be as a guard upon him to keepe him from swerving out of he right way But in the creation of the ten there fell out the cleane contrary for they cashierd the Consuls and Tribuns and gave authority of themselves to make lawes and every thing else as absolutly as the people of Rome So that being absolute of themselves without Consuls without Tribuns without appeale to the people and hereby having none to looke into their courses the second yeare they had the meanes especially moov'd by the ambition of Appius to become insolent And hereupon it is to be noted that when it is said that a power given by free suffrages never hurt any Commonwealth we must presuppose that the people suffer not themselves to be induc'd to give it unlesse with due circumstances and at due seasons But when either being deceiv'd or upon some other occasion leading them blindsold they are brought to give it undiscreetly and in that kind as the people of Rome gave it to the ten it will befall them alwayes as it did to these Which is easily proov'd considering the causes that held the Dictatours in goodnesse and those that gave the ten occasion of becomming evill And advising also how those Republiques have done that have bin thought well governed in the giving of authority for a long time as the Sparitans gave their Kings and the Venetians their Duke for a man may preceive that in one or other sort they had their guards upon them that they who were ill dispos'd could not at their pleasures abuse that authority Nor availes it in this case that the matter is not corrupted for an absolute authority corrupts the matter in a very short time gathers friends and makes partisans neither is poverty or want of good kindred a let for wealth and every other advantage presently runnes after them as particularly in the ereation of the ten we shall treate CHAP. XXXVI The citizens who have possessed the greatest charges in the Commonwealth ought not to disdaine the lesse as unworthy of them THe Romans had made Marcus Fabius and Caius Manlius Consuls and gain'd a very glorious battell of the Veyentes and the Etruscans where in Quintus Fabius was slaine the Consuls brother who had bin consul the yeare before Where we should well consider how proper the lawes of that citie were for her advancement and how much those other Republique that trace not herfoote steps decevie themselves For though the Romans were zealous lovers of glory yet never did they esteeme it dishonourable at one time to obey where other whiles they had commanded and to serve in that army whereof they had bin Commanders which custome is contrary to the opinion lawes and courses of the citizens of our times And in Venice yet is this errour that a citizen having borne a great office esteemes it a disgrace to accept of a lesse and the citie allowes him to refuse it Which thing though it were honourable for the private yet is it wholly unprofitable for the publique For a Commonwealth may expect better performance from and repose more trust in that citizen who descends from a greater charge to undertake a lesse then in him that from a lesse arises to the command of a greater Because they cannot with good reason trust him with their weighty affayres unlesse they see men about him of such reverence and vertue that his inexperience may be guided and directed by their vertue and authority And if in Rome there had bin that custome which is in Venice and other Republique and moderne Kingdomes that he who had once bin Consull would never goe to the warr afterwards but as Consul many things very prejudiciall to the free government of the state would have growne therupon and through the errours committed by these new men and by their ambition which they might have us'd with more freedome not having those grave men about them by whose presence they might be so kept in awe that they should not dare to step aside and so they would have become dissolute which would all have turn'd to the publique losse CHAP. XXXVII VVhat distaste the Agrarian law gave in Rome and that it is very offensive to make a law in a Commonwealth that lookes far backwards and yet goes directly against an ancient custome of the Citie IT is an opinion of the ancient writers that men are wont to vex themselves in their crosses and glut and cloy themselves in their prosperity and that from the one and the other of these two passions proceede the same affects for at what time soever men are freed from fighting for necessity they are presently together by the ears through ambition which is so powerfull in mens hearts that to what degree foâ—ver they arise it never abandons them The reason is because nature hath created men in such a sort that they can desire every thing but not attaine to it So that the desire of getting being greater then the power to get thence growes the dislike of what a man injoyes and the small satisfaction a man hath thereof Hereupon arises the change of their states for some men desiring to have more and others fearing to lose what have they already they procede to enmities and warre from whence comes the destruction of one country and the advantage of another This discourse I have made because it suffis'd not the Commons of Rome to secure themselves from the Nobility by creating the Tribuns to which desire they were forc'd by nenecessity but that they suddenly upon the obteining thereof began to contend out of ambition and thinke to share equally with the nobility both in honours and fortunes as the things that are in most value with men Whereupon grew that disease that brought forth the quarrell touching the Agrarian law And in conclusion caus'd the destruction of the Roman Republique And because Commonwealths well ordered are to maintain the publique wealthy and the particulars poore it is likely there was in Rome some defect in this law which either was not so exactly fram'd at the beginning but that every day it had need of some revising and amending or that the making of it was so long put off that it became scandalous to look so farre backwards or that being well instituted at first in time it grew by use corrupt So in what manner soever it were that law was never mention'd in Rome but that the whole city was in a tumult This law had two principall heads By one they order'd that no citizen could possesse more then so many acres of ground by the other that the lands which they tooke from their enemies should be divided among the people of Rome It came therefore to thwart the Nobility two manner of wayes because they that had the greatest states in possessio were not permitted by thelaw who were the greater part of the Nobility and there upon ought not to injoy it and when the enemies goods should be divided among the
the popular faction advis'd that now the time was come they had power to chastise the people and to take away that Authority which they had laid hold on in prejudice of the Nobility by keeping them in hunger and want distributing the Corn to them Which opinion of his they hearing of took such distast against Coriolanus that had not the Tribunes cited him to appear to defend his cause the people had slain him in a tumult as he came out of the Senate Upon which accident we note that which before was said how fit and usefull it is that the Commonwealths with their Lawes give meanes to vent the choler which the universality hath conceiv'd against any one Citizen For when they have not these ordinary meanes they have recourse to extraordinary and out of question these are of worse effect then those For if by an orderly course one Citizen be ssuppres'd although it were wrongfully done yet follwes thereupon little or no disorder in the Republick because the execution is done without any private mans power or assistance of forrein forces which are those that take away the common liberty but by the publick and lawful power which have their particular bounds nor any way pass so far as to endammage the Commonwealth And to confirm this opinion with examples this of Coriolanus from the ancients shall suffice me upon which let every one consider what mischief thereby had faln on the Common-wealth of Rome if in a tumult he had been flain for thereupon had grown offences between particular men offences cause feare feare seekes defence for defence men make partisans and thus parties grow in Cities and from them the ruine of Cities But the matter being order'd by publick authority they took away all those mischiefes which might have happen'd had it been carried by private power we have seen in our daies what innovations it hath brought on the Florentine Republick in that the multitude had no legal meanes to vent their displeasure against a single Citizen as it befel in the time of Franciscus Valorus who was as it were Prince of the City and being by many thought ambitious and a man that by his insolent and high stomack would not content himself to live within a civil Government and there being no way in the Commonwealth to resist him unless with some faction opposite to his thence it came that he not doubting other then some extraordinary meanes began to seek favourers of his party to defend him On the other side they that oppos'd him having no ready way to suppress him devis'd some extraordinary waies insomuch as they came at length to fight and where if by an ordinary course he could have been restrain'd his power had sunk with his own loss onely a now having to use extraordinary meanes in breaking it there ensued not only his but the ruine of many other Noble Citizens There might also be alledged to confirm our former conclusion the accident chanc'd in Florence upon the occasion of Peter Soderinus which wholly proceeded from the want of meanes in that Republick to accuse the ambition of some powerful Citizens for it was not enough to accuse a mighty man before eight Judges in a Commonwealth The Judges ought to be in great number for a few do after the manner of two or three so that if such courses were taken either the Citizens would have accus'd him living ill and