Selected quad for the lemma: cause_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
cause_n	body_n	effect_n	natural_a	1,661	5	6.1187	4	false

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ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A12767	The art of logick deliuered in the precepts of Aristotle and Ramus. VVherein 1. The agreement of both authors is declared. 2. The defects in Ramus, are supplyed, and his superfluities pared off, by the precepts of Aristotle. 3. The precepts of both, are expounded and applyed to vse, by the assistance of the best schoolemen. By Tho: Spencer.	Spencer, Thomas, fl. 1628-1629.	1628 (1628)	STC 23072; ESTC S117789	95,773	326

and signifieth a notion which our vnderstanding doth apprehend a resultancy or reflection proceeding from a being obiected to our vnderstanding Which hath a force to argue That is hath of its nature a power aptitude or fitnes to bring the thing obiected unto our understanding into the knowledge and intuition thereof I omit to giue instance of these things because that will better be done in setting out the nature of particular Arguments Wherefore now wee haue fully done with the first precept of Logick I will proceede to the second CHAP. II. The Distribution of Logick LOGICK hath two parts the Finding out of arguments Ramus Disposing of arguments This precept must haue the second place for the nature of the things themselues doth require it because by this we come to know what particulars are wrapped vp in the former precept and Aristotle in the 6. Booke of his Topicks and latter end of the first Chapter requires that the thing defined be distributed into parts Ramus tooke this precept out of the second Chapter of Aristotles Categories where wee haue these words Those things which are contained in Logick bee without complexion with complexion I sayd Ramus followed Aristotle in this partition and the thing it selfe shewes it for they both divide Logick into two parts The first part in Logick according to Aristotle are things without complexion so are they acording to Ramus as his owne words doe witnesse when he termes them Seuerall respects of things considered alone and by themselues Aristotle giues his incomplexed things no name but thereby he meanes arguments as they are vndisposed as his next precept doth shew and Ramus giues them that name expresly Ramus calls the first part of Logick invention and so doth Aristotle too as wee may gather from the 32. chapter of the first booke of his Priorums Where a little after the beginning he requires a facultie of inuenting in him that makes a Syllogisme but more plainly and fully we finde the same thing in the first Chapter of the eight booke of his Topicks To finde out saith he the place from whence a man may argue appertaines to Logick therefore vnto the first part of Logick for it can haue no other place Ramus calls the second part of Logick disposition So doth Aristotle also in the place last alleadged where he requires of a Logician to dispose singular things by themselues and he saith that this disposition is proper to a Logician and therefore belongs to Logick and consequently it is a second part thereof for it cannot be the first yea that Aristotle meant thus doth vndoubtedly appeare because he appoints his Logician first to finde out the places from whence t● argue and then in the second place to dispose them being so found out Two parts That is the precepts of Logick tend vnto two things or ends and they be called parts because all those precepts be shared or parted betweene these two ends some of them appertaine to the one and the rest vnto the other Finding out To finde out sometime signifies to discover a thing that is secret but here it is not so taken but the meaning is that the precepts of Logick doe assigne the seates and places of arguments and describe and set forth the nature of them and so much for the generall Distribution of Logick CHAP. III. Of the seates of Arguments in generall Aristotle assigneth ten places or seates of arguments in the fourth Chapter of his Categories in these words Those things which we finde in Logick without all coniunction doe signifie 1 Substance as a man a beast c. 2 Quantitie as two or three cubits 3 Qualitie as white c. 4 Relation as double halfe c. 5 Where as in the field c. 6 When as yesterday the yeere past 7 The place as he sitteth c. 8 To inioy as to be armed c. 9 Todoe as to cut c. 10 To suffer as to be cut c. He repeates the same doctrine in the ninth Chapter of his first booke of the Topicks and in both places he doth explicate them by certaine properties that be common to them all ioyntly viz. 1. They neither affirme nor deny 2. They be neither false nor true 3. A coniunction being added to them they containe negation or affirmation truth or falshood 4. All propositions are framed from them In the fift Chapter of his Categories and in his Prior. lib. 1. cap. 27. Eorum igitur Post lib. 1. cap. 22. he doth divide them thus These ten be Either subiected onely Predicated onely Or subiected and predicated also This distribution is fitly set out by Altisiodore in his Preface