THE METHOD TO Science By I. S. LONDON Printed by W. Redmayne for the Author and are to be Sold by Thomas Metcalf Bookseller over against Earl's-Court in Drury-lane 1696. Book I. Of the First Operation of our Understanding Less 1. OF NOTIONS or the very First Ground on which all Science is built Less 2. Of the Distinction of Natural Notions and of the Reducing them under Ten Common Heads p. 10 Less 3. How these Common Heads of Notions are to be Divided and of the Common Head of SUBSTANCE p. 25 â—ess 4. Some Considerations belonging to those Heads of Notions or to the Ten Predicaments in Common p. 36 â—ess 5. Of the Common Head call'd QUANTITY p. 50 â—ess 6. Of the Common Head of QUALITY p. 60 â—ess 7. Of the Common Head of RELATION p. 71 Less 8. Of the Common Heads of ACTION and PASSION p. 81 Less 9. Of the Common Head of UBI or WHERE p. 89 Less 10. Of the Common Head oâ— QUANDO or WHEN p. 9â— Less 11. Of the Expressions of ouâ— NOTIONS by WORDS p. 100 Book II. Of the Second Operation oâ— our Understanding or JUDGâ—MENTS Less 1. OF the Nature of Judgâ—ments or Propositions Common Of their Parts Of 〈◊〉 Ground of their Verification 〈◊〉 of the several Manners of Predicâ—ting p. 11â— Less 2. Of Self-evident Propositions First Principles p. 1â—â— Less 3. That First Principles are Ideâ—â—tical Propositions prov'd by Instaâ—â—ces The Use that is to be made of them Also of some Other Propositions either in whole or in part Formally Identical and of the Reducing of Inferiour Truths to Self-evident Propositions p. 15â— Less 4. Of the Generating of Knowledge in us and of the Method how this is perform'd p. 163 Book III. Of the Third Operation of our Understanding DISCOURSE and of the Effects and Defects of it Less 1. OF Artificial Discourse the Force of Consequence and of the Only Right Figure of a Syllogism p. 225 Less 2. Of the several Manners or Moods of a Syllogism and of the Laws of Concluding p. 235 Less 3. Of the Matter of a Conclusive Syllogism or what Middle Term is Proper for Demonstration p. 248 Less 4. How every Truth is to be Reduced to an Identical Proposition and consequently every Errour to a Contradiction What Consequences follow thence of one Truth being in another and of the Science of Pure Spirits p. 261 Less 5. Of other Mediums for Demonstration from the Four Causes p. 272 Less 6. Several Instances of Demonstration p. 288 Less 7. Other Instances of Demonstration p. 302 Advertisement p. 316 Less 8. Of Opinion and Faith p. 322 Less 9. Of Assent Suspense Certainty and Uncertainty p. 344 Less 10. Of Disputation and Paralogisms p. 356 Appendix p. 374 The Errata's in the Preface PRef P. 26. l. 15. out of P. 28. l. 19. cast about P. 46. l. 19. the Cartesian Corrections of the Errata PAge 5. Line 8. onely which P. 18. l. 10. as is P. 21. l. 18. that Motion P. 62. l. 6. most nearly P. 69. l. 23. but their P. 75. l. 1. become P. 77. l. 6. has besides P. 106. l. 2. False P. 107. l. 17. Proposition P. 122. l. 31. A whole P. 128. l. 12. Sophroniscus P. 147. l. 18. make P. 236. l. 16. Proposition is Identical P. 245. l. 27. nunc P. 250. l. 5. that can P. 255. l. 7. Sensitivum P. 257. l. 30. 't is Evidently P. 258. l. ult Basis. P. 270. l. 31. at one P. 273. l. 33. est of P. 281. l. 27. be a kind P. 301. l. 1. Cause of P. 308. l. 20. exercise it 's P. 311. l. 25. there P. 318. l. 18. Frailty which P. 321. l. 23. all own P. 322. l. 3. main P. 326. l. 1. what is is P. 354. l. 20. Erroneous P. 362. l. 13. he is not P. 364. l. 30. Grammatical P. 369. l. 13. The Sixth P. 370. l. 34. a proud P. 381. l. 17. with no. P. 388. l. 3. to be P. 393. l. 19. gives P. 414. l. 26. very small P. 417. l. 22. Slender Flexible and. l. 24. contiguous P. 419. l. 25. Art P. 424. l. 18. Is it P. 425. l. 13. so they l. 16. do P. 427. l. 7. Lock P. 273. l. 17. and seeing P. 396. l. 21. that is ' t is PREFACE DEDICATORY TO THE LEARNED STUDENTS OF Both Our Universities REason being Man's Nature and the Proper Act of Reason the Deducing Evidently New Knowledges out of Antecedent ones it may seem Wonderful that Mankind after the using their Reason and Disputing so long time should still Disagree in their Sentiments and contradict one another in inferring their Conclusions so that those who are sam'd for the Greatest Philosophers do still remain in Perpetual and as far as it can be discern'd Endless and Irreconcileable Variance and Dissension about their Tenets It seems to shock the very Definition of Man and to lay in some sort a scandal upon Creative Wisdom it self that whereas all other Creatures do arrive at the Natural End for which they were made Mankind alone nay the Noblest Portion of that Kind who cultivate their Thoughts with the most exact care that may be should still miss of Reasoning rightly and so fall short of True Knowledge