since it is evident that there is some necessary Being otherwise nothing could ever have been and that without action nothing could be from it Since also all change imports somewhat of passion and all passion supposes action and all action active power and active power an original seat or subject that is self-active or that hath the power of action in and of it self For there could be no derivation of it from that which hath it not and no firstderivation but from that which hath it originally of it self And a first derivation there must be since all things that are or ever have been furnisht with it and not of themselves must either mediately or immediately have derived it from that which had it of it self It is therefore manifest that there is a necessary self-active Being The cause and Author of this perpetually variable state and frame of things And hence 6. Since we can frame no notion of life which self-active power doth not at least comprehend as upon trial we shall find that we cannot it is consequent that this Being is also originally vital and the root of all vitality such as hath life in or of it self and from whence it is propagated to every other living thing And so as we plainly see that this sensible world did sometime begin to be 't is also evident it took its beginning from a Being essentially vital and active that had it self no beginning Nor can we make a difficulty to conclude that this Being which now we have shewn is active and all action implies some power is 7. Of vast and mighty Power we will not say infinite lest we should step too far at once not minding now to discuss whether creation require infinite power when we consider and contemplate the vastness of the work performed by it Unto which if we were to make our estimate by nothing else we must at least judge this power to be proportionable For when our eyes behold an effect exceeding the power of any cause which they can behold our mind must step in and supply the defect of our feebler sense so as to make a judgment there is a cause we see not equal to this effect As when we behold a great and magnificent fabrick and entring in we see not the master or any living thing which was Cicero's Observation in reference to this present purpose besides Mice or Weasles we will not think that Mice or Weasels built it Nor need we in a matter so obvious insist further But only when our severer Reason hath made us confess our further contemplation should make us admire a power which is at once both so apparent and so stupendous Corollary And now from what hath been hitherto discoursed it seems a plain and necessary consectary That this world had a cause divers from the matter whereof it is composed For otherwise matter that hath been more generally taken to be of it self altogether unactive must be stated the only cause and fountain of all the action and motion that is now to be found in the whole Universe Which is a conceit wild and absurd enough not only as it opposes the common judgment of such as have with the greatest diligence enquired into things of this nature But as being in it self manifestly impossible to be true As would easily appear if it were needful to press farther Dr. More 's reasonings to this purpose which he hath done sufficiently for himself And also that otherwise all the great and undeniable changes which continually happen in it must proceed from its own constant and eternal action upon it self while it is yet feigned to be a necessary being with the notion whereof they are notoriously inconsistent Which therefore we taking to be most clear may now the more securely proceed to what follows CHAP. III. Wisdom asserted to belong to this Being The production of this world by a mighty Agent destitute of Wisdom impossible On consideration of 1. What would be adverse to this production 2. What would be wanting some effects to which a designing cause will on all hands be confessed necessary as having manifest characters of skill and design upon them Absurd here to except the works of nature Wherein at least equal characters of Wisdom and design to be seen as in any the most confessed pieces of Art Instanced in the frame and Motion of heavenly bodies A mean unphilosophical temper to be more taken with novelties than common things of greater importance Further instance in the composition of the bodies of Animals Two contrary causes of mens not acknowledging the Wisdom of their Maker herein Progress is made from the consideration of the parts and frame to powers and functions of Terrestrial Creatures Growth Nutrition Propagation of kind Spontaneous motion Sensation The pretence considered that the bodies of Animals are machines 1. How improbable it is 2. How little to the purpose The powers of the humane soul. It appears notwithstanding them it had a cause By them a wise and intelligent cause It is not matter That not capable of Reason They not here reflected on who think reasonable souls made of refined matter by the Creator Not being matter nor arising from thence it must have a Cause that is intelligent 9. Goodness also belonging to this Being WE therefore add That this being is Wise and Intelligent as well as powerful upon the very view of this world it will appear so vast power was guided by equal wisdom in the framing of it Though this is wont to be the principal labour in evincing the existence of a Deity viz. the proving that this universe owes its rise to a wise and designing cause as may be seen in Cicero's excellent performance in this kind and in divers later Writers Yet the placing so much of their endeavour herein seems in great part to have proceeded hence that this hath been chosen for the great medium to prove that it had a cause divers from it self But if that once be done a shorter way and it fully appear that this world is not it self a necessary Being having the power of all the action and motion to be found in it of it self which already seems plain enough And it do most evidently thence also appear to have had a cause foreign to or distinct from it self though we shall not therefore the more carelesly consider this subject yet no place of doubt seems to remain but that this was an Intelligent cause and that this world was the product of wisdom and counsel and not of meer power alone For what imagination can be more grosly absurd than to suppose this orderly frame of things to have been the result of so mighty power not accompanied or guided by wisdom and counsel that is as the case must now unavoidably be understood that there is some being necessarily existent of an essentially active nature of unconceivably vast and mighty power and vigour destitute of all
time that there is however a necessary Being unto which all the perfections whereof we have any foot-steps or resemblances in the Creation do originally and essentially belong is undeniably evident Now that we may proceed what can felfessentiate underived Power Wisdom Goodness be but most perfect Power Wisdom Goodness Or such as than which there can never be more perfect For since there can be no Wisdom Power or Goodness which is not either original and self-essentiate or derived and participated from thence Who sees not that the former must be the more perfect Yea and that it comprehended all the other as what was from it in it self And consequently that it is simply the most perfect And the reason will be the same concerning any other perfection the stamps and characters whereof we find signed upon the creatures But that the Being unto which these belong is absolutely and universally perfect in every kind must be further evidenced by considering more at large the notion and import of such a self-originate necessary Being Some indeed both more anciently and of late have inverted this course and from the supposition of absolute perfection have gone about to infer necessity of existence as being contained in the Idaea of the former But of this latter we are otherwise assured upon clearer and less exceptionable terms And being so are to consider what improvement may be made of it to our present purpose And in the general this seems manifestly imported in the notion of the necessary Being we have already evinced that it have in it some way or other in what way there will be occasion to consider hereafter the entire sum and utmost fulness of Being beyond which or without the compass whereof no perfection is conceivable or indeed which is of the same import nothing Let it be observed that we pretend not to argue this from the bare terms necessary Being only but from hence that it is such as we have found it Though indeed these very terms import not a little to this purpose For that which is necessarily of it self without being beholden to any thing seems as good as all things and to contain in it self an immense fulness being indigent of nothing Nor by indigence is here meant cravingness or a sense of want only in opposition whereto every good and virtuous man hath or may attain a sort of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or self-fulness and be satisfied from himself which yet is a stamp of Divinity and a part of the image of God or such a participation of the Divine Nature as is agreeable to the state and condition of a creature But we understand by it what is naturally before that want it self really and not in opinion as the covetous is said to be poor On the other hand we here intend not a meerly rational much less an imaginary but a real self-fulness And so we say what is of that nature that it is and subsists wholly and only of it self without depending on any other must owe this absoluteness to so peculiar an excellency of its own nature as we cannot well conceive to be less than whereby it comprehends in it self the most boundless and unlimited fulness of Being life power or whatsoever can be conceived under the name of a perfection For taking notice of the existence of any thing whatsoever some reason must be assignable whence it is that this particular Being doth exist and hath such and such powers and properties belonging to it as do occur to our notice therein when we can now resolve its existence into some cause that put it into Being and made it what it is we cease so much to admire the thing how excellent soever it be and turn our admiration upon its cause concluding that to have all the perfection in it which we discern in the effect whatsoever unknown perfection which we may suppose is very great it may have besides And upon this ground we are led when we behold the manifold excellencies that lie dispers'd among particular Beings in this universe with the glory of the whole resulting thence to resolve their existence into a common cause which we design by the name of God And now considering him as a wise Agent which hath been proved and consequently a free one that acted not from any necessity of nature but his meer good pleasure herein we will not only conclude him to have all that perfection and excellency in him which we find him to have display'd in so vast and glorious a work but will readily believe him supposing we have admitted a conviction concerning what hath been discoursed before to have a most unconceivable treasure of hidden excellency and perfection in him that is not represented to our view in this work of his And account that he who could do all this which we see is done could do unspeakably more For though speaking of natural and necessitated Agents which always act to their uttermost it would be absurd to argue from their having done some lesser thing to their power of doing somewhat that is much greater Yet as to free Agents that can choose