such part in order But if all the parts which the thing containeth haue not one selfe end but diuers then diuide it by such differences as euery part may haue his proper end Moreouer if the forme matter or cause efficient haue diuers respects and considerations then according to that diuersitie make diuers diuisions and first declare what is common to all the parts in generall and what is proper to euery one in particular Finally if some one whole thing lieth hidden then it is to bee found out by looking into some of the particular parts thereof And these are al the chiefest points contained in the Latine Treatise which my friend Aâ—…ontius wrote de methodo And though that Petrus Ramus maketh but one kinde of method that is to say to proceed from the first principles or elements yet I am sure he will not denie but that to goe forward and backward be two diuers things though not contrarie as doth well appeare by the compositiue and resolutiue method before defined I doe not yet perfectly vnderstand by all this with what method a simple question is to be handled therefore I pray you shew the true way and order thereof The method or way in handling a simple question dependeth vpon these 9. Interrogatiues that is to say 1. First what significations the name or word hath whereof the question is made and how it is to be taken 2. Secondly whether there bee any such thing or not 3. Thirdly what it is 4. Fourthly what be the parts or speciall kindes thereof 5. Fiftly what be the causes 6. Sixtly what be the effects 7. Seuenthly what things be incident or appurtenant vnto it 8. Eightly what things are like vnto it 9. And ninthly what things bee contrarie to it All which questions Aristotle reduceth into these foure that is to say Whether it be What it is What manner of thing it is and Why it is Giue example of a simple question handled according to the nine questions before recited As for example If we haue to treat of vertue first wee must shew the diuers significations of vertue for vertue signifieth sometime power and abilitie as when we say vertue attractiue vertue digestiue or vertue expulsiue but here vertue is to be taken for a morall habit bringing forth good and commendable actions Secondly whether vertue be or not it plainly appeareth by the diuers doings of men whereof some bee good some bee bad Thirdly what vertue is we know by the definition thereof in saying that vertue is a morall habit inclining mans will to doe that which is alwaies good and agreeable to true iudgement Fourthly the kindes of vertue be diuers as Prudence Iustice Temperance Fortitude Modestie and such like Fiftly the causes of vertue be also diuers for the cause efficient thereof is good and mans will obedient to true reason and to true judgement the matter or subiect of vertue is the minde or heart of man the finall cause is blessednesse Sixtly the effect of vertue is tranquillitie of the minde and many prosperous successes and also publike vtilitie and peace Seuenthly things incident to vertue are these the honour praise and commendation of good men Eightly things of affinitie or like to vertue be all good inclinations dispositions or good naturall affections as to be louing kinde and mercifull Ninthly things contrarie to vertue bee all manner of vices as pride couetousnesse hypocrisie dissimulation c. What method is to be obserned in handling a compound question A compound question is to be handled by arguing and reasoning on both sides whereof wee shall treat hereafter In the meane time we haue to speake of a Proposition without the which no argument can be made for all arguments doe consist of propositions Here endeth the second Booke THE ART OF LOGICKE THE THIRD BOOKE CHAP. I. Of a Proposition WHat is a Proposition It is a perfect speech whereby something is manifestly declared to be true or false Whereof is such speech specially compounded Of Noune and Verbe which Noune would be of the Nominatiue case and the Verbe of the Indicatiue Mood as when I say Man is a sensible body for the Logicians do seldome allow any such speeches as are either of the Optatiue Imperatiue Interrogatiue or Vocatiue Mood as I would to God I had a good horse this speech is not accounted to be so true or certaine as to say I haue a good horse Of how many parts doth a Proposition consist Of three that is to say the Subiect Predicat and Copulat What is the Copulat It is the Verbe Substantiue called in Latine Sum es fui that is to be which doth couple or ioine the Predicat with his Subiect as when we say Man is a sensible body here in this proposition the word man is the subiect and the word sensible body is the predicat and the Verbe is is the copulat which copulat is not alwaies incident to euery proposition and specially when the predicat is some other Verbe and not the Verbe substantiue as Plato disputeth Socrates walketh which is as much to say as Plato is disputing Socrates is walking How many waies is a proposition diuided Three manner of waies that is according to substance qualitie and quantitie According to substance thus Of propositions some are said to be categoricall that is simple and some hypotheticall that is compound of which compound propositions we minde not to speake before we haue treated of all things belonging to a categoricall and simple proposition which is twofold that is to say absolute and modall What is an absolute categoricall proposition It is a speech which affirmeth or denieth something absolutely without any respect as when we say God is true or Euery man is a lier and this is otherwise called of the Logicians Propositio categorica de inesse How is a simple proposition diuided according to qualitie Into an affirmatiue and negatiue proposition When is it said to be affirmatiue and when negatiue It is said to be affirmatiue when the predicat is affirmed of the subiect as when I say that Iohn is learned and that is negatiue when the predicat is denied of the subiect as Iohn is not learned And note that in such kinde of speech the negatiue is alwaies ioined to the Verbo How many waies is a simple proposition diuided according to quantitie Foure manner of waies that is to say into an vniuersall particular indefinite and singular proposition When is it said to be vniuersall When some vniuersall signe is added to the subiect Which words are said to be vniuersall signes These all euery whatsoeuer whosoeuer none no body not one none at all euery where no where and such like as Euery man is a lier No man is true When is it said to be a particular proposition When some particular signe is added to the subiect Which call you particular signes These some any many few and such like as Some man is wise Few are wise When
