veste Dianam Praedafuit canibus non minus ille suis. Scilicet in superis etiam fortuna luenda est nec veniam laeso numine casus habet In like maner Tully reporteth in his thirde booke de natura deorum what good fortune befell Iason Phaereus who hauing an impostume as hée thought incurable went to fight with purpose to dye but with a wound his impostume was opened a thing which neyther himselfe nor his phisitians euer imagined Héere then was fortune on eyther side in Iason that was wounded and in him that gaue him the wound good in the first bad in the second For the enemies weapon was by fortune a cause of Iasons vnexpected health whereas death was desired of the one and intended by the other for he that gaue the stroake thought rather to make a new wound than cure an olde disease This is fortune with Aristotle Nowe on the other side if a thrée-footed stoole should fall from aloft and yet in falling stand on his féete this with him is chaunce for the stoole fell for no such ende and it is a thing altogether sencelesse Epicurus said that the world was made by the casual concourse and mixture of litle round indiuisible bodies like moates in the funne whose ridiculous blasphemy Tully mocketh not without deserued cause 2. de nat deorum for so if a man shoulde by chaunce cast abroad an hundred thousand or more of characters or Printers stampes hée might as well reade on the ground all saint Austins woorkes or Cowpers dictionary by the casuall scattering of A. B. C. These bée examples of chaunce with Aristotle not of fortune But it is folly tâ—… stand vpon this nice and friuolous distinction of Chaunce and Fortune sith in common spéech they be taken all as one and so they bée héere to bée vnderstoode In this kinde of cause ignorance and vnwitting simplicitie haue place as I sayd before whereof come excuses and supplications when a man pleadeth ignorance and therefore hopeth to finde pardon as Tully for Ligarius Ignosce pater errauit lapsus est non putauit si vnquam posthac And againe Erraui temerè feci ad clementiam tuam confugio delicti veniam peto vt ignoscasoro But indéede this name of Fortune Chaunce Hap or Hazard was onely inuented by such as knewe not the first cause Gods prouidence And therefore when any thing fell out contrary to theyr expectation whereof they neyther vnderstoode the cause nor could yéeld any reason they said it came by chaunce fortune and hazarde Wherevpon Fortune was made a goddesse of good luck and many christians vse these prophane tearmes God send mée good lucke and good fortune Whose idle prayers bée noted by an Ethnike Poet. Nullum numen abest si sit prudentia sed te Nos facimus fortuna deam caeloque locamus Aristotle calleth Fortune 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 improuidum incertum dubium humano iudicio ambiguum and yet 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 vt diuinum quiddam beatum Canons incident to causes generally God onely is the first and principall cause of all thinges All other causes whatsoeuer are secondary and subiect so his eternall direction Nothing is without a cause If all the causes concurre the effect will followe To whatsoeuer thing you ascribe the cause or deny the cause to the same you attribute or deny the effect or thing caused Such as the cause is such for the moste part is the thing caused this holdeth not in destroying causes Particuler Canons of the efficient When many efficient causes ioine and concurre together in any action as the principall cause with other helpers and instrumentes there they all ioyntly together bée onely the full and perfect efficient cause of that effect Cause naturall voluntary accidentall violent God hath distributed to euery creature some naturall proprieties vertues and operations If the naturall vertue and propertie of any thing bée affirmed the naturall effect will follow vnlesse that naturall facultie bée otherwise let or hindered and if the effect bée the cause must also haue gone before If will and aduise or deliberation bée then the effect may bée Such as the naturall disposition and will is suche is the effect iudged to bée If the cause be in hazard that is if the cause bée to vs vncertaine and vnknowne then may the effect fall out vncertainely and by hazard or when wée looke not for it Alone and with others If the sole cause woorke continually the thing caused is alwayes if not then otherwise if the efficient doo necessarily require the helpe of others in woorking then without them nothing can bée doone if not then otherwise if it woorke by instrumentes then are those instrumentes required If the efficient woorke alone then it dserueth the more either prayse or condemnation if with others then the lesse so Nisus 9. Aeneid accuseth himselfe and excuseth Euryalus Me me adsum qui feci in me conuertite ferrum ô Rutuli mea fraus omnis nihil iste nec ausus Nec potuit Procreant conseruant No efficient cause except God can make any woorke without matter Hinc illud gigni E nihilo nihil in nihilum nil posse reuerti And if the matter bée the woorke may bée made If the procreant and conseruant cause bée the thing may bée procreated and conserued If the vndooing and destroiyng cause bée then must the thing decay If the cause efficient bée good the effect will bée good and bad if bad If the destroying cause bée good the thing destroyd was bad If the thing destroyed bée bad the cause destroying must bée good yâ— is to say hath doon some good hath brought some profit The efficient may bée expressed by variety both of Grammaticall cases and Rhetoricall figures as in procreant causes God is the father and fountayne and well of all goodnes The beginning of euery good thing is in of and from God From procreant causes the Poets doo oftentimes fetch their epithites circumloqutions as Sole satus Phaeton c. Phaeton borne of the sunne If you put downe or take away that is if you affirme or deny the cause efficient procreant and conseruant in tyme fit and conuenient to woorke and béeing not idle then the effect must bée put downe or taken away but diuersly according to the diuersitie of the causes themselues For If such a cause bée as that it woorketh of his owne proper force plainly and certainly no other thing helping it then must the effect follow certeinly Now let vs sée a little the vse of these Canons in comparison of the plaine definitions and explications of proprieties put downe by Ramus Let this serue for an example He that is idle is wanton But Paris is idle Therefore Paris is wanton In the proposition which is the first axiome of the thrée Idlenesse as a procreant cause doth argue Wantonnesse as his effect In the second axiome which maketh the assumption the same Wantonnesse is an adiunct of Paris that is a