their own act and guide themselves by wisdom and judgment therein the matter is not so As when some great Prince bestows a rich largess upon some mean person especially that deserved nothing from him or was recommended by nothing to his royal favour besides his poverty and misery we justly take it for a very significant demonstration of that princely munificence and bounty which would encline him to do much greater things when he should see a proportionable cause But now if taking notice of the excellencies that appear in caused Beings and enquiring how they come to exist and be what they are we resolve all into their cause which considering as perfectly free and arbitrary in all his communications We do thence rationally conclude that if he had thought fit he could have made a much more pompous display of himself and that there is in him besides what appears a vast and most abundant store of undiscovered perfection When next we turn our enquiry and contemplation more entirely upon the cause And bethink our selves But how came he to exist and be what he is Finding this cannot be refunded upon any superiour cause And our utmost enquiry can admit of no other result but this that he is of himself what he is We will surely say then he is all in all And that perfection which before we judged vastly great we will now conclude alltogether absolute and such beyond which no greater can be thought Adding I say to what pre-conceptions we had of his greatness from the works which we see have been done by him for why should we lose any ground we might esteem our selves to have gain'd before the consideration of of this necessary self-subsistence And that no other reason is assignable of his being what he is but the peculiar and incommunicable excellency of his own
distinct particular notion of God which we are sure is adequate and full it may however suffice that it is a true one as far as it goes and such as cannot be mistaken for the notion of any thing else And it will be more especially sufficient to our present purpose if enough be comprehended in it to recommend him to us as a fit and worthy object of Religion and whereto a Templea ought to be designed As it will appear there is when also we shall have added what is intended concerning his conversableness with men The ground whereof is also in great part included in this account of him so that the consideration of it cannot be wholly severed from that of his existence as hath been intimated above That is that if such a Being exist unto which this notion belongs it will sufficiently appear he is such as that he can converse with men though it doth not thence certainly follow that he will For it were a rash and bold adventure to say he could not be God if he did not condescend to such terms of reconciliation and converse with apostate creatures Whereof therefore more is to be said than the meer manifesting his existence in its own place And as to this that we may proceed gradually and in the most familiar and intelligible way that we can we may 1. Be most assured that there hath been somewhat or other from all eternity or that looking backward somewhat of real being must be confessed eternal Let such as have not been used to think of any thing more than what they could see with their eyes and to whom reasoning only seems difficult because they have not tried what they can do in it but use their thoughts a little and by moving them a few easie steps they will soon find themselves as sure of this as that they see or hear or understand or are any thing For being sure that something now is that you see for instance or are something You must then acknowledge that certainly either something always was and hath ever been or been from all eternity or else you must say that sometime nothing was or that all being once was not And so since you find that something now is that there was a time when any thing of being did begin to be that is that till that time there was nothing But now at that time somewhat first began to be For what can be plainer than that if all being sometime was not and now some being is every thing of being had a beginning And thence it would follow that some being that is the first that ever began to be did of it self start up out of nothing or made it self to be when before nothing was But now do you not plainly see that it is altogether impossible any thing should do so that is when it was as yet nothing and when nothing at all as yet was that it should make it self or come into being of it self For sure making it self is doing something But can that which is nothing do any thing unto all doing there must be some doer Wherefore a thing must be before it can do any thing and therefore it would follow that it was before it was or was and was not was some thing and nothing at the same time Yea and it was divers from it self For a cause must be a distinct thing from that which is caused by it Wherefore it is most apparent that some being hath ever been or did never begin to be Whence further 2. It is also evident that some being was uncaused or was ever of it self without any cause For what never was from another had never any cause since nothing could be its own cause And somewhat as appears from what hath been said never was from another Or it may be plainly argued thus That either some being was uncaused or all being was caused But if all being were caused then some one at least was the cause of it self which hath been already shown impossible Therefore the expression commonly used concerning the first Being that it was of it self is only to be taken negatively that is that it was not of another not positively as if it did sometime make it self Or what there is positive signified by that form of speech is only to be taken thus that it was a being of that nature as that it was impossible it should ever not have been Not that it did ever of it self step out of not being into Being Of which more hereafter 3. And now it is hence further evident that some being is independent upon any other that is whereas it already appears that some being did never depend on any other as a productive cause Or was not beholden to any other that it might come into Being It is thereupon equally evident that 't is simply independent or cannot be beholden to any for for its continued being For what did never need a productive cause doth as little need a sustaining or conserving cause And to make this more plain either some being is independent or all being is dependent But there is nothing without the compass of all being whereon it may depend Wherefore to say that all being doth depend is to say it depends on nothing that is that it depends not For to depend on nothing is not to depend It is therefore a manifest contradiction to say that all being doth depend against which it is no relief to say that all beings do circularly depend on one another For so however the whole circle or sphere of being should depend on nothing or one at last depend on it self which negatively taken as before is truc and the thing we contend for that one the common support of all the rest depends not on any thing without it self Whence also it is plainly consequent That 4. Such a Being is necessary or doth necessarily exist that is that it is of such a nature as that it could not or cannot but be For what is in being neither by its own choice or any others is necessarily But what was not made by it self which hath been shewn impossible that any thing should nor by any other as it hath been proved something was not It is manifest it neither depended on its own choice nor any others that it is And therefore its existence is not owing to choice at all but to the necessity of its own nature Wherefore it is always by a simple absolute natural necessity being of such a nature to which it is altogether repugnant and impossible ever not to have been or ever to cease from being And now having gone thus far and being assured that hitherto we feel the ground firm under us that is having gained a full certainty that there is an eternal uncaused independent necessary Being and therefore actually and everlastingly existing we may advance one step further and with equal assurance add 5. That this eternal independent uncaused
undoubtingly say the same thing and then since there is a reason for this judgment what can be devised to be the reason but that there are so manifest characters and evidences of skill in the composure as are not attributeable to any thing else Now here I would further demand is there any thing in this reason yea or no Doth it signifie any thing or is it of any value to the purpose for which it is alledg'd surely it is of very great in as much as when it is considered it leaves it not in a mans power to think any thing else and what can be said more potently and efficaciously to demonstrate But now if this reason signifie any thing it signifies thus much that wheresoever there are equal characters and evidences of skill at least where there are equal a skilful Agent must be acknowledged And so it will in spight of cavil conclude universally and abstractly from what we can suppose distinctly signified by the terms of Art and Nature that whatsoever effect hath such or equal characters of skill upon it did proceed from a skilful cause That is that if this effect be said to be from a skilful cause as such viz. as having manifest characters of skill upon it then every such effect viz. that hath equally manifest characters of skill upon it must be with equal reason concluded to be from a skilful cause We will acknowledge skill to act and wit to contrive very distinguishable things and in reference to some works as the making some curious automaton or self-moving Engine are commonly lodg'd in divers subjects that is the contrivance exercises the wit and invention of one and the making the manual dexterity and skill of others But the manifest characters of both will be seen in the effect That is the curious elaborateness of each several part shews the later and the order and dependence of parts and their conspiracy to one common end the former Each betokens design or at least the Smith or Carpenter must be understood to design his own part that is to do as he was directed Both together do plainly bespeak an Agent that knew what he did And that the thing was not done by chance or was not the casual product of only being busie at random or making a careless stir without aiming at any thing And this no man that is in his wits would upon sight of the whole frame more doubt to assent unto than that two and two make four And he would certainly be thought mad that should profess to think that only by some one 's making a blustering stir among several small fragments of brass iron and wood these parts happened to be thus curiously formed and came together into this frame of their own accord Or lest this should be thought to intimate too rude a representation of their conceit who think this world to have fallen into this frame and order wherein it is by the agitation of the moving parts or particles of matter without the direction of a wise mover and that we may also make the case as plain as is possible to the most ordinary capacity We will suppose for instance that one who had never before seen a watch or any thing of that sort hath now this little engine first offered to his view can we doubt but he would upon the meer sight of its figure structure and the very curious workmanship which we will suppose appearing in it presently acknowledge the Artificers hand But if he were also made to understand the use and purpose for which it serves and it were