it list not as it ought A corrupt Conscience hath many turnings and windings various coverts and hiding places for lust Sometimes the veil of hypocrisie yea of Religion is made use of to cover sin as Mat. 23.14 Sometimes a good name is put on a bad thing or a bad designe is justified by a good end or a good cause is made use of to justifie a bad action or when mens lusts wil not comply with the rule men bring down the rule to their lusts Again sometimes new lights are pleaded to maintain old errors Mens lusts make many controversies about sin they make great sins little and little none at al. Thus practic error and ignorance is the cause of al sin Of which see more fully Philos Gen. P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 5. § 4. Not only practic Error Self-love a radical cause of Sin but also Self-love has a maligne venimous influence on al sin Plato hath excellent Philosophemes on this Theme So Repub. 9. pag. 574 c. he describes to the life the servile condition of a wicked person under the Tyrannie of Self-love how he is thereby violently impelled and hurried into al sin So also in what follows pag. 577. of which hereafter Thus likewise in his Leg. 5. pag. 731. he lively demonstrates 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That Self-love is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an ingenite evil in which they who indulge themselves have no remedie against sin Then he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And to speak the truth self-love is altogether the cause of al those evils in which the life of man is involved And he gives the reason of it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For he that loves is truly blind about what he loves and thence misjudgeth things just good and honest being in this opinion that there is more honor due to him than to truth And Aristotle gives us the reason hereof Because 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a self-lover acts a for himself according to his profit Every self-lover is chained to that great Idol Self which he makes his God and the only Centre in which al the lines of his Affections and Actions meet Self is the last end of self-lovers even in their highest acts of self-denial if they give their goods to the poor or their bodies to be burned for Religion it is al to please self They may crosse their own wils but never crosse self as their last end if they seek after God it is to advance self self-love formes al their actions and passions into a subservience unto some carnal self-interest What makes superstitiose persons so much to vilifie mortifie and with so much severitie torment their bodies but thereby to exalt their inward excellences And as self-lovers make self the last End so also the first Principe of al they do Self-love ever affects self-dependence it would fain have a World of its own to live act and breathe in it lays the whole weight of religiose services on self as the bottome of its dependence it would live and die within the sphere of its own activitie as wel as interest It 's exceeding sweet to self to have a stock of its own even in things religiose to trade with and thereby merit divine favor And alas how soon are men overcome by tentations when they are self-dependent and self-strong He that thinkes to keep himself from sin by self-strength wil soon be overcome by it Now Self being the last End and first Principe of self-love it hence becomes a spermatic universal cause of al sin Every self-lover is his own Idol and whiles he inordinately embraces and adheres to himself he is soon overcome thereby and so hurried into sin Yea self-love makes the best duties and services for God most carnal vile and abominable to God Where self is predominant the intention of the Soul is spurious and rotten and a bad intention makes the best workes bad Where self rules it formes even religiose services into a conformitie to carnal lusts wherefore he that cannot depart from self wil soon depart from God and tumble headlong into al sin Self-love is the strongest carnal concupiscence and most directly opposite to divine love The soverain power of Lust increaseth according to the obedience men render to themselves and self-love by obeying self and its particular movements men make it a God yea the more men endeavor to humor and gratifie it the more tyrannie it is Man has not a worse or more dangerous Companion than himself his carnal self which is so potent to draw him into sin It has always been the ambition of the Creature to deifie it self not by being equal in nature with God but by being its first Cause and last End which is the spring of al departure from God and conversion to the Creature And that which makes self-love more potent to promote sin is its policie and many artifices to concele its self and sin How oft doth carnal self-love put on the masque of true lawful self-love and thereby delude the Soul into sin There is a great ressemblance between spiritual self-love and carnal whence the later oft conceles it self under the vizard of the former The more a man loves himself the lesse he conceits he loves himself as the more mad a man is the lesse he judgeth himself so Self-love is so artificial in its colors as that it can discolor virtue with the face of vice and vice with virtues face Thus by its fraudes and deceits in conceling it self and sin it greatly advances sin The members of self-love are principally three 1 Concupiscence or adherence to the Creature as our last end 2 Carnal confidence or dependence on self as the first cause 3 Spiritual pride or an over-valuing estime of self-excellences Each of these have a venimous influence on al sin as we have largely demonstrated out of Plato and others Philos General P. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 4. § 8 9 10. § 5. Next to the Causes of moral Evil we may consider its Species or Kinds Al moral Evil or Sin may be distributed into involuntary Sins are either of Ignorance of Passion or wilful or voluntary again involuntary into sins of Ignorance or of Passion We find the foundation of this distribution in Plato Phileb pag. 22. where he saith That those who choose sin do it either involuntarily and ignorantly or out of a voluntary miserable necessitie 1. As for involuntary Sins they are 1 Sins of Ignorance when the ignorance is not affected either from prejudice voluntary neglect or custome in sin as before § 3. 2 Sins of Passion or Infirmitie when the passion is antecedent to the wil and doth as it were extort the consent of the wil being vehement and violent For if the passion be consequent to the act of the wil or but a languid remisse motion such as doth not force the wil the sin is not so much of passion as voluntary whence passions
the concurse of God be only General and Indifferent it then hangs in suspense and has not efficace enough to reach its effect unlesse it be so or so disposed Whence also it follows that it is in the power of the second cause to resist or frustrate the concurse of God so that it shal not reach its effect Hence lastly it follows that the concurse of God is not efficacious and omnipotent which we shal anon prove 3 That the concurse of God as to its manner of working is not general but particular is asserted and demonstrated by some of the most acute of the Scholastic Theologues So Bradwardine l. 1. c. 4. and l. 3. c. 7. Joan. major in Sentent 2. Dist 28. q. 1. p. 122. Alvarez de Auxil Disput 23. with several others But here it is objected 1. by Burgersdicius and others Objections against Gods particular concurse 1 If God concur by a particular concurse to the specification of the action then he may be said to walke discourse eat c. To this Objection we respond 1 by denying that God concurs to the specification of the action albeit he concurs by a particular concurse for an action is specified from its particular cause not from the first universal cause So that here is that which they cal a fallacie of many interrogations whereof one is true the other false Or we may cal it a begging of the Question in that they suppose That if God concur by a particular concurse he concurs also to the specification of the action which is an inconsequent consequence 2 Those Animal acts of walking eating c. ascribed to the second cause cannot be ascribed to God the first cause albeit they more principally belong to him because they procede not from pure efficience but from information to use the Aristotelean phrase or a bodie so organised Those actions signifie a relation to the particular subject whence they slow and therefore cannot be properly attributed to God as Bradward l. 1. c. 4. p. 178. and Suarez Metaphys Disput 21. S. 3. acutely replie shewing that ambulation eating c. do not denote pure efficience but a subject informed by such motions which are therefore proper to the said subject 2 But the main objection of Burgersdicius and others against Gods particular concurse is taken from sinful actions unto which say they God cannot be said to concur by a particular concurse unlesse we make him the author of sin This objection makes a great noise but has little of weight in it For 1 The deordination of any sinful act can only be ascribed to the second cause who is the Author of it not unto the first cause who only produceth the physical entitative Act. 2 That which is most sinful in regard of the second cause is so ordered by God as that it shal conduce to the greatest good as before and hereafter in the providence of God 6. Gods Concurse Efficacious Gods concurse is most Potent and Efficacious This Adjunct and Mode of operation is most expresse in Sacred Philosophie specially as to gratiose Influences which are most potent Sin is a mighty strong poison ay but medicinal Grace is a much stronger Antidote The powers of darkenesse and Hel are very strong but Christ the Captain of our Salvation hath Samson-like carried away the Gates of Hel upon his shoulders and led captivitie captive His Grace is most potent irresistible and victorions Thus Jansenius Augustin Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 24. p. 43. having in what precedes sufficiently refuted the Conditional Grace of the Molimstes he addes This therefore is the true reason why no medicinal Grace of Christ ever wants its effect but al workes both to wil and to do because with Augustin Grace and the good worke are so reciprocated that as from Grace conferred the effect of the worke may be inferred so on the other hand from the defect of the worke it may be inferred that Grace was not given By which manner of reasoning it appears that Grace as the cause and the operation of the Wil as the effect are as the Philosophers speak convertible and mutually inseparable each from other For so Augustin speakes of the Conflict against Tentations Agis si ageris bene agis si à â—bono ageris so efficacious is medicinal Grace Yea Jansenins a voucheth that there is no manner of speech among the Scholastic Theologues so efficacious to expresse that the determination or predetermination of the Wil is from the Grace of God but Augustin assumes the same to demonstrate that the Grace of Christ is not such that the effect should be suspended or dependent on any condition to be performed by the human Wil but that the effect is most potently produced by it not if the Wil willeth but by working and determining the Wil to wil. So Habak 3.4 Habak 3.4 And his brightnesse was as the light he had bornes coming out of his hand and there was the hiding of his power And his brightnesse was as the light The brightnesse of Christ was exceding gloriose even like the brightnesse of the Sun in its meridian glorie Thence it follows he had hornes coming out of his hands 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 properly signifies to send forth beams as hornes to irradiate and shine forth Beams and hornes have some analogie and ressemblance and therefore the same word among the Hebrews signifies both Hence the vulgar Version renders 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Exod. 34.29 hornes whereas it signifies there beams as here Whence it follows out of his hands Hands here denote Christ's power as Act. 11.21 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 hand signifies power the hand being the instrument of the bodie whereby it puts forth its power Thence he addes There was the hiding of his power i. e. his secret power lay wrapt up in his efficacious rays or concurse which is exceding influential and potent like hornes We find something analogous hereto in Plato Repub 6. pag. 509. where treating of God as the first Cause of al good he compares him to the Sun and his concurse to the rays thereof in this manner Thou wilt say I presume that the Sun doth not only cause that things are seen but also that they are generated do grow are nourished although it be not the generation of those things Thus therefore determine that the chiefest good namely God doth give to those things that are known not only that they are known 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but also force and efficace for their existence c. Wherein he compares the efficacious Concurse of God to the spermatic potent influxe of the Sun which gives life sense motion nutrition angmentation and vigor to al manner of Insects Whence those blind Gentiles made the Sun under the fictitious names of Apollo and his Son Esculapius the supreme God of Medicine because the Virtues of Plants depend on the Sun See Court Gent. P. 1. B. 2. C. 8. §. 11. its heat
a moral Causalitie as an Author is evident from the very reason that he gives thereof namely because God is most good which only excludes Gods moral Efficience from sin as sin not his natural Efficience from the substrate mater or entitative act of sin which is in itself good and therefore from God the Cause of al good So that Plato's argument is so far from denying Gods natural Efficience to the entitative act of sin as that it confirmes the same The holy God in al his providential Efficience and Gubernation about sin whether it be permissive or ordinative is gloriosely vindicated from being the Author or moral cause of sin because he doth nothing deficiently as failing from that eternal immutable Law of Righteousnesse This is incomparably wel explicated by Simplicius in Epictetus cap. 1. pag. 24. Our Souls whiles good desire good but when they are sinful sinful objects 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And both i.e. good and bad act from their own election not as being compelled by any violent necessitie Wherefore God may not be said to be the Author of sin for he made the Soul which is naturally capable of evil as being good according to the riches of his Bonitie In which he clears God from being the Author or moral cause of sin because al his providential Efficience about sin is only as he is good An Author ' properly as the Civil Law teacheth us is he that gives command Is à quo consilium accepimus Auctor noster translatè dicatur Unde Tutor propriè Auctor pulillo dicitur cui consilium impartit Justin Institut counsel or encouragement to an Act. So a Tutor is said to be the Author of what his Pupil doth by giving him counsel So again he is said to be an Author who doth approve what another doth In Philosophie he is said to be an Author who by suasive or dissuasive reasons doth exhort the principal Agent to or dehort him from any action The same they cal a Moral Cause as opposed to effective Now in no one of these respects can God be said to be the Author or moral Cause of sin for he neither commands nor counsels nor encourageth nor approves sin nor yet dissuades from virtue Neither doth God violently necessitate or compel men to sin but concurs only to the material entitative act of sin as the prime universal Efficient not as a particular deficient moral Cause 3. God the prime Cause of the entitative Act of Sin Prop. Albeit God be not the moral deficient Cause or Author of sin yet he is the efficient and prime cause of the material entitative act of sin This is evident both from Sacred and Platonic Philosophic Thus Amos 3.6 Shal there be evil in the citie and the Lord hath not done it I acknowlege this primarily to be understood of the evil of punishment yet we are to remember that evils of punishment in regard of second causes are evils of doing Gods punishing Israel albeit it were good as from God yet it was usually sinful as to the instruments made use of therein and yet in this very regard God was the prime Efficient of the material entitative act albeit he were not a moral deficient cause of the obliquitie Thus Plato Repub. 10. pag. 896. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Must it not then necessarily be conceded that the Soul of the Universe is the cause of althings good both honest and evil and base of althings just and unjust and of al contraries in as much as we assert him to be the cause of althings Wherein observe 1 That he philosophiseth here of God as the universal Soul or Spirit of the Universe influencing and governing althings 2 He saith this universal Spirit or Soul is the prime Efficient of althings good Yea 3 not only of things honest or morally good but also of things evil base and unjust i. e. as to their entitative material act because in this regard they are good 4 He grounds this Hypothesis on the universal Causalitie of God as the prime Cause of althings Thus also Plato in his Timaeus pag. 28. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It 's necessary that whatever is produced be produced by some cause If so then al natural products must be produced by God the first Cause of althings and is not the entitative act of sin a natural product That the substrate mater or material entitative act of sin fals under the providential Efficience of God as the first universal Cause of althings has been universally avouched and maintained in al Ages of Christians both by Fathers and Schole-men Papists and Protestants excepting only Durandus and two or three more of his Sectators Thus Augustin de duab Anim. contra Manich. c. 6. about the end where he proves against the Manichees who held two first Principes one of good and another of evil That whatever really is as it is must procede from one God Thus also Bradward de Caus Dei pag. 739. where he strongly proves That God necessarily concurs to the substance of the act of sin albeit not to its deformitie The like pag. 289 290. Gregor Ariminensis Sent. 2. Distinct 34. Art 3. pag. 110 c. gives us potent and invict demonstrations That God is the immediate cause of the entitative material act of sin Not to mention Alvarze de Auxil l. 3. Disp 34. and other late Dominicans who as I conceive are unjustly loaded with prejudices by a Divine of name in this particular Indeed the very Jesuites and those of their Faction concur with us in this Hypothesis Thus Suarez Metaph. Disput 22. Sect. 1. pag. 551 c. where he strongly demonstrates That every action both natural and free good and evil as actions are produced immediately by God as the first cause This Hypothesis he maintains stoutly against Durandus and his sectators and as I judge with arguments never to be answered Thus also Ruiz de Voluntate Dei Disput 26 27. Yea Penottus de Libertat l. 8. c. 11. assures us that al Divines accord That God is the cause of the natural Entitie of Sin Among Reformed Divines this Hypothesis is generally maintained I shal mention only Davenant who was not rigid in this way in his Answer to Gods love to Mankind pag. 143 147 174 c. also de Reprobat pag. 113. where he greatly explicates and demonstrates our Hypothesis But to explicate and demonstrate our Proposition by force of reason take notice that we say not that God is the cause of sin Gods Concurse to the entitative Act of Sin demonstrated but that he is the cause of the material entitative act of sin For the clearing of which we are to consider That many things which are true under an Hypothesis and in a limited sense are not so absolutely Thus here we may not say simply and absolutely that God is the cause of sin yet we may not denie but that he is the cause of the substrate mater