thereby without calling the Spanish Army to aid would have wreak'd their anger on him or not behaving himself ill they durst not have ventur'd to seek his ruine for feare themselves of incurring danger And so on all sides had ceas'd that ravenous cruelty which was the cheif occasion of offence Whereupon we may conclude this that so oft as we see forrein forces call'd upon by any party of Citizens we may well beleeve that in that City there is lack of good Ordinances even lack of that ordinary meanes to vent without extraordinary waies the maligne humors which grow in men whereunto it is sufficiently remedied by allowing of accusations before many Judges and withall countenancing them Which courses were so well order'd in Rome that in so many quarrels between the people and the Senate neither the one nor the other nor any particular Citizen ever intended to availe themselves by any forreign strength because they having a remedy at home were not necessitated to go seek it abroad And though the examples above written are sufficient to prove this yet I will alledg another related by Titus Livius in his History who reports that in Clusia the Noblest City in those daies in all Tuscany by one Lucumon Aruns was ravished and he not being able to work his revenge by reason of the ravishers might went and found out the French-men who then raign'd in that place we now call Lombardy and encourag'd them to bring an Army to Clusia showing them that with their gain they might revenge him of the injury done him and if Aruns had seen possibility to have been righted by any means in the City he never would have inquir'd after any barbarous power But as these accusations are profitable in a Commonwealth so are calumnies unprofitable and hurtful as it shall appear by our discourse in the next Chapter CHAP. VIII Accusations are not more beneficial to Common-wealths then Calumnies pernitious NOtwithstanding that the virtue of Furius Camillus after he had freed the City of Rome from the siege and oppression of the Frenchmen had brought to pass that none of the Citizens of Rome thought it took any way from their credit or degree to give him place yet Manlius Capitolinus could not endure that so much honor and renown should be ascribed to him Being of opinion that touching the safety of Rome in that he had defended the Capitol from the Enemies he deserv'd as much as Camillus and in regard of other warlike glories he was no way second to him So that overburden'd with envy nor being able to take rest for this mans honor and perceiving he could sow no discord among the Fathers he made his address to the people scattering among them divers sinister opinions And among other things he said this also that the treasure which was collected for the Frenchmen and after not given them was usurp'd by some private Citizens and if it were had again it might be turn'd to the publick good easing the people of their tributes or some private debts These words were of force with the people so that they began to run together and as they listed to raise many tumults in the City Which thing much displeasing the Senat and they taking it for a matter of great moment and dangerous created a Dictatour that he might examin the case and bridle the violence of Manlius Whereupon the Dictator cited him and they met in publick one against the other the Dictator environ'd with the Nobility Manlius with the People Manlius was demanded who had the treasure he spoke
among his people and withall diligence to shew that his valour got not the victory but rather it came by chance or by the enemies cowardise or by the direction of the other Captaines who were together with him in that imployment After that Vespasian being in Judea was by his army declar'd Emperor Antonius Primus who was then with another army in Illiria took his part and came thence into Italy against Vitellius who commanded at Rome and valorously conquer'd two Vitellian armies and made himself Master of Rome so that Mutianus sent by Vespanian found all already gotten by Antonius his valor and all difficulties surpassed The reward Antonius gain'd hereby was that Mutianus took away his command of the army and by little and little made him of no authority in Rome whereupon Antonius went away to Vespasian who was yet in Asia by whom he was so coldly receiv'd that in a short time depriv'd of all dignity he dyed in despaire And of these examples stories are full In our daies every one living knows with what industry and valour Gonsalvus Ferdinand warring in the Kingdom of Naples against the Frenchmen for Ferdinand King of Arragon brought that Kingdom under his obedience and how he had for reward of his conquest that Ferdinand parted from Arragon and came to Naples and first discharged him of his command of soldiers afterwards took from him the fortresses and then brought him away with him into Spain where a while after he dyed in disgrace Therefore this suspicion is so natural in Princes that they cannot escape it and it is impossible they prove thankfull to those who by victory have under their banners made great conquests And from that which a Prince is not free 't is no marvaile nor a thing worthy of greater note that a people is not free For a city living free hath two ends the one to gain the other to keep it self free and it cannot be but in the one or the other by excess of love it may erre Touching the errors in getting they shall be spoken of in their place as for the errors in maintaining their liberty there are these among others to hurt those citizens they should reward and to suspect those they should repose upon And though these wayes in a Republique come to corruption cause great evils and that many times they hasten it to a Tyranny as at Rome it befell Caesar who by strong hand took away that which unthankfulness denied him yet in a Commonwealth not corrupted are they causes of great good and make it live more free keeping men for fear of punishment more vertuous and less ambitious It is true that of all people that ever reign'd upon the causes above alleadg'd Rome was the least ungratefull for of her ingratitude we may say there is no other example but that of Scipio for Coriolanus and Camillus were banisht for the injury the one and the other had done the people But the one was not pardoned because he alwaies continued his malicious mind against the people the other was not only recall'd but all his lifetime after ador'd as a Prince But the ingratitude us'd towards Scipio grew from a suspicion the citizens began to have of him which was never conceived of the others which arose first from the greatness of the enemy Scipio had overcome from the reputation that the conquest of so long and perrilous a war had given him from the quick dispatch of it from those favours which youth wisdome and other his memorable vertues had gotten him Which things were so great that the Magistrates of Rome fear'd his authority more than any thing Which displeas'd the grave men as a matter not accustomed in Rome And his manner of living was thought so extraordinary that Priscus Cato reputed a man of great integrity was the first that stir'd against him and said that a city could not be called free where the Magistrates stood in fear of one citizen So if the people of Rome in this case followed Cato's opinion they deserve that excuse which I said before those Princes and people merit who through suspicion prove unthankfull Wherefore concluding this discourse I say that whether this vice be used either through suspicion or covetousness it shall appear that the people never put it in practise upon covetousness and upon suspicion less than Princes having less cause to be suspicious as quickly it shall be declared CHAP. XXX What means a Prince or Republique should use to avoid this vice of ingratitude or what A Commander or Citizen to be free from their danger A Prince to avoyd this necessity of living with suspicion or being ungratefull ought personally go to the warrs as in the beginning did those Roman Emperors and in our daies the Turk does and as those that are valorous have done and yet do For overcoming the glory and the gain is all their own And when they are not there in person the glory of the action belonging to another they think they cannot well make that conquest their own unlefs they put out that glory in another which they themselves knew not how to get and so become ungratefull and unjust And without doubt greater is their loss than their gain but when either through negligence for lack of judgment they stay idle at home and send out a Commander I have no other precept to give them than what they know of themselves But I advise that Commander because as I think he can hardly escape the nips of unthankfulness that he betake himself to one of these two expedients either presently upon his victory let him leave his army and put himself into his Princes hands abstaining from any action savouring of insolence or ambition that so he having no occasion given of suspicion may have reason to reward him or at least not hurt him Or when he likes not to do thus let him resolutely take part against him and use all those means whereby he may think to hold from his Prince what he hath gotten procuring the soldiers and the subjects good wills let him make friendship with his neighbors possess with his men the strong places corrupt the Chief of his army and assure himself of those he cannot and this way endeavor to punish his Lord for the ingratitude he would have us'd towards him Otherwaies there are not but as it was said before men know not how to be wholly vicious nor wholly good And alwaies it comes to pass that presently after the victory they will not part with their army behave themselves with modesty they cannot and to stand upon defyance in some honorable termes they know not how So that being irresolute which way to take between delay and doubt they are suppressed But to a Republique which would avoyd this vice of ingratitude we cannot apply the same remedy we may to a Prince that is that she go herself and not send out in her imployments being necessitated to make use of some one
