by which we can be constantly assur'd which sort of Probability is Greater or Lesser 'T is a Thousand times easier to establish absolutely certain Rules of Demonstration were Men but as zealous to pursue Truth as they love to talk at random either because they think that Noblest Quest not worth their Pains or perhaps because Palliated Scepticks inveigle them into a Conceit that Science is unattainable To obviate which Calumny has these Fifty Years been the Butt of my Endeavours 17. As for Authority this one Maxim pursu'd home secures us from being deceiv'd by relying on it viz. No Authority deserves Assent farther than Reason gives it to deserve So that all the Certainty of Authority is to be refunded into Intrinsecal Arguments taken from the Nature of Mankind the Attesters and the Nature I mean the Notoreity and Concern of the Things attested and thence ascertaining the Attesters Knowledge and Veracity Which if they can be demonstrated or put beyond Probability for till then none who are able to raise Doubts and see the Medium is Inconclusive can be bound in Reason to assent upon any Testimony even the Wisest Men may rationally Assent to what they attest otherwise not tho' weaker Arguments as I hinted above may suffice for the Vulgar and for our Outward Actions 18. To close my Reflexions on this Chapter I am apt to think that this Learned Author is here drawn aside from using his Excellent Reason to his best Advantage by apprehending some Things to be onely Probable which or the Certainty of the Authority for them are perfectly Demonstrable as in particular that of the Existence of Julius Caesar. The same I judge of these viz. That Alexander the Great conquer'd Asia that there are such Cities as Rome or Paris that the same Chances cannot light often upon a Hundred Dice that I shall not think over again in order the same Thoughts next Year as I did this and a Thousand such like Which perhaps many will take to be but highly Probable whereas I upon good Reason cannot but judge they are all of them Demonstrable But I am weary and hasten to an End 19. The last Chapter bears for its Title Of the Division of Sciences The two First General Branches of this Division are in my opinion Co-incident as will be seen hereafter However the Learned World is much oblig'd to the Author for putting Ethicks to be capable of Demonstration and a true Science But as to his Third Branch which he calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or the Doctrine of Signs I must confess I do not well know what to make of it For to make the Doctrine of Words to be a Science or part of Philosophy is to make Philosophy Wordish He defin'd Philosophy in his Preface to be The Knowledge of Things and here he seems to make the Knowledge of Words a part of Science or Philosophy taken distinctly from the Knowledge of Things which is his First Branch All Science is Connected Sense and both Sense and Science are in our Minds The Common Agreement of Men gives Words to be Signs Common Usage shews this Agreement Grammar helps them with Congruity Critick gathers from Authors or Derivations the Genuine Signification of such Words as are not so much worn by Common Use but mostly used by the Learned For when they are thus Common Critick is Useless Logick which is to direct our Reason and define our Notions so to keep our Thoughts or Discourses steady takes care they be not Ambiguous or if they be gives Rules to detect their Double Sense
the Ideists behaved themselves as to this Point 6. How far the Author engages to clear this Difficulty 7. The First Cause carries on the Course of Second Causes by Immediate Dispositions 8. And therefore he affists Nature if dispos'd when it cannot reach 9. Therefore if the Matter can be dispos'd for a Rational Soul God will give it 10. There can be such a Disposition in Matter 11. Therefore some Material Part by which immediately the Soul has Notions from the Objects 12. Therefore Effluviums are sent from Bodies to that Part. 13. Therefore Man is truly One Thing which is Corporeo-Spiritual 14. Therefore some Chief Part in him which is primarily Corporeo-Spiritual or has both those Natures in it 15. VVhich is affected according to both those Natures because of their Identification in that part 16. The peculiar Temper of that Part consists in Indifferency 17. That Part very tender and Sensible yet not Tenacious § 18. That Part the most Noble of all Material Nature 19. Perhaps 't is Reflexive of Light or Lucid. 20. The Effluviums have in them the Nature of the Bodies whence they are sent 21. They affect that Part as Things Distinct from the Man 22. VVhy they Imprint Abstract Notions 23. The peculiar Nature of our Soul renders those Notions perfectly Distinct and Indivisible 24. VVhence Complex Notions come 25. The Soul cannot alone produce any new Act in her self 26. But by the Phantasms exciting her a-new 27. How Reminiscence is made 28. Memory and Reminiscence Inexplicable unless Phantasms remain in the Brain The Manner how Reminiscence is made in Brutes 29. How Reflexion is connaturally made 30. Direct Notions are Common to all Mankind and their Words Proper Reflex ones Improper and their Words Metaphorical 31. Whence we come to have Negative Notions 32. But those Negative Notions do not abstract from the Subject 33. How we come to have a Notion of Nothing 34. Hence great Care to be had lest we take Non-Entities or Nothings for Things 35. Logical Notions are Real ones 36. The Test to try Artificial Notions Hence all Philosophy is Real Knowledge 37. How our Soul comes to have Phantastick Notions or as we call them Fancies How to avoid being deluded by them 38. How we may discourse evidently of those Natures of which we have no Proper Notions § 39. We can have no Proper Notion of God 's Essence 40. The Author speaks not here of Comparing Notions or of Judgments 41. The Author's Apology for this Discourse and what can be the onely Way to go about to confute it Preliminary Fifth § 1. THE Design of the Author here § 2. The Meaning of the Word Existence 3. The Extream Danger of Misconceiving it 4. The Meaning of Ens or Thing 5. The Meaning of Entity or Essence 6. The Meaning of Matter and Form or of Power and Act. 7. What is meant literally by the common Saying that Matter and Form compound Body 8. The Literal Meaning of Substantial or Essential Forms The Reason why some Moderns oppose Substantial or Essential Forms The Meaning of Metaphysical Composition and Divisibility 9. What is the Principle of Individuation 10. The Meaning of the Word Substance The Word Improper 11. That the Word Supporting and Inhering taken Metaphorically may be allow'd and ought not to be Ridicul'd 12. The Meaning of Suppositum or Hypostasis 13. The Meaning of Suppositality 14. The Meaning of the Word Individuum 15. The Meaning of Substantia Prima and Substantia Secunda 16. The Word Accidents is Improper § 17. The Word Modes more Proper 18. The Word Quantity is very Proper 19. The Word Extension very Improper 20. The Meaning of Divisibility Impenetrability Space and Measurability 21. A short Explication what Quantity Quality and Relation are 22. What Transcendents are 23. The Five Sorts of Transcendents 24. Great Care to be had that Transcendent Words be not held Univocal 25. What great Errours spring thence shewn in the Univocal Acception of the Transcendent Word Compounded 26. The Cartesians Unadvised in going ultra Crepidam Reflexion First § 1. THE Excellent Wit and Unbyass'd Ingenuity of the Author of the Essay acknowledg'd 2. 