Selected quad for the lemma: cause_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
cause_n	authority_n	king_n	time_n	1,485	5	3.4894	3	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A88684	Considerations touching the great question of the King's right in dispensing with the penal laws Written on the occasion of His late blessed Majesties granting free toleration and indulgence. By Richard Langhorn, late of the Middle Temple, Esq;	Langhorne, Richard, 1654-1679.; Langhorne, Richard, fl. 1687.	1687 (1687)	Wing L396A; ESTC R229629	25,471	35

in the same Parliament thereby intending to make the said Earl either to retract or to forbear prosecution of his Charge against the said Duke or to invalidate his Testimony And true it is that the Fifth Article of the Charge against the said Earl was That he Counsell'd and perswaded King James to Grant and to allow unto the Papists free Toleration and Silencing of all the Laws made and standing in force against them The Charge is not That he Counsell'd the King to Grant a Publick and Free Toleration But to Dispense with the Laws For Toleration and Dispensation import no more than a permission to Exercise their Religion in their private Houses and to Suspend the Execution of the Laws there mention'd for a Time. All which the said King had power in pursuance of a Treaty and Articles between Crowns upon the breach or performance of which Peace or War Common-Good or Publick-Prejudice depend to do But to Counsel a free Toleration imports an Allowance of Publick Worship which as Affairs then stood here could not consist with Publick Peace The Temper of this Nation not enduring it nor could the Papists have been secured from the Rage of the People in the Enjoyment of it And the Silencing of the Laws might import a Total Repeal of them which the King did not Claim a Right to do of himself So that this comes not to our Poynt in Question This Lord was not Impeached by Parliament nor by any appearing Concurrence of Judges nor for Advising the King to Dispense with any Penal Law for Publick-Good or where Necessity required But there is yet something more in this Case of the Earl of Bristol The whole Story is told at large by Mr. Rushworth in the Book before cited And it had this farther in it viz. That when the Impeachment was brought into the Lords House the Earl of Bristol put in his Answer to it and as to this particular Article he first denyed positively That he had Counsell'd any thing in the matter charged And then he declared fully what was done and set forth at large the matters of Fact before-mention'd as well as to what was Signed by King James and his Late Majesty King Charles the First as also the Declaration Signed by the Lord Conway by King James his Order So that in this Case there are these things worthy observation to the present purpose First That it is not probable but that the said Duke of Buckingham being the then Greatest Minister of State and Favourit to King James did Advise in all things which then passed in that Affair and particularly in the Declaration Signed by the Lord Conway But touching the Lord Conway's Signing a Declaration there can be no question Secondly That the said Earl wanted neither Wit Will nor Courage to Charge the said Duke as far and with Crimes as distastful as he could find any wherewith to Charge And that he was not fond of nor any ways obliged to spare the Person of the Lord Conway who was the Duke's Friend and must have been the Duke's most material Wittness to save him in Case the Charge against the Duke had been prosecuted Thirdly That the Parliament then sitting was as diligent in Enquiring into Misdemeanors as much displeased with the Duke of Buckingham as little tender of the Lord Conway as Secretary of State and much inclined to Enquire in relation to the too much Advancing and Stretching the King's Prerogative to the prejudice of the Subject and against the known Laws as peradventure any Parliament that ever Sett in England yet neither did Parliament nor this Earl of Bristol Charge any thing against this Duke or Exhibite any Impeachment against the said Lord Conway for Advising to Dispense with Penal Laws nor did this Parliament any way appear to prosecute the said Earl of Bristol upon this Impeachment Exhibited against him though he was thereby particularly Charged for thus Advising This seems a very probable Argument at least to prove that both the Earl of Bristol and this Parliament did Believe the King to have this Right which is here Asserted Object IX That King James when he Treated in Relation to the Match with Spain being demanded to Suspend the Execution of the Penal Laws then in force against the Papists was pleased to Answer That it was not in his Power so to do without a Parliament Answ This whole Objection is most certainly a mistake For it is evidently proved before what Opinion King James had and how well he was satisfied with and understood his Right in the point of Dispensations And how Wise and Knowing a Prince he was all Man-kind is satisfied Therefore if any thing were demanded of that King in that Treaty to which his Majesty gave any such Answer as is here Objected The demand did certainly Extend so far as to require a Total Silencing and Repealing of those Laws In which Case his Majesties Answer was most certainly True. But to suppose that King to have given this Answer where the Question or Demand was only touching a Suspension of Laws and then afterwards to have offer'd and promised a Suspension of the same Laws under his Great Seal would be with the highest Folly Self-contradiction and want of Sincerity imaginable Object X. That his now Majesty in a Speech heretofore made by him in this present Parliament did by implication agree that he had not by wishing that he had such Power as is now insisted on And when afterwards his Majesty by Advice took upon him to Exercise this Power he did again upon further Advice wave the same Answ I. This as well as the other Objections in the Case of King James if they were granted as far as the Objections can be put Nay if the Cases were That King James had and his now Majesty also past Acts of Parliament express in the point to bar themselves and the Crown of this Right the same must be only intended as to the ordinary Exercise of that Right But not of the Extraordinary Exercise thereof when the Publick Good requires the same should be Exercised which is proved by the Grounds before layd Secondly And that his Majesties proceedings are to be thus intended and not otherwise is proved by the continual Exercise of that Power in the Cases of Suspensions of Penal Laws suspended by the King 's sole Power and the Suspensions never Question'd never Complain'd of but still submitted unto and admitted as Legal namely those touching Navigation touching Importation of French-Wines and touching The Breadth of Cart-Wheels If the King had been really perswaded into a real Belief by the mistaken Advice of the Earl of Clarendon whose Opinion in Law was never esteemed of Venerable Authority at the time of his Speaking which is Objected It is clear by his Majesties Practice since that he hath found cause to alter that Belief And if his Majesty for Reasons best known to his Royal Self hath in one particular Case waved the