Whereupon Aristides told the people that Themistocles advice was exceeding profitable but very dishonest For which cause the people wholly resus'd it which Philip of Macedon would not have done nor those other Princes who seeke their owne gaine rather and have made more advantage by breaking their faith than by any way else Touching the breaking of agreements upon the not observance of some particulars therein I meane not to meddle with them being ordinary matters but I speak of those that breake upon extraordinary and maine points Wherein by what we have said I beleeve the people are lesse faulty than the Princes and therefore may better bee trusted than they CHAP. LX. How the Consulship and every other Magistracie in Rome was given without respect of age IT appeares by order of the Story that the Commonwealth of Rome after that the Consulship came among the people bestowed it upon their Citizens without regard of yeares or bloud and indeed they never had respect to age but altogether aimed at vertue whether it were in young or old Which wee perceive by the testimonie of Valerius Corvinus who at 23. yeares of age was made Consul And the same Valerius speaking to his souldiers sayd That the Consulship was the reward of vertuc and not of bloud Which thing whether it were advisedly sayd or no might require much dispute And touching bloud this was yeelded to upon necessitie and this necessitie that was in Rome might be in every Citie that would doe the same things Rome did as otherwhere is sayd for toyle and labour cannot be imposed on men without reward nor can their hopes of obtaining reward bee taken from them without danger And therefore it was fit timely to give them hope of the Consulship and by this hope were they a while fed without having it at length that hope served not but there was a necessity to come to performance with them But the Citie that imployes not their people in any glorious action may treate the mafter their owne manner as other where it was argued But that which will take the same course Rome tooke must make this distinction And grant that it be so for that of time there is no reply nay rather it is necessary for in the choosing of a young man into a degree which hath need of the discretion of an old man it is likely the people being to make the choyce that some very worthy and noble action of his preferres him thereto And when a young man becomes endowed with such vertues that hee hath made himself famous by his heroicke actions it were a very great wrong that that Citie might not serve her selfe of him then but should be put off to expect till that vigour and quicknesse of spirit were grown old and dull whereof in that age his country might have made good use as Rome did of Valerius Corvinus of Scipio and Pompey and many others that triumphed very young THE SECOND BOOKE THE PREFACE MEN do alwaies commend but not alwaies with reason the times of old and blame the present and they take part so much with things past that they celebrate not onely those ages which they have known by the memory writers have lest them but those also which now being old they remember they have seen in their youth And when this their opinion is false as most commonly it is I perswade my self the reasons that bring them into this error are divers And the first I take to be that of matters of old the truth is not wholly known of thoiâ— actions most commonly those things are conceal'd that would bring any infamy upon the times but whatsoever advances their credit glory is set out with magnificence For most writers do so much follow the conquerors fortune that to make their victories glorious they not only augment what they have vertuously done but they so illustrate their enomies actions that those that are afterwards born in any of their countreys either conquering or conquered have cause to admire those men and times and so consequently are forc'd exceedingly to praise and love them Besides this men hating things either for fear or envic two very powerfull causes of hatred are quite spent in things that are passed being they are not able to hurt nor can give occasion of envic But on the contrary part it comes to pass that those things that are now in hand and we see which by reason of the through knowledge we have of them no tittle thereof being conceal'd from us and knowing in them together with the good many things worthy dislike hereupon we are compell'd to judge them much Inferior to matters of old although that in truth the present deserve far more glory and reputation this I say not arguing touching the arts which are now brought to such perfection that the times cannot take from them nor add but little more glory to them but speaking of things belonging to means lives and manners whereof the proofes are not very evident I answer that this custome above written of praising and blaming is sometimes false and sometimes true for sometimes they must needs light upon the truth because all humane things are continually in motion and either rise or fall As we see the civil government of a city or countrey so ordain'd by some rare person that for a time even by reason of the worth of this man the State mends much and is more and more amplified he that is then borne in that State and commends more the times of old than those moderne is much deceiv'd and the cause of his errour proceeds from those things that have bin formerly sayd But those that are afterwards born in that City or countrie whose dayes are onely during their decline from their excellence then erre nor And I devising with my selfe whence these things proceed I think the world hath continued alwayes in one manner and that in iâ— hath beene alwayes as much good as evill but that that good and evill does change from country to country as it appeares by that which is discover'd to us of those ancient kingdomes which alter'd from the one to the other by change of manners But the world continued the same There was onely this difference that where it first had plac'd its vertue in Assiria it afterwards remov'd it into Media then into persia in so much that at length it came into Italie and so to Rome And if after the Romane Empire there succeeded not any other that lasted nor where the world had retired all its vertue together yet we see it was spread abroad into severall Nations where men behav'd themselves very bravely and valouroufly as in the Kingdome of France the Kingdome of the Turks and that of the Soldan so now adayes in Germanie and so among those that were first of the Saracin sect which did great exploits and made themselves masters of so great a part of the world after they had destroyed the Easterne
with Hannibal was made a Captain over some certain number of slaves whom the Romans for want of men had put into armes ordained specially a capital punishment for any that should object to any of them their servitude so hurtful a matter as it is said was it thought by the Romans to set men at nought and reproach them with any disgrace for there is nothing so much incenses men to rage or breeds more hatred in them whether it be spoken in earnest or in jeast Bitter taunts when they have too great a mingle of truth with them leave behind them a very distastfull remembrance CHAP. XXVII Prudent Princes and Commonwealths ought to be contented with the victory for oftentimes when that suffices them not they lose it THE using of disgracefull words against the enemy proceeds most commonly from an insolencie which either the victory or a false hope of victory incites thee to which false hope causes men to erre not only in their sayings but in their doings also for this hope when it enters into mens breasts makes them go beyond the point and many times lose the opportunity of having a certain good hoping to attain unto a better uncertain good and because this is a matter worthy consideration men often deceiving themselves to the dammage of their State I am of advice to shew it particularly by ancient examples and modern being it cannot so distinctly be prov'd by reasons Hannibal after he had defeated the Romans at Canna sent his Agents to Carthage to give them notice of the victory and to demand new supplies It was argued in the Senate what was fit to be done Hanno an old man and a discreet Citizen of Carthage advised to use this victory wisely and make peace with the Romans being that now they might have it upon reasonable termes having gained a battell and that they should not go about to seek for it after a battell lost for it should be the Carthaginians design to shew the Romans that they were able to deal with them and having gotten a victory they should take a care not to lose it for hope of a greater This course was not taken but afterwards the Senate of Carthage understood that this was very good counsell when the occasion was lost When Alexander the Great had conquer'd all the Levant the Commonwealth of Tyre famous in those daies and puissant by reason that their City was seated in the water as Venice is seeing Alexanders greatness sent Ambassadors to him to tell him that they would become his faithfull servans and yeeld him what obedience he should desire but that they would not admit either him or his soldiers into their Town Whereat Alexander disdaining that any one City should shut her gates against him seeing he had forc'd all others open throughout the whole world would not accept their conditions but rejected them and forthwith sent his army thither That Town stood in the water and was well provided with victualls and other munition fit for defence so that Alexander after four moneths spent considering that one City took away all that time from his glory which many other great conquests never did and therefore determined to try an agreement and to grant what they of themselves had asked But they of Tyre being grown insolent hereupon not only refused the conditions but slew those that