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ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A57360	The cabinet-council containing the cheif [sic] arts of empire and mysteries of state : discabineted in political and polemical aphorisms grounded on authority, and experience : and illustrated with the choicest examples and historical observations / by the ever-renowned knight, Sir Walter Raleigh ; published by John Milton, Esq.; Cabinet-council	Raleigh, Walter, Sir, 1552?-1618.; Milton, John, 1608-1674.	1658 (1658)	Wing R156; ESTC R8392	78,451	210

other extream forgetting that Vertue doth always consist in the mean The multitude is inclined to innovation and easily induced by false perswasion and consequently easily transported by seditious leaders Men are naturally disposed to fear those things which threaten danger and terror● yet unless these perils by some new accident be daily revived that fear by little and little vanisheth and Security recovereth the place Whoso findeth himself contemned or not respected becometh discontent which humor in generous mindes breedeth oftentimes adventerous imaginations whereof audacious attempts have followed cheifly in persons of authority and reputation for he that hopeth no good feareth no evil Yet true it is that dangerous enterprises the the more they be thought upon the less hope they give of good success for which reason conspiracies not suddainly executed are for the most part revealed or abandoned All people do naturally imitate the manners of their Prince and observing his proceedings resolve to hate or love him But if they happen once to ha●e the Prince then his doings good or evil are afterwards not good but if at the beginning he gained the love of the people then every bad action is reputed a vertue as though he could not be induced to do amiss without good cause or reason Greatly are Princes deceived if in the election of Ministers they more respect their own particular affection then the sufficiency of the person elected A Prince having conquered any new Dominion is thereby rather incombred then strengthned unless the same be after well governed and seldom is it seen that a principality by ill means gotten hath bin long injoyed As to the perfection of the whole body soundness of head only sufficeth not unless the other members also do their office even so it is not enough that a Prince be faultless but it behooveth also that the Magistrates and Ministers should perform their duty Great Princes rarely resist their appetites● as for the most part private men can for they being alwaies honored and obeyed do seldom with patience indure the want of any thing reasonable as being perswaded that what they desire is just and that their Commandment hath power to remove all difficulties All men are naturally good when no respect of profit or pleasure draws them to become evill But this worlds corruption and our frailty is such as easily and often for our particular interest we incline to the worst which was the cause that wise Law-makers found out reward and punishment the one to incite men to good the other to fear them from being evill A Tyrant indeavoreth to maintain his Estate by three means First he practiseth to hold all Subjects in extream awe and to be basely minded to the end they should want courage to take arms against him Secondly he kindleth diffidence and discord among the great men thereby to remove occasion of conspiracy and combination Lastly he holdeth them disarmed and idle so as they ne●ther know nor can attempt any thing against him To govern is nothing else but to hold Subjects in love and obedience for in respect of the end they ought not and in regard of the other they cannot attempt any thing contrary to the governors will and their duty The Laws and Ordinances of a Common-weale made at the beginning thereof when men were good do often prove unprofitable when they are become evill and therefore new Laws are made according to the accidents which happen The discontent or disorder of people is ever occasioned by the inequality of their goods because the poorer sort would be made equall to the rich but the offence that grows among great men is the desire of honor for they being equal do indeavor to aspire to equall authority A Prince that desireth by means of his Ambassador to deceive an other Prince must first abuse his own Ambassador to the end he should do and speak with more earnestness being indeed perswaded that the intent and meaning of his Master is simple which happily would not were he privy that his Princes meaning were to dissemble This course is also commonly holden by those that by imployment of a third