Succession is as a Golden Chain that holds fast together and close every part of the Royal Contexture in it self and leaves no Chasms Chinks or Ruptures whereby any dissolving cause can be admitted entrance to subvert or disjoint the Frame I have before spoke of this Head and shall only add that as Kingly Government was the first so when Commonwealths were introduced with much strugling they kept Life a while in Greece and Rome but have been reduced to Monarchy again about one Thousand seven Hundred Years since Tacitus after his short way tells us Vrbem Romam a principio Reges habuere Libertatem consulatum L. Brutus instituit Dictaturae ad tempus sumebantur neque Decemviralis Potestas ultra biennium neque Tribunorum militum Consulare jus diu valuit Non Cinnae non Syllae longa dominatio Pompeii Crassique potentia cito in Caesarem Lepidi atque Antonii arma in Augustum cessere qui cuncta discordiis civilibus fessa nomine Principis sub Imperium accepit Tacit. l. 1. Annal. Monarchy hath no Private Ends. that Rome had Kings first that L. Brutus appointed Liberty and Consulship Dictatorship was sometimes assumed the Decemvirate lasted not alive two Years nor did the Consular right of the Tribunes of the People long continue nor was the command of Cinna or Sylla durable and the power of Pompey and Crassus devolved upon Caesar as the Arms of Anthony did upon Augustus who received all being weakned wearied tired out or spent with civil Discords under the Empire of a Prince From whose very Name the title of semper Augustus and Caesar is continued to this day which duration in no Commonwealth can be found Therefore every one that desires to live under an uniform unchangeable and durable Government must prize and value Monarchy most It is furthermore the peculiar Excellency of Monarchy that it hath no separate or distinct Interests or Designs from the Good of the Publick the End of all just Empire being the Safety and Profit of the Subjects saith a (f) Finis justi Imperii utilitas obedientium salus Ammianus lib. 30. Judicious Historian For a King neither in time of Peace or War can ever have any Good or Evil befal him wherein his Subjects have not their share It is onely in Monarchy where Paternal and Conjugal Love are in the highest degree and relation betwixt the Prince and his People the (g) Nalson's Common Interest p. 111. Blessings of Happiness or the Miseries of Infelicity are stowed in the same Bottom So that a Monarch consulting the Safety Honour Welfare Peace and Prosperity of his People doth at the same time consult his own Interest in every one of them and this must of necessity oblige him to act strenuously and constantly in all his Endeavours for the attainment of those Ends. This will induce him to exert all his Royal Vertues of Justice Fortitude c. will cause him to be watchful to suppress the Turbulent and Factious who would discompose the happy Harmony at home and be vigilant against the Attempts of Foreign Powers For the State can neither sink by Intestine Discords or fall by Foreign force but he must be ruined with it and so out of the natural Tenderness care and concern for the Safety Peace and Happiness of himself and People he must be truly a Father of his Country whereas the Members or Representatives of a Republic are at best but Guardians and greedy ones as we of late experienced who generally commit great Wastes Objection That Monarchy is apt to turn to Tyranny The common objection perpetually in the Mouths of Democratick Factious People is that Monarchy is apt to degenerate into Tyranny according to that of the (h) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Lib. 5. Polit. c. 10. Philosopher who having recounted the external and intrinsick causes of the decay of other forms of Governments saith that the dissolution of Kingdoms happens rarely from external Causes and so they are more durable but it may happen from two intrinsick ones viz. the Dissention of those of the Royal Family or Princes or when Kings govern something Tyrannically But this is only true where Monarchy is Absolute Arbitrary and Unbounded which in the English Monarchy is much otherwise For though the Kings of England where they have not precluded themselves by their gracious Condescentions and Grants to their People are not limited by any other Power than their own Royal Pleasure Yet their Concessions have been so many and formed into Laws as Measures and Standards of Government that they are Mounds and Boundaries which the Monarchy hath no less Prudently than Indulgently been pleased to give it self thereby to ease the Subject of any just occasion of Fears or Jealousies which receive their Birth from the formidable redundancy of their absolute Power and by this means the Government is secured from the falling intoan Arbitrary and Tyrannical way of Rulers and the Minds of the Subjects freed from the dreadful apprehension of Slavery And as by this Incomparable method of goodness and generosity in our Princes the Subjects of all conditions are the more powerfully obliged to all dutiful Allegiance to their temperate Government so the Government it self is thereby rendred more capable of effectually answering all the Ends and Intentions of Society When it is debated whether Monarchy or Tyranny be the most convenient Government the true Sence of it is this Comparison betwixt a King and Tyrant Whether the People shall live more happily when the supream Power is in one and the Person by the Laws of the Country is known whereby no Room is left for Division and Faction concerning that single Sovereign Or When one Man being more active and crafty than his Fellows who ought to have an equal share in the Authority raises a Faction upon some plausible pretences and under the colour of serving his Confederated Party perswades them to be commanded by him and so exercises the supream Power in an Illegal way which as is compassed by engaging the People in misery under colour of making them more happy so it must be kept up by as bad Arts and an Army must be maintained to make good by force what Law cannot justify In this manner as the question is to be stated betwixt a Lawful King and Tyrant So if it be enquired whether Monarchy or Aristocracy be better it is not whether a bad King be better than a good Commonwealth consisting of the Optimacy but the Comparison ought to be betwixt a good King and a good Aristocracy or betwixt them when both bad First Comparison betwixt a King and a Commonwealth Therefore it is to be considered That a People may easilier have a good King than a good Nobility taking Good in a Political Sence as providing for the Peoples Happiness because the King's Interest is the same with that of the Peoples which is a strong State-security whereas the Commonwealth of Greece
in such cases it is not to be wondred at that a majority of Votes might be opposite to more judicious and foreseeing Members judgments neither is the Maxim universally true for it must be caeteris paribus if all things be alike For it is not sufficient for an Adviser to see unless he can let another see by the light of Reason A man ought not implicitely to ground his Actions upon the Authority of other mens Eyes whether many or few but of his own One Physician may see more into the state of a mans body than many Empiricks One experienced Commander may know more in Military Affairs than ten fresh-water Souldiers One old States-man in his own Element is worth many new Practitioners One man upon a Hill may see more than an Hundred in a Valley And who will deny but among an Hundred one of them may have a stronger Eye and see clearer and further than all the Ninety Nine So one Paphnutius in the Council of Nice saw more than many greater Clerks And it is no new thing to find one or two men in the Parliament change the Votes of the House Therefore nothing is got by this way of arguing though it be one of the plausiblest and most improveable of any of the Topicks they choose And if we could be sure that all the Members of such Assemblies were free from all the imperfections such are liable to much might be yielded to it All these Arguments were used for that sole end that they might possess their Party with the reasonableness of their desires to the King that he would implicitly yield up his reason to the guidance of their Councils They were not so frontless at first Concerning the Negative Voice as positively to deny the Kings negative Vote in Parliament that had never been doubted and there is good reason it should be a most sure Fundamental of the Government since nothing can be Statute-law but that to which the King assents Le Roy le veult For who can be said to will that hath not the Power to deny Si vult is scire an velim efficite us possim nolle Seneca But they affirmed that in Cases extraordinary when the Kingdom was to be saved from ruine the King seduced and preferring dangerous men it was necessary for them to take care of the Publick And then the Kings denying to pass their Bills was a deserting of them Objection That in Cases of Extraordinary necessity the Houses to have Power to secure the People from Tyranny Otherwise they alledged Parliaments had not sufficient Power to restrain Tyranny and so they boldly affirmed they had an absolute indisputable Power in declaring Law and as their Observer words it they are not bound to Precedents since Statutes cannot bind them there being no obligation stronger than the Justice and Honour of Parliaments And to summ up all he tells us if the Parliament meaning the two Houses be not vertually the whole Kingdom it self if it be not the supreme Judicature as well in matters of State as matters of Law if it be not the great Council of the Kingdom as well as of the King to whom it belongeth by the consent of all Nations to provide in all extraordinary cases ne quid detrimenti capiat Respublica let the brand of Treason saith he stick upon it Indeed because by all these most false and impious assertions and those horrid Acts built upon them they brought so great a ruine to the Kingdom they are and ever will be uâ—less a Platonick year return again branded with Rebellion in the highest degree To answer this Accumulation of Treasonable Positions for such I hope I may call in some sence Answer what is against the Kings Crown and Dignity is no ways difficult from the discourse of right constituted Parliaments For those of them that carry any shew of Reason are such only as may be understood of Acts of Parliament compleated by the