since it is evident that there is some necessary Being otherwise nothing could ever have been and that without action nothing could be from it Since also all change imports somewhat of passion and all passion supposes action and all action active power and active power an original seat or subject that is self-active or that hath the power of action in and of it self For there could be no derivation of it from that which hath it not and no firstderivation but from that which hath it originally of it self And a first derivation there must be since all things that are or ever have been furnisht with it and not of themselves must either mediately or immediately have derived it from that which had it of it self It is therefore manifest that there is a necessary self-active Being The cause and Author of this perpetually variable state and frame of things And hence 6. Since we can frame no notion of life which self-active power doth not at least comprehend as upon trial we shall find that we cannot it is consequent that this Being is also originally vital and the root of all vitality such as hath life in or of it self and from whence it is propagated to every other living thing And so as we plainly see that this sensible world did sometime begin to be 't is also evident it took its beginning from a Being essentially vital and active that had it self no beginning Nor can we make a difficulty to conclude that this Being which now we have shewn is active and all action implies some power is 7. Of vast and mighty Power we will not say infinite lest we should step too far at once not minding now to discuss whether creation require infinite power when we consider and contemplate the vastness of the work performed by it Unto which if we were to make our estimate by nothing else we must at least judge this power to be proportionable For when our eyes behold an effect exceeding the power of any cause which they can behold our mind must step in and supply the defect of our feebler sense so as to make a judgment there is a cause we see not equal to this effect As when we behold a great and magnificent fabrick and entring in we see not the master or any living thing which was Cicero's Observation in reference to this present purpose besides Mice or Weasles we will not think that Mice or Weasels built it Nor need we in a matter so obvious insist further But only when our severer Reason hath made us confess our further contemplation should make us admire a power which is at once both so apparent and so stupendous Corollary And now from what hath been hitherto discoursed it seems a plain and necessary consectary That this world had a cause divers from the matter whereof it is composed For otherwise matter that hath been more generally taken to be of it self altogether unactive must be stated the only cause and fountain of all the action and motion that is now to be found in the whole Universe Which is a conceit wild and absurd enough not only as it opposes the common judgment of such as have with the greatest diligence enquired into things of this nature But as being in it self manifestly impossible to be true As would easily appear if it were needful to press farther Dr. More 's reasonings to this purpose which he hath done sufficiently for himself And also that otherwise all the great and undeniable changes which continually happen in it must proceed from its own constant and eternal action upon it self while it is yet feigned to be a necessary being with the notion whereof they are notoriously inconsistent Which therefore we taking to be most clear may now the more securely proceed to what follows CHAP. III. Wisdom asserted to belong to this Being The production of this world by a mighty Agent destitute of Wisdom impossible On consideration of 1. What would be adverse to this production 2. What would be wanting some effects to which a designing cause will on all hands be confessed necessary as having manifest characters of skill and design upon them Absurd here to except the works of nature Wherein at least equal characters of Wisdom and design to be seen as in any the most confessed pieces of Art Instanced in the frame and Motion of heavenly bodies A mean unphilosophical temper to be more taken with novelties than common things of greater importance Further instance in the composition of the bodies of Animals Two contrary causes of mens not acknowledging the Wisdom of their Maker herein Progress is made from the consideration of the parts and frame to powers and functions of Terrestrial Creatures Growth Nutrition Propagation of kind Spontaneous motion Sensation The pretence considered that the bodies of Animals are machines 1. How improbable it is 2. How little to the purpose The powers of the humane soul. It appears notwithstanding them it had a cause By them a wise and intelligent cause It is not matter That not capable of Reason They not here reflected on who think reasonable souls made of refined matter by the Creator Not being matter nor arising from thence it must have a Cause that is intelligent 9. Goodness also belonging to this Being WE therefore add That this being is Wise and Intelligent as well as powerful upon the very view of this world it will appear so vast power was guided by equal wisdom in the framing of it Though this is wont to be the principal labour in evincing the existence of a Deity viz. the proving that this universe owes its rise to a wise and designing cause as may be seen in Cicero's excellent performance in this kind and in divers later Writers Yet the placing so much of their endeavour herein seems in great part to have proceeded hence that this hath been chosen for the great medium to prove that it had a cause divers from it self But if that once be done a shorter way and it fully appear that this world is not it self a necessary Being having the power of all the action and motion to be found in it of it self which already seems plain enough And it do most evidently thence also appear to have had a cause foreign to or distinct from it self though we shall not therefore the more carelesly consider this subject yet no place of doubt seems to remain but that this was an Intelligent cause and that this world was the product of wisdom and counsel and not of meer power alone For what imagination can be more grosly absurd than to suppose this orderly frame of things to have been the result of so mighty power not accompanied or guided by wisdom and counsel that is as the case must now unavoidably be understood that there is some being necessarily existent of an essentially active nature of unconceivably vast and mighty power and vigour destitute of all
on the frame of the universe and the order of parts in the bodies of all sorts of living creatures as the meanest ordinary understanding is capable of would soon discover incomparably greater evidence of wisdom and design in the contrivance of these than in that of a watch or a clock And if there were any whose understandings are but of that size and measure as to suppose that the whole frame of the heavens serves to no other purpose than to be of some such use as that to us mortals here on earth if they would but allow themselves leasure to think and consider might discern the most convincing and amazing discoveries of wise contrivance and design as well as of vastest might and power in disposing things into so apt a subserviency to that meaner end And that so exact a knowledge is had thereby of times and seasons days and years as that the simplest Idiot in a Country may be able to tell you when the light of the Sun is withdrawn from his eyes at what time it will return and when it will look in at such a window and when at the other And by what degrees his days and nights shall either increase or be diminished And what proportion of time he shall have for his labours in this season of the year and what in that without the least suspicion or fear that it shall ever fall out otherwise But that some in later days whose more enlarged minds have by diligent search and artificial helps got clearer notices even then most of the more learned of former times concerning the true frame and vastness of the Universe the matter nature and condition of the heavenly bodies their situation order and laws of motion and the great probability of their serving to nobler purposes than the greater part of learned men have ever dreamt of before That I say any of these should have chosen it for the employment of their great intellects to devise ways of excluding intellectual power from the contrivance of this frame of things having so great advantages beyond the most of mankind besides to contemplate and adore the great Author and Lord of all is one of the greatest wonders that comes under our notice And might tempt even a sober mind to prefer vulgar and popular ignorance before their learned philosophical deliration Though yet indeed not their Philosophy by which they would be distinguished from the common sort but what they have in common with them ought in justice to bear the blame For it is not evident how much soever