distinctly shewn him how each thing contributes and all things in this little fabrick concur to this purpose the exact measuring and dividing of time by minutes hours and months he would certainly both confess and praise the great ingenuity of the first inventer But now if a by-stander beholding him in this admiration would undertake to shew a profounder reach and strain of wit and should say Sir you are mistaken concerning the composition of this so much admired piece it was not made or designed by the hand or skill of any one there were only an innumerable company of little atoms or very small bodies much too small to be perceived by your sense that were busily frisking and plying to and fro about the place of its nativity and by a strange chance or a stranger fate and the necessary laws of that motion which they were unavoidably put into by a certain boisterous undesigning mover they fell together into this small bulk so as to compose it into this very shape and figure and with this same number and order of parts which you now behold One squadron of these busie particles little thinking what they were about agreeing to make up one wheel and another some other in that proportion which you see Others of them also falling and becoming fixed in so happy a posture and situation as to describe the several figures by which the little moving fingers point out the hour of the day and day of the month And all conspired to fall together each into its own place in so lucky a juncture as that the regular motion failed not to ensue which we see is now observed in it What man is either so wise or so foolish for it is hard to determine whether the excess or defect should best qualifie him to be of this faith as to be capable of being made believe this piece of natural history And if one should give this account of the production of such a trifle would he not be thought in jest But if he persist and solemnly profess that thus he takes it to have been would he not be thought in good earnest mad And let but any sober reason judge whether we have not unspeakably more manifest madness to contend against in such as suppose this world and the bodies of living creatures to have fallen into this frame and orderly disposition of parts wherein they are without the direction of a wise and designing cause And whether there be not an incomparably greater number of most wild and arbitrary suppositions in their fiction than in this Besides the innumerable supposed repetitions of the same strange chances all the world over even as numberless not only as productions but as the changes that continually happen to all the things produced And if the concourse of atoms could make this world why not for it is but little to mention such a thing as this a Porch or a Temple or an House or a City as Tully speaks in the before recited place which were less operous and much more easie performances It is not to be supposed that all should be Astronomers Anatomists or natural Philosophers that shall read these lines And therefore it is intended not to insist upon particulars and to make as little use as is possible of terms that would only be agreeable to that supposition But surely such general easie reflections
on the frame of the universe and the order of parts in the bodies of all sorts of living creatures as the meanest ordinary understanding is capable of would soon discover incomparably greater evidence of wisdom and design in the contrivance of these than in that of a watch or a clock And if there were any whose understandings are but of that size and measure as to suppose that the whole frame of the heavens serves to no other purpose than to be of some such use as that to us mortals here on earth if they would but allow themselves leasure to think and consider might discern the most convincing and amazing discoveries of wise contrivance and design as well as of vastest might and power in disposing things into so apt a subserviency to that meaner end And that so exact a knowledge is had thereby of times and seasons days and years as that the simplest Idiot in a Country may be able to tell you when the light of the Sun is withdrawn from his eyes at what time it will return and when it will look in at such a window and when at the other And by what degrees his days and nights shall either increase or be diminished And what proportion of time he shall have for his labours in this season of the year and what in that without the least suspicion or fear that it shall ever fall out otherwise But that some in later days whose more enlarged minds have by diligent search and artificial helps got clearer notices even then most of the more learned of former times concerning the true frame and vastness of the Universe the matter nature and condition of the heavenly bodies their situation order and laws of motion and the great probability of their serving to nobler purposes than the greater part of learned men have ever dreamt of before That I say any of these should have chosen it for the employment of their great intellects to devise ways of excluding intellectual power from the contrivance of this frame of things having so great advantages beyond the most of mankind besides to contemplate and adore the great Author and Lord of all is one of the greatest wonders that comes under our notice And might tempt even a sober mind to prefer vulgar and popular ignorance before their learned philosophical deliration Though yet indeed not their Philosophy by which they would be distinguished from the common sort but what they have in common with them ought in justice to bear the blame For it is not evident how much soever they reckon themselves exalted above the vulgar sort that their miserable shifting in this matter proceeds only from what is most meanly so i. e. their labouring under the most vulgar and meanest diseases of the mind disregard of what is common and an aptness to place more in the strangeness of new unexpected and surprizing events than in things unspeakably more considerable that are of every days observation Than which nothing argues a more abject unphilosophical temper For let us but suppose what no man can pretend is more impossible and what any man must confess is less considerable than what our eyes daily see that in some part of the air near this earth and within such limits as that the whole Scene might be conveniently beheld at one view there should suddenly appear a little globe of pure flaming light resembling that of the Sun and suppose it fixt as a center to another body or moving about that other as its centre as this or that hypothesis best pleases us which we could plainly perceive to be a proportionably-little earth beautified with little Trees and Woods flowry Fields and flowing rivulets with larger lakes into which these discharge themselves And suppose we the other Planets all of proportionable bigness to the narrow limits assigned them placed at their due distances and playing about this supposed earth or Sun so as to measure their shorter and soon absolved days months and years or two twelve or thirty years according to their supposed lesser circuits Would they not presently and with great amazement confess an intelligent contriver and maker of this whole frame above a Posidonius or any mortal And have we not in the present frame of things a demonstration of Wisdom and Counsel as far exceeding that which is now supposed as the making some toy or bauble to please a child is less an argument of wisdom than the contrivance of somewhat that is of apparent and universal use Or if we could suppose this present state of things to have but newly begun and our selves pre-existent so that we could take notice of the very passing of things out of horrid confusion into the comely order they are now in would not this put the matter out of doubt And that this state had once a beginning needs not be proved over again But might what would yesterday have been the effect of wisdom better have been brought about by chance five or six thousand years or any longer time ago It speaks not want of evidence in the thing but want of consideration and of exercising our understandings if what were new would not only convince but astonish and what is old of the same importance doth not so much as convince And let them that understand any thing of the composition of an humane body or indeed of any living creature but bethink themselves whether there be not equal contrivance at least appearing in the composure of that admirable fabrick as of any the most admired machine or engine devised and made by humane wit and skill If we pitch upon any thing of known and common use as suppose again a Clock or Watch which is no sooner seen than it is acknowledg'd as hath been said the effect of a designing cause will we not confess as much of the body of a man Yea what comparison is there when in the structure of some one single member as an hand a foot an eye or ear there appears upon a diligent search unspeakably greater curiosity whether we consider the variety of parts their exquisite figuration or their apt disposition to the distinct uses and ends these members serve for than is to be seen in any Clock or Watch Concerning which uses of the several parts in mans body Galen so largely discoursing in seventeen Books inserts on the by this Epiphonema upon the mention of one particular instance of our most wise Makers provident care Unto whom saith he I compose these Commentaries meaning his present work of unfolding the useful figuration of the humane body as certain Hymns or Songs of praise esteeming true Piety more to consist in this that I first may know and then declare to others his Wisdom Power Providence and Goodness than in sacrificing to him many Hecatombs And in the ignorance whereof there is greatest impiety rather than in ababstaining from Sacrifice Nor as he adds in the close of that excellent work is