not of the matter What is the cause efficient That which maketh or worketh any thing and is the authour thereof as the Carpenter is the cause efficient of the house and Shipwright of the ship What is the end or finall cause It is that for whose sake any thing is done as the end of warre is to haue peace the end of studie is to get learning and knowledge Giue examples of definitions made of euery one of these causes Of matter let this bee your example Beere is a drinke made of mault water and hops Of forme thus Man is a sensible bodie endued with a soule intellectiue or reasonable which is the true shape of man Of the cause efficient thus That is a Decree of the Senate which the Senate commandeth and ordaineth for the Senate is the cause efficient of the Decree Anger or wrath is the boiling of the bloud about the heart through the stirring vp of choler Of the end thus A house is a building made to defend our bodies from the iniuries of the aire and weather May not a good definition be made of many of these causes ioined together Yes indeed Giue example Loe here the example of Demosthenes in defining what Law is Law saith he is the inuention and gift of God and the decree of wise men the correction of crimes either rashly or aduisedly committed and a common couenant or consent of the Citie according to the which all men ought to liue In this definition the first and chiefest cause efficient is God the second cause efficient is the common couenant or consent of the Citie the matter is the decree of the wise the end is the correction of crimes and the keeping of the Citizens in good order of life When is a definition said to be made by the Relatiue When one Relatiue is interpreted by another as thus He is a father which hath a sonne and he is a master which hath a seruant When is a definition said to be made by the effects vertues or offices of the thing defined When the nature of the thing is plainly declared by shewing the said effects or offices as thus An adamant stone is that which being laid nigh to iron or steele draweth the steele vnto him Iustice is a vertue which giueth euery man his right When is a definition said to be made by numbering vp of the parts When it containeth either the chiefe or all the parts of some whole thing or else all the speciall kindes of some generall kinde Giue examples of both these waies Of the first thus A house is a building hauing a foundation walles and couering Of the second way thus A sensible body is that which comprehendeth both man and bruit beast When is a definition said to be made by heaping vp of accidents When a thing is rather described then defined by such common and proper accidents as doe belong to the same as fire is an element that is hot and drie and exceedeth all other elements in lightnesse and therefore this last kinde of definition ought rather to be called a description then a definition which is vsuall to the Poets Orators and Historiographers in describing either person fact or thing also to the Physicians in describing their simples as roots plants herbes and such like CHAP. II. Of the precepts to be obserued in Definition HOw many precepts are to be obserued in making a true definition These three First that it briefly expresse the whole power and nature of the thing defined Secondly that there be nothing therein superfluous nor any thing wanting Thirdly that the definition be not common to many things but proper to that thing only which is defined so as it may make it to differ from all other things What order is to be obserued in making a dialecticall definition First you must know in what predicament the thing is contained which you would define to the intent that in descending from the most generall kinde downe towards the most spâ—…ciall kinde of the same predicament ye may finde out by the way that which is next generall kinde to the thing that is to be defined which next generall kinde being found out yee must then seeke out the speciall difference or propertie the proper cause effect or common accidents belonging to the same as for example if ye would define what vertue is ye must resort to the predicament of qualitie wherein vertue is contained then in descending from qualitie proceed to habit from habit to habit of the minde which is twofold that is to say intellectuall and morall and not finding it vnder habit intellectuall proceed to habit morall for that is the next generall kinde to vertue that done seeke out the difference or propertie true cause or effect the difference is to be good wherein it differeth from vice for vice is also a morall habit as well as vertue the effect of vertue is to incline mans will to doe alwaies according to right reason or true iudgement so shall you make a true definition of vertue in saying that vertue is a good morall habit inclining mans will to doe alwaies according to true iudgement And after this sort yee may learne to define any other thing CHAP. III. Of Diuision WHat is Diuision Diuision is the parting or diuiding of a word or thing that is more generall vnto other words or things lesse generall for Diuision is twofold that is of a name and of a thing When is it said to be the diuision of a name When some Equinoke or doubtfull word is diuided into his manifold significations as this word Wolfe into a man hauing that name into a foure-footed beast into an vlcerous sore and into a certaine fish each one called by the name of Wolfe which kinde of distinction or diuision is very necessarâ—…e to auoid ambiguitie of speech which ambiguitie causeth many times great errour How manifold is the diuision of a thing It is threefold that is substantiall partible and accidentall When is it properly said to be substantiall When any generall kinde is diuided by his speciall differences into his proper speciall kindes as thus of sensible bodies one is reasonable as man and another is vnreasonable as a bruit beast When is this kinde of diuision to be vsed When the speciall kindes lacke proper names as most commonly the speciall kindes subalternate doe which may be diuided againe as generall kindes into more speciall kindes as for example of vnreasonable beasts some be terrestriall some bee aquaticall and some aierie againe euery one of these may bee diuided into their speciall kindes euen vntill ye come to the lowest of all and vnto the Indiuiduums comprehended vnder the same and that not only of things contained in the predicament of substance but also in any other predicaments of accidents as of magnitudes one is long as a line another is broad as a superficies and another is thicke as a body This diuision though it â—…e of accidents contained