'T is probable he has taken a Prejudice against Metaphysicks 3. The Incomparable Excellency of the Science of Metaphysicks shewn from the Objects it treats of 4. And from the Manner by which it handles them 5. The Knowledge of these High Objects Attainable by Natural Reason 6. Mr. Locke's Tenet of no Innate Ideas Solidly Grounded and Unanswerable Reflexion Second § 1. IN what the Author agrees and disagrees with Mr. Locke 2. We may have Notions without perceiving we have them § 3. VVe may think without being Conscious that we think 4. 'T is impossible to be Conscious or know we know without a new Act of Reflexion 5. 'T is impossible to be Conscious of or know our present Reflex Act but by a new Reflex one Hence we can never come to know our Last Reflexion 6. 'T is utterly deny'd that Consciousness causes Individuation The Unreasonableness of the Opinion that Men do always think Reflexion Third § 1. NO Notion Simple but that of Existence The Order of our Notions is to be taken from Nature 2. The word Solidity arbitrarily and abusively taken by Mr. Locke 3. His Solidity not at all Essential to Body 4. Space without Body or Vacuum is a meer Groundless Fancy 5. The Contrary to that Tenet demonstrated 6. Therefore 't is impossible there should be any True Experiment to prove a Vacuum Reflexion Fourth § 1. MR. Locke's First Chapter commendable § 2. Privative Notions connotate the Subject 3. Meer Motions made upon the Senses Insufficient to give us Knowledge of the Objects 4. Sensible Qualities are the same in the Objects as in the Mind § 5. The Pretence of God's Voluntary Annexing Improper Causes to Effects is Unphilosophical 6. The Power in the Object to cause Sensation and Knowledge is improperly such Reflexion Fifth § 1. IDeas or Notions are not Actual Perceptions but the Object perceiv'd and durably remaining It destroys the Nature of Memory to make it consist in the Reviving Ideas The Mind cannot revive Perceptions 2. Ideas in the Fancy may fade but Notions are never blotted out of the Soul Reflexion Sixth § 1. IF Brutes can know they may have General Notions and Abstract and Compare too 2. The Distinguishing our Notions guides our Reason and Judgment right 3. All Complex Ideas or Notions must consist of Simpler ones united in the Thing 4. Otherwise they are Groundless Fancies 5. The Manner how all Complex Ideas or Notions are made elaborately explain'd 6. How the Doctrine of Cartesius Mr. Locke and J. S. differ as to this Point Reflection Seventh § 1. EXtension not well Explicated Immensity worse 2. Place well Explicated 3. Body and Extension not the same Notion § 4. Space cannot be without Extension 5. Extension and Space differ onely Formally or in some nice respect 6. The Common Explication of Extension defended 7.
Ens adequately divided into Body and Spirit 8. Vacuum must either be Res or Modus Rei otherwise we can have no Notion of it 9. The Extravagant Arguments for Vacuum refuted 10. VVe can set Bounds to Space Time and to all Durations but God's 11. Annihilation implies a Contradiction and is not an Act of Omnipotency but of Impotency 12. The Cartesians can hardly avoid Vacuum 13. The having an Idea of Vacuum distinct from that of Plenum no Argument to prove it Reflexion Eighth § 1. THE plain Sense of the Vulgar gives us the true Notion of Time 2. Duration is not Succession but rather Opposite to it 3. 'T is a strange Paradox to say the Notion of Succession or Duration is to be taken from the Train of Ideas in our Mind 4. Our not perceiving Duration when we Sleep no Argument for it 5. This Tenet is against Experience 6. And against the Nature of Things and of Resemblances too 7. One Motion if Known and Regular may and must be a Measure to another 8. There is no Shew of Reason that the Equality of the Periods of Duration can possibly be taken from the Train of our Ideas 9. This odd Tenet not positively asserted by Mr. Locke Reflexion Ninth § 1. IMaginary Time before the VVorld a meer Illusion of Fancy 2. They who advance Tenets against Nature must alter the Meaning of those VVords that express our Natural Notions 3. God's Immensity not Commensurate to an Infinitely Expanded Space 4. VVe can have no Notion of a Vacuum but a Fancy onely 5. Scripture-Texts the worst sort of Arguments for Philosophers unless they be most Plain and Literally meant 6. Onely Self-Existence and what flows from that Notion is peculiar to God 7. Our Natural Notions assure us that 't is meer Fancy to explicate God's Attributes by respect to Corporeal Natures Reflexion Tenth § 1. ENdless Addition of Numbers can never give us the Notion of Infinity 2. How we come to have that Notion 3. And with what Ease 4. The Notion of Infinite is most perfectly Positive 5. Duration easily conceivable without Succession Reflexion Eleventh § 1. THoughts are not to be called Sensations § 2. Thinking is the Action and not the Essence of the Soul § 3. Mr. Locke's Position that Things are Good or Evil onely in reference to Pleasure or Pain is True and Solid Reflexion Twelfth § 1. THE due Commendation of Mr. Locke's Doctrine in this Chapter of Power 2. That some Spiritual Agent is the First Mover of Bodies The VVill cannot move our Bodies 3. The Understanding and VVill not Distinct Powers 4. Man's Freedom or Self-Determination deduced from Principles 5. The Difference between Men and Brutes in their Determination to Action 6. Man naturally pursues what is according to Reason or Virtuous Therefore his Nature has been perverted since his Creation 7. Therefore Supernatural Motives are added to strengthen Man's Weaken'd Nature or Reason 8. Supernatural Motives being the Stronger would always prevail were they duely apply'd to a Subject disposed 9. Why the Understanding and VVill must be the same Power Substantially 10. How to Conquer in our Spiritual Warfare 11. 'T is evident that Man Determins himself to Action 12. Yet as Pre-determin'd by God 13. Determination to Virtuous Action does perfect and not destroy Freedom 14. Good if evidently appearing such does certainly Determin the VVill. 15. How Wrong Judgments come § 16. Sin generally springs from True but Disproportionate Judgments 17. Of Uneasiness and Mr. Locke's Discourse concerning it 18. Good is the onely Determiner of the Will and not Uneasiness 19. Prov'd from our Natural Defire of Happiness 20. The Appearance of Good is of Greatest Weight but in a manner disregarded by Mr. Locke 21. Putting this Appearance his Reasons do not conclude 22. Prov'd because Ease is not the Perfection of a Soul 23. The Truth of this Point stated 24. Mr. Locke omits here the Idea of Power to be a Thing tho' Nature suggests and forces it Reflexion Thirteenth § 1. OUR Mixture of our Notions is Regular Mr. Locke's Irregular and Disorderly 2. Without knowing what Substance or Thing is we cannot pretend to Philosophy 3. All our Notions and amongst them that of Substance or Res is taken from the Thing 4. We cannot be Ignorant of the Notion of Substance or Thing 5. We know the more Inferiour Notions of Things less perfectly And Individual Essence the least of all 6. To gain a Distinct Notion of Substance or Thing we must consider it abstractedly from its Modes singly Consider'd 7. The Literal Truth how Substance and its Accidents or the Thing and its Modes are exactly known § 8. 