a thing caused For first the finall cause the end purpose intent drift marke or scope as it were of the whole action is propounded to the efficient and so vrgeth and mooueth him to prepare the matter and apply the forme therevnto for the full accomplishing of the enterprise which beeing once performed the efficient cause now ceaseth as hauing obteined that it sought for And this béeing thus atchieued is not the finall cause but the thing caused As for example I purpose to sweate and therefore I daunce héere the sweating is not the finall cause but the intent and purpose which I had to sweate is the cause that mooued mée to daunce and so caused mée to sweate which sweating is the thing caused and although in vulgar spéech the vse of a thing and the end of the same thing bée confounded yet by art and reason they should bée distinguished the one a cause the other a thing caused If any man obiect that if wée say the end is onely the purpose of the efficient then this place will bée restrained to such things onely as vse reason and can purpose where all Logike must bée generall and applyable as well to Non ens as to Ens to that which is not as that which is they aunswere that wée néede not take this woord purpose or deliberation so strictly as to apply it onely to reasonable creatures but generally say that euery thing woorketh for some end and purpose whether it bée by natures instinct or voluntary consultation Or if this séeme more philosophicall then religious wée may say that in all artificiall thinges and such naturall things as haue no deliberation that which wée call the ende is but the thing caused by them and the cause finall is the purpose of God in naturall thinges and the intent of the artificer in things that bée artificiall Et finis mouet efficientem cogitatio de fine finis vt obiectum cogitatio de fine vt adiunctum agenti inhaerens sayth Piscator Some others make the finall cause to bée nothing but a part of the efficient and no distinct cause it selfe sith it onely mooueth the efficient to forward the operation The end is chiefe or subordinate chiefe which the efficient desireth for it selfe as the couetous man Riches and it is either vniuersall to the which all thinges in the world generally be referred as Gods glory or speciall whervnto euery thing in his kinde is referred as the house is the ende of the builder for hée séeketh no further Subordinate is that which is not for it selfe desired but referred to the chiefe end Canons If the ende bée then the thing must also be whose ende it is and if the ende cease to bée then the thing whose ende it was can no longer bée Euery thing is referred to his ende The end dooth eyther allow or disallow euery mans action Or thus that is good whose end was good and contrarily Sic Aristotle 3. Rhet. Laco cum rationem de Ephoratu in iudicio redderet rogatus an ipse alios iure perijsse existimaret assensus est Ille verò nonne haec tu cum illis decreuisti ille assensus est nonne igitur tu inquit peribis Minimè verò inquit illi enim pecunijs acceptis haec commiserunt ego verò nequaquam sed ex sententia The end is more to bée desired than those things that bée referred to the end He that séeketh the ende séeketh also those things that bée referred to the same end All the arguments that common Rhetoricians fetch from Honestum and Vtile are for the most part deriued from the end or finall cause sith for the cause of these two most things are enterprised In like maner the gesses and coniectures of Iudges are fet from the end as hée was most like to woorke the mischiefe who might haue any end or profit in practising of the same Whose vse is good that is good but not contrarily the thing is bad because it is abused The end dooth not alwaies follow the efficient cause eyther because the efficient could not accomplish the thing alone or els because hée would not Theloall lib. 7. cap. 2. Le finall intent del chescun que pursuyte briefe est ou a recouerer seisin ou possession de terre ou tenement ou d'auer â—…hose dont home peut auer heritage ou franktenement ou terme ou d'auer remedy et recoÌ„pence pur iniury et damage a luy auenue per le act ou non feasance d'un auter ou pur le non performance des contracts et obligations ou auters parts et causes que sont come contracts Home vient pur auower son atturney cest presence ne serra dit apparance car son intent ne fuit d'apperer al briefe c. 8. H. 7. 8. Abuses of causes Sophistry as I haue said elswhere is no Logike therefore least I should iniury the art by ioyning sophisticall fallacians with Logicall institutions I haue rather reserued them to these annotations then thrusted them in among the precepts Some vse I confesse there may bée had of them although I know that who so throughly perceaueth the truth of this art néedes to séeke no other meanes to auoyde these deceipts sith RectuÌ„ est index sui obliqui But if wée shall put downe euery thing in Logike which hath any litle shew of profite therevnto Grammer will be good Logike because it helpeth vs to vtter yâ— which wée haue Logically conceaued The woord Sophista was at the first a title of commendation and onely applyed vnto him that was a Philosopher or teacher of wisedome But now it is become odious as Tyrannus and such like Sophistry therefore is the abuse of Logike deceiuing the simple with a glorious shew of counterfeit reasons commonly called Fallacians Fallacians bée eyther in the woord or in the reason Fallacians in the woord bée of two sorts some in a simple woord some in the coniunction of woordes In a simple woord bée three The first is when vâ—…uall and vpstart woordes bée foisted in as hée putteth his felicitie in circumpugnable goods circumpugnabilibus bonis meaning Riches because men fight about them Le seignieur des Accords in his Bigarrures pag. 198. hath many of this making although somewhat more tollerable because of the ridiculous application Ils font saith hée speaking of some French Carminiâ—…cators de petitelettes descriptionettes qui soÌ„t fort agreabletets aux oreillettes delicatelettes principallettement des mignar delettes damoisellettes Come Ma nymphe follastrelette Ma follastre nymphelette And after Ie vous vens une goutette Vne goute clairelette Vne claire goutelette Qui vient d'une fontenette Miguarde fontenelette Fontaine mignardelette c. And page 65. of another sputatilicall goose he saith thus Un certayne predicant qui veuloit Pindariser en chaire et choisir des mots courtisans pour applaudir a quelques damoiselles fraischemeÌ„t reuenues de la cour auoit coustume â—…e â—…uenter
