other Virtues But this we think worthy of special Notice That even from the Instances given 't is not very apparent that Virtue according to it 's most Internal Essence is a Mediocrity We rather suppose that according to the Definition given it is some Intellectual Power is the Cause of that Mediocrity which we observe as well in our Actings as our Sufferings For in these Cases such Mediocrity appears But as to Virtue her self she must not pretend to go farther than in what barely is Just V. NAY Virtue is rather an Extreme And this not only as to it's Well-being and Best Estate which Aristotle himself consents to but we call it an Extreme even as to it's Essence and Definition For how can Virtue Ethic. Nicom l. 2. c. 6. as to it's Essence be a Mediocrity when Mediocrity as we said is only what we seek for and adhere to in those Objects about which Virtue is conversant namely in those Actings and Sufferings which befall us Wherefore since Virtue is according to it 's own Nature the best of Blessings that Mankind is capable of and the most excelling Power and Perfection of our Souls it cannot be better Defin'd than in styling it The very Triumph and Inauguration of Human Nature or its Supreme Good And 't is no more than what is due to the Essence of Virtue that it should bear this high Preheminence Wherefore it seems defectively said of Aristotle That Virtue was only an Extreme as to its Well-being and Best Estate but not according to its Essence For even that Best Estate must of necessity be Part of Virtues Essence and both concur to the Top and Complement of our Natures Which is no more than what the Pythagoreans have every where observ'd VI. Ethic. Nicom l. 2. c. 9. WHEREFORE that Philosopher treads much more carefully where he makes Virtue to consist in Finding and Electing a Medium than when he makes Virtue it self that Medium or Mediocrity For this is just as if one should call the Instrument that is fram'd to find out two Middle Lines which hold a continued Proportion to be the very Lines themselves Or to say that a Pair of Compasses which find or make the Centre of a Circle are the very Middle or Centre it self VII LASTLY When his Followers declare Virtue to be this Medium they understand it in respect of two Things which are Homogeneous or consonant to such Medium For so Aristotle does illustrate it by Examples of Arithmetical Proportion as well in Magnitude as Numbers Altho after all he seems herein rather to have found the Medium Rei than the Medium quoad Nos I mean that which is rather true in Speculation than in Practice But his Affecting to make it Hemogeneous is hereby manifest That while he calls Virtue a certain Medium he makes it to partake of either Extreme Thus Andronicus his Paraphrast calls Virtue The Middle of the Two Extremes falling short on the one side and exceeding on the other Even as it appears in Fortitude which to a certain Degree may be term'd Confidence BUT this can never hold For while he this turns Confidence into Virtue which still is defin'd to be a Thing absolutely good if we suppose that such his Confidence were a Virtue to the Degree of three it would follow That such Confidence would doubly excel if rais'd to the degree of six But by such Logick 〈◊〉 would become better than Virtue which must never be understood Wherefore we suppose that Virtue is not the Medium it self but rather the Finder and the Chuser of such Medium Nay we affirm that such Medium is not singly discovered by the degrees of more or less or of Excess or of Defect but is also determin'd by other prudential Circumstances even as Aristotle himself declares namely That the true Medium in Virtue Ethic. Nicom lib. 2. c. 6. and that which is its very best must be ascertain'd with regard unto Time and to Occasions and to the Persons with whom or for whose sake we act and to the manner of acting So by this 't is plain that to pursue all Cases under the notion and fancy of a Mediocrity were merely superstitious if not altogether vain VIII I think it for my part sufficient if what Virtue seeks out and electeth be that which is Rectum or Right 'T is very true that this Right it self seems also to be a certain middle thing just as a Line which is drawn upon another streight Line at Right Angles is equally the Medium of all others that can be drawn from the same Point and that unequally vary from such Line Wherefore the Pythagoreans were wont to say Magn. Moral l. 1. cap. 25. Nicom l. 2. c. 5. that Good was Uniform and Evil Multiform And Andronicus is positive That this Right is something which is of a Simple and Uniform Nature IX LET us also add that this Rectâ—… which Virtue pursues in all things is termed Equal Andronicus l. 5. c. 4. and a thing which holds Congrâ— and Proportion For things congruous are aâ—… equal as in Geometry is manifest So that all these things point at a Mediocrity For what iâ— greater or less than another is not congruous And therefore that ought to be the Medium which is neither more or less and which iâ— also called Equality Upon the whole Matter let us agree how faâ— Virtue consists in a Mediocrity or Medium 'T is not that she her self is that Medium but that our Souls do by her Aid elect that