therefore hee had assigned a truer cause in saying that humane malice and pertinacie and not riches were the cause of all the abouenamed euilles wee might also prooue by more reasons that pouertie were rather the cause of those inconueniences seeing the want of those things wherewith the rich men abound kindleth desire and greedinesse in the poore that afterwards is the cause of all those euils which euerie day are committed And therefore the Philosopher contrary to your Arcesilaus sayth that pouertie bringeth foorth seditions and maleficences Our Greeke yet further affirmeth that riches is not commodious saying that the richer any one is the more things hee hath neede of but if the definition of riches be true of necessity his position must bee false for where is the heape and collection of all necessarie instruments for sustentation benefit and ornament of humane life there can bee no defect or want of any thing and though riches procure a man to bee iealous ouer him selfe and sometimes putteth him in daunger yet from this reason can wee not conclude that they are wicked but rather the contrarie seeing there is no feare of loosing badde but good thinges which of their owne nature bring the possessor into no danger but rather is procured by mans couetousnesse and deprauation as in like manner lust is the cause that the chastity of a faire woman is hardly secure and yet must we not therefore say that beautie is a wicked thing I grant vnto you also Signior Antonio that in faire apparel sumptuous pallaces the nature of matter Architects wit is rather admired then the rich possesser of these things that splendor brightnes is proper to the iewels gold and not to the man rich who therwith adorneth himself but not withstanding this if the rich man had not made this rich apparel or built a sumptuous house for his own publike benefit neither could the nature of matter nor the Architects wit inuention of thēselues procure admiration as also the beauty splendor of iewels shuld remain buried in the inwardmost caues of the earth except the rich man discouering as it were the treasures of Nature should not offer them to the beholders eies beside this in all these ornaments the beames of magnificence shine which is numbred amongst the principallest vertues heroycall To possesse therefore and vse all these things both how when with conueniēt measure quantity bringeth vnto man a singular decency being truly worthie to be placed in the numbers of goods desired and to be sought after as in like maneral other kind of riches I say likewise that felicity is proper to vs cannot be taken away as also that riches being a good of Fortune remaineth in the power of the same fortune But we must obserue that felicitie may be considered two maner of wayes the first as it dependeth of his proper efficient cause which is vertue the second as it dependeth not only of the efficient but also of al causes instrumentall and the circumstances necessarily conioyned with the cause efficient in the first maner considered it is our own proper cannot be taken away because vertue true productresse of felicitie is not subiect to blowes of fortune neither haue honour riches nor any other externall goodes in it any part In this manner the Philosopher obserueth felicitie in the first of his Ethikes when hee distinguisheth the felicitie of Platoes Idea from Riches honour and those contentments that the vulgar sort esteeme In this manner also did hee consider it in the seuenth of his Politikes where hee sayde Felicitie happeneth not vnto vs through the goods of Fortune but euery one the more hee possesseth of vertue and prudence and after them frameth his opperations the greater is his felicitie and this is prooued by the testimonie of God himselfe who not for any good externall but of himselfe is happie and blessed Felicitie considered after the seconde manner it beeing no other but a collection and heape of humane goodes as well internall as externall which ioyntly together concurre by meane of vertuous action to the enioying of perfect and chiefest contentment although it can not be wholy taken away yet notwithstanding in many circumstances it may be hindred After this maner the Philosopher considereth it in the first of his Rhetorike where he doth not only place the goodes of the minde amongst the parts of felicitie but also the goods of the body and those externall In this sort also doth he obserue it in the seuenth of his Ethickes where he plainely affirmeth that an happy man hath neede of goodes externall and of fortune to the end that in his operations hee may not be hindred which thing saith he being very wel knowne prosperous fortune and felicitie by many come to be termed the selfe-same things We must further note that the Philosopher in the place by you cited Vseth these formall words Chiefe good is our proper owne being such as that hardly it can be taken from vs He denieth not therefore but that felicitie anay be taken away but yet he saith very hardly minding to inferre that it could not bee absolutely remooued but may peraduenture bee defrauded of his circumstances Out of which wee may very well conclude that felicitie should be depriued of her principall instrument wanting riches and that hee which is not rich can not be perfectly happy considering that he cannot exercise the Vertue of liberality beneficence and magnificence which make a man woorthie of honour Me thinkes Signior Antonio saide the Queene your cause is in such sort ouerthrowne as that it booteth you litle to replie any further and I am assured that from these Signiors you should not receiue the least suffragation of pouertie if you were to gather their voyces by scrutanie It would not be a iust and indifferent scrutany most excellent Queene saide the Greeke smiling if the number of the rich were not equally ballanced with as many poore because passion which is euer in the rich predominant and not equitie would giue sentence Notwithstanding I will accept your Maiesties iudgement as a firme decree neither will I further reply expecting that one day I may bee made to conceiue by one that with effects and not words shall prooue that riches are good and worthy of a vertuous man And although other perswasions were not sufficient saide Count Guido Caleagnini yet might experience manifest it vnto you which euery day sheweth that riches is not onely a necessary instrument of felicitie but further that among all worldly goodes it holdeth chiefest place seeing riches without labour dispenseth liberally to him rich of all other goodes which the poore man by vertue can not with great industrie attaine vnto And it seemeth he richly borne is in like manner borne gratious vertuous woorthie to be beloued of euery one and commended the which by you learned being wel and rightly vnderstoode you dedicate your labours not to the vertuous