makes an incomparable parallel between natural Vision and Divine Illumination In natural Vision saith he there must be a visive Facultie an Object visible and Light to discerne the Object This Light is derived from the Sun which is the principal and next cause of Vision For addes he as oft as the eyes are converted to such things as are illustrated by the Sun vision in the eyes is very apparent Then he draws up his parallel pag. 509. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Thus also thinke of the mind For when that in which Truth itself and Being itself shines forth inheres in it it doth consider and understand the same and then it seems to have an illuminated Mind and Divine Intellect Wherein observe 1 That God who is Being itself as also Truth itself or the first Truth 2 That before there can be any true light in the mind this first Truth must shine forth and irradiate the same 3 That when God illuminates the mind there is not only a transient but a fixed light firmely impressed on it This Divine Light doth become one with the mind and so formes conformes reformes yea transformes it into the things known 4 That the Intellect thus illuminated becomes truely Divine Thence he subjoins 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That therefore that gives truth to those things that are known as also a facultie to know them cal thou the IDEA OF GOOD namely the cause of Science and Truth which is understood by the Intellect Note here that 1 he cals God considered as the Fountain of al Illumination the Idea of Good i. e. the supreme Idea of al Perfection and Truth in whose light alone we can see light 2 He saith that this Idea of good gives truth to those things that are known i. e. al objective wisdome impressed on things as also al objective Revelation whereby things mysterious are reveled 3 Also a facultie to know things intelligible i. e. subjective Illumination and Light both habitual and actual 4 Hence this Idea of good is the cause of al Science and Truth which is understood The sectators of Plato thus explicate his mind about Divine Illumination 1 They make God to be the true essentia Wisdome Thus Plotinus En. 5. l. 8. c. 5. pag. 546. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The true Wisdome is Essence and again the true Essence is Wisdome i. e. God who is Essence itself is Wisdome itself 2 This essential Wisdome or Light doth illuminate al but is illuminated by none as the Sun gives light to althings but receives not light from any thing 3 The create finite Intellect being irradiated by this essential light of life is invested with true formes and Ideas of things and is thereby conducted into the knowlege of things mysterious and Divine This Divine Illumination is every where inculcated in sacred Philosophie and generally acknowleged by the Greek Theologues Chrysostome stiles it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The illuminant Intellect the superne Grace the gift of the Grace of God not of human Nature Greg. Neocaesar Orat. Panegyr 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The greatest gift of God and the illustrious afflate from Heaven And the reasons which enforce the necessitie of such a Divine Illumination for the apprehending of supernatural Truths are taken from the sublimitie of the Object and the imperfection of the human Intellect we find both conjoined 1 Cor. 2.14 The animal man is not capable of the things of the Spirit 1 Cor. 2.14 c. By the animal man we are to understand every man void of supernatural light by which alone things spiritual are discerned for al knowlege supposeth some proportion between the Object and the apprehensive Facultie now what proportion is there between the natural Intellect and supernatural Truths Can an animal facultie take in spiritual objects Is it possible then that the natural mind may by its own force without Divine Illumination reach supernatural Mysteries Thence saith Augustin de Trinit l. 14. c. 7. Tho human intellect cannot apprehend sublimer intelligibles unlesse it be fortified and perfected by a stronger light And Greg. Nyssenus 2. in Eunom assures us That it appertains to the Father Son and holy Spirit 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to illuminate minds with the light of Divine knowlege Whence this Divine illumination is stiled by the Greek Theologues 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 illumination 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 irradiation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 illustrant Grace 2. Having explicated Divine Illumination The Infusion of Virtues we now procede to treat of the infusion of al other supernatural Habits or Virtues whereby the Rational Creature is governed and conducted to his last end That al true moral and supernatural good is no way attainable but by Divine infusion is every where inculcated in sacred Philosophie Thus also in the Theologie of the Grecians it was frequently inculcated 1 That no one could 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 avoid the snares of sin but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he who was assisted and fortified by God as Basil Eth. c. 3. So Greg. Nyssen Orat. 3. in Orat. Domin Tom. 1. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 He that wil avoid domineering sin must cal God for his succur alwaies having him in his eye who exerciseth him by tentations 2 That al true moral or supernatural good comes from God by Divine infusion This gratiose infusion of Virtue by God was by various and emphatic notions illustrated by the Greek Fathers who terme medicinal efficacious Grace the Spring of this supernatural Infusion 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the salutarie Grace also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 manuducent and assistent Grace Again 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Divine infusion or inspiration For say they 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that we can do any thing morally good is from the impulse of God Yea they make not only the first infusion but also the prosecution and conservation of al moral good to be from God Whence Divine Grace is termed by them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 persequent or actuating and conservant Grace Hence 3 the Act whereby the Soul is turned from Vice to Virtue is termed by the Greek Theologues 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Restauration 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Revocation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Discession 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 putting off the old man 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Progresse from a bad state to a good 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Transmutation of Soul Of which see more in what precedes of efficacious Concurse c. 7. It was a great Question among the ancient Philosophers Whether Virtue came by institution or by Divine afflation and infusion The Cynics and Stoics held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That Virtue was teachable as Laertius But Socrates and Plato his sectator held the contrary So Plato Protag pag. 361. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Virtue is not a thing that may be taught or gained by institution This he more copiosely demonstrates in his Meno pag. 89. where he proves 1 That men are not good or virtuose
5. They know not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This notes their ignorance of Right or Law Neither wil they understand 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 this notes their oscitance and negligence in examining Causes and maters of Fact They walke in darkenesse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This some understand of being blinded by private Affections and Bribes so that they cannot see what is just and equal according to Exod. 23.8 And thou shalt take no gift for the gift blindeth the wise and perverteth the words of the just Now by reason of these things he saith Al the foundations of the earth i. e. the Judaic State are out of course Which shews that injustice destroyes the very foundations of a Nation Thus Job 15.34 And fire shal consume the tabernacles of Briberie How much Justice is necessary to preserve States and commanded by God appears Deut. 16.18 And they shal judge the people with judgement of justice Deut. 16.18 i. e. with an equalitie towards al parties and in al maters So v. 20. Justice justice shalt thou follow i. e. al manner of justice v. 20. nothing but justice exactly diligently continually 2 The Office of a Magistrate must be administred with Temperance Temperance Thus Plato Repub. 3. pag. 403. We have said that the Keepers of the Laws or Magistrates be commanded that they altogether abhor Drunkennesse for it is lawful for any man to be drunke rather than for a Keeper And he gives this reason of it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For it is ridiculous that a Keeper should want a Keeper Meaning that a Drunkard wants a Keeper himself and therefore is not fit to be the Keeper of others Thus Solomons Mother Prov. 31.4 Prov. 31.4 It is not for Kings to drinke wine Hebr. it is not convenient for Kings to drinke wine i. e. a large quantitie of it which the Grecians terme 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a drinker of wine or one given to wine Whence Plato addes pag. 404. That the diet of the Magistrate ought to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 simple not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with varietie of dainties which is most destructive to sanitie 3 Magistrates must administer their Office with moderation as to passions 3. Moderation and freedome from discords Thus Plato Repub. 2. pag. 378. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Magistrates of the Citie ought to be possessed with this sentiment that it is the basest thing for them to contend by mutual discords How much irregular passions are unbecoming a Civil Magistrate is wel expressed by Aristotle Rhet. lib. 1. cap. 1. art 4. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It is not lawful to pervert a Judge by provoking him to anger or to envie or to compassion for this is al one as if one about to use a rule should pervert the same 4 Clemence also ought to be illustrious in magistratic Administrations 4. Clemence Thence Plato Politicus pag. 274. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We said that a King and Civil Magistrate is a Pastor of Mankind and in this regard a God for mortal man Wherein he makes a Magistrate to be Gods Vicegerent and a Pastor of mankind which denotes his clemence Thence that of Seneca to Nero The clemence of a Magistrate workes a shame of sin in the Subjects that is the greatest punishment which comes from the mildest Magistrate c. 5 Magistrates ought to exercice their Office with Self-denial 5. Fidelitie c. Diligence Courage and Fidelitie Thus Plato Repub. 2. pag. 374. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ex quo se Caesar orbi terrarum dedicavit sibi cripuit Seneca By how much the greater the Office of Magistrates is doth it not require by so much the greater vacation and thence the greatest art and diligence How much sloth and negligence is unworthy of a Civil Magistrate we are assured by Homer Iliad 2. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It becomes not a Magistrate to sleep swectly the whole night to whom the people and so great cares are committed Again Plato Leg. 6. requires that a Judge be indued not only with judgement and prudence for the understanding of maters but also with fidelitie in and for the determination of them § 8. Having explicated the essential Constitution and Administration of Politie we now procede to the Vtilitie thereof The effects of Politie both good and bad as also to what is Conservative and Destructive thereto As for the Vtilitie of a good Politie we have it wel laid down by Plato in his Menexenus pag. 238. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Politie is the Nurse of men good truely of good men but bad of bad men And we are now to explicate that our Ancestors were educated in an excellent forme of Politie by the benefit whereof both those that now live have become good as also they which made a good end of their days He being about to describe the Politie of the Athenian Republic begins with a Preface touching the efficacious influence of good Politie to make men good as also of bad to render men bad Touching those things that are Preservative or Destructive of politic Bodies Plato has given us many Philosophemes Things destructive to Republics As for the Preservatives of a politic Bodie they are sufficiently evident in what precedes touching politic Constitution and Administration and they wil farther appear by shewing what things are destructive thereto 1. 1. Atheisme and carnal Politie As Religion is the main Foundation and Pillar of politic Societie so Atheisme and carnal Politie in subjecting Religion to private interest is that which brings ruine to the same What influence Atheisme has on the ruine of Republics Plato frequently inculcates particularly in his Leg. lib. 10. and elsewhere as hereafter when we come to discourse professedly of Atheisme B. 2. C. 1. S. 2. As more open Atheisme so carnal Politie in prostituting and subjecting Religion to private interest either of State or single persons is a great cause of ruine unto States This was that which brought ruine to the ten Tribes who after their revolt from Rehoboam and Judah being afraid lest that if the people should go up to worship God at Jerusalem they would again be thereby induced to returne to their old Allegeance they upon corrupt reasons of State erected Calves at Dan and Bethel hoping thereby to keep the people in obedience to Jeroboam who had usurped the Governement Now this their politic contrivement in making Religion to subserve their State-interest whereby they hoped to preserve their usurped Politie proved indeed the main cause of their destruction So sotish is the solie of those who endeavor by subjecting Religion to State-interest to secure themselves which is indeed the most compendiose way to State-ruine 2. 2. Luxurie and Idlenesse Another great cause of Ruine to politic Bodies is Luxurie Sensualitie and Idlenesse Plato assures us That Polities are composed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 out of the manners of
would he expresse against the bold daring Atheists of this Age O! what an ignoble base degenerate uncomfortable thing is Atheisme how repugnant both morally and physically is it to human Nature Ought not the Atheist sooner to dout of his own being than God's For if he be God who made him must needs be Thence Padre Paul that great Venetian Politician composed a Treatise That Atheisme is repugnant to human Nature and is not to be found therein but that they who acknowlege not the true Deitie must necessarily feigne to themselves some false ones as it is mentioned in his Life pag. 71. In sum Atheisme is a proposition so disnatural monstrose and difficult to be establisnt in the mind of man that notwithstanding the insolence vanitie and pride of Atheists who endeavor by violence to rase out al notices of a Deitie in their Conscience yet stil they give us some evidences of their fears that there is a Deitie by listing up their eyes and hands towards Heaven or such like Indicia in sudden and great calamities § 2. 1. Vniversal consent for the Existence of God Plato's zelose Philosophemes against Atheisme having been discussed we descend to his Demonstration of the Existence of God First That there is a God he demonstrates from the universal consent of al Times and Nations Thus Leg. 10. pag. 887. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. But now giving credit to those Traditions which together with their milke they sucked in and which they heard from their Motkers and Nurses who made it their businesse to implant these sentiments on their minds c. Wherein he shews how those that denie the Existence of God contradict the universally received Tradition which they sucked in with their mothers milke and that which is indeed engraven on their very Beings as hereafter Yea he makes this Hypothesis That there is a God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a self-evidencing first Principe which needs no argument for the confirmation thereof because Nature it self instructes us therein it being that which the most prostigate men cannot rase out of their Souls Thence Damascene Orthod Fid. l. 1. c. 3. saith That it never came into Controversie among the most of Grecians that there was a God And he gives this reason for it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The knowlege or notion of Gods Existence is naturally insite and ingenite to us or engraven on our Natures We may draw forth the force of this Platonic Argument in Plato's own dialect thus Have not al mankind in al times and places given their assent and consent to the existence of a Deitie Doth not al the Polytheisme of the Pagan World give evident testimonie for the existence of a Deitie What made the Egyptians Grecians and Romans so fond of their base multiplied Deities but a notion engraven on their Beings fomented by universal Tradition that there was some supreme Being they owed Hommage unto It 's true their Hommage and Worship was misplaced as to its proper object but doth not the act sufficiently argue that they owned a Deitie albeit not the true God Hath not the whole World subscribed to the notion of a Deitie Was there ever any Nation so barbarous as not to pay Hommage to some supreme Being Can we give instance of any part of the habitable World where professed Atheisme gained place or habitation Has there not been an universal Tradition among the more intelligent of men that God made the World and governes the same Yea doth not this notion of a Deitie run not only through al Times Ages and Nations but even through the Principes of human Nature yea in the venes and bloud of men Wel then might Plato say That men sucked it in with their mothers milke So much for inartificial Argument 2. 2. From the subordination of Causes to a first Cause Plato demonstrates the Existence of a Deitie rationally from the Subordination of second causes and effects to a first Cause Thus in his Timaeus pag. 28. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Whatever is produced it is necessary that it be produced by some Cause for it cannot be that any thing should be produced or made without a Cause Then in what follows 〈◊〉 proves the World was made 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The World was made because it is seen and touched and has a bodie But it is clear that such things are produced c. Whence he concludes that God was the Parent and first Cause of the Universe Plato bottomes his demonstration on these two Hypotheses 1 That the World was made 2 That it was made by some precedent Cause 1 That the World was made and not eternal was an Hypothesis generally maintained by al the Philosophers before Aristotle who asserted That the first Mater was eternal and that on a mistaken Principe That nothing could be produced out of nothing But Plato strongly proves the World could not be eternal because it is sensible and corporeous and therefore the effect of some precedent Cause And his argument may in his own interrogatorie mode be thus improved If the World be eternal must it not also be immutable and invariable Can there be any generation and corruption in that which is eternal For where there are generations and corruptions there must be causes and effects which implie prioritie and posterioritie for the cause naturally precedes the effect but can there be any prioritie and posterioritie in what is eternal If the World was from al eternitie must not the things that are generated and corrupted eternally have been and eternally not have been Must not the present way of Generation and Corruption correspond with the World's Eternitie Doth not our reason yea commun sense assure us that the Worlds present course of generation and corruption is inconsistent with its Eternitie Is it not most absurd and irrational to conceive that one man should beget another successively from al Eternitie Doth not the very conception of succession in Eternitie implie a flat contradiction Moreover doth not generation and corruption suppose an inequal succession of ascent and descent and is not this incompatible with an eternal Being Again if there were an infinite succession of generations and corruptions how is it possible there should be any effect or issue for can there be an end where there is no beginning Against the Eternitie of the World see more largely Derodone L'Atheisme convaincu pag. 5. where he proves from al the principal parts of the World the Sun Moon c. that it could not be eternal and thence makes good his Hypothesis that it was created by God See also Sr. Charles Wolseley's Vnreasonablenesse of Atheisme Edit 3. pag. 47-64 177. 2 Plato's next Hypothesis to prove God to be the first Cause The World made by some prime Cause is That the World was made by some precedent Cause For saith he whatever is produced is produced by some Cause We see nothing but what is produced by somewhat
