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ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A62177	Advice given to the Republick of Venice how they ought to govern themselves both at home and abroad, to have perpetual dominion / first written in Italian by that great politician and lover of his countrey, Father Paul the Venetian, author of the Council of Trent ; translated into English by Dr. Aglionby ; dedicated to His Excellency the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.; Opinione come debba governarsi internamente ed esternamente la Repubblica di Venezia. English.	Sarpi, Paolo, 1552-1623.; Aglionby, William, d. 1705.	1693 (1693)	Wing S693; ESTC R22760	39,883	142

Four State-Ministers though bound by excessive Rewards to Secresy And what a wonderful thing was the deposition of the Doge Foscari conceal'd by his own Brother Certainly one cannot without Tears observe that in our Times so great a Quality which seem'd to be proper to the Venetian Commonwealth is something altered by the inconsideration of the young Nobility who not out of Disloyalty but too much Freedom do let things slip from them which ought to be conceal'd I think every Venetian Nobleman ought to teach his Children the use of Secresie with their Catechism but the better way were to forbid all talking of Public Concerns out of the place where they are properly to be deliberated on and much less among those who are partakers of the Secret Let the Honours and Dignities of the Commonwealth be dispensed regularly and by degrees avoiding all sudden Flights because they are dangerous To see a Cloud enlighten'd of a sudden is most commonly a sign of a Thunderbolt to come out of it and he that from a private man leaps in an instant to the Port of a Prince has something of the Player Honours given by degrees keep the young Nobility from attaining them before they are ripe for them and we may observe that as in Physick a man moderately Learned but well Experienc'd is safer for the health of the Body Natural So in the Government of the Commonwealth a man often employed though perhaps of less acuteness succeeds best All Matters of Benefices are very properly under the Cognizance of the Great Council but it would be as proper to take away all Appeals to the Quaranties and place them in the Senate because it often happens that these Causes are to be decided according to reason of State and those Quarantia Judges put little value upon those Politick Reasons And besides it seems a great incongruity that a Sentence where the Person of the Doge and the whole Signoria both intervene should afterwards be lyable to the Censure of Forty Persons of lesser value I believe if it were observed to chastise rigorously but secretly all those Lawyers and their Clients who carry these Appeals to the Quarantias the use of them would be less frequent and in time they would be forborn as if they were forbidden If it should fall out that any of your Subjects should procure a Decree in the Rota or Court of Rome you must rigorously command from him a Renunciation ab Impetratis else all beneficiary Causes will be devolv'd to Rome where they are look'd upon as Sacred and so a fourth part of all Civil Causes would be lost for your own Courts Auditors of the Rota are to be with the Commonwealth like Bishops in partibus Infidelium a thing of Title but without Subjects Let the Bishops of the Venetian State be always praecogniz'd in the Consistory by a Venetian Cardinal without the Circumstance of creating him Special Procurator but as Protector which he really ought to be as other Cardinals brag they are so for other States For the Court of Rome to avoid these procurations to Venetian Cardinals would perhaps desist making any of that Nation that so they might oblige the State to have recourse to Strangers which in time would also prejudice the pretence of being treated as Crown'd Heads If the preconisation be made otherwise let the State seize the Temporalities of the Bishoprick and stop all Pensions laid upon it 'T is true that if the Cardinal Nipote should make the Preconisation and enjoy at the same time the priviledge of a Venetian Nobleman it could not well be rejected If it should ever happen that there should be a Pope I won't say a Venetian for that would be of more danger than advantage to the Government but a Foreigner well inclin'd to the Venetian Republick then would be the time to obtain once for all the Grant of the Tenths upon the Clergy as once it was got under Clement the Sixth whose Bull is unfortunately lost for 't is troublesome to get it renew'd every Five Year or Seven Year and it would be a Point gain'd which still would more and more equal the Republick with Crown'd Heads as also if in the Titles given by the Pope to the Doge there could be gain'd the Superlative as Carissimo or Dilectissimo as is usual to Crown'd Heads it would be a new lustre to the Republick which for want of these things and also because that never any Venetian Nuncio was promoted to be Cardinal is look'd upon at Rome as a kind of Third Power between Crown'd Heads and the Ducal State If I say all this could be gain'd by the State from a Pope there