they reckon themselves exalted above the vulgar sort that their miserable shifting in this matter proceeds only from what is most meanly so i. e. their labouring under the most vulgar and meanest diseases of the mind disregard of what is common and an aptness to place more in the strangeness of new unexpected and surprizing events than in things unspeakably more considerable that are of every days observation Than which nothing argues a more abject unphilosophical temper For let us but suppose what no man can pretend is more impossible and what any man must confess is less considerable than what our eyes daily see that in some part of the air near this earth and within such limits as that the whole Scene might be conveniently beheld at one view there should suddenly appear a little globe of pure flaming light resembling that of the Sun and suppose it fixt as a center to another body or moving about that other as its centre as this or that hypothesis best pleases us which we could plainly perceive to be a proportionably-little earth beautified with little Trees and Woods flowry Fields and flowing rivulets with larger lakes into which these discharge themselves And suppose we the other Planets all of proportionable bigness to the narrow limits assigned them placed at their due distances and playing about this supposed earth or Sun so as to measure their shorter and soon absolved days months and years or two twelve or thirty years according to their supposed lesser circuits Would they not presently and with great amazement confess an intelligent contriver and maker of this whole frame above a Posidonius or any mortal And have we not in the present frame of things a demonstration of Wisdom and Counsel as far exceeding that which is now supposed as the making some toy or bauble to please a child is less an argument of wisdom than the contrivance of somewhat that is of apparent and universal use Or if we could suppose this present state of things to have but newly begun and our selves pre-existent so that we could take notice of the very passing of things out of horrid confusion into the comely order they are now in would not this put the matter out of doubt And that this state had once a beginning needs not be proved over again But might what would yesterday have been the effect of wisdom better have been brought about by chance five or six thousand years or any longer time ago It speaks not want of evidence in the thing but want of consideration and of exercising our understandings if what were new would not only convince but astonish and what is old of the same importance doth not so much as convince And let them that understand any thing of the composition of an humane body or indeed of any living creature but bethink themselves whether there be not equal contrivance at least appearing in the composure of that admirable fabrick as of any the most admired machine or engine devised and made by humane wit and skill If we pitch upon any thing of known and common use as suppose again a Clock or Watch which is no sooner seen than it is acknowledg'd as hath been said the effect of a designing cause will we not confess as much of the body of a man Yea what comparison is there when in the structure of some one single member as an hand a foot an eye or ear there appears upon a diligent search unspeakably greater curiosity whether we consider the variety of parts their exquisite figuration or their apt disposition to the distinct uses and ends these members serve for than is to be seen in any Clock or Watch Concerning which uses of the several parts in mans body Galen so largely discoursing in seventeen Books inserts on the by this Epiphonema upon the mention of one particular instance of our most wise Makers provident care Unto whom saith he I compose these Commentaries meaning his present work of unfolding the useful figuration of the humane body as certain Hymns or Songs of praise esteeming true Piety more to consist in this that I first may know and then declare to others his Wisdom Power Providence and Goodness than in sacrificing to him many Hecatombs And in the ignorance whereof there is greatest impiety rather than in ababstaining from Sacrifice Nor as he adds in the close of that excellent work is
matter into so useful and happy a conjuncture as that such a quality might result or to speak more suteably to the most How if you had not been shewn the way would you have thought it were to be done or which way would you have gone to work to turn meat and drink into flesh and bloud Nor is propagation of their own kind by the creatures that have that faculty implanted in them less admirable or more possible to be imitated by any humane device Such productions stay in their first descent Who can by his own contrivance find out a way of making any thing that can produce-another like it self What machine did ever man invent that had this power And the ways and means by which it is done are such though he that can do all things well knew how to compass his ends by them as do exceed not our understanding only but our wonder And what shall we say of spontaneous motion wherewith we find also creatures endowed that are so mean and despicable in our eyes as well as our selves that is that so silly a thing as a fly a gnat c. should have a power in it to move it self or stop its own motion at its own pleasure How far have all attempted imitations in this kind fallen short of this perfection and how much more excellent a thing is the smallest and most contemptible insect than the most admired machine we ever heard or read of as Archytas Tarintinus his Dove so anciently celebrated or more lately Regiomontanus his Fly or his Eagle or any the like Not only as having this peculiar power above any thing of this sort but as having the sundry other powers besides meeting in it whereof these are wholy destitute And should we go on to instance further in the several powers of sensation both external and internal the various instincts appetitions passions sympathies antipathies the powers of memory and we might add of speech that we find the inferiour orders of creatures either necessarily furnish'd with or some of them as to this last dispos'd unto How should we even over-do the present business and too needlesly insult over humane wit which we must suppose to have already yeilded the cause in challenging it to produce and offer to view an hearing seeing-engine that can imagine talk is capable of hunger thirst of desire anger fear grief c. as its own creature concerning which it may glory and say I have done this Is it so admirable a performance and so ungainsayable an evidence of skill and wisdom with much labour and long travel of mind a busie restless agitation of working thoughts the often renewal of frustrated attempts the varying of defeated trials this way and that at length to hit upon and by much pains and with a slow gradual progress by the use of who can tell how many sundry sorts of instruments or tools managed by more possibly than a few hands by long hewing hammering turning filing to compose one only single machine of such a frame and structure as that by the frequent re-inforcement of a skilful hand it may be capable of some and that otherwise but a very short-liv'd motion And is it no argument or effect of wisdom so easily and certainly without labour error or disappointment to frame both so infinite a variety of kinds and so innumerable individuals of every such kind of living creatures that cannot only with the greatest facility move themselves with so many sorts of motion downwards upwards many of them to and fro this way or that with a progressive or circular a swifter or a slower motion at their own pleasure but can also grow propagate see hear desire joy c. Is this no work of wisdom but only blind either fate or chance of how strangely perverse and odd a complexion is that understanding if yet it may be called an understanding that can make this judgment And they think they have found out a rare knack and that gives a great relief to their diseased minds who have learn'd to call the bodies of living creatures even the humane not excepted by way of diminution machines or engines too But how little cause there is to hug or be fond of this fansie would plainly appear If first we would allow our selves leasure to examine with how small pretence this appellation is so placed and applied And next if it be applied rightly to how little purpose it is alledg'd or that it signifies nothing to the exclusion of divine wisdom from the formation of them And for the first because we know not a better let it be considered how defective and unsatisfying the account is which the great and justly admired master in this faculty gives how divers of those things which he would have to be so are performed only in the mechanical way For though his ingenuity must be acknowledged in his modest exception of some nobler operations belonging to our selves from coming under those rigid necessitating laws yet certainly to the severe enquiry of one not partially addicted to the sentiments of so