one to repell force with force he carrieth also with him the caracter of iniustice And how caÌ„ this be replied Tassone if to suffer iniury as the Philosopher affirmeth is free froÌ„ vice to offer it is vitious vniust The Philosopher saith wel answered Gualinguo but yet this taketh not away my positioÌ„ for thogh the suffring of iniurie be without vice yet giueth it some testimonie of vice in the patieÌ„t for that by this act of supporting iniury he sheweth himself worthie of contempt and consequently vniust and wicked for only the wicked man is worthy to be ignominious Seeing honor is not lost added Tassone but through want of iustice and defect of valor is a kind of iniustice this word Valor in the definition of honor seemeth to be superfluous The common sort said Gualinguo not knowing that iustice comprehendeth al vertues iniustice al vices and ordinarily distinguishing between base actions and those of iniustice to make men learned as also vnlearned conceiue the nature of this our honor the word valor is not only not superfluous but necessary and so much the more by reason common opinion holdeth base cowardly men more infamous then those vniust and in euery one want of valor is more obserued then that of iustice Nay said Count Hercules the abuse is growne so far as all men valiant of person are esteemed honest men although in the rest they be most dissolute This hapneth answered Gualinguo because the common sort which know not the inward vertues of the mind measureth the goodnes and valor of a man from the force of his body not from the power of his mind little obseruing that as man by the vertue of the mind exceedeth the creatures so in strength of body by many beasts he is excelled Tassone said nothing else but count Hercules Mosti obiected tel me sir knight if this our honor once lost may be recouered again Let euerie one take heed said Gualinguo of loosing his honor for being once iustly lost it can neuer be recouered and I said iustly because lost otherwise it may rather be termed honour suspended then lost as it happeneth to those honest men who by false suggestions enter into the euill opinion of the world seeing it may come to passe that time in the ende discouering the trueth they may recouer their good name You impose too seuere a law vpon honor Signior Gualinguo replied Count Hercules in that it onely being once lost you giue out it cannot be recouered for my part I iudge it scarce reasonable that one bad action cannot by many other good be recompensed for this is no other but to bring an offender into extreame desperation by which meane honour that in a man ought to be the principall cause of doing well would be an occasion for him to multiplie his flagitions without euer reforming them By my definition of honour deliuered you should bee out of doubt answered Gualinguo that honour iustly lost cannot be recouered For if it be true that honour is a firme opinion in him that honoureth that he honoured hath neuâ—â— led in iustice nor valor one that hath only failed once is known for the man cannot come within the compasse of this definitioÌ„ because then it should not be conuertible with the defirite and would be no other but as if we should ascribe a reasonable soule to an asse But if men added Mosti should turne to haue as good an opinion of such an one as at the first might he not recouering the priuiledge of honour come within this definition If we should grant said Gualinguo that an asse had winges we might conclude that hee were a birde and fowle therfore I say vnto you that this case in him can hardly be admitted who hath iustly lost his honor because they who haue notice of his defect althogh they would yet could they not of such an one retaine so good an opinion as at the first if they lost not also theyr owne memories the which is hard or at least verie difficult For men for the most parte being enuious and maleuolent they are vnmindfull of vertuous actions keeping them close but they reserue fresh in memorie another mans misdeedes and continually with their tongues blaze it abroad and touching this seuere and strict law of honor I say it is seuere but yet iust and likewise those lawes be iust though austere that cut off the liues of malefactors or their meÌ„bers the which things though they be irrecouerable yet cannot these chasticements hold malefactors in but if the feare of losse were recompenced with the hope of recouerie who seeth not how great the number of wicked men would bee and of those ready to worke mischiefe The law of honor then is the cause of wel doing not of multiplying flagition because the greater sort of men hold their honor so deare as that they dare not do euill for feare of the losse therof knowing that it once only being lost can neuer be recouered But for al this I do not affirme that a maÌ„ who hath ceased the honor of the world should vppon this multiply in flagitions without euer reforming himselfe but rather the coÌ„trary that a maÌ„ after the recouery of the former good opinion cannot do better then manifest to the world in all his actioÌ„s ensuing that he is peniteÌ„t turned to a better life for though it may wel be that he shall hardly be able to returne to his first degree of honor yet he may become a good man shun continuall reproach And how should it come to passe replied Mosti that proouing a good man he should not likewise become honourable I pray you tell me is not an honest man worthy of honor If you deny this you frame a paradox against the Philosopher who affirme that onely the honest man is woorthy of honour An honest man answered Gualinguo is two maner of wayes vnderstood One is he that neuer crackt his credit but is wel knowne for such an one and this man is truely worthy of honor and deseruedly honored The other is he who hauing once or twice failed and knowne for such an one in the end amendeth and becommeth good this man is not absolutely woorthy of honor neither can he be counted honorable but only in comparison of a man impious Count Hercules was content with this last distinction when Count Gherardo Beuelacqui I saw saide he in the booke of Posseuiuo intituled of Honour amongst many other this one notable disputation whether honor consisteth in the honorer or him honoured and notwithstanding he greatly laboreth to ressolue this difficultie yet my conceit was not therewith satisfied for by one reason it seemes to haue residence in the honorer seeing in him is placed that opinion which you auerre to be honor On the other side it appeareth rather to be in him honored seeing he giueth denomination to the subiect and that as milke for the whitenesse is in
