because begotten of no other Man as the rest were but immediately created of God So also the Heaven is the first Cause of Motion not absolutely but in the Genus of Natural Causes as is collected from the 1st Book of the Meteors Cap. 1. In the same manner may the Soul be said to be the first Cause of vital Operations and likewise every principal Cause in regard of its Instruments c. Ax. 30. Seventhly Cause Efficient is divided into Universal and Particular Ax. 31. Universal is that which concurrs with other Causes with the same Efficiency to the producing of many Effects Ax. 32. A Particular only which by its Efficiency produces but one Effect 1. § Universal Causes are God and the Heavens God concurrs with particular Causes to all Effects The Heavens only to them which are Natural and Material In this Sense Book 2. of the Physicks Cap. 2. The Sun and Man I add God are said to beget Man The Sun as an universal For with the same Efficiency it concurrs to the producing of all things Man as a Particular So also may a Driver be said to be a Universal when driving a Team of Horses because in the same manner and with the same Virtue he drives all his Horses as well the Sound as the Lame Ax. 33. Lastly and Eighthly Cause Efficient is divided into next and remote Ax. 34. The Next is that which produces the Effect immediately Ax. 35. The Remote which produces the Effect by means of some more neighbouring Cause 1. § A Cause Efficient is said to be two ways Next to wit either generally or specially In general that Cause is said to be Next which either by its Existence they commonly say Suppositum or Virtue is joyned to the Effect For such Virtue being an Instrument of the principal Cause it is deem'd with the Principal to be one only And therefore when the principal Cause by its Virtue is joyned to the Effect it is its self esteemed to be joyned to the Effect Neither is it any matter whether that Virtue be an Instrument conjoyned or separate For Example The Fire is said to be the next Cause of Ustion Parents of their Children notwithstanding the Fire acts by Mediation of Heat and the Parents of Seed For altho' Heat and Seed are Instruments yet do they not effect by their Intervening but that the principal Cause may be said to be next to the Effect A Cause therefore is said to be remote in this Sense viz. which neither by its Existence nor Virtue is joyned to the Effect As when the Grandfather is said to be the Cause of his Son's Son or Grandson c. 2. A Cause Efficient is said to be next in Species which is so joyned by its Existence to its Effect as that it is joyned to it without any mediating Virtue And a next Cause has no Place in Substances but only Accidents especially proper For a Substance does not effect a Substance without some mediate or instrumental Virtue And this is the Cause which is said to be absolutely next and that is either Internal or External Internal is that which is in the Subject of the Accident of which it is the Cause So the Soul and every Substantial Form is said to be the next Cause of its own Proprieties Hitherto appertaineth the Emanative Cause Likewise the Continent or Synectical of the Physicians External is that which is not in the Subject of that Accident whose Cause it is And so the Interposition of the Earth is said to be the next Cause of an Eclipse But the Use of this Cause in the Definition and Demonstration of proper Accidents is much the more great CHAP. XVIII Of End Ax. 1. ENd is defin'd to be that for the sake of which a thing is 1. § Being that which moves the Efficient to Action by superinducing its Love upon it and begetting an Appetite on and Desire of it self Ax. 2. End is three ways divided and first into that of which and for which Ax. 3. The End of which is that which the Efficient desires Ax. 4. For which for whose sake or for which the Efficient desires such an End 1. § As for Instance The of which of Medicine is Health for which the Sick Ax. 5. Secondly End is divided into Principal and Secondary Ax. 6. The Principal End is that which the Agent first or also principally intends Ax. 7. The Secondary which the Agent so intends as that it may enjoy it with the Principal or else attain it if the first and principal End should fail 1. § For Example The principal End of Clothes is that our Bodies should be defended against the Inclemency of the Heavens the Secondary Conjoyned with that Principal is that they should adorn it So the Principal End for which God was pleas'd to manifest himself in the Creation of the World was that Man should be endued with the Knowledge of God and Piety The Secondary and Succedaneous that he might render them inexcusable who holding the Truth in Unrighteousness go on still in Iniquity Ax. 8. Thirdly and Lastly End is divided into Subordinate and Last Ax. 9. A Subordinate End is that which is referred to some farther End Ax. 10. The Last to which all other Ends are referred that it self to no farther 1. § There is often a long Series of Subordinate Ends in which the Subordinate is a Means in Respect of the Sequent End For Example One digging in the Earth to fetch out Iron Iron is drawn out that of it may be made some Instrument which may be serviceable for our Use As suppose a Penknife or a Lancet the Lancet inserves the Physician for the Cutting of the Vein the Cutting of the Vein to transmit the Superfluous Blood or take away the Vitious The Loss of Blood conduces to the Conservation or Recuperation of Health Our Health indeed of it self is to be desired but referred notwithstanding to this End that our Actions may be free and Expedite Actions again are referred either to Pleasure or Glory or Honesty or something else in which Subordination of Ends there is no going to Infinity as we have taught before For otherwise vain and fruitless would be that Appetition which Nature has planted in all things as the Philosopher argues Book 1. of the Ethicks Cap. 1. There is therefore some chief End in which the Appetite must terminate and acquiesce 2. § An End is said to be two ways last either in its own Genus or absolutely That is said to be so in its own Genus which is the last amongst those Ends which are intended by the same Agent So in that Series which I have brought there are many Ends which are last in their own Genus For to fetch forth Iron is the last End of such who dig in the Mines the Penknife of the Smith Health of the Physician But there is but one absolutely last and that is Felicity 3. § That End which is subordinated in