force de plusours fayts Annotations THis argument of the thing caused conteyneth not onely déedes and woorkes but also thoughtes and woordes counsayles and deliberations and all motions whatsoeuer Parmenio the father and Philotas the sonne were both put to death for suspicion of treason against Alexander Where their cogitation and compassing of their Souereignes death were such effectes as were plagued by death For like occasion also were Lentulus Cethegus and other complices of Catyline brought to confusion Yet when sayinges writinges counsayles and deliberations bée brought in as testimonies then are they argumentes borrowed assumpta aliunde Canons Wée commend men by their causes and adiuncts as for their noble auncestors great possessions c. but especially by reason of their effectes as for that they did this or this c. Nam genus proauos quae non fecimus ipsi Vix ea nostra voco And as for Riches perinde sunt as hée that vseth them good if hée apply them well bad if otherwise If the thing caused bée then the cause eyther is or was but not alwayes contrarily Such as the thing caused is such commonly is the cause That which is attributed or not attributed to the thing caused must bée applyed or not applyed to the cause Fit Cor. 22. E. 3. p. 26. Thorpe recita coment vn gaoler vient al gaole oue vn lanterne en sa maine a veier ses prisoners queux auoyent debruse lour fers et estoyeÌ„t touts prests d'auer occise luy et batoyent et naufroyent luy malement mes il auoyt vn hatchet en sa maine oue quelle il occist trois de eux et puis eschapa et fuit aiudge per tout le counsell que il auoyt bien fayt Stanford lib. 1. ca. 9. Nota que en auncient temps la volunt fuit cy materiall que il fuit repute pur le fait Fit Cor. 15. E. 3. P. 383. ou vn compassant le mort d'auter luy naufraâ—…y gréeuousement que il luy lessa giser pur mort et pius s'enfua et l'auter reuiua et non obstant fuit aiudge felony 〈◊〉 quant sa volunt apiert cy ouertment de luy auer tue voluntas reputabitur pro facto et oue ceo accorda Bracton qui dit In maleficijs spectatur voluntas non exitus nihil interest vtrum quis occidat an causam mortis praebeat Mes le ley n'est issint a cestiour Car il doyt morir en fayt auant que il serra aiudge felony Et si home ferist auter oue intent de luy bater mes nemy a luy tuer vncore sil morust de tiel bater il est felony en luy que ferist perque a cest iour home peut conuerter le dit tert de Bracton et dire que Exitus in maleficijs spectatur non voluntas dundaxat Elenchs Martiall vseth this argument sophistically in his first booke Extemporalis factus est meus Rhetor Calphurnium non scripsit salutauit As though this were an affect of an extemporall Rhetor to salute a man by name without premeditation But here hys meaning was to bée merry in taunting the man for his ill memory who could skarce remember his familiar friendes name vnlesse hée had written it before and learned it without booke The sixt Chapter Of the whole part generall speciall HItherto of the first diuision of argumentes fully agréeable in the cause and the thinge caused Now followeth the second Secondly therefore the argument fully agréeable is eyther the whole and his part or els the generall and his speciall The whole is that which conteyneth partes the part is that which is conteyned of the whole The whole is integrall or vniuersall The whole integral is that which hath his essence or béeing of the partes as Logike hath two partes exposition of argumentes and disposition of the same and of these two parts the whole essence and nature of Logike confisteth So a messuage is made of two partes del terre et structure And héere the part is called a member and is that which giueth essence to the whole as Exposition and Disposition in respect of Logike terre and structure in respect of a messuage The whole vniuersall called the general is such a whole as giueth the essence or béeing to his specials as an Inherent argument is the generall conteyning originall arguments and those yâ— are secondary as his specials For here an inherent argument is a whole essence which dooth equally perteyne to originall arguments and such as are secondary The speciall is a part of the generall as arguments first and secondary are specials of an Inherent argument as being parts put vnder it indifferently and equally or alike The general is eyther most generall or subalternall the speciall is either most speciall or subalternall that is put vnder The chiefe or moste generall is that which hath no generall aboue As in Logicall Inuention an argument is the most generall comprising both Inherent and borrowed argumentes vnder it The generall and speciall subalternall or vnder another are those which may bée in diuers respects both generals and specials generals in respect of their inferiors specials in respect of their superiors as a cause is a speciall in respect of an argument fully agréeable but it is a generall in respect of the materiall or formall cause The most speciall is that which cannot be deuided into specials as this or that singuler materiall or formall cause conteining none other vnder it Generals are certayne resemblances of causes in themselues comprehended as specials are of effects Speciall examples referred to their generals belong to this place Annotations HOttoman Totum partes vtrum prius an posterius sunt anne simul primum distinctio adhibenda est vt aliud sit totum naturale veluti arbor fundus auis equus aliud artificiosum veluti domus nauis currus si naturale totum est verissimum est quod Aristoteles libro de natura octauo scribiâ—… prius esse naturae temporis rationis ordine id quod perfectum est eo quod est inchoatum sin autem artificiosum est tum eiusdem Aristotelis monitu altera distinctio adhibenda est vtrum subtiliter artis ratione an populariter ex sermonis consuetudine disseratur Nam quia subtili ratione ea demum pars verè proprièque dicitur quae suo munere fungitur fungi autem suo munere nisi suo toti inhaerens non potest certè totum pars naturae ac temporis ordine simul sint necesse est Nam vbi est domus ibi necesse est esse tectum vbi tectum reuera tegens ibi necesse est esse domum vbi currus ibi rota vbi rota reuera actu voluens est ibi currus sin autem populariter loquamur homonymia id est communione nominis abutamur tum verò pars dicetur esse prior totum verò