that loue is no other but a desire which is also conformable to experience seeing wee loue because we desire and desire because we loue Leon the Iew a man questionlesse of quicke and excellent witte answered Guirino hath in this committed an error as one that contradicteth him selfe in the first Dialogue wherein hee distinguisheth loue from desire but to resolue your doubt I auerre that if we consider loue as an affection it is as different from desire as the beginning from the middest seeing loue is that sodaine and first motion which groweth in mans minde through apprehension of conformable beauty which without consent of hope disturbeth that minde and altering the heart and desire grounded vppon hope followeth loue it being a meane to attain to the end which is vnion with beautie Notwithstanding loue is taken for desire because after the first motion it is transformed into desire and then it is true that we loue because we desire and desire because we loue The L. Leonora replied no further but Madam Tarquinia Molza It seemeth added shee that this your conclusion is contrarie to the Philosopher for he in his Politikes saith thus that none can loue except he first be delighted with beautie and he thus delighted in beautie loueth not sodainely but then loueth when he desireth the thing beloued beeing absent and hath to it as great a zeale being present Our of these wordes wee collect that desire preceed eth and followeth not loue Wee must obserue learned Ladie aunswered Guirino that the Philosopher speaketh not of loue in this place as it is a perturbation and that first motion by vs before spoken of but intendeth it by louing action desirous to inferre that the Louer is not brought to such acte before Loue bee resolued into a desire of the thing beloued and this is so farre from being contrary as that it is conformable to all our pofitions The Ladie Tarquinia highly commended this cleere explication of Aristotles wordes and vsing no further speech the Lady Victoria Tassona propounded her doubt after this sort Hitherto you haue discoursed of loue we giuing attention not knowing as yet whether loue be a good or discommendable thing when notwithstāding this most principally shuld be taught for all our desires and actions being moued from the knowledge of good and euill we flying alwayes known euill and following the good who is hee that would not auoyde loue if he thought it wicked or would not folowe it esteeming it good resolue me therefore of this doubt whether loue be good or wicked Petrarch wittily disputeth answered Guirino vpon this probleme in the Song That my old Lord Wicked though sweete he seeme Made to appeere before the Queene on hie Whom of our parts diuine men gouernesse do deeme Hauing her seate aboue the lofty azurde skie Where hee faining to cite loue before the tribunall of reason accuseth him as wicked and peruerse and loue defendeth him selfe in the end of which conflict reason hauing heard both the one and other part leaueth the controuersie vndecided saying Suffice it that to your complaints I haue attended well But yet more time this strife requires Allerrour to repell Notwithstanding the reasons are not of light importāce by which our minds should be induced to beleeue that loue is a wicked thing First in that it is an exceeding perturbation of our mind and perturbations being contrary to tranquillitie which is one of the principallest conditions of humane felicitie being good of it selfe and to be desired and therefore of necessitie al those of themselues are wicked and odious secondly because he depriueth vs of libertie thirdly for that further he cōtending with reason auoydeth al good operations As Petrarch affirmeth complaining him selfe of loue in the third Stanza of this vnderwritten Sonnet saying These haue me made lesse for to loue my God Then that I ought and lesse my selfe also One woman hath me scourged with this rod That equally all thoughts procure me woe And a little more vnderneath Thus am I now dispoilde of my sweete libertie By my most cruell foe whome I accuse and flie And in the triumph of loue Of vs I will now speake and first of that great man That of our life and libertie dispoile vs can The same whome all the world calles Loue as I doe learne But bitter as you see and better shall discerne If of your quiet thoughts he proue the soueraigne sire As in our hearts his thoughts do kindle burning fier And further loue is a cause that loosing our selues wee are transformed into another as Petrarch affirmeth of him selfe in the Song by me cited These two haue me transformed into the state you see Of me a liuing man making a Lawrell tree Which planted in cold ground without leaues cannot be And in the third chapter of loue Of my great enemy the path I searched out And seeking her to finde I was transformd throughout As louer to be lou'd possessed out of doubt Ariosto also supposeth that Loue for the most part is a wicked thing when he saith Loue we do not therefore so wicked alwayes find But that sometimes he helpes aswell as hurtes the minde Notwithstanding most gente Lady I am of a contrary opinion and hold that loue is a most excellent thing and necessary to a good and happy life but I vnderstand not this by bestiall loue For this vndoubtedly is wicked and that which depriueth of libertie and auoydeth all good operations there being no greater seruitude then sin and this peraduenture Petrarch vnderstoode when he said These haue me caused lesse to loue my God But speaking of other sorts of loue all are good and profitable to a man and comming to the first which for his excellencie is called diuine loue this is most excellent in that being a desire of vnition with the thing beutifull as the true Image of Diuinitie by meane of humane creature it lifteth vp the minde to loue beautie and is inflamed with incredible loue towardes his Creator Neither can that loue be termed wicked which bursteth out into desire of generating by honest meane the thing beautifull in that being ioyned with a desire of eternitie of al other it procureth the greatest good to mākind But what shal we say of the other kind of loue placed in the second degree of temperance may we peraduenture affirme it wicked seeing farre from all brutish action in the contemplation of beautie onely and reciprocall affection of his deare beloued he contents him selfe This is that perfect degree of loue which enflameth the hearts of men to glorious enterprises Wherefore Petrarch calling to minde his errour in this Sonnet vnder all cadged when he so rashly indignified Loue in the sixt Stanza and also in the rest of the Sonnet he faineth him selfe by loue taxed of ingratitude saying My mortall foe with bitter frumps assayes But woman marke the other part alwayes Which shal the truth declare with faithfull heart How thus ingrate this
felicitie dependeth on operation according to the best and most perfect vertue and this is not deriued from excellent operation but from not performing very vitious action and therefore it bringeth not with it felicitie but maketh a man indifferent neither happy nor miserable but when wee consider it as vnited with perfect honor then we may say that it is a disposition and preparation to felicitie Patritio was satisfied and Signior Hercules Varani who hath no small taste of learning propounded after this manner The Philosopher sheweth in the first of his Ethickes in the place aboue cited that felicitie is not honour because felicitie is our owne and honour is not and rendring hereof a reason he vseth these formall words It seemeth honour is rather in the performer than in him that receiueth it Out of which wordes some moue this question whither honor be in the honorer or honoured amongst others Posseuino maketh a large discussion concluding that honour is both in the one and other In the honorer because hee dooth his duetie in honouring him that deserueth and in the honoured as receiuing the reward of vertuous operation Nowe of this honour wherewith we are borne you haue sufficiently shewed howe it is both in one and other but of perfect honor we stand in doubt And Gualinguo It is no lesse improper for to search whether this honour bee in him honouring or the honored than it woulde bee to demaund whether the Statue were in the Grauer in the procurer of it to be wrought or in him whose image