'T is impossible not to know Extension it being in a manner Self-evident 9. The Cohesion of Extended Parts is above Physical Proofs and can onely be known by Metaphysicks 10. Whence 't is in vain to seek for Natural Efficient Causes for those Effects that depend on Formal Causes 11. We may have Clear Knowledge of Spiritual Natures by Reflexion 12. The Reason why and the Manner how Reflexion Fourteenth § 1. THE Mind alone does not collect Notions or compare them 2. Verbal Relations come not from Defect in our Language but for want of a Real Ground 3. What Causality is and what Grounds the Relations of Cause and Effect 4. The Knowing the Principle of Individuation must antecede the Knowledge of Identity and Diversity 5. What gives the Ground to specifie all Notions 6. What gives the Ground to our Notions of the Individuum 7. How Individual Men are constituted 8. Existence cannot possibly be the Principle of Individuation 9. The Outward Circumstances of Time and Place cannot conduce to constitute the Individual Essence 10. An Individual Man is formally an Individual Thing of that Kind and an Individual Person too § 11. The Essence of Things not to be taken from the Judgment of the Vulgar nor from Extravagant Suppositions 12. Consciousness cannot constitute Personal Identity 13. That Consciousness is Inseparable from every Individual Man 14. Yet Angels who are pure Acts are Constituted in part by the Act of Knowing themselves 15. No Soul is Indifferent to any Matter The Notion of the Individuum is Essential The Substance is the same tho' some Quantity of the Matter does come and go Reflexion Fifteenth § 1. THat is onely True Virtue which is according to Right Reason 2. How we come to have Confus'd Ideas or Notions 3. The VVhole Thing as it needs not so it cannot be known clearly 4. The Metaphysical Reason why this Complexion of Accidents which constitutes Individuums should be almost infinitely Various 5. VVe can Sufficiently know Things without Comprehending fully this Complexion 6. No Formal Truth or Falshood in Ideas or Notions Reflexion Sixteenth § 1. WHence Proper and Metaphorical Notions and VVords have their Origin 2. The General Rules to know the Right Sense of VVords § 3. Words of Art most liable to be mistaken 4. The Way how to avoid being
Point elucidated by Abstract and Concrete Words Hence Space without Body or Vacuum is a Contradiction The State of the Question Aristotle neglects to shew particularly how Knowledge was made Later Philosophers were at a great puzzle about it How the Schools explicated this Point How the Ideists behav'd themselves as to this Point How far the Author engages to clear this Difficulty The First Cause carries on the Course of Second Causes by Immediate Dispositions And therefore he assists Nature if Dispos'd when it cannot reach Therefore if the Matter can be Dispos'd for a Rational Soul GOD will give it There can be such a Disposition in Matter Therefore some Material Part by which immediately the Soul has Notions from the Object Therefore Effluviums are sent from Bodies to that Part. Therefore Man is truly One Thing which is Corporeo-Spiritual Therefore some Chief Part in him which is primarily Corporeo-Spiritual or has both those Natures in it Which is affected according to both those Natures because of their Identification in that Part. The Peculiar Temper of that Part consists in Indifferency That Part very Tender and Sensible yet not Tenacious That part the most Noble of all Material Nature Perhaps 't is Reflexive of Light or Lucid. The Effluviums have in them the Naturee of the Bodies whence they are sent They affect that Part as Things Distinct from the Man Why they imprint Abstract Notions The Peculiar Nature of our Soul renders those Notions perfectly distinct and Indivisible Whence Complex Notions come * Method to Science Book 1. Less 3. § 2. The Soul cannot Alone produce any New Act in her self But by the Phantasms exciting her anew How Reminiscence is made Memory and Reminiscence inexplicable unless Phantasms remain in the Brain The manner how Reminiscence is made in Brutes How Reflexion is connaturally made Direct Notions common to all Mankind and their Words Proper Reflex ones Improper and their Words Metaphorical Whence we come to have Negative Notions But Negative Notions as they are Negative do not abstract from the Subject How we come to have a Notion of Nothing Hence great Care is to be had lest we take Non-Entities or Nothings for Things Logical Notions are Real ones The Test to try Artificial Notions * See Method to Science B. 1. L. 7. §. 13 14. Hence all Philosophy is Real Knowledge How our Soul comes to have Phantastick Notions or as we call them Fancies How to avoid being deluded by them How we may discourse evidently of those Natures of which we have no Proper Notions We can have no Proper Notion of GOD's Essence The Author speaks not here of Comparing Notions or of Judgments The Author's Apology for this Discourse and what can be the only way to go about to confute it The Design of the Author here * Book 1. Less 11. The Meaning of the word Existence * Method 1. B. 1. L. 2. § 14. The Extreme Danger of Misconceiving it The meaning of Ens or Thing * B. 3. L. 7. * Ibid. The Meaning of Entity or Essence The Meaning of Matter and Form or of Power and Act. What 's meant literally by the common saying that Matter and Form compound Body The Literal Meaning of Substantial or Essential Forms The Reason why some Moderns oppose Substantial or Essential Forms The Meaning of Metaphysical Composition and Divisibility What is the Principle of Individuation The Meaning of the word Substance The word Improper That the words Supporting and Inhering taken metaphorically may be allow'd and ought not to be Ridicul'd The meaning of Suppositum or Hypostasis The Meaning of Suppositality The Meaning of the word Individuum The Meaning of Substantia Prima and SubstantiaSecunda The VVord Accidents is improper The Word Mode more proper The VVord Quantity is very Proper The VVord Extension very improper The Meaning of Divisibility Impenetrability Space and Measurability A Short Explication what Quantity Quality and Relation are VVhat Transcendents are The Five Sorts of Transcendents Great Care to be had that Transcendent VVords be not held Univocal VVhat great Errors spring thence shown in the Univocal Acception of the Transcendent word Compounded The Cartesians unadvis'd in going ultra Crepidam The Excellent Wit and Unbyassed Ingenuity of the Author of the Essay acknowledged 'T is Probable he has taken a Prejudice against Metaphysicks The Incomparable Excellency of the Science of Metaphysicks shewn from the Objects it treats of And from the Manner by which it handles them The Knowledge of these high Objects attainable by Natural Reason Mr. Locke's Tenet of no Innate Ideas Solidly Grounded and Unanswerable In what the Author agrees and disagrees with Mr. Locke We may have Notions without perceiving we have them We may Think without being Conscious that we Think 'T is impossible to be Conscious or know we know without a new Act of Reflexion 'T is impossible to be Conscious of or know our present Reflex Act but by a new Reflex one Hence we can never come to know our last Reflexion 'T is utterly deny'd that Consciousness causes Individuation The Unreasonableness of the Opinion that Men do always think No Notion Simple but that of Existence The Order of our Notions is to be taken from Nature The Word Solidity arbitrarily and abusively taken by M. L. His Solidity not at all Essential to Body Space without Body or Vacuum is a meer Groundless Fancy The Contrary to that Tenet Demonstrated Therefore 't is impossible there should be any True Experiment to prove a Vacuum * Method to Science B. 1. L. 2. §. 