cause Now if it be the certaine will of God that Reprobates shall in no wise beleeve hee cannot with reason and equity tye them to beleeve For then he tyeth them to an act contrary to his determinate will 3 Because they have no object of Faith no Christ to beleeve in Credere jubet fidei nullum obiectum ponit He commandeth to beleeve and affordeth no object to beleeve in this soundeth not well The Divels have no part in Christ or the new Covenant We will not therefore say that God can justly bind them to beleeve or punish them as transgressors of the Covenant because they beleeve not How then can we say that God can justly require faith of Reprobates or destroy them for not beleeving if they have indeed no more part in Christ or in the Covenant then the Divels have If a man should command his servant to eate and punish him for not eating and in the meane time fully resolve that hee shall have no meat to eat would any reasonable man say that such a man were just in the command or punishment Change but the name and the case is the same Againe that Christ dyed for Reprobates by the Doctrine of absolute Reprobation is a lye and can God justly bind men to beleeve a lye This is the second reason 3 The third reason why the absolute decree infringeth Gods justice is because it will have him to punish men for omission of an act which is made impossible to them by his owne decree not by that decree alone by which he determined to give them no power to beleeve having lost it but by that decree also by which he purposed that we should partake with Adam in his sinne and be stripped of all that supernaturall power which we had by Gods free grant bestowed upon us in Adam before he fell These are the reasons which move me to thinke that this absolute decree is repugnant to Gods Iustice Three things are usually answered 1 That Gods wayes may be very just and yet seem unjust to mans erring understanding and so is this decree though flesh and bloud will not yeeld it to be so This answer I take to be false and the contradictory to it to be true namely that nothing is truely just which humane understanding purged from prejudice corrupt affections and customes hath in all ages places and persons judged to be unjust The reason is because God hath by the light of nature and those generall impressions of good and evill honest and dishonest just and unjust made in the hearts of men sufficiently instructed and enabled them to judge what is just and what is not When a thing is done reason so quallified is able to say This is just or this is unjust whether it be done by God or man For vertues in men being but the image of those perfections that dwell in God Iustice in men and God are for substance but one and the same thing though infinitly differing in degree as the greater and lesser light That this power is ingraffed in men God himself who best knoweth with what endowments he hath beautified his creature hath sufficiently signified in those Scriptures where he calleth on men to be judges of the equity of his wayes Iudge J pray you between me and my vineyard Esay 5. Judge O ye house of Israel are not my wayes equall and your wayes unequall Ezek. 18.25 God would never put them upon the tryall of reason if he had not made it able to examine them The incarnation of the sonne of God his birth of a Virgin his dying the resurrection of the body and such mysteries as are peculiar to the Gospell and the proper objects of the Christian faith God hath not offered to the tryall of our understandings buâ— rather derideth those that presume to judge of them by reason 1 Cor. 1.20 Where is the Scribe where is the wise when is the disputer of this world and the reason is because these things being supernaturall and therefore not discernable by naturall power man is no competent judge of them by his naturall understanding nor may adventure upon the tryal and iudgement of them with lesse danger then Vzzah look into the Ark for Scrutator majestatis opprimetur à gloriâ 〈◊〉 that pryeth into Gods majestie will be overwhelmed of his glory But of the justice of his decrees and wayes he maketh him a judge because the common notions of just and unjust being imprinted in nature he is able by naturall reason to apprehend what is just in divine acts as well as in his owne 2 It is answered that these decrees are set downe is Scripture to be the will of God and therfore they must needs be just For Gods will is the rule of all righteousnesse To this answer I have these things to reply 1 This rule in Divinity is much abused by the mainteyners of absolute Reprobation and may not be admitted in their sence and meaning For Gods will is not a rule of justice to himself as if things were therefore just because he willeth them and worketh them but his justice rather is a rule of his will and works which are the expressions of his will He therefore maketh decrees and executeth them because they are agreeable to that justice which dwels in the divine nature as he maketh nothing which hath not potentiam objectivam a power of being created without implying contradiction to himself or any thing in him so he willeth and doeth nothing but that which may be willed or done salvâ justitiâ without wrong to his justice Hierom Proâ—m in Hosea St. Hierom speaking of the Prophet Hoseas taking a wife of fornications Hosea 1.2 saith it was done in typo typically not really quia si fiaâ— turpissimum est because if had beene indeed done it had beene a most foule thing But thou wilt answer sayth he Deo jubente nihil turpe est God commanding it nothing is dishonest Thus much we say sayth the Father that God commandeth nothing but what is honest but he doth not by commanding dishonest things make those things honest which are abominable plainely giving us to see what he thought viz. that God doth not will a thing and so make it good but willeth it because it is in it selfe good antecedently and before the act of Gods will about it And thus much doth Zanchy though a rigid mainteyner of absolute reprobation not obscurely confesse in his Treatise de nativ Dei where he letteth fall such speeches as make Gods justice antecedent to his will and therefore the rule of it rather then a thing regulated by it (f) Zanch. l. 3. de nat Dei c. 4 q. 9. thes 2. Neque aliquid velle potest quod justuÌ„ non sit Neither can God will anything sayth he which is not just And againe (g) Quod placet principi legis habet vigorem The Princes pleasure hath the strength of a Law is a rule
determination but not the perswasion of the will God is therefore a truer cause of sinne by this doctrine then the Divell 2 Wicked men are esteemed authors of their owne offences because they plot purpose choose and commit them and are immediate agents in the acting of them But God by this opinion doth more for he overruleth the projects and purposes of wicked men and by an uncontrollable motion proceeding from an immutable decree carrieth all their deliberations resolutions choyses and actions precisely that very way so as they cannot choose but doe as they doe whatsoeuer they may think to the contrary They have indeed potentiam in se liberam a power in it self free to choose what they refuse or to refuse what they choose to determine themselves this way or that way as liketh them best but they have not liberum â—sum a free use of this their power God doth determine their will before it hath determined it selfe and maketh them doe those onely actions which his omnipotent will hath determined and not which their willes out of any absolute dominion over their owne actions have prescribed More rightly therefore may God be called the Author of those offences for (u) Opera magis pertinent ad imperaÌ„tem quaÌ„ ad exequentem deeds whether good or bad are owned more truly by him that over-ruleth them then by the servile instruments that onely execute and doe them 3 Wicked counsellers and they who allure and advise men to sinne are accounted by God and men to be the causes of those sinnes to which they are the perswaders and have beene punished for those misdeeds which others through their instigations have committed Jezabell Ahabs wife was reputed and punished as the murderer of Naboth because she counselled and contrived the doing of it as we may see 1. Kings 21.23.25 But what is counselling to inforcing Evill counsels may be refused but an almighty power cannot be resisted God therefore that useth this according to their doctrine in the production of sinnes is much more an author of them then hee that onely useth the other 2 If we could finde out a King that should so carry himselfe in procuring the ruine and the offences of any subject as by this opinion God doth in the effecting of the damnation and transgressions of Reprobates we would all charge him with the ruine and sinnes of those his Subjects (w) Molin Anat. c. 12. de praedest p. 73 Quis non regem abominetur sic loqueÌ„tem Who would not abhorre sayth Moulin a King speaking thus (y) Ego hunc hominem addico suspendioâ— sed ut justè suspendatur volo patret homicidium vel peculatum J will have this man hang'd and that J may hang him justly I will have him murther or steale This King saith he should not onely make an innocent man miserable sed sceleratum but wicked too and should punish him for that offence cujus ipse causa esset of which himselfe is the cause It is a cleere case (y) Sueton vit Tib. cap. 61. Tiberius as Suetonius reports having a purpose to put certaine Virgins to death because it was not lawfull among the Romans to strangle Virgins caused them all to be defloured by the Hangman that so they might bee strangled Who will not say that Tiberius was the principall author of the deflouring of those maides In like manner say the Supralapsarians God hath a purpose of putting great store of men to the second death but because it is not lawfull for him by reason of his justice to put to death men innocent and without blame he hath decreed that the Divell shall defloure them that afterward he may damne them It followeth therefore that God is the maine cause of those their sinnes 3 That God is the Author of mens salvation and conversion all sides grant and yet hee doth no more in the procuring of them then these men report him to do in the Reprobates impenitency and damnation The salvation and conversion of the Elect say they he hath absolutely and antecedently without the fore-sight