Selected quad for the lemma: cause_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
cause_n	bad_a	good_a	reason_n	1,431	5	5.5448	4	false

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ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A62636	Several discourses upon the attributes of God viz. Concerning the perfection of God. Concerning our imitation of the divine perfections. The happiness of God. The unchangeableness of God. The knowledge of God. The wisdom, glory, and soveraignty of God. The wisdom of God, in the creation of the world. The wisdom of God, in his providence. The wisdom of God, in the redemption of mankind. The justice of God, in the distribution of rewards and punishments. The truth of God. The holiness of God. To which is annexed a spital sermon, of doing good. By the most reverend Dr. John Tillotson, late Lord Arch-Bishop of Canterbury. Being the sixth volume; published from the originals, by Raph Barker, D.D. chaplain to his grace.	Tillotson, John, 1630-1694.; Barker, Ralph, 1648-1708.	1699 (1699)	Wing T1264; ESTC R219315	169,861	473

which relate to the Divine Vnderstanding viz. Knowledge and Wisdom I come now to consider those which relate to the Divine Will viz. these four the Justice the Truth the Goodness and the Holiness of God I begin with the First namely the Justice of God At the 17 verse of this chapter God by a great and wonderful Condescention of his goodness reveals to Abraham his Intention concerning the Destruction of Sodom upon this Abraham v. 23. interceded with God for the saving of the Righteous Persons that were there and to this end he Pleads with God his Justice and Righteousness with which he apprehended it to be in consistent to destroy the Righteous with the wicked which without a Miracle could not be avoided in a general Destruction Wilt thou also destroy the Righteous with the Wicked Peradventure there be fifty Righteous within the City wilt thou also destroy and not spare the place for the fifty Righteous that are therein that be far from thee to do after this manner to slay the Righteous with the Wicked and that the Righteous should be as the Wicked that be far from thee shall not the Judge of all the Earth do right This Negative Interrogation is equivalent to a vehement affirmation shall not the Judge all the Earth do right that is undoubtedly he will This we may take for a certain and undoubted Principle that in the distribution of rewards and punishments the Judge of the World will do Righteously So that the Argument that lies under our Consideration is the Justice of God in the distribution of Rewards and Punishments for the clearing of which we will consider it First In Hypothesi in regard to the particular Case which is here put by Abraham in the Text. Secondly In Thesi we will consider it in General in the Distribution of Rewards and Punishments First We will consider it in Hypothesi in regard to the particular Case which is here put by Abraham in the Text and the rather because if we look well into it there is something of real Difficulty in it not easie to be cleared for Abraham's reasoning if it be true does plainly Conclude that it would have been unrighteous with God in the destruction of Sodom not to make a difference between the Righteous and the Wicked but to involve them equally in the same common Destruction That be far from thee to do after this manner to slay the Righteous with the Wicked and that the Righteous should be as the Wicked that be far from thee shall not the Judge of all the Earth do right as if he had said surely the Judge of all the Earth will never do so unrighteous a Thing And yet notwithstanding this we see it is very usual for the Providence of God to involve good Men in general Calamities and to make no visible difference between the Righteous and the Wicked Now the difficulty is how to reconcile these appearances of Providence with this reasoning of Abraham in the Text. And for the doing of this I see but one possible way and that is this that Abraham does not here speak concerning the Judgments of God which befal Men in the ordinary Course of his Providence which many times happen promiscuously and involve good and bad Men in the same ruine and the reason hereof is Plain because God in his ordinary Providence does permit the Causes which produce these Judgments to Act according to their own Nature and they either cannot or will not make any distinction for the Calamities which ordinarily happen in the World are produced by two sorts of Causes either those which we call Natural or those which are Voluntary Natural Causes such as Wind and Thunder and Storms and the infection of the Air and the like these acting by a Necessity of Nature without any Knowledge or Choice can make no distinction between the Good and the Bad. And the Voluntary Causes of Calamities as Men are they many times will make no difference between the Righteous and the Wicked nay many times they are Maliciously bent against the Righteous and the effects of their Malice fall heaviest upon them Now we say that things happen in the way of ordinary Providence when Natural Causes are permitted to Act according to their Nature and Voluntary Causes are left to their Liberty and therefore