internal parts and how they each of them perform their distinct offices If we could discern the continual motion of the blood how it is conveyed by its proper conduits from its first source and fountain partly downwards to the lower intrails if rather it ascend not from thence as at least what afterwards becomes bloud doth partly upwards to its admirable elaboratory the heart where it is refined and furnished with fresh vital spirits and so transmitted thence by the distinct vessels prepared for this purpose could we perceive the curious contrivance of those little doors by which it is let in and out on this side and on that the order and course of its circulation its most commodious distribution by two social chanels or conduit-pipes that every where accompany one another throughout the body Could we discern the curious artifice of the brain its ways of purgation and were it possible to pry into the secret chambers receptacles of the less or more pure spirits there perceive their manifold conveyances and the rare texture of that net commonly call'd the wonderful one Could we behold the veins arteries and nerves all of them arising from their proper and distinct originals and their orderly dispersion for the most part by pairs and conjugations on this side and that from the middle of the back with the curiously wrought branches which supposing these to appear duly diversified as so many more duskish strokes in this transparent frame they would be found to make throughout the whole of it were every smaller fibre thus made at once discernable especially those innumerable threds into which the spinal marrow is distributed at the bottom of the back and could we through the same medium perceive those numerous little machines made to serve unto voluntary motions which in the whole body are computed by some to the number of four hundred and thirty or thereabouts or so many of them as according to the present supposition could possibly come in view and discern their composition their various and elegant figures round square long triangular c. and behold them do their offices and see how they ply to and fro and work in their respective places as any motion is to be performed by them Were all these things I say thus made liable to an easie and distinct view who would not admiringly cry out how fearfully and wonderfully am I made And sure there is no man sober who would not upon such a sight pronounce that man mad that should suppose such a production to have been a meer undesigned casualty At least if there be any thing in the world that may be thought to carry sufficiently convincing evidences in it of its having been made industriously and on purpose not by chance would not this composition thus offered to view be esteemed to do so much more Yea and if it it did only bear upon it characters equally evidential of wisdom and design with what doth certainly so though in the lowest degree it were sufficient to evince our present purpose For if one such instance as this would bring the matter no higher than to a bare equality that would at least argue a maker of man's body as wise and as properly designing as the Artificer of any such slighter piece of workmanship that may yet certainly be concluded the effect of skill and design And then enough might be said from other instances to manifest him unspeakably superiour And that the matter would be brought at least to an equality upon the supposition now made there can be no doubt if any one be judge that hath not abjur'd his understanding and his eyes together And what then if we Jay aside that supposition which only somewhat gratifies fancy and imagination doth that alter the case or is there the less of wisdom and contrivance expressed in this work of forming mans body only for that it is not so easily and suddenly obvious to our sight Then we might with the same reason say concerning some curious piece of carved work that is thought fit to be kept lock'd up in a Cabinet when we see it that there was admirable workmanship shewn in doing it but as soon as it is again shut up in its repository that there was none at all Inasmuch as we speak of the objective characters of wisdom and design that are in the thing it self though they must some way or other come under our notice otherwise we can be capable of arguing nothing from them yet since we have sufficient assurance that there really are svch characters in the structure of the body of man as have been mentioned and a thousand more than have been thought necessary to be mentioned here It is plain that the greater or less facility of finding them out so that we be at a certainty that they are Whether by the slower and more gradual search of our own eyes or by relying upon the testimony of such as have purchased themselves that satisfaction by their own labour and diligence is meerly accidental to the thing it self we are discoursing of And neither adds to nor detracts from the rational evidence of the present argument Or if it do either the more abstruse paths of Divine Wisdom in this as in other things do rather recommend it the more to our adoration and reverence than if every thing were obvious and lay open to the first glance of a more careless eye The things which we are sure or may be if we do not shut our eyes the wise Maker of this world hath done do sufficiently serve to assure us that he could have done this also that is have made everything in the frame and shape of our bodies conspicuous in the way but now supposed if he had thought it fit He hath done greater things And since he hath not thought that fit we may be bold to say the doing of it would signifie more trifling and less design It gives us a more amiable and comely representation of the Being we are treating of that his works are less for oftentation than use And that his Wisdom and other Attributes appear in them rather to the instruction of sober than the gratification of vain minds We may therefore confidently conclude that the figuration of the humane body carries with it as manifest unquestionable evidences of design as any piece of humane artifice that most confessedly in the judgment of any man doth so And therefore had as certainly a designing cause We may challenge the world to shew a disparity unless it be that the advantage is unconceivably great on our side For would not any one that hath not abandon'd at once both his reason and his modesty be asham'd to confess and admire the skill that is shewn in making a Statue or the picture of a man that as one ingeniously says is but the shadow of his skin and deny the wisdom that appears in the composure of his body it self that contains so
our selves if they or any as fluid finer matter were the immediate subjects of it It is therefore however sufficiently evident and out of question that the humane soul be its own substance what it will must have an efficient divers from matter which it was our present intendment to evince And so our way is clear to proceed to The second enquiry whether it be not also manifest from the powers and operations which belong to it as it is reasonable that it must have had an intelligent efficient That is since we find and are assured that there is a sort of Being in the world yea somewhat of our selves and that hath best right of any thing else about us to be called our selves that can think understand deliberate argue c. And which we can most certainly assure our selves whether it were pre-existent in any former state or no is not an independent or uncaused Being and hath therefore been the effect of some cause whether it be not apparently the effect of a wise Cause And this upon supposition of what hath been before proved seems not liable to any the least rational doubt For it is already apparent that it is not it self matter and if it were it is however the more apparent that its cause is not matter Inasmuch as if it be it self matter its powers and operations are so much above the natural capacity of matter as that it must have had a cause so much more noble and of a more perfect nature than that as to be able to raise and improve it beyond the natural capacity of matter which it was impossible for that it self to do Whence it is plain it must have a cause divers from matter Wherefore this its immaterial cause must either be wise and intelligent or not so But is it possible any man should ever be guilty of a greater absurdity than to acknowledge some certain immaterial Agent destitute of Wisdom the only cause and fountain of all that wisdom that is or hath ever been in the whole race of mankind That is as much as to say that all the wisdom of mankind hath been caused without a cause For it is the same thing after we have acknowledged any thing to be caused to say it was caused by no cause as to say it was caused by such a cause as hath nothing of that in it whereof we find somewhat to be in the effect Nor can it avail any thing to speak of the disproportion or superiour excellency in some effects to their second or to their only partial causes As that there are sometimes learned children of unlearned parents For who did ever in that case say the parents were the productive causes of that learning or of them as they were learned Sure that learning comes from some other cause But shall it then be said the souls of men have received their being from some such immaterial Agent destitute of wisdom and afterward their wisdom and intellectual ability came some other way by their own observation or by institution and precept from others whence then came their capacity of observing or of receiving such instruction Can any thing naturally destitute even of seminal reason as we may call it or of any aptitude or capacity tending thereto ever be able to make observations or receive instructions whereby at length it may become rational And is not that capacity of the soul of man a real something or is there no difference between being capable of reason and uncapable what then did this real something proceed from nothing or was the soul it self caused and this its capacity uncaused or was its cause only capable of intellectual perfection but not actually furnished therewith But if it were only capable surely its advantages for the actual attainment thereof have been much greater than ours Whence it were strange if that capacity should never have come into act And more strange that we should know or have any ground to pretend that it hath not But that there was an actual exercise of wisdom in the production of the reasonable soul is most evident For is it a necessary being that we have proved it is not It is therefore a contingent and its being depended on a free cause into whose pleasure only it was resolvable that it should be or not be And which therefore had a dominion over its own acts If this bespeak not an intelligent Agent what doth And though this might also be said concerning every thing else which is not necessarily and so might yield a more general argument to evince a free designing cause yet it concludes with greater evidence concerning the reasonable soul whose powers and operations it is so manifestly impossible should have proceeded from matter And therefore even that vain and refuted pretence it self that other things might by the necessary laws of its motion become what they are can have less place here Whence it is more apparent that the reasonable soul must have had a free and intelligent cause that used liberty and counsel in determining that it should be and especially that it should be such a sort of thing as we find it is For when we see how aptly its powers and faculties serve for their proper and peculiar operations who that is not besides himself can think that such a thing was made by one that knew not what he was doing or that such powers were not given on purpose for such operations And what is the capacity but a power that should sometime be reduced into act and arrive to the exercise of reason it self Now was it possible any thing should give that power that had it not any way that is in the same kind or in some more excellent and noble kind For we contend not that this Agent whereof we speak is in the strict and proper sense rational taking that term to import an ability or faculty of inferring what is less known from what is more For we suppose all things equally known to him which so far as is requisite to our present design that is the representing him the proper object of Religion or of that honour which the dedication of a Temple to him imports we may in due time come more expresly to assert And that the knowledge which is with us the end of reasoning is in him in its highest perfection without being at all beholden to that means that all the connexion of things with one another lie open to one comprehensive view and are known to be connected but not because they are so We say is it conceivable that mans knowing power should proceed from a cause that hath it not in the same or this more perfect kind And may use those words to this purpose not for their authority which we expect not should be here significant but the convincing evidence they carry with them He that teacheth man knowledge shall not he know That we may derive this matter to an issue 't is evident