came to treat with them Whereupon Alexander all enraged at this affront so stronly assaulted the Town that he took it destroy'd it and slew or made slaves all the men therein A Spanish Army came upon the Florentines Territories to restore the Medici into Florence and to lay some taxes upon the Town being hired hereunto by some Citizens inhabiting therein who put them in hopes that as soon as they should set foot in their Country they would take armes in favour of them they comming into the plain and none of these discovering themselves to be for them because they had want of victualls tryed to make an agreement whereupon the Florentines grown proud would not accept of any upon which occasion followed the loss of Prato and the ruine of that State Therefore Princes cannot commit a greater error when they are assail'd in case the assailants are far more puissant then they then to refuse all termes of agreement especially when they are proffer'd them for never will such poor ones be offerd wherein is not in a good measure comprised his good that accepts them and some part of his victory Wherefore the Tyrians should have satisfied themselves that Alexander accepted those conditions he had formerly refused and their victory had been great enough when with their armes in hand they had made so mighty a Prince as he to yeeld to their demands It should have sufficed the Florentines also and they had gotten a good victory too if the Spanish army gave way to any of their desires though they had not fulfilled all of them for that armies design was to change the State of Florence to take away her devotion to France and to draw some monies from her When of these three the people had yeelded to two which were the last and had gotten themselves but one which was the preservation of their state they within had each of them gained some honour and satisfaction nor should the people have troubled themselves for the other two things one remaining to them nor should they have offered sing they had been sure of a certain victory to hazard it at fortunes discretion trying even the extremity thereof which never any wise man will endanger himself in unless it be upon necessity Hanniball being departed out of Italy where he had been very glorious for sixteen years recalled by his own country men the Carthaginians to releive his native Country found Asdruball and Siphax defeated the Kingdome of Numidia lost and Carthage restrain'd within the compass of her own walls which had no other refuge but him and his army and knowing that was his Countries last hopes he would not hazard it till he had first made trial of all other remedies nor was he asham'd to ask peace judging that if there was any way to save his Country it was by that and not by war which being refused him though he had been sure to lose he would not faile to fight thinking that it might fall out so that possible it was for him to overcome and if lose it he must lose it gloriously And if Hanniball who was so valorous a captain and had his army intire did require peace before he would hazard the battell when he perceived that in losing it his country would be subdued what should another of less valor and experience then he do But men run into this error by not knowing how to limit their hopes so that grounded on their own vast conceits without weighing their strengths they are utterly ruin'd CHAP. XXVIII How dangerous a thing it is for a Republick or Prince not to revenge an injury
concludes thus So much does fortune blind mens eyes when shee would not have her force withstood Nor can this conclusion be more true Whereupon men that are alwaies under hard crosses deserve the less blame as they that enjoy continuall prosperity also merit less prayse for we shall many times see those led to their destruction and these advanc'd to an extraordinory greatness by some occasion the heavens have presented in their furtherances hereto giving means to the one to behave himself vertuously quite bereaving the other of them And we may well say fortune does this for she makes choyce of a man when she purposes to bring great matters to pass of such judgement and spirit that knows how to make use of those occasions she presents him So in like manner when shee would bring horrible destructions upon any Place she there preferrs men to that purpose that they may help to draw on that ruine And in case there be any that may prevent these mischiefes shee either brings him to his end or else deprives him of all abilities to do any goood This we very well know by our Authors discourse how that fortune for to amplify Rome and to bring it to that greatness it attain'd to deemd it necessary to scourge it as we shall discourse at large in the beginning of the next book following but yet would not wholly ruin it And this appears in as much as shee banished Camillus but put him not to death shee made Rome be taken but not the Capitoll shee ordein'd that the Romaus should not think out any thing of avayle to save Rome yet for defence of the Capitoll they wanted of no good advice To the end Rome should be taken she causd the greater part of those Soldiers that were routed at Allia to go to Vejum And as for defence of the City of Rome she cut off all the waies to order it so shee prepar'd every thing ready to recover it again having conducted an intire Roman Army to Vejum and Camillus to Ardea whereby they might be able to make a strong head under the command of a Captain never blemished with any disgrace of loss yet throughly whole in his reputation for the recovery of his Country Wee might here produce some modern example to confirm what wee have said but because I think it unnecessary being this may well suffice I shall omit it I avow therefore this to be very true as by many histories wee may see it that men may well follow fortune but not oppose it they may well weave her webs but not break them Wherefore let men never abandon themselves being they know not what shall become of them in the end the passages of their fortunes being through crooked and unknown waies they should ever hope and so hoping put on still and never give over in despaire whatsoever chance or trouble they be faln into CHAP. XXX Republicks and Princes that really are mighty seek not by monies to make alliance with others but by their valour and repute of their Forces THe Romans were straightly besiegd in the Capitoll and however they lookt for ayd from Vejum and from Camillus being forc't by famine they came to termes of agreement with the French to redeem themselves for a certain sum of money upon which agreement as they were weighing the gold Camillus arriv'd with his Army which fortune brought to pass saies our Historian to the end that the Romans should not live redeemd by gold Which thing is not only remarkable in this part but in the procese of this Commonwealths actions where it is evident that they never vanquished Towns with moneys nor ever bought peace by mony but by prowesse in the warres Which I think never befell any other Republick and among other signes by which a man discerns the power of a State he is to marke in what manner it lives with the neighbouring States And when it is so orderd that they become tributaries thereunto to keep friendship with it there is an assured sign that that State is powerfull But when the said neighbours though inferious to it draw money from thence there is then a great evidence of the weakness thereof Read all the Roman Stories and ye shall see how the Massilians the Aeduans the Rhodians Hiero the Siracusan Enmenes and Massinissa Kings joyning upon the confines of the Roman Empire to have friendship with it concur'd in expences and tribute at all times that need was seeking after no other requitall thereof but to be protected by it Wee shall see the contrary in poor and feeble States and so beginning at ours of Florence in the times past even when the reputation thereof was at the greatest there was never a great Lord in Romania that had not some allowance from thence and besides she gave to those of Perugia and Castella to all the rest of her neighbours For had this City been warlick and strong the contrary would have followd for all those to have been under the protection of it would have given money and have sought to buy its friendship and not to sell their own Neither have the Florentines alone liv'd in this baseness but the Venetians and the King of France who though a Prince of great Dominions lives tributary to the Swisses and the King of Engl. The cause whereof is in that he disarmes his subjects and because that King and those other afore-named had rather enjoy a present profit to rack their people and squeese them and avoid rather an imaginary than a real danger than do such expedients as would secure and for ever make their States happy Which disorder though some while it may produce quiet yet in time it proves the cause of want losses and unrecoverable ruine And it would be too long to relate how many times the Florentines the Venetians and this Kingdome have redeemd themselves even in the warrs and how many times they have subjected themselves to disgrace which the Romans were only once like to have done It would be tedious to tell how many Towns the Florentines and Venetians have bought whereof afterwards the inconvenience hath been found and how that those things that are bought with gold men know not how to desend with the sword The Romans observd this brave way and manner of living while they were free but after they came under their Emperors governments and that those Emperors grow naught and lov'd the shade and could not endure any toyle in the Sun they began also to redeem themselves somtimes from the Parthians somtimes from the Germans and now and then also from some others of their neighbours which was the beginning of that great Empires ruine Whereupon arose the like inconvenients from their having disarm'd their people from whence also proceeds another greater that the nearer thy enemy comes to thee the weaker he finds thee for whosoever lives after that manner we have spoken of above treats evill those subjects he hath