person would perswade any thing fained or false For the performance of conditions in treaty of Peace or League of Amity the Promises Vowes and Oathes of Princes are of great effect yet because fidelity in a man is not ever certain and time doth daily offer occasions of variation there is no assurance so secure and good as to stand so prepared as the Enemy may want able means how to offend To resolve in matters doubtfull or answer requests which we are not willing to grant the least offensive way is not to use direct denial but by delaies prolong the time and so in place of effect afford good expectation The old Proverbe ●aith Magistratus virum ostendit which is no less true then ancient for men in such fortune are occasioned not only to make proof of their sufficiency but also to discover their affections and the more their greatness is the less respect they have to contain those passions which are natural Albeit great troubles and continual adversity seem insupportable yet is there nothing more dangerous then ouermuch prosperity and being pressed by new appetites they disturb their own security In speaking of occurrents doubtfull it is alwaies wisdom to fain Ignorance or at least alledge that we beleive then not for most commonly they are utterly untrue or far other then vulgarly is believed The Actions of men are commonly liked or disallowed according to the bad or good success attributing that to Council which sometimes is due to fortune The multitude of men were wont to be more pleased with suddain then slow resolutions and many times accompt those enterprises generous which are rashly and inconsideratly attempted Great difference there is between Subjects desperate and others which are only discontented for the one desire nothing but present alteration which they indeavor with all hazard the other wish for innovation inciting any motion or practice● because their intent is to attend time and that occasion may present it self A benefit bestowed on him who thinketh himself greatly injured doth not suffice to raze the same out of his memory cheifly if the benefit be given at such time as no meer motion but necessity may seem the occasion thereof That Peace ought to be desired which removeth suspition which assureth us from perill which bringeth quiet certain and acquitteth us of expences But when it worketh contrary effects it may be called a dangerous war covered with the name of deceitfull trust not unlike a perilous poyson ministred in lieu of a wholsom Medicine The effect of things and not externall show or seeming ought to be regarded yet it is incredible what great grace is gained by courteous speech and affability the reason whereof is as I suppose that every man beleiveth he doth merit more then indeed he is worthy and consequently holdeth himself injured

Tam Marti Quam Mercurio The true and lively Portraiture of the Hoble. and learned Knight Sr. Walter Ralegh Ro Vaughan sculp The Cabinet-Council Containing the Cheif ARTS OF EMPIRE And MYSTERIES of STATE DISCABINETED In Political and Polemical Aphorisms grounded on Authority and Experience And illustrated with the choicest Examples and Historical Observations By the Ever-renowned Knight Sir WALTER RALEIGH Published By JOHN MILTON Esq Quis Martem tunicâ tectum Adamantinâ dignè scripserit London Printed by Tho. Newcomb for Tho. Johnson at the sign of the Key in St. Pauls Churchyard near the West-end 1658. To the READER HAving had the Manuscript of this Treatise Written by Sir Walter Raleigh many years in my hands and finding it lately by chance among other Books and Papers upon reading thereof I thought it a kinde of injury to withhold longer the work of so eminent an Author from the Publick it being both answerable in Stile to other Works of his already Extant as far as the subject would permit and given me for a true Copy by a Learned Man at his Death who had Collected several such peices John Milton THE Principal Contents CHAP. I. THe Definition and Division of Publick Weals and Soveraign States according to their several Species or Kindes Pag. 1. Chap. 2. Of Soveraign or Monarchick Government with its essential Marks and specifical Differences Pag. 2. Chap. 3. Of Monarchies Seigniorile exemplified in the Turkish and West-Indian Empire Pag. 5. Chap. 4. Of Monarchies Royal with the Means to maintain them Pag. 7. Chap. 5. Of Monarchies Tyrannical Pag. 9. Chap. 6. Of new-found Monarchies and Principalities with the Means to perpetuate them Pag. 10. Chap. 7. Of Councils and Counsellors in general Pag. 14. Chap. 8. Of Councils in some particular Monarchies Aristocraties and Democraties Pag. 15. Chap. 9. Of Officers and Commissioners with their