which iâ— congruous or in the Middle For thus only can that Sentence be true and solid X. BUT now the Difficulty remaining will be to establish something unto which this Rectitude and Congruity which Virtue every where seeks is to conform Ethic. Nicom l. 6. c. 1. Aristotle says That what is congruous to Right Reason is right And again That the Medium in every thing is what Right Reason declares to be such And so in his Definition of Virtue Ethic. Nicom l. 2. c. 6. That 't is bounded with Reason And he adds also Even as a prudent Man shall determine thereof As if by those Words he would stop any farther Inquiry what kind of thing this Right Reason was by which that which is right and congruous should be try'd Now Ethic. Nicom l. 6. c. 5. according to Aristotle Right Reason is that which is conformable to Prudence But then he himself elsewhere defines Prudence To be a true Habit exerting it self in what happens to a Man good or bad according to Reason But surely this sounds very odd and is no better than a trifling Circle to define Right Reason by Prudence and Prudence again by Right Reason XI HOWEVER if there be but Recourse had to that Definition of Prudence which we before have delivered the point will be fully resolv'd For it will from thence appear that whoever is prudent is also of a Mind so
cleans'd and defecated that the Light of Truth is not eclipsed in him either by Passions or any corporeal Impediments And for this Cause let no Man wonder if Right Reason be styl'd That which is according to Prudence For if the prudent Man as to Life and good Manners have it not it can no where be found Aristotle in his Ethicks to Nicomachus is of the same mind For the good Man says he judges all things aright and Truth is visible unto him where-ever it be and good things appear both proper and pleasant in every shape And 't is very possible that a good Man grows more excellent if while he finds Truth in others he has cause to think that he himself was the Rule and Measure thereof But as to Plebeians they tumble into Error for Pleasure-sake as counting that real Good which is really otherwise The same Author has other Passages to the like intent For he makes Temperance the only true Guardian and Conservator of Prudence And that the sober Man is only wise in all that concerns Probity of Life He does not think that the Motives of Pleasure or of Pain can influence or pervert our Opinions Eth. Nic. l. 6. c. 5. as to the Doctrine of a Triangle and it 's having so many Angles as are equal unto two right ones or the like But as to Manners and the Conduct of our Life those Motives have as he believes strange Influence Nay he supposes that whoever is led by his Passions and the Sense only of Pleasure or of Pain is led as a blind Man that has lost his Eyes and in whom the very Principles for his Direction are extinguish'd XII LET us therefore here applaud this wise Philosopher for that Variety of Truth and of Utility which redounds from this Advice For 't is plain from hence that our Minds being thus purg'd from Vanities and Passions can as in an instant discern not only all that is worthy and valuable in human Affairs but what is noxious or of no account Next we may gather from it that some things are valuable and worthy even in their own Nature since if they were not at all L. 1. c. 6. § 12. and had no Being they could never be seen But since they are seen and beheld by a clear and perspicacious Mind 't is of evidence they are such in their own nature as they appear to be Lastly to waste time in disputing whether any thing be in its own Nature laudable before we take pains to reform our Minds in the way prescrib'd is not only Labor lost but a sort of Frenzy And if we shall conclude that nothing is of its own nature honest and laudable when at the same time we live in Vice and Wickedness this is to be downright impudent for we ought first to try and then to give our Opinion We have touch'd this point before and therefore we need not dwell upon it any longer here XIII THERE is now but one thing more to clear before us all the Difficulty that remains For whereas it may sound as if we give up our prudent Man to Inspirations and to Enthusiasm while we contend he cannot in any other respect be wise than as his Mind is reform'd and purg'd and that it must also needs hence ensue that whatsoever a Man so purg'd shall afterwards imagine must therefore be according to Right Reason or Right Reason it self merely because he thinks so And that in short there must be no other Measure or Principle but that his Imagination shall be as the Standard of Congruity and of Right Therefore it is necessary as Andronicus Rhodius speaks first to inquire and find out What is the Mode and Standard of this Right Reason And what that Principle in human Affairs that is just and congruous For surely that alone is Right Reason which to such Standard Mode and Principle can be apply'd and this must be some Primitive Good which is not only most simple but most excellent and a true Basis Norma and Standard for all the rest XIV Now while I am in this high pursuit I call to witness all that is holy L. 1. c. 2. § 5 c. that in my Sense there cannot in the whole compass of