in this life to fly vice and to embrace vertue from whence all good actions doe spring Logically thus Euery man shall render account at the last day of all his deeds both good and bad and shall receiue a iust reward according to the same Ergo Euery man whilest he liueth in this world ought to fly vice and to embrace vertue From the cause efficient SIth Man was created by God the Creator of all things and Author of all goodnesse excellencie and vertue and was formed according to the very Image and likenesse of God it behoueth man therefore to imitate his Creator and by leading a godly and vertuous life to shew that hee is somewhat like him though not able in all things to attaine to the perfection of so perfect a patterne Logically thus God the cause efficient is good therefore Man being the effect ought to be good From the End THe Prophets and Apostles inspired with the Holy Ghost Author of all Truth by many their writings doe testifie that the greatnesse and excellencie of that blessednesse wherunto Man is created is such as no man is able to expresse with tongue nor in his heart or minde to conceiue the same wherfore sith Man is created to such exceeding great blessednesse it behoueth him to embrace vertue which is the very meane and way to bring him to that blessednesse Logically thus Sith most glorious blessednes is the end of Man Man therfore ought to embrace vertue that he may attaine to that end What arguments are to be gathered on the behalfe of the Predicate and from what places These that follow and such like and first from the definition thus From the Definition of the Predicate SIth Vertue is a morall habite whereby Mans will and all his actions are alwayes directed to God and gouerned according to true iudgement and thereby are made most acceptable both to God and Man Man therefore ought to embrace Vertue from whence such noble fruits doe spring Logically thus Man ought to loue that habite from whence all honest actions doe spring therefore man ought to loue Vertue From the Description MAn ought with all endeuour to follow that thing wherby he may attaine not a vaine and transitorie glory but a true and euerlasting glory and thereby to be made acceptable both to God and Man Wherefore Man ought to embrace Vertue from whence such glory springeth Logically thus That thing is worthy to be beloued of Man which getteth him euerlasting glory Therefore Vertue is worthy to be beloued From the Etymologie SIth Vertue if you diligently consider and weigh the signification of the word is none other thing but a Noble affection of the minde of great excellencie and most meete for Man it is not to be doubted but that those which leauing so precious a thing doe set their whole delight in seeking after worldly riches and bodily pleasure are much deceiued and doe greatly offend Logically thus Such excellencie as is most meet for Man becommeth Man best Therefore Vertue becommeth him best From the generall Kinde SIth it is well knowne that Man ought with all diligence to seeke after those habites whereby humane nature is best adorned and made most perfect And that Vertue amongst such habites is the chiese because that thereby the minde of Man is taught to know what truth is and his will thereby is alwayes inclined to honest and laudable actions Man therefore ought with al his power and endeuor to embrace Vertue Logically thus Man ought chiefely to loue those habites whereby his nature is made perfect Therefore man ought to loue Vertue From the speciall Kinde IT is most meete yea most necessarie for all men to loue fortitude and temperance for by temperance Mans wil is bridled and kept from all euill lusts and affections and by fortitude he is made free from feare of death and as without temperance mans life cannot be honest so without fortitude his death cannot be commendable wherefore it plainly appeareth how necessary a thing it is for a man to embrace Vertue as that which chiefely maketh his life honest and laudable and his death glorious and honorable Logically thus A man ought to loue fortitude and temperance Ergo He ought to loue Vertue From the corruption of the Subiect THe destruction of Vertue is the cause of most grieuous euils for the light of Vertue being extinct the minde is immediately wrapped in such darkenesse as it cannot see nor discerne what is honest what is profitable or what is hurtfull by meanes whereof man falleth into most filthie vices which doe so infect and corrupt the life of man as it becommeth most detestable both to God and Man whereby it plainely appeareth how noble a thing Vertue is and with what loue and diligence it ought to be embraced of all men Logically thus The destruction of Vertue is euill therefore Vertue is good and worthy to be beloued From the vse of the Subiect THe vse of Vertue maketh mans life commendable holy glorious and acceptable both to God and Man then which nothing can bee in this world more to bee desired of man wherefore it manifestly appeareth that Vertue is so noble a thing as all men ought to bestow all their studie labour and care in obtaining the same Logically thus The vse of Vertue is good Therefore Vertue is good From common Accidents SIth all men doe greatly desire to haue their consciences quieted and their mindes free from all euill lustes affects and passions which with continuall strife doe molest the same and thereby doe cause Man to lead a miserable life Man therfore ought to refuse no paine nor labour so as he may attaine to Vertue which is alwaies accompanied with that tranquillitie of minde and conscience that is so much desired Logically thus The tranquillitie of the minde and conscience is to be desired Ergo Vertue which is alwaies accompanied with that tranquillitie is to be desired From the cause Efficient SIth true Vertue is not to be gotten by any mans labour exercise or industrie without the great grace of God who is chiefe Authour and Giuer of all good gifts it well appeareth that Vertue is a most excellent thing and most worthie to be had in admiration and therefore with feruent loue and diligence to be embraced of all men Logically thus God the chiefe Author of all good is the cause Efficient of Vertue therefore Vertue proceeding of so worthy a cause must needs be an excellent thing and worthy of all men to be embraced From the Effect TRue honor and glory hath beene alwaies had amongst all men in great admiration because it seemeth not only by mans iudgement but also by the diuine iudgement of God to be alwaies attributed to vertue wherefore sith Vertue doth yeeld such noble fruits and effects Vertue must needs be a noble thing it selfe and worthy of all men to be embraced Logically thus The Effect of Vertue which is true honor and glory is good