nature Whereby he was not only able to make such a world but did possess eternally and invariably in himself all that he is and hath We cannot conceive that all to be less than absolutely universal and comprehensive of whatsoever can lie within the whole compass of Being For when we find that among all other Beings which is most certainly true not only of actual but all possible Beings also how perfect soever they are or may be in their own kinds none of them nor all of them together are erver can be of that perfection as to be of themselves without dependence on somewhat else as their productive yea and sustaining cause we see besides that their cause hath all the perfection some way in it that is to be found in them all There is also that appropriate perfection belonging thereto that it could be and eternally is yea and could not but be only of it self by the underived and incommunicable excellency of its own Being And surely what includes in it all the perfection of all actual and possible Beings besides its own for there is nothing possible which some cause yea and even this cannot produce unconceivably more must needs be absolutely and every way perfect Of all which perfections this is the radical one that belongs to this common Cause and Author of all things that he is necessarily and only self-subsisting For if this high Prerogative in point of Being had been wanting nothing at all had ever been Therefore we attribute to God the greatest thing that can be said or thought and not what is wholly divers from all other perfection but which contains all others in it when we affirm of him that he is necessarily of himself For though when we have bewildered and lost our selves as we soon may in the contemplation of this amazing subject we readily indulge our wearied minds the case and liberty of resolving this high excellency of self or necessary existence in a meer negation and say that we mean by it nothing else than that he was not from another Yet surely if we would take some pains with our selves and keep our slothful shifting thoughts to some exercise in this matter though we can never comprehend that vast fulness of perfection which is imported in it for it were not what we plead for if we could comprehend it Yet we should soon see and confess that it contains unspeakably more than a negation even some great thing that is so much beyond our thoughts that we shall reckon we have said but a little in saying we cannot conceive it And that when we have stretcht our understandings to the utmost of their line and measure though we may suppose our selves to have conceived a great deal there is infinitely more that we conceive not Wherefore that is a sober and most important truth which is occasionally drawn forth as is supposed from the so admired D. Cartes by the urgent objections of this very acute friendly adversary That the inexhaustible power of God is the reason for which he needed no cause And that since that unexhausted power or the immensity of his essence is most highly positive therefore he may be said to be of himself positively i. e. not as if he did ever by any positive efficiency cause himself which is most manifestly impossible but that the positive excellency of his own being was such as could never need nor admit of being caused And that seems highly eternal which is so largely insisted on by Doctor Jackson and divers others that what is without cause must also be without limit of being Because all limitation proceeds from the cause of a thing which imparted to it so much and no more which argument though it seem neglected by Des Cartes and is opposed by his Antagonist Yet I cannot but judge that the longer one meditates the less he shall understand how any thing can be limited ad intra or from it self c. As the Author of the Tentam. Phys. Theol. speaks But that we may entertain our selves with some more particular considerations of this necessary Being which may evince that general assertion of its absolute plenitude or fulness of essence It appears to be such As is first at the greatest imaginable distance from non-entity For what can be at a greater than that which is necessarily which signifies as much as whereto not to be is utterly impossible Now an utter impossibility not to be or the uttermost distance from no Being seems plainly to imply the absolute plenitude of all Being And if here it be said that to be necessarily and of it self needs be understood to import no more than a firm possession of that being which a thing hath be it never so scant or minute a portion of being I answer without insisting upon the ambiguity of the words to be it seems indeed so If we measure the signification of this expression by its first and more obvious appearance But if you consider the matter more narrowly you will find here is also signified the nature and kind of the Being possessed as well as the manner of possession viz. that it is a Being of so excellent and noble a kind as that it can subsist alone without being beholden which is so great an excellency as that it manifestly comprehends all other or is the foundation of all that can be conceived besides Which they that fondly dream of necessary matter not considering unwarily make one single atom a more excellent thing than the whole frame of heaven and earth That being supposed simply necessary this the meerest piece of hap-hazard the strangest chance imaginable and beyond what any but themselves could ever have imagined And which being considered would give us to understand that no minute or finite being can be necessarily And hence we may see what it is to be nearer or at a further distance from not-being For these things that came contingently into being or at the pleasure of a free cause have all but a finite and limited being whereof some having a smaller portion of being than others approach so much the nearer to not-being Proportionably what hath its being necessarily and of it self is at the farthest distance from no-being as comprehending all being in it self Or to borrow the expressions of an elegant Writer translated into our own Language We have much more non-essence than essence If we have the essence of a man yet not of the Heavens or of Angels We are confined and limited within a particular essence but God who is what he is comprehendeth all possible essences Nor is this precariously spoken or as what may be hoped to be granted upon courtesie But let the matter be rigidly examined and discussed and the certain truth of it will most evidently appear For if any thing be in this sense remoter than other from no-Being it must either be what is necessarily of it self or what is contingently at the pleasure
is by eternal necessary emanation of the Divine Nature be duly distinguished from the arbitrary products of the Divine Will And the matter be throughly examined whether herein be not a sufficient distinction of that which is increated and that which is created In this way it is possible it might be cleared how a Trinity in the God-head may be very consistently with the unity thereof But that it is we cannot know but by his telling us so It being among the many things of God which are not to be known but by the Spirit of God revealing and testifying them in and according to the holy Scriptures As the things of a man are not known but by the spirit of a man And what further evidence we may justly and reasonably take from those Scriptures even in reference to some of the things hitherto discoursed may be hereafter shewn CHAP. V. Demands in reference to what hath been hitherto discoursed with some reasonings thereupon 1. Is is possible that upon supposition of This Beings existence it may be in any way sutable to our present state made known to us that it doth exist Proved 1. That it may 2. That since any other fit way that can be thought on is as much liable to exception as that we have already This must be therefore sufficient Strong Impressions Glorious Apparitions Terrible Voices Surprising Transformations If these necessary Is it needful they be universal Frequent If not more rare things of this sort not wanting 2 Demand Can Subjects remote from their Prince sufficiently be assured of his existence 3 Demand Can we be sure there are men on earth AND if any should in the mean time still remain either doubtful or apt to cavil after all that hath been said for proof of that Beings existence which we have described I would only add these few things by way of enquiry or demand viz. First Do they believe upon supposition of the existence of such a Being that it is possible it may be made known to us in our present state and circumstances by means not unsutable thereto or inconvenient to the order and government of the world that it doth exist It were strange to say or suppose that a Being of so high perfection as this we have hitherto given an account of if he is cannot in any fit way make it known that he is to an intelligent and apprehensive sort of creatures If indeed he is and be the common cause Author and Lord of us and all things which we do now but suppose And we may defie cavil to alledge any thing that is so much as colourable against the possibility of the supposition surely he hath done greater things than the making of it known that he is It is no unapprehensible thing There hath been no inconsistent notion hitherto given of him Nothing said concerning him but will well admit that it is possible such a Being may be now existant Yea we not only can conceive but we actually have and cannot but have some conception of the several attributes we have ascribed to him so as to apply them severally to somewhat else if we will not apply them joyntly to him We cannot but admit there is some eternal necessary Being somewhat that is of it self active somewhat that is powerful wise and good And these notions have in them no repugnancy to one another wherefore it is not impossible they may meet and agree together in full perfection to one and the same existent Being And hence it is manifestly no unapprehensible thing that such a Being doth exist Now supposing that it doth exist and hath been to us the cause and Author of our Being hath given us the reasonable intelligent nature which we find our selves possessors of and that very power whereby we apprehend the existence of such a Being as he is to be possible all which we for the present do still but suppose while also his actual existence is not unapprehensible were it not the greatest madness imaginable to say that if he do exist he cannot also make our apprehensive nature understand this apprehensible thing that he doth exist We will therefore take it for granted and as a thing which no man well in his wits will deny that upon supposition such a Being the Cause and Author of all things do exist he might in some convenient way or other with sufficient evidence make it known to such creatures as we so as to beget in us a rational certainty that he doth exist Upon which presumed ground we will only reason thus or assume to it That there is no possible and fit way of doing it which is not liable to as much exception as the evidence we already have Whence it will be consequent that if the thing be possible to be fitly done it is done already That is that if we can apprehend how it may be possible such a Being actually existent might give us that evidence of his existence that should be sutable to our present state and sufficient to out-weigh all objections to the contrary without which it were not rationally sufficient And that we can apprehend no possible way of doing this which will not be liable to the same or equal objections as may be made against the present means we have for the begetting of this certainty in us then we have already sufficient evidence of this Beings existence That is such as ought to prevail against all objections and obtain our assent that it doth exist Here it is only needful to be considered what ways can be thought of which we will say might assure us in this matter that we already have not And what might be objected against them equally as against the means we now have Will we say such a Being if he did actually exist might ascertain us of his existence by some powerful impression of that truth upon our minds We will not insist what there is of this already Let them consider who gainsay what they can find of it in their own minds And whether they are not engaged by their Atheistical inclinations in a contention against themselves and their more natural sentiments From which they find it a matter of no small difficulty to be delivered It was not for nothing that even Epicurus himself calls this of an existing Diety a Proleptical Notion But you may say the impression might have been simply universal and so irresistable as to prevent or overbear all doubt or inclination to doubt And first for the universality of it why may we not suppose it already sufficiently universal As hath been heretofore alledged With what confidence can the few dissenting Atheists that have professed to be of another perswasion put that value upon themselves as to reckon their dissent considerable enough to implede the universality of this impression Or what doth it signifie more to that purpose than some few instances may do of persons so stupidly foolish as to give much less