which is their Natural Perfection What Tree but bears the Fruit Proper to its Kind Or what Cause in the World but produces such Effects as are sutable to its Nature And tho' by the Interfering of Cross-Agents there happens now and then a Deficiency in some very Few Particulars yet that Defect is never found in a Considerable part of the Species for Chance would not be Chance if it did come near the reaching an Universality whereas Mankind in its whole Latitude seems to fall short of improving it self in Truth at least in gaining Certainty of it or if some have attain'd it yet the Number of those Right Reasoners is so very Inconsiderable that they are lost amongst the Croud of those who stray into Errour Nor can those Happy Few who have light on it obtain Quiet Possession of what they have Acquir'd but their Title to it is perpetually Disputed by Great Multitudes of Pretenders who put in their Claim and set up their Pleas for their Opposit Tenets Whence our First Enquiry ought to be how Man's Nature comes to be so Disabled from performing its Primary Operation or from Reasoning rightly that so we may bethink our selves by what Means it may if possible recover the true use of its Natural Faculty how it may be cur'd of the Impotency it labours under and be freed from those Impediments which hinder it from Acting as it ought 2. Divines will tell us that this mischief happens thro' Original Sin Nor can it be doubted but there is some Truth in what they alledge For questionless Passion distorts the Understanding by the Ascendent which the Depraved Will has over it in such Concerns as the Will is addicted to and has espous'd an Interest in But this
less Divisible or rather 't is not so properly Quantity as is the other because it has no Vnity to distinguish it from a mere Confused Multitude of Ones but by means of the Understanding conceiving it to be so many Units terminated by the last yet because Plurality and Paucity are More and Less of any one Determinate Number and that there is a Ground in Nature for our Understanding to consider many Scatter'd Ones and comprehend or bind them together into one Notion and that such Notions are useful or necessary to Mankind therefore this Order'd Multitude of discrete or shatter'd Ones call'd Number is rightly placed in the Predicament of Quantity For t is to be noted that when 't is said Quantity is Divisibilis in semper Divisibilia it was not meant of Quantity in Common or all Quantity but only of that Species of Quantity call'd Continued 4. The Unity proper to Extended Quantity is Continuity of its parts For if the parts of this sort of Quantity be Discontinu'd either Nothing or vacuum comes between them and then they are still Continu'd against the Supposition for Nothing can do nothing and therefore cannot discontinue the Parts of Quantity Or else some Body comes between them and Discontinues them and then since all Bodies bring their own Quantities along with them however the Bodies A. and B. are distanced by C's coming between them because every Body has its determinate bounds and Limits yet the Quantity of those three Bodies precisely consider'd has none but goes on Smoothly in the self same tenour thro' the whole Mass of Body whether those Bodies be Different or the Same without Notches or Nicks butting and bounding it here and there or in the least diversifying it what ever Variety is found in the Figure Colour Hardness Softness or in any other consideration belonging to those Bodies Again since this Species of Quantity has its peculiar Notion Nature or Essence it must have some kind of Vnity too peculiar to it self But none is imaginable except Continuity nor does any so directly subsume under the notion of Quantity which is Divisibility or Vnity of its potential parts or sute so exactly with it Nay were the parts of Quantity discontinu'd quantitatively they would be divided quantitatively that is not Divisible or One that is none or Not-Quantity against the Supposition Therefore the Vnity proper to this Species of Quantity is Continuity of its parts Cor. I. Therefore the Quantity of the whole World is One Vninterrupted Continuity and the World it self speaking of Quantitative Unity One Great Continuum 5. Quantity according to its precise Notion cannot be Essential to Body because it can neither be the Genus of it nor the Intrinsecal Difference that constitutes it as is prov'd above 6. Yet Quantity Materially consider'd and not according to its precise and formal notion of Divisibility may as it were per accidens contribute to the Essence of Individual Bodies For since nothing is truly and perfectly Ens or Capable of Existence but Individuals nor since Thing in common cannot exist can any thing be Capable of Existing but by being ultimately Determinated and thence