the Effect the less Principal as far as it causes is always worse than or inferiour to the Effect 1. § When we compare the Effect with the Cause we are to consider the Cause as it is such that is according to that Virtue by which it causes when the Virtue of the Cause is such as that it contains in it whatever is in the Effect it is said to be a principal Cause The Effect is said to be contained in the Cause either formally or eminently When formally or the Effect is of the same Nature with the Cause the Cause is said to be univocal and is equal to its Effect as when Heat begets Heat or a Mouse a Mouse When Eminently or the Cause by a Nobler Sort of Virtue produces the Effect it is said to be Aequivocal and is better than its Effect as when Light produces Heat or the Architect an House when neither formally nor eminently it is said to be less Principal and that not so much effects as subserves the Principal in producing the Effect Ax. 22. The less Principal is subdivided into procatarctical Proëgumenal and Instrumental Ax. 23. Procatarctical is that which Extrinsically excites the principal Cause to Action Ax. 24. The Proëgumenal which inwardly disposes or also excites the principal Cause to Action 1. The Cause in Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Procatarctical in Latin may be called Incipiens or Inchoans that is beginning or inchoating And is either Object Occasion Author or Merit So far it may be said to be the Object as it moves or excites the principal Cause to Action Occasion is the Conveniency of Time and Place to act in which it self also has some Force of moving to Action in as much as it removes Impediments to Action Author here is said to be him who proposing Reasons persuades the principal Cause either to or from Action He is also call'd the Moral Cause Merit or Meritorious Cause is that which moves the Agent to a Requital and that either in good or evil things And even all these are without the principal Cause In which they are distinguished from the Proegumenal which consists in the principal Cause it self For Example If any one walking about in the Night should see many precious things in the open House of his Enemy from whom just before he had receiv'd an Injury to be negligently kept and at the Instigation of another should take them away The objective Cause of of this would be the Precious Things themselves exciting the Covetousness of the Thief the Occasion the Darkness of the Night and open House which in no little Measure further him in his Purpose the Author or Moral Cause he who instigated him the Meritorious the Injury received for which the Thief comes to be more prone to steal The Proëgumenal Cause is the proper Avarice of the Thief Farthermore Author or Cause Moral has Place only in voluntary Causes Object Occasion Meritorious and Proëgumental also in others Occasion is sometimes taken for Cause Meritorious As when an Injury committed or done is said to be the Occasion of a Fight or War or Slaughter and in this Sense if feigned is call'd by the Greeks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the Latins Pretext The Proëgumenal either disposes only the principal Cause as when the Temperament of the Body is said to be the Cause of Manners or also moves it and spurs it on As when Anger is said to be the Cause of Revenge or Avarice of Theft 2. § The Procatarctical and Proëgumenal Causes are of great Use in Physick For Physicians reduce almost all Diseases to three Causes Procatarctical Proegumenal and Synectical or Containing The Procatarctical with them is the External and Evident Cause The other Two the Internal and hidden Causes The Proëgumenal the Antecedent The Containing the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or that which is connate with and also exists together with the Disease and coheres immediately with it and this with us is the next Cause For Example The Procatarctical Cause of the Fever is either Cold or the Astringent Bathes the Proëgumenal the Skin bound up and Evaporation hindred the Containing the Humour Putrescent and accended Ax. 25. The Instrumental Cause is that which subserves the principal Cause in its Effecting 1. § All Instruments subserve not the Principal in the like Manner For there are some Instruments joyn'd to the principal Cause in acting and there are some in acting separate from them Those are Instruments conjoyn'd of which the principal Cause makes use in the Effection of the thing And these are either Active as the Heat in the Fire or Passive as a Knife a Sword c. Separate Instruments are those which act in the place and stead of the principal Cause So the Ambassadour is the Instrument of the Prince and the Seed seems to many the Instrument of Generation but mistakenly For separate Instruments have no Place in Naturals but Morals And this brings us to the next Maxim viz. Ax. 26. The Essence of Instruments consists in their Fitness for Use 1. § Instruments says Aristotle Book 2. of An. Cap. 4. in Offices and Uses are distinguish'd or convene amongst themselves For every Instrument is that which it is because and so far as it is fit for some certain Use So an Ax is so far an Ax as that in the Quality of its Matter and Form it is fit to cut And the Eye so far an Eye as it is fit to see with For the Eye the Hand and other Organical Parts of Man or Beast when dead are not Eye or Hand unless Homonymously or ambiguously that is doubtfully as Aristotle says Book 4. of the Meteors Cap. 17. Ax. 27. Sixthly Cause Efficient is divided into First and Second Ax. 28. The First is that which depends upon none Ax. 29. The Second which depends upon the First 1. § A Cause is Two Ways said to be First to wit absolutely or in its own Genus That is said to be absolutely on which all things depend both when they are Made Exist and Operate or as they say in Fieri Esse and Operation The Cause absolutely First is only One to wit God For all things depend on God both as to their Making Being and Operating according to that of the Apostle St. Paul Acts 17. In him we live and move and have our Being Furthermore all things are said to depend upon God as they are made or in Fieri as they say by reason of Creation and that either proximately or remotely as they are or in being by reason of Conservation as they operate of his Providence either ordinarily or extraordinarily c. 2. § That Cause is said to be First in its own Genus on which the rest of the Causes of the same Genus depend Such a First Cause is not only given in every Genus of Causes but also in every Subordination So Adam is the first Cause of Men in his Species