14. Mr. Locke's First Chapter commendable Privative Notions must Connotate the Subject * See Prelim. 3. §. 9 10 11. Meer Motions made upon the Senses Insufficient to give us Knowledge of the Objects * Prelim. 4. §. 26 27 28 c. Sensible Qualities are the same in the Objects as in the Mind The Pretence of GOD's Voluntary Annexing Improper Causes to Effects is Unphilosophical The Power in the Object to cause Sensation and Knowledge is Improperly such * B. 1. L. 7. §. 9 10 11. Ideas or Notions are not Actual Perceptions but the Object perceiv'd and durably remaining It destroys the Nature of Memory to make it consist in the Reviving Ideas The Mind cannot revive Perceptions * Prelim. 4. § 26 27 28. Ideas in the Fancy may fade but Notions are never blotted out of the Soul If Brutes can know they may have General Notions and Abstract and Compare too The distinguishing our Notions guides our Reason and Judgment right All Complex Ideas or Notions must consist of simpler ones united in the Thing Otherwise they are Groundless Fancies The Manner how all Complex Ideas or Notions are made elaborately explain'd How the Doctrine of Cartesius Mr. Locke and J. S. differ as to this point Extension not well Explicated Immensity worse Place well explicated Body and Extension not the same Notion Space cannot be without Extension Extension and Space differ only Formally or in some
nice respect The Common Explication of Extension defended Ens adequately divided into Body and Spirit Vacuum must either be Res or Modus Rei otherwise we can have no Notion of it * Preliminary 4. §. 39. The Extravagant Arguments for Vacuum refuted Psal. 103. v. 24. We can set Bounds to Space Time and to all Duration but GOD's Annihilation implies a Contradiction and is not an Act of Omnipotency but of Impotency The Cartesians can hardly avoid Vacuum The having an Idea of Vacuum distinct from that of Plenum no Argument to prove it The plain Sense of the Vulgar gives us the true Notion of Time Duration is not Succession but rather opposit to it 'T is a strange Paradox to say the Notion of Succession or Duration is to be taken from the Train of Ideas in our Head Our not Perceiving Duration when we Sleep no Argument for it This Tenet is against Experience And against the Nature of Things and of Resemblances too One Motion if Known and Regular may and must be a Measure to another There is no shew of Reason that the Equality of the Periods of Duration can possibly be taken from the Train of our Ideas This odd Tenet not positively asserted by Mr. L. ImaginaryTime before the World a meer Illusion of Fancy They who advance Tenets against Nature must alter the Meaning of those Words that express our Natural Notions God's Immensity not Commensurate to an Infinitely Expanded Space We can have no Notion of a Vacuum but a Fancy only Scripture-Texts the worst sort of Arguments for Philosophers unless they be most Plain and Literally meant Only Self Existence and what flows from that Notion is Peculiar to GOD. Our Natural Notions assure us that 't is meer Fancy to explicate GOD's Attributes by respect to Corporeal Natures Endless Addition of Numbers can never give us the Notion of Infinity How we come to have that Notion * Prelim. 4. § 31 32. And with what Ease The Notion of Infinite is most perfectly Positive Duration easily conceivable without Succession * James 1. 17. * Apocal. cap. 1. v. 7. Thoughts are not to be call'd Sensations Thinking is the Action and not the Essence of the Soul Mr. L.'s Position that Things are Good or Evil only in reference to Pleasure or Pain is True and Solid The due Commendation of Mr. L's Doctrine in this Chapter of Power That some Spiritual Agent is the First Mover of Bodies The Will cannot move our Bodies * Preliminary 4. §. 25. 26. Refl 5. §. 1. The Understanding and Will not Distinct Powers Man's Freedom or Self determination deduced from Principles The Difference between Man and Brutes in their Determination to Action Man naturally pursues what is according to Reason or Virtuous Therefore his Nature has been perverted since his Creation Therefore Supernatural Motives are added to strengthen Man's weaken'd Nature or Reason Supernatural Motives being the stronger would always prevail were they duly Apply'd to a Subject dispos'd Why the Understanding and Will must be the same Power substantially How to conquer in our Spiritual Warfare 'T is evident that Man determines himself to Action Yet as Predetermin'd by GOD. Determination to Virtuous Action does perfect and not destroy Freedom Good if evidently Appearing such does certainly determine the Will How Wrong Judgments come Sin generally springs from True but Disproportionate Judgments Of Uneasiness and Mr. L's discourse concerning it Good is the only Determiner of the Will and not Uneasiness Prov'd from our Natural Desire of Happiness The Appearance of the Good is of greatest weight but in a manner disregarded by Mr. Locke Putting this Appearance his Reasons do not conclude Prov'd because Ease is not the Perfection of a Soul The Truth of this Point stated Mr. L. omits here the Idea of Power to be a Thing tho' Nature suggests iâ— Our Mixture of our Notions is Regular Mr. L.'s Irregular and Disorderly Without knowing what Substance or Thing is we cannos pretend to Philosophy All our Notions and amongst them that of Substance or Res is taken from the Thing We cannot be Ignorant of the Notion of Substance or Thing We know the more Inferiour Notions of Things less perfectly And the Individual Essence least of all To gain a Distinct Notion of Substance or Thing me must consider it abstractedly from its Modes singly consider'd The Literal Truth how Substance and its Accidents or the Thing and its Modes are distinctly known 'T is impossible not to know Extension is being in a manner Self-evident The Cohesion of Extended Parts is above Physical Proofs and can only be known by Metaphysicks Whence 't is in vain to seek for Natural Efficient Causes for those Effects that depend on Formal Causes We may have Clear Knowledge of Spiritual Natures by Reflexion The Reason Why and the Manner How * Reflex 9. §. 7. * See Method to Science B. 4. C. 6. §. 