Dilemma Diuers whereof some be called Certains or horned Arguments some Crocodolites some Assistatons some Pseudomenons Define all these kindes and giue examples 1 The horned Argument is when by some subtile and craftie manner of questioning we seeke to haue such an answere as we may take vantage therof as the Pharises did when they questioned with Christ touching the payment of Tribute to Caesar. 2 The Crocodolite is when being deceiued by some craftie manner of questioning we doe admit that which our Aduersary turneth againe vpon vs to our own hindrance as in the fable of the Crocodile whereof this name Crocodolite proceedeth for it is said that the Crocodile hauing taken away a childe from his mother reasoned with her in this sort I will deliuer thee thy childe againe if thou wilt say a troth whether therfore shall I deliuer him or not The mother answered thou shalt not deliuer him and therefore of right thou oughtest to deliuer him No saith he I will not deliuer him to the intent it may seeme that thou hast said troth and though thou haddest said that I should deliuer him yet I would not deliuer him indeed for making thee a lyar 3 Assistaton is a kinde of cauelling not consisting of any sure ground as if a man did say that he doth hold his peace or lyeth or knoweth nothing another by and by might cauill thereof in this sort Ergo He that holdeth his peace speaketh he that lyeth saith truth he that knoweth nothing knoweth something 4 Pseudomenon is a false or lying kinde of cauelling as thus The heauen couereth all things Ergo it couereth it selfe Epimenides being a Candiot himselfe said That the Candiotes were lyers the question is whether he said true or not for though he said true and that the Candiotes were lyers yet it is false because a Candiot said it againe if the Candiotes be no lyers nor Epimenides is a lyer then hee is to be beleeued How are the Fallaxes of these captious Arguments to be found out The Fallaxes of all these kindes of captious Arguments are soone found out if wee consider well the rules before taught touching the repâ—…gnances of Propositions as whether there be any ambiguitie in the Termes and whether the selfe-same Termes in the repugnant parts haue respect to one selfe-thing time or place or not it is good also to consider the substance quantitie and qualitie of the Propositions for in the last example this saying Candiotes be lyers is a Proposition indefinite and therefore is not of such force as to say all Candiotes be lyers which is an vniuersall Proposition for of particular Premisses nothing rightly followeth In the other examples you shall finde that there is some doubtfulnesse in the Termes hauing respect eyther to diuers things to diuers times or diuers places as to say he holdeth his peace when he speaketh Heere is doubtfulnesse in the Termes hauing respect to diuers things that is to say as well to those things which hee meaneth to keepe in silence as to those words which hee vttereth by mouth so in this word Suite in the example of Protagoras was doubtfulnesse for that Protagoras meant some other Suite and not that which he himselfe commenced CHAP. XXVIII Of Enumeration WHat is Enumeration Enumeration is a kinde of Argument wherin many things being reckoned vp and denied one thing onely of necessitie remaineth to bee affirmed as thus Sith thou hast this Horse eyther thou didst buy him or he came to thee by inheritance or hee was giuen thee or bred at home with thee or else thou didst take him from thine enemie in time of warre or if none of these were then thou must needs steale him but thou neyther boughtest him nor he fell not vnto thee by inheritance nor was giuen thee â—…or bred vp at home with thee nor yet taken by thee from the enemie it followeth therefore of necessitie that thou hast stolne him When is this kind of argument to be confuted When your aduersary can prooue any necessary part to bee left out CHAP. XXIX Of a simple Conclusion WHat is a simple Conclusion A simple Conclusion is no other thing but a necessary Enthymeme in the which the Consequent doth necessarily follow the antecedent as thus shee hath had a childe Ergo she hath layne with a man CHAP. XXX Of Subiection WHat is Subiection Subiection is a questioning kinde of Argument in the which wee confute each question with a reason immediatly following the same as thus How is this fellow become so wel moneyed had he any great Patrimonie left him No for all his Fathers lands were sold. Came there any inheritance to him by discent any otherwise No for hee was disinherited of all men Came there any goods vnto him by Executorship c. If then hee hath not been enriched by any of these honest wayes either he hath a golden Myne at home or else hee is come to these riches by some vnlawfull meanes This argument faileth when any principall part is left out and therefore differeth not much from Enumeration before recited CHAP. XXXI Of Opposition WHat is Opposition Oppositioâ—… is a kind of Argument made of Repugnant parts wherein we reuert from the Opposite of the first Proposition vnto the same Proposition againe as thus If I were in the Citie at such time as this man was slaine in the Countrey then I slew him not this Proposition is now a simple Conclusion and may be made an Opposition in this maner If I had been in the Countrey at such time as you say this man was slaine then you might well suspect mee to haue slaine him but sith I was not there at that time there is no cause therefore why you should suspect mee CHAP. XXXII Of Violation WHat is Uiolation Violation is a kinde of Concluding more meete to confute then to prooue whereby we shew the reason of our aduersarie to make for vs and not for him as thus it is not good to marrie a wife because that of marriage many times commeth the losse of children to our great sorrow yea rather it is good therefore to marrie a wife to get other children for our comfort Thus much touching the diuers kindes of reasoning now we will treate of Fallaxes or false Conclusions and shew how â—…o confute them Heere endeth the fift Booke of Logick THE SIXT BOOKE OF LOGICKE CHAP. I. Of Confutation THere be some that make two kinds of Confutation the one belonging to person the other to matter Confutation of person is done either by taunting rayling rendring checke for checke or by scorning and that either by wordes or else by countenance gesture and action which kinde of Confutation because it belongeth rather to scoffing then to true order of reasoning I will leaue to speake thereof dealing onely with that Confutation that belongeth to matter which is two-fold the one generall the other speciall it is generall when wee affirme that the Argument faileth either in forme in matter