else and therefore must rationally conclude there must be some first Producer Our reason compels us to look out for some first Cause that gave being to althings we see Doth a man beget a man and was not this man begotten by some other man and so upward til we come to some first man And how came that first man to be produced but by some first Cause In al subordinate Efficients is not the first the cause of the middle and the middle whether many or one the cause of the last If then there be not a first can there be a middle and last So that may not men as wel denie al Effects yea themselves to be as denie a first Cause to be Surely if God had not a Being nothing else could be in things subordinate one to the other take away the first you take away al the rest Therefore it must necessarily be that the World was made by some precedent first Cause This Hypothesis Plato layes down against the Antithesis of Leucippus and Democritus which Epicurus afterward espoused namely That there was an infinite vacuitie or emty space in which were innumerous Atomes or corporeous Particles of al formes and shapes which by their weight were in continual agitation or motion by the various casual occursions of which this whole Vniverse and al the parts thereof were framed into that order and forme they now are in Against this Antithesis Plato seems to have framed his Hypothesis laid down in his Timaeus pag. 28. where he asserts That the Vniverse received its origine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as it is in the Autographe not from any casual occursion of Atomes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but from a prudent potent first Cause who framed this Universe according to the most accurate Exemplar of his own divine Ideas So in his Sophista pag. 265 he saith Natural things were produced not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from a casual cause without intelligence but that they were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 fruits or workes of God the supreme Opificer of althings We may forme his Argument according to his own dialectic mode thus Is it possible that this beautiful wel-ordered Universe should emerge out of a casual concurse of Atomes in the infinite Vacuitie What! were these corporeous Particles eternally there or only introduced in time If eternally then is not necessary that they be invariable and immutable for doth not al variation and alteration belong to time the measure thereof Can any thing that is in a strict sense eternal varie are not eternal and variable termes contradictorie as before Or wil they say that these Atomes were introduced or produced in this vacuous space in time must they not then have some cause of their production And wil it not hence follow that there is a first Cause or Deitie as anon Again what a world of absurdities yea contradictions is this Epicurean Hypothesis clogged with Is it possible to imagine that such minute corporeous Particles should in this imaginarie vacuitie be invested with an eternal gravitie whereby an eternal casual motion is caused here and there without any tendence to a Centure Can it also be imagined that these poor Corpuscules should continue in perpetual motion til by chance they hit one against the other and so were conglomerated into this order we find them in the Universe Is it not a fond sick-brain conceit that phlegmatic dul mater and stupid motion should by chance produce such an harmonious Universe Alas what a systeme of contradictions would follow hereon See Sr. Charles Wolseley against Atheisme pag. 87. But to descend to the affirmative of Plato's Hypothesis That the World was made by some precedent first Cause This he also inculcates in his Theaetctus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 We must take it for granted that nothing can make it self Whence it is necessary that at last we come to some first Cause 1 That in the subordination of Causes there cannot be a progresse into infinite we are told by Aristotle or who ever were the Composer of that Book Metaph. l. 1. c. 2. and the reason is most evident because what is infinite is incomprehensible and impertransible as also adverse to al order for in infinites there is no first or last Again if in the subordination of Causes there should be an infinite Series then it would follow hence that there never was any Cause which was not subsequent to infinite Causes precedent whence also it would follow that there were infinite Causes before any Cause 2 That nothing ever did or can make it self is most evident from multitudes of contradictions that follow this Hypothesis for then a thing should be said to act physically before it had a being to be superior and inferior dependent and independent to exist and not to exist in the same instant and in one and the same respect 3 That this Universe was made by some Cause precedent to it self is evident because it hath a possibilitie not to be whence it follows that once it was not for whatever has a possibilitie not to be has a passive power at least metaphysic if not physic and where any passive power is there is something of the original nothing out of which althings were made by him who is pure Act and perfect Being Thus Damascene Orthodox Fide l. 1. c. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Al Beings are either create or increate truely if create they are altogether mutable For it 's necessary that those things which began by mutation should be always obnoxious to mutation either by being corruptible or alterable according to pleasure But if al Beings be increate then are they al immutable Thence he addes Who therefore wil not conclude that al Beings sensible yea that the very Angels may be many ways changed and altered Whence he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Therefore seing the Opificer of things is increate he must be also altogether immutable And what can this be other than God 4 That God made althings is strongly demonstrated by Aquinas contra Gent. l. 2. c. 15. of which hereafter See also Mendoza Hurtado Phys Disp 10. Sect. 1. § 3. 3. The Existence of God from a first Motor Another Argument whereby Plato proves the existence of a Deitie is taken from the dependence of al motions on a prime Motor or first Mover Thus Leg. 10. pag. 893. being about to demonstrate the existence of a Deitie against the Atheists of his Age he makes this Preface Let us make this Preface to our Discourse sithat it is our purpose to prove there is a God we ought with greater studie and diligence to cal upon him for his aide now than at other times Wherefore being as it were confirmed by these bonds let us begin our Discourse Therefore if any shal demand of me 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whether or no therefore do althings stand stil and is nothing moved or on the contrary are althings or somethings moved
c. But that God is without cause without end sempiterne and e4ternal increate immutable inalterable simple incomposite incorporeous invisible intangible incircumscripte infinite incomprehensible good just ommipotent the Opificer of al Creatures comprehensive of althings provident of althings the supreme Soverain and Judge we both acknowledge and confesse Also that God is one namely in Vnitie of Essence which is known in three Persons Father Son and holy SPirit c. § 3. The first Attribute that occurs for explication of the divine Being is Vnitie The Divine Vnitie whereof we find great and lively notices both in sacred and Platonic Philosophie Thus Moses Deut. 6.4 Deut. 6.4 Hear O Israel the Lord our God is one Lord. Mose here first cals for their solemne attention and then laies down his assertion touching the Unitie of the divine Essence which he seems to bottome on the very name 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 subjoined as a part of the predicate denoting that he who is the first independent Essence and Essentiator of althings can be but one Thus frequently in the N. T. Mar. 12.32 Rom. 3.29 30. 1 Tim. 2.5 c. And we find much in Platonic Philosophie of the same import Thus Plato in his Parmenides where he lays down his prime metaphysic Philosophemes pag. 142. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. If there be One can it possibly be but that it should part ake of Essence Where he seems to make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ens unum convertible namely that Ens is one and one Ens. So he concludes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For ONE always embraceth ENS and ENS ONE with mutual embraces His plain naked mind is that the first Being and One admit of reciprocation i. e. God the first Being is the prime Unitie Aristotle also and his sectators make Ens and Vnum convertible but in a far different manner from Plato who understood both of God Thus also Pythagoras held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That Vnitie is the first principe of althings It 's true Plato as others makes mention of many Gods yet he tels us That it was from the Autoritie of their Ancestors and by reason of the severitie of Laws 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 without Demonstration or Oriental Tradition yea he confesseth that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Polytheisme was repugnant to right reason And this he learned from his Master Socrates who was so zelose and warme in this particular that he was content to suffer a Pagan Martyrdome for the avouching the Vnitie of God against the Laws and Customes of the Athenians Plutarch on the INscription 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 E 1 Thou art engraven on the dores of the Delphic Temple assures us that the ancient name given unto God was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 E 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 EN THOV ART ONE For there cannot be many Gods but one 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 One ought to be Being as Being one For 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Diversitie or Alteritie is placed with the difference of Being but One is sincere and without mixture for by the mixture of another with another a thing is made compound and impure Wherein he strongly proves that God can be but one because a pure necessary absolute Being or Act without mixture and composition Plutarch also in the Life of Numa Pompilius assures us That some learned Romans and that not without cause do attribute the order of the beginning and end of mans life to one self-God and Power divine So Laertius in the Life of Zeno informes us That the Stoics held 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that there was one God called by diverse names according to his Proprieties or Attributes and Operations Thus Seneca There are so many Names of God as there are Offices Hence they stiled their Jupiter 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. not that they intended to assert many Deities but one and the same Deitie with regard to his various opertions So Aristotle in his Book de Mundo confesseth There was but one God called by diverse names from his effects Thus also Augustin de Civit. l. 7. c. 11. Al these names they imposed on the one God by reason of his diverse powers and causalities not that from the diversitie of effects they asserted diverse Gods And that almost al the learned Philosopher asserted one God is maintained by Suarez Metaph. Disp 30. sect 10. pag. 97. As for rational Arguments the Vnitie of God may be thus demonstrated 1 That there is a God who is a necessary independent Being has been already proved hence it is evident that he can be but one For a Being absolutely necessary and from it self has a necessitie of Being so far as it is singular therefore it is not multiplicable or more than one For if a singular is not multiplicable then whatever agrees to any thing as singular admits not of multiplicabilitie That a Being absolutely necessary and independent has its necessitie of Being as singular is evident because singularitie is essential and necessary to a Being absolutely necessary as such for a Being absolutely necessary is such so far as in act and it is in act as singular whence singularitie intrinsecally and essentially belongs thereto as Suarez Metaph. Disp 30. sect 10. Thus the Author of the Book de Fundament l. 2. c. 6. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. There is therefore in the World a Being necessarily existing of it self which hath no cause nor equal seing it is the Cause of althings from which their substance and existence is but his existence dependes not on any thing without himself This is the blessed God who is therefore one because an Ens necessarily existing 2 Again if there be two or more Gods then they are al infinite independent and self-Beings or some produced and finite The first implies a coutradiction because there cannot be many infinites the later also because such Beings should be produced by real efficience and yet eternal also essentially diverse from the first Being that produced them and yet equal because God 3 That which is most singularly perfect self-sufficient and infinite can be but one For if there were two things or more singularly perfect and infinite then they would differ really or be the same If the same then they are not two if they really differ then one has somewhat which the other has not if so then neither is most singularly perfect and infinite For infinite comprehendes al perfection Thus Damascene Orthodox Fid. l. 1. c. 5. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. The Divinitie is perfect and indeficient every way If then we assert many Gods they must be different but if there be a difference among them where is their perfection For if one be different either in Bonitie Wisdome Virtue c. he so far comes short of perfection See more of Gods Unitie Aquinas contra Gent. l. 1. c. 42. § 4. Next to the Unitie of God
instructes us The least notice of God of great moment That the least notices of God and his Divine Perfections ought to be of great moment and estime with us So in his Critieas pag. 107. by an allusion taken from Painters he illustrates this Hypothesis thus When Painters draw the Pictures of the Gods c. we thinke it sufficient if they give us but any darke representation of them neither do we being unskilful animadvert with a censorious eye on their worke but rest abundantly satisfied in what representation they give us But when they come to draw our own picture or the picture of any that belong to us we more severely animadvert and censure them if they erre in the least point The same is to be observed in the explication of these things 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. When we discourse of things celestial and divine we thinke our selves abundantly satisfied if there be the least evidence brought for the explication of their nature but on the contrary in our examens of things mortal and human we are wont to use greater diligence Wherefore if those things which we are now about to discourse of be not so exactly as their dignitie requires represented by us you 'l pardon us An excellent preface to a discourse of things divine touching God which Plato is here entering on Hence 4. Al notices of God by Divine Revelation Plato adviseth us not to expect or desire farther discoveries of God than his own revelation and illumination shal afford to us So in his Timaeus pag. 29. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It must be remembred both by me that speak and by you who are Judges of my discourses that we have but human Nature and therefore if we can but attain unto some Oriental Tradition or probable relation of these things touching God c. we may not inquire farther about them That by his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 we must understand some Oriental Judaic Tradition originally of divine revelation I thinke wil appear evident to any that considers the use of this phrase in Plato Indeed in our contemplations and discourses of God it is neither profitable nor safe to procede further than divine Revelation and Illumination shal conduct us Neither need we be ashamed to be ignorant of such Secrets of God the humble ignorance of which argues more solid knowlege than curiose and vain speculations thereof These are the best bounds for our inquiries about God not only to follow God learning but also to leave off inquiring when and where God leaves off to teach as we may not neglect what God has reveled of himself so we may not search into what God has kept secret for as the former argues too much sloth and ingratitude so the later too much pride and curiositie It was a great Saying of Augustin We may safely follow Scripture which as an indulgent mother goes softly that she may not go beyond our infirmitie A believing ignorance in things not reveled about God is much better than a rash science Al natural reason and investigation about God ought to follow not precede faith Hence 5. The Gradation of our ascent to God Plato informes us That our ascent in the contemplation of God musk be by the same degrees by which he descendes to us either in his workes or words Thus Repub. 6. pag. 509 c. he informes us That it is above al human capacitie to comprehend the Majestie of the chiefest Good as it is in its inaccessible splendor yet we may ascend thereto by certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Gra es or degrees which Grades of Ascent must be taken from Gods Grades or degrees of Descent unto us that so we may by a certain Analogie and similitude ascend up to the knowlege of God so far as it is possible for man Yet he gives us this needful caution That we must speake soberly of these so great Mysteries and take heed that we ascribe not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a spurious birth to the Parent of the Vniverse The grades or degrees whereby God descendes to us and we ascend to him are either natural or supernatural 1. Natural Grades of knowing God The natural Grades or Degrees whereby God descendes down to us and we ascend up to him are al the Effects Products and Workes of God with al their Virtues Efficaces Orders Varieties and al manner of Perfections So Plato Repub. 6. treating largely of Gods Causalitie he saith Al natural Causes and Effects are but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Workes Artifices and Children of God the great Parent of the Vniverse whereby we may ascend up to the knowlege of God This is more natively and clearly laid down in sacred Philosophie Rom. 1.19 20. as Rom. 1.19 20. where he saith the visible workes of God as so many ascents lead us up to the contemplation of the invisible perfections of God specially his eternal power and Godhead That there is a natural knowlege of God gained by the Book of Nature is most evident albeit the Socinians to serve their Hypothesis denie it This natural knowlege of God is either insite or acquisite So Dion Prusaeensis said that our 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 persuasion of God was either innate or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 acquisite Our insite and innate knowlege of God consistes in those commun notices of God both speculative and practic which are impressed on the Conscience Our acquisite natural knowlege of God is that which is gained by actual comparation and discourse from the workes of God This acquisite knowlege may according to the distribution of that spurious Dionysius who was indeed a great Platonist cap. 2. de Myst Theolog. be acquired and promoved three ways by way of Causalitie by way of Eminence by way of Negation 1 By way of Causalitie when by the Effects of God 1. By way of Causalitie which are either little Images or at least Vestigia Footsteps of God we mount up to the knowlege and contemplation of God the original Parent or first Cause of al. For indeed the effect carries with it the signature impresse and ressemblance of its Cause as you frequently see the Parents complexion or conditions in the Child Thus Plato Repub. 6. pag. 507. having laid down this preface that it was impossible to comprehend yea to apprehend any thing of the Divine Majestie in himself he tels us That he would inquire after him in his off-spring or effects and then he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but take heed lest I should against my wil give you a spurious Idea of the Child of this great Parent He speakes in the language of Aratus cited by Paul Act. 17.28 we are al his off-spring Act. 17.28 and applies this notion to al lower goods which he makes to be the off-spring or issue of the chiefest Good and therefore by them we ascend up to the