might be some return made by making a Law That Church-men in Criminals should not be judged by any Tribunal but the Council of Ten or Delegates from that Council And now I am speaking of that Council I cannot but inculcate That all means possible should be used to hinder an Avogadore from daring to carry the Decrees of the Council of Ten to be re-view'd or censur'd by any other Council but rather if there ought to be any Change made in them let it be by the same Power that made them otherwise the Consequence will be a constant annihilation of their Decrees and a manifest depression of the great Nobility with an Exaltation of the lesser Touching the Authority of this Council I have this more to say That I could wish that the Delegations of its Power were less frequent with great regard to the Dignity of the Persons as well as to the Splendor of the Government which is always more reverenced when it is least communicated like the Sun-beams which in that glorious Body are of Gold but communicated to the Moon are but of Silver Indeed our Ancestors would have deserved well of us if they had lengthened the time of this Magistracy but because that which was not done in those Old Times can hardly be hop'd in these Modern ones the only Remedy would be to obtain a Continuation of the same persons for another year under pretext of avoiding so many various Elections in so short a time as must be made by a Scrutiny in the Pregadi 'T is true that would exempt the persons continued from the Governments of Expence but as long as that Exemption did not extend beyond a year there would be little Inconvenience in it And if it be objected That this would too much strengthen the Authority of the great ones I answer That it lasting but a few months could not be of ill Consequence and on the other side those hands are as it were tied up which ought to be at liberty to do Justice while every week they may be canvass'd and teas'd by a Party of mean Persons both for the Conditions of their Mind and Fortune I have often admired how the Council of Ten having already all the Criminal Power and a good part of the Judiciary in Civil Causes as well as

which by other Pieces of his were already sufficiently publish'd to the World But what an Idea must we have of that Man whom a Venetian Senate not only admitted to their Debates but consulted upon the whole Frame of their Government a Senate I say justly deserving the Titles of Wise and Great who have maintain'd their State for 1200 years with little alteration who have been a Bulwark to the Christian World against the most potent Invader that ever was who at the same time have struggled with all the Christian Princes united and headed even by Popes whose spiritual power alone has been able to subvert greater Empires This Senate or at least the wisest of them the Inquisitors of State who have the whole Executive Power in their hands cannot let this Subject of theirs leave the World without having from him a Scheme of their present Affairs and a prospect of the Occurrences to come Nothing certainly can give us a greater Idea of Padre Paulo nor shew us how great Abilities in the most retired and concealed Subjects will break out in all wise Governments and cannot long be conceal'd As to the work it self I shall say little it being improper to forestall the Reader 's Judgment by mine but I think I may venture to give him some cautions against a surprise from some bold Maxims and arbitrary Positions which he will meet with and perhaps not expect from one of our Author's Profession nor in the Methods of a Government which carries the specious and popular Title of Liberty in the Head of it As to the Author tho he were a religious man and a very strict observer of that Life yet being above ordinary methods and having a Mind elevated beyond his sphere he thought that not only he might but that he ought to go to the Extent of his Capacity when he was to advise those whom God Almighty had invested with Soveraign Power This makes him lay down that great Maxim That all is just that contributes to the preservation of the Government and in a natural deduction from this advise in some cases not to stand upon common proceedings I remember the Author of his Life says That he had adapted most of the Aphorisms of Hippocrates about the Diseases and Cure of the Body natural to those of the Body politick and if so he could not forget that of Extremis Morbis extrema Remedia which alone would warrant all uncommon proceedings Most people have an Idea of Commonwealths not unlike that which Poets and young people have of the Golden Age where they fancy that without either labour solicitude or chagrin people past their time in the Innocent Pleasures of Love and Musick and other soft Delights so the World imagines that a Popular Government is all sweetness and liberty precarious and depending upon their Votes free from oppression and slavery and constant to known methods but all this is a very wrong Conception they are invested with Soveraign Power and must and do use it for their own preservation as absolutely as any Soveraign Prince in the World and whoever shall seriously consider the Machine of this