with the good thou shalt be good and with the froward thou shalt learne frowardnesse What bee the Maxims of this place If one thing being put to another endueth the same with any quality that thing must needes haue the same qualitie it selfe I doe place this place next to action because it seemeth to me that it appertaineth to action Of common Accidents WHat cast yee common Accidents I call those common Accidents such things as are either alwaies or for the most part so knit together as the one goeth before or after the other or els accompany each one the other whereof some are necessarie and some probable How may we reason from the Necessarie Both affirmatiuely and negatiuely and first affirmatiuely by the latter part thus This Appletree hath flowers Ergo it hath budded It hath fruit Ergo it hath both budded and flowred This woman is brought to bed of a childe Ergo she hath conceiued Negatiuely by the former part thus This woman neuer conceiued Ergo she can bring forth no childe This man neuer studied Ergo he is not learned What be the maxims of this place If the latter be the former must needs goe before and if the former were not the latter cannot be Of Probable Accidents Coniectures Presumptions Signes and Circumstances HOw may we reason from Probable Accidents From Probable Accidents you may reason Affirmatiuely thus The feast of Bacehus is this day celebrated Ergo there will bee many drunken this day The generall Sessions are holden this day Ergo there will be some hanged What be the maxims of this place If the latter be it is likely that the former went before and if the former bee it is like enough the latter may sollow but you must beware in reasoning from this place that you fetch not your argument from such Accidents as chance but seldome or be indifferent for such be neither necessarie nor probable but sophisticall and fallible as to reason thus Shee is a faire woman Ergo she is vnchast Whereto serueth the place of common Accidents In the Iudiciall kinde it helpeth greatly to proue the fact In the Demonstratiue kinde to praise or dispraise In the Deliberatiue kinde to perswade or disswade and to gather together all Coniectures meete for the purpose and therefore this place is much vsed of natural Philosophers to proue things by naturall signes or by Physiognomie also of Astrologers â—…o proue dearth mortalitie and such like by wonders and monsters as by blazing starres and such like impressions Also it is much vsed of Chiromancers Southsayers and such as vse to iudge by Coniectures and therefore this place extendeth very farre and serueth to many vses Hitherto also are referred the places of circumstances and chiefely of time and place from whence good arguments may be fetched Of Time HOw are arguments fetched from time Negatiuely thus Pythag was not borne in Numa Pompilius time Ergo Numa was not Pythagoras scholler The ceremoniall lawes of Moses were made for a certaine time Ergo after that time they doe not bind What be the Maxims of this place Nothing can bee without time for if time bee taken away the thing also must needs faile Of Place HOw are arguments fetched from place Negatiuely thus Cicero was not at Rome when Iulius Caesar was slaine Ergo Cicero slew him not What is the maxime of this place No certain body or thing is without a place neither is one bodie at one time in diuers places and thus much touching inward places Of outward Places and first of Causes WHich be outward Places Outward places bee those which appertaine to the thing and yet doe not cleaue thereunto of which places the first is of Causes and Effects What is a Cause A Cause is that by vertue wherof another thing followeth How many chiefe kindes of Causes be there Foure that is to say the Cause Efficient the end matter and shape of the two last whereof we haue spoken before because they be inward places and doe belong to the Substance of the thing and therefore we haue to deale onely here with the cause Efficient and end Of the Cause Efficient WHat is that cause Efficient and how is it deuided Cause Efficient is that from whence proceedeth the first beginning of any thing that is made or done and is the maker thereof As for example the Carpenter is the Cause Efficient of the house which he maketh and so is euery Artificer of his owne worke Causes Efficient are deuided into two kinds that is to say Cause Absolute and Cause Adiuuant Cause Absolute worketh by his owne force and vertue as the fire that burneth Cause Adiuuant worketh not by himselfe but is a helper and such cause is sometime principall as vertue is a Principall Cause of blessed life and sometime not Principal as the gifts of the body and of fortune be helpers to the happy life but not Principall Causes thereof Againe of Causes some are of Necessitie without which the thing cannot be made as the Instrument or matter and some are said not to be of Necessitie as when we say The speaking of truth causeth hatred and yet not of Necessitie Also of Causes Efficient some be Vniuersall and some Particular as the Eclipse or euill Coniunction of certaine Planets is the Vniuersal cause of Pestilence but the corruption of humours in mans body is the particular cause thereof Againe of causes some bee called of the Latins Propinquae that is to say nigh vnto the Effect as the father and mother be the nighest Causes of Generation of Children And some be called Remotae that is to say remoued causes which be further of as the Grandsâ—…rs and Grandames of the said children Moreouer of Causes Efficient some work by a certaine naturall Necessity as those that lack choise and iudgement as fire that burneth and the Sun that shineth and all other naturall things that doe work by their own force and vertue Some againe do work by counsell reason and free-will as men Angels and most chiefely God himselfe How may we reason from the Efficient Cause to the Effect From the necessarie Efficient Cause you may reason both Affirmatiuely and Negatiuely Affirmatiuely thus The Sun is lately gone downe Ergo it is twilight Negatiuely thus The Sunne was not vp when Troy was destroyed Ergo Troy was not destroyed in the day time but from the Efficient not Necessarie you can reason but onely Affirmatiuely thus He is slaine Ergo he is dead but you cannot say he is not slaine Ergo he is not dead What be the maxims of this Place The Necessarie Cause Efficient not letted the Effect must needs follow as if he hath drunken poison he must needs die But if such Cause faileth the effect also must needs faile as the Sunne is not vp Ergo it is not day He neuer studied Ergo he is not learned to which place may be referred the places of occasion Instrument Meane and Generation How may we reason