compleatly fitted to be This or That and this Determination distinguishing one Individuum from all others is perform'd by means of such a particular Complexion of Accidents as fits them for their Primary Operation for which Nature ordain'd them and this Complexion of Accidents is either of Quantity or else as is shewn in Physicks of different modifications of Quantity it follows that Quantity materially consider'd and not according to its Formal notion of Divisibility may as it were by Accident contribute to the Essence of Individual Bodies 7. The Intrinsecal Differences of Quantity are more and less of the Notion of Quantity This is prov'd formerly when we treated of the Division of Substance and the reason given there holds equally here 8. The Proper Species of Quantity mathematically consider'd or as it abstracts from Motion are Longitude Latitude and Profundity otherwise call'd Linea Superficies and Corpus For it is evident that Latitude is another sort of Quantity and has more of that Notion in it than Longitude has and that Profundity is a different sort of Quantity and has in it more of Quantity thus consider'd than either of the other as containing in it self all the three Dimensions 9. Therefore the Intrinsecal Differences of each of these continued Quantities consider'd Mathematically as abstracted from all Order to Motion are Divisibility into greater or into lesser determinate parts For since the Notion of Quantity is Divisibility and Divisibility respects the Parts into which it may be divided and this respect cannot be to Indeterminate parts into which it may be divided they being as Euclid has demonstrated Infinit as well in the greatest as the least Quantities so that they cannot have any differences thus considered wherefore Divisibility into Greater and Lesser parts being the Intrinsecal Differences of all such Quantities in regard that the Greater have more of the Immediate Generical Notion or of that kind of Quantity in them the smaller less of it and Divisibility into parts which are Determinate may bear the Notion of Greater or lesser Divisibility which Divisibility into Potential parts as was said cannot it follows that Divisibility into Greater and Lesser Determinate parts are the Intrinsecal Differences of this kind of Quantity Mathematically consider'd Besides Greater and Lesser bear in their Notions some Proportion between those parts which cannot be conceiv'd unless those Parts be Determinate 10. The Proper and Intrinsecal Differences of Continued Quantity consider'd Physically or in Order to Motion that is Affecting it's subject as apt to be wrought upon by Natural Causes are more or less Divisible or capable to be wrought upon and divided by those Causes This is evident from the very same Reason supposing Intrinsecal Differences to be onely more or less of the immediate common Notion or of the Genus they are to divide 11. The More and Less Divisibility of Continu'd Quantity thus consider'd is to be more easily or less easily wrought upon or divided by Natural Agents For since Quantity thus consider'd does not respect the Parts it contains or may be divided into but the Causes in Nature and their Operation upon its Subject Body it follows that the Notion of its being more or less Divisible as thus consider'd can only mean more or less susceptive of the Efficiency of Natural Causes that is more easily or less easily Divisible by the said Causes which is to be Rare and Dense 12. The Division of Continu'd Quantity into Permanent and Successive is made by Accidental Differences and not by Essential ones as were the former Divisions of it For since to move and to stand still are Accidental to Quantity and have no respect to that Generical Notion as more and less of it as had the other Differences above mentioned it follows that these Differences are Accidental to their Generical
all a long produce such Effects yet since we know and can demonstrate the An est of this Order or that the Course of Nature is still carry'd on by Proper Causes and Effects hence we can demonstrate there is no such thing as that Chimerical Cause call'd Chance governing the World which Fantastick whimsy is imputed to the Epicureans Corol. 