of any deservings of theirs resolved upon and by irresistible meanes in their severall generations draweth them to beleeve repent and endure to the end that so they might be saved and his absolute decree accomplished On the other side the damnation the sinnes and the finall impenitency of Reprobates he hath of his alone will and pleasure peremptorily decreed this his decree he executeth in time drawing them on by his unconquerable power and providence from sinne to sinne till they have made up their measure and in the end have inflicted on them that eternall vengeance which he had provided for them What difference is here in the course which God taketh for the conversion and salvation of the Elect and the obduration and damnation of Reprobates And therefore what hindereth but that God by their grounds may as truly be stiled the prime cause and author of the sinnes of the one as of the conversion of the other The Fathers thought it a plaine case and therefore they did generally make sinne an object of prescience not predestination and bent the most of those arguments by which they refuted this foule assertion against an absolute irresistible and necessitating decree as I could easily shew but that I feare to be overlong Onely I will cite some few of those Authors words whom the learned and reverend Bishop hath alledged in favour and for the defence of the Predestinarians and the mainteiners of Gotteschalkes opinion The Church of Lyons in their answer to the positions of Iohannes Scotus which he framed against Gotteschalk hath these words (z) Bish Vsher his hist of Gottesc pag. 138. Qui vim necessitatem peccandi deum intuliste homini vel inferre dicit manifeste horribiliter in deum blasphemat quem ad peccata compellendo utique authorem peccati osse confirmat Whosoever sayth that God hath layd a constraynt or a necessity of sinning upon any man he doth manifestly and fearfully blaspheme God in as much as he maketh him by affirming that of him to be the very author of sinne Remigius Archbishop of that Church explaining his Churches opinion in the poynt of prescience and predestination in 7 severall rules in the 5th of those rules he hath these words to the same purpose God sayth he by his prescience and predestination hath layd a necessity of being wicked upon no man (a) Id. ib. p. 173. Hee enim si fecisset ipse utique esset author mal rum c. For if he had done this he should have been the author of sinnes And thus in my judgment doth it plainly appeare that by absolute Reprobation as it is taught the upper way God is made to be the true cause of mens sinnes Many distinctions are brought to free the Supralapsarian way from this crimination all which me thinke are no better then meere delusions of the simple and inconsiderate
in libertima dei veluntate fundari dicimus We affirme that this non-Election is founded in the most free pleasure of God And (n) Ib thes 3. heterodox Nominem post lâ—psum merâ Dei voluntate praeteritum osse that no man lying in the fall is past over by the meere will of God is numbred by the same Divines among the Heterodox positions To this purpose also speake the Ministers of the Palatinate (o) Act Syn. Iud. Palat thes 3. Causa reprobationis est liberrima ac justissima Dei voluntas The cause of Reprobation is the most free and just will of God (p) Ib thes 4. Quod Deus nonnullos praeterit granâ praedicationis evan â—elii ejus causa est idem beneplacitum sive eadem libera vâ—luntas That God passeth over some and denyeth them the grace of the Gospell the cause is the same free pleasure of God (q) Iudic. Theol. Hassiac Decrevit deus quosdam in lapsu misâ—ia relinquere pro suo beneplacito God decreed to leave some in the fall of his owne good pleasure Thus the Divines of Hâ—ssen The proofe of this they fetch from the execution of this decree in time (r) Deus in tempore quosdomè genere humino de relinquit in miseâ—ââ—suâ nec media ad fiâ—eÌ„ conversioneÌ„ ipsumque etiam saluâ—em obtinendam necessaria eis confert c idque pro libertiniâ suâ voluntate God doth in time leave some of mankind fallen and doth not bestow upon them meanes necessary to beleeve c. and this out of his most free pleasure This they joyntly affirme and prove it by this reason especially All men were lookt on as sinners If sinne therefore were the cause that moved God to reprobate he should have reprobated or rejected all But he did not reprobate all therefore for sinne he reprobated none but for his own pleasure in which we must rest without seeking any other cause Now from these two things layd together viz. 1 That God did bring men into a necessity of sinning 2 That he hath left the reprobates under this necessity it will follow that he is the author of the reprobates sinnes 1 Because Causa causae est causa causati The cause of a cause is the cause of its effect if there be a necessary subordination between the causes and the effect whether it be a cause by acts negative or positive But God is the chiefe or sole cause by their doctrine of that which is the necessary and immediate cause of the sinnes of Reprobates namely their impotency and want of supernaturall grace therefore he is by the same doctrine the true