Royal Assent but being spoken of either or both Houses in opposition to the King they are most false as I shall shew in particular For First If the two Houses are not bound to keep any Law no man can accuse them of breach of any What obligation can Justice lay on them who by a strange vertue of Representation are not capable of doing wrong But it is well known that Statutes stand in full force to the two Houses as being not void till repealed by a joynt consent of the King and the two Houses It would be much for the credit of the Observers desperate Cause if he were able to shew one such Precedent of an Ordinance made by Parliament without the Kings assent that was binding to the Kingdom in nature of a Law Our Kings can repeal no Laws by their own Prerogative though they may suspend the Execution It seems the Houses would have Power to do both and our Author in another place thinks it strange that the King should assume or challenge such a share in the Legislative Power to himself as without his concurrence the Lords and Commons should have no right to make Temporary Orders for putting the Kingdom into a Posture of Defence These were strange Phrases never heard before by English Ears Our Laws give this Honour to the King That he can joyn or be sharer with no man The King like Solomon's true Mother challengeth the whole Child not a divisible share but the very life of the Legislative Power The Commons present and pray the Lords advise and consent the King Enacts Secondly The Houses have no Power to declare Law As to their claiming an absolute Power in declaring Law it is as bold and false an Assertion as the other when spoken of the two Houses They may vote in order to a new Bill the explaining or repeal of any Law formerly made or prepare a Bill for any New Law and that is all they can do but authoritatively to declare any Law is most contrary to the Constitution of the Houses and never was adjudged one of their Privileges Thirdly As to the Justice and Honour of a Parliament when the State is in quiet and the Conventions only for making wholsome Laws for the Publick weal there are no Factions in Court or Country no private Intriegues to be managed the People neither uneasie nor discontented then it is to be expected That none but the wisest and wealthiest of the Gentry will be chosen Members of that August Assembly and their Justice and Honour will be conspicuous in all their Actions But have we not known Houses of Commons composed of other kinds of Persons who have voted their own Justice and Honour to be to imprison their fellow Members and fellow Subjects in an Arbitrary way How (d) Address part 3. p. 121. could a generous Soul conscious to himself he had transgressed no Law kneel at the Bar of such a House with the same submission as if he believed the Speaker
Capitularia Caroli (e) See Fred. Lindebrogus Codex Legum Antiq. magnis the Burgundian Alman Bavarian Saxon Longobard Ripuarian and Frisons Laws mention such Officers for preserving the publick Peace and (f) See Prynne 's Irenarch Redivivus p. 1. ad 5. punishing all Malefactors and infringers of the publick Peace as we have At the Common-Law before Justices of Peace were made there were sundry Persons to whose Charge the maintenance of the Peace was recommended and who with their other (g) Dalton's Justice of Peace c. 1. Conservators of the Peace Offices had and yet still have the Conservation of the Peace annexed to their Charge as incident to and inseparable from their said Offices yet they were only stiled and so now are by their Offices the Conservation of the Peace being included therein First the King is the principal (h) Idem Conservator of the Peace within his Dominions The King the principal Conservator of Peace and is properly Capitalis Justiciarius Angliae in whose Hands at the beginning the Administration of all Justice and all Judicature in all Causes first was and afterwards by and from him only was the Authority derived and given to all yet the Power nevertheless remains still in himself insomuch that he may himself sit in Judgment as in ancient times the Kings here have done and may take Knowledg of all cases and causes Before I leave this Head I cannot pass by the Act of (i) 20 H. 7. c. 11. H. 7. wherein is so fully declared the King's Care to have due Administration of Justice as in the close of the last Chapter I have only hinted The Reasons why Justices of Peace made The King's Care for right and easie Administration of Justice The Preamble saith The King considereth that a great part of the Wealth and Prosperity of the Land standeth in that that his Subjects may live in Surety under his Peace in their Bodies and Goods and that the Husbandry of this Land may encrease and be upholden which must be had by due Execution of Laws and Ordinances and so commandeth the Justices to execute the tenor of their Commission as they will stand in Love and Favour of his Grace and in avoiding the pains that he ordained if they do the contrary If they be lett or hindred they must show it to the King which if they do not and it come to the Kings knowledg they shall be out of his Favour as Men out of Credence and put out of Commission for ever Moreover he chargeth and commandeth all manner of Men as well Poor as Rich which be to him all one in due Administration of Justice that is hurt or grieved in any thing that the said Justice of Peace may hear determine or execute in any wise that he so grieved make his complaint to the next Justice of Peace and if he afford no remedy then to the Justices of the Assise and if he find no remedy there then to the King or Chancellor c. and as a further security it is added And over that his Highness shall not lett for any favour affection costs charge nor none other cause but that he shall see his Laws to have plain and true execution and his Subjects to live in security of their Lands Bodies and Goods according to his said Laws Thus we see who is the Principal Other Conservator of the Peace and Royal Conservator of the Peace others are the Lord Chancellor or Lord Keeper Lord Treasurer Lord High Steward of England Earl Marshal Lord High Constable of England every Justice of the Kings Bench and Master of the Rolls who have the power included in their Office and over all the Realm when they are present may award Precepts take Recognisances for the Peace of which and others Lambard in his Eirenarche may be consulted and how far Justices of Assise Stewards of the Sheriffs Turn and Court of Pye-powders the Sheriffs Chief Constable Coroners and Petty Constables may commit to Ward breakers of the Peace in their view though they cannot take surety at the request of any man that being peculiar to the Justices of Peace's Office Sir Edward Coke (k) Term. Pasch fol. 176. 4. Inst Coram Rege prima fuit Institutio Justiciariorum pro Pace conservanda Ad Pacem nostram conservandam saith that the first institution of Justices for the preserving the Peace was 6 Ed. 1. but Mr. Prynne will have it of older date because he finds that King Henry the Third by several Patents or Writs from the 17th to the end of his Reign did constitute and appoint several persons in most Counties of the Realm to be Guardians and Preservers of the Peace of the Realm and in the Patent 51 H. 3. m. 10.13 dorso it is dilectis fidelibus suis custodibus pacis Com. Linc. North. Ebor. Vicecom eorundem Comitat. and the like 54 H. 3. m. 21. d. But the first regular settlement of them seems to be Anno 1327. 1 Ed. 3. c. 16. The Authorities afterwards were further explained 4 Ed. 3. c. 2. 18 Ed. 3. c. 2. 34 Ed. 3. c. 1. Sir Edward Coke (l) Ibid. 171. tells us that the Commission of Peace stood over-burthened and incumbered with divers Statutes some whereof were before and some since repealed and stuffed with many vain and unnecessary repetitions and many other corruptions crept into it by mistaking of Clerks c. for amendment and correction whereof (m) Mich. 32 33 Eliz. Sir Christopher Wray Chief Justice of England assembled all the Judges of England and upon perusal had of the former Commission of Peace and due consideration had thereupon and often conferences betwixt themselves they resolved upon a reformation of the form with divers additions and alterations both in matter and method as it stood in Sir Edward's time and he saith It needed another Reformation by reason of Statutes since repealed and others expired of which he gives several instances Therefore he saith It is a good rule for all Judges and Justices whatsoever that have Jurisdiction by any Statute which at the first was Temporary or for a time to consider well before they give Judgment Whether that Statute hath been continued or made perpetual and if at first it was made perpetual Whether it be not repealed or altered by any later Statute What Commissions Patents and Writs were issued out by King Edward the First for preserving the Peace of the Realm suppressing seising and punishing of those who disturbed it may be found Cl. 9 Ed. 1. m. 10. d. in Rylies (n) P. 443 451 to 457 433 480. Prynne's Animadv fol. 149. Appendix so there is a Patent 14 Ed. 1. m. 15. 15 Ed. 1. m. 13. de militibus constitutis ad Articulos in Statuto de conservatione pacis edito contentoâ— observandos constituting persons of note in every County to observe them named in the Record and so for other Kings Reigns