contemplation of their Parent So Damascene Orthod Fid. l. 1. c. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But those things that are spoken of God affirmatively are predicated of him as the cause of althings And he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But he shal be more properly named from things more excellent and more akin to himself now things immaterial are more excellent Wherein he instructes us 1 That our affirmative notices of God are chiefly drawen from his effects 2 That among his effects those give us the most lively Ideas of God which are most excellent and akin to him namely things immaterial as the human Soul c. God so manifestes himself in the whole opifice of the Universe that we can no sooner open our eyes but may behold the gloriose Ideas of his Divine Wisdome Power and Goodnesse which ever way we turne our eye there shines forth some ray of the Divinitie What is the whole Universe but a visible Map or Picture of the invisible Deitie Is not the Creators Name written in golden Characters on every page of the Book of Nature It 's true some want eyes to see and read their Creators Name in the Book of Nature but it follows not hence that there is no natural knowlege of God as the Socinians would needs persuade us For that a thing be called natural it is not necessary that it be actually in al men but it sufficeth if it may be derived from a natural principe because some men are blind we may not thence conclude that sight is not natural to a man 2 Another natural grade or way of knowing God is by way of Eminence 2. By way of Eminence These Notices of God by way of Eminence are best when composed both of Affirmatives and Negatives as also of termes most simple Thus Damascene Orthodox Fid. l. 1. c. 15. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The sweetest notion of God is that complexion of both Affirmatives and Negatives as superessential Essence superdivine Divinitie supercausal Cause and the like When we see any perfection in the Creature we attribute the same to God in a more eminent degree and manner And here we are to remember that the more general notions of created perfections albeit they are more imperfect as belonging to the Creature yet they are more properly attributed to God than more special notions because the former are more abstract and simple the later more concrete and composite For by how much the higher we ascend to the generic notions of things by so much the more simple our notions are Hence it is that Knowlege is more properly ascribed to God than Sense or Reason because it is more generic and simple so Life than Vegetation Spirit than Soul hence also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Being as Jehovah which denotes the same are the most proper Names we can give God because the most generic and simple notions And the reason of the whole is this Seing the Divine Essence is more aptly and familiarly expressed by Abnegation or Remotion than by Affirmation hence it follows that by how much the more concrete and special our notions are by so much the lesse they agree to God and on the contrary by how much the more simple and general they are by so much the more they agree to God because they are by so much the more remote from the imperfections of the Creature as Twisse Scient med pag. 309. Hence 3 The best natural way or degree of knowing God is by Negation or Remotion for the Divine Essence 3. By way of Remotion by reason of its Immensitie and Infinitude exceding al the Ideas or notions our Intellect can forme of it cannot better be apprehended than by removing al imperfections from it So Aquinas Sum. 1. Quaest 10. Art 1. Things simple are best defined by Negation not as if negation were essential to them but because our Intellect which first apprehendes things composite cannot arrive to the cognition of things simple but by the remotion of al composition The same he more fully explicates contra Gent. l. 1. c. 14. In the consideration of the Divine Essence the way of Remotion is chiefly to be used for the Divine Essence by reason of its Immensitie excedes al forme that our Intellect can attain unto wherefore we cannot apprehend it by knowing what it is but we have some notices thereof by knowing what it is not For we by so much the more draw near to the knowlege of God by how much the more we can by our Intellect remove imperfections from God for we by so much the more perfectly know every thing by how much the more fully we contemplate its differences from other things for every thing has in it self its proper essence whereby it is distinguished from al other things But because in the consideration of the Divine Essence we cannot conceive what it is or its Genus nor its distinction from other things by affirmative differences it is therefore necessary that we conceive of it by negative differences Indeed the most simple spirital divine and excellent things are best set forth by negatives Hence God himself is best expressed and apprehended by way of negation We know rather what he is not than what he is 2. The supernatural grades or degrees whereby God descendes to us and we ascend to him are either Graciose or Glorious The supernatural Grades whereby we ascend up to God 1 The grades of Grace whereby we ascend up to God are either objective or subjective 1 The supernatural objective grades of Grace are either simple or complexe 1. Christ. 1 The simple objective grade of Grace whereby we ascend up to God and the contemplation of him is Christ the Mediator who is the essential Glasse wherein al the Glorie of the Deitie is most resplendent as 2 Cor. 3.18 He is the image of God 2 Cor. 4.4 2 Cor. 4.4 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an image is an expresse ressemblance or imitamen of an exemplar according to its forme or kind and so it differs from Vesâ—igium or a Footstep which gives only some darke notices of a thing by its causalitie There are some vestigia or footsteps of God impressed on the sensible world yea an accidental Image of God on the renewed Soul but Christ is an essential Image of God in whom al the invisibile perfections of God become visible to an eye of faith Thence he is said to be Col. 1.15 Col. 1.15 the image of the invisible God i. e. God who is invisible in himself becomes visible in his Son Whence also he is stiled Heb. 1.3 Heb. 1.3 the effulgence of his glorie and character of his person 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the splendor or effulgence of the Sun communicated in and by its rayes specially as they fal on a cloud and so make 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Parelius or a reflexe image of the Sun which seems to be
much the more perfect this self-motion is by so much the more perfect is the life Plants are said by some kind of Analogie to live because they have a shadow of self-motion which appears in their Vegetation yet they cannot be said properly to live because they rejoice not in any true 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 self-motion or spontaneitie Brutes are said properly to live because they have a true self-motion and spontaneitie arising from the actuation of their animal and vital spirits yet their life is much short of the rational life which consistes in a rational 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 self-motion or spontaneitie of moving towards the last end And yet the Angelic life is higher than the rational in that the Angels have no dependence at al on physic mater But the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 self-motion of the Life of God is of al most perfect in that it is absolutely independent The most noble Creatures have but imperfect self-motion Angels move themselves but not primarily and independently as to God the prime Motor yea their being moved by God the first Motor is in order of nature before their own self-motion so that they are but as man moved self-movers But God being independent in his Being is also independent in his self-motion he moves himself and althings else but is moved by nothing This is excellently illustrated by Plato Leg. 10. pag. 894. where he proves That God who is the prime Motor moving himself and althings else doth infinitely excel of which more largely before Chap. 2. § 3. Thus also Aquinas contra Gent. l. 1. c. 97. Life is in this respect attributed unto things as they are said to be moved by themselves and not by another hence those things which seem to move themselves are said by way of analogie to live as living Springs and Quicksilver But properly those things are said to move themselves which are composite of mover and moved as animates But nothing operates from it self so much as God because he is the first Cause of althings c. Hence 4. God Life it self God is Life it self For Gods Life being his Essence as actuose and independent he doth not only live but is Life in the abstract Whence Plato Phaedo pag. 106. cals God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the very species forme or idea of life as before Creatures live but they are not life it self because they have their life by participation and every Being by participation must be reduced to somewhat that is such of it self therefore the life of the Creature must be reduced to God who is life it self Thus Aquinas sum part 1. Quaest 18. Art 3. God being Essence it self and Intelligence it self therefore life doth chiefly belong unto him For the clearing whereof we are to consider that seing things are said to live so far as they operate of themselves and are not moved by others therefore by how much the more perfectly this mode of self-operating doth belong to any thing by so much the more perfect its life is Hence those things that have understanding have the most perfect mode of living because they have the most perfect mode of self-moving but albeit our Intellect doth in somethings act it self yet in somethings it is acted by others Therefore that which in its own nature is Intelligence it self and is not determined or moved by any other that obtains the highest degree of life and is indeed life it self Hence 5. God is eternal immortal life Thus Plato Phaedo Gods Life immortal pag. 106. proves that Gods life is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 immortal because he is the Idea of life So in his Phaedrus pag. 245 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That which is ever moved is immortal but that which moves another and is moved by another because it hath an end of its motion it must necessarily have an end of its life His designe is to prove that the Soul being a self-moving principe must necessarily be an ever-moving principe and so immortal And his Argument is this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Whatever is moved by it self i. e. rationally or intellectually that is ever moved and therefore immortal Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Seing it is manifest that what moves it self is immortal So Johan Grammaticus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That which is moved of it self i. e. intellectually is ever moved and what is so is immortal That Gods Life is immortal is most evident because 1 it has no beginning therefore no end 2 God being the prime Motor must necessarily be immobile without succession or mutation 3 Al death importes dissolution and where there is dissolution there must necessarily be composition and parts But God is most simple 6. God is Life effectively God the Cause of al Life Act. 17.28 as he is the first cause of al life to his Creatures Act. 17.28 In him we live and move and have our being i. e. we receive al life from him because we receive al motion from him and we receive al motion from him because we receive our being from him So Damascene Orthod Fid. l. 1. c. 19. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And it the Deitie gives to althings Being as their Nature requires and it is the Being of Beings and the Life of things living and the Reason of things rational and the Intelligence of things intellectile Thus Plato Phaedr pag. 245. Therefore that only that moves it self because it is never deserted by it self can never cease to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 yea to al other things that are moved this is the fountain and principe of motion The first self moving Principe or Cause cannot cease to move because it gives motion to althings but receives motion from nothing It is the fountain of al motion and therefore of al life Of the Life of God that it is intellectual self-sufficient most blessed c. see Suarez Metaphys Disput 30. Sect. 14. pag. 116. § 2. Gods Science or Knowlege Having discoursed of the Life of God in the general we passe on to explicate the modes and ways in which this life is said to be actuose For as the Actuositie of the Rational life is manifested by Acts of Intelligence and Volition so proportionably the Actuositie of the Divine Life is explicated by Acts of Divine Intelligence and Volition We shal begin with the divine Intellect Intelligence Science and Sapience which are one and the same in God and no way distinct from his Essence For God being a pure Act the Intelligent Intellect intelligible Species Act of Intellection and objective Idea are but one in him God is the prime Being the prime Life and the prime Self-mover and therefore the prime Intelligent His Intellect is that whereby he understandes himself and althings without himself which either are or were or shal be or may be together with the various Modes Orders and Habitudes of althings and al these not by any abstract Ideas
also Cap. 18. pag. 223. God saith he knows things future by that whereby they are future namely by his Divine Wil. And he urgeth for this that Principe of Aristotle 1. Post 2. To know a thing certainly is to know it by its cause But now God knows al futures certainly therefore by their most true cause even that which virtually contains al other causes and causations and this is no other than his own wil. That God knows althings future in the determination of his own Wil was the commun Hypothesis of the ancient Scholastic Theologues as of Augustin before them So Robert Grosseteste in his M. SS De Libero Arbitrio Thus Scotus assures us That the Root of the Divine Science as to future Contingents is the determination of the Divine Wil which determination is not only necessary to cooperate with the free Creature but also to determine the Wil of the Creature to act freely This Hypothesis is also excellently well explicated and demonstrated by Alvarez de Anxil Grat. l. 2. Disp 7. p. 106. God saith he in the absolute efficacious Decree of his own Wil predetermining in particular al future Contingents as also free acts knows certainly and infallibly those to be future as to al circumstances as wel as to their substance Therefore from this Decree there may be assigned a sufficient Reason of the certitude of Divine Science as to al futurs which are not morally evil And he thus proves his Hypothesis A determinate cause which is so efficacious as that it cannot be hindred by any other cause must needs infallibly produce its effect but such is the Divine Decree Ergo. Then p. 108. he explicates how God knows sin God certainly and infallibly knows al future sins in that Decree whereby he decrees to predetermine the create Wil to the entitie of the act of sin so far as the act is ens and to permit the moral evil of sin as sin c. as before 3. The Jesuites superadde to the two former Sciences of simple Intelligence and Vision Scientia media Scientia Media a middle Science whereby God is supposed to foresee such or such events to be future on condition that such or such causes he so or so constituted This Middle Science 1. supposeth that some events are certainly future independently as to the Wil of God which is altogether impossibly for a thing merely possible cannot pass from its state of possibilitie to a state of Futurition without some cause of that transmutation now there can be no cause of futurition but the Divine Wil as we shall prove hereafter Nothing can be future either absolutely or conditionately but what the Divine Will has decreed shal be future therefore the object of this Middle Science cannot be things future but only possible Doth not this Middle Science by feigning that future which is only possible overthrow the very foundation of the Divine Science as to things future Is it not impossible that the prescience of a thing future should precede the decree of its futurition So Avarez de Auxil l. 2. cap. 7. Nothing can make a thing cognoscible as future but what gives futurition thereto And what gives futurition to any thing but the decree and determination of the Divine Wil 2 It supposeth Gods Science to depend upon its object which also is impossible because then it should be variable and mutable as the object is Yea to speak properly the object of this Middle Science is not at al cognoscible or knowable For nothing is knowable farther than it is clothed with some degree of necessitie at least as to essence or existence what is not either necessarily existent or future cannot be known now the object of this Middle Science is not either existent or future therefore not cognoscible Again God takes not the reason or idea of his cognition from the things themselves or any Hypotheses they fal under which are al variable but from the invariable determination of his own Wil as before It 's true our Intuition and Cognition is formed by a passive reception of species from its object Nostra intuitio fit patiendo abobjectis non sic intuitio divina and therefore it is murable and variable according to the variations of the object but can we imagine that this imperfect mode may attend the Divine Intuition and Cognition Should the principe and reason of the Divine Cognition procede from and depend on its finite object must not God also be finite passive and dependent Is not the Divine Idea before its Ideate yea eternal How then can it depend thereon 3 This Middle Science supposeth the Divine Science to be only conjectural and uncertain For such as the object is such is the Science thereof a contingent object cannot give a necessary certain Science al Logic scientific necessitie is founded in physic necessitie That which may otherwise be cannot be necessarily known as Gods knowlege would be false if he knew those things to be future which shal never be so would it be incertain if the object be not certainly future if the object be certainly future it must have a certain cause of its futurition which can be no other than the Wil of God But now according to this hypothetic Middle Science God cannot divine which way mans Free-wil wil incline it self before it hath inclined to this or that object and doth not this render the knowlege of God only conjectural yea no knowlege at al For how can a thing be certainly known to be future without some cause determining it to be such That Gods knows althings future though never so contingent in themselves most certainly in the determination of his own Wil see Greg. Ariminens Sent. l. 1. Dist 38. Quaest 2. also Grosseteste de Libero Arbitrio Wherefore if God has a certain prescience of future contingents as without al peradventure he has we must search for the causes of this Divine Prescience not in the extrinsec objects which can never give it but in God himself and in the determination of his own Wil in regard of which al future contingents are necessary not absolutely but hypothetically on supposition of the said determination 4 This Middle Science enervates and destroyeth the Grace of God 1 It destroyes the Grace of Election in that it supposeth that Peter could from his own free-wil consent to the Cal of God provided he were put under such circumstances and invested with such commun aides even antecedently to his Election to Grace and Glorie which they make to follow the prevision of his Faith by this Middle Science And thus the whole of Election dependes on the improvement of Free-wil and the prevision thereof by this Middle Science 2 It enervates and dispirits the whole of Christs Redemtion in that it makes al the efficace of Christs Death dependent on the prevision of mans assent and consent to him as Lord. It supposeth that Christ died for no man absolutely but only on