Venetian State must own that neither the Governors themselves nor the people governed by them have any such Excellent and Inviting Prerogatives as can justly give them a Superiority to the Government of a wise Prince and well dispos'd People in a limited Monarchy But I have said enough of this the Reader will best judge whether the reading of this Book will enamour him of a Republican Government or not I have no more to say but that this is a very faithful Translation from an Original Manuscript communicated to me in Italy where it begins to creep abroad and if we had in England the conveniency of Workmen that could Print Italian correctly I would have publish'd both the Original and my Translation together The words of Quarantie and Avogadore may puzzle some people but they will easily understand that the first is a kind of Bench of Judges deligated out of the Body of the lesser Nobility for the Trial of Civil and some Criminal Causes and the other is the Name of a great Magistrate in Venice who among oth●r Priviledges has that of carrying the Sentences of the Council of Ten before the great Council THE OPINION OF Padre Paolo Most Illustrious and Excellent Lords the Inquisitors of State I Write by Obedience to your Lordship's Commands without Reflection upon my own small Abilities because the Chief Consideration of a Subject ought to be to obey his Prince Your Excellencies have commanded me to deliver my Opinion how the Venetian Republick ought to regulate it self to hope for a perpetual Duration To obtain a true Notion of this it will be necessary to distinguish and first to regulate the Government of the City in which will be comprehended the manner of keeping the Nobles and the Citizens to their Duty then look abroad to the rest of your Dominions and lastly give some Form to the dealing with Foreign Princes To begin with the First I might in short put you in mind of the Saying of St. Bernardino of Siena to the Doge Moro who said That the Republick should continue so long as they should keep to the Rule of doing Exact Justice but to come nearer to the matter and the Condition of these Times we must reduce under that Head of Justice all that contributes to the Service of the State and to speak yet more succinctly we will lay it down as a Maxim That all is just which is any ways necessary for the maintaining of the Government In the particular Government of the City 't is an excellent Custom to lay the Impositions as well upon the Nobility as the rest of the Citizens First Because the Burden is less when it is general And Secondly Because 't is just when 't is without Partiality There is no doubt but it lessens something of the Splendor of the Nobility to see them tax'd particularly since in many Governments the Nobility and Gentry though they are Subjects and not part of the Government do nevertheless enjoy a Freedom from Taxes and contribute more with their Sword than Purse towards the Publick Charge But since the Ancient Simplicity of our Ancestors has patiently submitted to this Yoak and because the Priviledges of the Sword are dangerous in a Commonwealth I think 't is advisable not to innovate in this Point because such a change would give too much offence to the rest of your People and too much Haughtiness to your own Nobility 'T is true that when the Taxes are upon the Lands so as to be unavoidable it would be convenient to give the Nobility all the advantage of time for payment and at last if they are insolvent it will not be amiss to neglect the rigorous Exaction of the Law that so the Nobility be not ruin'd because Extreams are always dangerous and the Republick may suffer as much from having too many poor

than them both and if he that is thus agrandiz'd be a Neighbour his advancement is so much more to be feared These Alterations indeed may not be so dangerous to a little Prince who does not fear depending upon a great one to avoid being molested by one who is already too strong for him But to come closer to the Case of the Republick we will say That if the Church could make it self Master of any part of the King of Spain's Dominions in Italy where he is the greatest Prince they might hope for the consent of the Republick which is the Second Great Italian Potentate because by that means the Republick might become the First and however the strength of the Church will always give less jealousie to the Republick than the Spanish Power in Italy for the Nature of the Pontifical Principality is Elective and Temporary and the Aims and Designs of that Court vary according to the Genius of the several Popes and sometimes it is subject to long Vacancies whereas the Monarchy of Spain is successive and as one may say Eternal and govern'd by standing lasting Maxims But if the Church be to grow great by the Spoils of any other Italian Prince it would be the Interest of the Republick to oppose it because the Damage thence resulting is evident and the Advantage dangerous It ought to be well consider'd how the State of the Church is increased in this last Century The custom that was in the Church before to give Infeodations upon slight Acknowledgments had brought that power to be more of show than real