Selected quad for the lemma: cause_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
cause_n	body_n	heat_n	hot_a	2,056	5	7.8780	4	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A25846	Logic, or, The art of thinking in which, besides the common, are contain'd many excellent new rules, very profitable for directing of reason and acquiring of judgment in things as well relating to the instruction of for the excellency of the matter printed many times in French and Latin, and now for publick good translated into English by several hands.; Logique. English. 1685	Arnauld, Antoine, 1612-1694.; Nicole, Pierre, 1625-1695.	1685 (1685)	Wing A3723; ESTC R7858	106,112	258

for Perfection and Clearriess in Ideas are two different things For they are Perfect when they represent to us whatever is in the Object Clear when they represent to us as much as suffices to apprehend the object clearly and distinctly On the other side they are confus'd and obscure Ideas which we have of Sensible Qualities as of Colours Sounds Odors Tasts Cold Heat Ponderosity c. As also those of our desires as of Hunger Thirst Pain c. Now mark the reason of the Obscurity of these Ideas In regard we were first Children before we were Men and that exterior things operating within us stirr'd up various Sensations in our Mind by the help of those Impressions which they made in our Bodies the Mind conscious that those Sensations are affected against her will and that by some Body's as for example the Sensation of heat by the Eire would not only judg that there were some things without her which were the causes of these Sensations wherein she was not deceiv'd but going farther imagin'd something in the Objects altogether like Sensation or at least like the Ideas thence arising Upon these Considerations therefore she form'd Ideas to her self and transfer'd the Sensations of Heat Cold c. into those things that are without her And by that means those confused and obscure Ideas of sensible qualities arose from hence that the Mind intermix'd her own false Judgments with those that she deriv'd from Nature Now in regard these Ideas are not natural but Arbitrary Men have made a most fantastical use of 'em and turn'd 'em into meer Chimeras for tho' that Heat and Burning are two sorts of Sensation the one weaker the other fiercer we have allow'd heat to the Fire affirming Fire to be endu'd with Heat yet we have depriv'd Fire of the burning faculty or of the pain which we feel in approaching too near it denying Fire to be affected with Pain But if Men had rightly apprehended that Pain is not to be attributed to the Fire that burns the Hand yet had they been in another error while they thought pain to be in the hand which the Fire burns when as pain is only in the Sense This was not only the Opinion of some of the antient Philosopers as the Cyrenarchs but even of St. Austin himself For says he in his 14 Book de civitat dei Pains said to be Pains of the Flesh are pains of the Soul in the Flesh and out of the Flesh for pain of the Flesh is only an Injury to the Soul and a certain dissent from its suffering as the Pain of the Soul which is Sadness is a dissent from those things that befal us against our Wills Thus in his seventh Book upon Genesis C. 19. When the Soul feels the Afflictions of the Body she is offended in her act of Government of the Body her Rule being disturb'd and this offence is call'd Pain Now that that Pain which is call'd the Pain of the Body belongs to the Soul and not to the Body is manifest from this that those things that affect us with Pain seldom trouble us when our minds are intent upon other things as we sind by the Affrican Priest of whom St. Austin L. 14. de Civitat dei C. 24. Who when pleas'd upon the Counterfeiting of Groans and Lamentations would so abstract himself from his Senses and lye as it were for Dead that they could not make him sensible of Pinching and Pricking nor of the heat of Fire till it began to scorch his Skin Moreover it is to be observ'd that neither the ill disposition of the hand nor any motion arising from burning causes the Soul to be sensible of the Pain unless this Motion be Communicated to the Brain by certain small Strings included in the Nerves and extended from the Brain to the Hands and other parts of the Body which cannot be mov'd unless that part of the Body be also mov'd from whence they derive themselves So that if there be any accident that hinders these little Strings from communicating their motion to the Brain as in the Palsy a Man may endure Wounds and Pain without any Sence of Pain Insomuch that what appears yet more strange a Man may have a pain in his hands that wants hands as often it happens to those whose hands are cut off for that if the threads of the Nerves extended from the Hand to the Brain be mov'd near the Elbow where they terminate they may move that part of the Brain to which they are fastened in the same manner as it might be mov'd if the same threads descended to the hand as the one end of a small Rope may be moved in the same manner if drawn about the middle as if pull'd at the other extremity and thus the Soul should feel the same Pain as it would feel if the Person had hands For the Soul directs its attentiveness thither from whence that motion of the Brain us'd to proceed which before affected it with that sort of Pain Thus the Reflections that we behold in a Glass appear in the same place where they would be should they be lookt upon with direct beams as being the most usual manner of beholding Objects And these things shall suffice to let us understand that it may well be that a Soul separated from the Body may be liable to the Torments of Hell-Fire and to feel the same Pain as any one would feel through the tortures of Earthly Fire in regard that when it was join'd to the Body it was not the Body but the Soul that felt the pain of the Fire and that pain was nothing but a certain sadness of the Mind wherewith it was afflicted for the sufferings of the Body to which it was join'd by God Why then may we not conceive that divine Justice may so accommodate some part of the material Body to the separate Soul that the motion of that matter may excite troublesome and afflicting thoughts in the Soul so separated But let us return to confus'd Ideas The Idea of Ponderosity is no less confus'd then any of the rest already recited for having observ'd from our Infancy that Stones and other heavy things fall down as soon as let go out of our hands we form'd an Idea of the thing falling which is genuine and true We also form'd an Idea of the reason why the thing does fall which is true likewise but when we only saw the Stone and nothing else that forc'd it downward out of the rashness of our Judgment we concluded that there was no such thing as what we did not see and therefore that the Stone fell by vertue of its own proper and intrinsic Force and at length we affix'd to this confused Idea coin'd only in our own Judgments the name of Ponderosity It came to pass also that we made different Judgments of the same things of which the same Judgment was to be asserted for as we saw Stones mov'd toward the Earth we