18. The Mind alone does not collect Notions or compare them Verbal Relations come not from Defect in our Language but for want of a Real Ground What Causality is and what grounds the Relations of Cause and Effect The Knowing the Principle of Individuation must anteceede the Knowledge of Identity and Diversity What gives the Ground to Specify all Notions What gives the Ground to our Notions of the Individuum How Individual Men are constituted * Method to Science B. 2. L. 1. §. 10. Existence cannot possibly be the Principle of Individuation The Outward Circumstances of Time and Place cannot conduce to constitute the Individual Essences An Individual Man is formally an Individual Thing of that Kind and an Individual Person too The Essence of Things not to be taken from the Judgment of the Vulgar nor from Extravagant Suppositions Consciousness cannot constitute Personal Identity * Reflex 2. § 2 3 4 5. That Consciousnes is Inseparable from every Individual Man Yet Angels who are Pure Acts are constituted in part by the Act of Knowing themselves No Soul is Indifferent to any Matter The Notion of the Individuum is Essential The Substance is the same tho' some Quantity of the Matter does come and go That is only true Virtue which is according to Right Reason How we come to have Confused Ideas or Notions The whole Thing as it needs not so it cannot be known clearly The Metaphysical Reason why this Complexion of Accidents which constitutes Individuums should be almost infinitely various * Job 36. 26. We can sufficiently know Things without comprehending fully this Câ—mplexion No Formal Truth or Falshood in Ideas or Notions Whence Proper and Metaphorical Notions and Words have their Origin The General Rules to know the right Sense of Words Words of Art most liable to be mistaken The way how to avoid being mistaken in Words of Art Even in Terms of Art the Thing is chiefly signify'd Metaphysical Words not Unintelligible but most Clear This Third Book concerning Words seems Unnecessary Whence J. S. is not much concern'd to
or Natures of Thing or of such a Thing and both the first of them and also all the rest are nothing but the Thing diversly Consider'd The Conceptions or Notions of the Modes or Accidents are innumerable but there is only One which is the Conception of Thing it self which we find to be this that 't is Capable to be or exist and this Notion or which is the same the Object thus consider'd we call Ens Res Substance or Thing The other Notions we have of it such as are Big Qualify'd Related c. have neither Being nor any Order to Being in their signification or peculiar Notion as had the other Wherefore since Nature tells us that we must first conceive the Thing to be ere we can conceive it to be after such and such a manner nor can the Mode or Manner be apprehended to be of its single self capable to be otherwise than as it is annext to what 's Capable to be by its self or by its own peculiar Nature that is as it is identify'd with it therefore no Mode or Accident can exist by Virtue of its own Idea or Notion but in Virtue of the Notion of Thing or Substance with which therefore tho' formally Different they are all materially Identify'd Or thus more briefly Had not the Thing somewhat in it which grounds this true Conception of it that 't is Capable to be none of the Accidents they all wanting in their Notion any Order to Being could be conceiv'd to be at all And this in Literal Truth is the great Mystery of those Positions about which Disputants in the Schools blinded with their own ill-understood Metaphors have so long like Andabatae fought in the dark about such Questions as these viz. Whether the Essence of the Accidents is their Inexistence or Inherence in the Substance Whether the Substance supports them in Being Is their Substratum or the Subject in which those Accidental Forms do Inhere Then in pursuance of their Fanciful Metaphor some of them begin to cast about how those Forms are United to the Subject or Substance or come to be received in it in order to which and that nothing may be wanting to do the work thorowly they coyn a new connecting little Entity call'd an Union to soder them together and so instead of making it One Entity they very wisely make Three All which Conceits if we look narrowly into them have at the bottom this mistake that all our several Conceptions have so many distinct Entities in the Thing corresponding to them Which vast Errour both perverts all true Philosophy and is against a First Principle in Metaphysicks by making Unum to be Divisum in se or One Entity to be Many Now if these Modes be Things or to speak more properly if the Notion of every manner of a Thing be the formal Notion of the Thing it self or of what 's Capable of Existing first the Nature of Modes is destroy'd for they will be no longer the How but the What and the Nature or Notion of Substance or Ens is lost too for if all the Modes are Distinct Entities or Capable of Existing they must all be Substances which blends all the Notions Mankind has or can have on the perfect Distinction of which all Science is grounded in a perfect Confusion and consequently reduces all our Knowledge to a Chaos of Ignorance 8 But I wonder most how this Learned Man can think none knows what Extension is We cannot open our Eyes but they inform us that the Air and other Bodies which which we see are not cramp'd into an Indivisible but are vastly Expanded or which is the same Extended May we not as well say we may see Light and yet have no Notion of it And does not himself make Extension to be one of his Simple Ideas the Knowledge of which goes along with all the Knowledges we have of Bodies and withall resembles the Thing For what thinks he serves an Idea but to make Men Know by it what it represents or consequently an Idea of Extension but to make us know Extension Perhaps he may think we cannot know it because we cannot define or explicate it but in Words Equivalent to it But first this Objection has no Ground because all Definitions and Explications in the World are the same Sense with the Notion they Define and Explicate and were it not so they would be no Definitions nor Explications of that Notion for they do no more but give us all the Parts of the Entire Notion and all the Parts are the same as the Whole Next how does it follow that because we cannot explicate it we do not know it Whereas the direct contrary follows in our present Case For the commonest Notions can the worst be defin'd because they least need it being Self-known or Self-evident Not all the Wit of Man can Define and Explicate what it is to be and yet all Mankind knows it perfectly or else it is impossible they not knowing what the Copula means should know the Truth or Falshood of any Proposition whatever Thirdly He seems to think that as some of the School-men do imagin Contradictory Positions may follow out of the Notion of Extension else why should he imagin the Difficulties concerning it are Inextricable Which I must declare against as the the worst piece of Scepticism next to the denying all First Principles For if Contradictory Positions may follow out of any Notion taken from the Thing then that Notion and consequently the Thing it self would not have any