respective Distinctions Pag. 17. Chap. 10. Of Magistrates their Qualifications and Elections Pag. 18. Chap. 11. Observations intrinsically concerning every Publick State in Points of Justice Treasure and War P. 20. Chap. 12. Extrinsick Observations shewing how to deal with Neighbor Princes and Provinces respectively how to prevent their Designs and decypher their Intendments Pag. 24. Chap. 13. Observations confirmed by Authorities of Princes and Principalities charactering an excellent Prince or Governor Pag. 28. Chap. 14. Of the Princes intimate Counsellors and Ministers of State with their several Requisites Pag. 32. Chap. 15. The Art of Ruling or Mystery of Regiment Pag. 38. Chap. 16. Of Princely Authority wherein it consists and how far to be extended and delegated Pag. 40. Chap. 17. Of Power and Force and how to be raised and maintained P. 42. Chap. 18. Of Conspiracy and Treason with the causes and ways of prevention or discovery Pag. 44. Chap. 19. Of Publick Hate and Contempt with the occasions and means to redress and avoid it Pag. 47. Chap. 20. Of Diffidence and Dissimulation in the mannage of State Affairs Pag. 54. Chap. 21. Of War Defensive and Invasive with Instructions touching Laws of Arms Soldiers and Military Discipline Pag. 56. Chap. 22. Of Generals and Commanders and their requisite Abilities in Martial enterprises and expeditions Pag. 67. Chap. 23. Of Councils in War and Directions Tactick and Stratagematick with advice how to make an honorable Peace Pag. 71. Chap. 24. Of Civil War with the Causes and Remedies thereof Pag. 80. Chap. 25. A Collection of Political Observations confirmed by Reason and Experience advertising Princes Statesmen and private persons how to demean themselves in all Fortunes and Events Pag. 88. Chap. 26. Maximes of State or Prudential Grounds and Polemical Precepts concerning all Estates and forms of Policy in times of Peace or War c. confirmed by select Narrations and Historical Parallels Pag. 153. THE Cabinet Council Containing the chief Arts of EMPIRE AND Mysteries of State CHAP. I. The Definition and Division of Publick Weales and Soveraign States according to their several species or kinds A Common-wealth is a certain Soveraign Government of many Families with those things that are common among them All Common-wealths are either Monarchies Aristocraties Democraties A Monarchie is that State where the Soveraignty resteth in the person of one only Prince An Aristocratie is where some small part of the people have in the● as a body corporate the Soveraignty and supream power of the whole State A Democrati● is where all the people have Power and Authority Soveraign So doth it appear that the place and person where the Soveraigntie resteth doth cause the State to be either a Monarchie an Aristocratie or Popular Government CHAP. II. Of Soveraign or Monarchick Government with its Essential markes and Specifical differences SOveraigntie is an absolute and perpetual power in every publike State and he is properly and only a Soveraign that acknowledgeth no Superior or Equal nor holdeth of any other Prince person or power but God and his own sword The First mark of Soveraigntie is absolute Power and Authority to command all Subjects in general and every of them in particular without consent of any other person or persons either greater or inferior to himself The Second mark of Majesty is Authority to make War and conclude Peace at his pleasure The Third is Power to bestow all Honors and cheif Offices at his pleasure The Fourth marke of Soveraigntie is Appellation The Fifth mark and last is power to pardon all Subjects by rigor of Law or otherwise condemned in Life Lands Goods or Honors These Powers are not to be imparted to any Officer Deputy or other Magistrate but in the Princes absence and for some urgent occasion Monarchies are of three sorts Signioril Royal Tyrannical The Diver●●tie of Monarchies doth no● proceed from the Nature of the State but the diverse proceedings of those Princes that governe for great difference there may be between the nature of the Common wealth and the Government thereof That Prince that giveth the Magistracies Honors and Offices without respect of Nobility Riches or Vertue may be said to governe popularly And that Monarchy may be said to b● governed Aristocratically when the Monarch imparteth the principal Honors and Offices to the Noble and Rich men only The same difference there is to be found in States Aristocratical and Popular for the one and the other may be both Signioril or Tyrannical A Monarch Signioril is he who by force of Arms and just War is made owner of mens bodies and goods and governeth them as a Master of a Familie governeth base Servants and Slaves A Monarch Royal is he whose Subjects are obedient unto his Laws and the Monarch himself obeyeth the Lawes of God and Nature suffering every Subject to enjoy liberty natural with property in Lands and Goods governing as a Father governeth his Children A Monarch Tyrannical is he who without regard to the Law of God or Nature commandeth Free-men as Slaves and useth their Lands and Goods as his own CHAP. III. Of Monarchie Signioril Exemplified in