only mean that which is only proper to cause in us a Sentiment of Heat and by Heavy that which falls downward not being propt up they may then deservedly say that it is a folly to deny Fire to be Hot and Stones to be Heavy But if they mean by Heat that which has in it's self a Quality like to that which we imagine when we feel heat and by Heavy that which has in it self an Internal Principle which causes it to fall to the Center not being compell'd by any violence from without it will be easy then to demonstrate to 'em that it is no denial of a clear thing but of a thing which is very obscure if not altogether false that Fire is hot in that Sence or that a Stone is heavy in regard it is apparent that Fire causes in us a sence of Heat by that action whereby it operates upon our Bodies but it is no way evident that there is in the Fire any thing like to that which we feel in the Fire And it is as evident in the same manner that Stones fall down but it is not so clear that they fall of themselves without any outward detruding Violence Thus we see the great benefit of defining names for that by this means we understand what it is we dispute of that we may not contend in vain about words which we understand some one way some another as is frequently practis'd even in our ordinary discourses But besides this benefit there is also another which is that we cannot many times have a distinct Idea of a thing unless we make use of many words to denote it Now it would be Impertinent especially in writings that concern the Sciences to be always repeating a long Series of words And therefore having once defin'd the thing by several words we fix to some one word the Idea conceiv'd to serve instead of all the rest Thus after we have found that there are numbers that may be divided into two equal Numbers to avoid the often repetition of those words we fix this Propriety and call a number that may be divided into two equal Numbers an even Number Whence it is apparent that as often as we make use of the defin'd Name the Definition is to be mentally suppli'd which a Man must have always so ready in his Mind that as soon as he hears even Numbers he presently understands such a number as may be divided into two Numbers and these two things ought to be so inseparable from the thoughts that the Tongue should no sooner express the one but the Mind should add the other For they who have defin'd Names as the Geometricians do with so much Care did it only to abridg their Writings or as St. Austin says Least by continual Circumlocution they should Create delays but yet they do not do it to abridg the Ideas of the things of which they discourse believing the Mind will supply the entire Definition to short words which they only make use of to avoid the Perplexity which multitude of words would produce CHAP. XII Certain Observations of great Importance touching the Definition of Words HAving thus explain'd the nature benefit and necessity of the definition of Names it will not be from the purpose to speak something of their use least an ill use be made of ' em First all Names are not to be defin'd for that would be often unprofitable and impossible to be done I say unprofitable for that when the Ideas conceiv'd of things are distinct and that all Men understanding the same Language conceive the same Idea it would be superfluous to define such a name because we have already the intent of the Definition as being fix'd without a definition to the distinct and clear Idea But this happens in things that are purely simple of which all Men naturally have the same Idea so that the words by which they are denoted are understood by all men in the same sence or if there be any mixture of obscurity that which is clear is primarily understood And so they who make use of such words to denote a clear Idea need not fear least they should be understood amiss Such are the words Ens or being Thought Extension Equality Duration or Time For tho' some may obscure the Idea of Time by several Propositions which they call Definitions as that Time is the measure of motion according to Priority and Posteriority nevertheless they never mind these definitions themselves when they speak of Time nor do they conceive any other thing of it So that both Learned and Unlearned with the same facility understand the same thing when they hear that a Horse takes up less time in pacing a Furlong then a Tortoise I have said moreover that it is impossible to define all words In regard that to define some words there is a necessity of using other words that express the Idea to which that word is to be annex'd And then if these words which were made use of to explain the the first be also to be defin'd there will be a necessity for other words and so to the Worlds end And therefore there are some primitive words which cannot be defind and it would be as great a fault to be too curious about their Definitions as not to define sufficiently for both ways we fall into the same Confusion which we labour to avoid The second observation is that we ought not to change Definitions known and already receiv'd unless we meet with something in 'em that is to be found fault with for it is always more easy to teach the signification of a word to others when Custom already receiv'd at least among the Learned has fix'd it to an Idea then to annex it anew to another Idea and force it from a former to which it has been properly join'd by daily use And therefore it would be a great error to alter the Definitions receiv'd by the Mathematicians unless where there are any that are not sufficiently plain and obvious to Sence or such whose Ideas are not Politely describ'd as in Euclid may be thought the Definition of Angle and Proportion Thirdly it is to be observ'd that when there is a necessity to define a name it behoves us to approach as near as may be to common Custom and not to give to words a Sence altogether foreign to what they already have or which are contrary to their Etimologie as if a Parallelogram should be defin'd a figure consisting of three Lines But if the word has two significations it must be depriv'd of one that the other may be only affix'd to it Thus when Heat signifies as well the feeling which we have of it as the Quality which we believe to be in the Fire like to that which we feel to remove this ambiguity I will use the name of Heat but I must not apply it but to one of these Ideas dismising it from the other saying I call Heat that feeling which