that it be conjoin'd with the Patient and 2dly unlike unto it 1. § The first of these is precepted Book 7. Physicks Cap. 3. and the other Book 1. of Gener. and Corrup Cap. 7. An Efficient is said to be two ways joined to the Patient to wit either by Existence vulgarly call'd Suppositum or Virtue For Example When Fire burns Wood it is conjoyn'd to the Wood by its Existence when heats the Sitters by it is not joyn'd to them by its Existence but Power or Virtue 2. § An Agent likewise is said to be Two Ways unlike the Patient either as to Species or Degree In the first manner Hot to Cold in the last that which is more hot to that which is less hot or that which is more cold to that which is less cold Those which neither the one cannot act upon the other or suffer from it any manner of ways Ax. 9. Thirdly the Efficient is divided into free and necessary Ax. 10. A Free is that which Causes Consultedly or with Design Ax. 11. A Necessary not but by Necessity of Nature 1. § Liberty in general is a Faculty of doing what one pleases and therefore he who is absolutely free is free from all Servitude Law imposed upon him by others Coaction and Necessity of Nature But when the Will is said to be free and a free Cause opposed to a Necessary nothing farther is understood by the Name of Liberty but an Immunity from Coaction Necessity and natural Determination For he who is a Servant or Subject to another's Law enjoys the Liberty of his own Will when he judges that he is to live according to the Law or Beck of him with whom he lives But Natural Necessity and Coaction evert Liberty Why therefore is not coacted Cause contained in this Division Because he who is compell'd is so compell'd by another as that he conduces nothing to the Effect himself and therefore cannot be numbered amongst the Efficients 2. § By Natural Necessity we understand not only that by which Inanimate things act as Plants but that also by which Brutes and Infants before the Use of Reason For the Actions of Brutes and Infants proceed almost in the same manner from Natural Instinct and Sense as do the Actions of Plants from Nature it self In this Sense are the Parts of the Division immediately opposed and in this are contained all the Species's of Causes which follow Ax. 12. A free Cause can act and not act what how and when it pleases Ax. 13. A Necessary is determin'd to one certain thing and acts both when and as much as it can 1. § For Example For this Cause is one said freely to dispute or write because Voluntarily and of ones own Accord one disputes or writes and also because one can dispute or not dispute and the Disputation begun can at Will interrupt or do any of those things which are said to be in our own Power For to these only does the Liberty of the Will extend Causes necessary are determin'd to one thing that is they can but cannot but act and that only which they do and nothing else and as much as they can So Fire cannot but heat fit Matter and heats every thing so much as that it cannot heat it any more Ax. 14. Fourthly Cause Efficient is divided into Cause by it self and Cause by Accident Ax. 15. Cause by it self is that which as it is such produces an Effect of its own Council and agreeable to its Natural Disposition Ax. 16. By Accident which not as such or else besides its own Council or Natural Propension 1. § That a Cause Efficient be a Cause of it self two Conditions thus are required First that the Effect answer to its Council or Natural Propension to its Council if a Free Propension if a Necessary The other that it produce it as such If either of these are wanting the Cause is said to be by Accident If the first because some Event or Effect by Accident coheres with the Effect which is produc'd by the Cause Efficient by it self As when one digging up the Earth finds a Treasure For to dig the Earth is the Effect of the Digger by it self with which Effect the finding of the Treasure by Accident that is besides the Council of the Digger and Nature of the Digging is joyn'd So when an Animal begets a Monster it is the Cause of the Monster by Accident Because the Generation of the Monster is joyned with that of Nature by Accident and besides its Scope and Intention If the latter that is if the latter Qualification be wanting the Cause is said by Accident because the Effect is not ascrib'd to the Cause but that which happens to it As when Polyclete or a Musician is said to be the Cause of a Statue For neither does Polyclete make the Statue as he is Polyclete or Musician as he is Musician but a Statuary For it is Accidental to the Statuary that he is either Polyclete or a Musician See Book 2. of the Physicks Cap. 2. Ax. 17. To cause by Accident are reduc'd Fortune and Chance 1. § Videlicet To the first Species of it which is said to be by reason of its Effect Fortune in Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is defin'd by Aristotle Book 2. of the Physicks Cap. 5. thus It is therefore manifest that Fortune is a Cause by Accident in those things which are done for the sake of something and consultedly undertaken By Themistius in his Periphrase upon this Place more fully to be a Cause by Accident of those things which neither necessarily nor often but rarely happen and in those alone which for the sake of something are consultedly undertaken 2. § Now Chance in Creek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is a Cause by Accident of those things which rarely happen and that in all those things which are undertaken for the sake of another and not only consultedly For Chance extends farther than Fortune For whereas both are Causes by Accident which act for the sake of some End and are conversant in things rarely happening Fortune only is placed in those things which act consultedly Chance also in those which act by Necessity of Nature as in Infants Brutes Plants and also inanimate things in which there is no Place for Fortune As for Instance when any one digging finds a Treasure we may say that 't was by Chance or Fortune done But when a Tile falling from a House shall wound a Passer by that is we say by Chance not Fortune done All Fortune therefore is Chance but not on the contrary as is said Book the same Cap. 6. Altho ' these Words are often confounded Ax. 18. Fifthly Cause Efficient is divided into Principal and less Principal Ax. 19. A Principal is that which produces the Effect by its own Virtue Ax. 20. A Less which inserves the Principal towards its producing the Effect Ax. 21. The Principal Cause is either equal to or nobler never worse than