in the course of ordinary Providence it is not to be expected that such a distinction should be made it is neither possible nor does Justice require it it is not possible supposing Natural Causes left to Act according to their Nature and Voluntary Causes to be left to their Liberty nor does Justice require it for every Man is so much a Sinner that no evil that befals him in this World can be said to be unjust in respect of God So that Abraham is not here to be understood as speaking of such Judgments as befal Men in the ordinary course of God's Providence in which if the Good and Bad be involv'd alike it cannot be expected to be otherwise nor is there any injustice in it but Abraham here speaks of Miraculous and Extraordinary Judgments which are immediately inflicted by God for the Punishment of some crying Sins and the example of the World to deter others from the like And such was this Judgment which God intended to bring upon Sodom and which Abraham hath Relation to in this Discourse of his In this Case it may be expected from the Justice of God that a Difference should be made between the Righteous and the Wicked and that for these Reasons 1. Because this is a Judgment which God himself executes It is not an Event of common Providence which always follows the Nature of its Cause but an Act of God as a Judge Now it is essential to a Judge to make a Discrimination between the Good and the Bad so as to punish the one and spare the other and this is as necessary to all proper Acts of Judgment in this World as the other there being no other difference between them but that one is a Particular Judgment and the other the General Judgment of the whole World 2. When God goes out of the way of his ordinary Providence in Punishing it may reasonably be expected that he should make a Difference between the Good and the Bad for the Reason why he does not in his common Providence is because he will not break and interrupt the establisht order of things upon every little occasion But when he does go besides the common course of Things in punishing the Reason ceaseth which hindred him before from making a Difference and 't is reasonable enough to expect that in the inflicting of a Miraculous Judgment a Miraculous Difference should be made Without making this difference the end of these Miraculous Judgments would not be attained which is remarkably to punish the crying Sins of Men and by that example to deter others from the like Sins But if these Judgments should fall

suck wicked Thoughts and Actions to them for it is usual in Scripture-phrase as to ascribe all good Motions to God's Spirit so all evil Thoughts and Actions to the Devil not that he is the immediate Cause of them but because he is always ready to tempt Men to them and one way or other to promote them 3. I see no Reason to grant as many have done an immediate Power to the Devil over the fancies and imaginations of Men and that he may know the workings of them tho' not the secret thoughts of Mens Minds for this seems to me to be in effect to grant him the Knowledge of Mens Hearts and to give him a Key to that Closet which God hath reserved to himself for it is a very nice Distinction which is here made between the Thoughts of Mens Minds and the Images of their Fancies and if these should happen to be but words that signifie the same thing we shall unawares intrench upon the Prerogative of God Therefore because the Scripture is a stranger to these nice and subtile distinctions between the Imaginations of the Fancy and the Thoughts of the Heart I think it is much safer to assert the Prerogative of God in that latitude that the Scripture useth the word heart for all the inward motions of the Mind for the Thoughts and Intentions of the Heart and roundly to affirm that all the inward motions of our Souls are totally exempt from the immediate cognizance of any other Spirit but God's alone and that neither Angel nor Devil hath any further Knowledge of them than may be collected and inferr'd in a way of probable Conjecture from the particular Knowledge of Mens Tempers and Habits and Designs and the Course of their Actions I proceed to the III. Particular God's Knowledge of future Events This God proposes as the way to discern the true God from Idols Isaiah 41.21 c. Produce your Cause saith the Lord bring forth your strong Reasons saith the King of Jacob that is let them bring some Argument that may convince us that they are Gods and he instanceth in foretelling future Evants v. 22. Let them shew the former things what they be that we may consider them and know the latter end of them or declare us things for to come Shew the things that are to come hereafter that we may know that ye are Gods God puts it upon this issue if they can foretel future things then they are Gods if not they are vanity and a work of naught and he is an abomination that chuseth them v. 24. By things to come I understand such Effects as do not depend upon any necessary Cause but upon the Will of Free Agents and so may be or may not be from whence it is plain that it is the Prerogative of God proper and peculiar to Him to know future Events And here I shall consider these two things 1. That God knows future Events 2. That he only