7. Hence we can Demonstrate that every the least motion of a Fly or an Insect the Figure of every leaf of a Tree or grain of Sand on the Sea Shore do come within the Compass of this Course of Nature or Gods Providence which neglects not the least of his Creatures but has a Superintendency over all Which Considerations tho' they may at first sight seem Incredible and paradoxical and Stun our Reason yet after that by recourse to our Principles we have recover'd our dazled sight and clearly see they must be True will exceedingly conduce to raise our Souls connaturally to deep Contemplations of Gods Infinit Wisdom Goodness and Providence and ground in us a perfect Resignation to his Will in all occurrences and let us see and be asham'd of our froward proud peevish and selfish humour which nothing will content but the having the Whole Course of Nature alter'd for our sakes as if the World were made meerly for us or that Causes should not have their Proper Effects Which being a Contradiction is therefore as Unreasonable and Foolish as it is in a Man that wants Money to be angry that Two and Three Shillings do not make Forty Corol. VIII Hence none can have just occasion to grumble at God's Providence for Ill Successes For since we know à priori that God he being Infinitely wise casts the whole Frame of the World or the Course of Causes in the most perfect and best Order to wish we should be otherwise after we see that no Causes can bring our endeavouring it to Effect is to wish the Whole World should be worse for the Interest of one Inconsiderable piece of it which is against Common sense and the Light of Nature to expect from a Common Governour who is to provide in the first place for the Common Good and is even against the Judgment and Generous Practice of diverse Heathens who for the Common Good of a Small part of the World their own Country have not car'd to ruine their Private Concerns nay to Sacrifice their Lives Corol. IX On this Doctrine is grounded the Duty of Gratitude we owe to God for all the Good we have of what nature soever For it is hence seen demonstratively that God is as much the Giver of that Good by laying such a steady Course of innumerable Causes to convey it to us as if he had given it by his own hand Immediately nay it ought more to increase our Gratitude to see that he has Ordered such an Infinity of Causes from the beginning of the World to be Instrumental to our Good Corol. X. Hence lastly is shewn the Wisdome of Christianity which instructs all its Followers to express in their Common Language and to put in practise all the Substance of those Truths which we have with so much labour Speculatively Demonstrated As when they say that Every thing that happens is Gods Will pray his Will may be done Resign to it Acknowledg that all the Good they have comes from God thank him for it free him from all Imputation of Injustice when any Harm lights to them and bear it with a Humble Patience c. 9. There is a certain Order or priority of Nature in our Notions taken from the same subject by which one of them or which is the same the Subject as grounding one of those Notions is conceiv'd to be kind of Efficient Cause of Another of them For it is Evident that the First Efficiency of Fire is the making that smart Impression on our Feeling Sense which we call Heating out of which if continu'd it follows that it dissipates or shatters asunder all the parts of the mixt Body on which it works To which 't is Consequent that it Disgregates the Heterogeneous parts of it and Congregates the Homogeneous ones from which latter Effects of Heating as being most obvious and discernible to Mankind Aristotle takes his Definition of Hot things Thus out of Rationality springs a Solid and Serious Content in Discovering new Truths which are the Natural Perfection of a Soul and from this Content a greater degree of the Love of seeing still more Truths Thus Risibility springs from Rationality the Object of which is not a Solid Food nourishing and dilating the Soul as is this later which causes some increase of Science in her but as it were a kind of Light Repast and Recreation to her sprung from the Observing some trifling particulars which were Odd Aukward and Sudden or Unexpected and withal not Harmful or Contristating 10. In those Subjects which have many Accidents in them we must Separate those Accidents from the Subject and consider attentively according to which of them it produces such an Effect which found we shall discover a Proper Cause and its Proper Effect For example put case we experience Aloes purges Choler we must separate its Colour Smell Hardness Bitter Tast and the rest of its Accidents and endeavour to find out according to which of them it produces that Effect and if we can find it does this precisely as Bitter we shall discover that Bitterness is the proper Medicine against Choler and thence we can gain this Certain Knowledge and establish this Universal Conclusion that Every Bitter Thing is good against Choler according to that Solid Maxim in Logick A Quatenus ad Omne valet consequentia Note That Induction in such cases gives great light to a Man already well vers'd in Natural Principles But this former Maxim must be Understood with this Provis◠that it be meant to hold per se loquendo as the Schools phrase it that is if nothing hinders as it does often in the Practise