of that mutual Habitude or Relation which things may have each to the other whether simple or Analogical And these are large in their Extent as Trope Ax. 9. Reason of unequal Attribution viz. that those signifie that common Nature which is unequally communicated to its subjected Species's Ax. 10. By Reason of us the Homonymy is when for the sake of the Memory of any Person near and dear to us or some Illustrious Person in Hopes of Similitude or the like we impose such and such Names upon our Children and Friends Ax. 11. Of these the farthest distant from Synonyms that is such as we have in the Beginning of this Chapter defined are Homonyms by Chance and those whose Reason or Homonymy is in us More nearly the Tropicks and first the Analogous Nearest of all those that are Ambiguous by reason of Unequal Attribution c. 1. § Now the general Cause of Homonymy or Ambiguity is the Infinite Multitude of things and Paucity of Words For by reason of that much greater Paucity of Words than Things of Necessity one Word must be applied to signifie many things But the Cause why this Word or that Word is Homonymous is either none as in Homonymy by Chance Or if there be any which may move a wise Man to make use of the same Word to signifie many things it is either the Change of the Word from its proper Signification as in the Tropicks or unequal Attribution as in them which convene not equally to Inferiours or Conservation of some ones Memory or the Hope of Similitude or Example For Instance the Word Jus in Latin signifies both Broth and that which is oppos'd to Injustice the Homony my is by Chance For there is no Reason why this Name should be impos'd upon things having no Affinity at all amongst themselves 2 § What and how many sold Trope is is to be known from the Rhetoricians But Trope causes Homonomy because a Sentence pronounc'd in Tropical Words may be ambiguous and sallacious as when the Word fox is put for a Guilâ—ful Person Pastor for a Minister of the Church Soul for Man Author for the Work c. For it 's uncertain whether a Man may use these in their Proper or their translated Signification Homonyms by unequal Attribution are For Example such as these viz. Enâ— or Being in Respect of Subfrance and Accident Syllogism in respect of Syllogism strictly so call'd and other Syllogisms which 〈◊〉 are wont to be called Syllogisms and so the Term Sanum in Latin is given to Animal Medicine and Urine c. 3 § And even all these have their Causes of Ambiguity in Things Others also there are which we have said have their Causes of Ambiguity in us and our Will as when we give the Name of the Parent to the Child for the Conservation of his Memory or some Pious and Learned Person hoping that ours may be excited by his Example to become like unto him These Ammonius in his Commentary on the Book of the Categ calls Memoriae and the others Spei gratia 4. § But that the Homonomy of Words may be so much the better understood which is in the first Place to be regarded in Disputations we may take Notice of some Canons or Criterions which Aristotle delivers Book 1. Top. Cap. 15. Of which we shall here repeat the Chief All those Words in the first Place fall under the Title of Homonymous to which many are Contraries as that of the Latin Word Grave to which Leve and Acutum Secondly Those which have sometimes a Contrary sometimes not as the Word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to love unto which sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or hate and sometimes nothing as when signifying to wont Thirdly Those which have sometimes a Medium sometimes not So the Words Candid and Fâ—â—â—â—d that is in English White and dark Brown For when Discourse is of Colour the Pale and other Middles are interjected between them But when of Voice said to be Candid or Fuscid that is Clear or Hoarse then nothing Fourthly Those are said to be Homonymous to which something is opposed that is Ambiguous So Acute is an Homonym because Obtuse For both an Ax is said to be Obtuse and the Voice and the Wit So also the Word Flock and therefore likewise Pasior And so in other Genus's of Oppositions excepting Disparates Fifthly those whose Conjugates jugates are Homonyms and so because the Latin Word Sanus is an Homonym so also must the Word Sanitas be Sixthly Those which signifie Things of divers Kinds and so Good because to be found in all Categories So also the Greek Word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because it signifies as well an Ass as a Milstone Seventhly Those which are attributed to such things as are not such as that they may be compared and the one be said to be more such or as much such as the other and therefore Candid because attributed both to the Voice and a Garment When a Voice can be said to be neither more nor less so than a Garment Eighthly Those Words which signifie the Differences of Genus's that are not Subaltern As Acute that is the Difference both of Voice and Magnitude Ninthly Those which have diverse Differences as the Word Jus in Latin For others are the Differences of that from which the Lawyers are called Jurisconsulti and Others that which may be drank Tenthly and Lastly Those which signifie sometimes a Species and sometimes a Difference as the Word Candor which signifies a Species of Colour and a Difference of Voice c. Ax. 12. The diverse Acceptions of Words which the Schoolmen call Suppositions Effect no Homonymy Ax. 13. Words are either taken Materially or Formally Ax. 14. They are said to be taken Materially when for themselves Ax. 15. Formally when for the Things by them signified 1. § For Example When I say Animal is a Word of Three Syllables of the Neuter Gender and the Third Declension the Word Homo is a Word of Two Syllables of the Common Gender The Words Homo and Animal are Materially taken that is by and for themselves not otherwise than as if they signify'd nothing at all But when I say Man is an Animal the Words Man and Animal are formally taken that is for those things which they signifie according to Institution Ax. 16. Formal Acception when of singular Words is but of One Mode but when of Universal it is either Simple or Concrete and Ax. 17. Simple then when a Universal is taken for the Common Nature Abstractedly from Inferiours Ax. 18. Concrete when in Inferiours 1. § For Example When I say Animal is the Genus of Man the Word Animal is taken simply for the Nature of Animal Abstractedly considered as in the Notion of the Mind or Understanding it is prescinded from Inferiours But when I say Man is an Animal the Word Animal is taken in the Concrete viz. as it exists in Humane Species This Concrete Acception is by the