himselfe by naturall instinct that which artificiall Logike doth prescribe in her seuerall rules and constitutions Artificiall Logike then is the polyshing of natural wit as discouering the validitie of euerie reason bée it necessary wherof cometh science or contingent whence procéedeth opinion Although I knowe there is a great controuersie and contention among the auncient Philosophers concerning these two whilest some of them mayntayne onely Science some others holde with opinion onely Heraclitus called opinion the falling sicknesse for that thereby men many times fell headlong into diuers delusions and erronious conceiptes So in like maner the Stoikes held this for one of their Paradoxes that Sapiens nihil opinatur a wise man is not opinatiue a wise man neuer iudgeth according to opinion On the other side Anaxarchus was of this opinion that all mans iudgment was but opinion and that his vnderstanding coulde perfitly vnderstand nothing which the Pyrrhonians taught after him and the new Academikes and a man may coniecture that Plato and Aristotle sometimes inclyned that way for Plato in his booke called Timaeus ascribeth truth to God and Gods children leauing nothing but truelike to mortall men and Aristotle in the second of his Metaphisikes compareth mans vnderstanding in respect of perfect knowledge of trueth to the dazeling eyes of a Batt in the broade day light But yet notwithstanding these forealledged places both Plato and Aristotle haue elsewhere euidently declared that man is capable both of Science and certayne Knowledge as in thinges contayned in Arts and also of opinion as in infinit affaires which are dayly incident and this was long before their tyme elegantly put downe by the famous Poet and Logician Parmenides 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Oportet verò te omnia nosse Tùm veritatis suasufacilis sententiam Tùm verò mortalium opiniones quarum non amplius fidâ—…s vera Because of these two kinds of conceiptes Aristotle wouldâ—… néedes make two Logikes the one for Science the other for Opinion wherein if so it may be sayde of so great a Philosopher it séemeth hée was but an Opinator For although among thinges conceaued and knowne some bée necessary and vnfallible some doubtfull and contingent yet the Arte of Knowing and Reasoning of the same I meane Logike is only one and the same as the sight of the eye in perceyuing all colours bée they chaungeable or not chaungeable And aswell might a man say there must be two arts of Grammer if Grammer bée a distinct Art one for courtly spéeche an other for country talke or two distinct arts of making of cups one for golden cuppes an other for cuppes of siluer as two Logikes one for vnfallible Argumentes and another for Contingent Therefore one Logike suffiseth to dispute of all thinges necessary or contingent whatsoeuer Yet this one Logike her selfe in respect of her preceptes is alway necessary and neuer contingent for otherwise it were no Art but the application of it may bée in contingent causes aswell as necessary Two partes of Logike The Stoicall diuision of Logike into Inuention and Iudgement although both Aristotle himselfe séeme to commend it in some places as in 8. Topi. 3 Rhet and Tully and Quintilian doo altogether obserue it is yet reprehended of some who thinke that Iudgement is not any seuerall part of Logike but rather an adiâ—…ct or propertie generally incident to the whole Art because say they there is vse of iudgement euen in inuention But in my fancie they might better haue founde some fault with these wordes Iudgement and Inuention then reprehended the distribution which is most true if they consider what the Stoikes did vnderstand by these woordes For by the first part called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 they intend the explication of the diuers kindes natures affections relations and proprieties of seuerall argumentes which because it helpeth inuention is called Inuention as I sayd before although indéede a man shall no more finde argumentes by this first part â—…f Logike then hée shall get Latine woords by Etymologie the first part of Grammer which made me alter the woords as not proper but rather borowed from the Mathematikes where two or thrée numbers being receiued or put downe a third or fourth number proportionable is found out which of them is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Inuention And by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Iudicium Iudgement is meant nothing els but a Disposition ordering or placing and setling of these seuerall argumentes alreadie inuented to the intent that a man may the better iudge of them so that here Iudgement is taken for Disposition the effect for the cause for Iudgement ariseth of the ordering and disposing of arguments They might therefore haue chaunged the woordes and kept the thing which yet they haue not done but brought in new diuisions of Logike correspondent to the setling and placing of Aristotles Logicall discourses in his booke called Organon sometimes into thrée partes as Apodicticall Topicall Elenchticall sometimes into two by name Apodicticall and Dialecticall Topicall or Dialecticall they will haue to bée a seuerall kinde of Logike by probable argumentes Apodicticall that which disputeth by necessary conclusions as though there were not one and the same Art Science and order of reasoning both by probable and necessary argumentes as I sayde before and the selfe same places of argumentes both in the one and in the other as causes effectes subiectes adiuncts c. both contingent and necessary For as for that third kinde of Logike which they call Elenchticall séeing it is no Logike at all but rather the abuse and peruersion of Logike I sée no cause why it shoulde be taught in Logike yet if any man thinke that the true preceptes of Logike once knowne will not be sufficient to desâ—…ry the falsenesse of sophisticall argumentations he may for his contentation séeke for a full discourse thereof out of some commentarie and not ouercharge the Art it selfe with vnnecessary institutions I graunt there is something profitable in the Elenches as also in some other tractates of the same kind but if wée shall put downe all in Logike for true Logike which doth in any respect helpe Logike wée shall neuer make an ende of Logike Exposition is the first part As in Grammer Aetymologie concerneth seuerall woords and Syntaxis the due coherence of the same so Exposition the first part of Logike declareth the particular affection and nature of euery seuerall argument and Disposition the second part by ordering and setling the same causeth iudgement and vnderstanding And as seuerall woords bée in respect of Grammer so seuered reasons in respect of Logike and as of many woords is made spéech so of diuers arguments arise axioms Exposition and Disposition are not two seuerall arts of Logike as though wée should haue one Logike to expound the natures of seuerall arguments and another to iudge of the same by Disposition but they bée two essentiall parts of the whole