it representeth therefore I say that honour as a rewarde is neither in him honoring nor the honored And what sence will you apply to the wordes of the Philosopher replied Varani When Gualinguo The Philosopher woulde inferre that honour being no other than that reward which sheweth operation of vertue it dependeth of the giuer as of the cause efficient which is he honouring and not of the other honoured being hee that receiueth it seeing it is in our power to deserue it but not to receiue it as wee haue saide yet to honourable action hee honoured concurreth in a more eminent manner than the honorer in that he thereto concurreth as the ende hee honouring performing honor in fauour of the other honored but if by this reason honour were formally both in the honorer and honored by the contentment which of honourable action is both in the one and other as affirmeth Posseuino this would bee false which the Philosopher saith for the contentment of receiuing honour being greater than of performing it it would by this meanes come to bee more in the honored that receiueth then in the honorer that performeth it And how can it be added Varano that in receiuing there should be greater contentment than in perfourming considering as the same Posseuino affirmeth that it is a thing more excelent to do than suffer but he that receiueth suffereth This proposition also of Posseuino answered Gualinguo is false speaking absolutely for being alwayes true it would follow that the creature in reasonable action were more excellent than the Creator But to the end we erre not in this it must be obserued that to giue and receiue is considered two manner of wayes one when wee performe or giue simply in honesty without hauing receiued or so much as hoped for any benefit And in this kind it is much more excellent to giue thē to receiue and the contentment of him that giueth is much more then of the other that receiueth for in the giuer abundance appeareth but in the receiuer indigence The other kind is when we giue in recompence of a receiued benefit especially the reward of Vertue which is the honour of this world and in this respect vndoubtedlie it is a matter of greater excellence to receiue then giue because it noteth aboundance of perfection in the receiuer and want in him that giueth and so consequently it is a greater contentment to receiue after this maner thē to giue conformable to which our opinion the Philosopher in the second of his Rhetorick saith The performer of a benefit is much more ioyfull in beholding him benefited then is the receiuer in seeing his benefactor and to conclude by howe much the cause finall is more noble and excellent then the efficient so much more excellent is it to receiue then to giue honour And therefore the most mightie God concurreth with honour as of all other things the most eminent being the end in fauour whereof all things do moue Signior Hercules approoued this answere and Signior Francesco Villa thus propounded You sir knight haue defined honour vniuersally to be the most precious of all goods externall which being true it would follow that Praise Honour Glory and Fame should be the selfe same things signified by these diuers names or being different your proposition would bee false for glorie is much more esteemed then honour which seemeth to be most precious as that which onely agreeth with God And Gualin Your doubt Signior Villa is no lesse excellent and gracious then your selfe wherefore resoluing it I say that if wee consider the foundation and from whence they take their originall praise honour and glory be the self same things neither doth one in perfectiō exceed another seing al of them are grounded vpon vertue and from her are deriued And therfore the Romans so ioyned togither the Temple of Vertue and Honour as to the Temple of Honor one could not passe vnlesse first he wen by that of Vertue but if we consider these termes in themselues they are of diuers signification for speaking properly we praise habites and vertues but attribute honour to the actions that of vertue depend and glorie to the excellence of vertue and actions togither distinguishing therefore euerie one of these termes we wil affirm that praise is a speech which sheweth and exalteth another mans vertue the which in two sorts is afforded with liuely voyce and in writing as also by poesie and this by the Graecian is called Encomion and hath his place with honour permanent Glorie the faithfull heire as it were of Praise is no other but a common and approoued opinion of another mans excellent vertue and Heroycall acts and from honour is different because this without any other signe or reward may be preserued in memory with men through infinit ages Fame notwithstanding it seeme the same that is Glorie that also being a publike rumour that bringeth forth vniuersall opinion yet is it from Glorie different first because shee in one instant hath her sorce and many times is falacious but Glorie is euer firme as not framed but with long time Moreouer glorie is alwaies taken in good parte Fame sometimes well otherwhiles euill whereupon wicked men also are saide to be famous and therefore Fame of Virgill is described to be an horrible monster then which there is nothing more swift It seemeth also that Fame agreeth most with the dead but Glorie belongeth
that haue intreated of matters with out defining them haue rather bred in the mindes of others grosse ignorance then distinct absolute knowledge Seeing that from good definition the solution of all doubtes which occurre in science springeth Into this error many ancient Philosophers and diners moderne writers are fallen and amongst others touching this subiect we now haue in hande the error of Mutius Iustinopolitane a witte questionlesse verie rare is inexcusable who refusing the Philosophers definition of Nobilitie hath himselfe thereof giuen no definition at all which may make it distinct in kinde from other things wherefore labouring to shewe contradiction and error in Aristotle hee hath discouered himselfe to bee but vaine and rather a professor of the lawes then a good Philosopher But further lette vs obserue lines which beginning from one center extende to the circumference in the same center are both one thing and diuers so al things created as from God they take their beginning bee all one but in respect to diuers formes they be ordained they bee diuers If wee therefore consider things created in their beginning which is God not only men as these wise men affirme but all other thinges also are equally good noble and excellent but if wee consider them according to their exterior formes and kinds they are betweene themselues verie diuers and therefore the Philosopher in his Diuine Philosophie sayth that kindes bee like numbers minding to inferre that as numbers in vnitie bee the selfe same thing neither dooth the one exceede the other in perfection but when from vnitie they are seperate and fashioned in kinde one is then more perfect and excellent then another So all the kindes of things in their beginning are the same but once framed into forme are diuers further more let vs note and from hence groweth the error of the Stoicke and his followers that this bountie excellence and this their originall Nobility as by proper vertue