knows them 1. God knows future Events which will appear from the dictates of Natural Light and from Scripture 1. From the dictates of Natural Light as it is a Perfection and that which among Men is accounted the best part of Wisdom and unless this did belong to God how could he govern the World The Heathens except only the Epicureans generally granted this as appears in those wise Counsels which we frequently meet with in them to this purpose that we should not be anxious for the future but having done our endeavour leave the Events of things to God who only knows them and disposeth them Permittes ipsis expendere Numinibus quid Conveniat nobis rebusque sit utile nostris Juv. And afterward saith he We are importunate with God for Wife and Children At illis notum qui pueri qualisque futura sit uxor and that this was their Opinion appears yet more clearly from those apprehensions which they had of Divination Tully lays down this for a Principle Deos posse nobis signa futurarum reum ostendere de Legibus and in his Book de Divin he tells us that there was such a thing as Divination for it was an old Opinion jam usque ab Heroicis ducta temporibus eaque Pop. Rom. omnium gentium firmata consensu and afterward that this Divination was not sine instinctu afflatúque divino I know they did variously explain this according to their several Opinions about Fate and Contingency and their Apprehensions about the Providence of God One Sect of them the Stoicks held that there was a fatal Chain of Causes from first to last and things did necessarily follow one another and by this Means they made Fore-knowledge easie and explicable and tho' in their Disputes they seem to grant no such thing as Events and Contingencies yet they are agreed in the thing that those things which we call Events tho' they would not call them so were Fore-known to God And for this I shall only cite one Testimony of Seneca speaking of God's Fore-knowledge of the most contingent things the Dispositions of Men long before they are Born he adds nota est enim illis operis sui series omniúmque illis rerum per manus suas iturarum scientia in aperto semper est nobis ex abdito subit quae repentina putamus illis provisa veniunt familiaria and how peremptory soever this Sect is in their disputes about Fate yet when they speak of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and generally in their Moral Discourses they seem plainly to me to exempt the will of Man from this fatal necessity And those other Sects of the Philosophers that denyed Fate did generally grant God's Fore-knowledge of contingent things I grant indeed that they did rather make God's Fore-knowledge an Arbitrary and Voluntary than a necessary Perfection that is that God when he pleased to apply himself to it could Fore-know all future Events but their general Opinion was that as his Providence did not extend to small and inconsiderable things so neither his Fore-knowledge But Tully seems to attribute a very perfect Providence to him and a Fore-knowledge of the least things Quis non timeat omnia providentem cogitantem animadvertentem omnia ad se pertinere putantem curiosum negotij plenum deum But I cannot say he is constant to himself but they all agree in granting to him this Perfection of knowing all future things if he pleased to trouble himself with it and had they not in this mistaken the Nature of God they might easily have apprehended that 't is no trouble nor weariness to an Infinite Understanding that is always in Act to know the least things how many soever they be 2. From Scripture which gives us Testimonies and Arguments of it 1. Testimonies Isa 48.3 c. Acts 15.18 Known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the World 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 from everlasting which by the way I cannot but compare with the forecited

admit such a Knowledge in God as seems contradictious and impossible to our Reason why may we not allow and frame such Notions of his Goodness and Justice To this I answer There is a great difference between those Perfections of God which are imitable and those which are not Knowledge of future Events is a Perfection wherein we are not bound to be like God and if we are assured of the thing that he doth know them it is not necessary that we should know the manner of it and dis-intangle it from contradiction and impossibility but it is otherwise in God's Goodness and Justice which are imitable he that imitates endeavours to be like something that he knows and we must have a clear Idea and Notion of that which we would bring our selves to the likeness of these Perfections of God we are capable of knowing and therefore the Knowledge of these Perfections is chiefly recommended to us in Scripture Jer. 9.24 By these God reveals himself and declares his Name and makes himself known to us even by those Attributes which declare his Goodness and Mercy and Justice Exod. 34.6 7. Psal 86.15 Deut. 32.3 4 5. When God would give a Description of himself to Moses he promises to cause his goodness to pass before him So that it doth not follow that because God's Knowledge of future Events is to be admitted notwithstanding the seeming contradiction and impossibility of it therefore we