A. and B. Where he hath these words An Argument is that which proveth or is proved This is all that I finde touching arguments in generall Aristotle delivers the doctrine of Substance which is the first seat of arguments in the fift Chapter alledged which containeth these foure things 1. A substance is every thing of which we may say that it is We finde the same thing in Thomas Whatsoever saith he is essentiall to a thing appertaineth vnto substance 1. p.q. 77. art 1. ad 1m. 2. Substance is First as every singular individuall thing Second as Genus and species 3. Genus and species signifie substances by a figura●iue speech not properly they signifie rather the manner according to which a thing is 4. A singular thing is most properly a substance because all other things be attributed thereunto and that attributed vnto none Thus haue I set downe all that I finde in Aristotle touching the nature of those arguments which are contained in the first place or seat of arguments for this time we must omit the consideration of the second substance for that hath the last place in this first part of Logick The first substance comes now to be handled Thomas doth wholly subscribe vnto Aristotle for this distinction and explication of substance reported out of Aristotle and he shewes the same in this short sentence viz In the name of first substance is intended the nature of universall and parts 1. p.q. 29. art 3. ad 2m. And for further explication he saith 1. p. q 75. art 2. ad 2m. A first or individuall substance may be taken two wayes one way for every thing that hath a substance another way for a compleat subsistency in the nature of any species from whence a mans hand may be called a first substance or an individuall thing after the first sort but not after the second so also a mans soule may be called a first substance or a singular thing in the first sort because it is as it were a thing that subsisteth but that which is compounded of soule and bodie is called a first substance or an individuall being in the second sence Vnto this place must be referred every individual effect as it consisteth by force of all the causes and every individuall subiect that receiveth any outward change

whether it be by the substracting of something inioyed or the receiving of something that is added The nature of these effects and subiects is delivered by Aristotle in his tenth place or seat of arguments viz. of suffering I say they are contained there for in the judgement of Thomas 1. p.q. 79. art To suffer is no more but to lose things inioyed whether appertaining to nature or not appertaining thereto or to be brought from power to act and therefore Aristotles tenth seat of suffering importeth the whole nature of every individuall effect and subiect as it is an effect and subiect Now I conceiue that this is wholy agreeable vnto Aristotles meaning because in his doctrine of predicated arguments hee speakes not a word of effects and subiects This Doctrine is peculiar to Aristotle Ramus doth not acknowledge it for he hath not a word of it It may bee he conceived that 1. To set downe all the seats of arguments in one place together would breed a needles repetition 2. These single termes did not appertaine to Logick 3. The first substance or thing subiected in every sentence hath not the nature of an argument It is very likely that he thought thus because this doctrine of Aristotle hath beene anciently receiued therefore hee would not depart from it vnles hee had some reason for it and I conceiue he had no reason but these 3. I answer these three arguments bee insufficient The first because Aristotle doth neuer repeat or handle these ten seates of arguments twise but in stead of them sometime hee brings in the doctrine of a definition Propertie Genus Accident as the things which are contained in those ten seates of arguments and this wee finde in the 8. and 9. chapters of the first booke of his Topicks Some other time he sets out the nature of other arguments but they are such as are either contained in these 4. or arise from them and at most hee doth but explicate at large the same things that he had set downe summarily in the 10. places aforesaid Neither is the second reason good for those 10. things are propounded not as me●re and simple beings but in respect of that reflection or relation which ariseth out of them vnto our vnderstanding for he doth intend them as they may bee fit to argue and serue vnto the framing of disputations either in single propositions or in syllogismes as himselfe expresly sheweth in the 8. and 9. chapters alledged and this is also evident by the properties which he assigneth vnto them viz They containe truth or falshood affirmation or negation when one of them is attributed to the other The third also is insufficient for the first substance or subiect part of every sentence hath truly and properly the nature of an argument for it hath a relation or emanation vnto many things that may be added or attributed to it so as we conceiue it to be a receptiue thing 1. of the causes wherof it is compounded and constituted 2. of the properties flowing from