it cannot be acquired so may it not by vice bee lost and therefore Lucifer considered in his first instant nature is no lesse perfect and noble then other angels for his sinne doth not procure but as other angels so he hath had his originall from God Which errour they had very wel preuented if they had beene circumspect and sought after the definition of Nobilitie which is an esteemable condition that in some indiuidualles of humane kinde is found for willing to haue defined it they should not haue saide that Nobilitie was an excellent qualitie in al things created depending on their beginning which is god the father of all thinges and that in those thinges it is preserued when they abandon not the first roote and stocke nor practise not Vice for they might haue perceiued that in this definition there is a notable error and most speciall inconuencience the error is that they hauing to define a particular qualitie which in humane kinde is obserued defined a common qualitie which is not onely found in diuers kindes but also in many things differing more thē in kinde the inconuenience is great for if their definition were good an Asse should bee of farre better condition then man in whom as neither vertue nor vice can concurre so could he neuer degenerate from his first stocke original and so consequently should euer bee noble as on the contrarie a man sometimes vertuous sometimes vitious should now be noble and anone after ignoble Mutius saith that Nobilitie consisteth in perfection in kinde determining to inferre that those thinges which in their kinde are perfect bee truly noble the which beeing true that creature from whose flesh the Iews abstaine being perfect might be numbred amongst those noble he addeth afterward as greatly in himselfe perplexed that althogh he descended from ancient linage be noble yet is not he so discended only noble for by this meanes saith he we shuld infringe the power of nature and vertue that they coulde not generate a new nobilitie Mutius therefore contendeth to proue that there be three sortes of nobilitie of the first conformable to the Perepateticke hee maketh antiquitie of bloud the auther of the second nature drawing neere to Seneca who affirmeth in the place by mee cited that he is more noble then another whose disposition is better and witte more apt to liberall artes of the third sort he maketh vertue productresse following the opinion of Boetius that hee is noble who degenerateth not from his originall and applieth himselfe to vertue This man questionlesse in his profession learned did not marke that he deuiding nobilitie into two diuers kindes hath not shewed nor defined the neerest kinde wherein they agree for if he had examined his definition he might easiely haue foreseene that they not being to bee reduced vnder vniuocall kinde and very hardly vnder analogie no more could different kindes be fashioned after such a manner as he framed them hee hath therefore Vainly alleaged that nature or the intention of nature may generate nobilitie for as wee haue declared nature of her selfe is the cause of reason and by accident of nobilitie for if she distribute nobilitie as well as reason all men as they are reasonable so should they be noble but in that the cause of nbilitie is fortune being a cause contingent of men wee see some noble others ignoble That vertue is the cause of nobilitie we grant but not the vertue of one alone as he affirmeth but rather the vertue of many we grant also that nature in respect of her selfe is to all a kinde and louing mother notwithstanding let vs adde that she working by seed manifesteth herselfe a step-mother to some considering seed from the heauens places nourishment and sathers receiueth diuers disposition sometimes good some times bad wherevpon indiuidualles of the same kinde but especially in humane kinde as they are of diuers temperatures so in them ditters inclinations and in their mindes different effects and affects are discouered from whence it proceedeth in reason that some are esteemed of noble race and others of ignoble some ingenious others stupide some preuaile with force of mind and are truely worthy to command and others be as it were lumpish sturdy with whome seruitude better befitteth Vnto which the diuine Philosopher alluding saith that in the generation of men there is a mixture in some of gold and those are alwaies worthy to command others haue commixtion with siluer and these are fit sometimes to obey sometimes to commaund the third and last sort participate with yron Wherefore as of al others most vile they are euer fit to serue and neuer to command Consormable to his master was the great Perepatitian who shewed by most euident reasons that by nature the Lord and seruant was allotted Nobilitie therefore is not contrary to the lawes of Nature Because Nature made all thinges necessary common to all and those which are accidentall and contingent shee left them subiect to instabilitie for if wee see by experience that in
that discommended the place vnderstand thou O friend that I would rather choose to be cheefe in this place then second in Rome and Alexander for this vertue surnamed the great was of so haughtie a minde as hauing vnderstood by some that there were diuers worlds sighing greatly lamented that being now seauen and twentie yeares of age he had not yet conquered nor gotten one As vaine-glory and ambition obscure the actions of this arâ—e so doth the vertue of modestie cause it to bee wonderfull resplendant the good African acquired no lesse glory in refusing with modestie the superfluous honors offered vnto him by the Senate and people of Rome then he did in vanquishing and subduing the proud forces of the Carthaginians As on the contrary Alexander obscured his famous acts by the vice of ambitioÌ„ he accepting by sycophaÌ„ts to be called the sonne of Inpiter Hammon and finally with all those honors to bee honored which rather agreed with the supernall gods then any mortall man Clemencie also moderatrix of anger is in a manner necessarie to the managing of this arte in that anger is an obfuscation to the vertues of the minde and impaireth bodyly force and vigor wherefore an angry Captain forgetting his arte and stratageme easily becommeth a prey to his enemie Caesar as he was and euer shall bee the warrior of the world without peere so of al others was hee most curteous and gentle neither can wee finde that bee fought at any time with his enemie being in furie and by being much more ready to pardon then reuenge he remained finally betrayed and slaine Whereas on the contrary Alexander by the vice of anger obscured his great victories for in fury he deliuered Lysimachus to the Lion pearced the breast of Clito with a launce and put Calistheues to death Affabilitie and curtesie though to the seueritie of this art they sceme litle befitting and conuenient yet are they profitable as the thinges that procure a Captain to be acceptable and beloued of his souldiers by this vertue Scipio African obtained great honor and profit for he was so affable and domesticall amongst his souldiers that although he had an exceeding great armie yet saluted hee them all by their names As vertue cannot be practised without iustice so also without iustice cannot arte militarie consist