must pray in aide of others If he can doe the first he needeth not doubt but being driven to the other his greatness cannot long continue● for albeit a matter of no difficultie it is to perswade a people yet to make them constant is a work well neer impossible Example Thes●us Cyrus Romulus The Second sort of new Princes are such as be aspired by favor or corruption or by the vertue or greatness of fortune or friends A Prince by any or all these means advanced and desirous to hold his Estate● must indeavor by his own vertue to maintain himself without depending upon any other which may be done by this means First to assure all enemies from offending Secondly to win the love and friendship of so many neighbours as possibly he may Thirdly to compass all designes tending to his honor or profit and bring them to pas● either by fraud or force Fourthly to make himself honoured and followed of Captains and Soldiers Fifthly to oppress all those that would or can offend Sixthly to be obsequious liberal to frinds magnanimous terrible to Foes Seventhly to c●sse all old and unfaithfull bands and entertain new Eighthly to hold such Amitie with Kings and Princes as they ought reasonablie to favor him● or else they would offend easily they cannot● Example Giovannie Torrigiani Caesar Borgi● The Third and last meanes whereby private persons doe aspire to Principalities is not force and violence● but meer good-will and favor of men The cause or occasion thereof is only vertue or fortune or at least a certain fortunate craft and wittiness because he aspireth either by favor of the People or by favor of the Nobilitie for these contrary humors are in all Common wealths to be found And the reason thereof is that the great men do ever endeavor to oppress the people and the people do labor not to be oppressed by them Of these divers appetites one of these three ef●ects doe proceed viz. Principalitie ●iberty or Licencious life Principality may come either by love of the multitude or of the great men for when any of these factions do find it self oppressed then do they soon consent to make one a Prince hoping by his vertue and valor to be defended Example Francesco Sforz● Alessandro de Medici A Prince in this ●ort aspired to maintain his Estate must first consider well by which of these factions aforesaid he is advanced for if by favor of great men he be aspired then must he meet with many difficulties for having about him divers persons of great qualitie and such as were but lately his equals hardly shall he command them in such sort as it behoveth But if the Prince be advanced by the people● few or none shall hardly disobey him So it appeareth that a Prince made by the multitude is much more secure then he whom the Nobilitie preferreth for common people doe not desire to enjoy more then their own and to be defended from oppression but great men doe studie not only to hold their own but also to command and insult upon inferiors Note that all Monarchies are P●incipalities But all Principalities are not Monarchies CHAP. VII Of Councils and Counsellors in general A Senate or Council is a certain lawful assembly of Counsellors to give advice to him or them that have in the comon Weale Power Soveraign A Counsellor is called in the Latine Senator which word signifieth in effect an old man The Grecians and Romans also most commonly composed the●● Councils of ancient and expert persons for if they or the greater part of them had bin young men then might the Council have more properly bin called a Juvenate then a Senate The chief and most necessary note required in a Counsellor is to have no dependance of any other Prince or Common-weale either Oath Homage Natural obligation Pention or reward In this point the Venetians have bin ever most precise and for that reason doe not admit any Cardinal or other Clergieman to be either of or at their Councils therefore when the Venetian Sena●e is assembled the Usher being ready to shut the dore cryeth aloud Fuora Preti Depart Priest Note also that in every state of what quality soever a secret or Cabinet-Council is mainly necessary CHAP. VIII Of Councils in some particular Monarchies Aristocraties and Democraties