entende vn act de Parlement s. l'assent de les seigniors de les comons et de le roy et l'un ou deux sans le tierce ne fait ceo vn act Car eomentque les seigniors et comons agrée al chose vncore n'est act tanque le roy ad assent auxi Cause en compaigne Cause procreant Fol. 214. Adonques icy en le principal case le roy Henry le quart fuit fits et heyre a Iohn de Gaunt que fuit vn des fits le roy Edward le tierce et fuit auxi fits et heyre al Blaunch feme del dit Iohn de Gaunt que fuit file et heyre Henry Duke de Lancaster Issintque le Duchy de Lancaster vient aldit Henry le quart per disceÌ„t del part sa mere Folio 242. b. Car del heure que tout iustice tranquilitie et repose est deryue del roy come del fountaine de ceo le ley eâ—… tous ses besoignes et choses luy fauour come le chiefe test del ceo Cause conseruant Fol. 315. b. le roy est le test del bien publique et les subiects ses membres et l'office le roy que le ley a luy appoynt est de preseruer ses subiects The matter is the cause of the which a thing is made So in August Willy sheweth what matter his cup was made of thus Then lo Perigot the pledge which I plight Amazer ywrought of the maple warre In December Collyn in his complaint Where I was woont to seeke the honny Bee Woorking her formall roomes in waxen frame The grisly toadestoole growne there might I see And loathed paddocks lording on the same Againe And learn'de of lighter timber coats to frame Such as might saue my sheep me fro shame Againe To make fine cages for the Nightingale And baskets of bulrushe was my woont Maister Plowden Fol. 15. b. Les vlnes del panne sont le mater del toge Annotations ARistotle sometimes calleth the efficient the beginning of motion and rest as in the first of his Metaphysikes and second of his Physikes And otherwhiles hée vseth this very name Efficient as in his Topikes and Demonstrations The auncient Philosophers made great discourses concerning this cause but some very fabulous sayth Aristotle 3. Metap As Hesiodus and Parmenides made Loue the maker of all things some obscure and ambiguous as Hermotimus and Anaxagoras sayde that a certaine diuyne spirite was the author of all so Empedocles giues all to Concord Discord and diuers others to other diuers things Wherfore Aristotle compareth them to yoong fresh souldiers and vnexperienced fellowes that many times hit home and lay on loade but without eyther artor order 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Gréeke is a cause in English It is somtimes taken generally for any reason or argument by common custome and vse of spéech but héere it hath a more speciall and proper signification and conteyneth onely these foure kinds of causes following 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 bée very significant woords to expresse the cause and that which is made of the cause The Latinistes haue none so good vnlesse you take that dunsicall deriuation Causa Causatum which wée imitate in English to very good purpose thus the cause and the thing caused Where as the woord Cause comprehendeth efficient materiall formall and finall cause so the thing caused aunswering 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Gréeke and Causatum in Latine conteyneth the seuerall effectes of euery particuler cause as proportionably wée may say the ende and the thing whose end it is the forme and the thing formed the maker and the thing made the matter and the thing materiate For otherwise although in Latine Effectum doo stand for all foure yet properly it onely betokeneth that which is caused by the efficient For thus wée may distinguishe the seuerall vertues of the foure causes although I knowe they all concurre togither in causing so that the constitution of the thing caused is not fet from this or that alone but from all foure ioyntly Foelix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas sayth Virgill For although by effects and other arguments wée may haue a probable gesse and make sensible coniectures at thinges yet no true science or knowledge is had but from the causes By the effectes and euentes wée sée 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that thinges bée so but by the causes wée knowe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 why they be so and that is onely woorthy the name of knowledge These diuers sortes and distinctions of efficients are greatly to bée considered in dayly affaires as containing in them the reason of the well or ill dooing of any thing of all punishments rewards excuse compassion c. Omnis procreatio conseruatio fit natura consilio per se vel per accidens itaque illa primo haec postremo in loco collocaui Naturally So all naturall thinges bée made marde augmented diminished altered and remooued from place to place by this operation of nature I sayd before that the efficient was rather distinguished then artificially deuided For in trueth the preseruing cause is the efficient rather of the preseruation it selfe than of the thing preserued And the instrumentall cause as it is an instrument is no efficient at all but rather a helping member or part of the efficient sith it hath no power in it selfe to cause the thing caused Causa sine qua non is of some referred to helping causes Occasio est agendi tempestiuitas siue opportunitas casu oblata quod postremum ex nominis etymologia intelligitur reliquum ex appellationibus graecis 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 quorum nominum extremum notat tempus vnde agens initium agendi facit quod graecè expressius sonat 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 videtur occasio esse causa per accidens sed diuersa ab illis duabus a Ramo positis Aristotle in the second of his Physikes distinguisheth betwéene Fortune and Chaunce as making Fortune properly incident to those efficients onely which woorke with aduise and deliberation yet then vse it not and this is called Imprudentia when wée doo a thing vnawares But Chaunce hée will haue that to bée which is found in things void of such deliberation So that if a man should call the stones that couer some honourable personage fortunate for that they bée somewhat honored this were but an vnproper kind of speaking by Aristotles rule A man goeth towards Westminster to talke with his couÌ„seller and misseth of him héere his going was in vaine but in going hée findeth a ringe His going to Westminster was the cause of the finding of the ringe but yet such a cause as wée call Fortune or Haphazard So Ouid excuseth himselfe for seeing somewhat more than hée should before he would Cur aliquid vidi cur noxia lumina feci Cur imprudenti cognita culpa mihi est Inscius Actaeon vidit sine