of Physick For in Mixt Bodies there is a Strange Variety and Medly of Accidents or Qualities divers of which are of a Disparate and sometimes of a Sub-contrary or Contrary nature to one another so that it requires a great Sagacity to add to them such other Mixts as may obviate their Interfering and make the intended Effect follow Thus much of Demonstration from the thing as it is Active or from the Efficient which is the first of the Four Causes 11. Demonstrations may be taken also from the Matter or Material Cause that is from the Thing or Subject as it is Passive For from the Divisibility of a Thing whether that Divisibility be Metaphysical or Physical we may demonstrate the Corruptibility of it which necessarily following out of the Thing as 't is Divisible is therefore a Property of it Thus capable of Admiring is a Property necessarily Inferring Rationality in it's Subject Admiration being nothing but a Suspension of the Rational Faculty at
contrary to the Nature of Change or Motion therefore i-The First Being cannot be the Immediate Cause of Motion or Change nor consequently of the First Motion in Nature 20. The latter part of the former Minor viz. that a Body could not have been the Immediate Cause of the First Motion in Nature is thus prov'd Ce-Nothing that antecedently to the First Motion was not-Moving or in Rest could have been the Immediate Cause of the First Motion in Nature but la-Every Body antecedently to the First Motion in Nature was not-Moving or in Rest therefore rent-No Body could have been the Immediate Cause of the First Motion in Nature Note that this Demonstration supposes a First Motion in Nature which was prov'd Demonstration 4. LESSON VII Other Instances of Demonstration Thesis V. THere is a First Self-Existent Being or a Deity Demonstration VI. Proposition I. The Notion or Nature of Ens and of Existent in Creatures and consequently of Essence and Existence are Distinct. Da-Every Notion of which Existent and not-existent may be truly predicated is Different from the Notion of Existent But ri-The Notion of Ens in its First and Proper Signification taken for an Individual Substance is a Notion of which Existent and not-existent may be predicated therefore i The Notion of Ens thus understood is dâ—fferent from the Notion of Existent and consequently the Notions of Essence and Existence are also Distinct. 2. The Minor is Evident For we can truly say that Petrus est while he is Living and as truly say of the same Peter that Fuit or non-est when he is Dead 3. The Major is no less Evident For when we say Petrus est or Peter is Existent were the notion of the Predicate Existent the same with Peter the Subject the Proposition would be in sense formally Identical and the same as 't is to say what 's Existent is Existent Wherefore when we say Petrus non est or Peter is not-Existent Peter Signifying the same as Existent it would be the same as if we said what 's Existent is not Existent which is a Contradiction Proposition II. 4. The Notion of Ens Abstracts from Existence or is Indifferent to it and to Non-existence This needs no farther Proof For in the two Propositions lately mention'd Existent and not Existent are truly predicated of the same Ens viz. Peter which could not be unless the Subject Peter did Abstract from both or were Indifferent to both Besides all the Words which we use to express the Notions or Natures of any Created Ens whatever do so perfectly Abstract from Existence that it is neither Exprest Imply'd nor in the least Hinted in them as appears in the words Lapis Quercus Bucephalus Petrus Raphael which give us not the least light or intimation that they are Existent or not-Existent Proposition III. 5. Were there any Inclination in Created Entities to one more than to the other it seems to be rather to Not-being than to Being For since Peter even tho' possest of Actual Being is still no less capable of Not-being it seems as if he had a particular Natural Tendency to Not-being because tho' supported Formally as it were by it's Opposit Actual Existence he is notwithstanding no less a Capacity of Not-existing his Original nothingness being so radicated in his Nature as he is a Creature that it sticks to it and inclines him to it even while he is Proposition IV. 6. Existence is no ways Intrinsical to any Created Ens either Essentially or as an Affection springing out of it's Essence This has been demonstrated Prop. 2 d. and 3 d. Because Every nature requires all it's Intrinsicals and what follows out of them or is Connected with them and is not Indifferent to have them or not have them as Ens is to have or not have Existence Proposition V. 7. All Created things have their Existence from something that is Extrinsical to them For whatever has any thing and not from it's self or