means and the other by detestable courses wrought the same effect me thinks I should not forbear to discourse also of two Roman Citizens who by several wayes but both honorable attaind one and the same glory CHAP XXII How Manlius Torquatus his rigor and Valereus Corvinus his mildness gaind each of them the same glory AT the same time there were in Rome two famous Captaines Monlius Torquatus and Valerius Corvinus who both of equal vertue had a like triumph'd and liv'd in equal credit reputation in Rome each of them touching the enemy had with equal valor gained it but as for the Armyes and treating of their Soldiers they proceeded exceeding differently for Manlius with all kind of severity commanded them without intermitting his Soldiers pains or punishments Valerius on the other part in all kinds and termes of courtefie treated them with a familiar way of affability for it appears that the one to keep his Soldiers in obedience put his own son to death and the other never hurt any Yet in such a differency of proceeding each produc'd the same fruit as well to the enemies loss as the Commonwealths profit and his own particular for never any Soldier refus'd the fight or mutini'd against them or in any part disagreed from their wills however that Manlius his commands were so rigorous that all other kinds of commands which exceeded measure in everity were termed Manlian commands Where we are first to consider whence it was that Manlius was constrained to proceed so rigidly the next is what was the cause that these two different waies brought forth the same effect and in the last place which is the better of the two and more profitable to imitate If any man consider well Manlius his disposition from the time that T. Livius begins to make mention of him he shall find him a very valiant man religiously loving his Father and his Countrey and exceedingly reverencing his Superiors These things we gather from the slaughter of the Frenchmen from the defence of his Father against the Tribune and in that before he went to fight with the Frenchmen he went to the Consul with these words Without thy allowance I will never fight with the enemy no though I were assured of victory When a man then so dispos'd attains to such dignity as to command he desires to find all other men like himself and his strong courage moves him to command strong and stout things and the same when once they are commanded will likewise that they be observed and the rule is most certain that when rigid and hard things are commanded it is fit with rigour to see them observd otherwise wouldst thou find thy self much deciv'd Where it is to be noted that if a man will be obeyed it is necessary he know how to command and they know how to command that make a comparison between their own quality and theirs that are to obey and when they see a proportion then let them command but when a disproportion let them forbeare And therefore a wise man said that to hold a Common-wealth by violence and force it was needfull there were a proportion between the person forcing and the party forced and whenever that proportion was there it was credible that that violence would last but when the party forced was of more force than the person forcing it might be doubted that violence would every day fail But returning to our discourse I say that to command stout and strong things it is necessary to be stout too and he that is of this stoutness and commands such things can never by mildness cause them to be observ'd but he that hath not this strength of courage ought beware of these extraordinary commands and in those ordinary he may well use his own humanity for ordinary punishments are not imputed to the Prince but to the lawes and customes We ought then to be-believe that Manlius was forced to proceed so roughly by his own extraordinary commands whereunto his own nature was inclinable which are very useful in a Commonwealth because they reduce the orders thereof to their originals and ancient vigor And if a Republike were so fortunate that she often had as we have formerly said some one by his example to renew and revive the Laws and not retain them onely from running to ruine but draw them quite back to their beginnings she might be perpetual So that Manlius was one of those who by the rigor of his commands maintained the military discipline in Rome drawn thereunto first by his own nature afterwards from a desire which he had that that should be observed which his natural inclination had made him ordain On the other side Valerius might as he pleased proceed with curtesie as he whom it sufficed that the accustomed orders were observed in the Romane Armies which custome because it was good was enough to honor him and yet not painful to observe nor did it force Valerius to punish the offenders as well because it may be there were none as for that if there had been any they imputed as it is said their punishments to the wonted orders and customes and not to the Princes cruelty So that Valerius had power to cause all humanity and mildness to flâ—w from himself whereby he might easily gain his souldiers good wills Whereupon it came to pass that the one or the other having the same obedience were able though proceeding diversly to work the same effect They that would follow these may chance to fall into those vices of contempt and hatred as I said in my discourse before of Hanaibal and Scipio which is avoided by an excessive worth in thee and not otherwise It remains now that we consider which of these ways of proceeding is the more commendable which I take to be a matter disputable because as well the one as other is much prais'd by writers Yet they that write how a Prince should rule his subjects come nearer to Valerius then Manlius And Xenophon alledged formerly by me giving many examples of Cyrus his humanity accords much with that which T. Livius says of Valerius for being made Consul against the Samnites the day come he was to fight he spake to his souldiers with that affability and familiarity with which he used to behave himself towards them and after such speaking T. Livius saies these words There was never any Captain more familiar with his souldiers among the meanest of them freely undergoing all services besides in military exercises whereas the soldiers use to contend with their equals either in swiftness or strength he himself without change of countenance as graciously and easily lost as won nor scorned he any one that offered himself to match him liberal he was and affable no less mindful of other mens liberties then of his own dignity and which is the greatest point of popularity the same course he took to attain to his magistracy the same he followed in
continuation of the Dominion the remembrances and occasions of innovations are quite extinguished for evermore one change leaves a kind of breach or dent to fasten the building of another CHAP. III. Of mixt Principalities BUt the difficulties consist in the new Principality and first if it be not all new but asâ—a member so that it may be termed altogether as mixt and the variations thereof proceed in the first place from a natural difficulty which we commonly finde in all new Principalities for men do willingly change their Lord beleeving to better their condition and this beliefe causes them to take armes against him that rules over them whereby they deceive themselves because they find after by experience they have made it worse which depends upon another natural and ordinary necessity forcing him alwaies to offend those whose Prince he newly becomes as well by his soldiers he is put to entertain upon them as by many other injuries which a new conquest draws along with it in such manner as thou findest all those thine enemies whom thou hast endammaged in the seizing of that Principality and afterwards canst not keep them thy friends that have seated thee in it for not being able to satisfie them according to their expectations nor put in practice strong remedies against them being obliged to them For however one be very well provided with strong armies yet hath he alwaies need of the favor of the inhabitants in the Countrey to enter thereinto For these reasons Lewis the twelfth King of France suddenly took Milan and as soon lost it and the the first time Lodwick his own forces served well enough to wrest it out of his hands for those people that had opened him the gates finding themselves deceived of their opinion and of that future good which they had promised themselves could not endure the distastes the new Prince gave them True it is that Coutreys that have rebelled again the second time being recovered are harder lost for their Lord taking occasion from their rebellion is less respective of persons but cares only to secure himself by punishing the delinquents to clear all suspicions and to provide for himself where he thinks he is weakest so that if to make France lose Milan the first time it was enough for Duke Lodwick to make some small stir only upon the confines yet afterwards before they could make him lose it the second time they had need of the whole world together against him and that all his armies should be wasted and driven out of Italy which proceeded from the forenamed causes however though both the first and second time it was taken from him The generall causes of the first we have treated of it remains now that we see those of the second and set down the remedies that he had or any one else can have that should chance to be in those termes he was whereby he might be able to maintain himself better in his conquest than the King of France did I say therefore that these States which by Conquest are annexed to the ancient states of their conquerors are either of the same province and the same language or otherwise and when they are it is very easy to hold them especially when they are not used to live free and to enjoy them securely it is enough to have