strength but Julius the Second succeeding Alexander the Sixth made Borgia Duke of Volentine Nephew to Alexander who had seiz'd upon all those Infeodations in Romania refund them to the Church and added to them the conquest of Bologna and got also from the Republick the Cities of Cervia Rimini Ravenna Faenza Imola and others to which under Clement the Eighth was added the whole Dutchy of Ferrara and lately that of Vrbin So that these Acquisitions alone would make up a great Principality and the Church seems to want nothing towards the making of it the most considerable power of Italy than the addition of Parma and Piacenza and some little Independent Castles in the Territories about Rome Besides it can never more be lessen'd by Infeodations that being quite left off by that Court So that to let the Church grow any greater in Italy generally speaking cannot be for the Interest of the Venetian Republick To the Second Point What Title Inclination or Facility the Church may have to acquire any portion of the State of the Republick we shall say That since the Court makes profession of the Extreamest Justice and that likewise they are loth to begin the Example of Princes usurping upon one another I think they can hardly set up any Title but upon the Polesine of Rovigo which they say was formerly annex'd to the Dutchy of Ferrara and in the times that the Dispute was between the Dukes of Ferrara and the Republick the Popes always shewed themselves smart Defenders of the Dukes Of Four Interdicts published by the Church against the Venetians Two of them were for this very cause the first in the year 1305. the Second in the year 1483. under Sixtus the Fourth at which time indeed the Republick had taken the whole Dutchy of Ferrara by the Instigation of the Pope himself but he being Friends with the Duke commanded them to restore what they had taken which they refusing to do he fulminated his Excommunication and Interdict but a Peace following the Republick kept by agreement the Polesine of Rovigo The Third Interdict was in 1505. under Julius the Second because the Republick had several Cities of Romania in their possessions and the last of all was now lately under Paul the Fifth So that if the Popes shewed such a concern for the thing when it was only belonging to the Dukes of Ferrara much more would they do it now when the profit would be their own So that we may believe that as to this they do own a Title and have likewise inclination enough to regain this bit of Territory that is lopp'd off from them We are therefore to consider what Facility they have to do it and I do not believe that ever of themselves they will kindle the fire but make advantage of one ready kindled by some other as it happened under Julius the Second Nay if they reflect upon the great Rule of preserving the Liberty of Italy they will not for so small a matter enter into a League against the Republick for it is of greater concern to them not to break the Ballance of Dominion in Italy lest the Tramontani should take advantage of it and subdue all But this very Reason was strong in Pope Julius the Second's time and yet was without Effect in a Mind bent all upon particular Interest wherefore I conclude that we are not to expect greater Temper in the Modern Popes but ought to rest satisfied that if a powerful Foreign Prince should promise them the acquisition of the State of the Republick they would embrace the motion without delay To the Third Question I say That the Republick might have just Reason to make themselves amends for the Country they lost in Romagna it not being a thing they had usurp'd from the Church but a voluntary Dedition of those Cities who were tyranniz'd over by little Tyrants that had taken occasion from the Negligence of Popes to make themselves Masters of those places They were yielded up by the Republick to take off Julius the Second who was the great Fomentour of the Fire which was kindled against the Venetians in the League of Cambray where the Forces of all the Princes of Christendom were united against them and without doubt upon good circumstances the Republick might justifie the re-taking of these Towns and I believe there is Inclination enough to do it all Princes being willing to extend their Territories but the point is the Facility of doing it which I think altogether remote for all other Italian Princes if not out of conscience yet out of Ostentation of Religion would be backward to fall upon the Church and except it should happen that some one of them should grow too powerful for all the others united and so be able to right himself I think the State of the Church need not fear being lessen'd To the Fourth Question I answer in the Negative and do not believe that the Church would joyn with the Republick to acquire the State of any other Prince except it were such a one as the Church had a pretence upon and then they would keep all which would not please the Republick Besides we ought to reflect upon the Genius of the Popedom which being Elective most commonly the Popes have no other aim than to keep all quiet and preserve the general Respect of Princes towards them that in that decrepit Age they may