Metaphysical Verity in it but be purely Chimerical Add that the learned Thomas Albius in his Excellent Preface before the Latin Edition of Sir Kenelm Digby's Treatise of Bodies has clearly solv'd those Imaginary Contradictions 9. To shew the Difficulty of Knowing Extension he objects that no Reason can be given for the Cohesion of the Parts of Extended Matter If he means that we can give no. Physical Reason for it or such an one as fetch'd from the Qualities or Operations of Bodies I grant it for all those Qualities and Operations are Subsequent to the Notion of Extension and Grounded on it But if he thinks there cannot be a far Better and Clearer Reason given from the Supream Science Metaphysicks I deny it I explain my self All Positions that concern the Essences of Things or Modes either do belong to the Object of Metaphysicks so that whoever makes the Natures or Essences of any of these not to be what they are is most clearly convinced by his violating that Metaphysical First Principle A Thing is what it is to maintain a clear Contradiction If then Divisibility be the Essence of Quantity and Divisibility signifies Unity of the Potential Parts of Quantity and Continuity as making those Parts formally Indivisas in se be evidently the Unity proper to those Parts it follows that Quantity being the Common Affection of Body does formally and as necessarily make its whole Subject that is
Man is perform'd by the Concurrence of both those Parts Whence in every Act of his Soul he must be re-excited by some Object that is out of the Soul either striking on his Senses or else by the repeated Strokes of the Material Phantasms lodg'd within upon the Seat of Knowledge These propose a-fresh the Motives and continue those Impressions all the while he deliberates compares discourses and determins and when the Man according to that part call'd the Fancy is full as it were of those Agreeable Phantasms and consequently the Soul hic est nunc is full too of those Notions or Apprehensions of their Agreeableness the Whole Man acts for them and moves to attain them In which Case what is purely Material in those Actions or belonging meerly to Corporeal Motion is refunded into the Stupendious Contrivance of the Body whose Motions follow connaturally from the Phantasms in the same way as it does in Brutes which is equally wonderful we knowing no more than they that is not at all how it is done But the Manner of the Action as to its Design Direction wise Ordering of it and its Proceeding from Knowledge Freedom and Reason all which we know it does springs peculiarly from the Soul or from Man according to his Spiritual Part. Now the Fundamental Ground of my Position is this Man is not Two Things nor which is the same made up of Soul and Body as two Actual Parts but One Thing of which consequently those two are Potential Parts onely Wherefore neither of those Parts is Actually but the Whole and therefore neither of them alone can Act because neither of them exists alone * the Existence of the Thing being that in which its Virtue of Operating consists But in truth his Argument proceeds as well from this Topick as it does from that of meer Thought moving the Body for we can comprehend as little how Man tho' acting with his Phantasms and Thoughts too does move the Body and all its Distinct Parts so variously as how the Thought alone can do it Nor were there some Flaw in this Particular does it prejudice his main Demonstration of a Deity they being Distinct Questions Add that if we may conjecture from some Expressions of his in other places he may perhaps be of my Opinion in this Point and by the Word Mind mean the Man tho' in many places he speaks very Ambiguously or rather seems too plainly to maintain the contrary Position 7. I take leave on this Occasion to recommend it to Speculative Men to endeavour to draw all their Demonstrations from the Nature of the Thing this being the onely solid way and not from Foreign Topicks After we have prov'd a Deity let us next demonstrate that God is Self-existent or that his Essence or Nature is Existence and then all that concerns the Deity or his Immediate Operations nay even the Rational Explication of the Trinity it self will if Right Logick and Reflexion be not wanting follow more solidly and more clearly than the clearest Mathematical Conclusions if we rate Clearness and Evidence as we ought not from the Figures on Paper which make it easie to our Fancy but from the greater Simplicity and Clearness of the Notions and their Terms and of their equally-evident Connexion which coming nearest to First and Self-evident Principles do most firmly establish the Judgment 8. The 11th Chapter treats Of our Knowledge of the Existence of other Things by which words he means other Things than our selves He seems to ground his Discourse on this Position that no particular Man can know the Existence of any other Being but only when by Actually operating upon him it makes it self perceiv'd by him which he calls the Way of Sensation or Experience Now if by the Words any other Being he means Bodies nothing can be more Solid or worthy a Philosopher But why we may not gather by our Reason the Existence of Spiritual Beings or Angels tho' they do not operate upon us actually from some Operation on other Things in Nature that can onely proceed from them I cannot discern Rather I hope I have demonstrated we can in my Method Book 3. Less 6. Thesis 4. Indeed the Notions of Angelical Natures are not proper ones as our Natural Notions which are imprinted by Sensation are which makes our Conceptions and consequently the Words which we use when we discourse of them Metaphorical Nor matters it that our Expressions concerning them are oft-times Negative or signifie that they are not such Beings as Bodies are but Immaterial Unextended Indivisible and consequently their Operations Unsuccessive in regard we intend all the while to signifie by those Words a Positive Being tho' our low Natural Conceptions cannot reach its particular Nature as in it self And if we intend this then this is the meaning of those Words or our Notion of them Meaning and Intention being all one Yet these Predicates tho' Negative or Metaphorical are notwithstanding truly said of them and therefore we can Argue and Discourse as consequently from them as we can from the most Positive or Proper Notions we have Indeed as Mr. Locke says well § 12. we cannot know they exist by the Ideas we have of them in our Minds and the Reason is because those Ideas or Notions taking them as â—â—stinct are but Inadequate Conceptions of the Thing and consider'd distinctly are formally but a part of that Complexion of Accidents that constitute the Individuum which only is capable of Existing or the Whole because Parts cannot exist out of the Whole But he is much mistaken if he thinks we can no more know they are Capable of Existing by the Notions we have of them than we can that Centaurs are For the Idea or Fancy of Centaurs involves Inconsistent Notions in its very Nature or rather No-Nature which the Notion of a Subsistent Spirit called an Angel does not Add that Knowing Willing and Operating which we attribute to such Beings are all Positive Notions and Consistent or capable to meet in a Spiritual Thing 9. Whereas Mr. Locke says we can onely know the Existence of any Other Thing when it operates upon us and therefore we know it is actually by Sensation I cannot see the least reason why we should not know our own Being by Sensation too as well as that of other Bodies without having recourse to Intuition which apply'd to that Case 't is hard to understand or to know how it differs from the direct Knowledge had by Sensation or Experience We can hear see feel and smell some parts of our own Body as well as we can those of Others Indeed now when we are ripe for more express Knowledges those Impressions made by one of our own Parts upon others do not cause in us the Notion of Existence tho' perhaps they may tacitly repeat it because we know already and before-hand that we do exist But put case we did not would not these Impressions make us know by