great a wit because they were his it would appear there are great defects and many things yet wanting in the account which is given us of some of the meaner of those functions which he would attribute only to organiz'd matter or to use his own expression to the conformation of the members of the body and the course of the spirits excited by the heat of the heart c. For howsoever accurately he describes the instruments and the way his account seems very little satisfying of the principle either of spontaneous motion or of sensation As to the former though it be very apparent that the muscles seated in that opposite posture wherein they are mostly found paired throughout the body the nerves and the animal spirits in the brain and suppose we that glandule seated in the inmost parts of it are the instruments of the motion of the limbs and the whole body yet what are all these to the prime causation or much more to the spontaneity of this motion And whereas with us who are acknowledged to have such a faculty independent on the body an act of will doth so manifestly contribute so that when we will our body is moved with so admirable facility and we feel not the cumbersome weight of an arm to be lift up or of our whole corporeal bulk to be moved this way or that by a slower or swifter motion Yea and when as also if we will we can on the sudden in a very instant start up out of the most composed sedentary posture and put our selves upon occasion into the most violent course of motion or action But if we have no such will though we have the same agile spirits about us we find no difficulty to keep in a posture of rest and are for the most part not sensible of any endeavour or urgency of those active particles as if they were hardly
it is a most apparent and demonstrable truth For it is plain that all being and perfection which is not necessary proceeds from that which is as the cause of it And that no cause could communicate any thing to another which it had not some way in it self Wherefore it is manifestly consequent that all other being was wholly before comprehended in that which is necessary as having been wholly produced by it And what is wholly comprehended of another i. e. within its productive power before it be produced can be no real addition to it when it is Now what can be supposed to import fulness of Being and perfection more than this impossibility of addition or that there can be nothing greater or more perfect And now these considerations are mentioned without solicitude whether they be so many exactly distinct heads For admit that they be not all distinct but some are involved with others of them yet the same truth may more powerfully strike some understandings in one form of representation others in another And it suffices that though not severally they do together plainly evidence that the necessary Being includes the absolute entire fulness of all Being and perfection actual and possible within it self Having therefore thus dispatcht that former part of this undertaking the eviction of an every way perfect Being we shall now need to labour little in the other viz. Secondly the more express deduction of the infiniteness and onliness thereof For as to the former of these it is in effect the same thing that hath been already proved Since to the fullest notion infiniteness absolute perfection seems every way most fully to correspond For absolute perfection includes all conceivable perfection leaves nothing excluded And what doth most simple infiniteness import but to have nothing for a boundary or which is the same not to be bounded at all We intend not now principally infiniteness extrinsically considered with respect to time and place as to be eternal and immense do import But intrinsically as importing bottomless profundity of essence and the full confluence of all kinds and degrees of perfection without bound or limit This is the same with absoute perfection Which yet if any should suspect not to be so They might however easily and expresly prove it of the necessary Being upon the same grounds that have been already alledged for proof of that As that the necessary Being hath actuality answerable to the utmost possibility of the creature That it is the only root and cause of all other Being The actual cause of whatsoever is actually The possible cause of whatsoever is possible to be Which is most apparently true And hath been evidenced to be so by what hath been said so lately as that it needs not be repeated That is in short that nothing that is not necessarily and of it self could ever have been or can be but as it hath been or shall be put into Being by that which is necessarily and of it self So that this is as apparent as that any thing is or can be But now let sober reason judge whether there can be any bounds or limits set to the possibility of producible Being either in respect of kinds numbers or degrees of perfection Who can say or think when there can be so many sorts of creatures produced or at least individuals of those sorts that there can be no more Or that any creature is so perfect as that none can be made more perfect which indeed to suppose were to suppose an actual infiniteness in the creature And then it being however still but somewhat that is created or made how can its Maker but be infinite For surely no body will be so absurd as to imagine an infinite effect of a finite cause Either therefore the creature is or sometime may be actually made so perfect that it cannot be more perfect or not If not we have our purpose that there is an infinite possibility on the part of the creature always unreplete and consequently a proportionable infinite actuality of power on the Creators part Infinite power I say otherwise there were not that acknowledged infinite possibility of producible being For nothing is producible that no power can produce And I say infinite actual power because the Creator being what he is necessarily what power he hath not actually he can never have as was argued before But if it be said the creature either is or may sometime be actually so perfect as that it cannot be more perfect That as was said will suppose it actually infinite and therefore much more that its cause is so And therefore in this way our present purpose would be gained also But we have no mind to gain it this latter way as we have no need 'T is in it self plain to any one that considers that this possibility on the creatures part can never actually be filled up That it is a bottomless abyss in which our thoughts may still gradually go down deeper and deeper without end that is that still more might be produced or more perfect creatures and still more everlastingly without any bound which sufficiently infers what we aim at that the Creators actual power is proportionable And indeed the supposition of the former can neither consist with the Creators perfection nor with the imperfection of the creature it would infer that the Creators productive power might be exhausted that he could do no more and so place an actual boundary to him and make him finite It were to make the creature actually full of being that it could receive no more and so would make that infinite But it may be said since all power is in order to act and the very notion of possibility imports that such a thing of which it is said may some time be actual it seems very unreasonable to say that the infinite power of a cause cannot produce an infinite effect Or that infinite possibility can never become infinite actuality For that were to say and unsay the same thing of the same To affirm omnipotency and impotency of the same cause possibility and impossibility of the same effect How urgent soever this difficulty may seem there needs nothing but patience and attentive consideration to disintangle our selves and get through it For if we will but allow our selves the leasure to consider we shall find that power and possibility must here be taken not simply and abstractly but as each of them is in conjunction with infinite And what is infinite but that which can never be travell'd through or whereof no end can be ever arriv'd unto Now suppose infinite power had produced all that it could produce there were an end of it i. e. it had found limits and a boundary beyond which it could not go If infinite possibility were filled up there were an end of that also and so neither were infinite It may then be further urged that there is therefore no such thing as infinite power or