Nature be found a greater Good than is that Love which to free it from all other Imputations we call Intellectual For what can more fill elevate and irradiate the Soul than this intellectual Love L. 3. c. 8. § 8. Surely nothing is more exalted or Divine nothing more ravishing and complacent nothing more sharp in distinguishing what in every Case is decorous and right or more quick in executing whatsoever is laudable and just Since therefore this is the most high and the most simple good it ought in preference to be the Rule and Standard of all the rest and nothing should pass or be accounted for Right Reason which from this Divine Source and Fountain did not take its Birth XV. AND what is all this Intellectual Love we so describe Vid. Margin supra but an inward Life and Sense that moves in the Boniform Faculty of the Soul 'T is by this the Soul relisheth what is simply the best thither it tends and in that alone it has its Joy and Triumph Hence we are instructed how to set God before our Eyes to love him above all to adhere to him as the supremest Good to consider him as the Perfection of all Reason of all Beauty of all Love how all was made by his Power and that all is upheld by his Providence Hence also is the Soul taught how to affect and admire the Creation and all the Parcels of it as they share in that Divine Perfection and Beneficence which is dispersed through the whole Mass So that if any of these Parcels appear defective or discompos'd the Soul compassionates and brings help strenuously endeavouring as it is able to restore every thing to that state of Felicity which God and Nature intended for it In short it turns all its Faculties to make good Men happy and all its Care and Discipline is to make bad Men good XVI THEREFORE I say this most simple and Divine Sense and Feeling in the Boniform Faculty of the Soul is that Rule or Boundary V. Marg. supr whereby Reason is examin'd and approves her self For if she offers or affirms any thing that is contrary to the Sense and Feeling 't is spurious and dishonest if congruous to it 't is Orthodox fit and just So that we need not invent any other external Idea of Good or follow those who vainly dream of remoter Objects when as this inward Life and Sense points singly at that Idea which is fram'd not from exterior things but from the Relish and intrinsick Feeling of the Boniform Faculty within And altho this Idea be but single and alone yet from thence arise all the Shapes and Modes of Virtue and of Well-doing And 't is into this again that
have acted otherwise than as we have already done II. AS to the first of these Objections the Answer is not hard 'T is true we cannot otherwise think of God's Fore knowledg but to be every way clear and perfect and without possibility of Error as to those Objects about which he judges or does pronounce And firely he does always judg and determine of things according as they are that iâ— to say of â—contingent thing that it is contingent and of a necessary thing that it is necessary Whence is comes to pass that those things which are comingent and proceed from a Free Principle of Acting they are allow'd to be such by God's Consent For we ought not to confine God's Omniscience within narrower Bounds â—…n we do his Omnipotence which all Men acknowledg to be able to do whatever does not imply a Contradiction And therefore to disparch this Difficulty in afew words We say that the Fore-knowledg of contingent Effects which proceed from a free Principle of Acting does either imply a Contradiction or it does not If it does imply a Contradiction then such Effects are not the Objects of God's Omniscience nor determin'd by it or rightly suppos'd to be determin'd at all But if it do not imply a Contradiction then we actually confess that Divine Prescience and Man's Free Will are not inconsistent but that both of them may sâ—ly stand with each other Therefore by neither way can any sound or convincing Argument be drawn from God's Fore-knowledg against the Liberty of Man's Will III. AS to the other Difficulty the whole Sense thereof falls within this Proverbial Saying Nemo est lubens Malus aut Beatus invitas that is Ethic. Nicom l. 3. c. 5. No Man is willingly Wicked or Happy against his Will Or else into that saying of Socrates Omnis Improbus ignorat That no Man was Wicked but through Ignorance Which sounds as if the Will of Man wanted nothing but the Knowledg of what was Good and Virtuous to force him to imbrace it Nay that the Will was so fram'd as not to be able to resist that Good which it did but once understand Now if this were true there would not need so much Exhortation to the love of Virtue as to the Study of Wisdom Nor would the Liberty of Man's Will consist so much in Pre-election as in Counsels and Deliberations and these to be still so Govern'd as that nothing should prove repugnant to some Excellent End IV. WHEREFORE inasmuch as we find that Idea of the chief End which is termed Beatitude or Happiness to be but confusedly apprehended by us 't is every Man's Duty with principal Care to find out in what this chief Happiness doth consist and how we may attain it Yet whether all this be plac'd within every Man's Reach is a very hard thing to determine We see the Bulk of Mankind are like those who falling sick of a Disease and not knowing how to cure themselves ought to be visited by others that are in Health and from them take Remedies and Advice So the Generality that see little of themselves while they are dazled by false Lights and the bare Apparitions of Good can never discover What is the Ultimate Good and what the most Excellent Object of Human Life For as Aristotle observ'd all men seek after Apparent Good Ethic. Nicom l. 3. c. 5. nor are they Masters of their own â—…agination but every Man frames a different Good to himself according to his Complexion V. 