in the Authors in the (o) Sir Edw. Coke 4 Inst Ryley's Appendix p. 521 c. 537 563. Margent the exact Abridgment of the Record of the Tower Tit. Justices of Peace and Prynne's Irenarchus Redivivus The constituting and making of Justices of Peace is inherent in and inseparable from the Crown as appears by the Statute 27 H. 8. c. 24. (p) Dalton c. 3. Some are Justices by Act of Parliament as the Archbishop of York Bishop of Duresm and Ely and their Successors others by the Kings Charters as Mayors and other Officers of Corportion Towns Others are by Commission which are properly Justices of Peace to take care not so much of the publick Discipline and correction of manners as for the Peace and security of the High-ways they being at their Quarter-Sessions to hear and determine of Felons Breakers of the Peace Contempts and Trespasses to suppress Routs and Tumults restore possessions forceably entred c. They (q) Sir Tho. Smith's Commonwealth part 2. c. 22. Who are chosen to be Justices of Peace are elected out of the Nobility Knights Esquires and Gentlemen and such as be learned in the Laws such and such number as the Prince shall think meet and in whom for wisdom and discretion he putteth his trust being mostly Inhabitants within the County saving that some of the High Nobility At the King's Pleasure and chief Magistrates for honour sake are put in all or most of the Commissions Those have no time limited but by Commission from his Majesty alterable at pleasure Much increased in number At first they were but four after eight and now thirty or forty in a Shire either by increase of riches learning or activity in Policy and Government more being found than anciently who have either will or power or both to do their King and Country service and they are not too many to handle affairs of the Commonwealth especially for the benefit of the Subject For the better distributing of Justice that they may have in all parts of the County one or more not very remote to apply themselves to The Faults they may punish Each of them hath Authority upon complaint to him made of any Theft Robbery Manslaughter Murther Violence Complots Routs Riots unlawful Games forceable Entries Excess in Apparel Conventicles evil order in Ale-houses and Taverns of Idle and Vagabond Persons Masters and Servants not observing the Laws Rapes false Moneys Extortions or any such Disturbances of the Peace quiet and good order of the Shire to commit the Persons supposed to be Offenders to the Prison and to charge the Constable or sheriff to bring them thither and the Jaylor to neceive them till the next Quarter-Sessions when the Sheriff or his Under-Sheriff with his Bailiffs be to attend him at their Sections where Informations are given in to them by Bill which is shown to the Juries and if they find just cause for the complaint they find the Bill and the Party is Indicted and Tryed by a Jury of twelve men at the Kings Suit for the King is reckoned the one Party and the Prisoner the other They are also to order the repair of Bridges High-ways the Poor the lame Souldiers pensions and do many things besides according to the Power given in their Commissions which particularizeth all things they are to take Cognizance of sometimes upon suspicion of War to take care for the order of the Shire and sometimes to take Muster of Harness and able men Once in a year or two the Prince with his Council Instructions given to Justices of the Peace saith a Manuscript I have seen chuseth out certain Articles out of Penal Laws made to repress the pride and evil rule of the People and sends them down to the Justices willing them to meet together and consult among themselves how to order the matter most wisely and circumspectly whereby the People might be kept in good order and obedience according to Law and they after a certain space meet and certify the Prince or his Privy-Council how they do find the Shire in rule and order touching those points and all other disorders There was never saith Sir Thomas Smith (r) Part 2. tit Juslices of Pearce in any Commonwealth devised a more wise a more dulce and gentle How beneficial the Institution of Justices of Peace or more certain way to rule the People whereby they are kept always as it were in a Bridle of good order and sooner looked to that they do not offend than punished when they have offended for seeing the chief Persons of Quality and Interest among them have such charge and Authority given them by the King and if occasion be do commit cause to be Indicted and punished or sent to Prison for disobedience Offenders against the Laws It curbeth and terrifieth Offenders so that it is a new Furbishing of the good Laws of the Realm and a continual repressing of Disorders which the Common sort of People are too prone to if it were not for this impending lash which every where is held over Criminals The Law it self as registred and printed is but a dumb and dead thing the Ministers of the Law are those that give life to it and for that end were Justices of the Peace Constituted who being Gentlemen of Interest and parts are the fittest Instruments to see the Laws duly Executed They are principally concerned in seeing to the Execution of several Laws which are Committed to their Charge and it is greatly advantagious to the Country that at every Quarter-Sessions in the face of the Country one of the Justices of the Peace gives a charge to the Jurys wherein with learning and Judgment he acquaints them with the Excellency Antiquity and Utility of Monarchical Government the usefulness of those Laws Wise and Gracious Princes have granted to their Subjects the excellent Composure Contexture and Harmony in the Government and many other particulars fit for them to know as good Subjects and good Neighbours Having met with some Speeches made in Queen Elizabeth's time which relate either to Justices of the Peace or the Execution of Laws in general I think it may not be unacceptable to the Reader to understand in what manner that Queen caused her Chancellor to quicken the execution of the Laws Some touches of which follow (s) MS. Speech to the Justices Itinerant Anno 1559. The Conservation of Peace their principal Charge By the Conservation of Peace and Concord every Commonweal hath a perfect Foundation to begin marvelous good course to increase a strong Pillar to sustain it and a strong Buckler to defend it The plain and good order of each County consisteth in the well or evil Executing of Justice for thereby either every man enjoyeth his own and the whole Commonweal is in a calm and even Temper or by remisness in Execution the Free-Booters and Beasts of Prey are let loose to rob and despoil some and affright
Monarchy Aristocracy Democracy were not so evenly poiz'd and attemper'd ad pondus as Lycurgus endeavoured it in the Lacedaemonian State I shall content my self with an Epitome not a Paraphrase as the forementioned Author hath made of what Polybius (p) Lib. 6. Histor p. 197. Edit Basil hath left in his Excellent History wherein he deducing matters from such an Original as those who knew not or believed not the Creation could do delivers us his sence of the mutations and managery of Government to this purpose That when by reason of some great Inundation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 great Plague or Death all Institutions and Arts having been lost In process of time by the propagation of those that escap'd these Devastations a multitude grew who herded according to their kind and for the weakness of their Party in respect of ravenous Creatures as well as their Savage Neighbors we may suppose they associated together it necessarily followed that he who in the Strength of his Body and confidence of Spirit excell'd the rest obtain'd the Princedom and Empire as we see in Bulls Goats Cocks c. and so the rest obey'd that Man who was properly the Monarch and in Process of time 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by familiar Conversation and living together under this one Head like a select Flock or Herd these Mortals began to think of Honest and Just and their contraries and by the noble or ignoble actions of some of the Society the Sence of Honour and Disgrace was impress'd in their Minds and consequently of Profitable and Incommodious (q) Idem pag. 198. He that was their Governour excelling in Power and in the opinion of all endowed with those qualifications were judged good and profitable and administring to his Subjects what was competent to every of them They now fearing no violence most willingly submitted themselves to him and he being venerable to them 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with unanimous consent they impugn and revenge themselves on those who oppose or conspire against his Government and so from a Monarch he becomes a King when reason had obtain'd the Principality which before Fierceness and Power possess'd So that in all this first settlement of Monarchy or a Kingdom in the purest state of Nature we can conceive describ'd we have no mention in this judicious Author of Compact with the People or Election but of submitting It is true upon the degeneracy of Kings Factions arising he speaks of Election not of those of strong Bodies only and daring Souls for such he presumes made themselves Masters but of such as by their Wills and Reason experimentally discover'd in their Actions were most agreeable to the Peoples liking But that this was done by the force of Faction appears from what he subjoins 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that those who were thus destined for the Kingdom selected special places and encompassed them with Rampiers or Walls fortifying them for the security of themselves and to supply their Subjects with necessaries from whence arose the great Cities which had large Sokes by which means they possess'd the whole Country of the Kingdom I do own that he makes offence and hatred of the People or envy against the succeeding Princes who were debauched and degenerated 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to be the causes why in process of time some of the Noblest became the leaders of the People to repress such Princes and root out the Monarchy and Kingdom But still it was because Factions encreased and so Aristocracy was changed into Oligarchy which set of Rulers oppressing the People whose discontents being observ'd by some popular Persons they animated them to join to subvert the Oligarchy Hitherto we find nothing of the imaginary delegation of the Peoples Power to one or more but prosperous events crown'd their Rebellions against their Superiors What follows is observable that the People having slain the Optimacy fearing the Injustice of Superiors they durst not set a King over themselves nor trust the Government in the hands of a few having so late Instances of their Tyranny and Sloth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 So the single and sincere Hope which was only left in themselves induced them to establish a Democracy and so to themselves receive the Trust and Providence of the Common-weal which the (r) French Monarchy or Absolute Power p. 20. Paraphrast calls their last untainted hope founded on themselves that is in their own Strength So that till the forms of Government by a King or Tyrant Aristocracy or Oligarchy were wholly subverted we hear not a Syllable of the Peoples challenging a power and then it is no wonder when they have slain the richest and divided the spoil and have entertained an opinion that they shall never be Servants more but live in an equal Freedom and Wealth if they be blown up with a popular Pride and call themselves the supream Power