there could be no regular motion such as is absolutely necessary to the forming and continuing of any the compacted bodily substances which our eyes behold every day Yea or of any whatsoever suppose we their figures or shapes to be as rude deformed and useless as we can imagine much less such as the exquisite compositions and the exact order of things in the Universe do evidently require and discover And if there were no such thing carried in this supposition as is positively adverse to the thing supposed so as most certainly to hinder it as we see plainly there is yet the meer want of what is necessary to such a production is enough to render it impossible and the supposition of it absurd For it is not only absurd to suppose a production which somewhat shall certainly resist and hinder but which wants a cause to effect it And it is not less absurd to suppose it effected by a manifestly insufficient and unproportionable cause than by none at all For as nothing can be produced without a cause so no cause can work above or beyond its own capacity and natural aptitude Whatsoever therefore is ascribed to any cause above and beyond its ability all that surplusage is ascribed to no cause at all And so an effect in that part at least were supposed without a cause And if then it follow when an effect is produced that it had a cause why doth it not equally follow when an effect is produced having manifest characters of wisdom and design upon it that it had a wise and designing cause If it be said there be some fortuitous or casual at least undesigned productions that look like the effects of wisdom and contrivance but indeed are not as the Birds so orderly and seasonable making their Nests the Bees their Comb and the Spider its Web which are capable of no design That exception needs to be well proved before it be admitted and that it be plainly demonstrated both that these creatures are not capable of design and that there is not an universal designing cause from whose directive as well as operative influence no imaginable effect or event can be exempted In which case it will no more be necessary that every creature that is observed steadily to work towards an end should it self design and know it than that an Artificers tools should know what he is doing with them but if they do not 't is plain he must And surely it lies upon them who so except to prove in this case what they say and not be so precarious as to beg or think us so easie as to grant so much only because they have thought fit to say it or would fain have it so That is that this or that strange event happened without any designing caus But however I would demand of such as make this exception whether they think there be any effect at all to which a designing cause was necessary or which they will judge impossible to have been otherwise produced than by the direction and contrivance of wisdom and counsel I little doubt but there are thousands of things laboured and wrought by the hand of man concerning which they would presently upon first sight pronounce they were the effects of skill and not of chance yea if they only considered their frame and shape though they yet understood not their use and end They would surely think at least some effects or other sufficient to argue to us a designing cause And would they but soberly consider and resolve what characters or footsteps of wisdom and design might be reckon'd sufficient to put us out of doubt would they not upon comparing be brought to acknowledge there are no where any more conspicuous and manifest than in the things daily in view that go ordinarily with us under the name of the works of nature whence it is plainly consequent that what men commonly call universal Nature if they would be content no longer to lurk in the darkness of an obscure and uninterpreted word they must confess is nothing else but common Providence that is the universal power which is every where active in the world in conjunction with the unerring wisdom which guides and moderates all its exertions and operations or the wisdom which directs and governs that power Otherwise when they see cause to acknowledge that such an exact order and disposition of parts in very neat and elegant compositions doth plainly argue wisdom and skill in the contrivance only they will distinguish and say it is so in the effects of art but not of nature What is this but to deny in particular what they granted in general to make what they have said signifie nothing more than if they had said such exquisite order of parts is the effect of wisdom where it is the effect of wisdom but it is not the effect of wisdom where it is not the effect of wisdom and to trifle instead of giving a reason why things are so and so And whence take they their advantage for this trifling or do hope to hide their folly in it but that they think while what is meant by art is known what is meant by nature cannot be known But if it be not known how can they tell but their distinguishing members are co-incident and run into one yea and if they would allow the thing it self to speak and the effect to confess and dictate the name of its own cause how plain is it that they do run into one and that the expression imports no impropriety which we somewhere find in Cicero The art of Nature or rather that nature is nothing else but Divine Art at least in as near an analogy as there can be between any things Divine and Humane For that this matter even the thing it self waving for the present the consideration of names may be a little more narrowly discuss'd and search'd into Let some curious piece of workmanship be offered to such a Sceptick's view the making whereof he did not see nor of any thing like it and we will suppose him not told that this was made by the hand of any man nor that he hath any thing to guide his judgment about the way of its becoming what it is but only his own view of the thing it self and yet he shall presently without hesitation pronounce This was the effect of much skill I would here enquire why do you so pronounce or what is the reason of this your judgment surely he would not say he hath no reason at all for this so confident and unwavering determination For then he would not be determined but speak by chance and be indifferent to say that or any thing else Somewhat or other there must be that when he is askt is this the effect of skill shall so suddenly and irresistibly captivate him into an assent that it is that he cannot think otherwise Nay if a thousand men were askt the same question they would as
undoubtingly say the same thing and then since there is a reason for this judgment what can be devised to be the reason but that there are so manifest characters and evidences of skill in the composure as are not attributeable to any thing else Now here I would further demand is there any thing in this reason yea or no Doth it signifie any thing or is it of any value to the purpose for which it is alledg'd surely it is of very great in as much as when it is considered it leaves it not in a mans power to think any thing else and what can be said more potently and efficaciously to demonstrate But now if this reason signifie any thing it signifies thus much that wheresoever there are equal characters and evidences of skill at least where there are equal a skilful Agent must be acknowledged And so it will in spight of cavil conclude universally and abstractly from what we can suppose distinctly signified by the terms of Art and Nature that whatsoever effect hath such or equal characters of skill upon it did proceed from a skilful cause That is that if this effect be said to be from a skilful cause as such viz. as having manifest characters of skill upon it then every such effect viz. that hath equally manifest characters of skill upon it must be with equal reason concluded to be from a skilful cause We will acknowledge skill to act and wit to contrive very distinguishable things and in reference to some works as the making some curious automaton or self-moving Engine are commonly lodg'd in divers subjects that is the contrivance exercises the wit and invention of one and the making the manual dexterity and skill of others But the manifest characters of both will be seen in the effect That is the curious elaborateness of each several part shews the later and the order and dependence of parts and their conspiracy to one common end the former Each betokens design or at least the Smith or Carpenter must be understood to design his own part that is to do as he was directed Both together do plainly bespeak an Agent that knew what he did And that the thing was not done by chance or was not the casual product of only being busie at random or making a careless stir without aiming at any thing And this no man that is in his wits would upon sight of the whole frame more doubt to assent unto than that two and two make four And he would certainly be thought mad that should profess to think that only by some one 's making a blustering stir among several small fragments of brass iron and wood these parts happened to be thus curiously formed and came together into this frame of their own accord Or lest this should be thought to intimate too rude a representation of their conceit who think this world to have fallen into this frame and order wherein it is by the agitation of the moving parts or particles of matter without the direction of a wise mover and that we may also make the case as plain as is possible to the most ordinary capacity We will suppose for instance that one who had never before seen a watch or any thing of that sort hath now this little engine first offered to his view can we doubt but he would upon the meer sight of its