practised in England continually it may appeare by the discourse of Bracton who wrote in king Henry the thirds time in this manner Est enim inter alia crimina crimen quod ex parte tangit ipsum regem cuius pax infringitur et ex parte priuatam personam quae nequiter contra pacem regis occiditur Vnde primò videndum est de homicidio quid sit vnde dicatur quae eius species qua poena homicidae punientur Est enim homicidium hominis occisio ab homine facta Si autem à boue cane vel alia re non dicitur propriè homicidiuÌ„ Dicitur propriè homicidium ab homine caedo quasi hominis cedium Species homicidij sunt multae Nam aliud spirituale aliud corporale de spirituali verò ad praesens non est dicendum Sed corporale est quo homo occiditur corporaliter hoc dupliciter committitur lingua facto Lingua tribus modis s. praecepto consilio defensione vel tuitione Facto quatuor modis s. iustitia vt cum iudex vel iusticiarius reum iustè damnatum occidit Istud autem homicidium si fit ex liuore vel delectatione effundendi humani sanguinis licet ille iustè occidatur iudex tamen peccat mortaliter propter intentioneÌ„ corruptam Si verò hoc fiat ex amore iustitiae nec peccat iudex ipsum condemnando ad mortem praecipiendo ministro vt occidat eum nec minister si iussus à iudice occidat condemnatum Et peccat vterque si hoc fecerint iuris ordine non seruato Necessitate quo casu distinguendum est vtrum necessitas illa fuit ineuitabilis an non Si autem euitabilis eam euadere potuisset occisor absque occi sione tune erit reus homicidij Si autem ineuitabilis quia occidit hominem sine odij meditatione in metu dolore animi se sua de liberando cum aliter euadere non potuisset non tenetur homicidij Casu sicut per infortunium cum quis proijcit lapidem ad auem vel animal alius transiens ex insperato percutitur moritur Vel siquis arborem inciderit per occasum arboris aliquis opprimatur huiusmodi Sed hic distinguendum est vtrum quis dederit operam rei licitae an illicitae vt si lapidem proijciebat quis versus locum per quem consueuerunt homines transitum facere vel dum insequitur quis equum vel bouem aliquis à boue vel equo percussus fuerit huiusmodi hîc imputatur ei Si verò licitae rei operam dabat vt si magister causa disciplinae discipulum verberauit vel dum quis deponebat foenum de curru vel arborem incidebat huiusmodi adhibuit diligentiam quam potuit s. respiciendo proclamando nec nimis tardè aut dimissè sed tempore congruo ita clamosè vt si aliquis ibi fuisset vel illuc venisset potuisset aufugere aut sibi praecauere non imputabitur ei 〈◊〉 â—…is est de magistro non excedendo modum verberandi â—…ipulum Voluntate vt siquis ex certa scientia in assultu praemedâ—…tato ira vel odio vel causa lucri nequiter in felonia contra pacem domini regis aliquem interfecerit Et fit aliquando huâ—…smodi homicidium pluribus astantibus videntibus aliquando verò clanculum nemine vidente itá vt sciri non possit quis sit occisor huiusmodi homicidium dici poterit murdâ—…m secundum quod inferius dicetur Poena verò homicidij duplex est spiritualis videlicet corporalis spiritualis tollitur per poenitentiam Et occidit quis alium dupliciter quandoque lingua quandoque facto Lingua vt si quis dissuadendo retrahit aliquem à proposito volentem alium liberare à morte Et sic aliquandò indirectè facit quis homicidium Poena verò homicidij commissi facto variatur Nam pro homicidio iustitiae iusta recta intentione facto non est aliqua poena infligenda Si sit aliquis qui mulierem pregnantem percusserit vel ei venenum dederit per quod fecerit abortiuum si puerperium iam formatum vel animatum fueriâ—…t maximè si animatum facit homicidium Mes contrarium tenetur Fitz. cor P. 263. 146. Car a faire homicide il est requisite que le chose occise soit in rerum natura Possunt multi-culpabiles esse homicidij sicut vnus vt si plures rixati fuerint inter se in aliquo conflictu aliquis sit interfectus inter tales nec apparet à quo vel à cuius vulnere omnes dici possunt homicidae illi qui percusserunt tenuerunt malo animo percussum dum percussus fuerit Item illi qui voluntate occidendi venerunt licet non percusserint Item illi qui non occiderunt nec voluntateÌ„ occidendi habuerunt sed venerunt ad praestandum auxilium consilium occisoribus c. Item ille qui praecepit percutere occidere quia cum non sint immunes à culpa immunes esse non debent à poena I haue written the whole discourse for that there is herein conteined the practise of most of these precepts concerning efficient causes Héerevnto may bée added also our Essoynes de malo lecti del creteine del eawe c. as standing all vpon the same grounds of violent and compulsiue causes and therefore in themselues reasonable excuses of absence Ceux parols Heyres tantsolement font l'estate d'enheritance en touts feofmeÌ„ts et grauÌ„ts Litleton pag. 1. for the sole cause So agayne Littleton fol. 166. a. Home ne voyt vnques que cest paroll Defendemus fuit en ascun fine mes tantsolement cest paroll Warrantizabimus Perque semble que cest paroll et verbe Warrantizo fait la Garrrantie et est la cause del Garrantie et null auter verbe en nostre ley For the destroying cause Vide 47. E. 3. fol. vltimo Nota que diuorce poet estre per cinque voyes s. Causa professionis praecontractus coÌ„sanguinitatis affinitatis frigiditatis Et nota que apres diuorce causa professionis le feme serra endowe et le heyre inherite mes en auters cases el ne serra endowe ne le heyre inherite Here diuorce is a dissolution of matrimony and the constitution of the one is the destruction of the other For instrumentall causes sée 21. E. 4. 16. per Brigges Qui fait per auter fait per Luymesme Come de seruant c. et Fayrfax la. 44. b. For voluntary aduise and deliberation 41. E. 3. 30. per Finche Si deux sont vouche per lour fayt demesne et al sequatur sub suo periculo l'un vient et l'auter fayt defaut et le tenant surmit que cestuy que fist defaut n'ad rien de fayre en value il auera l'entiere garrantie