it 3. and of outward additions whereby it is beautified and made to differ and dissent from other and whereby it is made equall or vnequall like or vnlike vnto others as we shall playnly see when we come to the particulars and it is plaine that Aristotle vnderstood that argument which he calls the first substance after this sort for in the sayd 5 chapter of his Categories he sayth it is proper vnto the first substance to receiue contraries as sicknes and health blacknes and whitnes and thereby to be changed from well to ill from white to blacke The onely doubt is whether an individuall effect and subiect bee some wayes predicated or not Ramus sayth yea and brings them as predicated arguments Aristotle doth not so and no doubt he hath the truth No indiuiduall effect is predicated I haue three reasons for it first we neuer find any such predication in the formall writings in the schooles 2. No man can say this indiuiduall thing consisting of soule and bodie is this man for the predicate is lesse knowne then the subiect The subiect engendreth distinct and certaine knowledge because it comprehendeth all the causes but no man will say so of the predicate nor so much 3. The authority of the schools is against it I will alleadge Thomas for them all An integrall whole sayth he 1. p. 1. 77. art 1. ad 1m. is not predicated of all the parts together vnles improperly as when we say these walls this foundation and roofe is this house For the subiect the matter is yet more cleere we cannot say this learning is this man Thomas sayth truly 1. p. q. 29. art 3. ad 3 m Accidents doe mans est the subiect but hee neuer sayd nor any man else that the subiect doth manifest the accident and no maruaile why for if the subiect be predicated of the accident then we must conceiue that the accident is without and before the subiect but no man will say so therfore we may conclude the indiuiduall effect and subiect are fitly comprehended vnder the name of a first substance Thus I haue set downe and explicated the generall nature of arguments and the speciall nature of that argument which is alwayes subiected or argued In the next place I come to those arguments which be alway predicated CHAP. IIII. The distribution of predicated Arguments Arguments be Positiue Consenting absolutely Ramus after a sort Dissenting Comparatiue A positiue argument is that which 〈◊〉 attributed simply and absolutely considered in it selfe not compared with others A consenting argument is that which is predicated of the subiect affirmatiuely I Finde this doctrine of positiue arguments deliuered by Aristotle also and I will shew it in his doctrine of consenting arguments in the second chapter of his Categortes hee sayth some arguments be of the subiect and other some in the subiect those I say be in the subiect which are no parts of it nor can be without that thing in which they are The same thing is taught by Thomas yet more plainly 1. p. q. 25. art 6. In. cor Some arguments saith he be of the essence and other some without the essence of the subtect of which they are predicated I say this of Thomas and that of Aristotle are the same with the last two branches of Ramus his division or at least it is comprehended in them for those that be of the essence doe absolutely agree with the subiect of whose essence they be They that be in the subiect but without the essence therof doe agree to the subiect after a sort seeing therefore they agree in those two last branches they must agree also in the former branches of the division seeing every argument that agrees absolutely doth consent positiuely with the subiect of which they be predicated and consequently it is enough to the vnderstanding of the whole if we doe explicate and prosecute those two last branches and because I suppose that the

terms of Aristotle and Thomas be more significant and fit I thinke it best to follow them Of the essence By these words are set out such arguments as be essentiall vnto the thing of which they are predicated now all the causes be of this kinde for as much as the effect is constituted by all the causes as Thomas hath taught vs in 2. dist 27. q. 1. art 2. ad 9m. he saith the effect is constituted by all the causes that is each one in its kind and maner of working for all of them doe concur and bestow their force vnto the procuring of the thing to be These arguments be all comprehended in the 9. place of arguments viz. To doe CHAP. V. The Definition of a Cause A Cause is that by force whereof Ramus a thing is THis argument which we call a Cause is sometimes taken for every thing wherevpon another followes and so saith Okam 1. dist 1. q. 3. lit N. wherefore as the same Okam sayth 1. dist 41. lit F. A Cause is taken two wayes Sometimes for every thing that hath another thing as an effect thereof and sometime also for a proposition whereof another doth follow thus farre Okam A Cause in this place is taken not so largely as in Okam● first and third senses but in the second A Cause in this notion is also taken for the thing it selfe which doth cause and sometimes also for the nature of Causing or for the thing as it doth exercise