If Science it is call'd Demonstrative or Apodictical as Cap. 2. Soph. Elench And if Opinion or other Assent besides Science it is called Dialectical c. Ax. 3. So that a Dialectical Syllogism is nothing more than a Syllogism Generating Opinion or any other Assent besides Science Or as Aristotle explains himself Book 1. of his Top. Cap. 1. arguing out of Probables And he is thought the best Dialectick who can best defend his own and dilute or wash away the Opinions of his Adversary c. Ax. 4. And in treating of this sort of Syllogism we are to consider of Questions Propositions and Invention of Arguments Ax. 5. And a Question here may be any thing provided it contradict not Piety good Manners or common Sense 1. § For he that shall call in Question whether God be to be worshipped or Parents Honoured or the Magistrates to be obeyed ought rather to be punished than followed with Dialectical Arguments So he that shaâ—â— doubt whether the Snow be white is not otherwise to be convinc'd than by the Testimony of his outward Sense which he who disbelieves what is iâ— that he will believe c. Ax. 6. So that concerning the Subject of the Dialectical Problemes we need not much to be sollicitous anâ— their Attributes are either of the first or second Notions of which those constitute Real these Notional Problemes c. Ax. 7. A Real is when the Attribute of thâ— Question is real as is a Place a Superficies or so A Notional when a Notional as is Superficies the Gonus of Place or so Because Genus is not a true thing but a second Notion or Logical and only feign in the Mind whereas a Superficies is a true thinâ— and not feign'd in the Mind c. Ax. 8. Real again are either absolute or compared Ax. 9. Absolute that in which sought whether tâ—â— Attribute agrees to the Subject or no. Ax. 10. Compared when two or more Subject being proposed it is asked which the Attribute â—â—grees or disagrees most to or two or more Attributes whether of them agrees more or most to 〈◊〉 Subject c. 1. § For Example When saught whether Glery to be numbered amongst our good things it is an Aâ—solute Probleme when whether Virtue or Glory a most to be desired or Alexander more Valiant or Tâ—â—â—rate a Compared Ax. 11. Problemes Dialectical of what kind soeveâ— may be taken out of all Disciplines whatsoever Ax. 12. Propositions Dialectical are to be true 〈◊〉 least probable not Paradoxal that is against the common or receiv'd Opinion For how shall the Respondent grant that which is against the common or râ—ceiv'd Opinion and which it may be he judges to be false But let us take some Notes from the Learned Hereboord and so end this Chapter Notes and Observations from the Learned Hereboord having Relation to this Chapter 1. A Dialectical Syllogism may also thus be defin'd A Dialectical Syllogism is that which begets Opinion Human Faith or Doubt or any other Assent besides Science or Error which distinguishes it likewise from the Sophistical Syllogism 2. A Syllogism Dialectical is also by another Name called Topical from the Greek Word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Place in Latin Probabilis that is Probable or Contingent because tho' it produces a true yet is it an uncertain and infirm Assent because its Propositions tho' true are yet Contingent as may appear by what is said above 3. When a Paradox is said to be a Probleme true against the common Opinion it is not to be understood only of that of the Unlearned or Vulgar but also of the Multitude of the Lettered who have taken up with Principles Ancient and not so well examined such as that viz. the Earth moves which tho' it be true yet may it be so against the common Opinion and therefore a Paradox 4. A Term of Art signifies no more than this viz. a Term proper to every Art So Metonymy and Synecdoche are Terms of Art viz. Rhetorical Meridian Horizon Zodiac Astronomical Genus and Species Logical c. And this brings us to the next Consideration viz. that CHAP. XVI Of the Invention or finding out of Dialectical Arguments or Topical Places and Rules Ax. 1. NOW to the Invention or finding out of Probable or Dialectical Arguments belong Place and Rule A. 2. A Place is a Seat or certain Common Note by whose Admonition an Argument is found Ax. 3. A Rule a Canon or Proposition containing the Reason of the Consequence of Dialectical Syllogism c. Ax. 4. The Distribution of the Arguments here to be used viz. in Dialectical Disputations is usually into Artificial and Inartificial that is into those of Art to be drawn from the Consideration of the Parts of the Question and Testimonies which are to be found without Now the first Ax. 5. Are to be used for the Confirming or Refelling of all sorts of Problemes alike that is in the same manner being no other than Testimonies But the Artificial not but may be said to be of two sorts viz. those for the Confirming and Refelling of Notional and those for Confirming and Refelling of such as we have call'd real Problemes because concerned about real things Ax. 6. Now those of the first kind viz. for the Confirming and Refelling of Notional Problemes are always taken from the Nature or Propriety of that Affection or 2d Notion concerning which it is query'd in the Probleme 1. § Which or else some Canon belonging to it being placed in the Major an Assumption being made the controverted Affection is prov'd to be in the Subject as because Air is the Subject Matter of Wind we prove it not to be its Genus and because Immortality is the Affection of Life Eternal we prove it not to be its Genus both which Arguments lean upon this Rule viz. That that which is the Subject or Propriety of a thing cannot be its Genus c. given us Cap. 11. of the first Book And so Divines make it appear that good Works are not to be the Cause of our Justification because every cause is before its Effect But good Works are after our Justification and therefore not its Cause And this Argumentation leans upon this Foundation Theoreme 3. Cap. 15. of the first Book viz That every Cause is before it s Caused in Nature and Knowledge c. Such Syllogisms as these Aristotle calls Book 2. Post Cap. 8. Syllogisms Logical that is Notional and the Use of them is very great in all Discipline Ax. 9. Arguments of the other sort viz. for Proving or Refelling of real Problemes are always taken from the Affections belonging to the Nature of the Subject or Predicate as from their Places Ax. 10. Of which those are the best which are taken from the Nature of the Predicate because not sought whether the Subject be but Predicate or whether the Predicate be in the Subject or not c. 1. § Now for Examples of them both suppose any one