by this the valorous Captaine procureth himselfe to be beloued for hope of iust reward as also to be feared through expectation of deserued punishment And not onley moral vertues but some liberall artes also seeme necessary to the perfection of this arte and amongst others Rhethoricke produceth most admirable effects which the lesser Scipio manifested in Spaine who finding his armie very licentious corrupted altogether with depraued customes by a most eloquent oration without any other meanes reduced them to the Romaine discipline and Iulius Caesar by this arte of speaking confirmed his Souldiers mindes in France astonished with the hugenes of the duch mens bodies and therefore he obtained a most glorious victorie against proud Ariouistus Finally the ancient Captaines so esteemed as also those of these daies holde the force of cloquence to bee so great in arte militarie that seldome or neuer they enter into battail but first they confirme the mindes of the Souldiers by a Martiall Oration enflaming them vnto battaile And being of most notable importance and a singular precept of arte militarie to preserue an armie healthfull I will also affirme that to haue knowledge in some thinges which appertaine to the arte of Phisicke cannot but be a speciall assistance for it shall wonderfully import a skilful Captaine to vnderstaÌ„d the quality of the aire the goodnes of waters wines the properties of meates as well in choosing out situation for his encamping as for the nourishment of his armie we may read that Romane Captaines contended no lesse in this then in other martiall practises Architecture further is necessary to this arte especially that parte which appertaineth to fortification for wanting this knowledge a captaine can neither defend offend nor expugne a citie In this point Iulius Caesar was so excellent as that of himselfe he brought admiration to the world through the towers bridges fortresses and engines whereof euen yet to this daye there appere diuers monumentes and representations In my opinion most illustrous lady I haue manifestly enough declared that this our noble arte is a consent harmony of al the worthiest perfections and an heape of all the vertues being an arte truly worthy of those men who for participating of deuinitie and mortalitie are termed Heroes wherefore no meruaile though Curtius most valiant of any other Romane Knight was by the Oracle of Apollo approued worthy to fill vp that huge gulffe in the market place of Rome as the most excellent and pretious thing which in that citie could be found neither can it bee alleadged but that there were also at the same instaÌ„t in Rome men in learning most excellent Pythagoras Numa hauing there plaÌ„ted their golden philosophie I could further by infinit examples make demonstration that militarie arte is of all other perfections aptest to exalte a man euen to the highest degree of glory but all volumes and writings being heerewith replenished I refer my selfe ouer to that which the historiographers affirme Notwithstanding to open the eies of the learned I will affirme that amongst the ancientes armes were euer in greater estimation then letters which may be conceiued by the statues images framed of their cheefest gods and painted not with books or scroules of paper in their hand but with instruments of warlike arte they minding to manifest that without armes there could bee no perfect deitie they gaue therefore vnto Ioue lightning to Neptune and Pluto a tridental mace to Saturne a sickle or sithe to Apolle a bowe arrowes and a darte to Hercules a clubbe to Pallas a shielde a lance and helmet to Diana a bowe shafttes and a darte vnto Cupide a bowe and fatall arrowes And further the ancients esteemed this art of so great excellence as that it could not continue without the protection of some particular deity And therefore they esteemed Mars and Bellona gods of war adorning their Statues with warlike instruments which instruments they also thought worthy to be made by diuine hand and workmanship and therfore they beleeued Vuicane to be the Gods armourer which Plutarch sheweth saying Vulcane at his hot worke doth sweate and blow To make the piercing shaft for Ioue his bow Finally the holy scripture calleth the great God the god of Armies not of the learned so that Signior Patritio you may yeeld your selfe vanquished and not put your soule to compromise for you well know that you defend an vniust cause Patritio laughed said You Signior Brancaccio shew your selfe ingrate yea and trecherous towards the learned seeing the Armes and art of speaking from the learned obtained you vse against themselues And I am out of al doubt that if you
were not as great a scholler as a souldiour you could neuer in this conflict haue shewed your selfe so aduenturous a Champion and yet for al this the victorie shal not remaine on your side though you haue lightly wounded mee for with more mortall blowes I haue pierced you I vnderstande you sayde Brancaccio you would inferre that your arguments remaine yet firme and vnshaken wherevnto I haue not yet made any answer and by commending Armes that I haue not a iotte obscured the glory of Letters Therefore from that I haue alleadged it may be gathered that your first foundation goeth to ground for honour is not a reward of perfection which procureth the felicitie of him alone that possesseth it but is a reward of beneficence that helpeth others and that it may appeare howe your reasons conclude not against Souldiours I will sette downe the difference which your Philosopher maketh betweene prayse and honour touched the other day by Caualier Gualinguo Prayse saith hee is that speech which noteth singularitie of vertue and is proper to habite whereuppon wee vsually commend Praxiteles and Phydias for the habite of sculpture which they had in excellencie but honour agreeth not properly to habites but vertuous opperations For it is the true reward of excellent action in that if one had vertue and should bee idle hee might rather bee praysed then honoured Nowe vertuous opperations beeing in two kindes some internall as to contemplate and others externall as to practise armes it is a thing manifest that honour cannot belong to internall opperation for internall action being knowne to none but to him onely that worketh it cannot stirre vp any to honor it It must needs therefore bee the reward of externall action which beeing manifest not only to the worker but also to others moueth and vrgeth the honourer who knoweth it to giue honour thereunto And therefore the Philosopher saith well that honour rather consisteth in him honouring then in him honoured minding to make knowne that to attaine to honourable action it is necessarie that the action bee knowne for vertuous by the honourer The actions therefore of men learned Signior Patritio as your selfe haue concluded being actions intrinsecall and only of the minde as by you learned only they are known and vnderstood so you by your selues may inwardly honor them but these not manifest to others you shall rather bee worthie of praise then honour And on the cōtrarie the opperations of vs Martialists grounding their internal beginning in the mind and discouering themselues to the eyes and eares of others by meane of valor and vertue of our bodies