But what is this to the natural Freedom pleaded for when it is nothing but the headstrong unbridledness of the Multitude that have cast their Riders and got loose the Reins on their own Neck (s) Idem pag. 199. Polybius goes on to tell us how Democracy was soon overturned after though for a while those who had Experience of the Oppression of the Rich were delighted with the Equality and Liberty of the present State 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that seemed sweet to them above all Treasure yet afterwards some growing Rich little valued that Equality and Liberty which custom had made them sleight and nauseate and so began to contemn the Poor and excelling the rest in Riches began to covet Rule yet knowing they could not by their own Interest or eminence of Vertue obtain it they began to be lavish of their Wealth and variously bait the People and so corrupt them into Tumults and Sedition and the People being thereby raised to hopes of living upon the Goods of those of contrary Factions by following some magnanimous and daring Captain who yet for his Poverty could not Lawfully aspire to the Honours of the Common-wealth found no better or easier way to rise but by heightning Factions whereby Parties being imbodied Murthered Plundered and Destroyed one another till at last wearied or one Man getting a greater interest in the People than the rest and being fortunate to overtop the rest they submit to such and after all their miseries return again to Monarchy I cannot dismiss (t) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Polybius without noting from him how preferrable Monarchy is to any of the popular sorts of Government For he observing that as Iron is wasted by rust Wood by worms so that although they might escape exterior defacings yet they will decay by those inbred devourers So he observes that all simple Governments are apt to some evil that is peculiar and consequential to their Nature as he instanceth in a Kingdom changed into Monarchy absolute by which he means that which we now
from the military Tribunes and they having the name of Tribunes from the distinction of the Romans into Tribes that they might be distinguished from the military Tribunes were called the Tribunes of the People At (o) Pighius Tyrannofugio first they were only two but after encreased to the number of ten They had power to hinder any Proceedings in the Senate which they thought might prove prejudicial to the Commons At (p) Stadius in Florum lib. 3. c. 2. Eorum Autoritas magis in intercedendo quam jubendo first they had not Authority to enact any new Decrees as afterwards by abusing their Authority and by Connivance they usurped for in old time they sate (q) Pighius ut supra without the door of the Senate whither whatsoever was determin'd within the Senate was sent to them to be perused and if they approved it they subscribed a Roman T for Tribunus When any new Laws were to be proposed the (r) Godwyn's Roman Antiqu. lib. 3. sect 2. Praetors Consuls Dictators Interrex Decemviri military Tribunes Triumviri and Tribunes of the People only had liberty to propose them and they were exposed to view of the People for three Market days and after the Magistrates assembled the People to hear the Law which by the Proponent was pleaded for by an Oration and seconded by others and if not liked it was opposed in the same manner The People being assembled according to the triple distinction of them into Tribes and the division of each Tribe into ten Curiae or Parishes and the Centuries or Hundreds the Assemblies were called Comitia Tributa Centuriata or Curiata Now into a Pitcher were put the names of these several divisions and that Tribe or Centuries Name which was first drawn was called Tribus vel Centuria Praerogativa because they were first asked their Voices and commonly the vote of that was followed by the rest especially in choice of Consuls the Curia upon which the first Lot did fall was called Principium (s) Hubert in Lib. 1. Cicer. Epist Serm. 2. Now while the People were busy in their Lottery if any Tribune of the Commons should intercidere or forbid the Proceeding he might be heard and the whole Assembly was for that time dismissed or if the Consuls commanded supplications to be offered up in behalf of the Emperor or if it fell on some forbidding of Feasts or if any were seized with the Falling-sickness or the Soothsayers found any unlucky Signs upon any of these the Assembly was dissolved otherwise the Law that was approved by the People was recorded being graven (t) Tacit. Annal. 11. in Brass and put in the Treasure house That which was determined in the (v) Sigonius de Jure lib. 3. cap. 1. Parish-Assemblies was called Lex Curiata that in the Centuries Lex Centuriata that which was in the Assembly of the Tribes was not called a Law but Plebiscitum CHAP. VIII The Inconveniences of all kinds of Republic Governments I Shall now consider all these forms of Commonwealths in gross and hope to satisfy the ingenuous and unbiass'd Reader That if a People were in a capacity to chuse their own Government they should have no reason to chuse a Common-wealth rather than Kingly Government much less that they should endeavour to innovate or introduce it where already so Geometrically composed as it is in England both for the glory and benefit of the King and People It is Judiciously noted by a late (a) Nalson's Common Interest c. 3. The Benefits designed in all Societies Learned Writer That the happiness of all Societies principally consists in the securing domestic Peace or protection from foreign Enemies securing to every Member of the Society their particular right and property free from encroachment and oppression or in the equal distribution of Justice to all according to their proportion of Reward or Punishment Through all which heads I shall endeavour to shew that in Commonwealths these Particulars cannot or have not so effectually been secured as in a rightly constituted Monarchy First as to the securing domestick Peace 1. Securing Domestick Peace the very constitutions of Commonwealths requiring many Magistrates of equal Authority subject to the Political Diseases of State Viz. Covetousness Ambition Oppression and Faction and all the Concomitants of these make them more subject to Intestine Discords than Monarchy can be First Ibid. Covetousness in Commonwealths-men causes Discords It must be considered that in all Commonwealth Governments there is a necessity of change of Persons either annually chosen or to be for some few Years duration and all such must at the same time intend the interests of their private affairs separate from the public and there being most tempting Probabilities of a private and particular advantage to be made of all publick Trust where there is Power it is a perpetual Spur to ambitious and selfish Spirits to court such Employments which are like to be serviceable to their Honour or private Fortunes and the (b) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Polit lib. 5. c. 4. best Men being restrained by their modesty and paucity those that have designs by direct or indirect ways wind themselves into those places and by the rotation knowing they shall not long enjoy them they will improve the time in enriching themselves and connive at others that do so lest they themselves should be called to an account every ones rapaciousness being likelier to be so much the eagerer because he knows it may not come again to his turn to have the Quarry to prey upon Therefore the common interest if it be regarded must be only as it is subservient to these By-ends Thus in our late Republic the great Business even of the zealousest Pretenders to the Public was to enrich themselves and their Confederates as was apparent by the considerable Estates they had even after they had been forced to disgorge those fat Portions of Crown Bishops Dean and Chapter and Cathedral Lands By this observation we may conclude that the constituent parts of this Government being ever like to be such the miserable People must be continually spunged to feed so many greedy Worms and when the Prey grows scarce these Blood-Hounds will be sure to fight who shall get the best Share Besides there must be continual Heart-Burnings and Part-making Factions among them when those that are endowed with (c) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Polit. l. 5. c. 7. great Souls or are equal in Fortitude or Vertue have not the eminentest command at least as they judg according to their Worth and Merits By which means some will be carrying things by Arbitrary Power over their Equals as the Philosopher instanceth in Pausanius in Lacedaemon Hanno at Carthage Lysander and Eniadas and the Partheniae who judging themselves equal with those that had rule and being by them slighted and branded with the title of Bastards conspired to have slain the Senate and Optimacy To instance in
〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and according to the Use of the Country for that the Barbarous Nations were more prone to Servitude than the Grecians and the Asiaticks endured with less trouble than the Europeans that Command which he calls Absolute as of Masters over Servants This he calls in reality 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Tyrannical Government but Kingly also in that it is firm legitimate and according to the Use of the Country For that he (s) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Polit. lib. 3. cap. 10. Hâ—insii saith Citizens or Subjects defend Kings but Guards of Strangers are employed by Tyrants Kings commanding lawfully over the willing and Tyrants over the unwilling and without Rules of Law The third kind he calls that which among the Grecians was styled the Aesmynetian And this he (t) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Optiva tyrannis i. suffragio 〈◊〉 saith was an Elective Tyranny either perpetual for Life or for a time And this because it was a Command over the Willing such Persons being elected he styles a Kingly Government and instanceth in the Mitylenians who chose Pittacus to be their King against Alcaeus and Antimenides who were banished Such (u) Halicarnassâ—us lib. 5. Dionysius makes the Roman Dictators Such the Cumaeni by an honester Name styled their Tyrants and such were the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of Athens Such a Kingdom Timolio held at Syracuse which he as well as Pittacus spontaneously resigned and did not convert into a Tyranny as Dionysius