extinguished the Princes line who ruled over them For in other matters allowing them their ancient conditions and there being not much difference of manners betwixt them men ordinarily live quiet enough as we have seen that Burgundy did Britany Gascouy and Normandy which so long time continued with France for however there be some difference of language between them yet can they easily comport one with another and whosoever makes the conquest of them meaning to hold them must have two regards the first that the race of their former Prince be quite extinguished the other that he change nothing neither in their lawes nor taxes so that in a very short time they become one entire body with their ancient Principality But when any States are gaind in a Province disagreeing in language manners and orders here are the difficulties and here is there need of good fortune and great industry to maintain them and it would be one of the best and livelyest remedies for the Conqueror to goe in person and dwell there this would make the possession here of more secure and durable as the Turk hath done in Greece who among all the other courses taken by him for to hold that State had he not gone thither himself in person to dwell it had never been possible for him to have kept it for abiding there he sees the disorders growing in their beginnings and forthwith can remedy them whereas being not there present they are heard of when they are grown to some height and then is there no help for them Moreover the Province is not pillaged by the officers thou sendest thither the subjects are much satisfied of having recourse to the Prince near at hand whereupon have they more reason to love him if they mean to be good and intending to do otherwise to fear him and forrein Princes will be well aware how they invade that State insomuch that making his abode there he can very hardly lose it Another remedy which is also a better is to send Colonies into one or two places which may be as it were the keys of that State for it is necessary either to do this or to maintain there many horse and foot In these colonies the Prince makes no great expence and either without his charge or at a very small rate he may both send and maintain them and gives offence only to them from whom he takes their fields and houses to bestow them on those new inhabitants who are but a very small part of that State and those that he offends remaining dispersed and poore can never hurt him and all the rest on one part have no offence given them and therefore a small matter keeps them in quiet on the other side they are wary not to erre for fear it befalls not them as it did those that were dispoild I conclude then that those colonies that are not chargeable are the more trusty give the less offence and they that are offended being but poor and scattered can do but little harme as I have said for it is to be noted that men must either be dallyed and flattered withall or else be quite crusht for they revenge themselves of small dammages but of great ones they are not able so that when wrong is done to any man it ought so to be done that it need fear no return of revenge again But in lieu of Colonies by maintaining soldiers there the expence is great for the whole revenues of that State are to be spent in the keepingof it so the conquest proves but a loss to him that hath got it endammages him rather for it hurts that whole State to
encourage such Princes to fortifie and guard their own Capital city and of the countrey about not to hold much account and whoever shall have well fortified that town and touching other matters of governments shall have behaved himself towards his subjects as hath been formerly said and hereafter shall be shall never be assaild but with great regard for men willingly undertake not enterprises where they see difficulty to work them through nor can much facility be there found where one assails him who hath his town strong and wel guarded and is not hated of his people The cities of Germany are very free they have but very little of the countrey about them belonging to them and they obey the Emperor when they please and they stand not in fear neither of him nor any other Potentate about them for they are in such a manner fortified that every one thinks the siege of any of them would prove hard and tedious for all of them have ditches and rampires and good store of Artillery and alwaies have their publick cellars well provided with meat and drink and firing for a yeer besides this whereby to feed the common people and without any loss to the publick they have alwaies in common whereby they are able for a year to imploy them in the labor of those trades that are the sinews and the life of that city and of that industry whereby the commons ordinarily supported themselves they hold up also the military exercises in repute and hereupon have they many orders to maintain them A Prince then that is master of a good strong city and causeth not himself to be hated cannot be assaulted and in case he were he that should assail him would be fain to quit him with shame for the affairs of the world are so various that it is almost impossible that an army can lie incampt before a town for the space of a whole yeer and if any should reply that the people having their possessions abroad in case they should see them a fire would not have patience and the redious siege and their love to themselves would make them for get their Prince I answer that a Prince puissant and couragious will easily master those difficulties now giving his subjects hope that the mischiief will not be of durance sometimes affright them with the cruelty of their enemies and other whiles cunningly securing himself of those whom he thinks too forward to run to the enemy Besides this by ordinary reason the enemy should burne and waste their countrey upon his arrival and at those times while mens minds are yet warme and resolute in their defence and therefore so much the less ought a Prince doubt for after some few dayes that their courages grow coole the dammages are all done and mischiefs received and there is no help for it and then have they more occasion to cleave faster to their Prince thinking he is now more bound to them their houses having for his defence been fired and their possessions wasted and mens nature is as well to hold themselves oblig'd for the kindnesses they do as for those they receive whereupon if all be well weigh'd a wise Prince shall not find much difficulty to keep sure and true to him his Citizens hearts at the beginning and latter end of the siege when he hath no want of provision for food and ammunition CHAP. XI Concerning Ecclesiastical Principalities THere remains now only that we treat of the Ecclesiastical Principalities about which all the difficulties are before they are gotten for they are attained to either by vertue or Fortune and without the one or the other they are held for they are maintaind by orders inverterated in the religion all which are so powerfull and of such nature that they maintain their Princes in their dominions in what manner soever they proceed and live These only have an Estate and defend it not have subjects and govern them not and yet their States because undefended are not taken from them nor their subjects though not govern'd care not think not neither are able to aliene themselves from them These Principalities then are only happy and secure but they being sustained by superior causes whereunto humane understanding reaches not I will not meddle with them for being set up and maintained by God it would be the part of a presumptuous and rash man to enter into discourse of them Yet if any man should ask me whence it proceeds that the Church in temporal power hath attaind to such greatness seeing that till the time of Alexander the sixt the Italian Potentates and not only they who are entituled the potentates but every Baron and Lord though of the meanest condition in regard of the temporality made but small account of it and now a King of France trembles at the power thereof and it hath been able to drive him out of Italy and ruine the Venetians and however this be well known me thinks it is not superstitious in some part to recall it to memory Before that Charles King of France past into Italy this countrey was under the rule of the Pope Venetians the King of Naples the Duke of Milan and the Florentines These Potentates took two things principally to their care the one that no forreiner should invade Italy the other that no one of them should inlarge their State They against whom this care was most taken were the Pope and the Venetians and to restrain the Venetians there needed the union of all the rest as it was in the defence of Ferrara and to keep the Pope low they served themselves of the Barons of Rome who being divided into two factions the Orsini and Colonnesi there was alwaies occasion of offence between them who standing ready with their armes in hand in the view of the Pope held the Popedome weak and feeble and however sometimes there arose a couragious Pope as was Sextus yet either his fortune or his wisdome was not able to free him of these incommodities and the brevity of their lives was the cause thereof for in ten years which time one with another Popes ordinarily liv'd with much ado could they bring low one of the factions And if as we may say one had near put out the Colonnesi there arose another enemy to the Orsini who made them grow again so that there was never time quite to root them out This then was the cause why the Popes temporal power was of small esteem in Italy there arose afterwards Pope Alexander the sixt who of all the Popes that ever were shewed what a Pope was able to do with money and forces and he effected by means of his instrument Duke Valentine and by the ocasion of the French mens passage all those things which I have formerly discoursed upon in the Dukes actions and however his purpose was nothing at all to inlarge the Church dominions but to make the Duke great yet what he did turnd to the Churches advantage