their Hunger Ax. 14. Secondly that to which convenes one Equal to that also convenes the other and that to which one not to that neither convenes the other 1. § As Christ had the Power of miraculously healing the Paralytick and therefore to forgive Sins A magnanimous Man does not become a hasty Gate and therefore not a Speech Ax. 15. The third Rule is That which agrees to one of the Equals that also to the other and that which not to one that also not to the other c. 1. § As Orpheus Pollux Theseus and Hercules might go to the Infernal World and therefore that Benefit seems not to be deny'd to Aeneas who was not inferiour to them in Nobility of Stock About which Aeneas disputes in Virgil in this manner Si potuit Manes c. English'd by Mr. Ogilby in this manner Could Orpheus make his Bride from Shades retire With pleasant Notes from his enchanting Lyre If Pollux could by an alternate Death His Brother ease and tread so oft one Path Why should I Theseus or Alcides name And my Progenitors from great Jove came c. Thus also we may argue Tyrus did not sustain the Force of Alexander and therefore Jerusalem had not done it if Alexander had Besieged that c. 2. § All the Canons from the compared Places have great Probability and are almost certain if the Argument be well compared with the Parts of the Question that is compared with the Subject or Predicate of the Question and not any thing else which is added in determining the Subject or Predicate For if this should be done the Illation would be foolish As if any one should argue Luscus can see an Ox a great way off and therefore a little Bird And that from this Canon that to which the greater agrees to that also the less The Cause of this Error consists in the evil Comparison For although the Ox be greater thon the Bird yet does it require a greater Perspicacity to see a little Bird a great way off than an Ox. Ax. 16. Places from like and unlike are of no great Use to prove or refel but however we will recite their Canons And so proceed 1. § To that of Testimonies And the first is that to the like the like agree And the Second that the like to the unlike do not As if one should attempt to prove that all things should be common amongst Men because so amongst Beasts one might answer the Ratio of Men and Beasts is not the same And therefore that the same things should agree to one as agrees to the other is not necessary because that the like should agree to the unlike is not necessary c. Ax. 17. Now that from Testimonies has ten Canons and first that of the Divine is most firm and also of its self most worthy of Belief 1. § Under which Notion are contain'd not only such as proceed from God himself As that of this is my Beloved Son c. But also such as are written or said by Men who it appears were divinely inspired such as were the Prophets and Holy Apostles c. But at this Day none are to be receiv'd for Divine but only such as are contained in the Canonical Books of the Holy Scritures Ax. 18. Secondly The next in Degree to that of the Divine is the Testimony of our Senses as well the External as the Internal to which appertains the Testimony of Conscience 1. § The Force of Conscience is great says Cicero for Milo and that not only in the Judgment as that those should not fear who have committed none Ill Those again have continually Punishment before their Eyes that have sinned But in the whole Course of our Life and in all things For God has implanted in our Natures a certain Force of assenting to some most Universal and known Propositions of Truth on which lean Arts and Sciences as well Theoretical as Practical to wit such as these viz. that the Whole is greater than its Part. To God is due Religion to Parents Honour to the Magistrate Obedience c. Which he that believes not seems to have shaken Hands with his Conscience and bidden adieu to the proper Force of his own Nature Secondly Not less is the Force of the External Senses whose Judgment whosoever denies to be true at the same time taking away the Sciences and all Assent of the Mind has brought an Infelicity upon himself like that of the Scepticks and Academicks Ax. 19. No Humane Testimony in the third Place as Humane that is as brought forth by Man or proceeding meerly from Man as Man's is of so much Authority but that it may be questioned both because it is beyond the Humane Condition not to err And because Men are so easily carried away by their Affections through the Force of which they embrace that as a Truth which in their sedate Moods they know even to be false Ax. 20. Fourthly That which leans upon the tacite Consent of all Men is before others the most likely 1. § As That the Soul of Man is Immortal and such like which lean upon no less than the Dictates of every Man 's Natural Reason and Conscience In this Number yet are not to be reckon'd those old Wives Sayings amongst the Vulgar viz. such as these That Swans sing most sweetly when they come to die Bears bring forth mis-shapen Cubbs c. For these no wise Man will give any heed to Ax. 21. Fifthly In a Case where Men disagree in their Testimonies that which the Most and the Wisest Assert is the most likely to be true Ax. 22. Sixthly A Skilful Artificer if an Honest Man is to be given way to in his own Art Ax. 23. Seventhly If Words are in Dispute the most used are always the best Ax. 24. Eighthly In Questions of right and wrong of much Moment are Laws Edicts Acts of Parliament Opinions of wise Men Customs Sentences in the like Case c. Ax. 25. Ninthly In those of Fact 〈◊〉 are of Use Witnesses Hand-Writings Confessions c. Ax. 26. Tenthly A Negative Testimony in most Cases is not of any Avail at all 1. § For it does not follow because Aristotle or Plato has not said it that therefore the thing is not so But if any Proof in Testimony this follows viz. That Aristotle Plato and other Professors of Wisdom have said it and therefore it is so Or denyed it and therefore it is not so c. For although a Testimony may not be Negative yet nothing hinders but that a Negative Conclusion may be proved by a Testimony c. The Testimonies of Sacred Writ also Negative prove in things necessary to Salvation whether to be done or to be believed although in the rest they do not to wit because all things Necessary to Salvation are in them contained And thus much of Canons Absolute Now come we to those which are Compared or concerning Comparisons c. CHAP. XIX Of Canons Compared