from it's own Intrinsical Nature must have it from Another or from something that is Extrinsical to it there being no Third sort of Cause imaginable which is neither Intrinsical nor Extrinsical that is which is neither it's self nor Another Proposition VI. 8. No Created Ens can give Existence to another For tho' as was shown formerly the virtue by which the Ens operates be the Existence of that Ens yet it can work no otherwise than as the Thing it self is or according to the Nature of the Thing which has that Existence whose Nature it actually Imprints as it were on the Subject as we find in Fire heating in Water moistning and in the whole Line of Universal Causality Again since the whole Line of Causality also bears that no Cause can act unless it be first Determin'd and as it were Appropriated to work such an Effect whence come those establisht Maxims that the Course of Nature is carry'd on by Proper Causes to Proper Effects and Ex indifferente nihil sequitur Therefore seeing Prop. 2. The Created Ens to which such an Existence belongs and consequently the Nature or Essence of that Ens Abstracts from all Existence and is perfectly Indifferent even to it 's own and much more to the Existence of any other Ens it follows demonstratively that no Created Ens can give Existence to another or be the Proper Cause of it Therefore Proposition VII 9. There must be some Vncreated Cause that gives Existence to all Created Entities This is already Evident since no Created Entity can have it's Existence either from it's own Intrinsical Nature or from any other Creature Proposition VIII 10. This Vncreated Cause of all Existence must be Self-Existent that is his Essence must be his Existence For were his Essence Indifferent to Existence or Existence Accidental to him and not Essential he would need Another Cause to give him Existence for the same reason Creatures do and so He would not be Vncreated Therefore there is a First Self-existent Being or a DEITY Corol. III. Hence it is seen that all that Created Causes operate upon Entities grown to maturity is to dispose to the not being of the things they work upon by Altering the Matter so that out of those Alterations brought to such a point the Body ceases to be any longer of such a Nature or Kind and consequently loses it's Existence At which Instant the Providence of the First Being so Orders his World that those Determinations of Matter which were Inconsistent with the Former Ens should be Proper for the New Ens that is to succeed to which in the very First Instant the other ceases to be and this new one is Ultimately Determin'd to be this He by his Bountiful and Steady Emanation of Being gives it such a peculiar Existence as is Commensurated and Proper to it's Essence Thesis VI. An Angel cannot undergo any Change after the First Instant of it's Being Demonstration VII Axiom 1. If Agent and Patient be perfectly fitted
Motion which was not in that Instant begun Or if they mean only it's Potential parts or which is the same that One Actual Whole not to pose them by what virtue those Potential parts do formally cohere which without making Divisibility which is Quantitative Vnity or Continuity the Essence of Quantity is impossible to explicate the Question returns and we demand how Firmly those parts do cling together that is how Dense that Whole was and in what it's Density consisted which we affirm must have been either in it's Intrinsical Nature or such a degree of Consistency which is in it's being to such a degree more or less Divisible by Natural Causes or in Nothing Again if Density consisted in the Rest of it's Parts and there was most perfect Rest before there was any Motion then the Density of it must have surpassed all Degrees and therefore it must have been of the Nature of Epicurus his Atomes that is Insuperably and Essentially Incapable of being Divided which they must not say who make their Elements made by the Rubbing of some parts of the Matter against the others Besides in thaâ— supposition GOD as the Author of Nature had offer'd Violence to his own Creation by Dividing it immediately at first Lastly that Matter was of it's own nature Indifferent to be Mov'd or not-Mov'd that is Indifferent to Rest or Motion for Being and Extension abstract from both whereas in our case Density and the same may be said had it been Rare being Natural to it and not Adventitious or Accidental by the Operation of External Causes it could not have been Indifferent to it since every thing necessarily Requires what is Natural to it self Nor is a Thing meerly by it's being in Rest of another Nature To understand this more clearly let us consider this Proposition That Thing call'd the First Matter is in Rest 't is about the Essence or Nature or Intrinsecal Quality of the Subject of