THe King of Spaine for the government of his Dominions hath seven Councils viz the Council of the Indies the Council of Spaine the Council of Italy and the Low Countries the Council of War the Council of Orders the Council of Inquisition and the Council Royal. In France are three Councils viz the Council Privy the Council of Judges which they call Presidents et Conc●liers de Parlament and the great Council which they call assemblei d● troys estates Of Councils in Aristocraties In V●nice beside the Senate and great Council are four Councils viz the Sages of the Sea the Sages of the Land the Co●ncil of Tenn the three presidents of Quarantia and the Senate All which Councils do amount to 120 persons with the Magistrates The great Council of Ragusa consisteth of 60 persons and hath another privie Council of 12. Of Councils in Democraties Genoua hath 3 Councils● the great Council of 200 the Senate which consisteth of 60 and the privie Council which hath 26 Counsellors so it doth appear that in all Commonwealths be they Monarchies Aristocracies or Popular States The Council-privie is most necessarie and often used Also this difference is to be noted between the Councils in Monarchies and the Councils in Aristocracies and States Popular that is to say that all deliberations ●it ●o be published are in a Monarchie consulted and resolved upon in the Council privie and after ratified by Common Council But in Optimacies or popular government the Custom is contrary Here also is to be noted that albeit the use an● Authorit● of ever● Senate and Privie Councel is most needful yet hath it no Authority to command but in the name of those in whom the Soveraignty resteth for if Councellors had power to command absolutely then should they be Soveraigns and consequently all execution at their pleasure which may not be without detracting from Majestie which is a thing so soveraign and sacred as no Citizen or Subject of what quality soever may touch or approach thereunto CHAP. IX Of Officers and Commissioners with their respective Distinctions AN Officer is a person publick that hath charge ordinary and limited by Law A Commissioner is also a person publick● but his charge is extraordinary and limited by Commission Officers are of two ●orts and so be Commissioners the one hath power to command and are called Magistrates the other hath authority to execute so the one and the other are persons publick yet are not all publick persons either Officers or Commissioners Commissioners are ordained to govern in Provinces● in Warr in Justice in disposing the Treasure or some other Function concerning the State but all Commissions

and plenty is turned into poverty for by these means ●re men brought into desperation Rapacissimo ●uique ac perditissim● non agri aut faenus sed sola instrumenta vitiorum manebunt Tac. Now to consider how destiny might be eschewed were in vain For such a remedy no wit or wisdom can devise being the decree of God no doubt it is inevitable Ita fato placuit nullius rei eodem semper loc● stare fortunam Sen. There is nothing exempt from the peril of mutation the earth Heavens and whole World is thereunto subject Certi● eunt cuncta temporibus nasci debent crescere extingui Sen. Touching the second causes of Civil War some remedies may be used because it preceedeth of Faction Sedition or Tyranny I call Faction a certain association of divers persons combined to the offence of others It proceedeth often of private or publick displeasure and more often of ambition Nemo eorum qui in Rep. versantur quo● vincat sed a quibus vincatur aspicit Sen. 1. Factions are of two sorts for either they consist of many or of few persons both be dangerous but the former more apt to take arms and that party which proveth weakest prayeth arms of forrain forces 2. The other faction wherein are fewer partakers be commonly great personages or men of more importance than ordinary people and that proveth most perillous and bloody N●bilium factiones trah●nt adse in partes universum etiam populum● Arist. Albeit some wise men have held opinion that factions are necessary yet cannot that conceipt be reasonably maintained unless it be upon confines and in such places where conspiracy is feared which Cato in hisprivate Family used Semper contentiunculas aliquas aut dissensum inter servos callidè serebat s●●pectam habens nimiam c●ncordiam ●rum m●tuensque Plut. Factions amongst the Nobility are somtimes suppressed by forbidding colors or unknown badges to be worn also to inhibit names or watch-words of mutinies is necessary which was Mecae●as counsel to Augustus and Aristotle thinketh it fit that Laws should be made against the Factions of