Charity and Forbearance Tho' the Demonstrations of Learned Men do much Good yet I am sure the want of Charity does more Harm 'T is in the highest manner Preternatural that Rational Souls should be forced or dealt with any other way than by Reason unless they come to wrong Common Morality or the Peace of the Common wealth in which they live both which are so evidently against the Law of Nature that their Reason must needs see and acknowledge it unless most wickedly blinded with Passion and Vice Alas what Silly Reasons do good Weak People take for Certain and are convinced by them as perfectly as we are by the Clearest Demonstration And which more obliges us to pity them if we propose to them strong Reasons they are too weighty for their weak Strength to wield and their own ridiculous ones do sute better with their Size and Pitch of Wit 10. I am clearly of Mr. L's Judgment concerning the Degrees of Probability in several matters as also that in Traditional Truths each Remove weakens the force of the Proof if it descends meerly as he expresses it by the way of the Hearsay of a Hearsay The bare Narative must either be supported by a Consonant Frequent Open and Obligatory Practise and be strengthen'd by the Acknowledged High Concern of Perpetuating the Matter of Fact attested or it may in time dwindle away into a feeble Tittle-tattle And I very much esteem his Remark as both very Acute and very Solid that no Probability in Historical Relation can arise higher than its First Original unless that First Original were afterwards abetted and corroborated by other Motives His Allowance of the Validity of the Testimony for Miracles is Wise and Pious and his making Divine Revelation to be the highest Certainty is well becoming a Christian Philosopher For all our Knowledge whatever is taken from Things made and establish'd by God as the First Cause and therefore if it be Certain that God's Revelation or Testimony stands engag'd for any Point the Truth of that Point is prov'd by a Nobler Stronger and Higher Medium than can be drawn from Physicks or even Metaphysicks that is from the Soveraign Cause of all those Objects whence those respective Mediums are taken and by whom onely they they have any Truth at all in them no not so much as their Metaphysical Verity it self 11. It would not be impertinent on this Occasion to present Mr. Locke with a short Story A very Judicious Cantabrigian desir'd to know of me whether we ought not to assent to a Point of Christian Faith supposing it was evidently Reveal'd more firmly than to any Scientifical Conclusion I answer'd that we ought He ask'd Why Alledging that since there could not be any greater Certainty that it was reveal'd than Demonstration the Assent to the Conclusion could not in true Reason be more Firm than that which a Demonstration produces or than the Conclusion of any Science For let the Syllogism be this Whatever God said is True But God said there will be a Resurrection of our Bodies Therefore there will be such a Resurrection None can pretend said he any greater Certainty than that of Science for the Certainty of the Authority that gave us the Minor therefore since Conclusio sequitur deteriorem partem the Assent to the Conclusion can be in true Reason no greater than that of Science I reply'd that that Saying of the Logicians was meant of the Particularity or Negativeness found in the Premisses and not of the Force of the Medium I alledg'd that the Major had the greater Influence upon the Conclusion whence that Proposition so called had its Appellation than the Minor which was onely an Applier of the Force of the Major to some Particular or some other Notion in order to conclude concerning it and therefore the Certainty of the Conclusion was chiefly to be rated from the Force of the Major Whence those Enthymems which have the Major for their Antecedent are more Natural than those which have the Minor I insisted that the Divine Authority being alledg'd for the onely Medium or Motive for all Revealed Points whatever our Assent to the Verity of all such Points was onely to be refunded into It and that it lost not its Force by its being apply'd by a weaker Medium to some Particular provided that Supream Authority's standing engag'd for that Particular were closely Apply'd to our Mind which is done by absolute Certainty and Evidence To illustrate which I brought this Instance Let there be two Agents whereof the one is Calidum ut octo the other Calidum ut duo and both of them apply'd to the same Patient equally it will not follow from this Equal Application that they will have an Equal Effect but the Heat produced by the one will be more Intense than that which was caused by the other So supposing two Syllogisms the Minors of which are both known by Science but of the Majors one is known onely by Science the other by an infinitely higher Evidence viz. by the Essential Veracity of the Divine Authority it will not follow from the Equal Application of it by the respective Minors to this or that Particular Subsum'd under them that the Assent to the two Conclusions which is the Effect they are to produce in our Minds will be Equal but they will operate according to their Several Forces provided the Force of both be but Closely apply'd to our Minds so to make it work its Full Effect which is done by seeing both the Minors to be Absolutely Certain and Evident I have not Time to dilate on this high Point as it deserves but leave it to the Sober Reflexion of all Judicious Lovers of Truth who seriously desire that Christian Principles may approve themselves to be in all respects perfectly Rational And 't is a Duty we all owe to our selves and to the World to shew that Christian Faith does not pervert or impair but perfect and exalt our Reason REFLEXION 22th ON The 17th 18th 19th and Last CHAPTERS 1. THis Learned Author states Reason very right in all its Parts but I believe he mistakes the right End Intention and Use of Syllogisms and that while he opposes them he takes his Measures from the Modern School-way of Syllogistick Arguing and the little Fruit it has yielded Such Forms of Reasoning were certainly never intended for the Vulgar as by his Discourse he seems to apprehend nor for Men of good Mother-Wits to attain Ordinary Knowledge by casting their Thoughts in those Exact Molds For Mankind could use their Reason and improve in it too nay could draw their Consequences generally very well before Syllogistick Reasoning came in fashion tho' they could not so well make it out to themselves or others why the Consequence must follow nor refund it into its Causes and so set it above Contest by reducing it to Evidence Their own Natural Genius taught them to discourse right very often unreflectingly as
