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A49906 Reflections upon what the works commonly call good-luck and ill-luck with regard to lotteries and of the good use which may be made of them / written originally in French by Monsieur Le Clerk, done into English.; Reflexions sur ce que l'on appelle bonheur et malheur en matière de loteries et sur le bon usage qu'on en peut faire. English Le Clerc, Jean, 1657-1736. 1699 (1699) Wing L825; ESTC R17929 104,386 230

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happen so that all the World declare them to be the Effect of Fortune we may plainly see that there are such things as Fortune and Chance For we know very well both that the things of this Nature are the Work of Fortune and that what Fortune does is always of this Nature This manner of Argument supposes the common Forms of Speaking to be the Rule of True and False and that a Man may conclude from Words to Things which in a Philosopher is a most ridiculous Imagination For what is more common than for the People to entertain false Notions of Things and for the ways of expressing themselves suited to their Notions to be very improper and distant from the Truth Afterwards he says that when any thing of Advantage happens to a Man by Accident This is such a thing as we call the Effect of Fortune or Chance For Example A Man goes to a Place whither he does not use to go and where he should receive Money though at that time he went not thither with any such design if he receive Money there we say that he went thither and received it by Chance He pretends again that Herein Fortune and Chance differ Fortune is not properly concerned except in the Actions of such Beings as act upon a Principle of Choice whereas Chance takes place in the Effects of Causes which do not act by Choice I know not whether this Difference were constantly observed in common Speech but it is certain that those Bodies were called Automata which were thought to move of themselves Thus this Philosopher imagined he had defined the Nature of a Cause in Physicks while he only defined the Words by which People used to express themselves for he pretends that Chance had a great hand in Forming the Universe which is a most absurd Fancy and more becoming a Clown or an Ideot than a Philosopher as we shall see by and by The Latins who put no such distinction between Fortuna and Casus define them thus Lot Chance Fortune Event what else is all this but a thing 's falling out after one particular manner when it might either not have happened at all or have happened after quite another manner than it hath done Quid est aliud Sors quid Fortuna quid Casus quid Eventus nisi cum sic aliquid accidit sic evênit De Div. Nat. L. 2. c. 6. ut vel non cadere atque evenire vel aliter cadere atque evenire potuerit A Man that reads these Definitions of Fortune would be apt to think by some part of them that the Ancients did mean something by it and yet on the other hand to suspect that they had no Notion at all of the matter Aristotle is express that the common Way of Speaking proves Fortune and Chance to be something 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But if they be something what sort of Things are they Are they Spirits Are they Bodies Are they of some different Nature Aristotle in his Sixth Chapter of the Second Book of Physicks distinguishes them plainly from Spirit and * i. e. Body Nature for these he says are the Causes of all things Essentially and per se These two last Causes he owns did at first produce the Heaven and all the material World but yet he says that when all this was done a thousand Things were effected by Chance afterwards But still he does not inform us what this pretended Cause is considered in it self For in truth he knew not what he meant by it himself And one may see he did not by his quoting the common Form of Speech explaining the Word by the Use of it but never giving any Definition of Fortune He does indeed disallow that Notion of some who made Fortune a real Cause but such as the Mind of Man knew nothing of because too divine a thing for Man to comprehend it But all that he does is only telling us the Occasion how this Word grew so generally into Use In the mean while not to mention the Poets and their Modes of Speech which might be accused of too great liberty in Fiction the Temples which in several places were dedicated to Good or Ill Fortune seem to say that This was generally reputed a Deity For certainly Men must be mad to the last Degree who shall go about to build Temples address their Prayers and Praises and offer Sacrifices to any but Gods that is such as they believe to have a divine and much more an actual Existence Now This Reasoning were certainly conclusive did Men always speak and act consistently but as it is they often speak Words which they do not understand and do many Things when they know not what they do Tullus Hostilius built a Temple to Fear and Paleness Others erected Temples to the Mind to Vertue Pallori Pavori