one thought if darted in upon him at that time as 't is strange and more sad if it be not what becomes now of me if there prove to be a God! where are my mighty demonstrations upon which one may venture and which may cut off all fear and danger of future calamity in this dark unknown state I am going into shall I be the next hour nothing or miserable Or if I had opportunity shall I not have sufficient cause to proclaim as once one of the same fraternity did by way of warning to a surviving companion A Great and a Terrible God! a Great and a Terrible God! A Great and a Terrible God! I only add 'T is a most strangely mysterious and unaccountable Temper Such as is hardly reducible to its proper causes So that it would puzzle any mans enquiry to find out or even give but probable conjectures how so odd and preternatural a disaffection as Atheism should ever come to have place in an humane mind It must be concluded a very complicated disease and yet when our thoughts have fastned upon several things that have an aspect that way as none of them alone could infer it so it is hard to imagine how all of them together should ever come to deprave reasonable nature to such a degree 'T is first most astonishingly marvellous though it 's apparent this distemper hath its rise from an ill will that any man should so much as will that which the Atheist hath obtained of himself to believe or affect to be what he is The commonness of this vile disposition of will doth but sorrily shift off the wonder and only with those slight and trifling minds that have resigned the office of judging things to their more active senses and have learned the easie way of waving all enquiries about common things or resolving the account into this only that they are to be seen every day But if we allow'd our selves to consider this matter soberly we would soon find that howsoever it most plainly appear a very common plague upon the spirits of men and universal till a cure be wrought to say by way of wish No God or I would there were none Yet by the good leave of them who would thus easily excuse the thing the commonness of this horrid evil doth so little diminish that it increases the wonder Things are more strange as their causes are more hardly assignable What should the reason be that a Being of so incomparable excellency so amiable and alluring glory purity love and goodness is become undesirable and hateful to his own creatures That such creatures his more immediate peculiar off-spring stampt with his likeness the so vivid resemblances of his own spiritual immortal nature are become so wickedly unnatural towards their common and most indulgent Parent what to wish him dead to envie life and being to him from whom they have received their own 'T is strange as it is without a cause But they have offended him are in a revolt and sharply conscious of fearful demerits And who would not wish to live and to escape so unsupportable revenge 'T is still strange we would ever offend such a one Wherein were his Laws unequal his Government grievous But since we have this only is pertinent to be said by them that have no hope of forgiveness that are left to despair of reconciliation why do we sort our selves with Devils We profess not to be such Yea but we have no hope to be forgiven the sin we do not leave nor power to leave the sin which now we love This instead of lessening makes the wonder a miracle O wretched forlorn creature wouldst thou have God out of being for this I speak to thee who dost not yet profess to believe there is no God but dost only wish it The sustainer of the world The common Basis of all Being dost thou know what thou sayest Art thou not wishing thy self and all things into nothing This rather than humble thy self and beg forgiveness This rather than become again an holy pure obdeient creature and again blessed in him who first made thee so It can never cease I say to be a wonder we never ought to cease wondering that ever this befel the nature of man to be prone to wish such a thing that there were no God! But this is 't is true the too common case and if we will only have what is more a rarity go for a wonder How amazing then is it that if any man would even never so fain he ever can make himself believe there is no God! and shape his horrid course according to that most horrid misbelief By what fatal train of causes is this ever brought to pass Into what can we devise to resolve it Why such as have arrived to this pitch are much addicted to the pleasing of their senses and this they make their business so as that for a long time they have given themselves no leasure to mind objects of another nature especially that should any way tend to disturb them in their easie course Till they are gradually fallen into a forgetful sleep and the images of things are worn out with them that had only more slightly touch'd their minds before And being much used to go by the suggestions of sense they believe not what they neither see nor feel This is somewhat but does not reach the mark for there are many very great sensualists as great as they at least who never arrive hither but firmly avow it that they believe a Deity whatsoever mistaken notion they have of him whereupon they imagine to themselves impunity in their vicious course But these it may be said have so disaccustomed themselves to the exercise of their reason that they have no disposition to use their thoughts about any thing above the sphere of sense and have contracted so dull and sluggish a temper that they are no fitter to mind or employ themselves in any speculations that tend to beget in them the knowledge of God than any man is for discourse or business when he is fast asleep So indeed in reason one would expect to find it but the case is so much otherwise when we consider particular instances that we are the more perplex'd and intangled in this enquiry by considering how agreeable it is that the matter should be thus and observing that it proves oft-times not to be so Insomuch that reason and experience seem herein not to agree and hence we are put again upon new conjectures what the immediate cause of this strange malady should be For did it proceed purely from a sluggish temper of mind unapt to reasoning and discourse the more any were so the more dispos'd they should be to Atheism Whereas every one knows that multitudes of persons of dull and slow minds to any thing of ratiocination would rather you should burn their houses than tell them they did not believe in God and would presently tell you it
were pitty he should live that should but intimate a doubt whether there were a God or no. Yea and many somewhat more intelligent yet in this matter are shie of using their Reason and think it unsafe if not profane to go about to prove that there is a God lest they should move a doubt or seem hereby to make a question of it And in the mean time while they offer not at reasoning they more meanly supply that want after a sorry fashion from their education the tradition of their fore-fathers common example and the universal profession and practice of some Religion round about them and it may be only take the matter for granted because they never heard such a thing was ever doubted of or called in question in all their lives Whereas on the other hand they who incline to Atheism are perhaps some of them the greatest pretenders to Reason They rely little upon authority of former times and ages upon vulgar principles and maxims but are vogued great masters of Reason diligent searchers into the mysteries of nature and can philosophize as sufficiently appears beyond all imagination But 't is hoped it may be truly said for the vindication of Philosophy and them that profess it that modern Atheists have little of that to glory in and that their chief endowments are only their skill to please their senses and a faculty with a pittiful sort of drollery to tincture their cups and add a grace to their otherwise dull and flat conversation Yet all this howsoever being considered there is here but little advance made to the finding out whence Atheism should proceed For that want of reason should be thought the cause what hath been already said seems to forbid That many ignorant persons seem possest with a great awe of a Deity from which divers more knowing have delivered themselves And yet neither doth the former signifie any thing in just interpretation to the disrepute of Religion For truth is not the less true for that some hold it they know not how or why Nor doth the latter make to the reputation of Atheism inasmuch as men otherwise rational maysometimes learnedly dote But it confirms us that Atheism is a strange thing when its extraction and pedigree are so hardly found out and it seems to be directly of the lineage neither of knowledge nor ignorance neither sound Reason nor perfect Dotage Nor doth it at all urge to say and why may we not as well stand wondering whence the apprehension of a God and an addictedness to Religion should come when we find them peculiar neither to the more knowing nor the more ignorant For they are apparently and congruously enough to be derived from somewhat common to them both The impression of a Deity universally put upon the minds of all men which Atheists have made a shift to raze out or obliterate to that degree as to render it illegible and that cultivated by the exercise of Reason in some and in others less capable of that help somewhat confirmed by education and the other accessaries mentioned above Therefore is this matter still most mysteriously intricate that there should be one temper and perswasion agreeing to two so vastly different sorts of persons while yet we are to seek for a cause except what is most tremendous to think of from whence it should proceed that is common to them both And here is in short the sum of the wonder that any not appearing very grosly unreasonable in other matters which cannot be deny'd even of some of the more sensual and lewder sort of Atheists should in so plain and important a case be so beyond all expression