figure structure and the very curious workmanship which we will suppose appearing in it presently acknowledge the Artificers hand But if he were also made to understand the use and purpose for which it serves and it were distinctly shewn him how each thing contributes and all things in this little fabrick concur to this purpose the exact measuring and dividing of time by minutes hours and months he would certainly both confess and praise the great ingenuity of the first inventer But now if a by-stander beholding him in this admiration would undertake to shew a profounder reach and strain of wit and should say Sir you are mistaken concerning the composition of this so much admired piece it was not made or designed by the hand or skill of any one there were only an innumerable company of little atoms or very small bodies much too small to be perceived by your sense that were busily frisking and plying to and fro about the place of its nativity and by a strange chance or a stranger fate and the necessary laws of that motion which they were unavoidably put into by a certain boisterous undesigning mover they fell together into this small bulk so as to compose it into this very shape and figure and with this same number and order of parts which you now behold One squadron of these busie particles little thinking what they were about agreeing to make up one wheel and another some other in that proportion which you see Others of them also falling and becoming fixed in so happy a posture and situation as to describe the several figures by which the little moving fingers point out the hour of the day and day of the month And all conspired to fall together each into its own place in so lucky a juncture as that the regular motion failed not to ensue which we see is now observed in it What man is either so wise or so foolish for it is hard to determine whether the excess or defect should best qualifie him to be of this faith as to be capable of being made believe this piece of natural history And if one should give this account of the production of such a trifle would he not be thought in jest But if he persist and solemnly profess that thus he takes it to have been would he not be thought in good earnest mad And let but any sober reason judge whether we have not unspeakably more manifest madness to contend against in such as suppose this world and the bodies of living creatures to have fallen into this frame and orderly disposition of parts wherein they are without the direction of a wise and designing cause And whether there be not an incomparably greater number of most wild and arbitrary suppositions in their fiction than in this Besides the innumerable supposed repetitions of the same strange chances all the world over even as numberless not only as productions but as the changes that continually happen to all the things produced And if the concourse of atoms could make this world why not for it is but little to mention such a thing as this a Porch or a Temple or an House or a City as Tully speaks in the before recited place which were less operous and much more easie performances It is not to be supposed that all should be Astronomers Anatomists or natural Philosophers that shall read these lines And therefore it is intended not to insist upon particulars and to make as little use as is possible of terms that would only be agreeable to that supposition But surely such general easie reflections
internal parts and how they each of them perform their distinct offices If we could discern the continual motion of the blood how it is conveyed by its proper conduits from its first source and fountain partly downwards to the lower intrails if rather it ascend not from thence as at least what afterwards becomes bloud doth partly upwards to its admirable elaboratory the heart where it is refined and furnished with fresh vital spirits and so transmitted thence by the distinct vessels prepared for this purpose could we perceive the curious contrivance of those little doors by which it is let in and out on this side and on that the order and course of its circulation its most commodious distribution by two social chanels or conduit-pipes that every where accompany one another throughout the body Could we discern the curious artifice of the brain its ways of purgation and were it possible to pry into the secret chambers receptacles of the less or more pure spirits there perceive their manifold conveyances and the rare texture of that net commonly call'd the wonderful one Could we behold the veins arteries and nerves all of them arising from their proper and distinct originals and their orderly dispersion for the most part by pairs and conjugations on this side and that from the middle of the back with the curiously wrought branches which supposing these to appear duly diversified as so many more duskish strokes in this transparent frame they would be found to make throughout the whole of it were every smaller fibre thus made at once discernable especially those innumerable threds into which the spinal marrow is distributed at the bottom of the back and could we through the same medium perceive those numerous little machines made to serve unto voluntary motions which in the whole body are computed by some to the number of four hundred and thirty or thereabouts or so many of them as according to the present supposition could possibly come in view and discern their composition their various and elegant figures round square long triangular c. and behold them do their offices and see how they ply to and fro and work in their respective places as any motion is to be performed by them Were all these things I say thus made liable to an easie and distinct view who would not admiringly cry out how fearfully and wonderfully am I made And sure there is no man sober who would not upon such a sight pronounce that man mad that should suppose such a production to have been a meer undesigned casualty At least if there be any thing in the world that may be thought to carry sufficiently convincing evidences in it of its having been made industriously and on purpose not by chance would not this composition thus offered to view be esteemed to do so much more Yea and if it it did only bear upon it characters equally evidential of wisdom and design with what doth certainly so though in the lowest degree it were sufficient to evince our present purpose For if one such instance as this would bring the matter no higher than to a bare equality that would at least argue a maker of man's body as wise and as properly designing as the Artificer of any such slighter piece of workmanship that may yet certainly be concluded the effect of skill and design And then enough might be said from other instances to manifest him unspeakably superiour And that the matter would be brought at least to an equality upon the supposition now made there can be no doubt if any one be judge that hath not abjur'd his understanding and his eyes together And what then if we Jay aside that supposition which only somewhat gratifies fancy and imagination doth that alter the case or is there the less of wisdom and contrivance expressed in this work of forming mans body only for that it is not so easily and suddenly obvious to our sight Then we might with the same reason say concerning some curious piece of carved work that is thought fit to be kept lock'd up in a Cabinet when we see it that there was admirable workmanship shewn in doing it but as soon as it is again shut up in its repository that there was none at all Inasmuch as we speak of the objective characters of wisdom and design that are in the thing it self though they must some way or other come under our notice otherwise we can be capable of arguing nothing from them yet since we have sufficient assurance that there really are svch characters in the structure of the body of man as have been mentioned and a thousand more than have been thought necessary to be mentioned here It is plain that the greater or less facility of finding them out so that we be at a certainty that they are Whether by the slower and more gradual search of our own eyes or by relying upon the testimony of such as have purchased themselves that satisfaction by their own labour and diligence is meerly accidental to the thing it self we are discoursing of And neither adds to nor detracts from the rational evidence of the present argument Or if it do either the more abstruse paths of Divine Wisdom in this as in other things do rather recommend it the more to our adoration and reverence than if every thing were obvious and lay open to the first glance of a more careless eye The things which we are sure or may be if we do not shut our eyes the wise Maker of this world hath done do sufficiently serve to assure us that he could have done this also that is have made everything in the frame and shape of our bodies conspicuous in the way but now supposed if he had thought it fit He hath done greater things And since he hath not thought that fit we may be bold to say the doing of it would signifie more trifling and less design It gives us a more amiable and comely representation of the Being we are treating of that his works are less for oftentation than use And that his Wisdom and other Attributes appear in them rather to the instruction of sober than the gratification of vain minds We may therefore confidently conclude that the figuration of the humane body carries with it as manifest unquestionable evidences of design as any piece of humane artifice that most confessedly in the judgment of any man doth so And therefore had as certainly a designing cause We may challenge the world to shew a disparity unless it be that the advantage is unconceivably great on our side For would not any one that hath not abandon'd at once both his reason and his modesty be asham'd to confess and admire the skill that is shewn in making a Statue or the picture of a man that as one ingeniously says is but the shadow of his skin and deny the wisdom that appears in the composure of his body it self that contains so