Liv. l. 1. c. 27. Cic. de Nat. Deor. l. 2. Lactan. l. 1. to Honour to Piety to Fidelity to Hope to Chastity to Concord to Peace to Rest to Safety to Fortune to Liberty c. Others again were consecrated to to the Feaver to the Year the Month to Art to Poverty to Old Age to Death Now I can by no means perswade my self that the Ancients believed all these things to be things actually Existing but they knew not what they did when they built such Temples and therefore the Actions of Men will give us no surer ground of arguing from them than their Words and common Talk will Nay Some among them were well aware that when Men talked of Fortune they talked of a thing they did not understand Democritus says Men formed to themselves a Phantome of Fortune Euseb Praep. Ev. l. xiv 27. only for a Cover to their Ignorance This Passage is likewise quoted from a Comedy of Philemon There is no such Deity as Men call Fortune no no such matter all things happen by Chance and that which the World calls Fortune is any thing that happens to Men without being able to give a Reason why it should do so So again Tully The Causes under the Governance of Fortune are secret for every thing must have its Cause Cic. Top. c. 17. but whatever is effected by a hidden Cause and by a Method which we cannot account for this is properly an Effect of Fortune And Juvenal tells us Sat. x. that Fortune is only a Goddess in Fiction and of Mens making Nullum Numen abest si sit Prudentia sed Te Nos facimus Fortuna Deam caeloque locamus Fortune was never Worshipp'd by the Wise But set aloft by Fools usurps the Skies Thus you see by the Testimony of these Heathen Writers that the Word Fortune signifies nothing at all though some pretended that it imports a real Existence I shall clear this Point by enquiring into the thing it self when I have first produced two Passages of Christian Authors who expose and confute the Worshippers of Fortune and were of my Opinion that this
Word signifies Nothing The former of these is Lactantius who argues thus Fortune in it self is nothing we are not to suppose that the Word denotes any thing of real existence Inst Divin l. 3. c. 29. take it in what sense you please Fortune is no more than an Event which is sudden and unexpected But the Philosophers that they might not fail to mistake in every thing pretended to be very Wise in a trifling Matter Those I mean who change the Sex of Fortune and will needs have it a God and not a Goddess The same Deity they call sometimes Nature and sometimes Fortune because as Cicero observes it effects many things which we do not expect by reason of our Ignorance in the Causes that produce them And not knowing the Reasons why a thing happens Men must needs be ignorant what it is that brings it about The same Author in a very serious Tract where he gives his Son Rules drawn from Philosophy to govern him in his Behaviour Who says he does not know that the Power of Fortune is great which side soever she takes For when she opposes us we are certainly worsted Lactantius after some Reflections upon Cicero which are not much to the Matter now in hand proceeds in this manner Who does not know says he For my part I know no such thing Let him shew me if he can what that Power is what is the Favour of Fortune and what her Opposition to us It is by no means for the Reputation of a Man of Wit and Parts to lay down a thing for granted which if one deny he is not able to make out The other Author which I shall produce upon this Occasion is * De Cons Phil. L. 1. Pros i. Boethius whose Style in Beauty is equal to that of Lactantius and his Reasoning is much before His. If any one says Philosophy with whom Boethius is holding a Dialogue defines an accidental Event Casum and such as is not produced by any Connexion of Causes I assert that Chance is nothing in the World that it is an empty Word without any Sense or Signification at all For where can Chance find a place in things which God keeps in a regular Method There is no greater Truth than that nothing can come out of nothing Not one of the Ancients ever contradicted this Maxime tho' they understood it not of the Efficient but the Material Cause Now if a thing were produced without a Cause that thing would come out of nothing But if this cannot be then neither can there be such a thing as Chance according to our Definition of it Well but replies Boethius is there then nothing which we can properly call fortuitous or casual Or is there somewhat to which these Names belong tho' the Vulgar know it not Aristotle says Philosophy hath cleared this Difficulty in few words in his Book of Physicks and comes very near to the truth of the matter What I pray is his Resolution of the Case Says Boethius When any thing is done with a certain design replies Philosophy and some other thing different from that which was intended does for other causes happen this thing so besides the Intention of the Agent is what we call a fortuitous or casual Event As if a Man for instance in digging his Ground with a design