and proper cause of their sinnes 2 Because Removens prohibens c. that which withdraweth or withholdeth a thing which being present would hinder an event is the cause of that event as for example he that cutteth a string in which a stone hangs is the cause of the falling of that stone and he that withdraweth a pillar which being put to would uphold a house is the true cause in mens account of the falling of that house But God by their opinion withholdeth from Reprobates that power which being granted them might keep them from falling into sinne therefore he becommeth a true morall cause of their sinnes (s) Terâ—ul l. 1 contr Marcion c. 22. In cujus manu est quid ne fiat ei deputatur â—m jam fit In whose power it is that a thing be not done to him it is imputed when it is done saith Tertullian It will not suffice to say that God by withholding grace from Reprobates becommeth onely an accidentall not a proper and direct cause of their sinnes For a cause is then onely accidentall in relation to the effect when the effect is beside the intention and expectation of the cause For example digging in a feild is then an accidentall cause of the finding a bag of gold when that event is neither expected nor intended by the husbandman in digging But when the effect is lookt for and aymed at then the cause though it be the cause onely by withholding the impediment is not accidentall as a pilot who withholdeth his care and skill from a ship in a storme foreseeing that by his neglect the Ship will be drowned is not to be reputed an accidentall but a direct and proper cause of the losse of this ship This being so it followeth that God by this act and decree of removing and detayning grace necessary to the avoyding of sinne from Reprobates not as one ignorant and carelesse what will or shall follow but knowing infallably what mischiefe will follow and determining precisely that which doth follow namely their impenitency and damnation becommeth the proper and direct cause of their sinnes SEcondly it opposeth Gods Mercy God is mercifull a part it is of his title Exod. 34.6 2 Contrary to his Mercy mercifull and gracious He is mercy in the abstract 1 Joh. 4.16 God is love a Father of mercies and God of all consolations 2 Cor. 1.3 a Saviour of men 1 Tim. 4.10 And thus the Church hath alwayes taken him to be And therefore hath of old stiled him in her liturgy A God whose nature and property is alwayes to have mercy and to forgive Two wayes is Gods mercy spoken of in Scripture absolutely and comparatively 1 Absolutely and so it is set out in high and stately termes It is called rich mercy Eph. 2.4 great kindnesse Ionah 4.2 Abundant mercy 1 Pet. 1.2 love without height or depth length or breadth or any dimensions love passing knowledge Eph. 3.18 So great it is that Jonah could not intreat him to punish the little infant harmelesse Ninivites with temporall death for the sinnes of their guilty parents Ionah 4.11 2 Comparatively with two things it is compared 1 His owne justice 2 The love that dwelleth in the creature and is advanced above both I. With his owne Iustice it is compared and advanced above it not in its essence for all Gods excellencies are infinitely good and one is not greater then another but in its expressions and some things that have relation to it particularly in these 1 In its naturalnesse and dearenesse to God It is sayd of mercy it pleaseth him Micah 7.18 but justice is called his strange worke aliâ—num à naturâ suâ Esay 28.21 He doth not afflict willingly nor grieve the children of men Lamentat 3. 33. 2 In the frequent exercise of it selfe He is said to be slow of anger but abundant in goodnesse Exod. 34.6 mercies are bestowed every day judgements inflicted but now and then sparingly and after a long time of forbearance when there is no remedy 2 Chron. 36.15 All the day long have J stretched out my hands to a gainsaying and rebellious people Esay 65.2 That is I have been patient a long time and in that time I have not been idle but imployed in exhorting promising and shewing mercy that so I might
inviolable justice of God cannot absolute Reprobation of such especially as are commanded to beleeve and are called to salvation be reconciled My Reasons are these 1 Because it maketh God to punish the Righteous with the wicked The Sublapsarians say directly in plaine termes that God decreed to destruction men considered without sin and therefore yet righteous And the Sublapsarians say as much in effect for they say two things 1 That God did lay a necessity upon every man of being borne in Originall sinne as I have noted before 2 That he hath determined for that sinne to cast away the greatest part of mankind for ever and so they make God to doe that by two acts the one accompanying the other which the other say he did by one Calv. Instit 3. cap. 23. §. 