Christ is brought in as the meritorious antecedent Cause of our Adoption but as an effect and consequent of Election For so much the Particle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by denotes namely that Christ as Mediator is the effect of Predestination or Election but the cause of our Adoption This is strongly argued by Augustin in his Book De Praedestinatione Sanctorum And surely if the Merits of Christ have no causal influence on the Wil of God much lesse can mans Faith or Merits influence the same Thence he addes according to the good pleasure of his Wil which argues the Independence of his Wil. Thus we see how God wils Christ and Faith for the Salvation of the Elect and yet doth not wil the Salvation of the Elect for Christ and Faith as the moving causes of his Wil which is most independent So God wils both the means and the end and the means for the end yet he doth not for the end wil the means as if the end did move him to wil the means For in God the volition of one thing is not the cause of his willing another because there can no efficience of cause on effect or dependence of effect on the cause be affirmed of the Divine Wil which is but one simple indivisible act both as to end and means and therefore neither one nor t'other can be said to move or influence the Divine Wil albeit the same Divine Wil doth wil a causal connexion between the things willed in which regard Scholastic Theologues assigne reasons of the Divine Wil affirming That the passive attingence of the Divine Wil in respect of one thing is the cause of its passive attingence in regard of another thing albeit neither the cause of the Divine Wil i. e. to speak natively and properly God wils that one thing shal depend on another yet the Divine Wil neither dependes on nor is moved by either Gods soverain independent Wil is ful of reasons as to the admirable dependence of the things willed according to their subordinations yet there may not be the least reason or shadow of reason assigned as the cause or motive of the Divine Wil. Thus Ephes 1.11 Ephes 1.9 11. Who worketh althings according to the counsel of his Wil. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 There is the highest counsel and wisdome in the Divine Wil and yet no reason or cause can be assigned of it So v. 9. Having made known to us the mysterie of his Wil according to his good pleasure which he hath purposed in himself The Divine Wil is here said to be 1 ful of mysterious wisdome whereof no reason can be assigned without it self Thence 2 it is stiled good pleasure which denotes its Soveraintie and Independence Hence 3 it is said to be in it self i. e. no reason or cause extrinsec to it self can be assigned thereof though it be ful of mysterious wisdome and sublime reasons yet they are al within it self That there can no cause either physic or moral legal or final be assigned of the Divine Wil is evident 1 because the Divine Wil is one simple pure Act and therefore not capable of any Passion Impression and Causalitie from any extrinsec object 2 Because althings else are the effects of the Divine Wil and therefore cannot be the cause thereof because the same thing cannot be the cause of it self 3 Because the Divine Wil is eternal but althings else of finite duration and is it possible that what is temporal and finite should influence what is eternal and infinite That there can be no cause of the Divine Wil see Aquinas Part. 1. Quaest 19. Art 5. contra Gent. lib. 1. cap. 87. Hence 4. Prop. The Divine Wil it immutable The Divine Wil immutable This Immutabilitie of the Divine Wil ariseth from the Independence Simplicitie and Immutabilitie of the Divine Essence with which it has an essential connexion yea identitie Plato discourseth accurately of the Immutabilitie of the Divine Wil both in his Philosophemes of Divine Ideas as also in his Phaedo pag. 78. where he proves that the Divine Essence and Wil is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. one uniforme Being which existes of it self and is alwayes the same without the least degree of mutation c. of which more fully before in Gods Immutabilitie cap. 4. § 5. But this Immutabilitie of the divine Wil is more clearly illustrated and demonstrated in sacred Philosophie Thus Psal 33.10 Psal 33.10 11. The Lord bringeth the counsel of the Heathen to nought 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he hath infringed dissipated made void from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to break Thence it follows He maketh the devices of the people of none effect 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he hath broken from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to break properly the mind or purpose The divine Wil delights to break and dash in pieces the strongest resolutions and most fixed purposes of proud men But then follows the Immutabilitie of the divine Wil v. 11. The counsel of the Lord standeth for ever the thoughts of his heart to al generations 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the fixed counsel or determinate purpose of Jehovah Standeth for ever i. e. is inviolable and immutable This verse contains the Antithese of the precedent whereby David teacheth us that the divine Wil makes void the proud wil of man but no human wil can frustrate or alter the divine Wil as Job 12.13 14. Thus Psal 119.89 For ever O Lord thy word is setled in Heaven Psal 119.89 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is fixed established R. Ezora understandes this of the decrees or purposes of the Divine Wil which are firme stablished and immutable So Malach. 3.6 I am the Lord I change not therefore the Sons of Jacob are not consumed I change not This regards the Wil of God as wel as his essence so much the subsequent inference importes for the reason why the Sons of Jacob are not consumed must be resolved into the immutable Wil of God as the original cause It 's true the things willed by God are oft under mutations and God wils those mutations but with an immutable wil the mutation reacheth not the wil of God but only the things willed by God who wils this thing shal be now and the contrary afterward without the least alteration in his wil. A wil is then said to be changed when any begins to wil that which he before nilled or to nil that which he before willed which cannot be supposed to happen but in case of some mutation in knowlege or disposition but neither of these can be affirmed of God 1 God is infinitely wise and foresees al contingences circumstances and accidents that may happen and therefore cannot alter his thoughts or purposes for want of wisdome as we poor mortals frequently do 2 Gods disposition towards al objects is ever the same 3 The human wil is obnexious to mutations from impotence and want of power to accomplish what
which may be of more public use to forrain Nations but only touch briefly on such arguments as may confirme mine own Hypothesis with brief solutions of the contrary objections That Gods concurse is not merely conservative of the Principe Virtue and Force of second causes without any influence on the Act is evident 1 because subordination and dependence of second causes on the first not only for their Beings and Virtue with the conservation thereof but also in their Acting and Causing doth formally appertain to the essential Reason and Constitution of a Creature as such For the Dependence of a Creature on God not only in Being but also in Operation is not extrinsee to its essence but involved in the very intrinsec limitation thereof as Suarez strongly argues Metaph. Disp 31. § 14. Hence God by his Absolute Power cannot make a Creature which should be Independent and not subordinate to him in operation for this implies a contradiction namely that a Creature should be and should not be a Creature For if it depend not on God in al its Operations it is not a Creature 2 If the Created Wil cannot subsist of it self and maintain its own Virtue and Force much lesse can it Act of it self or by its own power The force of this Argument lies in this If the Create Wil cannot of it self conserve its own Act in Being when it is produced how is it possible that it should produce the same of it self Yea is not the very conservation of an Act in Being the same with the production thereof Do not Divines say that Conservation is but continued Creation how then can the Wil produce its own Act of it self if it cannot of it self conserve the same Or why may it not as wel conserve its Being and Virtue as conserve its Act of it self If we then as Durandus doth allow God the conservation of the Being Principe and Virtue must we not then also allow him by a paritie of Reason the conservation of the Act and if the conservation of the Act why not also the production thereof This Argument is wel managed by Bradwardine l. 2. c. 24. and 32. 3 Whatever is independent in Acting must also necessarily be so in Being for termes of Essence always bring with them termes or bounds of Activitie a limited cause necessarily is limited in its Operations and where there are limits and termes there must be Subordination and Dependence Nothing can operate of it self independently as to all Superior Cause but what has Being in and from it self for Operation and its limitation alwaies follows Essence and its limitation as Aristotle assures us 4 What ever is variable and mutable necessarily dependes on somewhat that is invariable and immutable but every Act of a Create Wil is variable and mutable therefore dependent on the immutable first Cause See more fully Suarez Metaph. Disput 22. Sect. 1. Hurtado de Mendoza Phys Disput 10. Sect. 10. § 17. But here it is objected by Durandus and his Sectators Durandus's Objections answered 1. That this destroyes human libertie c. This objection is fully answered in what precedes of the Wils Libertie Part. 2. B. 3. c. 9. sect 3. § 11 12. and B. 4. C. 1. § 28. also Philosoph General p. 1. l. 3. c. 3. sect 2. § 8 9. Where we fully demonstrate That the necessary concurse of God is so far from destroying human libertie that it doth confirme and promove the same in that it produceth not only the Act but its mode also determining the Wil to act freely 2 Durandus objectes That God can enable the second cause to produce its effect without the concurse of any other As it is manifest in the motion of a stone in the air which would move downward without a concurse To which we replie 1 That this supposition is not to be supposed for as the concurse of God is necessarily required to conserve the Being and Virtue of the second cause so also as to its motion neither is it more repugnant to the nature of a stone to conserve it self than to move it self on supposition that the Divine concurse be abstracted 2 Suarez wel respondes That it involves a repugnance and contradiction to suppose the creature potent or able to act independently as to the Creators concurse And the contradiction ariseth both on the part of the second cause as also of the effect which being both Beings by participation essentially depend on the first cause And God may as wel make a Being Independent in Essence as an Agent Independent in Acting both being equally repugnant to the perfection of God and imperfection or limitation of the creature 3 Durandus objectes That it cannot be that two Agents should immediately concur to the same action unlesse both be only partial and imperfect Agents The solution of this Objection wil be more completely manifest when we come to treat of the Immediation of the Divine concurse § 4. 1. Prop. at present let it suffice 1 That where total causes differ in kind it is no impediment or obstruction to either that both act immediately in their kind for the whole effect is totally produced by each 2 That it implies no imperfection in God to act immediately in and with the second cause because it is not from any Insufficience or Indigence that he makes use of the Creature but only from the immensitie of his Divine Bountie that he communicates a virtue to the second cause and together therewith produceth the effect 4 But the main objection of Durandus and his Sectators is taken from sinful Acts unto which if God immediately concur Gods concurse to the substrate mater of sin what he cannot but be the Author of Sin 1 This Objection albeit it may seem to favor the Divine Sanctitie yet it really destroyes the same in that it subvertes the Sacred Majestie his Essence and Independence as the first cause wherein his Essental Holinesse doth consiste as before 2 We easily grant that God is the cause only of good not of moral Evil as such as before c. 6. § 3. out of Plato For indeed moral Evil as such has no real Idea or Essence and therefore no real efficient cause but only deficient But yet 3 we stil aver that God doth concur to the whole entitative Act of sin without the least concurrence to the moral obliquitie thereof For the entitative Act of sin is of it self abstracted from the moral deordination physically or naturally good Whence that commun saying in the Scholes Al evil is founded in good as in its subject There is no pure Evil but what has some natural good for its substrate mater or subject Now al good that is not God must be from God as the prime cause if God were not the immediate essicient of the entitative Act of evil he were not the cause of al good Yet 4 God 's immediate concurse to the material Act of sin doth no way render him
obnoxious to that imputation of being the Author of sin For he concurs to the material Act of sin not as a moral cause but only as a physic cause God neither commands nor invites nor encourageth any to sin but prohibits the same and therefore is not the Author thereof An Author both according to Philosophie and Civil Law is he that Persuades Invites Commands or by any other moral influence promoves a thing But God by no such waies doth cause sin 5 Albeit God concurs with the deficient cause to the material entitie of sin yet he concurs not as a deficient cause For the Soverain God is not tied up by the same Laws that his Creature is The same sinful Act which is a Deordination in regard of man as it procedes from God is a conformitie to his Eternal Law or Wil. The great God breaks no Law albeit the Creature is guilty thereof 6 God as the first cause brings good out of that very Act which is evil in regard of the second cause The crucifying of our Lord which was a sin of the first magnitude in regard of the Instruments was yet by the wise God turned to the greatest good Thus the Moral Evils of men which are opposed to the Creatures good are yet so wisely ordered by God as that they are made subservient to the good of the Creator As wicked men oft extract evil out of good so the blessed God extractes good out of evil Touching Gods concurse to and gubernation of sin see more copiosely Chap. 9. § 2. 2. Prop. The prime cause doth by his concurse influence not only the Effect The Divine concurse reacheth the Wil. or Act of the human Wil but also the Wil it self This Hypothesis is expressely laid down both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie In Sacred Philosophie we find great demonstrations hereof So Psal 110.3 Thy people shal become very willing in the day of thy power and Phil. 2.13 It 's God that worketh in us 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 both to wil and to do Thus also Plato Alcibiad 1. p. 135. brings in Socrates instructing Alcibiades that God alone could change the wil. And the reasons which enforce this Hypothesis are most demonstrative 1 To suppose the Wil to Act without being actuated and influenced by God is to suppose it Independent and not subordinate to God in such acts 2 Either the wil of man must be subordinate to and dependent on the wil of God in al its acts or the wil of God must be subordinate to and dependent on the wil of man For in causes that concur to the same effect there must be subordination on the one part if there be no room for coordination as here is none 3 If God by his concurse produce the act of willing as our Adversaries the Jesuites and others grant how is it possible but that he must influence and actuate the wil Doth not every efficient cause in producing an Act in a subject connatural to the power or facultie of the said subject influence and actuate the same power 4 Al grant that the effect of the wil is produced by God and may we not thence strongly argue that the volition or act of willing is also produced by God and that by immediate influence on the wil Is it not equally necessary that the concurse of God reach as wel the active as passive efficience of the wil What reason can there be assigned by the Jesuites and Arminians our Antagonistes why the wil should not as much depend on the concurse of God for its act of volition as for its effect If the effect of the wil cannot be produced but by the immediate concurse of the first cause how can the wil it self act without being actuated by God 5 Can any act passe from the wil but by the concurse of the first cause and if so must not also the same first cause influence the wil for the production of such acts 3. Prop. Gods Concurse is universally extensive to al create Objects Gods Concurse universally extensive Rom. 11.36 This Hypothesis is frequently inculcated in sacred Philosophie as also in Platonic Thus Rom. 11.36 Of him and by him and for him are althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of him notes Gods Operation in framing althings 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by him his Cooperation in and with al second causes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unto or for him his final Causalitie as althings are for him This universal Causalitie is termed by Cyril Alexandr in Esa 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the multiforme Energie because it produceth al manner of effects Plato also mentions God's universal Causalitie as to al objects So Repub. 6. he makes althings not only visible but also intelligible as Sciences c. Yea al moral goods as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 things righteous honest and good to fal under the prime Causalitie of God who is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Righteousnesse it self Honestie it self and Bonitie it self and therefore 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the cause of al goods Thus also in his Parmenides pag. 144. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Essence therefore i. e. God is diffused throughout al varietie of Beings and is absent from nothing neither from the greatest nor yet from the least of Beings Thence he addes One therefore i. e. God is not only present to al essence but also to al the parts thereof being absent from no part either lesser or greater Wherein he assertes that God is diffused through and present with al parts of the Universe and al create Beings giving Essence Force Perfection and Operation to al Beings Aquinas makes the Concurse of God to extend universally to althings 1 As it gives forces and faculties of acting to al second causes 2 As it conserves and sustains them in Being and Vigor 3 As it excites and applies second causes to act 4 As it determines al second causes to act 5 As it directes orders governes and disposeth them so as that they may in the best manner reach their ends See Aquin. Part. 1. Quaest 105. contra Gent. l. 3. c. 70. That the Concurse of God the prime universal Cause is universally extensive as to al objects may be demonstrated 1 From the subordination of al second causes to the first cause Are not al causes not only efficient but also final subordinate to God Yea do not al material and formal Principes depend on the Concurse of God for al their operations Of which see Suarez Metaph. Disp 21. Sect. 1. 2 From the comprehension and perfection of God Doth he not in his own Simplicitie Actualitie and Infinitude comprehend al perfections both actual and possible Is he not then virtually and eminently althings And doth not this sufficiently argue that his Concurse is universally extensive unto althings 3 From the Superioritie and Altitude of God as the first Cause Is not God the most supreme and highest because the first Cause Must not then his Concurse be
most extensive as to al effects Doth not every cause by how much the higher it is by so much the more extend it self to varietie of effects Must not God then by being the first Cause necessarily extend his Concurse to al effects 4 From the Providence of God That althings fal under the Providence of God Plato as wel as Scripture greatly proves as we shal hereafter Ch. 8. § 2. shew and if so must not then the Concurse of God universally extend to althings so far as they partake of Being either natural or moral 4. Prop. Gods Concurse in regard of al second causes and objects is principal Gods concurse principal The Principatie and Soveraintie of Divine Concurse specially as to gratiose effects is frequently asserted in sacred Philosophie Esa 53.11 So it 's said of Christ Esa 53.11 He shal see the travel of his Soul Which assures us that Christ is the principal Parent of the New Creature as wel as of the old and that al Ministers or other Instruments are but as it were Midwifes unto Christ Thence Plato in his Theaetetus pag. 151. brings in Socrates using the same phrase touching himself and his Philosophemes Socrates being about to instruct Theaetetus one of his Disciples of great ingenie the more effectually to engage his attention and diligence he professeth That for his part he was but as his Mother a Midwife to assiste the Soul in the bringing forth of moral virtue 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 God compels me to play the Midwife but forbids me to generate Whereby he ascribeth the principal efficience of al moral virtue to God reserving only a ministerial subservience to man So great was the modestie of this poor Philosopher beyond many that professe Christianitie Thus Plato Repub. 6. makes God to be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the first and most soverain cause of althings whereas al second causes are but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 yea 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as it were children or effects and products and therefore al their efficience and causalitie is only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by commistion with and participation from God the first Cause Thence in his Phaed◠pag. 99. he affirmes that second causes if compared with the first deserve not the name of causes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to cal these causes is very importune or absued Thence he addes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That which is a cause indeed is one thing and that without which a cause is not a cause another Plato here makes mention of two sorts of causes 1 One which is truely a cause i. e. the First cause 2 Another which is only causa sine qua non a cause without which the effect is not produced such are al second causes whose ministerie the First cause makes use of yet so as that the principal efficience belongs only to the First cause in respect of which second causes are only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 concauses or subservient causes employed by God for the production of things So in his Timaeus pag. 46. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 These are concauses whose ministerie God useth to perfect so far as it may be the idea and forme of what is best But very many estime these to be not concauses but causes of althings But he subjoins Such have no reason or sense for what they assert 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For we must say that there is a Soul of althings that existe to whom only belongs the power of Vnderstanding but he is invisible Whence in what follows he expressely distinguisheth between the first and second causes ascribing principal causalitie to the former and ministerial or instrumental to the later There are in these Philosophemes of Plato observable 1 That God is the principal prime cause of althings 2 That al second causes if compared with God deserve not the name of causes but are only concauses or instruments to transfer the efficience of God unto the effect 3 That such as ascribe any causalitie to second causes more than what as instruments they receive from the First cause have neither sense nor reason on their side 4 That there is an universal Spirit or Soul which diffuseth it self throughout al create Beings and gives vigor determination and motion to al second causes and effects But now the more fully to explicate Plato's mind touching the principal Concurse of God the first cause How second Causes are Instruments of the first and the ministerial or instrumental causalitie of second causes we must first distinguish and then state and determine our Hypothesis We must distinguish 1 between principal causalitie simply considered and that which is such in its kind and in some respect 2 Between the second cause its respect to the first and its respect to the effect 3 Between an instrument taken in a laxe notion and in a strict also between a moral and a physic Instrument again between an active and passive Instrument lastly between a pure Instrument and a vital elevate Instrument 4 Between effects natural and supernatural These distinctions being premissed we shal state and determine our Hypothesis in the following Propositions 1 The Causalitie of God is simply and universally principal yet that of second causes may be principal in its kind The concurse of God is so far principal as that it can and oft doth produce its effect without the concurse of second causes but second causes can never produce their effects without the concurse of God the first Cause Hinc est quod omnes operationes hominis bonas quantumcunque fiant à libera voluntate tribuere solet augustinus ipsi Deo tanquam qui per voluntatem ut per instrumentum quod pro libero suo beneplacito agit impellit flectit vertit inclinat quoliber motus ipsius voluntatis operetur Ipse inquit cantat in nobis cujus gratia cantamus Nempe dicuntur ista non ut homini libera voluntas sed ut gloriatio de sua voluntate tollatur ne puter à se esse quod Deus donat Jansenius August Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 24. There is no effect which the second cause produceth but the first cause can produce it alone for his omnipotent concurse reacheth to al effects that implie not a contradiction without the least dependence on any second cause the second cause needs the first in al its operations but the first cause needs not the second in any Yea where the first and second cause concur to the same effect the concurse of the first cause is infinitely more principal than that of the second because the second cause actes not but as acted by the first cause The Excitation Application Determination and Actuation of the second cause is from the first Yet we may not denie a principal efficience to some second causes so far as the first cause has communicated to them a virtue of their own to be communicated to their effects as it wil appear by what follows