ne serra en son disaduantage adiudg vn entre car il auera assise del primer disseisin et recouera damages del primer iour del assise car son entent fuit de faire claime et nyent de prendre profit ou de expeller le tenant tout ousterment et de custodier le possession et issint lintent del vener sur le terre est destre respect Annotations THe formall and materiall cause bée essentiall partes of the thing caused the end and the efficient are not so The forme is alwaies made by the efficient the matter is commonly prepared not alwayes made by it as the quill is the matter whereof a pen is made here the maker of the pen dooth but order polish and prepare the quill but hée altogether maketh the forme and fashion of the pen. And although forma bée effectum efficientis yet it is causa formati Dicitur forma à formando differentia verò quia differre facit vna enim eademque res est etsi diuersa nomina and according to these two names hath Aristotle in the first of his Topiks assigned it two properties The one for giuing essence and knowledge of the same essence the other for causing difference And in respect of the former it is sometimes called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 quod quid erat esse as 1. post Sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ratio essentiae 1. de ortu animal sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 essentia rei 1. Philo sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â—…atio specifica essentialis 4. Phil sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 specifica completiua constitutiua as in Porphyry and sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 forma ratio sometimes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 species exemplar 5. Phil. In consideration of the latter propriety it is commonly called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 differentia for that especially by the forme things differ one from another so the formall cause of man is his reasonable soule for this maketh man to bée man and to differ from all other thinges that bée not man So euâ—…y naturall thing hath his peculiar forme as a lyon a horse a trée c. the heauen the earth the sea c. So euery artificiall thing also as a house a shippe c. So things incorporall as vertue vice c. So in a woord whatsoeuer is by the formall cause it is that which it is and is different from all other things that it is not Onely the forme among all other causes is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 simul congenita extant at the same instant with the thing formed so that there is a most necessary and reciprocall consequence betwéene the forme and the thing formed But now as the vnderstanding of the formall cause causeth surest knowledge so hardly can wée vnderstand what the formall cause is which peraduenture made Democritus thinke that truth lay hidden in the bottome and plunged in the déepe Indéede wée generally conceaue and gather that euery particular thing hath his peculiar forme but what is the peculiar forme of euery particular thing that we know not or if peraduenture wée gesse at them now and then yet hardly can wée expresse our conceits with laboursome and tedious circumlocutions So that for the most part things bée not knowne and if they bée in part perceiued then haue wée no nameâ—… for the thinges Here therefore the auntient philosophers were woonderfully troubled as Aristotle reporteth 2. Meta. Pythagoras would haue his numbers to bée yâ— cause of things and that euery thing was an image or resemblance of numbers and Plato altered their woordes a little saying that Idaea was the forme and that thinges formed were communications and participations of Idaeas of whome Aristotle concludeth thus that they valdè simpliciter imperitè egerunt hée seemed but nugari poeticas metaphoras loqui Canons IF you remooue the forme it is impossible for the thing formed to consist Such is euery thing as the forme permitteth it to bée The forme is the fountayne of actions The forme of euery thing is the especial part of the thinge and the alteration of the forme chaungeth the thing formed and maketh it an other thing but héere wée must distinguish betwéene the vniuersall chaunging of the forme and the particuler alteration thereof For if a house bée vtterly defaced though it bée reediâ—…ied of the selfe same timber and stone yet it is not the same house but if it bée but a litle decayed and so repayred in part it remayneth the same house still though in continuance of time euery stick and stone bée altered by often repayring of it The formall cause is generall as all other partes of Logike For the declaration whereof I will purposely note out some examples of the formall cause in actions and exercises aswell as thinges corporall Formalitie in pleading is now partly abridged by the statutes of 32. H. 8. ca. 20. 18. Elis. ca. 14. and 27. Elis. but how much it was estéemed heretofore sée 14. H. 8. 27. per Brooke Iustice. Car vn forme couyent d'estre tenus et vse ou auterment touts choses serra en confuse et sans order Car en trespasse couyent doner colour et vncore le sentence n'est le melieur en le veritie del matter pur ceoque est formalitie Et a vne plée en l'affirmatiue couyent prendre auerment et si soit en le negatiue couyent concluder al negatiue et ceo n'est forsque formalitie et formalitie est le pluis chiefe chose en nostre ley And the booke of Entries standeth all vpon formall precidents of declarations barres replications reioynders surreioynders rebutters issues verdites iudgements executions processe continuances essoynes c. Brytton whose booke was published in Edward the first both time and name Fol 42. describeth the order and forme of battayle but somewhat discrepant from the forme described 17. E. 3. and 19. H. 4. In 11. H. 6. 7. the ioyning of battayle in a writ of right is solempnly set downe betwéene sir Piers Colts and the Earle of Northumberland for the maner of Capenhow Sée 14. E. 4. 8. the forme of punishment called Fort et dure pronounced in Newgate by Iustice Needham vide 8. H. 4. 2. Finall cause Ramus in his French Logike placeth the end first sith according to Aristotle in the second of his Physikes the ende is first in conceipt and consideration though last in execution But in the last edition of his Latine Logike hée setteth it in the last place respecting rather finem rei then efficientis scopum intentionem which last resolution of his I follow at this present yet not so resolutely but that I can bée content to heare their aduise who bid vs take héede that we confound not the finall cause with the thing caused which wée shall the better doo say they if wée consider exactly the order and due coherence of the foure causes in the absolute constitution of