did or as Sylla and Julius Caesar did at Rome and Aratus at Sicyon according to the (w) Lib. 3. de Officiis Orator The last kind he calls (x) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Lib. 3. Polit. c. 10. Heinsii Heroic because it was used in the Heroick Ages and had three Characteristicks of true Kingly Government That it was a Power exercised over the Willing Fatherly and Legitimate For he saith the first Kings either for the Benefits they conferred on the Multitude by Invention of Arts Conduct in War or leading them out in Colonies or supplying them with Lands governing those who lonies or supplying them with Lands governing those who freely yielded to obey were in that esteem and had that Power and Authority which was requisite These had command in War and in things sacred where there were no Priests and did determine Causes and all these things some Kings administred without Oath others were sworn to the observation of them by the lifting up the Scepter and (y) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Ibid. concludes that in ancient times Kings had Rule and were Lords over all affairs of the City and those at home and abroad From whence and from what the Philosopher delivered in the beginning of this work and elsewhere (z) Commâ—nt in lib. 1. Polit. initic Giphanius with Thucydides concludes That these Hereditary Kings had such a Power as was restrained by certain Laws and they did not Reign as they listed and at their Pleasure but by certain Prescripts of Laws such we may presume as they ordained This was that Monarchy which was known in the first Ages of the World All People in all Ages and all places having by constant Experience found it most conducive to their Happiness and well-being For had there been any other form under which Mankind could have rationally promised themselves more or more certain Happiness than under this all humane care would long e're this have hit on it and there would have been an universal Regifugium But supposing we should quit these Topicks of Monarchy Other commendable Qualifications of Monarchy being according to the Law of Nature and that it is venerably for its Antiquity there are other Commodities wherein it excells other Forms As first that it is freest from the Canker of Faction which corrodes and consumes all other Governments Hence the most judicious (a) Tacitus 1. Annal. Historian tells us what Asinius Gallus replied to Tiberius That the Body of the Empire is one and so is to be governed by one Soul and in (b) Arduum sape eodem loci potentiam concordiam esse Idem another place tells us how difficult it is to find Concord among Equals in Power especially where not only as at Sparta there were two races of Kings governing at once but as many of them as there were Senators or Magistrates which by Bands and Confederacies are restlessly making Parties against each other whereby the Administration rowls from one Faction to another whereas Kingly Government is uniform and equal in it self and when by Factions Commonweals have been brought almost to utter ruin a (c) Omnem potestatem ad unum conferri pacis interfuit Tacitus 1. Histor single Persons Conduct hath restored all As (d) Perculsum undique ordinavit Imperii corpus quod ita haud dubie nunquam coire consentire potuisset nisi unius Praesidis nutu quasi anima mente regeretur Lib. 4. c. 3. Florus writes of Augustus Caesar that he ordered the shaken and distracted Body of the Empire which without doubt could never have been united in one Form again unless by the Direction of one President as a Soul and Spirit Even so we experienced in his late Majestie 's admirable yea miraculous Retauration which effected as great Blessings to these Islands as that of Augustus to the Roman Empire Besides it is a strong Argument for the Preference of Monarchical Government to all sorts of Republics that in all popular States we find all great affairs managed by some one leading Man who by the dexterity of his Address Power of his Eloquence or the Strength of his Arguments induceth so many as are necessary to join with him to effect them unless when by contrary renitency they are dissolved into Faction So when the Senate of Rome was in a most critical Debate An delenda esset Carthago Cato shewing them the Grapes which a few Years before grew there illustrated from thence the dangerous vicinity of so potent and opulent a State as had contended with them for the universal Empire and wanted only the skill of an uti Victoria to have effected it By which he cooled the warm Debates of the Senate and brought them to an affirmative Determination So Cicero often prevailed so Demosthenes and so the Daemagogues in popular States who are (e) Nalson's Common Interest pro tempore Monarchs the very head of every Faction in a Republic being a King in Disguise or a Tyrant in the dress of a Private Man The single Government being freed from the prime Cause of all intestine decay viz. Faction It necessarily follows that it must be of longer Duration Monarchy more durable as being built upon stronger and firmer Foundations than any other Model Ambitions Aemulations Hostile Parities popular Insolencies Senatorian Tyranny tumultuous Elections and infinite causes of Discords are the inseparable Associates and close Conomitants of all other Forms But in Monarchy hereditary
Such a Prince is served by the Just the Wise the Prudent and Skilful Nullum Numen abest si sit Prudentia Such a Prince is never short-sighted he foresees every thing in its Original Cause fits every thing to its End Authors commending Prudence The (a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Po'â—â— lib. 3. Philosopher tells us That it is the proper and peculiar Vertue of a King For more things saith the Sententious (b) Plura in summa fortuna auspiâ—â—is consiliis quam telis manibus geri 13. Annal Historian are done in great Empires by Conduct and Counsels than by Weapons and Hands Hence Flaccus in his Argonauticks non solis viribus aequum Credere semper acri potior prudentia dextra Hence it is that the great (c) Proprium est prudentiae conciâ—are sibi animos homiâ—um ad usus suns adjungere cum virtutes specâ—â— dispares prudentia junguntur 2. de Officiis ad Brutum Orator saith It is the Property of Prudence to attract and allure Mens Minds and render them useful For Vertues of different Classes by it are united there being nothing that destroyeth Authority so much as the unequal and untimely Interchange of Power pressed too far and relaxed too much and Hatred Timorousness and Temerity Profuseness and Parsimony all which are balanced timed and seasonably applied by Prudence What the Eye is to the Body in discovering the various Figures Dimensions and Distances of Bodies whereby we may direct our Course to or from them that Light of the Soul but much more pure is Prudence which sees not before only and one Hemisphere singly but every where round whereby the Soul forms saith a subtile (d) Jamblichus Episâ— ad Aphalum Philosopher a most beautiful Model and Exemplar of all its Actions It is this Vertue saith another sage (e) Damippus lib. 1. de Prudentia Author which designs and disposeth infinite Things and so is the Parent and Conductor of all other Vertues by whose Prescript and Reason all things are ordered To Exercise this useful Vertue requires a Man not only of Ingenuity The Particulars wherein Prudence useful to a Prince consists Wisdom Memory disquisitive and speculative but also conversant in great and various Affairs in Histories Ancient and Modern whereby he may be able to collate Matters and adjust them to their proper Scope and Designs By this all Men as well as Princes take mature Counsel consider things good and evil commodious and incommodious examine all Instruments as to their fitness and unfitness compare Circumstances revise Examples consider of timing of Business Places and Persons natural tendencies and where Authority is to be used and where Suasives how to countermine how to penetrate into hidden Counsels of others and to unmask their Disguises to ruminate upon things by-past to order the present and provide for the future It is Prudence teacheth how to be skilful in knowing the Causes Symptoms speediest and most effectual Cures of the Diseases of a State For as Prudence is the very healthful constitution of a Soul exerting no sickly or distempered Actions The Diseases of a State 〈…〉 by a Prudent Prince so a prudent Prince endeavoureth with all his Skill and Might to keep the State in a most perfect temper of Health vigour beauty and firmness So that under an old experienced Prince there are no Symptoms of old and decrepit Age in his Kingdom Archytas the Pythagorean saith As a General leads his Army (f) Sicâ—ipsam soelicitatem prasens vitae temperat regitque prudentia Stobaeus the Admiral orders his Fleet the Pilot his Ship or God governs the World and the Soul the Body so presentness of Prudence orders the Happiness of Life It were endless to remember all the Benefits that accrue to a Prince and his People by this only Vertue Prudence Be the Body of the Commonwealth in a Calenture by Factions and Seditions a prudent Prince knows how to extinguish the Fire by substracting the Feeders or breaking the Force of it by subdividing the complication of Causes or diverting of it some other way Doth it bleed by a Civil War He can bind up the Wound Does it suffer by want of Nourishment He can supply it with suitable Food that will neither pamper it to an unwieldy Sloth or luxurious Licentiousness He can by Bleeding or Drenching clear it of all its superfluous Humours He can asswage its Pains by removing Grievances or Oppressions He can invigorate every languid part by cordial Privileges and wholesom Laws can set strait its dislocated or distorted Joynts when any of the great Officers or Magistrates faulter limp or halt in their Duties Medaea never knew so many Balsamick Herbs to renew the old Age of Jason as a prudent Prince doth Rules and Methods to cure all the Distempers of his Kingdom preserve it in a perfect Health or restore it when declining The Consideration of all which made (g) Quam multis virtutibus opus est quibus velut anchoris 〈◊〉 navis firmatur quam varia prudentia qua velut clavo gubernetur Ep. ad Imp. Reg. c. Lipsius say How many Vertues are necessary as Anchors to fasten the Ship of the Commonwealth how various Prudence as a Rudder to govern it CHAP. XIV Of a Prince's Courage and Conduct in Military Affairs IT is not onely necessary that a Prince should know and exercise all those Royal Vertues that make him adorable on the Throne and in his Cabinet-Council when he is clothed with the Robes of Majesty The Benefits to the Subjects under a Martial Prince But he must likewise for the preservation of his People from Foreign Invasions enlarging of his Empire and keeping his Subjects in a profound Peace at home free from intestine Seditions and Rebellions put on his Armour and act the Part of a Generalissimo This requires according to the (a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Pol. lib. 2. c. 7. Philosopher many Vertues to establish it Therefore in another place (b) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Id. l. 7. Pol. c. 2. Laws for encouraging Soldiers he saith In some Countries the Laws were framed towards the attaining of particular Ends to the Governours and People and in some the End of the Laws were that they might rule over their Neighbours as he instanceth in the Lacedaemonian and Cretan Government where the greatest part of their Laws were accommodated to Warfare and concludes That in all Nations which can hope to be Superiour to others such Laws are in honour as he instanceth in the Scythians Persians Thracians and Celtae So in Carthage to encourage Military Service so many Rings were given to the Soldiery as they had served in several Expeditions In Macedonia it had been a Law that he that had killed no Enemy was girt with an Halter And among the Scythians That such an one should not drink of a Cup which at a certain Solemn Feast was to pass round Among