Causallitie in act or for the relation of Causing A Cause is taken in the second sense in this definition wherefore A Cause is that of which the effect even by it selfe dependeth Thus farre the Iesuites in their Preface vnto Porphyrte By this it is manifest that Ramus and Aristotle doe fully agree in the defining of a Cause and in the explication of that definition therefore we need not say more for the opening thereof a few examples wil make it easily vnderstood but we may not doe that in this place least we be forced to repeate the same thing againe when we come to the particulars CHAP. VI. The Distribution of a Cause There be foureCauses Ramus the Efficient and Matter Forme and End THere is an vniversall agreement in this precept also Aristotle makes them these foure as wee may finde in the 11. chapter of the second booke of his Postertorums his words be these There be 4. Causes 1. That which sheweth what a thing is 2. That which must be when the thing is 3. That which moueth first 4. That for which a thing is He hath the same thing in the fift booke of his Metaphysicks and 23 chapter Thomas doth follow him and doth teach the same things in 1a. 2 a. q. 72. art 3. in cor and no man thinks otherwise therefore I will descend to vnfold the nature of the particulars CHAP. VII Of the Efficient Cause The Efficient Cause is that Ramus from which the thing is Efficient This word imports no more but to doe or to bring to passe and therefore it signifieth the office of all the Causes and consequently it seemes not fit to be given vnto any one Cause distinctly yet notwithstanding we must know that there is good reason thus to call it else the learned of all ages would not haue giuen it that name yea the very nature of it deserues we should call it so as we shall see in the next passage From which These words doe set out the nature or office of that Cause which is called Efficient and signifie the originall or fountaine from whence the effect doth receiue tts being I say the effect and I meane the whole effect for this Cause doth ioyne together all the other Causes whereof the effect is compounded as namely it bestoweth the forme vpon the matter and doth destinate the matter formed vnto the producing of something that is good and therefore it deserues well to be called Efficient The forme doth make the effect to be of this or that kinde the matter formed doth make the effect to be this or that individuall thing the end makes it fit for this or that good but the motion and efficacy of the efficient Cause onely doth giue being vnto the effect in the event Wee haue many examples of this Cause and the operation thereof we finde one in the second of Genesis the seaventh verse where it is sayd God formed man of the dust of the ground and breathed into him the breath of life and he became a liuing soule In this example the making of man is attributed vnto God therefore God is sayd to be the Efficient Cause of man the office of this efficiency is placed in ioyning the forme vnto the matter he framed him of the dust there is the matter and breathed life into him and thereby the forme is imposed on the matter and then God did destinate him to an end viz. The actions of life thereby he made him a living soule We haue another the like example in the 11. of Genesis the 3. and 4. ver where it is reported that The men of the earth did build a high tower of bricke and slime for a memoriall of their name The men of the earth are made the builders of the tower and thereby they became the efficient cause of the whole worke they take bricke and frame it into a tower therefore they ioyne the matter and forme together they destinate the same vnto an end viz. the continuance of their name on earth And thus much shall suffice to set out the nature of the efficient cause Wee should now divide an efficient cause into the severall kindes but that we cannot for as Ramus truely sayes they are vnknowne vnto vs therefore we will set downe the divers and various manner wherein the efficient cause doth worke for that is well knowne and doth helpe vs much in the vnderstanding of the office of thus Cause The efficient cause doth worke By it selfe By accident A Cause doth then worke by it selfe Ramus when it worketh by force of and according vnto the inbred fitnesse thereof We finde this distinction and the explication thereof in the Schooles of all ages The efficient cause sayth Thomas workes by it selfe or by accident the first is when it moneth by its owne proper vertue The second when something is remoued therefrom or that which remaines is hindred from working 1a. 2● q. 76. art 1. in cor If wee ioyne Okam vnto Thomas wee shall finde this matter fully opened A Cause by accident sayth Okam 1. dist 2. q. 10. lit B. H. is that which worketh by a thing different from it selfe and a cause which workes by it selfe is that which causeth the effect according to its proper nature and not according to some other thing which outwardly doth befall it The efficient doth worke by it selfe in naturall things when it moues according vnto the instinct and inbred disposition of nature as when the living