'T IS in the Third Book of his Ethicks that the Philosopher proposes this Question and yet he does not otherwise clear it than by granting That it was some time or other in the Power of those who now are Blinded to have beheld what was truly Good and that Men are not less willingly Bad than Good But this does not directly satisfie the Objection Also he is pleas'd to expose it with more Words and Ornaments than is usual with him as in manner following That no Man is to himself the Cause of doing Ill but that such Things are done by Ignorance of the End and as Hoping he shall thereby attain what a Best for him That the Desire of the End falls not within our Choice but that it imports every Man to be so born as Naturally to See and Discern that what he chooseth is truly Good And he who has this Felicity by Birth is as it were Inspir'd and much oblig'd to Nature For he shall possess that High and Excellent Good which could never have been had either by Purchase or by Instruction had it not come by Birth-Right And thus to be born and under so benign a Planet is the true Perfection of Ingenuity VI. SINCE therefore this Natural Talent or inherent Aptitude which is so capable â—f Virtue and the Sense of all Good Things is antecedent to all our Industry as being the Gift of Nature and not the Reward of our Care and Diligence if a Man be destitue hereof 't is manifest that the Duties and Performances requir'd by Virtue are not in his Power Neither can the soundest Admonttions find Effect or Obedience with him 〈◊〉 less he be awak'ned by Stripes and Force or unless he be reform'd by something of Miracle from Above But whether any are so utterly depriv'd of this Natural Aptitude or by what Fate it befals them if they are so is to me so hard and perplexing a Question that I had rather wholly decline it than involâ—e my self within such Mysteries of Providence VII HOWEVER as to those who are so endow'd as to have some Native Foretast of this high and Excellent Good it seems to be plac'd within their Power either to acquire to themselves a clearer and more extended Knowledg therein or else to let that by degrees extinguish which already they have Into which Error if they shall unhappily run 't is with the same reason they may be said to be Willingly wicked as of the Intemperate man that he throws himself Wilfully into a Distemper L. 3. c. 6. And of whom Andronicus speaks in this sort Before the Man fell sick it was in his own Power to have preserv'd his Health But when Health is lost by Incontinence and Deâ—…h it is not in his Power to Recover it So 〈◊〉 Man may throw a Stone to the Bottom of the 〈◊〉 but being cast thither he cannot recover it â—…ever the Stone was willingly cast by him 〈◊〉 was in his Power either to Cast or to have â—…th-held it VIII AS for those Men who throw off all Distinction of Things Honest and Vile who have no other Sense than of the Animal life who consider only for themselves be it â—…ght or Wrong who think that Good is but of one Sort and this only referable to Animal Content or if perchance they think Good to be various yet still they six and appropriate all to themselves In such Men as these I 〈◊〉 confess their Will is perpetually determin'd to what
Faculty of Divination than into any certain and distinct Principles by which a Man might judge of that which in every thing were the best IX HOWEVER the same Philosopher is at last towards the end of his Eudemicks Moral Eudem l. 7. c. 15. very clear and very apposite in this Matter For when he brings the same question on the stage the Resolution is as follows ' That we are in this as in other Occasions to regulate our Lives by the Dictates of our internal Regent that we must aspire to such habits as may enable us to imitate the high Character of such a Regent and to conform thereto in all things Which amounts to this that our Consciences must be kept pure and immaculate For he adds That as human Nature does consist of two parts the one to command the other to obey so by institution in all Governments the inferiors are tyed to be subject to the Rulers That also this Government is of a double sort For just as Physick requires one thing and Health another and that the first is but in order to the latter even so it fares in contemplating the Ways of God He as the high and supreme Governor first sends his Edicts forth but the end and designation of them is to beget prudence in the heart of Man and then the work of prudence is to distinguish what in human affairs i◠best Now as to God he already is all-sufficient and wants nothing