Kindred and drives her through the Streets lashing or beating her as she goes along This as Juvenal saith was Ipsis Marti Venerique timendum So Antinous in Homer threatens Irus with the chopping off his Nose Ears and Privities and Vlysses inflicts that very punishment upon his Goat-herd Melanthius for his Pimping So in Canutus his Law the Wife who took other Passengers aboard her than her Husband is doomed she should have her Nose and Ears cut off Jâ—â—us Anglorum The curious may see more in Selden Tacitus observes another Law Hâ—â—redes successoresque sui cuique liberi nullum testamentum Si liberi non sunt pâ—â—ximus gradus in possâ—ssâ—oâ—e sratres patrui avunculi Idem that every ones Children were their Heirs and Successors and there was no Will to be If there be no Children then the next of kin shall inherit Brethren or Unkles by the Fathers or Mothers This seems to point out Gavil-kind otherwise there had been need of a Testament to dispose of something for younger Children So Selden observes that till our Grandfathers time it was not lawful to dispose of Land-Estates by Will unless it were in some Burroughs that had such priviledges but this hindred not but they might dispose by Deeds Another Law he mentions Suscipere inimicitias seu patris seu propiâ—qui quam amicitias necesse est Idem Nec implacabiles durant luitur enim etiam homicidium certo Armâ—ntorum ac pecorum numero recipitque satisfactionem universa domâ—s Idem which shews the use of those are called Deadly Feuds in the North was that to undertake the enmities rather than the friendships whether of ones Father or Kinsman is more necessary Yet he saith those do not hold on never to be appeased for even Murther is expiated by a certain number of Cattle and the whole Family of the murdered Person receives satisfaction So we find in our English Saxon Laws Murthers were formerly bought off with Head-money which was called Wâ—â—gild though one had killed a Noble-man yea a King himself which as I remember was valued at 60000 Thrimsas or Groats and so a Prince 30000 and others Proportionable Another Law we find thus The Lord imposeth upon his Tenant a certain quantity of Corn or Cattle or Clothes Frumenti modum Deminus aut pecoris aut vestis colâ—no injungit Idem Here we certainly find the usage of Country Farmholders In â—â—imitivo Regni sâ—â—tu pâ—st conquis â—â—nem 〈…〉 〈…〉 argenti 〈◊〉 sed sola 〈◊〉 solvebantur Dialog Scaccar So yet in Scotland a Gentleman of Quality or Lords Estate is not computed by Annual Rent but by so many Bolls of Victual So we find in Gervase of Tilbury that the Kings had payments made them out of their Lands not in Summs of Gold or Silver but only in Victuals or Provisions out of which the King's House was supplied with necessaries for daily use which the King's Officers accounting with the Sheriffs reduced into many payments viz. a Measure of Wheat to make Bread for 100 Men 1 s. the body of a Pasture-fed Beef 1 s. a Ram or Sheep 4 d. for Food for 20 Horses 4 d. Thus far I have thought fit to pick out of Tacitus the manners of the Germans and compare some of them with the English Saxon or Norman Customs to discover their Conformity But since in this account from Tacitus we find no satisfactory testimony as to the power of making Laws but that in general they used to meet in Consultation about the New or Full of the Moon where 2 (r) Alter tertius dies consultatione coâ—â—ntium abâ—umitur Id. 636. or 3 Days were usally spent and the Turba or Common Body of those that met which elsewhere he saith was by hundreds being Armed the Priests commanded silence and had the power of keeping Matters in order and the Princes Authority was there as I have noted besore I say considering these things I must seek otherwhere for clearer discovery before which I will only note Judgments given in their Councils that at such Councils as (s) Liâ—â—â— apud concilium accusare quoque discrimen capitis intendere Tacitus describes Judgments were given upon offences for he saith here Accusations might be presented and Capital Matters tried the distinction of punishment * Distinctio paenarum ex 〈◊〉 proditores tranâ—fuâ—â—â— arâ—oribus suspendunt ignavâ—â— imâ—eâ—â—â— â—â—pore Lips torpâ—â—â— Infames 〈…〉 〈◊〉 insupâ—r crate 〈◊〉 â—acitus de moribus German In some Places of Germany Drowning is yet a Punishment as Platerus gives an Account of a Woman tied in a Sack and cast into the River near Basil who was found alive after being taken up at the usual place half a mile below where she was cast in Observat being according to the Crime Traytors and such as fled to the Enemy were hung upon Trees but the slothful unfit for War and such as are infamous for sluggishness as Lipsius will have it Torpore not Corpore infames were drowned in Morasses an Hurdle being laid upon them and the reason he gives of the divers punishments is that the first which he calls Scelera are to be shown while punished but the other which he calls Flagitia wicked and heinous crimes but particularizeth not what they were should be hid and punished by Drowning then follows Levioribus delictis pro modo poenarum equorum pecorumque numero convicti mulct antur pars mulctae Regi vel Civitati pars ipsi qui vindicatur vel propinquis ejus exolvitur and that for smaller faults the punishment was a Mulct of Horses or Cattle whereof a great part was pay'd to the King or City and part to him that was acquitted or his kindred By which we may note a Sovereignty in the Kings or Free Cities or People to whom these Mulcts were pay'd But I leave these obscurer times and proceed to greater light Therefore for the better clearing of the Authority of the Saxon Kings in giving Laws to their Subjects and the discovering who were the constituent parts of the great Councils I shall first note something of the several Laws made in Germany France Several Laws made in several King loms after the declining of the Reman Empire and the Northern Countries and so proceed to some general observations of our Saxon Laws and lastly to illustrate or expound by a short Glossary the Saxon Titles of Great Men found mentioned in the Councils First as the Ancientest I meet with I will begin with the Gothic Laws Gothick Laws These Goths overrun Europe and did not only cause great Wars and Destructions but made great alterations in the Laws and Kingdoms The Goths according to the custom of other Northern People used not written Laws but their Country Customs till (t) Sub Erudiâ—â— Rege Gothi Legum instituta scriptis bahere câ—â—perunt nam antea mâ—ribus consuetudine tenebantur Isidor Chron. Goth. Aera 504.
Summons of the Prelates to a Parliament was that of 49 H. 3. directed to the Bishop of Duresm wherein the occasions of summoning are reckoned to be after the great Troubles being quieted by giving the Prince Hostage for establishing the Peace therefore to provide with wholesome Deliberation and to establish and totally to compleat with full Security a Peace c. Et super quibusdam aliis Regni nostri negotiis quae sine consilio vestro aliorum Praelatorum Magnatum nostrorum nolumus expediri cum eisdem tractatum habere nos oporteat vobis mandamus Rogantes in Fide Dilectione quibus nobis tenemini c. 14 Nov. The next (h) 23 E. 1. m. 9. dorso Writ is that of 23 E. 1. to the Archbishop of Canterbury thus Quia super quibusdam arduis negotiis nos Regnum nostrum ac vos caeterosque Praelatos de eodem Regno tangentibus quae sine vestra aceorum praesentia nolumus expediri Parliamentum nostrum tenere ac vobiscum super hiis colloquium habere volumus tractatum 24 July The same Year 23 E. 1. there was another (i) Cl. 24 E. 1. m. 4. dorso Parliament summoned by this memorable Writ directed to the Archbishop of Canterbury Sicut Lex justissima provida circumspectione sacrorum Principum stabilita hortatur ut quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur sic innuit evidenter ut communibus periculis per remediae provisa communiter obvietur Then reciting the King of France his frauds concerning Gascoign and his Hostile preparations adds provisa jaculaminus laedunt so commands him in fide dilectione to be personally present c. Praemunientes Priorem Capitulum vestrae Ecclesiae Archidiaconos totumque Clerum vestrae Dioecesis facientes quod iidem Prior Archidiaconus in propriis personis dictum Capitulum per unum idemque Clerus per duos Procuratores idoneos plenam sufficientem potestatem ab ipsis Capitulo Clero habentes una vobiscum intersint modis omnibus tunc ibidem ad tractandum ordinandum faciendum nobiscum cum caeteris Praelatis Proceribus aliis Incolis Regni nostri c. 30 Sept. The Variations of the Writs are mostly these The commanding part of the Summons to appear That the cause of the Summons is diversly expressed according to the present emergence Sometimes the word is Mandamus rogantes otherwhile as 27 E. 1. m. 16. Effectâ—ose requirimus rogamus Rogamus specialius Nihilominus injungendo mandamus as the same years m. 