so we are fairly agreed to quit that pretence without more ado of their partaking reason from thence And are only left to weigh over again what hath been already said to evince the contrary that is how manifestly absurd it is to imagine that particles of matter by their peculiar size or weight or shape or motion or all of these together and that whether single or associated should be capable of reasoning If the former be the thing which is resolv'd to be stuck to that is that they are of themselves irrational but they become reasonable by their being united in such a prepared and organized body This requires to be a little further considered And to this purpose it is necessary to obviate a pittiful shift that it is possible some may think fit to use for the avoiding the force of this dilemma and may rely upon as a ground why they may judge this choice the more secure that is that they say they are rational by dependance on the body they animate because they are only found so united with one another there that there they have the first coalition there they are severed from such as serve not this turn there they are pent in and held together as long as its due temperament lasts which when it fails they are dissipated and so lose their great advantage for the acts of reason which they had in such a body What pleasure soever this may yield it will soon appear it does them little service For it only implies that they have their rationality of themselves so be it that they were together and not immediately from the body or any otherwise than that they are somewhat beholding to it for a fair occasion of being together as if it were else an unlawful assembly or that they knew not otherwise how to meet and hold together They will not say that the body gives them being for they are eternal and self-subsisting as they will have it Yea of themselves though the case be otherwise with the Cartesian particles undiminishable as to their size and as to their figure and weight unalterable So that they have neither their littleness their roundness nor their lightness from the body but only their so happy meeting Admit this and only suppose them to be met out of the body And why may not this be thought supposable If they be not rational till they be met they cannot have wit enough to scruple meeting at least somewhere else than in the body And who knows but such a chance may happen As great as this are by these persons supposed to have happened before the world could have come to this pass it is now at who can tell but such a number of the same sort of Atoms it being natural for things so much of a complexion and temper to associate and find out another might ignorantly and thinking no harm come together And having done so why might they not keep together Do they need to be pent in How are they pent in whilst in the body If they be dispos'd they have ways enough to get out And if they must needs be inclin'd to scatter when the crasis of the body fails surely a way might be found to hem them in if that be all at the time of expiration more tightly and closely than they could be in the body And what reason can be devised why being become rational by their having been assembled in the body they may not agree to hold together and do so in spite of fate or maugre all ordinary accidents when they find it convenient to leave it And then upon these no-way impossible suppositions according to their principles so far as can be understood with whom we have to do will they now be rational out of the body Being still endowed as they cannot but be with the same high priviledges of being little round and light and being still also together and somewhat more it may be at liberty to roll and tumble and mingle with one another than in the body If it be now affirmed they will in this case be rational at least as long as they hold together then we are but where we were And this shift hath but diverted us a little but so as it was easie to bring the matter again about to the same point we were at before Wherefore the shelter of the body being thus quite again forsaken this poor expulsed crew of dislodging Atoms are exposed to fight in the open air for their rationality against all that was said before But if this refuge and sanctuary of the body be not meerly pretended to but really and plainly trusted in and stuck to Then are we sincerely and honestly to consider what a body so variously organiz'd can do to make such a party of Atoms that of themselves are not so singly nor together become rational And surely if the cause were not saved before it is now deplorate and lost without remedy For what do they find here that can thus beyond all expectation improve them to so high an excellency Is it flesh or bloud or bones that puts this stamp upon them Think what is the substance of the nobler parts the liver or heart or brain that they should turn these before rational Atoms when they fall into them into irrational any more than if they were well soak'd in a quagmire or did insinuate themselves into a piece of soft dough But here they meet with a benign and kindly heat and warmth which comfortably fosters and cherishes them till at length it hath hatched them into rational But methinks they should be warm enough of themselves since they are supposed so much to resemble fire And however wherein do we find a flame of fire more rational than a piece of ice Yea but here they find a due temper of moisture as well as heat And that surely doth not signifie much for if the common maxim be true that the dry soul is the wisest they might have been much wiser if they had kept themselves out of the body And since its necessary the soul should consist of that peculiar sort of Atoms before describ'd and the organical body which must be said for distinction sake the soul being all this while supposed a body also consists of Atoms too that are of a much courser alloy methinks a mixture should not be necessary but an hinderance and great debasement rather to this rational composition Besides that it cannot be understood if it were necessary these Atoms should receive any tincture from the body in order to their being rational what they can receive or how they can receive any thing They have not pores that can admit an adventitious moisture though it were of the divinest nectar and the body could never so plentifully furnish them with it Wherein then lies the great advantage these Atoms have by being in the body to their commencing rational If there be such advantage why can it not be
observance and respect it is judg'd too great a trouble to him and inconsistent with the felicity of his nature and being that he should have given himself any diversion or disturbance by making the world From the care and labour whereof he is with all ceremony to be excused It being too painful and laborious an undertaking for an immortal and an happy Being Besides that he was altogether destitute of instruments and utensils requisite to so great a performance Whence also thirdly he was with the same reason to be excused of all the care and incumbrance of government as indeed what right or pretence could he have to the government of a world that chose him not which is not his inheritance and which he never made But all is very plausibly shadowed over with a great appearance of reverence and veneration with magnificent elogies of his never interrupted felicity Whence also it is made a very great crime not to free even the Divine Nature it self from business Though yet the true ground and root of this Epicurean Faith doth sometime more apparently discover it self even an impatiency of the Divine Government and a regret of that irksom bondage which the acknowledgment of a Deity that were to be feared by men would infer upon them And therefore fourthly he is further expresly asserted to be such as need not be feared as cares not to be worshipped as with whom neither anger nor favour hath any place So that nothing more of duty is owing to him than a certain kind of arbitrary veneration which we give to any thing or person that we apprehend to excel us and to be