as well of prayse as likewise of highest honour wee are thought worthie neither can fortune bee an impediment of our glorie although sometimes shee hinder victorie For art Militarie as diuers others also hauing two endes the proper ende thereof is victorie And therefore Haniball obscured not a whit his warlike honor by the last battaile hee lost in Affricke hee according to Scipioes iudgement not hauing failed to performe all that which belonged to a most expert warriour for the obtaining of victory neyther vnto you Signior Patritio will it be any blemish to haue beene subdued by me this day in combate for though you haue not perswaded yet notwithstanding haue you spoken in all excellencie touching perswasion Signior Patritio further alleaged that arte Military had no parte in felicitie and much lesse in honor seeing it is a consumer of humane kinde and in this hee is deceiued hauing beene by vs declared that it is a good which vniuersally assisteth nations and citties by procuring vnto them obseruation of lawes and defending them from ennemies and therefore Marcus Tullius saith well that of necessitie warre must bee made to liue in peace Your Philosopher also commendeth the making of war vndertaking it for defence of our countrie to procure safetie to them with whom we haue war This is conformable also to the holy scripture where wee reade that God permitteth yea and commanndeth war saying to the Hebrew people Arme you and confound these Philistines enemies to the people of God and in Ieremy also we may obserue that God said Prepare your shields and helmets put on your breastplates ride your horses and take vp your lances against your enemies gathering your selues all together to bartaile and accursed be he who shal not shed bloud against the enemies of the people of Israel And in the Machabees we reade that God euer moued and stirred vp the people to battaile against the enimies of Israel And therefore Dauid in the Psalmes writeth Blessed bee the Lord who instructeth our handes to battaile And in all the Bookes of the Kings wee finde that God commaunded battaile for the chasticement of rebelles ouerthrowing of tyrantes and for the occasion of peace in the worlde Wherefore it would be both a lawful and commodious war if christian princes did arme their people against the cruell sword of the East and enemies of the elect and chosen people endeuoring to abate the pride of so outragious a tirant and by force of armes to reduce those nations to better life worship diuine then as they now liue with all sauage customes And although it cannot be done without effusion of humane bloud and some acte of iniustice notwithstanding of it no reckoning were to bee made seeing without fire and sword such a Phisition could not heale the like impostume And not to passe ouer any thing whereof our aduersarie boasteth I say that Lysanias Belus Hermes Apis and other such were deified not so much for the knowledge wherwith they were adorned as throgh the action of beneficence For as these opperations may by euerie one bee comprehended and conceiued so internall actions especially to luskish and stupide people being concealed and hidden they cannot bee honoured And this is a thing so manifest as it booteth not herein to make any other or further replication Signior Brancaccio hauing thus argued it seemed to the Queene and all the standers by that the victorie remained on the Knights parte when Signior Renato Cati standing vp on his feete Bee it lawful for mee sayd he most famous Queene to defend our cause seeing Signior Patritio rather a partialist then faithfull Champion of al the learned contemning the preualent armes of Ciuilians hath onely drawne out against him the weak tempred sword of contemplatiue Philosophie yet hee infallibly knoweth that these sort of learned though worthie of praise and commendations yet neuerthelesse are they poore naked and contemptible This indeede we see euerie day saide Patritio for no other cause but because the foolish multitude is intentiue on base gaine and discerneth not the vertue and demerite of honour It is proper to the Ciuilians thrise excellent Queene said Brancaccio smiling to confound the lawes wherefore no maruaile though Signior Cati a most famous Ciuilian hath broken the Law of combate by Champion sodainly as a warriour fresh in breath commeth to assaile
facultie cannot likewise be aumbred amongst the morall vertues For the Philosopher discussing of that particular vertue called Iustice saieth that it is conuersant about iustice distributrue and commutatiue that is in placing rewarde and punishments and reducing contractes and permutations to equallitie And this vertue beeing well considered in her foundation is not proper to Lawyers but vnto Law-giuers For the Lawyer or Cruilian is about three things conuersant To interprete the written lawes To aunsweare according to Lawe And to iudge aunswerable to the Lawes or according vnto those customes which by inueteration are of like force and vigour as the Lawes Out of this wee may drawe a conclusion conformable to the Philosopher that the written Lawe is a silent Lawe And the Lawyer is no other but the liuely or speaking Law and so consequently that the vertue of Iustice dependeth not on him but on the Lawgiuer and Law The Philosopher affirmeth that there be three conditions or qualities of men some distrusting authoritie yeeld onely to reason Others not Very capable of reason easily rest satisfied in authoritie And a third sort who incapable of reason do likewise contemne the authoritie of the wise and as these last of all other be the worst and the second giue proof but of a dul conceit so the first note a most eminent and pregnant wit and such are the Philosophers speculatiue who seeke after trueth and not authoritie And the Captains in war be those who despising other mens authoritie are gouerned only by reasō among the second sort lawyers are recounted whose doctrine is wholy grounded vpon authoritie therfore they were wont to say that one is not worthy to be heard that speaketh without authority and out of this a maxime may be gathered that Lawyers of themselues know nothing but that their knowledge dependeth vppon other mens opinions so that many times when they woulde answere or determine wythout hauing any eye to the force of reason where there is no written Lawe they fall a reciting their opinions who haue scribled a number of Booke cases and for the most part tie themselues thereunto as to a most certaine and infallible rule And the confusion of these Doctourshippes is so great who haue written rather for gayne and oftentation then through any zeale of iustice as that often amongst themselues they pleade not what is most reasonable and iust but what is most vsuall and common a thing surely worthy of diuision and also compassion as though the opinion of ten ignorant were more to be esteemed then the sentēce of foure wise mē whether these sort of learned most renowmed Lady shoulde precede warriours who with notified valour adorne their countries with a thousand Troupes administer argument to writets to immortalize themselues and consecrate vnto memorie martiall proceedings and magnanimous attempts it is easie to iudge By that which hath beene spoken it is clearely manifest that