Exercise of his said Power yet his continual Exercise of the same Right in the other last mention'd Cases makes it evident that it is only a wavior in this single Case in particular Circumstances and upon such Advice as that he still nevertheless thinks it most reasonable and legal to continue the Dispensations by which his Majesty hath Suspended those other Laws And it were Injurious to the Care and Wisdome of his Majesties Great Counsel and to the providence and foresight of his Counsel Learned the Judges to conceive that they do not take the Execution of those other Laws to stand well Suspended by his Majesties respective Proclamations by which they stand Suspended whilst yet they have not complained of those Suspensions nor prepared or advised the preparing of any Bills to be offered to his Majesty for the Repealing or Suspending of those Laws by Act of Parliament Object XI That all our present Judges have expresly declared their unanimous Opinion in the very point by giving in Charge the Laws intended to be Suspended by his Majesties late Declaration which hath been the Occasion of the Publick Debates touching this matter albeit the said Declaration did expresly affirm the said Suspension to be for Publick-Good Answ The Proceedings of our Reverend Judges are always Regulated by prudent but strict Rules and those Rules relate as well to matter of Form as to matter of Substance This our Law requires and by their Oaths they are bound up to proceed according to Law which is the true reason why many Judgments given in our several Courts are afterwards reversed in Cases otherwise very honest and just Learned Men have been often heard to wish that Matters of Form might be less Considerable in our Laws And that our Judges of every Court of Law had also a Power to Consider and Judge also of Equity in all Cases coming before them It seeming very harsh to such as do not throughly grasp the Reasons of things to hear it said that an honest just Cause was lost for matter of Form or because of the Errror or Ignorance of a Clerk And that Law in such a Case is one way and Conscience and Equity another way And these things seem often times in particular Cases to be very mischievous But when it shall be consider'd That this way of being tyed close even by an Oath to strict Rules is that which preserves us from Arbitrary Judgments and keeps all things Certain and that many particular Mischiefs are rather to be tolerated then the great and common Inconveniencies endured of Trusting any Judges whatsoever with an Arbitrary Power And that for the Relieving even of particular Persons against such mischiefs as may happen from the Close Observance of these strict Rules our Government hath appointed Courts of Equity No one can reasonably Complain that they are hurt or Injured Now it is conceived that the reason of this way of proceeding in our Judges in the Poynt objected was not that they judged the King to have no Power to Dispence with Penal Laws for the Publick-Good and when Necessity and Reason of State required but they were tyed up by their Oaths as is before-mention'd And consequently were bound not only to consider the substantial part whether by the King 's sole Power the Execution of Penal Laws upon Grounds warranted by Law might be Suspended But they were also to Consider the Form and Manner of the King 's Executing of this Power And if the same were not done in such manner as the Rules of Law required they could not legally be so bound by it as to be Excused from giving those Statutes in Charge though they might otherwise have a Liberty so far to comply with the Publick-Good and with what the King whom the Law hath constituted Judge of what is so judged to be necessary for the Publick-Good as not rigorously to compell the Execution of what they were nevertheless bound by their Oaths to give in Charge And this is conceived to be the true State of the present Case urged in the Objection which rightly understood makes nothing against the King's Right here affirmed and justifies the Prudence and High Integrity of the Lords the Judges The King found it absolutely necessary for Common-Good being to Engage in a most necessary War to suspend the Execution of several Penal Laws The Resolution taken in the Case was upon serious Debates had with his Ministers of State it being purely an Affair of State consequently his Majesties Counsel of Lawyers were not consulted in the Poynt it not being within their Cognizance to Advise in Affairs of State such as are the making of Peace or War c. Nor do they think themselves disparaged in being omitted out of Consultations of this nature The King upon this Advice resolves upon the thing as necessary and finding in common practice That it was not to be doubted but that he had a Power inherent in him to do this His Majesty having formerly Exercised this Right in the aforesaid Cases of Suspending the Execution of several Laws made in Relation to Cart-Wheels French-Wines c. In all which his Counsel of Lawyers had prepared and drawn up the Instruments by which the same were Suspended and no Complaint or Exception was ever taken against the same by any of the Judges or by the Parliament The form of doing this was by his Majesty left to his Ministers of State because it being matter of State it lay most properly within their Sphere to express the Reasons which were therein to be set forth for the doing what was to be done These States-men being solely used to consider matter of Substance and being mere Strangers to matters of Form and consequently not reflecting upon matter of Form as necessary drew up the Instrument by which this Suspension was to be Executed by the way of a Declaration and thought the passing of that Declaration in Council by his Majesty and the Publishing the same in Print being in their Judgments the sole matter of substance was all that was necessary in this Affair But it happened in this Case that for want of Advising with his Majesties Attorney General by whom those Instruments were prepared which suspend the Execution of those other Laws there was something amiss in this So that it came not so Legally and in such Form to the Judges as those others did consequently they could not by reason of their Oaths omit to give in Charge the Laws intended to be suspended by this Declaration Yet they took care like most prudent Persons and most Loyal and Dutiful Subjects not to press the rigorous Execution of any one of those Laws because the King had declared his Royal Judgment That the Execution of them was to the prejudice of Common-Good Nor yet did they proceed to declare any Reason why they continued to give the same in Charge nor to declare any Negative Opinon that the same were not Suspended But left all men to conjecture