this Proposition we are Enquiring to which supervenes that Accidental Predicate of being in Rest. Wherefore to be in Rest does not alter the Intrinsecals of their First Matter but presupposes them and therefore all it's Intrinsecals must have belong'd to it of it's own nature whether it had happen'd to be in Rest or in Motion 22. Density then in their First Matter cannot be explicated by Rest nor consequently Rarity by Motion Let us search then farther in what we can conceive it to consist or how it may be Explicated Now we are to note that all Particular Natures or Notions are to be Explicated by more Common and General ones if we go to work like Philosophers for all Grounds and Principles are made up of such Notions as are Common or Vniversal ones and to Explicate Particulars by other Particulars is the way of Proceeding by Similitudes which may serve sometimes to Elucidate but never to Prove or to Resolve any thing or Notion into its Formal Cause which belongs properly to Philosophers We find then abstracting fâ—om Rest and Motion which are Accidental to that Matter no Notion or Nature in it that can be Superiour to Density and Rarity but the Essence of it that is that Thing it Self call'd the First Matter and its Quantity And Quantity may be consider'd two ways Either as affecting the Body meerly in order to its Self or else in order to the Causes that may work upon it The Former we call Extension the latter Divisibility physically consider'd Now Density cannot any way be Explicated by Extension as that in which it consists as is most Evident in regard a Body may be Equally Extended whether it be Rare or Dense nor is any thing therefore Rarer or Denser because it is Longer or Shorter Let us apply then our Consideration to Divisibility taken in the sense spoken off lately viz. as making its Subject apt to be wrought upon or Divided by Natural Causes and the Proper and Intrinsecal Differences of every Common Notion being More and Less and it being also Evident from the very Notions and from the Consent of Mankind that we call those Bodies Dense which are Less Easy to be Divided or Less Dâ—visible and those Rare which are more Divisible or more Easy to be Divided we are in a fair way to find out clearly what Rarity and Density do consist in viz. Rarity in an Excess or greater Proportion of Quantity thus consider'd to the Matter or Subject of it and Density in a Lesser Proportion of the same Quantity to the Matter that is to the Subject of it according to the Notion of it as Matter Nor does this more strain our Reason to conceive this various participation of the same Accident Quantity than it does to conceive a Thing to partake the Quality of Whiteness Vnequally and be More or Less White For that Maxim of Quantitas non suscipit magis minus is meant Evidently of Extension in regard that the least imaginable Extension being Added or Abstracted from the former must necessarily vary the Species 23. That we may bear up more directly to our main Thesis Since Rarity or else Density must necessarily be in their First Matter for it is impossible to conceive it to be at all Divisible by Natural Causes but it must be either Easily or Hardly Divisible by them if we joyn to this that Contraria according to the Maxim sunt circa idem subjectum it will and must follow that the same Matter whether theirs or ours that had a Power in it to be Less Divisible or Dense had also a Power in it to be More Divisible or Rare and this not only in the First Matter it self but also in every particular Body in Nature made of it and which has the nature of that Matter in it whence results this Conclusion that Rare Bodies are Transmutable into Dense and Dense into Rare and that therefore there is Formal Mutation in Bodies according to these two Primary Qualities and consequently according to all Secondary Qualities too which as will be demonstrated in Physicks are made up of those Primary ones So that most of the Effects in Nature are carry'd on by Formal Mutation nor consequently can Nature be ever rightly Explicated by the Deniers of such a Formal Change 24. Let it be well noted that I speak not in this last Discourse of Contradictories which have no Middle between them and therefore cannot have the same Matter or Subject or make it Changeable from one to the other as because Body is Divisible it does not follow that the same Subject can be Chang'd to Indivisible What I discourse of and from whence in part I drew my Argument was from the nature of Contraries which are two Extremes under the same kind of Quality and therefore have Middling Qualities between both by passing through which as by Degrees or Steps the Body is Transmutable from one of them into the other And the reason is because neither Extreme is Infinitely such and therefore