absurd That they without scruple are pleased to think like other men in matters that concern and relate to common practice and wherein they might more colourably and with less hazard go out of the common road And are here only so dangerously and madly extravagant Theirs is therefore a particular madness the Dementia quoad hoc So much the stranger thing because they whom it possesses do only in this one case put off themselves and are like themselves and other men in all things else If they reckon'd it a glory to be singular they might as hath been plainly shewn more plausibly profess it as a principle that they are not bound to believe the existence of any secular Ruler and consequently not be subject to any longer than they see him and so subvert all Policy and Government or pretend an exemption from all obligation to any act of justice or to forbear the most injurious violence towards any man because they are not infallibly certain any one they see is an humane wight and so abjure all morality as they already have so great a part than offer with so fearful hazard to assault the Deity of whose existence if they would but think a while they might be most infallibly assured or go about to subvert the foundations of Religion Or if they would get themselves glory by great adventures or show themselves brave men by expressing a fearless contempt of Divine Power and Justice This fortitude is not humane These are without the compass of its object As Inundations Earthquakes c. are said to be unto which that any one should fearlesly expose himself can bring no profit to others nor therefore glory to him In all this harangue of discourse the design hath not been to fix upon any true cause of Atheism but to represent it a strange thing And an Atheist a Prodigy a Monster amongst mankind A dreadful spectacle forsaken of the common aids afforded to other men hung up in chains to warn others and let them see what an horrid creature man may make himself by voluntary aversion from God that made him In the mean time they upon whom this dreadful plague is not fallen may plainly see before them the object of that worship which is imported by a Temple An existing Deity a God to be worshipped Unto whom we shall yet see further reason to design and consecrate a Temple for that end and even our selves to become such when we have considered what comes next to be spoken of his Conversableness with men CHAP. VI. What is intended by Gods conversableness with men considered only as fundamental and presupposed to a Temple An account of the Epicurean Deity It s existence impossible any way to be proved if it did exist Nor can be affirmed to any good intent That such a Being is not God That the absolute perfection proved of God represents him a fit object of Religion From thence more particularly deduced to this purpose His Omnisciency Omnipotency Unlimited Goodness Immensity Curcellaeus 's Arguments again this last considered NOR is the thing here intended less necessary to a Temple and Religion than what we have hitherto been discoursing of For such a sort of Deity as should shut up it self and be reclus'd from all converse with men would leave us as
Temple and both afford encouragement and infer an obligation to Religion although no other perfection had been or could be demonstrated of the Divine Being than what is immediately to be collected from his works and the things whereof he hath been the sole and most arbitrary Author For what if no more were possible to be proved have we not even by thus much a representation of an object sufficiently worthy of our honiage and adoration He that could make and sustain such a world as this how unexpressibly doth he surpass in greatness the most excellent of all mortal creatures To some or other of whom upon some meerly accidental dignifying circumstances we justly esteem our selves to owe a dutiful observance and subjection If he did not comprehend within his own Being simply all perfection If there were many Gods and Worlds besides and he only the Creator and absolute Lord of our vortex were not that enough to entitle him to all the obedience and service we could give him and enable him sufficiently to reward it and render his presence and cherishing influences which he could every where diffuse within this circle and limited portion of the universe even infinitely covetable and desirable to us Yea if he were only the entire Author of our own particular Being how much more is that then the partial subordinate interest of an humane Parent To whom as even an Epicurean would confess nature it self urges and exacts a duty The refusal whereof even Barbarian ingenuity would abhor yea and brutal instinct condemn How much greater and more absolute is the right which the parentage of our whole being challenges If every man were created by a several God whose creative power were confined to only one such creature and each one were the solitary product and the charge of an appropriate Deity whose dominion the state of things would allow to be extended so far only and no further were there therefore no place left for Religion Or no tie unto love reverence obedience and adoration because the Author of my being comprehended not in himself all perfection when as yet he comprehended so much as to be the sole cause of all that is in me And his power over me and his goodness to me are hereby supposed the same which the only one God truly hath and exerciseth towards all If all that I am and have be from him I cannot surely owe to him less than all Such as have either had or supposed themselves to have their particular tutelary Genii of whom there will be more occasion to take notice hereafter though they reckoned them but a sort of deputed or vicarious Deities underlin Gods whom they never accounted the causes of their being yet how have they coveted and gloried to open their breasts to become their Temples and entertain the converse of those supposed Divine inhabitants If they had taken one of these to be their alone Creator how much greater had their veneration and their homage been This it may be hoped will be thought sufficiently proved in this discourse at least to have been so by some or other that we are not of our selves and that our extraction is to be fetcht higher than from matter or from only humane progenitors Nothing that is terrene and mortal could be the author of such powers as we find in our selves We are most certainly the off-spring of some or other Deity And he that made us knows us throughly can apply himself inwardly to us receive our addresses and applications our acknowledgments and adoration Whereunto we should have even upon these terms great and manifest obligation although nothing more of the excellency and perfection of our Creator were certainly known to us But it hath been further shewn that the necessary being from whence we sprang is also an absolutely and infinitely perfect Being That necessary Being cannot be less perfect than to include the entire and inexhaustible fulness of all being and perfection That therefore the God to whom this notion belongs must consequently be every way sufficient to all and be himself but one The only source and fountain of all life and Being the common basis and support of the universe The absolute Lord of this great Creation and the central object of the common concurrent Trust fear love and other worship of his Intelligent and reasonable creatures And therefore there remains no greater or other difficulty in apprehending how he can without disturbance to himself or interruption of his own felicity intend all the concernments of his creatures apply himself to them according to their several exigencies satisfie their desires and cravings inspect and govern their actions and affairs than we have to apprehend a Being absolutely and every way perfect Whereof if we cannot have a distinct apprehension all at once i. e. though we cannot comprehend every particular perfection of God in the same thought as our eye cannot behold at one view every part of an over-large object unto which however part by part it may be successively apply'd we can yet in the general apprehend him absolutely perfect or such to whom we are sure no perfection is wanting And can successively contemplate this or that as we are occasionally led to consider them And can answer to our selves difficulties that occur to us with this easie sure and ever ready solution that he can do all things That nothing is too hard for him That he is full all-sufficient and every way perfect Whereof we are the more confirmed that we find we cannot by the utmost range of our most enlarged thoughts ever reach any bound or end of that perfection which yet we must conclude is necessarily to be attributed to an absolutely perfect Being And this we have reason to take for a very sufficient answer to any doubt that can arise concerning the possibility of his converse with us unless we will be so unreasonable as to pretend that what is brought for solution hath greater difficulty in it than the doubt Or that because we cannot apprehend at once infinite perfection therefore it cannot be which were as much as to say that it cannot be because it is infinite for it were not infinite if we could distinctly apprehend it And so were to make it a reason against it self which is most injuriously and with no pretence attempted except we could shew an inconsistency in the terms which it is plain we can never do and should most idly attempt And it were to make our present apprehension the measure of all reality against our experience which if our indulgence to that self-magnifying conceit do not suspend our farther enquiries and researches would daily bring to our notice things we had no apprehension of before It were instead of that just and laudable ambition of becoming our selves like God in his imitable perfections to make him like our selves The true model of the Epicurean Deity Nor can any thing be more easie than that wherein we