it does also the Vulgar in Things within their Ken. In process of Time Reflecters upon Nature finding as it were by Experience that some Discourses were evidently Consequent some not they began to cast about and find out by what Virtue some Discourses came to be so evidently Conclusive above others And to this end Art if truly such being nothing but a deep Inspection into Nature they set themselves to anatomize and dissect a Rational Discourse that so they might discover the hidden Nerves and Ligaments that gave Force and Connexion to the whole They found that such a Discourse did consist of three main Parts call'd Propositions and each of these again of three lesser parts called by them Subject Copula and Predicate all which had Distinct Natures and Offices in the Discourse They discover'd that the Connexion of the two Terms in the Conclusion in which consists the Truth of it depended on their Connexion with a Third or Middle Term in the Premisses and that if they be not connected with it or Immediate but Remote from it as all Common Mediums are which beget Probabilities nothing is concluded and so the Conclusion may for any thing we know be False They observ'd hence that there could be but Three Terms in such a Discourse and that were they more it caused a Blunder and Inconsequence Hence they took Care those three Terms should be so placed as would render the Connexion of the other Two with the Medium most Clear at First Sight This done they treated of each of those Greater and Lesser Parts that is of Propositions and Notions singly and apart adding such Rules as they saw convenient for each From these Observations laid orderly together sprung the Art of Logick and all the Rudiments belonging to it All which have their Force from Nature nor ought any thing be esteemed Art but what has honest downright Nature for its Ground And I hope that in every Tittle of my whole Method I have not one Argument in those many Trains of Consequences I have drawn there throughout it that is not taken from the Nature of the Thing in hand Now things standing thus who can think Logick or Syllogism the main End of it are to be slighted as of little or no use Can any Man think that Art and Reflexion do add no Advantage to Untaught Nature Or that our Rude Natural and Common Reason may not be Cultivated and Improv'd as well as our Natural Voice Walking and Handling may be better'd by being taught to Sing Dance or Play on the Lute Artificially 2. I am very apt to think that at first the Inventers of Logick and Syllogisms did never intend to use them perpetually themselves nor to instruct others in any Science by using constantly that Method Since neither Aristotle nor any other Author I ever read Ancient or Modern ever went about to deliver a Scheme of Doctrine in a Syllogistick way But that after they had by Study and Reflexion found out in what their Evidence lay they made use of them as Exemplars or Tests by which they might try whether their Loose and Dishevell'd Discourses had an Evident and Necessary Connexion of Terms at the bottom or else in some Signal Occasions to confute and convince an Acute or Obstinate Adversary especially if the Auditory and Judges of the Dispute were Men of Learning For which Reason that way is still continued in Learned Assemblies Such as the Schools often are and always should be But when at length that way grew too common and that Sophisters and Bunglers would needs constantly use It and It only in their extempore Disputes which could be manag'd right and as they ought by none but those who were exact Masters of Logick it came at length to degenerate into insipid Artless Wrangle and Talking at random For the Multitude of ill-understood and barbarous School-terms encreased frivolous Distinctions as I lately instanced grew rife Principles were either neglected or else supplied by their Masters 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Natures of Things and the Ways dictated by Nature were left off and hence it came that no Progress was made in Science nor any Point decisively concluded 3. In divers parts of this Discourse I doubt not but Mr. Locke agrees with me What I disagree with him in is 1. I deny that in Learned and Philosophical Discourses for which Syllogisms were intended the Mind can perceive the Connexion of the Proofs where it really is as easily nay perhaps better without them Certainly the seeing the middle Term placed in the middle as it ought will make a Reflecting Man see better the Connexion of the Terms whence besides its own aptness to connect it comes even by vertue of its place to be seen to be Immediate to each of the Extremes and so more apt to connect them Again In a Syllogism there is no Necessary Word left out nor one Unnecessary Word put in whereas in Loose Discourses this last is always wanting And can we think it adds no degree of Clearness to the Discourse to keep it from being pester'd with many Unnecessary Words in many of which there will not want Ambiguity Nor is this all for in Loose Discourses the fine Language and Plausible Tricks of Rhetorick do too often dazle the Eye of the Mind and make that seem excellent Reason which brought the Test of a Syllogism will be seen to be plain Foolery and Ridiculous Nonsense Lastly Good Logicians who are skill'd in the Solid Reasons why the Conclusion follows do while they discourse Syllogistically guide their Thoughts all along by steady and generally Self-evident Rules and see a priori and this by the Highest Causes why and by what means the Conclusion must follow which conduces in a high measure to Demonstration and Science Whereas those that have only the Assistance of their Uncultivated Natural Reason do both want this knowing Satisfaction to themselves and are utterly Unable to give it to others I grant then that the Untaught Vulgar in Common Conversation and obvious Affairs can need no Syllogisms and that the Gentlewoman he speaks of may have Wit enough to avoid catching Cold tho' neither her self nor any for her do put the Reason of it into a Syllogism and so does a Milk-maid without the help of Mathematicks know certainly that the Diameter of her Pail is Shorter than the Circumference of it nay both of them would be blunder'd and know those Truths worse were the true Reasons for them put into the uncouth Garb of a Syllogism for Art is not their Talent But to think that Learned Men and Disputants gain little or no Advantage by them above the Vulgar is to maintain that Art tho' never so Solidly Grounded is good for nothing 4. Secondly To say that Syllogism helps little in Demonstration is I am sure against Reason and Experience both He might as well have said in one Word they are good for nothing at all For it cannot