from the Effect to the Cause Efficient From the Necessarie Effect both Affirmatiuely and Negatiuely thus it is day Ergo the Sun is vp it is not day Ergo the Sunne is not vp From the Effect not Necessarie you may only reason Negatiuely thus He is not dead Ergo He is not slaine but you cannot reason so Affirmatiuely as to say He is dead Ergo He is slaine What be the Maximes of this place The Effect being put the necessary Cause must needes be and the Effect being taken away the necessary Cause is also taken away When doe Arguments fetched from this place faile When the Cause is not necessary or proper Of the End WHat is End and how is it diuided The End is that for whose sake any thing is done and of ends some be chiefe and last and some not chiefe but helping The chiefe is that which is desired for it selfe sake and such is the best state of euery thing in his kinde as blessed life to Man courage and fiercenesse to a Horse of seruice heate and drynesse to Fire coldnesse and moistnesse to Water c. The helping end is that which is desired not for it selfe sake but for that it helpeth to attayne the chiefest end and of such helping ends one may be better then another as when we desire money to buy a house and the house to dwell in c. How may we reason from this place Both Affirmatiuely and Negatiuely affirmatiuely thus Vertue is good because blessed Life is good negatiuely thus If Adulterie be not good to allure another mans wife To breake wedlock is not good What be the Maximes of this place That thing whereof the end is good or euill is also of it selfe good or euill Tell the vse of these places of Causes and whereto they serue The vse thereof is diuers and manifold for sith that in the Deliberatiue kinde two principall questions are to be discussed first whether the thing be profitable and secondly whether it may be possible and conueniently done or not Arguments to proue the first are to be fetched out of the End and Effect And to proue the second out of the Cause Efficient Also in the kinde Demonstratiue to praise or dispraise Arguments are to be fetched out of the End and Effect Thirdly in the Iudiciall kinde wherein doubt riseth of the fact and will of the doer Arguments are to be fetched from the End to proue or disproue the same Finally these places together with the other two Causes Matter and Forme before taught doe serue to make those kindes of Definitions which we cal Causall Of Opposites WHat be Opposites Things contrary one to another How many kindes of Opposites be there Foure that is to say Relatiues Contraries Priuatiues and Contradictories And first of Relatiues WHen are things said to be Opposites by Relation When according to their owne significations they haue mutuall Relation one to another as the Father and the Sonne How may we reason from this place You may reason from the Affirmation of the one to the denyall of the other thus Augustus was Octaâ—…s his sonne Ergo He was not his Father What be the Maximes of this place Sith Relatiues be alwayes together by nature if the one be the other must needes be and if the one be taken away the other is also taken away What is to be obserued in fetching Arguments from this place You must beware that you haue one selfe respect and not diuers for to reason thus is no good Consequent This man is a Father Ergo He is no Sonne or thus This man is his Superior Ergo Not his Inferior for in diuers respects he may be both a Father and a Sonne a Superior and Inferior a Superior in one respect and Inferior in another Of Contraries WHat be Contraries and how are they diuided They be two Extremes Repugnant one to another whereof some are called Mediate that is to say hauing a meane and some Immediate hauing no meane at all How may we reason from these two kindes From the first kinde you may conclude negatiuely thus He is prodigall Ergo He is not couetous from the second kinde you may reason both Affirmatiuely Negatiuely thus This man is whole Ergo He is not sicke This man is not whole Ergo He is sicke What be the Maximes of this place The Maxime of the Affirmatiue to the Negatiue is the generall Maxime to all Opposites thus Whatsoeuer agreeth with the one Opposite must needes disagree with the other Opposite but the Maxime of the Immediate is thus If one of the Contraries Immediate be not the other must needes be as the former examples doe plainely shew Of Priuatiues WHat be Priuatiues Priuatiues are two Contraries belonging to one selfe Subiect apt to receiue the same in the which Subiect when the one is wanting at such time as Nature doth appoint the other must needes be How may we reason from this place Two wayes first from Affirmation of the one to the denyall of the other which is common to all Opposites as thus He is blind Ergo He seeth not Secondly you may reason from the denyall of the one to the affirmation of the other thus He cannot speake Ergo He is dumbe But this kinde of Argument is not strong vnlesse the thing required be applyed to his proper Subiect and in such time as nature hath appointed for it were no good argument to say thus a sucking child cannot speake Ergo he is dumbe or thus a whelpe of two daies old cannot see Ergo he is blinde for nature commonly suffereth not the childe to speake before it be two yeeres old nor the whelpe to see before it be nine daies olde What be the maxims of this place If the one bee not in the Subiect apt to receiue the same at such time as nature hath appointed the other must needs be Of Contradictories WHat be Contradictories They be Contraries hauing no meane whereof the one denieth the other How may we reason from this place Both Affirmatiuely and Negatiuely thus he is wife Ergo he is no foole he is a foole Ergo he is not wise What is the Maxime of this place If the one be the other cannot be for two Contradictories cannot be together at one selfe time in one selfe Subiect and in one selfe respect Of things differing in kinde called of the Latines Disparata WHat be they They are those things that doe differ in nature and kinde as a Man a Horse a Stone a Tree whereof euery one differeth from another in kinde and nature How may we reason from this place From the Affirmation of the one to the Deniall of the other as thus Peter is a Man Ergo he is no Horse What be the Maximes of this place Whatsoeuer agreeth with the one agreeth not with the other What is to be obserued in reasoning from all these kindes of Opposites That the Repugnancy consist in the Predicat and not in the Subiect for it were no