wherefore we may infer that whatever choice or whatever acquisition of natural Gifts we have which may most contribute to annex the Soul to God by contemplation this surely is the best and this the noblest Measure for all our Deliberations As on the other side whatever is so deficient or so redundant as to interrupt our Contemplation of God or of the Homage we owe him this of all things is the vilest This was the Answer given which for Truth and Divinity savours not so much of the Philosopher as of an Oracle X. YET let us add what he writes to the same effect Lib. 10. c. 8. unto Nicomachus He says That as to the Gods their whole Being was a continued Series of Happiness but as to Man that he had nothing of it farther than as he held resemblance with his Divine Original Now he should have remembered that the Divine Life was not a matter of Sapience only but was principally to consist in Love Benignity and in Beneficence or Well-doing For these are the Fruits of that Celestial Particle of the Soul which we term the Boniform and by which above any other Accessions we are made most like unto Almighty God XI PYTHAGORAS Var. Hist l. 12. c. 50. according to what Elian said of him made a happy Conjunction of these two things saying The Gods had been bountiful to Mortals in two eminent Blessings namely to speak the truth and to act righteously for that both of these bore resemblance unto the Works of the immortal Gods Which is to say that the Perfection of Divine Life is made up of Truth and Well-doing Wherefore if men will abide by the Judgment of Aristotle or Pythagoras or others of the most celebrated they must own that the Measure of Right Reason is to imitate the Divine Wisdom and the Divine Goodness with all our Might To which also we may refer and so expound that saying of Theages the Pythagorean That the source cause and measure of human Felicity does consist in the knowledge of such things as are most excellent and most divine CHAP. IV. Certain Axioms or Intellectual Principles into which almost all the Reasons of Morality may be reduced I. BUT since there is a Race of Men in the World who are quite seared up as to God and all that is Divine who allow no such thing as Superiority in the Faculties but assert Obedience to that Passion in particular which shall happen to usurp above the rest and make it the top of human Felicity to fullfil the desires thereof To such as these who would injuriously pass for men which they are not we must proceed by other steps than what are already set down For we must not talk of our Boniform Faculty as the measure of Right Reason and flowing from the divine part of the Soul but merely insist with them upon what refers to the Intellect Moral Eudem l. 5. c. 8. since as Aristotle notes some things are intelligible tho men know not the reason why II. FROM this Magazine therefore let us draw forth a stock of such Principles as being immediately and irresistibly true need no proof such I mean as all Moral Reason may in a sort have reference unto even as all Mathematical Demonstrations are found in some first undeniable Axioms And because these Principles arise out of that Faculty which the Greeks call Nūs that signifies the Mind or Intellect and that the Words Noema and Noemata derive therefrom and properly signifie Rules intellectual we do not therefore improperly stile the Rules that hereafter follow Moral Noema's But lest any should fansie them to be morose and unpracticable I must here affirm they propose nothing for good which at the same time is not grateful also and attended with delight NOEMA I. Good is that which is grateful pleasant and congruous to any Being which hath Life and Perception or that contributes in any degree to the preservation of it NOEMA II. But on the other side whatever is ungrateful unpleasant or any ways incongruous to any Being which hath Life and Perception is evil And if it finally tend to the destruction of that being it is the worst of evils As for example-sake if any thing should not only offend your Eyes or Ears but bring also blindness and deafness upon you this were the worst that could happen But if the sight and hearing were but only impaired thereby this were but an inferior Evil. And the Reason holds the same in the other Faculties NOEMA III. Among the several kinds or degrees of sensible Beings which are in the world some are better and more excellent than others NOEMA IV. One Good may excel another in Quality or Duration or in both This is self-evident yet it may be illustrated from this absurdity that otherwise one Life would not be better nor one sort of Happiness greater than another so as Gods Angels Men Horses and the vilest Worm would be happy alike which none but a mad man can fancy And as to Duration there is no scruple thereof NOEMA V. What is good is to be chosen what is evil to be avoided but the more excellent Good is preferable to the less excellent and a less Evil is to be born that we may avoid a greater NOEMA VI. In things of which we have no experience we must believe those who profess themselves to have experience Provided always that there be no suspicion of fraud or worldly contrivance but that there be a Conformity between their