like manner it was a wrong to Caracalla Commodus and Maximus to imitate Severus because none of them were endued with so great valor as to follow his steps therein Wherefore a new Prince in his Principality cannot well imitate Marcus his actions nor yet is it necessary to follow those of Severus but he ought make choyce of those parts in Severus which are necessary for the founding of a State and to take from Marcus those that are fit and glorious to preserve a State which is already established and setled CHAP. XX. Whether the Citadels and many other things which Princes often make use of are profitable or dammageable SOme Princes whereby they might safely keep their State have disarmed their subjects some others have held the towns under their dominion divided into factions others have maintain'd enmities against themselves others have appli'd themselves to gain them where they have suspected at their entrance into the government others have built Fortresses and others again have ruined and demolished them and however that upon all these things a man cannot well pass a determinate sentence unless one comes to the particulars of these States where some such like determinations were to be taken yet I shall speak of them in so large a manner as the master of it self will bear It was never then that a new Prince would disarme his own subjects but rather when he hath found them disarm'd he hath alwaies arm'd them For being belov'd those armes become thine those become faithful which thou hadst in suspicion and those which were faithful are maintaind so and thy subjects are made thy parrisans and because all thy subjects cannot be put in armes when thou bestowest favors on those thou armest with the others thou canst deal more for thy safety and that difference of proceeding which they know among them obliges them to thee those others excuse thee judgeing it necessary that they have deservd more who have undergone more danger and so have greater obligation but when thou disarmst them thou beginst to offend them that thou distrustest them either for cowardise or small faith and the one or the other of those two opinions provokes their hatred agaist thee and because thou canst not stand disarmed thou must thenturn thy self to mercenary Soldiery whereof we have formerly spoken what it is and when it is good it can never be so much as to defend thee from powerful enemies and suspected subjects therefore as I have said a new Prince in a new Principality hath alwaies ordaind them armes Of examples to this purpose Histories are full But when Prince gains a new State which as a member he adds to his ancient dominions then it is necessary to disarme that State unless it be those whom thou hast discoverd to have assisted thee in the conquest thereof and these also in time and upon occasions it is necessary to render delicate and effeminate and so order them that all the arms of thy State be in the hands of thy own Soldiers who live in thy ancient State near unto thee Our ancestors and they that were accounted Sages were wont to say that it was necessary to hold Pistoya in factions and Pisa with Fortresses and for this cause maintaind some town ssubject to them in differences whereby to hold it more easily This at what time Italy was ballanc'd in a certain manner might be well done but mee thinks it cannot now a dayes be well given for a precept for I do not beleeve that divisions made can do any good rather it must needs be that when the enemy approaches them Cities divided are presently lost for alwaies the weaker part will cleave to the forrein power and the other not be able to subsist The Venetians as I think mov'd by the aforesaid reasons maintaind the factions of the Guelfes and Gibellins in their townes and however they never suffer'd them to spill one anothers blood yet they nourish'd these differences among them to the end that the citizens imployd in these quarrels should not plot any thing against them which as it prov'd never serv'd them to any great purpose for being defeated at Vayla presently one of those two factions took courage and seizd upon their whole State Therefore such like waies argue the Princes weakness for in a strong principality they never will suffer such divisions for they shew them some kind of profit in time of peace being they are able by means thereof more easily to mannage their subjects but war comming such like orders discover their fallacy Without doubt Princes become great when they overcome the difficulties and oppositions that are made against them and therefore Fortune especially when she hath to make any new Prince great who hath more need to gain reputation than an hereditary Prince causes enemies to rise against him and him to undertake against them to the end he may have occasion to master them and know that ladder which his enemies have set him upon whereby to rise yet higher And therefore many think that a wise Prince when he hath the occasion ought cunningly to nourish some enmity that by the suppressing thereof his greatness may grow thereupon Princes especially those that are new have found more faith and profit in those men who in the beginning of their State have been held suspected than in those who at their entrance have been their confidents Pandulphus Petrucci Prince of Siena governd his State more with them that had been suspected by him than with the others But of this matter we cannot speak at large because it varies according to the subject I will only say this that those men who in the beginning of a Principality were once enemies if they be of quality so that to maintain themselves they have need of support the Prince might alwaies with the greatest facility gain for his and they are the rather forced to serve him faithfully insomuch as they know it is more necessary for them by their deeds to cancel that sinister opinion which was once held of them and so the Prince ever draws from these more advantage than from those who serving him too supinely neglect his affairs And seing the matter requires it I will not omit to put a Prince in mind who hath a new made himself master of a State by means of the inward helps he had from thence that he consider well the cause that mov'd them that favor'd him to favor him if it be not a natural affection towards him for if it be only because they were not content with their former government with much pains and difficulties shall he be able to keep them long his friends because it will be impossible for him to content them By these examples then which are drawn out of ancient and modern affaires searching into the cause hereof we shall find it much more easie to gain those men for friends who formerly were contented with the State and therefore were his enemies than those
matters to himself and so shall he gaine double glory to have given a beginning to a new Principality adornd and strengthnd it with good lawes good arms good friends and good examples as he shall have double shame that is born a Prince and by reason of his small discretion hath lost it And if we shall consider those Lords that in Italy have lost their States in our dayes as the King of Naples the Duke of Milan and others first we shall find in them a common defect touching their armes for the reasons which have been above discoursd at length Afterwards we shall see some of them that either shall have had the people for their enemies or be it they had the people to friend could never know how to assure themselves of the great ones for without such defects as these States are not lost which have so many nerves that they are able to maintaine an army in the feld Philip of Macedon not the father of Alexander the Great but he that was vanquished by Titus Quintius had not much State in regard of the greatnesse of the Romanes and of Greece that assail'd him neverthelesse in that he was a warlike man and knew how to entertaine the people and assure himself of the Nobles for many yeares he made the warre good against them and though at last some town perhaps were taken from him yet the Kingdome remaind in his hands still Wherefore these our Princes who for many yeares had continued in their Principalities for having afterwards lost them let them not blame Fortune but their own sloth because they never having thought during the time of quiet that they could suffer a change which is the common fault of men while faire weather losts not to provide for the tempest when afterwards mischiefes came upon them thought rather upon flying from them than upon their defence and hop'd that the people weary of the vanquishers insolence would recall them which course when the others faile is good but very ill is it to leave the other remedies for that for a man wou'd never go to fall beleeving another would come to take him up which may either not come to passe or if it does it is not for thy security because that defence of his is vile and depends nor upon thee but those defences only are good certaine and durable which depend upon thy owne selfe and thy owne vertues CHAP. XXV How great power Fortune hath in humane affaires and what meanes there is to resist it IT is not unknown unto me how that many have held opinion and still hold it that the affaires of the world are so governd by fortune and by God that men by their wisdome cannot amend or alter them or rather that there is no remedy for them and hereupon they would think that it were of no availe to take much paines in any thing but leave all to be governd by chance This opinion hath gain'd the more credit in our dayes by reason of the great alteration of things which we have of late seen and do every day see beyond all humane conjecture upon which I sometimes thinking am in some paret inclind to their opinion neverthelesse not to extingush quite our owne free will I think it may be true that Fortune is the mistrisse of one halfe of our actions but yet that she lets us have rule of the other half or little lesse And I