9 dorso Injungentes the same year firmiter injungendo 30 E. 1. m. 9. dorso Iterato mandamus Cl. 33 E. 1. m. 8. dorso Firmiter injungendo mandamus Claus 11 E. 3. part 2. m. 10. dorso Rogantes mandamus Cl. 38 H. 6. m. 29. dorso Rogando mandamus Cl. 22 23 E. 4. m. 11 dorso and so 15 Caroli 1. fol. 20. These are the greatest variations in the Mandatory part which was mostly to be personally present themselves the Bishops Abbats Priors Deans and Archdeacons and one Proctor for the Chapter and two for the Clergy of the Diocess Sometimes the word is Sitis apud nos omnibus praetermissis as 27 E. 1. m. 16. dorso or Personaliter intersitis the same Year m. 9. dorso and 30 E. 1. m. 7 9. dorso and several other or Sitis in propria persona vestra vel per sufficientem procuratorem a vobis plenam potestatem habentem as Cl. 6 E. 2. m. 2. dorso or quatenus omni excusatione voluntaria cessante as 4 E. 3. m. 13. dorso or propter arduitatem magnitudinem negotiorum absentiam vestram nâ—quimus nec volumus aliqualiter excusare other times especially Sede vacante to send a Proctor or Proxy thus Sufficientem Procuratorem plenam a vobis potestatem habentem mittatis as 27 E. 1. m. 9. dorso But (k) Claus 6 E. 3. m. 36. dorso other times thus Scientes pro certo quod nisi evidens manifesta necessitas id exposcat non intendemus Procuratores seâ— excusatores pro vobis admittere and gives the reason why as they loved the King and his Honour and the tranquillity and the quiet of the Kingdom they would be present because of the (l) Propter arduiâ—atem negotiorum praedâ—ctorum arduity or difficultness of the business Another reason is given Claus 11 E. 3. part 1. m. 15. lest by their absence the expedition of the Kings Affairs should be retarded or deferred and in another because of the absence of them oftentimes (m) Fuerunt non absque nostri Regni nostri incommodo saepius retardata the great Affairs have been retarded to the disprofit of the King and his Kingdom In the 12th of E. 3. it is very strict thus (n) Claus 12 E. 3. part 2. m. 32. dorso 13 E. 3. part 2. m. 1. dorso Attentis praemissorum arduitate imminentibus periculis quacunque excusatione cessante personaliter intersitis And 14 E. 3. after the King had taken upon him the Title of King of France the charge for their appearance was very strict Nos sicut honorem nostrum salvationem ejusdem Regni nostri Angliae caeterarumque terrarum ac jurium nostrorum praedictorum ac negotiorum expeditionem diligitis nullatenus omittatis and so in many others There is a prevalent Argument used in the (o) Claus 16 E. 3. part 1. m. 39. dorso Scituri quod gratitudinem ingratitudinâ—m quas nobis in absentia nostra jam osâ—endi contigerit plus ponderabimus quam si â—â—crant dum praesentes essemus ea curabimus juxta merita seu demerita compensare 16 E. 3. when he summoned a Parliament in his absence to induce the Prelates and other Members to appear personally That the King lets them know that he will more weigh the Gratitude or Ingratitude which they shew him in his absence than if he were present and he will take care to reward them according to their merit Another the Cl. 2 R. 2. m. 3. dorso That the King would in no wise have them excused unless they were detained with such an Infirmity as they could not labour The words are nisi tanta infirmitate tunc detenti fueritis quod aliqualiter illuc laborare non poteritis nullo modo excusatos habere volumus The ends of these Summons were sometimes general and sometimes special The general Causes were expressed by the common (p) Communi Regni uâ—iliâ—atâ— Cl. 6 Jo. m. 33. dorso The Causes of Summoning Profit of the Kingdom the Ardua negotia nos statum Regni tangentia Other times as 25 E. 1. M. 6. dorso Arduis urgentibus negotiis nos vos totum Regnum nostrum tangentibus Other times (q) Cl. 27 E. 1. m. 9. dorso ad salvationem Coronae nostrae Regiae communem utilitatem populi Regni nostri The
and his People as they loved to phrase it they answer by their Prolocutor that those who contract to their own ruin or esteem such Contracts before their own preservation are felonious to themselves and rebellious to Nature Inferring from thence That if the legal Constitution of Government The Writers for the Parliament affirm That where the Houses think the Constitution of the Government is not agreeable to the Liberty of the People they may alter it be not agreeable to the Liberties the House conceives needful for them they are obliged to contend to alter them which is no more nor less than if a Criminal being condemned to be hanged should be guilty of another Felony and Treason against Nature to yield to the Sentence but that he ought in his own defence to kill as many as he could that he might thereby save his life by escape Thus I hope I have made apparent the falshood of the Positions ranged in defence of that dismal Parliament How the Long Parliament voted all the Power into their own Hands who made use of them as Platforms upon which to plant the Artillery of their Acts and Ordinances For under the pretext of their obligation to preserve the Kingdom they voted to put it in a posture of defence and they voted from the King his Navies Officers Privy Counsellors and Revenues pretending the Navies were still reserved for the King in better hands than he would put them and for the other they would furnish him with better principled Ministers Whereas by the same Precedent the Subjects were bound to give up their Estates to their ordering as often as they pretended they could dispose of them more wisely For they might alledge the State which they reputed themselves had an interest paramount in them in case of publick extremity so that as they pretended the Head without the Body was the State before so now it was fit the Body should be without the Head whereas the Law hath provided against either exorbitances and if there was necessity we must fall into one we ought in reason to chuse the former because being better acquainted with that we could better digest it and it would be less burthensom to our Estates to satisfie one than five hundred nay ten thousand as it appeared when the greedy Commonwealths men with their Committees Armies c. was that flat Vermine in the Bowels which how true soever it is of the lumbricus latus was certainly true of this Monster That it was every where Head and Mouth It is to be well weighed When Parliaments beneficial when not that as Parliaments are in the highest degree beneficial when they keep within the bounds of duty and sobriety so when they will have their Ordinances to have the force of Laws and not govern themselves by known Laws they are the cause of many Distempers in a Kingdom and the Subjects condition is most unhappy in the Multitude of Physicians for extraordinary Remedies such as they always pretend to use are saith Sir Henry Wotton like hot Waters which may help at a pang but being too often used spoil the Stomach A Compleat Parliament is that (f) Answer to Observ p. 150. Panchreston or Soveraign Salve for all Sores but some would make the name of Parliament a Medusa's Head to transform reasonable men into Stones and subordinate Monarchy to the two Houses who must be denied nothing but with their good will would claim for them a paramount interest with the Soveraign whom they would advance only to the height and mighty Dignity of a Doge of Venice or a Roman Consul whilest they must be the Tribunes of the People their Supervisors So that we cannot be content to gather the blessed fruits right constituted Parliaments would afford us but we must rend away the top Branch yea stub up the Tree that we may scramble for the Fruit. Tacitus (g) 10 Annal. gives a Caution how a Prince may support his Authority that he do not vim Principatus resolvere cuncta ad Senatum revocando Kings not to grant away their Prerogatives at the Importunity of Parliaments It is fit a Prince should have the Glory of performing those things himself which are his Prerogatives and not to refer such things to Conventions of Parliament which properly belong not to their Cognizance Since therefore by the condescensions of our Wise and Gracious Princes there are several things in England the King cannot by Law do alone it is a most requisite Wisdom in Princes that as they observe the Laws in securing the Peoples Liberties and Privileges so by no Arbitrary Assumption of either or both Houses to let their Prerogatives be invaded for those are now no more than are rationally and politically necessary for orderly and established Government The Encroachments of the never to be forgotten long Parliament several of which I have in this and the foregoing Chapter hinted may be sufficient documents to Princes not to yield such a body too much Power for if the ballance once decline a little weight will sink it Therefore though Princes are not to enlarge their Prerogatives nova siti ad alia aliaque properare yet they ought to preserve those that remain For any Raveling once yielded will make the Royal Cittadel defenceless Testudo ubi collecta est in suum tegmen tuta est ad omnes ictus ubi exerit partes aliquas quodcunque nudavit obnoxium infirmum est The Tortoise as long as it keeps within its shell and coverture is safe but if it unbare any part it is obnoxious to danger Above all things a Prince should he careful never to part with the Prerogative of Summoning and Dissolving Parliaments For we cannot forget that the Houses of 1641. not content with a Bill for Triennial Parliaments got an Act for perpetuating themselves and that would not satisfie but they prepared a Bill for the certainty of future Parliaments whether the King had occasion for them or not so that if the King omitted the sending out of Writs and Summons the Chancellor might and for failure the Sheriff and I know not what inferiour Officers of which the Blessed King complains I cannot dismiss this Subject without taking notice of the Fundamental cause of Factious Members of Parliament The fundamental Cause of Factious Members in Parliament In England there is no such powerful Engine to make Faction and Sedition formidable and dangerous to Government as when the Majority of the Freeholders are wrought upon by the Arts I have in some measure hinted before and shall more largely in the Chapter of Faction to chuse Members of the House of Commons of their own Temper for such a Number being imbodied in that House give and receive mutual strength from one another For when such are met they do not take care to unite the minds of the Subjects to their Prince or one to another or imploy their time upon the great concerns of