23. This is so cleare a case that Calvin with some others have not stickt to say that God may with as much justice determine men to Hell the first way as the latter See Jnstit l. 3. c. 23. § 7. Where against those who deny that Adam fell by Gods decree he reasoneth thus All men are made guilty of Adams sinne by Gods absolute decree alone Adam therefore sinned by this onely decree (z) Quid eos prohibâ—t fateri de uno homine quod inviti de toto humano genere concedunt Quid enim tergiversando luderent operam What lets them to grant that of one man which they must grant of all men And a little after he sayth (a) Bonos istos justitiae Dei patronos perplexos haerere in festâ—â altas verò trabes superare nimis absurdum est It is too absurd that these kind Patrons of Gods Iustice should thus stumble at a straw and leape over a blocke God may with as much justice decree Adams sinne and mens damnation out of his onely will and pleasure as out of that will and pleasure the involving of men in the guilt of the first sinne and their damnation for it that is the substance of his reasoning To the same purpose speaketh Maccovius From hence we may see sayth he what to judge of that opinion of out adversaries viz. That God cannot justly ordaine men to destruction without the consideration of sinne (b) Maccov disp 18. p. 16. Nam dicant quaeso nobis quid majus sit imputate alicui culpam alterius propter ipsam illum morte aeternâ plectere an verò ordinare ad interitum At hoc potest sine ullâ laesione justitiae suae ergo multò magis potest illud posterius Let them tell me which is greater to impute to one man the sinne of another and punish him for it with eternall death or to ordaine simply without looking at sinne to destruction surely no man will deny the first of these to be greater But this God may doe without any wrong to Justice much more therefore may he do the other To these consenteth Dr. Twisse and sayth (c) Dr. Twiss Vind. gra l. 2. digr 1. pag. 15. Quod potest Deus intercedente liberâ suà constitutione illud etiam absolutè poterit vel sine aliqua constitutione interâ—dente If God may ordaine men to Hell for Adams sin which is derived unto them by Gods onely constitution he may as well doe it absolutely without any such constitution And it is most true it is all one in substance simply to decree the misery of an innocent man and to involve him in a sinne that he may be brought to misery Neyther of these decrees I take it are just 2 The second reason why it is against Gods justice is because it maketh him to require faith in CHRIST of those to whom he hath precisely in his absolute purpose denyed both a power to beleeve and a CHRIST to beleeve in That God bindeth Reprobates to beleeve as well as others it is the constant doctrine of Divines among whom Zanchius delivereth it for a Thesis (d) Zanch. l. 5. de natur Dei cap. 2. q. 1. de praed Sanctorii Quisque mandato Dei tenetur credere se ad salutem aeternam in Christo fuisse electum maximè autem is qui fidem in Christum profitetur Cum dicemus unumquemque teneri hoc credere neminem ne Reprobos quidem qui neque unquam ciedent nec credere in Christum possunt excipimus nisi credant gravissimè omnium peccant Every man especially he that professeth CHRIST is bound to beleeve that hee is chosen in CHRIST to salvation every man without exception even the Reprobate himselfe and if he beleeve it not he committeth a most grievous sinne above all others This he proveth by that speech of CHRIST Ioh. 16.9 The Spirit shall convince the world of sinne because they beleeve not in me Reprobates therefore are bound to beleeve Mr. Perkins also sayth something to the same purpose (e) Perk lib. de Praed pag. 89. Obj. 3. Quisque in Ecclesia mandato Dei cicde Evangelio tenetur credere se redemptum esse per Christum etiam improbus perinde ac Electus sed aliâ tamen aliâ ratione Electus tenetur credere ut credendo particeps siat electionis reprobus ut non credendo fiat inexcusabilis etiam ex intentione Dei Every one in the Church by vertue of this commandement beleeve the Gospell is bound to beleeve that he is redeemed by CHRIST as well the Reprobate as the Elect though for a different reason the Elect that by beleeving he may be saved the Reprobate that by not beleeving he may be without excuse and this out of the very purpose of God But now they cannot in justice be bound to beleeve if they be absolute Reprobates for three causes 1 Because they have no power to beleeve they want it and must want it for ever God hath decreed they shall never have any to their dying day Nemo obligatur ad impossibilia no man can be justly tyed to impossible performances Because no man can flye like a bird or reach heaven with the top of his finger therefore God cannot with justice exact of any the performance of these actions nor can he of Reprobates the obedience of Faith if it be not possible to them 2 Because it is not Gods unfeyned will they shall beleeve No man will say that it is Gods serious will that such a man shall live when it is his will that he shall never have the concourse of his providence and the act of preservation Nor can we say that God doth in good earnest will that those men should beleeve whom he will not furnish with necessary power to beleeve It may rather be sayd it is Gods unfeyned will they shall not beleeve because it is his will they shall want power to beleeve For it is a Maxime in Logique Qui vult aliquid in causâ vult effectum ex istâ causa profluentem He who willeth a thing in the cause willeth the effect that necessarily floweth from that