and demonstration of the officacitie of Divine Concurse we are to consider that there is a twofold Concurse of God one moral the other efficacious which some terme physic Concurse because it workes according to the manner of physic Efficients For a physic Cause is that which really and properly influenceth the Effect but a moral Cause as dictinguished from physic is that which contributes not any real and proper influxe for the production of the effect yet he doth so far morally concur as that the effect is imputed to him as it 's wel determined by Suarez Metaph. Disput 17. Sect. 2. pag. 402. A moral cause doth not reach the effect immediately neither doth it properly move and determine the Agent but only objectively and remotely by Commands Arguments Incentives Motives and such like moral influences which is only a metaphoric indirect remote improper and inefficacious kind of efficience But now a physic Cause is that which alone deserves and therefore in the Scholes has appropriated to it self the name of an efficient Cause because it doth by a proper real direct and efficacious influxe or causalitie reach its effect God has both a moral and physic or efficacious concurse in and for the production of moral good He commandes propones arguments invites persuades what is good as also efficaciously workes the same in those he intendes to do good to But as for sinful acts God doth not by any moral concurse concur thereto and therefore they may not be imputed to him as the Author of them This being premissed we procede to demonstrate the efficacitie of Gods Concurse 1 From its soverain nature and omnipotent manner of working specially in supernatural gratiose effects The efficacitie of actual Grace in the Infusion Conservation Promotion and Actuation of Habitual is lively illustrated by the Grecanic Fathers of the Primitive Churches who stile this efficacious medicinal Grace 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the superne or supernatural vocation and motion they terme it sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the operant and cooperant Grace also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Energie Aide and Assistence of God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the ineffable Virtue of God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the assistent Power It 's termed also by them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the superne and Divine impulse or inclination also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Divine hand 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Grace of protection 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the universal Spring of Energie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of it self perfect and sufficiently operative Chrysostome termes it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a gift above nature overcoming nature also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 insuperable Assistence But none among the Greek Theologues seems more lively to describe it than Cyril Alexandr lib. 1. de Adorat Tom. 1. where he assertes That men are turned from sin 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 not only by words injected into the Soul i. e. according to the Pelagian persuasion by moral suasion only but that God puts forth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an energetic efficacious Aide whereby the infirme Wil is led as by the hand Clemens Alexandr l. 1. Paed. c. 3. cals it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Inspiration of God also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the subtile and spirituale instructive force of Divine words And Athanas contr Gent. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the power communicated from God Again he saith 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Grace of God hath overcome Whence the Greek Theologues termed it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the invincible Assistence And Chrysostome saith expressely that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 al good comes from the Grace and efficacious Virtue of God 2 From its effective Principe the Divine Wil. We have before § 3. demonstrated that the Divine Concurse supposeth not any transient influxe form God but only the act of the Divine Wil which being omnipotent it thence necessarily follows that his concurse is also omnipotent and most efficacious Whence it is worthy our notice that the Concurse of God is in Scripture expressed by his fiat or word as Gen. 1.3 c. And what is this Word of God but the omnipotent Act of his Wil Hence in sacred Philosophie the Hebrew 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifie both Word and Thing denoting to us that there is an intimate reciprocation between Divine Words and Things whatever God speakes and sayes shal be done is done and whatever is done is but the effect of his Word or Wil every Word and Wil of God which regardes the event and issues of things is omnipotent and operative 3 From the Determination of the second cause by the first Gods Concurse is not only moral by propounding objects and persuading thereto but really operative and productive of things Now in al cooperation the causes cooperating are either coordinate or subordinate the first and second cause cannot be coordinate but the later must be subordinate to the former and if subordinate to then it must be determined by the first Cause It 's certain that either the second cause determines the first or the first the second and is it not more likely that the first cause should determine the second than that the second should determine the first to act Can we imagine that the concurse of the first cause is in the power of the second Is it not more agreable to the Nature of God and the condition of a Creature to determine that the causalitie of the second cause is subordinate unto and therefore determinable by the concurse of the first cause This argument is more fully managed by the Dominicans and Jansenistes See Bradwardine de Causa Dei l. 3. c. 7. p. 669. Alvarez de Auxil l. 3. Disp 18-21 l. 4. Disput 32. Jansenius August Tom. 3. l. 2. c. 22. 7. Gods Concurse connatural Lastly Gods concurse albeit it be most potent and efficacious yet is it also most Connatural and Congenial there is not more of force than Divine suavitie mixed therewith So Psal 110.3 Psal 110.3 Thy people shal be willing in the day of thy power Willing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 willingnesses 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 nadib signifies 1 Free ready chearful spontaneous 2 Metonymically a free gift or oblation 3 Princes who ought to be free-spirited generose liberal as Luke 22.25 4 The word is here used in the abstract which carries a great emphase for abstractes speak essences 5 It is here also in the Genitive case plural of thy willingnesses which the Hebrews use as expressive of a superlative degree So that the meaning is thy people shal be in the most superlative degree free ready willing as Noble and Free-borne Princes to offer up themselves a Free-wil-offering gift or oblation unto thee Hence efficacious Grace was termed by the Greek Fathers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the interne philtrum or charme by Basil 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Grace which is
sweetly received by Chrysostome Hom. 31. in Mat. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 an opportune vocation Of which see more Court Gen. P. 2. B. 3. c. 9. S. 3. § 12. Nihil Augustino certius est quà m in Scripturis S. Gratiam illam efficacem per quam solam operamur quicquid boni operamur nominedulcedinis suavitatis delectationis nempe spiritualis coelestis esse significatam Delectationi Dilectionem Ardorem Inflammationemque subnectit Sunt emim effectus qui immediatè ex illa coelesti suavitate germinant Jansen August Tom. 3. De Grat. l. 4. c. 1. Ubi fusiùs de suavitate hac spiriruali Gratiae Medicinalis tractat So sweetly doth Medicinal Grace Worke. And yet it workes nevertheless omnipotently for so it followeth in the day of thy power 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies 1 force and strength of bodie or mind and thence 2 Metonymically richesse or militarie Forces because in them men place their strength job 21.7 Psal 49.6 We may understand it in both senses 1 of Christs powerful efficacious heart-conquering Grace which is the cause or 2 for his powerful Forces and Armies which are the effect of this Omnipotent day of Christ Thus we see what an admirable combination here is of Divine Omnipotence with human Libertie how powerfully this medicinal Grace actes and yet how sweetly it actes so Omnipotently as if there were no room left for human Libertie and yet so connaturally and so sweetly as if there were not the least dram of Omnipotence and Force in it Oh! what an omnipotent Suavitie or sweet Omnipotence is there in this Medicinal Grace Who would not come under such a silken soft sweet violence as this is Need we then fear that any prejudice can befal human Libertie so long as this Wise Soverain Soul-physician workes upon the Wil Doth he not understand perfectly what are the proper ansae or handles of the Soul and so suit his Medicinal Grace thereto Hath he not a key exactly sitted to every lock yea to every ward in the lock of the wil Is not his Medicinal Grace full of the deepest and highest reason so that the Mind sees all the reason in the world why it should embrace the offers made to it by Christ And doth not the Wil upon this Divine heart-logic infused by Christ move as freely as chearfully as connaturally as if there were no power mixed with medicinal Grace Doth not Christ take the Wil by the hand and teach it to go as he did Ephraim Hos 11.3 and doth he not also draw it with cords of a man Coelestis illa suavitas mollit viam ut voluntas ex carnaliu rerum visco emergere possit seipsam in justitiam diligendam figere Cum enim non possit morus nisi ab immobili fieri suavitas illa immobilem quodammodo reddit animum ut possit in motu liberum spiritalis voluntatis ac dilectionem erumpere Ex quo fit consequenter ut si illa desit voluntas veluti emortua sit Jans August Tom. 3. de Grat. l. 4. c. 7. and hands of love i. e. with rational arguments and moral persuasions as Hos 11.4 Thus Esa 10.21 The remnant shal returne even the remnant of Jacob to their mighty God Here is a spontaneous chearful returne of back sliding Israel and yet it is to their mighty God 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the name given the Messias Esa 9.6 Christ drawes them by a mighty power and yet they returne as freely as if there were no power and efficace put forth So Esa 11.6 10 11. The like Esa 44. Having spoken v. 3. of the effusion of the spirit of Grace he addes what followed thereon v. 5. and another shal subscribe with his hand unto the Lord c. A Metaphor taken from such Volunteers as do freely and spontaneously with their own hand list and enrol themselves under a General So ineffable and admirable is the suavitie of efficacious Grace Yea may we not conclude hence that look by how much the more powerfully and invincibly this Medicinal Grace actes on the Wil by so much the more connaturally and sweetly it actes For hereby it determineth confirmeth and preserveth the Wil in its highest Libertie both of State and Act. For what more natural to the Wil than to adhere to its chiefest Good Or when doth it act more freely than when it is most peremtorily most inviolably and most immotably determined to love and enjoy its best friend and choisest Good Thus the Omnipotence and Efficace of Medicinal Grace is so far from destroying the Libertie of the Wil as that it doth most effectually preserve confirme and promote the same CHAP. VIII Of Creation and Providence in the General Creation proper to God the production of something out of nothing Active Creation the same with the Divine Wil Passive Creation what Gods Providence demonstrated The Explication of it The Wisdome and Eternal Law of Providence Providence an Act of the Divine Wil. The Spirits Efficience in Providence Providential means Fire the create mundane Spirit The Object of Divine Providence Its Adjuncts 1 Efficacitie 2 Immobilitie 3 Connaturalitie 4 Perfection 5 Mysterious Miracles Providential Conservation immediate and mediate Ordinary and Extraordinary § 1. HAving examined Divine concurse in its object Gods Creation demonstrated and explicated effective principe and Adjuncts or various modes of operation we now descend to the contemplation of it in regard of its Effects The Efficience of the first Cause in relation to its effects is usually distributed into Creation and Providence Creation is the Efficience of the first Cause whereby he made althings at first and stil continues to make some things out of nothing What lively Notices we have of Gods Creating althings out of nothing both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophie hath been sufficiently explicated and demonstrated in Plato's Physics Court Gent. P. 2. B. 3. Chap. 9. S. 1. Our present taske wil be to give some general Ideas of the Creation as it appertains to Gods prime Efficience 1. It 's most evident that no finite Being can be eternal or from eternitie Al the Philosophers before Aristotle generally asserted the production of althings by God but he from a confined mistaken notion of Gods infinite Effcience fondly conceited the first mater to be eternal because he could not imagine how something could be educed out of nothing But true Philosophie as wel as Divine Revelation teacheth us that althings were made by God and nothing besides himself is eternal That the world was not from eternitie we have sufficiently demonstrated in what precedes touching the existence of God C. 2. § 2. This Argument is wel managed by Derodone l'Atheisme Convaincu C. 1. And Suarez Metaphys Tom. 1. p. 536. strongly demonstrates That it is intrinsecally repugnant to Creation that it be eternal Yet the Jesuites generally grant That it is possible for the world to be from eternitie Which Hypothesis comes not short of a virtual
be a great deep And Psal 97.1 The Lord reigneth let the Earth rejoice Psal 97.1 2. because al his Judgments and Executions of Providence are most Equal and Righteous Yet it follows v. 2. Clouds and darknesse are about him i. e. Albeit his Government is most Righteous yet much darkenesse and mysterious Providences attend it there are deep mysteries in his Providential Procedures albeit Righteousnesse and Judgement are the habitation or establishment of his Throne as it follows Gods Providences are always mater of our Admiration but not of our Comprehension or Imitation To measure Providence by our shallow Reason what is it but to set the Sun by our false Dial It 's wel observed in the Life of Padre Paul p. 114. In the successe of human things Divine Providence is ever to be admired where human prudence vanisheth out of sight it being most certain that in actions there is an eternal force and a long chain of Causes so far without us that neither our knowlege or any consideration of ours can ever come near The workes of Providence are much like many curiose pieces of Nature and Art whereof we see the frame and operations but that which is the interne moving principe and gives the greatest force to the operations we see not So in the workes of Providence we see the Executions and Effects but O! how mysterious are the interne Reasons Is there not a particular though mysterious Providence ordering and directing the Operations of every individual and single Essence And is there not in every worke of Providence something Divine which doth puzle the most sharpe-sighted Reason and hath more in it than the most acute Philosopher can discover And why is it that the most of men mistake and censure Providence but because they cast their eye on some few particulars but consider not the whole frame and complexe It 's above our narrow Capacities to contemplate the whole frame of Providence and is not this the genuine reason why we misjudge and mistake the parts That is not disorder in the whole which seems so in some one particular as in the motions of a Watch. These mysteriose procedures of Divine Providence are wel expressed by Damascence Orthod Fid. l. 2. c. 29. We must saith he admire al the workes of Providence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 albeit they may appear to many injust because Divine Providence is unknown and incomprehensible and our cogitations and actions and things future are known to it only Thence he addes towards the close of the Chapter 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But we must know that there are many modes of the Divine Providence which can neither be explicated by speech nor comprehended by mind § 6. The distributions of Providence From the Adjuncts of Divine Providence we passe on to its various Distributions which are for the most part Modal only not Specific As 1 Providence in regard of its Object is distributed into General and Special General Providence is that which respectes althings in general Special Providence that which respectes some under a special relation to God as his people 2 Providence in regard of its manner of working is distributed into Mediate and Immediate Mediate Providence is that wherein God makes use of Means for the execution thereof of which before Immediate Providence is when God produceth Effects without the use of Means 3 Providence is distributed into Ordinary and Extraordinary Ordinary Providence is when God in the production and governing of things observes that Order which was constituted at first by himself Extraordinary Providence is when God in the Production Conservation or Gubernation of things breakes that natural Order constituted by himself Of Miracles The Effects of such extraordinary Providences are by a Metonymie of the Effect termed Miracles A Miracle properly is a Specimen of Creation because the constituted order of Nature being broken the Mater has only an Obediential Power for the production of the Effect Hence nothing but Omnipotence or Infinite Power can properly and physically in a way of principal efficience produce a Miracle It 's true the Ministers of God have when called to it by him been Instruments of doing Miracles yet their concurrence or efficience was only Moral and Instrumental they wrought al in the Name of God in a way of faith and dependence on him and for the manifestation of his Glory Wherefore our Lord Christ by working Miracles in his own Name and Autoritie without any moral dependence on another gave an evident Conviction and Demonstration of his being God For no Creature can worke a Miracle by its own Principal and Physical Efficience No this is the Prerogative of the first Cause and Omnipotent Deitie because every Miracle is educed out of nothing either as to the thing it self or at least as to the mode and manner of its being wrought In Nature and according to the ordinary course of Providence every passive power has an active power suited to it and by the application of Actives to Passives the effect is produced where therefore there is a defect of passive or active power and yet the effect is produced that we cal a Miracle which may be said to be wrought out of nothing three manner of ways 1 When there is no substrate mater at al to worke on 2 If there be a substrate mater yet when the mater is so inhabile and unapt as that it has no natural passive power or capacitie for such an effect Or 3 when there is a natural passive power and capacitie in the substrate mater yet there wants an active Principe or Efficient for the educing the effect out of that mater In al these regards a Miracle may be said to be produced out of nothing and so the peculiar effect of Divine extraordinary providence And indeed the very names both Latin Greek and Hebrew import a power extraordinary and Divine To let passe the origination of the Latin which is obvious Miracles are called by the Greeks 1 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as they are Signes of the Divine Efficience and Presence given for the succur of our Faith 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Powers as they are manifestations and demonstrations of Divine Omnipotence which is most illustrious therein 3 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Hebr. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Prodigies or tremendous Signes such as not only ravish men into admiration but leave also a terror and astonishing stupor on the mind So Phavorinus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 A Prodigie is a thing that leaves an astonishment on the Beholders by reason of the Miracle that is wrought Whence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is deduced from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 q. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that which terrefies and astonisheth Al which note that Miracles are the peculiar effects of extraordinary Providence The former Distributions of Providence seem only modal Providential Conservation proper to God its formal essential and specific distribution is into Conservative and