in some respect better than our selves An observance meerly upon courtesie But obedience and subjection to his Government fear of his displeasure expectation of his favour and benefits have no place left them We are not obliged to worship him as one with whom we have any concern and do owe him no more homage than to the great Mogul or the Cham of Tartary and indeed are less liable to his severity or capable of his favours than theirs for of theirs we are in some remote possibility of his in none at all In one word all converse between him and man on his part by providence and on ours by Religion is quite cut off Which evidently appears from what hath been already collected out of his own words and theirs who pretended to speak that so adored Authors mind and sense to be the scope and sum of the Epicurean doctrine in this matter and was indeed observed to be so long ago by one that we may suppose to have had better opportunity and advantages to know it than we Who discoursing that a man cannot live pleasantly according to the principles of Epicurus And that according to his doctrine beasts are more happy than men plainly gives this reason why he says so viz. that the Epicureans took away providence And that the design of their discoursing concerning God was that we might not fear him Unto which purpose also much more may be seen in the same Author elsewhere when he more directly pleads among divers more philosophical subjects on behalf of Religion against the Epicurean Doctrine which he saith they leave to us in word and shew but by their principles take away in deed as they do na-nature and the soul c. It is then out of question that the Doctrine of Epicurus utterly takes away all intercourse between God and man Which yet were little worth our notice or consideration nor would it answer any valuable end or purpose to revive the mention of such horrid opinions or tell the world what such a one said or thought two thousand years ago If their grave had been faithful to its trust and had retain'd their filthy poisonous savour within its own unhallowed Cell But since against what were so much to have been desired that their womb might have been their Grave their Grave becomes their womb where they are conceived and formed anew and whence by a second birth they spring forth afresh to the great annoyance of the world the debauching and endangering of mankind And that it is necessary some remedy be endeavoured of so mortal an evil it was also convenient to run it up to its original And contend against it as in its primitive state and vigour Wherefore this being a true though it be a very short account of the Epicurean God resulting all into this shorter sum That he is altogether unconversable with men and such therefore as cannot inhabit their Temple and for whom they can have no obligation or rational design to provide any it will be requisite in reference hereto and sutable to our present scope and purpose severally to evince these things 1. That the existence of such a Being as this were impossible ever to be proved unto men if it did exist 2. That Being supposed without any good ground 't is equally unimaginable that the supposition of it ean intend any valuable or good end 3. That this supposed Being cannot be God and is most abusively so called as hereby the true God the cause and author of all things is intended to be excluded 4. That it belongs to and may be deduced from the true notion of God which hath been given and proved by parts of a really existent Being that he is such as can converse with men For the first That there is no way to prove the existence of such a Being is evident For what ways of proving it can be thought of which the supposition it self doth not forbid and reject Is it to be proved by Revelation But that supposes converse with men and destroys what it should prove that such a Being having no converse with men doth exist And where is that Revelation Is it written or unwritten Or who are its vouchers Upon what authority doth it rest who was appointed to inform the world in this matter was Epicurus himself the common Oracle why did he never tell men so did he ever pretend to have seen any of these his vogued Gods No they are confessed not to be liable to our sense any more than the Inane it self And what Miracles did he ever work to confirm the truth of his Doctrine in this matter which sure was reasonably to be expected from one who would gain credit to dictates so contrary to the common sentiments of the rest of mankind And that were not to be proved any other way And what other way can be devised can it admit of rational demonstration what shall be the medium shall it be from the cause But what cause can or ever did he or his followers assign of God Or from effects And what shall they be When the matter of the whole universe is supposed ever to have been of it self and the particular frame of every thing made thereof to have resulted only of the casual coalition of the parts of that matter And
no real Being is supposed besides or shall it be that their Idea which they have of God includes existence as so belonging to him that he cannot but exist But by what right do they affix such an Idea to their petite and fictitious Deities How will they prove their Idea true or are we bound to to take their words for it Yea it is easily proved false and repugnant to it self while they would have that to be necessarily existent as they must if they will have it existent at all unto which in the mean time they deny the other perfections which necessary existence hath been proved to include But how vain and idle trifling is it arbitrarily and by a random fancy to imagine any thing what we please and attributing of our own special grace and favour necessary existence to it thence to conclude that it doth exist only because we have been pleased to make that belong to the notion of it What so odd and uncouth composition can we form any conception of which we may not make exist at this rate But the notion of God is not arbitrary but is natural proleptical and common to men imprest upon the minds of all whence they say it ought not to be drawn into controversie What the Epicurean notion of him we shall enquire further into that anon And in the mean time need not doubt to say any man might with as good pretence imagine the ridiculous sort of Gods described in Cicero's Ironical supposition and affirm them to exist as they those they have thought fit to feign and would impose upon the belief of men And when they have fancied these to exist is not that a mighty proof that they indeed do so But that which for the present we alledge is that supposing their notion were never so absolutely universal and agreeing with the common sentiments of all other men they have yet precluded themselves of any right to argue from its commonness to the existence of the thing it self Nor can they upon their principles form an argument thence that shall conclude or signifie any thing to this purpose None can be drawn hence that will conclude immediately and it self reach the mark without the addition of some further thing which so ill sorts with the rest of their Doctrine that it would subvert the whole frame That is it follows not that because men generally hold that there is a God that therefore there is one otherwise than as that consequence can be justified by this plain and irrefragable proof That no reason can be devised of so general an agreement or of that so common an impression upon the minds of men but this only that it must have proceeded from one common cause viz. God himself who having made man so prime a part of his Creation hath stampt with his own signature this nobler piece of his workmanship and purposely made and fram'd him to the acknowledgment and adoration of his Maker But how shall they argue so who while they acknowledge a God deny man to be his creature and will have him and all things be by chance or without dependence on any Maker what can an impression infer to this purpose that comes no one can tell whence or how But is plainly denied to be from him whose being they would argue from it The observation of so common an apprehension in the minds of men might upon their supposition beget much wonder but no knowledge and may perplex men much how such a thing should come to pass without making them any thing the wiser and would infer astonishment sooner than a good conclusion or than it would solidly prove any important truth And do they think they have salved the business and given us a satisfying account of this matter by telling us this impression is from nature as they speak It were to be wish'd some of them had told us or could yet tell us what they meant by nature Is it any intelligent principle Or was it guided by any such If yea whence came this impression but from God himself For surely an intelligent Being that could have this universal influence upon the minds of all men is much liker to be God than the imaginary entities they talk of that are bodies and no bodies have bloud and no bloud members and no members are some where and no where or if