nuper vir car vir est correlatiue al feme et ne poet estre vir nisi in respectu vxoris c. 31. 32. H. 8. 3. Dyer Il ne est possible que vn person poet estre souereigne et subiect 4. Elis. 22. Dyer That which agréeth with one of the Relatiues commonly agréeth with the other as if it bée honest to teach it is no shame to learne Relatiues in our law bée as seignior tenant paramount per auayle playntife defendant demandant tenant garde gardeine feffor feffée donor donée grauntor grauntée lessor lessée disseisor disseisée conuser conusée baron feme c. Repugnants If one repugnant argument bée denyed the other must bée affirmed if there bée no third thing put betwéene them Although Contraries cannot bée applyed vnto the same thing yet the same thing may be applied vnto contraries Priuatiues Priuatiues they call those whereof one denieth onely in that subiect wherevnto the affirmatiue agréeth by nature affirmatiue is that which dooth affirme and lay down some thing to bée or imagined to bée and héere the affirmatiue is called the habite the negatiue the priuation thereof A stone therefore cannot bée called blinde for that it was neuer framed of nature to bée capable of sight but it may bée called not séeing Crompton Fol. 29. Home tua auter quant est ebrius il serra pendus quant est sober Priuatiues be In prison alarg compos mentis non sane memorie auengle surde mute c. Priuatio praesupponit habitum vnde illa consectaria non videtur rem amittere cuius propria non fuit Non potest videri desisse habere qui nunquam habuit Quod quis si velit habere non potest id repudiare non potest Eius est non velle qui potest velle Expressa nocent non expressa non nocent Qui tacet non vtique fatetur sed tamen verum est eum non negare Cum architecti quidam palatium aedificarent in via publica cum proiecto lapide proclamassent quidam iter illac faciens lapide vulneratus architectos omnes in ius vocauit ab his consultus Pyleus animaduertit eos probare non posse quod proclamassent itaque non ius ait deficit sed probatio Cum igitur cras in iuditium veneritis cauete ne verbum proferatis sed me solum loqui sinatis die igitur iudicij constituto cum à iudice accusationi respondere iussi essent Pyleus illos vt mutos excusaret ibi aduersarius id pernegare caepit quoniam ipsos cum vulneraretur clamantes audisset vt sibi caueret quae verba Pyleus statim ad acta referri iussit ita eos à lite liberauit Baldus in sua pract tit de cautelis As for contradictories it were vtterly impertinent to make any discourse of them in this place as wholy belonging to axiomaticall disposition wherevnto all contradictions are naturally incident howsoeuer Beurhusius distinguish in this case Elenchs In relatiues Omnia castor emis fic fiet vt omnia vendaâ—… Martiall Indéed if Castor buy all some body must néeds sel all but it followeth not that therefore Castor must sell all In Repugnant Whitenes is a colour therefore blackenes is no colour It followeth not For as I sayd before contraries generally are not such of the which one and the same thing cannot bée affirmed but such as cannot be affirmed of one and the same thing So in Relatiues Tibullus lib. 1. At vos exiguo pecori furesque lupique Parcite de magno est praeda petenda grege It followeth not that because a pray is to bée taken of a great flocke therefore nothing is to bée taken of a little one So in Priuatiues Hee that seeth is aliue therefore Hee that is blinde is dead The 12. Chapter Of secondary Argumentes THus much of originall and first arguments The secondary remayneth which is made of the ioyning togither of the first and argueth as the first doe from whence it is deriued as the cause therefore argueth absolutely so such secondary arguments as are made of the cause and so in the rest according as their seuerall kinde of arguing is The Argument made of the first is eyther Distribution or Definition Annotations RAmus to these two which I haue put downe addeth other two Coniugates and Notation as argumentes made of the first As for Coniugates I sée in them no new different force of arguing as hée is iust for hée dealeth iustly héere is nothing in effect but the cause and the effect For as for the deriuation of this woord Iuste from Iustice it séemeth altother grammaticall and whereas they both doo fitly allude in she ende and falling thus Iustice Iust Iustly that commeth from a Rhetoricall figure called Polyptoton which concerneth the elegancie that is in the diuers fallinges and terminations of woords So in Notation the interpretation of the name séemeth rather the dutie of a dictionary then of any Logicall institution as Argumentum ab arguendo where againe there is no force of arguing but from the cause and the thing caused For as for the pretty and co nceipted chaunge of the woord argumentum ab arguendo it séemeth also a Rhetoricall agnomination yet as not fully resolued héerein I leaue them in these Annotations Coniugates or offspringes bée woordes diuersly deriued from one head as Iustice Iust Iustly hée dealeth Iustly therefore hée is iust The primitiue woord conteineth the cause of his offsprings as here Iustice of iust dealing Aristotle commendeth this place highly 7. topie Canons If you put downe or remooue one Coniugate you must put downe or remooue the other That which is giuen or taken to or from the one is giuen or taken to or from the other but here Contingency is more vsuall then necessitie therefore héede is to bée taken in distinguishing the one from the other In 4. H. 7. 9. b. Un briefe de partitione facienda del terre et rent fuit port Et Keble pleade pur le rent que le def fuit sole seisie sans ceo que il tient pro indiuiso oue le pl. et per Bryan cest bon plée car il n'auera partition del chose dont il ne ad ascun parte Coniugates from the cause Terence in Hecyra Act. 3. scoen 4. Dedecet iam ira haec etsi meritò iratus es This anger becomes you not although you haue cause to bée angry From the thing caused Tully in his oration for his house Primum dico Senatoris esse boni in Senatum venire First I say it is the part of a good Senator to come into the Senate house From the subiect Tully to Atticus Quia homo es humana tibi ferenda est ratio Because thou art a man thou must beare such thinges as are incident to men From the adiunct Tully in his epistles Rege interfecto regios omnes nutus tuemur The king béeing killed wée mainteine euery kingly becke and