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A35857 A dialogue at Oxford between a tutor and a gentleman, formerly his pupil, concerning government 1681 (1681) Wing D1290; ESTC R20617 14,276 23

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in the People to the end of the Chapter But where the People are not bound by contract to any other Lawful Prince it s then in their choice whether they will come into a moral Condition of Subjection to the Conqueror or no If they will not they dye or remain a Free People as to any moral Obligation But if on the one side the People be unwilling any longer to suffer the miseries they are under or have no Ability to make resistance and the Conqueror on the other side finds his forceable Dominion over them insecure and uneasie I say if upon such Considerations as these they mutually agree upon a Contract and Composition of Rule and Subjection upon such and such terms the Conqueror now has lost that name and his Government thenceforward must be such as the fundamental Contract makes it to be and the Rightful Dominion in the Prince and Duty of Subjection in the People will be so stated and limited as was concluded upon in the Original Agreement And I am persuaded it will appear an uncontrollable Truth in Policy that the Consent of a People either by themselves or their Ancestors is the only means without special Revelation whereby Magistracy is conferred on any Person or Family neither can God's Ordinance be conveyed and People engaged in Conscience any other way Tu. I confess I now begin to think that the Communities of Mankind have more to do in these matters than I was aware of and it 's more than probable that all Government whatever is very much for their sakes Pu. To me it seems plain That the Common Good of Humane Societies is the First and Last End of all Government for nulla potestas datur ad malum so in effect saies St. Paul in the 13th to the Romans speaking of Rulers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 He is the Minister of God to thee for good And Salus Populi c. has often been frownd upon but never answered And whoever shall Affirm that the Absolute Monarchies in Asia the many limited ones in Europe together with multitudes of Aristocracies and Common-wealths now extant in the world were constituted by God Almighty purely out of a partial Regard to those Persons and Families inconsiderable in the number to the Rest of Mankind to whom the Administration of those Powers is committed I believe he will find Few of his mind and not many that can debase themselves to so mean a Flattery as to own so sensless a position Tu. You have satisfied me that only Government in general is of Divine Right and that the particular Forms and Limitations of it are from humane Compact pray now inform me how you suppose our Government here in England first began and particularly what you think to be the Form and Essence of it whereby it differs from that of other Nations Pu. Now you put it hard upon me Tutor and I dare not undertake to give you full Satisfaction in so thoughtful a matter but you shall have more than my Guess And how I cannot choose but own the Goodness of Almighty God in the Architecture of our Government whereof I do declare my self so great an admiror that whatever more than humane Wisdom had the contrivance of it whether done at once or by degrees found out and perfected I conceive it unparallel'd for exactness of true Policy in the whole world Such care for the Authority of the Monarch such provision for the Liberty and Property of the People and that one may be justly allaid the other upheld and yet consist without Impeachment of each other that I wonder how our fore-fathers in those esteemed rude and unpolisht times could ever attain to such an accurate Composure First then Suppose a People compelled to it by the necessity of Conquest or agreeing to it by free consent Nobles and Commons setting over themselves by publick compact one chief Magistrate and resigning up themselves to him and his Heirs to be governed by such and such fundamental Laws whereby the chief Magistrates power is radically limited to one legal course of exercise Secondly Because in all Governments after-causes will arise not within the prospect of humane fore-sight requiring additional Laws pro re natâ and also because the original frame it self may in some cases stand in need of an Authentick Interpretation or would of course and by degrees moulder away and decay if not carefully repaired and look't after suppose them therefore covenanting with their Prince that if there be occasion in order to any of the aforesaid purposes there should be conventions of all degrees of men amongst them to provide suitable remedies and expedients for all the several exigencies and diseases of the State and if at any time there should be need of new Laws that the Prince himself should not have the sole power of making them but they reserve at first or afterwards it 's granted them which is all one an hand of concurrence therein and that they will be bound by no Laws but what they joyn with him in the making of Thirdly Because though the Nobles may personally convene yet the Commons being so many cannot all of them come together it 's therefore agreed that each County and Corporation shall have power to depute some particular persons to be instead of the whole that so the Nobles being present in person the Commons by their Deputies there may be representatively the whole body of the Kingdom having Commission by the original constitution to make new Laws or to guard and repair the old ones Fourthly Because the causes of their meeting would not be constant and perpetual they therefore did not form these Estates to be constantly existent but occasionally yet intentionally and virtually provided for their meeting whenever there should be occasion Fifthly Because a Monarchy was intended therefore as great power as was consistent with other parts of the Government was invested in the Prince in order to his better discharging the executive part of the Law and conculding that he who was to govern by Law and for the furtherance of whose Government for the good of the people the new Laws were to be made would thereby be engaged to see the convention of these Estates take place as of right it ought to do whenever there is occasion they therefore aptly plac't the formal part of nominating the time of Convention in the executive Power to be made use of as the reason of its being lodged there should require Sixthly It being found by experience in process of time that Princes not caring to have the male-administration of their Ministers look't into or to have any power in act but their own did therefore take advantage of this their nomination of time when the Estates should meet and made use of it seldomer than need required an inconvenience which had it not been provided for would have beaten down the Government at once and utterly defac't the whole frame of the Constitution to prevent