of the second cause there is no effect which the second cause produceth but the first cause can produce it by itself So also as to conservation The first cause workes by its own proper virtue and therefore more intimely and immediately than any second cause The virtue of an inferior cause is not conjunct with the effect but in and by the virtue of the superior 5 From the efficacitie and vehemence of Gods conservative Influxe By how much the more vehemently and efficaciously any cause worketh by so much the more penetrant intime and immediate is its influxe Now God as the first conservant Cause doth more vehemently adhere to and efficaciously influence the effect than any second cause can do Concerning the immediate Conservation of God see an excellent Discourse in Bradwardine de Caus lib. 1. cap. 2. pag. 164 c. 3. Gods Conservation by his Word or Wil. Heb. 1.3 Prop. God conserves althings by the word of his Power or immediate Volition Thus Heb. 1.3 Vpholding althings by the word of his power The Apostle ascribeth unto God infinite power in and for the conservation of althings whether great or smal It is infinite power that upholdeth the Earth that stretcheth out the Heavens c. And yet the same infinite power is put forth in the conservation of the least things as also for their motions The same power that moves the Heavens is also exerted in causing a feather to move the same power that shakes a leaf can shake yea rend the mountains the same strong arme that upholds a dust or atome can and doth uphold the Earth And he saith al this is by the word of his Power i. e. by his omnipotent Volition So 2 Pet. 3. having old us v. 5. That by the word of God the Heavens were made he addes v. 7. But the heavens and earth 2 Pet. 3.7 which are now by the same word are kept in store i. e. by the omnipotent Wil of God Gods Word being put for his Wil because we usually expresse our wils by our word That Gods Word or Wil is the immediate cause of althings and their conservation we have before fully demonstrated § 3. of this Chapter 4. Prop. Albeit the conservative Influxe of God be immediate Gods Conservation by means yet in the ordinary course of Providence he makes use of means for the conservation of his Creatures at least such as are corruptible So Hos 2.21 Hos 2.21 22. 22. I wil hear the heavens and they shal hear the earth and the earth shal hear the corne and the wine and the oil and they shal hear Jezreel 1 In this gradation we have a lively description of Divine Conservation both as to the whole Universe as also in regard of the principal part thereof man and more specially the Church of God 2 Neither doth this Prosopopoeia only point out to us the Divine Conservation of althings but also their causal connexions and subordinations each to other Jezreel i. e. according to its proper origination the seed of God cals on corne and wine and oil for sustenance and food and these liquors cal on the Earth for fructifying juices and vigor in order to their production and the Earth cals on the Heavens i. e. 1 on the Aereous inferior Heaven where the Clouds Snow Rain Dew and Vapors are for moist influences 2 on the Ethereous Heaven where the Sun and Stars are for warme influences And then lastly the Heavens cal on God who gives out both vigor and heat to the Celestial Bodies and these influences to the Earth which thence gives juices and vigor to the Plants whence Corne Wine and Oil is given forth to Jezreel Such is the admirable gradation and subordination of althings as means of Divine Conservation Thus Psal 65.9 10 11 12 13. Psal 65.11 12. Thou visitest the earth c. Thence v. 11. Thou crownest the year with thy goodnesse i.e. Thoroughout the whole year thou doest abundantly do good to thy poor Creatures and so doest as it were adorne beautifie and make glad the year Whence he addes and thy paths drop fatnesse Thy paths orbitae i. e. the clouds which are the paths wherein the chariot of thy Providence moves Drop fatnesse i. e. Rain and Snow which by their sulphureous nitrose efficaces make the Earth fat and flourishing whereby Man and Bestes are conserved Whence it follows v. 12. They drop on the pastures of the wildernesse and the little hils rejoice on every side Or are girded with joy Some understand this of metallic venes which are in the bosome of the Earth and do as it were gird it with joy or metals that cause joy We find mention also of the providential provision that God makes for his Creatures Psal 145.15 The eyes of al wait upon thee Psal 145.15 and thou givest them their meat in due season 16. Thou openest thy hand and satisfiest the desire of every living thing We have here a lively Image of Gods providential conservation who is brought in as a great Master of a Familie largely distributing Food even from his own hand to al under his care Such abundant provision doth the Benigne Lord make for the conservation of his Creature Whence some derive 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Shaddai the name of God from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a dug or teat that yields milk implying that God feeds al and supplies them with nourishment Others deduce Shaddai from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 dai sufficient q. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Scheddai who is sufficient because God is Alsufficient to supplie al his Creatures 5. Prop. When ordinary means fail God oft provides extraordinary for the relief of his Creatures Gods extraordinary provision for some Thus God provided for Eliah and many other of his Servants in their exigences whereof we find abundant instances in Sacred Philosophie and Historie Yea how oft doth our liberal Lord make extraordinary provision for mere Brutes in their indigent cases Psal 147.9 Thus Psal 147.9 He giveth to the Beste his food and to the young Ravens which crie The last clause Job 38.41 and to the young Ravens which crie is taken out of Job 38.41 Luke 12.24 Who provideth for the Raven his food When his young ones cry unto God they wander for lack of meat So Luk 12.24 Our Lord makes mention of Gods feeding the Ravens Which places put together seem to note some more than ordinary provision that God makes for them The Rabbines Rasi and Kimhi with some others tel us that the young Ravens by reason of their white color are left by their Parents to shift for themselves whence the Providence of God in an extraordinay manner causeth flies or wormes to arise out of their dung by which they are nourished Plinie and Albertus Magnus incline much to this Opinion of the Hebrews Others refer this not to the young Ravens newly hatcht but to such as are ready to flie
Rector of althings Thus we may applie Eccles 8.4 Where the word of a King is there is power or Domination and who can say to him what doest thou i. e. by how much the more Soverain any person is by so much the greater is his Domination God being King of Kings and Lord of Lords must necessarily be most Absolute in Power and Domination This is oft inculcated by Plato and carries with it its own Evidence For 1 althings receiving their Being Perfection Virtue and Operation from God it cannot be but that he should have an Absolute Dominion and Soverain Empire over them 2 Althings tend to God as their last end therefore he is the Supreme Rector of al. For when many things tend to one last end it 's necessary that there be some Supreme Rector and Moderator that ordaines them thereto For Gubernation is nothing else but the directing the things governed to their last end Thus Aquinas 1. q. 103. a. 3. Seing the end of the Gubernation of the world is the best good it 's necessary that the Gubernation of the world be best But now the best Gubernation is that which is by one c. 3 God is infinitely wise to order althings and potent to bring them to their ends therefore he is the Supreme Moderator of al. So Plato Leg. 10. p. 902. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 But that God who is most wise both can and wil take care of his own Creatures c. 4 The Bonitie of God argues him to be the Absolute Rector of althings For it belongs to Divine Bonitie to reduce althings made by him to those proper ends for which they were made Whatever flows from God as the first Cause must returne to him as the last end 5 This is the great concerne of Divine Gubernation to see that althings reach the end for which they were made For things wil never certainly and infallibly reach the end for which they were made unlesse they be directed and governed by the same power which made them It argues imperfection in an Artificer not to direct the worke he made to the end for which it was made And may we impute such an imperfection to the first Framer of althings Hence 2. Prop. Divine Gubernation proposeth the Glorie of God as the last end of a things The last end of Divine Gubernation What is al Gubernation but the directing althings to some last end And what is the last end of althings but the Glorie of God Thus Plato Leg. 10. pag 903. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Let us persuade this young man that he who by his providence takes the care of the whole that he may conserve and adorne it with necessary virtue doth wisely dispose and order althings to this end the force and efficace of whose Providence doth diffuse itself into al parts of the Vniverse according to their nature Whereby he explicates to us how God doth order and dispose althings for the good of the whole and his own Glorie This he more fully lays open in what follows 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. But thou knowest not that al generation of singulars is for this that the life of the whole may be blessed his Essence is not for thy sake but thou wert made for his sake For every Physician and every skilful Artificer makes al for the sake of the whole aspiring after the commun utilitie Thence he makes not the whole for the sake of the part but the part for the sake of the whole But thou art ful of indignation because thou canst not see how that which is best may accord with the commun good and thy proper interest Here are several things remarquable for explication and demonstration that the Glorie of God is the last end of Divine Gubernation 1 He saith Al singulars are for this that the life of the whole may be blessed Why may we not by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the whole understand God That Plato sometimes understandes God by this notion specially in his Timaeus pag. 90. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the contemplations of the whole c. I could easily persuade my self 2 But grant that we must understand this of the Vniverse strictly taken yet it must at last be resolved into God for is not the Universe and althings else for Gods sake not God for the sake of the Universe 3 Plato illustrates this by the Symbol of a wise Physician and skilful Artificer who workes al for the sake of the whole and is not the Divine Bonitie and Glorie that great Vniversitie or whole into which al lower ends must be melted 4 Plato blames his young Atheist and in him the most of men for preferring their private good before the good of the whole which Theologie teacheth is no other than the Glorie of God That althings are ordered and disposed by Divine Gubernation for the Glorie of God is manifest 1 From the prime motion and causalitie of God For God being the prime Motor of althings and moved by nothing it thence necessarily follows that by his Providence he governe and move althings to himself as the last end The order of ends necessarily answers the order of Agents the first Cause and Motor must needs be the last end of althings 2 From Gods Dominion over althings Every Agent has power to use his own workes for the end he made them and are not al Creatures the workes of Gods hands Has he not then power to use them for his own Glorie 3 From the perfection which althings acquire by subserving the Glorie of God By how much the nearer any Creature approcheth to the Divine Bonitie by so much the more perfect it is and is not every thing by so much the nearer the Divine Bonitie by how much the more subservient it is to the Glorie of God It was a good Saying of the spurious Dionysius The supreme Bonitie convertes althings unto itself which al desire as their last end and by which they al subsist as their most perfect end Hence 3. Prop. The order whereby Divine Gubernation disposeth and reduceth althings to their last end is most fixed The Order of Divine Gubernation fixed Esa 40.26 immobile and perfect This according to sacred Philosophie is wel expressed Esa 40.26 Lift up your eyes on high and behold who hath created these things that bringeth out their host by number he calleth them al by name by the greatnesse of his might for that he is strong in power not one faileth Observe here 1 he cals on mankind to lift up their eyes for the contemplation of the Creatures thereby to instruct themselves in the Gubernation of God 2 He founds Divine Gubernation on omnipotent Creation 3 He expresseth Gods fixed admirable order in governing things specially the Celestial bodies by bringing out their host by number O! what an accurate order do al the Celestial bodies observe in their motions Is not every one numbered and ranged in its proper place by
extraordinary Impressions which Divine Gubernation shal offer to them 6. Prop. Gods Gubernation by second Causes The Executions of Divine Gubernation are oft committed to second Causes and Instruments yet so as it actes immediately in and with them yea sometimes contrary to their natural Inclinations Thus Plato Leg. 10. p. 903. speaking of Gods Soverain Providential Gubernation saith That albeit God takes the care of the whole Vniverse himself yet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And over al these parts of the Universe are set Rulers and Moderators who constantly governe althings even the most minute parts that so by these they may governe al even to the last part unto their end By those Rulers under Divine Gubernation I presume he understandes al second Causes made use of thereby Divine operations do not exclude the operations of the second causes but these include subordination to Divine operations Divine Gubernation orders and governes Inferior Creatures by Superiors Corporals by Spirituals and Inferior sublunary bodies by Superior and Celestial Thus he governes althings immediately as to the manner of Order and yet many things mediately as to the execution thereof So that nothing can fal out against or beside the Universal Order of Divine Gubernation albeit many things do contrary to the order of particular Causes Touching the Executions of Divine Providence see § 3. Prop. 4. 7. Gods Gubernation reacheth althings Prop. The Object of Divine Gubernation is althings in their most extensive latitude Thus Plato Leg. 10. p. 902 903. proves That nothing is so minute and inconsiderable but it fals under Divine Gubernation But to descend to particulars 1 Divine Gubernation disposeth of al Seasons both Natural and Politic. 1 Natural Seasons Eccles 3.1 as Eccles 3.1 To every thing there is a season and a time to every purpose A Season i. e. a certain fixed determinate time 2 Politic Seasons for Human and Politic Actions 2 Gods Divine Gubernation orders al Vicissitudes and Changes in the world without the least vicissitude or change in himself Dan. 2.20 21. So Dan. 2.20 For Wisdome and Might are his i. e. for the Gubernation of althings Whence it follows v. 21. And he changeth the Times and the Seasons he removeth Kings and setteth up Kings 3 Divine Gubernation orders al the Meteors Snow Job 37.6 7. Rain c. So Job 37.6 For he saith to the Snow be thou on the earth likewise to the smal Rain and to the great Rain of his strength Whence it follows v. 7. He sealeth up the hand of every man that al men may know his worke He sealeth up the hand of every one Elibu's meaning is that when God sendeth his Snow and shours of Rain he thereby seals up or shuts up the hand of the Husbandman that so he may retire out of the fields home and consider his worke Then the Bestes go into Dens as v. 8. 4 God governeth al motions of second Causes even such as are most contingent and voluntary in the most certain manner 5 God governes al Events of things It was a great saying of Julius Caesar which he gained by experience That Fortune whereby the Ancients expressed Divine Gubernation has great force in althings but more particularly in the affaires of war wherein oft the most inconsiderable rencontres or occurrences produce the greatest changements Such is the wise and potent Gubernation of God in Military Affaires § 2. Divine Gubernation as to Man Having dispatcht the Gubernation of God in the general notion thereof we now descend to consider it in its special relation to Man both in his sinful and renovate State Gubernative Providence doth reach the whole Universe but in a more special manner Man and his Affaires So Plato saith Leg. 4. p. 709. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That God truely and with God Fortune and Opportunitie governe al human affaires By Fortune and Opportunitie we must understand Divine Gubernative Providence which in a more peculiar manner regardes Man because he is capable not only of Natural but also of Moral Gubernation God governes every Creature according to its capacitie whether Natural or Moral but now al Creatures inferior to man are capable only of Natural Gubernation and Passive Reduction to their last end they may be governed and directed to their last end but they cannot governe or direct themselves thereto But Man being invested with a Natural Passive remote capacitie of understanding and Wil can when in a special manner aided and assisted by supernatural Gubernation actively conduct and direct himself to his last end Hence Divine Gubernation as to Man is either Moral 1. Moral by Law or Efficacious 1 Gods Moral Gubernation is by Laws and Institutions Look as irrational Creatures are governed by natural Instinctes and Inclinations which are to them a Law directing them to their end so Rational Creatures have a more expresse formal Law which was at first impressed on their Beings but now under a new Edition by Divine Revelation whereby they are directed to their last end For a Law being nothing else but a certain Reason or Rule of operating it properly only can belong to intellectual rational Creatures who alone can understand the reason of their operations And that this Law is given to Man principally to direct him to his last end is evident because the Supreme Intention and Efficace of the Divine Law is to bring Man into subjection to God and who are subject to God but those who refer al to him as their last end Is it not the Intendement of every Lawgiver to make those good to whom his Laws are promulgated And wherein consistes the goodnesse of Man but in subjection to God and adhering to him as his last end So that the main end of al Laws both Positive and Moral is to direct man to his last end 2 This also is the main designe of Divine Efficacious Gubernation 2. Efficacious namely to reduce man unto to a subordination and subservience to his last end Only it has a different ay of operation as to wicked and pious men Wicked men if they persevere in their wickednesse are by Divine Gubernation reduced to their last end only passively by penal executions in order to the vindication of Divine Justice but elect pious Souls are actively reduced and directed to their last end by the supernatural Gubernation of the Divine Spirit Of both these in their order That wicked men Wicked men fal under Gods Gubernation and al their sinful Acts and Deeds are by Divine Gubernation reduced to the last end of al the Glorie of God wil appear evident if we reflect on what was before hinted that if the Creature withdraw it self from one order of Divine Gubernation it immediately fals under another if lawlesse irregular men substract and withdraw themselves from Gods gracious and easie yoke of obedience in order to life they deservedly fal under Gods Iron Yoke of vindictive Justice and Eternal Death and