pretend so great a difficulty that is to apprehend somewhat may be more perfect than we can apprehend What else but proud ignorance can hinder us from seeing that the more we know the more there is that we know not How often are we out-done by creatures of our own order in the Creation How many men are there whom we are daily constrain'd to admire as unspeakably excelling us and whom we cannot but acknowledge to be far more knowing discerning apprehensive of things of more composed minds of more penetrating judgments of more quick and nimble wits easily turning themselves to great variety of objects and affairs without distraction and confusion of more equal and dispassionate tempers less liable to commotion and disturbance than our selves How absurd and sensless a pretence is it against the thing it self that we cannot apprehend an infinite perfection in one common fountain of all perfection or because we cannot go through a multitude of businesses without distraction that therefore he that made us and all things cannot If we would make our selves the measure 't is likely we should confess we were out-stript when we are told that Julius Caesar could dictate letters when he was intent upon the greatest affairs to four and if he had nothing else to divert him to seven Secretaries at once That Cyrus could call by name all the Souldiers in his numerous Army With divers other strange instances of like nature And since the perfections of some so far exceed the measure of the most why is it then unconceivable that Divine perfection should so far surpass all as that God may intend the affairs of the world according to the several exigencies of his creatures without any ungrateful diversion to himself or diminution to his felicity And since they who partake of some and but a small portion of perfection only can be concern'd in many affairs with little trouble why cannot he that comprehends all perfection be concern'd in all without any For though we have in what hath been last said endeavoured to represent it as not so unapprehensible as is pretended that it may be so we take it in the mean time as formerly sufficiently proved that so it is That God is a being absolutely perfect or that includes eminently all perfection in himself Which general perfection of his Being as it modifies all his attributes so we shall particularly take notice that it doth so as to those that have a more direct influence upon and tend more fully to evince his conversableness with men As first His wisdom or knowledge for we need not be so curious as at present to distinguish them must be omniscience About which if any place were left for rational doubt it would be obvious to them to alledge it who are of slower inclinations towards Religion And object against all applications to or expectations from him That if we be not sure he knows simply all things so as wisely to consider them and resolve fitly about them it will be no little difficulty to determine which he doth and which not or to be at a certainty that this or that concernment of theirs about which they might addgess themselves to him be not among the unknown things At least we shall the less need to be curious in distinguishing or to consider what things may be supposed rather than other to be without the compass of his knowledge if it appear that it universally encompasses all things Or that nothing can be without its reach And because we suppose it already out of doubt that the true notion of God imports a Being absolutely or every way perfect nothing else can be doubted in this matter but whether the knowledge of all things be a perfection The greatest difficulty that hath troubled some in this matter hath been How it is possible there should be any certain knowledge of events yet to come that depend upon a free and self-determining cause But methinks we should not make a difficulty to acknowledge that to know these things imports greater perfection than not to know them and then it would be very unreasonable because we cannot shew how this or that thing was performed which manifestly is done therefore to deny that it is done at all So far is it that we can with any shew of reason conclude against any act of God from our ignorance of the manner of it that we should reckon it very absurd to conclude so concerning any act of our own or our ability thereto What if it were hitherto an unknown thing and impossible to be determined how the act of vision is performed by us were it a wise conclusion that therefore we neither do nor can see r How much more rash and presuming a confidence were it to reason thus concerning the Divine acts and perfections would we not in any such case be determined rather by that which is more evident than by what is more obscure As in the assigned instance we should have but these two propositions to compare that I do or have such a perfection belonging to me that I can see and that whatsoever act I do or can do I am able to understand the course and method of natures operation therein And thereupon to judge which of these two is more evident Wherein it may be supposed there 's no man in his wits to whom the determination would not be easie Accordingly in the present case we have only these two assertions that can be in competition in point of evidence between which we are to make a comparison and a consequent judgment viz. whatsoever perfection belongs to a Being absolutely perfect enabling it to do this or that the wit of man can comprehend the distinct way and manner of doing it and it imports greater perfection to know all things than to be ignorant of some and here surely whosoever shall think the determination difficult accounts the wit of man so exceeding great that he discovers his own to be very little For what can the pretence of evidence be in the former assertion Was it necessary that he in whose choice it was whether we should ever know any thing or no should make us capable of knowing every thing belonging to his own being Or will we adventure to be so assuming as while we deny it to God that he knows all things to attribute to our selves that we do But if we will think it not altogether unworthy of us to be ignorant of some thing what is there of which we may with more probability or with less disparagement be thought so than the manner of Gods knowing things And what place is there for complaint of inevidence in the latter Is not that knowledge more perfect which so fully already comprehends all things as upon that account to admit of no increase than that which shall be every day growing and have a continual succession of new objects emerging and coming into view before altogether unknown And will not
him only to replenish and be present by his essence in the highest heaven as some are wont to speak would they not confess it were a meaner and much lower thought to suppose that presence circumscribed within the so unconceivably narrower limits as the walls of an house If they would pretend to ascribe to him some perfection beyond this by supposing his essential presence commensurable to the vaster territory of the highest heavens even by the same supposition should they deny to him greater perfection than they ascribe For the perfection which in this kind they should ascribe were finite only but that which they should deny were infinite Again they will however acknowledge omnipotency a perfection included in the notion of an absolutely perfect Being therefore they will grant he can create another world for they do not pretend to believe this infinite and if they did by their supposition they should give away their cause at any the greatest distance we can conceive from this therefore so far his power can extend it self But what his power without his being what then is his power something or nothing nothing can do nothing therefore not make a world It is then some Being and whose Being is it but his own Is it a created Being That is to suppose him first impotent and then to have created omnipoteecy when he could do nothing Whence by the way we may see to how little purpose that distinction can be applyed in the present case of essential and virtual contact where the essence and virtue cannot but be the same But shall it be said he must in order to the creating such another world locally move thither where he designs it I ask then but can he not at the same time create thousands of worlds at any distance from this round about it No man can imagine this to be impossible to him that can do all things Wherefore of such extent is his power and consequently his Being Will they therefore say he can immensly if he please diffuse his Being but he voluntarily contracts it 'T is answered that is altogether impossible to a Being that is whatsoever it is by a simple and absolute necessity for whatsoever it is necessarily it is unalterably and eternally or is pure act and in a possibility to be nothing which it already is not Therefore since God can every where exert his power he is necessarily already every where And hence Gods immensity is the true reason of his immobility there being no imaginable space which he doth not necessarily replenish Whence also the supposition of his being so confined as was said is immediately repugnant to the notion of a necessary Being as well as of an absolutely perfect which hath been argued from it We might moreover add that upon the same supposition God might truly be said to have made a creature greater than himself for such this universe apparently were and that he can make one as they must confess who deny him not to be omnipotent most unconceivably greater Nothing therefore seems more manifest than that God is immense or as we may express it extrinsecally infinite with respect to place as well as intrinsecally in respect to the plenitude of his being and perfection Only it may be requisite to consider briefly what is said against it by the otherwise minded that pretend not to deny his infinity in that other sense Wherein that this discourse swell not beyond just bounds their strength viz. of argument for it will not be so seasonable here to discuss with them the Texts of Scripture wont to be insisted on in this matter shall be viewed as it is collected and gathered up in one of them And that shall be Curcellaeus who gives it as succinctly and fully as any I have met with of that sort of men The Doctrine it self we may take from him thus First on the negative part by way of denial of what we have been hitherto asserting he says The foundation that is of a distinction of Maresius's to which he is replying for so occasionally comes in the discourse viz. the infinity of the Divine Essence is not so firm as is commonly thought And that therefore it may be thought less firm he thinks fit to cast a slur upon it by making it the Doctrine of the Stoicks exprest by Virgil Jovis omnia plena as if it must needs be false because Virgil said it though I could tell if it were worth the while where Virgil speaks more agreeably to this sense than ours according to which he might as well have interpreted this passage as divers Texts of Scripture And then his Authority might have been of some value And by Lucan who helps it seems to disgrace and spoil it Jupiter est quodcunque vides quocunque moveris he might if he had a mind to make it thought Paganish have quoted a good many more but then there might have been some danger it should pass for a common notion Next he quotes some passages of Fathers that import dislike of it About which we need not concern our selves For the question is not what this or that man thought And then for the positive account of his own judgment in the case having recited divers Texts out of the Bible that seemed as he apprehended to make against him He would have us believe that these all speak rather of Gods providence and power by which he concerns himself in all our works words and thoughts wheresoever we live than of the absolute infinity of his Essence And afterwards That God is by his Essence in the supreme heaven where he inhabits the inaccessible light but thence he sends out from himself a spirit or a certain force whether he pleases by which he is truly present and works there But proceed we to his Reasons which he saith are not to be contemned We shall therefore not contemn them so far as not to take notice of them which trouble also the Reader may please to be at and afterward do as he thinks fit 1. That no difference can be conceived between God and creatures if God as they commonly speak be wholly in every point or do fill all the points of the universe with his whole Essence For so whatsoever at all is will be God himself Answ. And that is most marvellous that the in-being of one thing in another must needs take away all their difference and confound them each with other which sure would much rather argue them distinct For certainly it cannot without great impropriety be said that any thing is in it self And is both the container and contained How were these thoughts in his mind and these very notions which he opposes to each other so as not to be confounded with his mind and consequently with one another So that it 's a great wonder he was not of both opinions at once And how did he think his soul to be in his body which though substantially united