to cultivate it should find a Pot of Gold hidden there We say this is casual but yet it had a real and proper Cause and the unforeseen and unexpected Concurrence of such Causes forms that which is termed a casual Event If He who cultivated his Ground had not digged it or if he who buried this Treasure had not laid it in that place the Gold had not been found as it was These then are the Causes of that accidental Gain which happened to the Man by this Concurrence of theirs altogether foreign from the Design which he proposed to himself in digging his Ground The Remainder of this Argument may be seen in the Original for I cannot agree with Boethius in every Branch of it But this proves that if the Ancients used the words of Fortune or Chance to denote any unknown Being which acts without any Rule and which is neither a Spiritual nor a Bodily Substance they knew not their own meaning And yet thus I have shewed that Aristotle used them whatever Boethius says here to bring him off Let us now consider the Thing in it self And in order to discern what Sense these words Fortune and Chance are capable of we must remember that there are only Two sorts of Beings which we know of that can contribute to any thing that befals us The First sort consists of Bodies which acting alone and without the interposition of any other Cause leave no room for Fortune or Chance Because they act by fix'd unalterable Rules of Mechanism as all who have the least knowledge of Mechanicks and Natural Philosophy are abundantly satisfied The Common People indeed say a Body falls of it self when no Man nor any sensible Cause that comes under our Observation threw it down As when Fruit falls from a Tree or a Tile from the Roof of a House without any pulling or blast of Wind to blow it down And it is a very usual thing to say such things fell of themselves or by Chance But it is by no means true that nothing interposed and that no external Cause contributed to that Fall The Air and the Weight of the Bodies not to mention several other Causes that might concur occasioned their Fall A Body would continue for ever in the same State did not some Cause from without make an Alteration This is an Axiom in Natural Philosophy which I need not here go about to prove The second sort of Beings are what we call Spirits who among several other Faculties belonging to them are endued with Liberty which they exercise upon infinite Occasions They can at any time do or not do what they do they can do it after this or that manner they determine themselves in doubtful or indifferent Cases or what they look upon to be such by Humour and Fancy Without any Other Reason but that they have a mind to act so or so and without the interposition of any thing that should necessarily engage their Judgment or their Will Without troubling my Readers with a long Lecture of Metaphysicks I appeal to every Man 's own Sense and Experience and am entirely perswaded that all who will speak truly what they feel within themselves in innumerable Instances of Humane Life will agree that what I have said is the very Truth of the Case In this respect it may be said that the free determination of a Spiritual Substance is an Effect of Chance because it does not proceed from any necessary Cause And in regard Spirits act much upon Bodies the intervening of these Operations produce somewhat casual in those Motions which otherwise would not be at all We will put the
these things but only that we acknowledge every thing that happens to us to be an Effect of his Direction and Governance of the World And in this respect God is truly said to be the Cause of every thing excepting only the Evil of Sin which proceeds from the voluntary depravation of the Humane Nature Thus we may and ought to ascribe to God any Good Fortune that happens to us whether by matters depending upon Chance or any other way whatsoever though we do not think that he interposes after any particular or extraordinary manner for the determining of them Secondly This Proposition imports that God knowing before-hand all that happens in every kind and having it in his Power to hinder any part of it would not however put a stop to or divert the Course of Natural Causes to hinder the good Luck thus about to happen to any Person and that for special Reasons Tho' we cannot positively affirm that God had no such Reasons in his Eye because this is what we know nothing of Nor can we affirm that he had at least except God should please to reveal them to us or that we could fairly infer this by the Consequences of those Effects For the purpose The Great Lots lately drawn in England and Scotland are the Effects of Chance in the disposal whereof it is possible God might have some particular Reasons inducing him to give them to Those particular Men but it is possible too that he might not act upon any such particular Reasons He hath not revealed to us any thing of the Matter And the Consequences of that Advantage which some Persons gained have not produced Effects considerable