repair'd And this is from the Final c. 4. § Demonstrations Why are not only affirmed but also denied For as we may demonstrate that a Man is capable of Science because endu'd with Reason So also that a Beast is not because not c. For as an Affirmation is the Cause of an Affirmation so must a Negation be the Cause of a Negation c. See Book 1. Post Cap. 13. And so we proceed to the Chapter of the Conditions of the Principles of Demonstration in which we are taught what they ought to to be CHAP. XXIII Of the Conditions of the Principles of Demonstration Ax. 1. THE Conditions of the Principles or Propositions of Demonstrations Why are either Absolute or Related Ax. 2. Absolute are those which agree to the Propositions in themselves consider'd and Related as Compared with the Conclusion Ax. 3. The Absolute are these and first that the Propositions be necessarily true and reciprocal Secondly Immediate and First COMMENTARY True because a False cannot be known and also necessarily because from Propositions not necessary a necessary Conclusion cannot be drawn unless by Chance or Accident 2. § Immediate because if not there would be a Progress to Infinite which is inconsistent with the Nature of Rnowledge Ax. 4. These Two in the Major are required Necessarily but that the Minor supposing it be true should be also Necessary and Immediate is not absolutely Necessary 1. § For the Major is to consist of the Affection and its next Cause which are not only Reciprocated amongst themselves but also necessarily and immediately cohering But the Minor of the Affections Cause and Subject which it is not necessary should so closely cohere as that they should constitute a Necessary Immediate and Reciprocal Proposition since of the Affection not Subject the Knowledge is required c. 2. § Now the Minor is not necessary much less Reciprocal and Universally first when the Medium of the Demonstration is the Cause Efficient External of the Predicate For Example That which with the Rays of the Sun the Earth being objected cannot be illustrated that suffers a Defect of Light receiv'd from the Sun The Moon with the Rays of the Sun the Earth being objected cannot be illustrated And therefore c. In this Demonstration the Minor has no Degree of Necessity because it is not perpetual In Demonstrations from Cause Efficient Internal or Final indeed the Minor is always Necessary but not Reciprocal because often the next and Reciprocal Subject wants a Name For Example Every Plant whose Humour is apt to congeal at the Foot or Stalk of its Leaf is apt to shed its Leaves But the Humour of the Vine is apt to congeal at the Foot or Stalk of its Leaf And therefore the Vine is apt to shed its Leaves c. In which the Minor is not Reciprocal because it happens not only to the Vine to have its Humour congealed but to all other Plants to whom it happens to shed their Leaves But this happens because there is not a proper Name by which should be signify'd All and only those Plants to which the Congelation of the Humours and Fall of the Leaf evenes For the same Reason is it also that the Conclusion is not Reciprocal See Book 1. Post Cap. 5. and Book 2. Cap. 66. 3. § The Minor is not Immediate also when the next Cause of the Predicate has any former Cause by which it may be demonstrated For in all Causes which enter Demonstration there is a certain Series and Subordination so that every Posterior is the Effect of the Precedent As often therefore as any Effect is demonstrated by such a Cause as is the Effect of a former Cause that Minor must necessarily be Mediate and then that Minor is to be resolv'd into that former Cause and so on till you come to the First of that Series which constitutes a Demonstration of both Propositions Immediate And this Demonstration is the Foundation of all the rest which are of the same Series And therefore in searching of Science we are to proceed from the first Demonstration to the following in Synthetic Order and then the Minor Mediate is esteem'd as it were Immediate because now before demonstrated For a Demonstrated Proposition is no less apt to beget Knowledge than a Proposition Immediate and Indemonstrable But yet if any one shall happen upon a Demonstration whose Minor is Mediate he must proceed in Analytic Order towards the first and Fundamental Demonstration Nor will he first have attained Science before he shall have arriv'd at the first Cause For in this the Mind acquiesces But let us add Examples that the Thing may be so much the better understood That which is endu'd with a Three-fold Dimension admits not another Body to be with it at the same time in the same Place All Bodies are endu'd with a Three-fold Dimension And therefore c. The Minor of this Syllogism may be demonstrated in this manner That which consists of Matter and Form is endued with a Three-fold Dimension Every Body consists of Matter and Form And therefore every body c. Now the Minor of this Syllogism is Immediate as well as the Major because to consist of Matter and Form is the Definition of Body c. 4. § The same Series there is in Demonstration from Cause Final in which the Subordinate is demonstrated by the farther End until you shall come to the last in every Genus in which the Mind acquiesces For Example An Animal has Lungs that it may breath breathes that it may refresh the Heart the Heart is to be refresh'd to preserve a Temperature of Heat a Temperature of Heat is to be kept that the Life of the Animal may be preserv'd c. If these Demonstrations be propos'd in Form all excepting the Last will have a Mediate Minor and the Last is the Foundation of all the rest 5. § It sometimes happens that Demonstrations from Cause Efficient cannot be resolv'd into Propositions Mediate unless the Demonstration from Cause Final be commixt with the Demonstrations from Cause Efficient For Example A Man is of a most Acute Touch because he is of a very thin Skin a thin Skin because having abundance of Elaborated Animal Spirits abundance of those Elaborated Animal Spirits because having a very large Brain the Shop or Office of those Elaborated Animal Spirits Hitherto are they all Causes Efficient That a Man has a very large Brain is to be demonstrated from the End to wit because he should reason that Man should reason again from Cause Efficient to wit because he is a Rational Animal Here now we acquiesce because the Minor is the Definition of Man and therefore Immediate and Indemonstrable Ax 5. The Conditions of Principles relating to the Conclusion are Three And first that they be the Causes Secondly Prior to and Thirdly more known than the Conclusion Ax. 6. And these Conditions are required in both Propositions 1. § For as is the