are to admit of any Notion of God's Justice or Goodness that seems contradictious or impossible The Third Objection is made up of several inconveniencies that would follow from God's Knowledge of future Events 1. It would Prejudice the Liberty of the Creature For if God have an infallible Knowledge of what we will do then we cannot but do what he infallibly foresees we will do for otherwise his Knowledge would be fallible Answer God's-Fore-knowledge lays no necessity upon the Event In every Event we may consider the Effect in it self or with relation to the Cause and the manner how it comes to pass consider'd in it self it is future with relation to its Causes it is contingent God sees it as both and so as that which till it is may be or not be and when it comes to pass he sees the Man do it freely and so before it be done it hath no necessity but upon supposition of fore-sight as when it is it hath upon supposition that it is as Origen excellently explains it Fore-knowledge is not the cause of the things that are fore-known but because the thing is future and shall be this is the Reason why it is fore-known for it doth not because it was known come to pass but because it was to come to pass therefore it was fore-known and bare Knowledge is no more the Cause of any Event which because it is known must infallibly be than my seeing a Man run is the Cause of his running which because I do see is infallibly so 2 ly If God infallibly fore-knows what Men will do how can he be serious in his Exhortations to Repentance in his Expectation of it and his grieving for the Impenitency of Men Answer All these are founded in the liberty of our Actions God exhorts to Repentance and expects it because by his Grace we may do it he is said to grieve for our Impenitency because we may do otherwise and will not Exhortations are not vain in themselves but very proper to their end tho' through our obstinacy and hardness they may be rendred vain to us and without effect If the weight of the Objection lie upon serious and you ask how God can exhort Men seriously to that which he fore-sees that they will not do those whom he fore-knows will be finally impenitent I answer if his Exhortations were not serious he could not foresee the final impenitency of Men. To foresee Mens final impenitency is to foresee their willful contempt of Gods Warnings and Exhortations and Rejection of his Grace now Mens willful contempt of his Warnings and Exhortations cannot be foreseen unless God foresee that his Exhortations are serious and in good earnest Having answer'd the Objections against God's fore-knowing future Events I proceed to shew II. That God only knows future Events Isa 44.6 7. Thus saith the Lord the King of Israel and his Redeemer the Lord of Hosts I am the first and I am the last and besides me there is no God and who as I shall call and shall declare it and set it in order for me since I appointed the ancient People and the things that are coming and shall come let them shew unto them Isa 46.9 10. Remember the former things of old for I am God and there is none else I am God and there is none like me declaring the end from the beginning and from ancient times the things that are not yet done saying my counsel shall stand and I will do all my pleasure The Reason is evident because the Knowledge of future Events is beyond the reach of any finite understanding especially if we grant it to be beyond our finite understanding to explain the possibility of such a Knowledge for to be sure that is out of the reach of our Knowledge which we cannot so much as understand how it is possible it should be known by any Understanding But it may here be Objected Did not the Oracles among the Heathens foretel several things which Christians are satisfied came from the Devil I have no time at present to examine the business of Heathen Oracles I could easily shew there was much imposture in them but grant they were really delivered and given out by a Spirit yet the darkness and ambiguity the affected and contrived ambiguity is such as shews that the Devil was conscious to himself of the uncertainty of his Knowledge in those matters and those few that came to pass and are in any tolerable Sense said to be accomplisht were in such matters either wherein prudent Conjecture might go far and I grant the Devil to be a sagacious Spirit or else in dis-junctive Cases as when there are but two ways for a thing to be it must either be so or so in which a bold guessing may often hit right but guessing at future things is far from a Knowledge of them which only can clearly be made out by punctual and particular Predictions of Things with Circumstances of Time and Person such as we find in Scripture in many instances to the prediction of which the greatest sagacity and the utmost guessing could do nothing such as those Predictions of which I gave instances out of Scripture I have now done with the First general Head I propos'd to be spoken to from these Words viz. To prove that this Attribute of Knowledge belongs to God I proceed to the Second viz. To consider the Perfection and Prerogative of the Divine Knowledge which I shall speak to in these following Particulars 1. God's Knowledge is Present and Actual