enough to incline us to think that God had any particular Reasons for ordering those Benefits to those that enjoy them Thirdly This Proposition may signifie that God does interpose in casual Events after so particular a manner that he acts by an immediate Power and Providence in the Production of them And this is the usual Acceptation of the Words for otherwise Men have no reason to say that God presides over Lots and casual Events in any more particular manner than he does over all natural Effects whatsoever Now I am so far from denying that God can that I am well content to allow that he does upon several Occasions interpose after so extraordinary a manner as to make the Lot fall upon some certain Persons upon whom possibly it would not have fallen without such Interposition I shall explain my self by some Examples of this kind by and by But the thing I contend for is that generally speaking we cannot make God the immediate Author of good and ill Luck so as that he should bring this about by any supernatural and extraordinary Operation I am aware of one Passage in the Old Testament usually produced for Proof of the contrary Opinion But I hope to make it clear that it does not at all answer that purpose when I have first laid down the Reasons which induce me to believe that generally speaking God does not direct or concern himself with the Events of this kind more particularly than he does with those of any other kind whatsoever First I averr this Opinion to be A Supposition taken up without any Ground For I shall shew presently that there is nothing in Scripture to support it So that they who hold it have no other Refuge left than to prove it by the Consequences of such Events Now these Consequences as I said before are not of such Importance that the Finger of God should commonly be thought visible in them If the General Good of a Nation or Kingdom or of some Persons eminently serviceable to the Publick were the Result of such Events we then might probably conclude that God was more than ordinarily concerned to promote such good Effects But nothing of this kind yet appears nay we see quite contrary that several upon whom these Benefits have fallen make no other use of them than to be more profuse and vain in their Expences and make them either minister to their Pride or increase their Avarice And can any Man of common Sense suppose that God hath gone out of his Way as it were and wrought Miracles for the Advantage of the Vain and the Covetous Secondly If God act after a particular manner in Casual Events he either does it in All or in Some such only If in Some only let them be specified and let it be proved that such an Immediate Operation does not extend to the rest Now this is a Point never to be decided but by express Revelation or at least by Arguments drawn from Effects worthy of so particular a Providence Without one of these Proofs it is to no purpose to advance any such Distinction Now if God preside thus over all such Events and direct them by a positive and particular Act of his Will it will follow from hence that God works Miracles every Day for the sake of Men who it is but too plain are not worthy of them and in Places where we could hardly suspect that God should take any delight in exhibiting his Presence after an extraordinary manner They that play at Cards and Dice would at this rate engage God to declare for them by perpetual Wonders and the Groom-porters and Gaming-houses would have infinitely more Miracles wrought in them than ever the Temple it self or any other place had though we should take in all that stand upon Record or were ever done under the Old and New Testament I cannot tell whether such Consequences as these will go down with Others but for my own part I declare freely that there are very few things which I find my self less disposed to believe than that God works Miracles of this kind every Day for Gamesters Lotteries indeed are nothing near so frequent as Games but it is every whit as improbable that God should particularly interest himself in These as in Those For if the Placing of the Tickets be not the Effect of Chance but of a particular Providence then every Ticket drawn presents us with a fresh Miracle And as oft as Men shall take a fancy to set up new Lotteries God will be obliged if I may have leave to say so to come down from Heaven and regulate the Order of the Tickets He by his positive Assignment will dispense the Money to some and not to others without any visible reason of this difference whether we regard the Qualifications of the Persons or the Use they make of it Will those that have drawn the most considerable Benefits have the Confidence to say that their Merit was so much Superiour to Theirs who had only Blanks as to give them a better Title to the Favour of Heaven or have we any reasonable Assurance that this Success will dispose them to be more beneficent and charitable for the future This is an Enquiry which I charge upon their own Conscience to answer and what Time must inform