a Point is that which does not consist of Parts A Line is a Longitude void of Latitude A Right Line that which lies equally betwixt its Points c. Hypotheses in the first that there is a Natural Body a Heaven a Soul c. Arithmetick that there is a Unity seu non dari maximum Numerum that is that there 's no such thing as the highest Number Geometry that there 's a Line that from one Point to any other Point a right Line may be drawn c. All which are such as tho' they want not Demonstration yet are they such as that out of the Signification of the Words meerly known without the Accession of any thing else they cannot be known to be true For altho' any one should know what 's signify'd by the Name Body yet can he not know by this that every Body consists of Matter and Form Nay that there is such a Thing as Natural Body if not assisted by the Help of his Senses c. 4. § Hence is it that Axioms ought to be held by him that would learn any Science before he comes to his Master Theses's not because these are to be explained in the very Entrances of Sciences Definitions especially always but if known by the Judgment of the Senses Hypotheses indeed need not c. Ax. 14. Now when a Demonstration is Conform to these Laws it not only proves that the Affection 's in the Subject but also explains what that is and contains the perfect Definition of it 1. § That is contains all those things that are necessary to it only in Inverted Order For a Demonstration is thus proposed viz. The Earth is interposed between the Sun and the Moon and therefore the Moon suffers an Eclipse or a Defect of Light viz. receiv'd from the Sun And a Definition thus viz. An Eclipse is a Defect of Light in the Moon receiv'd from the Sun by Reason of the Earth's Interposition c. And this of Demonstration Why. Now come we to that which we call Demonstratin That of which the next Chapter as also of that which the Logicians call a Regress CHAP. XXIV Of Demonstration 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or That and Regress Ax. 1. NOW of Demonstration That the one is from the Effect and the other from the remote Cause Ax. 2. Of which that collects the Cause from the Effect Sensible and this the Effect from the remote Cause 1. § For Example If any one rising something later than usual should see the Walls of his Chamber collustrated with the Sun-Beams and collect from thence that the Sun had been sometime risen This would be from the sensible Effect From the remote Cause this viz. Plants have not a Sensitive Soul and therefore they don't breath c. Ax. 3. Now that from the Effect may be as well Affirmed as Denyed The remote Cause always Deny'd and Concluded in the Second Figure in Camestres And therefore as we collect Plants live because they grow and are nourished so also may we that Stones do not because they neither grow nor are nourished c. And as from an unequal Concitated Pulse of the Arteries we collect that there is a Fever So also from an equal and sedate that there is none or that there is an Immunity from a Fever c. But it does not follow that all Animals breathe because they have a Sensitive Soul altho' it does that no Plant does because it has not because having a Sensitive Soul is not the next Cause of Breathing c. 3. § Now of these two Species's of Demonstration the first is much nobler than the last First because it has more necessary Propositions consisting of the same Terms of which does the Demonstration 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Secondly begets Knowledge tho' not simply yet such as is in its Genus perfect For a Cause can no other ways be known but by its Effect Thirdly it is framed in the first Figure and may also be affirmed Whereas Demonstration from the Cause remote consists of less necessary Propositions and not immediate Neither does it beget Knowledge in its own kind perfect neither can it be fram'd in the first Figure c. Both yet beget such a Knowledge as that we may know whether the thing is or is not c. Ax. 4. As soon then as the Cause is deprehended from the sensible Effect a Comparison is instituted between that Cause and the Effect And when the Mind by its Sagacity discovers that that Cause is the Cause of that Effect then a Regress is made from the Cause to the Effect by a Demonstration 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. 1. § Sometimes the Effect is unknown and the Cause known and then immediately is made use of the Demonstration 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sometimes the Effect's perceiv'd and Cause unknown and then first the Cause from the Effect and then the Effect from the Cause is to be demonstrated And this sort of Demonstration is usually call'd by the Latins a Regress in which the Causes are first to be investigated by the Effects And then from the true Knowledge of those Causes is to be deriv'd a true and perfect Knowledge of those Effects whereby we not only know that the Effects be of which our Senses are Judges but also why and what they be further than which our Minds cannot reach And thus much may suffice for an Account of true Syllogism Notes and Observations from the Learned Heereboord in Relation to this 24th Chapter WHEN the Demonstration from the remote Cause is said to be always Negative by the Ingenious Author it is to be understood with this Restriction viz. when it is larger than the Effect and not reciprocated with it as in the Instance which he has given which is very true But sometimes it may happen that the remote Cause may be equal to and not larger than the Effect and then it is reciprocated with it and may be affirmed as in this Instance Those things which are Animals Vegetative are nourished Plants are Animals Vegetative and therefore they are nourished Wherein the middle Term is the Remote Cause For the next is the Nutritive Faculty and yet the Syllogism proceeds in the first Figure and is affirmed because the remote Cause is adequate to the Effect and reciprocate with it For whatsoever is nourished has a Vegetative Soul and whatsover is not has not c. CHAP. XXV Of Sophism Ax. 1. NEXT follows Syllogism 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Fallacious which counterfeiting a Shew of the True produces Error or an Ignorance of Depraved Disposition COMMENTARY 1. § Now Precepts concerning this are very necessary in Logick for Fear lest others should impose upon us For he that is liable to be deceiv'd by another and is not aware of it may also be deceiv'd by himself 2. § But say they who wo'n't admit of the Doctrin of Fallacious Syllogism in Logick the Right is the Rule both of it self and the Wrong