liken her to a precipitous torrent which when it rages over-flows the plaines overthrowes the trees and buildings removes the earth from one side and laies it on another every one flyes before it every one yeelds to the fury thereof as unable to withstand it and yet however it be thus when the times are calmer men are able to make provision against these excesses with banks and fences so that afterwards when it swels again it shall all passe smoothly along within its channell or else the violence thereof shall not prove so licentious and hurtfull In like manner befals it us with fortune which there shewes her power where vertue is not ordeind to resist her and thither turnes she all her forces where she perceives that no provisions nor resistances are made to uphold her And if you shall consider Italy which is the seat of these changes and that which hath given them their motions you shall see it to be a plaine field without any trench or bank which had it been fenc'd with convenienent vertue as was Germany Spain or France this inundation would never heave causd these great alterations it hath or else would it not have reach'd to us and this shall suffice to have said touching the opposing of fortune in generall But restraining my selfe more to particulars I say that to day we see a Prince prosper and flourish and to morrow utterly go to ruine not seeing that he hath alterd any condition or quality which I beleeve arises first from the causes which we have long fince run over that is because that Prince that relies wholly upon fortune runnes as her wheele turnes I beleeve also that he proves the fortunate man whose manner of proceeding meets with the quality of the time and so likewise he unfortunate from whose course of proceeding the times differ for we see that men in the things that induce them to the end which every one propounds to himselfe as glory and riches proceed therein diversly some with respects others more bold and rashly one with violence and the other with cunning the one with patience th' other with its contrary and every one by severall wayes may attaine thereto we see also two veby respective and wary men the one come to his purpose and th' other not and in like maner two equally prosper taking divers course the one being wary the other headstrong which proceeds from nothing else but from the quality of the times which agree or not with their proceedings From hence arises that which I said that two working diversly produce the same effects two equaly working the one attains his end the other not Hereupon also depends the alteration of the good for if to one that behaves himself with warinesse and patience times and affaires turne so favourably that the carriage of his businesse prove well he prospers but if the times and affaires chance he is ruind because he changes not his manner of proceeding not is there any man so wise that can frame himselfe hereunto as well because he cannot go out of the way from that whereunto Nature inclines him as also for that one having alwayes prosperd walking such a way cannot be perswaded to leave it and therefore the respective and wary man when it is fit time for him to use violence and force knows not how to put it in practice whereupon he is ruind but if he could change hi disposition with the times and the affaires he should not change his fortune Pope Julius the second proceeded in all his actions
with very great violence and found the times and things so conformable to that his manner of proceeding that in all of them he had happy successe Consider the first exploit he did at Bolonia even while John Bentivolio lived the Venetians were not well contented therewith the King of Spain likewise with the French had treated of that enterprises and nowithstanding al this he stirrd up by his own rage and fiercenesse personally undertook that expedition which action of his put in suspence and stopt Spaine and the Venetians those for feare and the others for desire to recover the Kingdome of Naples and on the other part drew after him the King of France for that King seeing him already in motion and desiring to hold him his friend whereby to humble the Venetians thought he could no way deny him his souldiers without doing him an open injury Julius then effected that with his violent and heady motion which no other Pope with all humane wisdome could ever have done for it he had expected to part from Rome with his conclusions settled and all his affaires ordered before hand as any other Pope would have done he had never brought it to passe For the King of France would have devised a thousand excuses and others would have put him in as many feares I will let passe his other actions for all of them were alike and all of them prov'd lucky to him and the brevity of his life never sufferd him to feele the contrary for had he litt upon such times afterwards that it had been necessary for him to proceed with respects there had been his utter ruine for he would never have left those wayes to which he had been naturally inclind I conclude then fortune varying and men continuing still obstinate to their own wayes prove happy while these accord together and as they disagree prove unhappy and I think it true that it is better to be heady than wary because Fortune is a mistresse and it is necessary to keep her in obedience to ruffle and force her and we see that she suffers her self rather to be masterd by those than by others that proceed coldly And therefore as a mistresse shee is a friend to young men because they are lesse respective more rough and command her with more boldnesse I have considered the 25 Chapter as representing me a full view of humane policy and cunning yet me thinks it cannot satisfie a Christian in the causes of the good and bad successe of things The life of man is like a game at Tables skill availes much I grant but that 's not all play thy game well but that will not winne the chance thou throwest must accord with thy play Examine this play never so surely play never so probably unlesse the chance thoucastest lead thee forward to advantage all hazards are losses and thy sure play leaves thee in the lurch The sum of this is set down in Ecclesiastes chap 9. v. 11. The race is not to the swift nor the battell to the strong neither yet bread to the wise nor yet riches to men of understanding nor yet favour to men of skill but time and chance hapeneth to them all Our cunning Author for all his exact rules he delivere in his books could not fence against the despight of Fortune as he complaines in his Epistle to this booke Nor that great example of policy Duke Valentine whome cur Author commends to Princes for his crafts-master could so ruffle or force his mistresse Fortune that he could keep her in obedience Man can contribute no more to his actions that vertue and wisdome but the successe depends upon a power above Surely there is the finger of god or as Prov. 16. v. 33. The lot is cast into the lap but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord. It was nor Josephs wisdome made all things thrive under his hand but because the Lord was with him that which he did the Lord made it to prosper Gen 39. Surely this is a blessing proceeding from the divine providence which beyond humane capacity so cooperateth with the causes as that their effects prove answerable and sometimes that we may know there is something above the ordinary causes the success returns with such a supereminency of worth that it far exceeds the vertue of the ordinary causes CHAP. XXVI An Exhortation to free Italy from the Barbarians HAving then weigh'd all things above discours'd and devising with my self whether at this present in Italy the time might serve to honor a new Prince whether there were matter that might minister occasion to a wise and valorous Prince to introduce such a forme that might do honor to him and good to the whole generality of the people in the countrey me thinks so many things concurre in favor of a new Prince that I know not whether there were ever any time more proper for this purpose And if as I said it was necessary desiring to see Moses his vertue that the children of Israel should be inthrald in Aegypt and to have experience of the magnanimity of Cyrus his mind that the Persians should be oppress'd by the Medes and to set forth the excellency of Theseus that the Athenians should be dispersed so at this present now we are desirous to know the valor of an Italian spirit it were necessary Italy should be reduc'd to the same termes it is now in and were in more slavery than the Hebrews were more subject than the Persians more scatterd than the Athenians without head without order battered pillaged rent asunder overrun and had undergone all kind of destruction And however even in these later dayes we have had some kind of shew of hope in some one whereby we might have conjectur'd that he had been ordained for the deliverance hereof yet it prov'd afterwards that in the very height of all his actions he was curb'd by fortune insomuch that this poore countrey remaining as it were without life attends still for him that shall heal her wounds give an end to all those pillagings and sackings of Lombardy to those robberies and taxations of the Kingdome and of Tuscany and heal them of their soars now this long time gangren'd We see how she makes her prayers to God that he send some one to redeem her from these Barbarous cruelties and insolencies We see her also wholly ready and disposed to follow any colours provided there be any one take them up Nor do we see at this present that she can look for other than your Illustrious Family to become Cheiftain of this deliverance which hath now by its own vertue and Fortune been so much exalted and favored by God and the Church whereof it now holds the Principality and this shall not be very hard for you to do if you shall call to mind the former actions and lives of those that are above named And though those men were very rare and admirable yet were they men and every one