Signior Cati setteth foorth lawes with the person of the Lawgiuers vnto whome they bring princes and men heroycall it shall not bee greatly inconuenient that armed men giue place seeing these determine and command the wars as also determine the place of Generals in an armie and not Ciuilians as hee constantly affirmeth except peraduenture hee meane that it is all one to commaunde ouer Souldiours as ouer executions or the minister of iustice this being a proper office of ciuilians This truth may be conceiued by the description the philosopher maketh of his excellent wel ordained commonwealth wherin he diuideth the Citizens into foure orders that is Warriours Senators iudges priestes and describing their offices he calleth not the souldiers by this brutish terrne of dogs but maintainers defenders and ministers of iust warres and to the Senator hee allotieth administration and gouernment of things publike And these men it concerneth to determine of warre or peace to these souldiours giue place for in such a degree they are to be reputed as Lords princes And to Iudges who are no other then ciuilians or lawyers belongeth the office of determining and deciding controuersie The priests who are the ancientest reduced as it wer to their last most perfect end he assigneth the care of things holy And wee must obserue that althogh to frame a city of it self sufficient there be many cōditions of men required notwithstanding to fashion a commonwealth the philosophers minde is that these foure orders should suffice and hee altogether excludes those mechanical degrees which practise sordide base professions as those who of vertue are incapable the rather being instrumentes then parte of a cittie If therfore authoritie grounded on effectuall reason bee worthy of credit it cannot bee true that ciuilians in a cittie are as Rhethoritians neither that their office is to command ouer Warriors although their authoritie stretcheth to command ouer sergeantes and executioners for they sit to iudge and determine controuersies not to gouern publike affaires yet is this no impediment but that a Lawier may haue place in the Senate be in the number of Rhethoritians when he shal not only vnderstād that which Vlpian teacheth but shal further possesse a part of those singular vertues wherewith Signior Cati is adorned and al these most excellent Ciuilians out of doubt most worthy councellors of our thrise illustrous Prince Seeing vnto these the name of Lawgiuers rather agreeth then ciuilians or Lawyers Signior Cati further inferreth that of lawes lawyers the benefit is much more vniuersall then that of armes and souldiers seeing Lawes assist the whole world and armes benefit but one citie or a Prince alone and that the benefit of the lawes is euer without other detriment but armes cannot pleasure without others offence we haue sufficiently declared that armes vniuersally are beneficial if they be moued vndertaken with iustice that God him self by his owne mouth commandeth warres as also that iust victorie is no lesse profitable to the vanquished thā victors For they vanquished are by it reduced to a better life for if armes were wicked because of offending others the like should the lawes bee which cannot bee executed without bloud The lawes commaund that menquellers bee slaine quarrellers and wounders to bee recompenced with the like measure that theeues adulterers sacrilegious and finally all malefactors be bitterly punished notwithstanding because this is done through zeale of iustice and that the good may inioy peace those laws are good as also the Lawyers if with iustice they execute them but if they bee vniust they doo more hurte then wicked souldiours for souldiers preserue their friends and by all euill meanes offende their enemies whereas couetous and auaricious Lawyers by giuing hope of safetie to their friendes haue no other drift or intention but to gnaw them euen to the bones And to speake truth of all sortes of men the vniust Lawyer is most pernitious I could alleadge most illustrons Ladie many other reasons to manifest that Lawyers though they bee woorthie of honour yet are they not therefore to be preferred before souldiers but because I see my ship now approaching neere her port passing ouer to custome common vse I affirme thus much that Dukes Kings and Emperours themselues are called Knights but neuer Doctors and armed in Iusts Turneyes and also in the middest of the fielde in Battaile they shewe themselues amongst warriours but in assemblies and Courts of Ciuilians Lawyers or other learned they neuer present themselues for disputation sake and this for no other cause but in that the exercise of armes is proper to great and mightie men and more honourable then that of Letters Do we not further see that in solemnities and ceremonies where precedence is specially regarded that great Captaines and men of warre go nearer the person of the king or Emperor then Secretaries Chancellors or Councellors although they bee great Doctors and maruailous learned men this beeing a manifest signe that of the same Kings or Emperours Armes are farre more highly esteemed then Letters and Souldiers then Doctours But if nothing els sufficed the iudgement of women euer infallible might serue for certaine proofe that warriours are more to bee esteemed then Doctours we seeing that the greater parte of women are rather carried away with the loue of knights then men learned neither can the ioy be imagined which they feele in their hearts when they see their louers appeare in Iusts or Turneyes armed with their embleames and fanours by them giuen and for their sakes to arme themselues breake launces and runne theyr gallant steedes and Coursers So that greeue it you not Signior Cati to rest content in common sentēce approbation and to leaue vnto vs warriours the highest degree of honor seeing wee haue both obtained and preserued it not with writings or vaine words but with true valor labour and bloud putting your selfe in mind of Milciades answere who deruaunded which was worthiest of greater estimation Homer the great learned man or Achilles the noble warriour so much more sayde he is Achilles to be valued aboue Homer as is the Conquerour more then hee who with sound of trumpet publisheth his victorie Here Signior Giulio Caesare stayed and Signior Cati minding to replie whome preualent reasons failed not for defence of Lawyers the Queene with her finger imposed filence and commanded the noble Ladie Countesse that shee should pronounce her sentence who after a little meditation censured in this manner We hauing heard and well considered the reasons both of one and other partie do determine that Ciuill honour which is the reward of excellent and heroycall actions ought more specially to be yeelded to men of martiall profession and that veneration proper to things diuine befitteth the wise and learned but reforming better this our definitiue sentence lette vs enact that watriours be esteemed honorable and doctours reuerend This deepe iudicial sentence of the Lady countesse was by al the standers by admired And with this issuing out of the Barge and mounted in sumptuous Coaches the Ladies and Knights hauing accompanied the Duke and Ladie Duchesse to the Pallace they all departed to their seuerall houses FINIS