between Dependence and the Essence of a Creature At present it may suffice that we assert that Dependence is so intrinsecally essentially and formally included in the very notion and essence of a Creature that the negation of it implies a contradiction in the Adject or an Opposite in an Apposite For what doth the notion of a Creature importe but its eduction out of nothing by the Infinite Power of its Creator And he that educed althings out of nothing is it not in his power also to reduce althings back to their primitive nothing And doth not this speak an obediential power in althings as to their Creators Soverain pleasure And where there is an obediential power is there not also subordination and subjection And doth not al this formally speak Dependence Thus Aquinas contra Gent. L. 2. C. 25. demonstrates That God cannot make a thing which shal want any essential principe for upon the remotion of any essential principe follows the remotion of the thing it self So that if God should make a thing without any one essential principe he should make a thing to be and not to be And in what follows he proves that dependence is an essential principe or mode of a Creature as Suarez and that not only as to Essence and its Conservation but also as to operation of which § 10. 2 The Creatures absolute subjection and subordination to God demonstrates its dependence on God That God has an absolute Dominion over the Creature has been demonstrated in the precedent Proposition and if the Dominion of God be Absolute then the Creatures subjection to and dependence on God must also be absolute and necessary It belongs to the Being of a Creature as such to be subject to and dependent on God for the receiving and acting whatever implies not a contradiction As it is impossible that God should make a Creature whereof he has not a ful and absolute Dominion so it is as impossible that a Creature should be made which may not depend on him as Suarez Metaphys Disput 31. Sect. 14. p. 215. 3 The Indigences and Exigences of the Creature demonstrate its dependence on God Is not every Creature Multiforme Mutable and Defectible And must not every Multiforme Mutable and Defectible Being be reduced to some Vniforme Immutable and Indefectible Being as the Original principe of its dependence is there not a natural levitie and vanitie in every Creature which renders it fluxible variable and inconstant was it not a great and most true saying of Heraclitus That althings are in fluxe or motion Do not althings then need some first Being and Cause to fixe their Beings and Motions Again doth not every potential Being need some pure Act to actuate the same And is not every Creature a potential Being which needs God the most simple pure Act to actuate the same Doth not every Recipient as Recipient need the active influxe of that principe from wom it receives al And is not every Creature a mere passive recipient as to God who is the first influential Cause of its existence motion and al Yea is not every Creature a mere passive Instrument in regard of the Divine Influxe Can it subsist or act without Divine concurse Cut off the dependence of a Creature from its Creator and what an endlesse Agitation yea Annihilation would it fal into See Aquinas contra Gent. L. 3. C. 91. and Bradwardine L. 2. C. 20. p. 541. 4 The Dependence of the Creature on God may be demonstrated from its Connaturalitie What more connatural to the Creature than dependence on its Creator Doth not the Stream naturally depend on its Fountain for derivations and is it not a violence to it to be cut off from this dependence Where doth the infirme member go for animal Spirits in order to sense and motion but to the Head And is it not most natural to the Ray to hang on the Sun which gave it existence O then how natural is it to the Creature to depend on its Creator the prime Cause of its existence and operation What a violence is it to the Creature to be taken off from this dependence Hence § 6. Creatural Dependence is not really distinct from the Essence of the Creature Dependence the same with the Essence That the Creatures Dependence is not really distinct from its Essence is evident because every Creature being Ens by participation it must necessarily follow that dependence on the first cause from whom it participates of Being is most essential to it As it is essential to the first cause to be Being by Essence and so Independent so it is also essential to the second cause to be Being by Participation and so Dependent So that the very notion and Idea of a Creature doth inseparably essentially and formally include Dependence on God as that which is not really distinct therefrom This is incomparably wel demonstrated by Suarez Metaphys Tom. 2. Disput 31. Sect. 14. p. 214. As to the root of this Dependence it must be said that it is really nothing else but the very essence of a create Being as such because if we by the force of our Intellect remove whatever is superadded to such an essence we shal find that of it self it has Limitation and Imperfection so that of it self it is not sufficient to act or cause any thing and therefore according to the absolute power of God there cannot be such a create Being which should not have such a subordination to the increate Being Therefore it is a signe that is founded in the very essential Reason of a create Being Wherefore albeit we may by the precision of Reason and some inadequate conception of mind apprehend Dependence in Essence in regard of some moment of reason before Dependence in causing yet this later really superaddes nothing to the Essence of a Create Being Wherein note wel that he makes not only dependence as to Essence and its Conservation but also as to Causation and Operation the same with the Essence of the Creature Which Hypothesis he demonstrates and establisheth against Durandus and his Sectators who assert the Creatures dependence on God as to Essence and Conservation but yet denie it as to causation and operation specially as to the substrate mater of sin It may not be denied but that Suarez in his first Tome of Metaphys Disput 20. Sect. 5. p. 530. saith That this Dependence of the Creature on the Creator is not altogether the same with the Creature but a mode distinct therefrom Yet these thing he grants 1 That this Dependence of the Creature on God is something really and intrinsecally existing in the Creature For al confesse that passive Creation is in the Creature But now Dependence is nothing else but passive Emanation or Creation if we speak of the first Creation from God 2 That this Dependence is a substantial or essential mode affecting the substance of the Creature albeit it constitute not the same 3 He
limits this modal distinction to the dependence of the Creature in its first Emanation or Creation but grants that its dependence in operation is really the same with the Essence of the Creature 4 Suppose we allow a modal distinction between the Creatures dependence and essence yet who knows not but that the most awakened Philosophers now generally grant that Modes specially such as are substantial and essential do not really differ from the things modified Thus Calovius Metaphys pag. 434. Dependence saith he is a mode of a create Being agreeing to it by reason of its imperfection which is not the very Essence of the Creature nor yet a new Entitie distinct from the Essence but something affecting the create Essence And he cites Suarez for this his Hypothesis Hence § 7. Creatural Dependence according to its formal Idea and notion Dependence importes Subordination importes a presupposition of influence or subordination posterioritie and inferioritie 1 Creatural dependence importes a presupposition of influence or subordination to the first Cause This is primarily and formally included in the very notion of Dependence neither doth it adde any real entitie or mode distinct from the Creature but explicates only the intrinsec condition and habitude of the Creature relating to the omnipotent causalitie and influence of God This subordination to God as the first cause ariseth from the imperfection of the Creature and the absolute Dominion of God And as to its latitude and extent it regardes both natural and supernatural Influences and Beings By supernatural Beings and Influences I mean such as being above the sphere of Nature are not connatural to or producible by its force and power These supernatural Beings have causalities proportionable to their Entities in which they are subordinate to God and dependent on him as natural Beings in their kind And in this respect the Creatures subordination to and dependence on God in the whole of its causalitie is commun both to natural and supernatural Beings Yea supernatural Beings by virtue of their subordination to God may be elevated and raised to act and cause somewhat beyond that causalitie which is connatural to them For even in this regard they are not lesse subordinate and subject to God than natural Beings are in their kind as Suarez wel urgeth Metaph. Tom. 2. Disput 31. Sect. 14. pag. 215. Such is the subordination both as to Naturals and Supernaturals which creatural Dependence on God as the first cause formally includes Hence 2 follows Posterioritie 2. Posterioritie Every dependent as such is posterior to that on which it dependes so the Creature as to God Aquinas tels us That al second causes act by virtue received from the first cause as instruments act by the direction of Art wherefore it is necessary that al other Agents whereby God fulfils the order of his Gubernation act by virtue from God and thence that they are posterior to him And this I thinke if wel understood might satisfie al those who with so much vehemence oppose al kind of predetermination by Divine concurse as to the human Wil For if we grant That God is the first cause of the Wils motion I cannot see how we can denie him the predetermination of the Wil. Though to avoid needlesse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I generally abstain from the terme predetermination yet without that prejudice which some I conceive undeservedly lode it with For if the Concurse of God be previous to the causalitie of the Wil so as to determine the same to act as we have demonstrated Ch. 7. § 4. I as yet cannot according to my shallow capacitie see any cogent reason why the said previous concurse may not be termed predeterminant But to returne to our Argument Creatural Dependence implies a posterioritie 1 as to Nature and Causalitie 2 As to Origination and Order 3 As to Dignitie 3. Inferioritie Whence 3 Creatural Dependence importes also Inferioritie For every dependent as such as inferior to that it dependes on Thus Alvarez de Auxil Grat. Disput 90. pag. 714. Dependence properly in causes efficient importes a certain subordination and inferioritie of him who dependes to him on whom he dependes therefore the Divine operation of the first cause doth not depend on the cooperation of the second cause but on the contrary the cooperation of the second cause dependes on the operation of the first cause which is previous as Ch. 7. § 4. § 8. Althings create depend on God as to their Futurition Creatural Dependence as to Futurition For the explication and demonstration of this Proposition we may consider 1 That althings future must have some cause of their Futurition Nothing future is of its own nature or by its own force future but indifferent to Futurition or Non-futurition If things were in their own nature and of themselves future then they would be always future and never present for that which agrees to any thing of its own nature agrees to it inseparably Hence it follows that Futurition cannot agree to things of their own nature but by some cause which brings them from a state of indifference and possibilitie to a state of Futurition And assuredly that which has not a certain determinate cause of its Futurition cannot be certainly and determinately future but only possible 2 That which gives futurition unto althings is the Divine Wil and Decree It 's impossible that any thing should passe from a state of pure possibilitie to a state of futurition but by the wil of God Things are not foreseen and decreed by God because future as some would needs persuade us but they are therefore future because decreed by God Thus Wiclef held That the Determination of God gave the highest firmitie in the futurition of his worke as Walden Tom. 1. L. 1. C. 23. pag. 37. and Bradwardine asserted That every Proposition of what is future is subjected to the Divine Wil and originated thereby So that indeed no Create Being either simple or complexe can be future antecedently to the Divine Wil. Whence it necessarily follows 3 That althings future depend on God for their futurition Every thing may as wel give Being to it self as Futurition Of this see more Ch. 5. § 2. Of Gods Science § 9. Al Creatures depend on God as to their first Production and Conservation 1 Al Creatures depend on God as to their first Production and Existence Plato in his Timaeus p. 28. saith Creatural Dependence as to Essence and Conservation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 That every thing produced is necessarily produced by some Cause For nothing can be the cause of it self As Novitie of Essence is essential to the Creature so also Dependence on God for that Essence Yea every mutation and state of the Creature with al its various modifications are from God Yea Suarez Metaphys Tom. 2. Disp 31. sect 14. p. 216. tels us That a create Being as such considered precisely and abstractly requires no other cause
but the increate Being in whom it hath a sufficient cause both Efficient Exemplar and Final For albeit some create Beings require other efficient causes besides God at least for their more connatural production yet the reason of a create Being as such requires them not And in what precedes he saith that the dependence of an effect on any create second cause is not so essential as its dependence on the increate first cause 2 Al Creatures depend on God for their Conservation This has been sufficiently demonstrated in what precedes C. 8. and it ma be further argued from the impossibilitie of a Creatures being conserved but in a way of dependence on Gods conservative influence For if a Creature should be conserved by it self or any other cause without dependence on the first cause God should not have an absolute Dominion over it neither were it in his power to annihilate the same § 10. Every Creature dependes on God as to Operation This Hypothesis though denied by Durandus Creatural Dependence as to Operation and some very few more yet it is generally owned by Scholastic Theologues and that on invict evident grounds For 1 Operation is the Index of the Essence what is dependent in Essence cannot be independent in Operation 2 Let us consider the series of causes and we shal find that every Inferior is obedient and subordinate to its Superior in acting 3 What is an Action but that special Dependence which the effect has on its efficient cause And is not God the prime efficient of althings 4 No Virtue or Efficace of any second Cause can actuate itself but necessarily requires for its actuation the Divine Concurse which gives al Virtue as also the conservation and actuation of the said Virtue The Virtue of the Inferior Agent always dependes on the Virtue of the Superior in as much as the Superior gives Virtue to the Inferior as also the conservation and actuation of the same Virtue 5 Whatever is limited in its Essence is also limited in its Activitie and Operation and where there is limitation there is subordination and dependence as wel in operation as in essence 6 If every second cause depend not on its first for al its operations then it is impossible that the first cause should hinder such operations for the exerting whereof the second cause dependes not on him Who can hinder that Action which he cannot by any influence reach And if this be granted what wil become of the Providence of God Must we not with Epicurus allow God to be only a Spectator no way a Rector or Gubernator of the most considerable part of Human Affaires and Acts That no Creature is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unimpedible in operation we have demonstrated in what precedes § 4. of this Chapter 7 It implies a contradiction that the second cause should act and yet not be actuated and influenced by the first cause And here whiles under the review of these Sentiments I may not let passe without some Animadversion the Reflexion of a Learned Author in a new Piece about Gods Prescience on this Argument namely That it can never be proved that it implies a contradiction for God to make a Creature which should be capable of acting without an immediate concurse if I apprehend his meaning as laid down p. 35 36 37. But because that Learned Author gives us only his Supposition without any Demonstration thereof or solution of those Arguments which the Scholes both of Thomistes and Scotistes as also the Jesuites Suarez and others have urged against the Hypothesis of Durandus which he seems to espouse I do not conceive my self obliged to superadde any Arguments for the re-enforcement of this Hypothesis which as been already copiosely demonstrated § 5 6 7. also Chap. 7. § 2 4. and Chap. 9. I shal only adde thus much that I cannot according to the utmost extension of my narrow apprehension conceive any medium between the extremes of this disjunctive Proposition Either the Human Wil must depend on the Divine Independent Wil of God for al its natural motions and operations or God must depend on the Human Will in it self Independent for al his Prescience motives of Election and all discrimination as to Grace and gratiose operations I am not ignorant of the general replie That this Hypothesis I oppose only cuts off Gods concurse as to sinful Acts. But I would willingly be satisfied in these Queries 1 Whether there be any Action of Man on Earth so good which hath not some mixture of Sin in it And if God concur to the substrate mater of it as good must be not also necessarily concur to the substrate mater of it as sinful Is not the substrate mater of the Act both as good and sinful the same 2 Again as there is no Action in this imperfect state so good but it has some sin mixed with it so is there any Action so sinful which has not some natural good as the substrate mater thereof as we have largely proved Chap. 9. § 2 3 Lastly if we cut off the material entitie of sinful Acts from Dependence on Gods immediate concurse do we not indeed thereby cut off the most illustrious part of Divine Providence in governing this lower world But of these sufficiently in what precedes specially C. 7. § 9. Hence § 11. The Wil of Man is necessarily subordinate to and dependent on the Wil of God in al its Operations The Dependence of the Human Wil in al its Acts. The Wil of Man cannot be the solitary cause of its own Act so as to exclude the efficience of the prime cause as C. 7. § 4. It 's true the Wil is a total cause in its own kind yet not so as to exclude the total influxe of God as the first cause Yea God is not only the total but also the immediate cause of al voluntary Acts which argues the Wils total and immediate Dependence on God in al its Acts as C. 7. § 4. Thus Aquinas Seing every mutable and multiforme must be reduced to some immobile principe as unto its cause and the Intellect and Wil of Man appear to be mutable and multiforme it 's necessary that they be reduced to some superior immobile immutable and uniforme cause Yea he saith that God is most intimely present to the Wil and as it were acting in it whiles he moves it to act And Scotus in 2. Sent. Dist 37. Q. 2. Queries Whether the Create Wil be so far a total and immediate cause of its own Act as to exclude the immediate Efficience of God And he proves the Negative because 1 If so then it would necessarily follow that God doth not certainly know the future evenements and acts of the Wil because his knowlege of things future dependes on the determination of his own Wil as Chap. 5. § 2. 2 If so then God were not the best and most perfect Being because he should not have Dominion over the