not first neither doe they shew the original cause of the Conclusion for the Maior of this Syllogisme may be proued by a former and more knowne Proposition for that which is more generall is more knowne then that which is lesse generall as thus Euery liuing body is nourishable but euery sensible body is a liuing body Ergo euery sensible body is nourishable Againe it is said to be vnperfect when we proceed from the effect to the cause as when we say it is day Ergo the Sunne is vp But that demonstration which proceedeth from the cause to the effect is the more worthier because we vse therein discourse of reason and vnderstanding and in the other we onely iudge by the outward sences wherof spring two principall kindes of Methode that is to say compendious or short orders or wayes of teaching in all manner of Sciences whereof the one is called composition proceeding forward from the first to the last and the other is called resolution proceeding backward from the last to the first as hath been said before in the 〈◊〉 Methode Lib. 2. cap. 5. CHAP. XX. Of Science Opinion Ignorance Witte and of the foure Sciencial questions WHat other things are wont to bee treated of by the Schoolemen in demonstration Diuers things as what difference is betwixt Science and Opinion also they treate of the diuers kindes of Ignorance of prompt Witte and of the foure Scienciall questions What difference is betwixt Science and opinion Science as hath been said before is that which consisteth of necessary certaine and infallible Propositions and of such things as cannot be otherwise Opinion is the knowledge of things casuall which may bee sometime false and sometime true How many kindes of Ignorance doe the Schoolemen make Two that is to say absolute which of the Schoolmen is called Ignorantia negationis and ignorance by false conception which they call Ignorantia affectionis The first is when we vtterly denie to haue any knowledge of a thing at all The other is when we thinke to know that which we know not being deceiued by some false perswasion whereunto we are affected whereof it is called Ignorantia affectionis How doth Aristotle define prompt Witte called of the Latines Solertia He defineth it to be a promptnesse or readinesse in quickly finding out the proofe or cause of any thing that is in question without any studie Which be the foure Sciential questions These whether the thing be what it is how it is and wherfore it is whereof the first enquireth of the Subiect whether it be the second of the Predicate as what it is the third how it is that is to say how the Predicate is spoken of the Subiect and the fourth asketh the cause why it is spoken of the Subiect And thus much of a Syllogisme Demonstratiue now of a Syllogisme Dialecticall or probable CHAP. XXI Of a Syllogisme Dialecticall WHat is a Dialecticall Syllogisme A Dialecticall Syllogisme is that which is made of probable and credible Propositions What things are said to be probable Things probable according to Aristotle are these that seeme true to all men or to the most part of men or to all wise men or to the most part of wise men or else to the most approued wise men whereby it appeareth that things probable may be said fiue manner of wayes Shew how First those things are probable which vnto all men aswell learned as vnlearned being in their right wits doe seeme to be true as these Euery mother loueth her childe we loue them that loue vs we must doe good to them that doe good to vs. Secondly those things that seeme true to most men as these it is better for a communalty to be ruled by one Prince then by many It is not good to serue many masters at once Thirdly those things that seeme true to all wise men as these what thing soeuer is honest the same is also profitable Vertue is better then riches Fourthly those that seeme true to the most part of the wise and learned as thus the soule of man is immortall the Sunne is greater then the earth Fiftly those things that seeme true to the most approued wise men as these The world had a beginning it is better for a Prince to be loued then feared of his Subiects And generally vnder things probable are contained all true Propositions that be casuall and not implying any necessitie I say here true Propositions to exclude false Propositions whereof Sophisticall Syllogismes are made and not those which we call probable or Logicall Syllogismes and yet such Propositions be not so true in deede as those that bee required in a Syllogisme demonstratiue but onely doe seeme true ingendring a certaine opinion in mans minde doubting notwithstanding the contrary for it breedeth not a perfect knowledge as Science doth whereby the minde is of all doubts throughly resolued And note here that the Schoolemen doe make the matter whereof a Dialecticall Syllogisme doth consist to be twofold that is Materia remota in English farre off and Materia propinqua that is to say nigh or neere at hand What doth Materia remota containe These foure Dialecticall Predicates that is Definition called of the Schoolemen Terminus property generall kinde and Accident All which Predicates are before defined and are called Predicates because they are common words spoken of others But truely I see no cause why these foure Predicates should be attributed to a Dialectical Syllogisme more then to a Syllogisme demonstratiue for sure I am that as good demonstrations may be made of these as of any other Predicats What is contained vnder Materia propinqua These a Dialecticall Proposition Probleme and Position What difference is betwixt these three words Dialecticall Proposition Probleme and Position A Dialecticall Proposition is a probable question vttered with a simple Interrogatory as whether the mother loueth her childe which is no question in deede but to him that asketh A Probleme is a doubtfull question vttered with a double Interrogatory as whether the least fixed starre in the firmament be greater then the Moone or not or whether that the Sunne be bigger then the earth or not Position is a wonderfull opinion maintained by some excellent Clerke as to say that all things are but one essence or being as Melissus affirmed or that all things doe continually flowe and change as Heraclitus held or that the earth moueth and not the heauens as Copernicus supposeth onely to finde out thereby the true motions of the Planets and not for that he thought so in deed CHAP. XXII Of a sophisticall Syllogisme WHat is a Sophisticall or false Syllogisme A false Syllogisme is that which is either made of false Propositions or else of such as seeme probable and be not in deede or else of probable premisses not rightly concluding and of such Syllogismes there be three sortes the one failing in matter the other in forme the third in both When is it said to faile in