Noblemen Nobilium contentiones part●s etiam legibus oportet prohibere conari Arist. Another cause of civil war we call sedition which is a suddain commotion or assembly of common people against their Prince or his Magistrates the Original of which disorders may proceed of divers causes but chiefly of oppression Imminentium periculorum remedium ipsa peric●la arbitrari Arist. Again Fear may be the occasion of Sedition as well in him that hath done injury as in him that looketh to be injured and is desirous to prevent it before it cometh It may proceed also of over-great mildness in Government Non ●iseriis sed licentia tantum concitum turbarum las●ivire magis plebem quàm saevire Livi. Sedition many times ariseth of Poverty or of the Artificers whose Arts are grown out of use and consequently no means whereof they can live Semper in civitat● quibus opes nullae sunt bonis invident veter● odere n●va expetunt odio rerum suarum m●tari omnia student Sab. Lastly Sedition cometh of Tyranny Insolency or Mutinous disposition of certain Captains Cavaliers or Ringleaders of the people for albeit the multitude is apt to innovation yet doth it stand firm until some first mover taketh the matter in hand Multitudo omnis sicut mare per se immobilis Livi. Of these Movers some are Ambitious who wanting other means to aspire hope by practice of Sedition to compass their designs or else they are Unthrifts who having consumed their own seek by violence to possess themselves of other mens Or else they are vain and light persons that without cause or reason attempt innovation themselves know not for what Non tam praemiis periculor●m quàm ipsis periculis laeti pro certis olim partis nova ambigua ancipitia malunt Thus having told the causes of Sedition I wish the remedies were prepared Omne malum nascens facilè opprimitur inveteratum fit plerumque robustius Cic. The first way to suppress Sedition is Eloquence and excellent perswasion which oftentimes worketh great effects among the multitude chiefly when it proceedeth from some reverend and grave person for his wisdom and integrity of life honored For the Prince himself is not to take this office in hand unless necessity so inforce Integra autoritas principis majoribus remediis servetur Tac. If perswasion cannot prevail then force must compel But before such violent proceedings use art and cunning either to appease the people or at least to disunite them and rather if the Prince do offer fair and ●romise plausibly Verba apud populum plurimum valent Tac. It is lawful also in such cases for Princes to use subtilty and the same not prevailing to wash away the stain thereof with Clemency For when Arms are laid down and every one yielded general punishment were needless Omnium culpa fuit paucorum sit poena Tac. The last cause of Sedition we named Tyranny which is a certain violent Government exceeding the Laws of God and nature The difference between Kings and Tyrants is this the one imployeth arms in defence of Peace the other useth them to terrifie those of whom his cruelty hath deserved hate Auferre trucidare raper● falsis nominibus imperium atque ubi solitudinem fecerint pacem appellant Tac. The quality of Tyrants is to esteem Promooters more then good Ministers because those men are the scourge of infinite others They are also Protectors of impious persons and stand in daily doubt of Noble and Vertuous Men Nobilitas opes amissi g●stique honores pro crimine Et ob virtutes certissimum exitium Tac. Tyrants do also endeavor to suppress the knowledge of Letters and civil life to the end all good arts should be exiled and Barbarism introduced Pellunt sapientiae prof●ssores omnes ●onas artes in exiliu● ag●nt Tac. These and such like be the conditions of Tyrants who for the most part are deposed and slain for as Kings live long and deliver their Dominions to their Children● and Posterity so Tyrants being feared and hated of all men cannot continue in their estate Ad generum Cereris ●ine ●oede vulnere pauci Descendunt reges sicca ●orte Tyranni Juven. The Remedies of these Mischiefs which proceed from the violence of such a Prince are Persecution or Patience Many generous spirits have used the first perswading themselves rather to die then endure the sight of a Tyrant Also the Grecians did think it a service acceptable to murther the person of such an impious Prince Graeci ●omines deorum honores tribuebant iis qui Tyrannos necaverunt Cic. Nevertheless in Christian consideration the other course is to be taken Let patience therefore incounter this mischief for seeing all Kings as well the bad as the good be sent by God they must be indured Res est gravis occidere regalem stirpem Homer