they be any where are confined to some certain places remote enough from our world with the affairs whereof or any other they cannot any way concern themselves without quite undoing and spoiling their felicity If they say no and that nature which put this stamp upon the minds of men is an utterly unintelligent thing nor was ever governed by any thing wiser than it self Strange that blind and undesigning nature should without being prompted become thus ignorantly officious to these idle voluptuary Godlings and should so effectually take course they might be known to the world who no way ever obliged it nor were ever like to do But to regress a little fain I would know what is this thing they call nature Is it any thing else than the course and inclination of conspiring Atoms which singly are not pretended to bear any such impression but as they luckily club and hit together in the composition of an humane soul by the meerest and strangest chance that ever hapned But would we ever regard what they say whom we believe to speak by chance were it to be supposed that characters and words serving to make up some proposition or other were by some strange agitation of wind and waves imprest and figured on the sand would we if we really believed the matter came to pass only by such an odd casualty think that proposition any whit the truer for being there or take this for a demonstration of its truth any more than if we had seen it in a Ballad Because men have casually come to think so therefore there are such beings to be called Gods between whom and them there never was or shall be any intercourse or mutual concern It follows as well as that because the staff stands in the corner the morrow will be a rainy day The dictates of nature are indeed most regardable things taken as expressions of his mind or emanations from him who is the Author and God of Nature But abstracted from him they are and signifie as much as a beam cut off from the body of the Sun Or a person that pretends himself an Ambassadour without credentials Indeed as is imported in the words noted from that grave Pagan a little before the principles of these men destroy quite nature it self as well as every thing of Religion And leave us the names and shew of them but take away the things themselves In sum Though there be no such impression upon the minds of men as that which they talk of yet if there were no such thing can be inferr'd from it as they would infer
that be the case if we suppose future contingencies to lie conceal'd from the penetrating eye of God For whatsoever is future will some time be present and then we will allow such contingencies to be known to him That is that God may know them when we our selves can And that nothing of that kind is known to him which is not at least knowable some way or other to our selves at least successively and one thing after another We will perhaps allow that prerogative to God in point of this knowledge that he can know these things now fall'n out all at once we but by degrees while yet there is not any one that is absolutely unknowable to us But why should it be thought unreasonable to attribute an excellency to the knowledge of God above ours as well in respect of the manner of knowing as the multitude of objects at once known we will readily confess in some creatures an excelency of their visive faculty above our own that they can see things in that darkness wherein they are to us invisible And will we not allow that to the eye of God which is as a flame of fire to be able to penetrate into the abstrusest darkness of futurity though we know not the way how it is done when yet we know that whatsoever belongs to the most perfect being must belong to his And that knowledge of all things imports more perfection than if it were lessened by the ignorance of any thing Some who have thought the certain foreknowledge of future contingencies not attributable to God have reckoned the matter sufficiently excused by this that it no more detracts from the Divine omniscience to state without the object of it things not possible or that imply a contradiction as they suppose these to do to be known than it doth from his omnipotency that it cannot do what is impossible or that implies a contradiction to be done But against this there seems to lie this reasonable exception that the two cases appear not sufficiently alike Inasmuch as the supposition of the former will be found not to leave the blessed God equally entitled to omnisciency as the latter to omnipotency For all things should not be alike the object of both And why should not that be understood to signifie the knowledge of simply all things as well as this the power of doing simply all things Or why should all things included in these two words signifie so very diversly that is there properly all things here some things only And why must we so difference the object of omnisciency and omnipotency as to make that so much narrower than this And then how is it all things when so great a number of things will be left excluded Whereas from the object of omnipotency that we may prevent what would be reply'd there will be no exclusion of any thing Not of the things which are actually already made for they are still momently reproduc'd by the same power Not of the actions and effects of free causes yet future for when they become actual God doth certainly perform the part of the first cause even by common consent in order to their becoming so which is certainly doing somewhat though all be not agreed what that part is Therefore they are in the mean time to be esteemed within the object of omnipotency or to be of the things which God can do viz. as the first cause virtually including the power of the second But more strictly all impossibility is either natural and absolute or moral and conditional What is absolutely or naturally impossible or repugnant in it self is not properly any thing Whatsoever simple being not yet existent we can form any conception of is producible and so within the compass of omnipotency for there is no repugnancy in simplicity That wherein therefore we place natural impossibility is the inconsistency of being this thing whose notion is such and another wholly and entirely whose notion is divers at the same time that which more barbarously than insignificantly hath been wont to be called incompossibility But surely all things are properly enough said to be naturally possible to God while all simple beings are producible by him of which any notion can be formed yea and compounded so as by their composition to result into a third thing So that it is not an exception to say that it is naturally impossible this thing should be another thing and yet be wholly it self still at once that it should be and not be or be without it self There is not within the compass of actual or conceivable being such a thing Nor is it reasonable to except such actions as are naturally possible to other Agents but not to him As to walk for instance or the like Inasmuch as though the excellency of his nature permits not they should be done by him yet since their power of doing them proceeds wholly from him he hath it virtually and eminently in himself As was formerly said of the infiniteness of his Being And for moral impossibility as to lye to do an unjust act That God never does them proceeds not from want of power but an eternal aversion of will It cannot be said he is not able to do such a thing if he would but so is his will quallified and conditioned by its own unchangeable rectitude that he most certainly never will or such things as are in themselves evil are never done by him not through the defect of natural power but from the permanent stability and fulness of all moral perfection And it is not without the compass of absolute omnipotency to do what is but conditionally impossible The absence of which restrictive condition would rather bespeak impotency and imperfection than omnipotency Therefore the object of omnipotence is simply all things Why not of omniscience as well It may be said all things as it signifies the object of omniscience is only restrained by the act or faculty signified therewith in the same word so as to denote the formal object of that faculty or act viz. all knowable things But surely that act must suppose some Agent whereto that knowable hath reference Knowable to whom to others or to God himself If we say the former it is indeed a great honour we put upon God to say he can know as much as others if the latter we speak absurdly and only say he can know all that he can know It were fairer to deny omniscience than so interpret it But if it be denied what shall the pretence be why that it implies a contradiction future contingents should be certainly known For they are uncertain and nothing can be otherwise truly known than as it is And it must be acknowledged that to whom any thing is uncertain it is a contradiction that to him it should be certainly known But that such things are uncertain to God needs other proof than I have met with in what follows in that cited Author or elsewhere All