also is necessarie as thus The woman giueth milke Ergo shee hath had a childe or is with childe if the signes be probable then the Enthimeme is also probable as thus This man is a night-gadder Ergo he is a thiefe CHAP. XXV Of an Example WHat is an Example An Example is a kind of Argument wherein wee proceed from one particular to proue another particular by reason of some likenes that is betwixt them as thus God did not punish the Niniuites because they repented Ergo Hee will not punish vs if we repent God did not let to plague King Dauid for adulterie Ergo He will not let to plague any other King for committing the same offence Wherein differeth this kinde of Argument from the rest This kinde of Argument differeth in forme from all the rest before taught for a Syllogisme proceedeth from the generall kinde to the speciall kinde or otherwise An Enthimeme imitating a Syllogisme reciteth in his Antecedent the cause of the Conclusion Againe an Induction out of many particularities gathereth an vniuersalitie none of which things is to be found in an Example proceeding onely from one particular to another like particular Notwithstanding Aristotle saith that it may be reduced partly to an Induction and partly to a Syllogisme for in taking the first particular you may by an vnperfect Induction imply an vniuersall Proposition And so from that vniuersall Proposition to proceed by order of Syllogisme vnto the other particular implyed in the conclusion of the Example as in this Example Iuaas died euill Ergo Pilate also died euill it may be first reduced into an vnperfect Induction thus Iudas dyed euill because hee was the author of Christs death and did not repent Ergo Euery man that was author of Christs death and did not repent died euill Into a Syllogisme thus Euery man that was author of Christs death and did not repent died euil but Pilat was author of Christs death and did not repent Ergo Pilate died euill Whereto serues this kinde of reasoning by Example Examples are very good in all morall matters to perswade or disswade What is to be obserued in reasoning by way of Example You must in any wise be sure that the similitude or likenesse of the particulars doe make to the purpose which you intend and that it be the very cause why the Predicate of the Antecedent properly belongeth to the Subiect for otherwise the argument is not good for if you should reason thus Iudas died euill Ergo Peter died euill because they were both sinners for their likenes in this behalfe is not the cause that Iudas died euill but the cause before alledged From whence is this kinde of argument fetched From the places of Comparison as from the like from the more and from the lesse of all which the generall rule or Maxime is thus In things like is like iudgement or reason as hath beene said before in the Treatise of Places Thus farre of the foure principall kinds of reasoning now of the rest and first CHAP. XXVI Of the Argument called Sorites WHat is Sorites Sorites is a kinde of Argument proceeding as it were by certaine degrees vnto the Conclusion which is gathered of many Propositions necessarily following one another and are knit together so as the Predicate of the first Proposition is the Subiect of the second and the Predicate of the second the Subiect of the third and so forth euen to the last Proposition whose Predicate being ioyned to the Subiect of the first Proposition doth make the Conclusion as thus The Soule of man doth moue it selfe whatsoeuer moueth it selfe is the beginning of mouing the beginning of mouing hath no end whatsoeuer hath no end is immortall Ergo the Soule of man is immortall When is this kinde of Argument said to be of force When it is made of Affirmatiue Propositions wherein words of affinitie are necessarily ioyned together as when kindes generall differences or properties are ioyned with those speciall kindes of whom they are spoken or when proper effects are ioyned with their proper causes for if the Propositions be eyther Negatiue or doe not necessarily hang together then it is no good Argument as in Negatiues let this be your example A Man is not a Lion a Lion is a sensible beast Ergo Man is not a sensible beast Now of Propositions not hanging necessarily together because that proper effects are not ioyned with their proper causes let this common iest be your example Whoso drinketh well sleepeth well Whoso sleepeth well sinneth not Whoso sinneth not shall be blessed Ergo Whoso drinketh well shall be blessed Which is no good Conclusion for much drinke is not alwayes the cause of sleepe nor sleeping the cause of not sinning The Rhetoricians vse another kinde of Argument called Gradatio which is much like to Soriteâ—… sauing that the Subiect of the first Proposition is not rehearsed in the Conclusion for they vse it rather as an ornament of speech then as a proofe as the vertue of SCIPIO wanne him Fame Fame got him Enemies and his Enemies procured his death CHAP. XXVII Of diuers other kindes of Arguments and first of a Dilemma and what kindes it comprehendeth THere be also other formes of Arguments whereof some be Fallaxes and some are good Conclusions and they be these Dilemma Enumeratio Simplex Conclusio Subiectio Oppositio Violatio What is Dilemma Dilemma is an Argument made of two members repugnant one to another whereof which soeuer thou grantest thou art by and by taken as thus It is not good to marrie a wife for if shee be faire shee will be common if foule then loathsome notwithstanding this is but a slipperie kinde of argument vnlesse both the repugnant parts be such as neyther of them can bee turned againe vpon the maker of the argument for then by conuersion the Dilemma is soone confuted as for example you may conuert both parts of the argument last recited thus It is good to marry a wife for if she be faire she shall not be loath some if foule then not common much like to this is that captious Argument which Protagoras the Lawyer made against his Scholler Euathlus who had couenanted to pay his Master a certaine summe of mony at the first Suite or Action that he should winne by pleading at the Law whereupon his Master did afterwards commence an Action against him and in reasoning with him of the matter made him this Dilemma Eyther saith he iudgement shall bee giuen against thee or with thee if against thee then thou must pay me by vertue of the iudgement if iudgement bee giuen with thee then thou must also pay me by couenant which the Scholler immediately confuted by conuersion in this sort Eyther saith he iudgement shall be giuen with me or against me if with mee then I shall bee quit by Law if against mee then I ought to pay nothing by couenant What other iutricate kindes of reasoning are said to be comprehended vnder