By the practising of all the respective qualifications I have according to my poor Ability set down in this Chapter and that of the Privy-Council and those more excellent Methods and Rules his own great Wisdom will suggest he shall attain to a great trust with his Master and a great respect and veneration from all the Wise and Sober and shall transmit a noble Example and durable Pattern to Posterity If it so fall out that such a Minister of State cannot in some particular Affair conform his Judgment to that of his Collegues or the Resolutions of his Prince It will be glorious in him after the laying open with all modesty and strength of Reason the grounds of his Opinion to submit quietly to his Prince's Pleasure with that resignedness a Servant doth to a great Master and he will be sure to reap the benefit of it For if his Prince in the Sequel find his Counsel was sound and not ill timed he will imploy him in greater matters and with more confidence than before and if such a Minister of State find that he hath been too partial or byassed in his Opinion he will soon find his own errour and be less apt for the future to commit the like However he is and ever will be a true Servant to his Prince and a good Minister of State who ex animo and with all possible sincerity can take as much pleasure in obeying his Soveraigns Will when he is laid aside as he did in serving of him so long as he was imployed by him Tu Marcellus eras Virgâ—l lib. 6. v. 883. CHAP. XXXII Of the Kings Soveraignity in appointing Magistrates IF it were possible saith (a) In Orat. The necessity of Magistrates to supply the Prince's Unubiquitariness Libanius that Princes in their own Bodies could be every where there would be no need of Magistrates to be sent into the Provinces they themselves being able to administer Justice unto all as the Sun is sufficient to give light unto them but seeing that cannot be no more than they can fight all their Battels with their own Hands and Swords therefore they must execute their Authority by others and determine Justice and causes of right and wrong not by their own Tongue and understanding but by the Sentence of others so as the (b) Polit. lib. 3. c. 16. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Philosopher observes making to themselves many Eyes and Ears Hands and Feet It is incumbent upon the Prince in his safe keeping of his Empire saith the (c) Cicero ad Fratrem Orator that he do not exhibit himself only but all the Ministers likewise of his power to be useful to the Publick and as Plutarch (d) Praecept Polit. adds to place every one according to his capacity in his several imployment For one (e) Philo de Creatione Principis man though he have never such alacrity in body and mind cannot be sufficient to undergo the greatness and multitude of business which every day do flow upon the neck of another unless they chuse co-adjutors out of the best men of known Wisdom Courage Prudence and Piety who not only are free from Pride the frequent concomitant of Power but are abhorrers of it as an hateful and exceeding great evil For such men are most fit helpers and assistants to good and worthy Princes Therefore (f) Lib. 1. c. 10. Bodin Arnisaeus (g) Pag. 27. All Magistracy derived from the Sovereign and other Digesters of Politicks make it the third right of Majesty to appoint and constitute Magistrates who having their Authority flowing from the Prince as the fountain derive from him all their Power of command So (h) Dio. Mecaenas adviseth Augustus ut solus sine Plebe Populo ac Senatu Magistratus crearet that he alone without the People and Senate create Magistrates and Zonaras rightly affirms that creatio Magistratuum maxima pars est muneris Imperatoris the creation of Magistrates is the greatest part of the Office of an Emperor The Soveraign possessing his proper Power without a Superiour (i) Arnisâ—us cap. 11. p. 267. the Magistrates are Instruments by which the Soveraign executes his Commands for it is reason he alone have the power of appointing them who hath the right (k) Intercidere Magistratuum iniquitatem infectumque reddere quiâ—quid fieri non eportuerit Plin. Panaegyr to redress the unjust Actions of the Magistrates and to make void whatsoever ought not to have been done by them (l) Lampridius in Alexandro Meliorem esse Rempublicam prope tutiorem in qua Princeps malus sit ea in qua mali Principâ— Ministri Hence it is a Prince is to be very solicitous in the choice of Magistrates for it is better for a Commonwealth and almost safer when a Prince is evil than when the Prince's Ministers are so Therefore in the choice of them the indoles aptness and ability of the persons for their respective Offices are principally to be regarded for (m) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Plut. Polit. Pracept omnia non pariter rerum sunt omnibus apta Some are fit for (n) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Tiut. Polit. Pracept Military and others for Civil commands * Propertiâ—s lib 3. The use of various Magistrates for varioâ— Employments some for the Consulting Contriving part others for the Executive some because there is use of their Popularity others of their Prudence others of their Justice some to conciliate the Subjects dutifulness to their Prince others to represent the Prince gracious to the People some for the care of the Prince's Revenue that he never want a Fund against all contingencies others to see the dispending of it for the Princes honour and his own and the Peoples benefit So that in (o) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Tiut. Polit. Pracept whomsoever any or especially all Vertues are conspicuous much is to be attributed to him and a Prince's Eye should soon discover him to imploy him according to his Talent Some Magistrates are absolutely necessary for the Administration of the Government without whom there cannot be that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as the Philosopher calls it such are Lord Chancellors Lord Treasurers Lord Lieutenants Judges Sheriffs c. others for the more splendid part of the Government which are Officers of the Court rather than Magistrates as Master of the Horse Grooms of the Stole Bed-chamber and Privy-Chamber Gentlemen Master of Ceremonies Kings of Armes c. Therefore the Philosopher (p) Absque necessariis Magistratibus Civitas ne consistere quidem potest absque its qui ad ornatum 〈◊〉 linem pertinent praclare adminislrari non potest 6. Polit. c. 8. rightly observes That without necessary Magistrates a City cannot subsist and without those who are for Ornament and Beauty the City cannot be administred honourably It is of excellent use to the Publick as well as advantagious to themselves that the young Nobility and
mixt and they rode from seven Years to seven Years These Justices in Eyre continued no longer than till Edward the Third's time for then as Mr. (m) Notes on Hengham p. 143. Justices of Assize Selden notes Justices of Assizes came in their Places though it is manifest that Justices of Assize were sooner begun For (n) Lib. 3. c. 10. Bracton mentions these Justices of Assizes in his time in these words Sunt etiam Justitiarii constituti ad quasdam Assisas duo vel tres vel plures qui quidem perpetui non sunt quia expleto negotio Jurisdictionem amittunt The form of the Writ in (o) Cl. 9 H. 3. m. 11. dorso 9 H. 3. is set down by Sir William Dugdale in which the King constitutes his Justitiarii to take the Assizes of new disseising and Delivery of the Gaol and the Command to the Sheriff is to cause (p) De qualibet Villa quatuor legales homines Praepositum de quolibet Burgo vel Villa mercanda duodecim legâ—les homines omnes Milites libere Tenentes c. four legal Men and the Provost out of every Village and twelve lawful Men out of every Market-Town and Borough and all the Knights and Free-Tenents that is all that held in Capite to do what the Justices should on the King's part appoint In 21 E. 1. (q) Placit Parliam 21 E. 1. num 12. another settlement was made that either discreet Justices should be assigned to take Assizes Jurats and Certificates throughout the whole Realm viz. for the Counties of York Northumberland Westmoreland Cumberland Lancaster Nottingham and Derby two In the Counties of Lincoln Leicester Warwick Stafford Salop Northampton Rutland Gloucester Hereford and Worcester other two In the Counties of Cornwall Devon Somerset Dorset Wiltshire Southamptom Oxford Berks Sussex and Surrey two For the Counties of Kent Essex Hertford Norfolk Suffolk Cambridge Huntingdon Bedford and Bucks two and that the Assizes c. of Middlesex should be taken before the Justices of the Bench. (r) Mâ—ltis vigiliis excegitata inventa fuit recuperandâ—e possessionis gratia ut per summariam cognitionem absque magna Juris solennitate quasi per compendium negotium terminetur Lib. 4. sol 164 b. Bracton speaking of the Writ called Assiza novae disseisinae saith it was found out and contrived by much Vigilance for the recovering of Possessions by a summary or speedy Conusance without great Solemnity of the Law that the business might be compendiously determined For before at Common-Law Assizes were not taken but either in the Bank or before Justices in Eyre which was a great delay to the Plaintiff and a great molestation and vexation of the Recognitors of the Assize therefore in Magna Charta the Assizes are appointed to be taken in the respective Counties and the Patents to Justices of Assize run thus (s) See the Patent Clause and Fine-Rolls from King John to Edw. 4. Sciatis quod constituimus vos Justiciarios nostros una cum hiis quos vobis associaverimus ad omnes Assisas c. in Com. c. arainandas capiendas c. facturi inde quod ad Justitiam pertinet secundum legem Consuetudinem Regni vostri Angliae Salvis nobis amerciamentis inde provenientibus The Justices of Nisi Prius (t) Ad exonerationem Juratorum ad ceâ— lerem justitiam in ea parte exhibendum Stat. de Finibus 27 E. 1. c. 4. were first instituted by the Statute of Westm Justices of Nisi Prius 2. and their Authority is annexed to the Justices of Assize These Justices were instituted for two principal Causes for the ease of Jurors and for the speedy exhibiting of Justice SECT 8. Justices of Oyer and Terminer AS to the Justices of Oyer and Terminer they are appointed either by (u) Coke 4. Inst fol. 162. general or special Commission By general Commission they are to enquire of Treasons Misprisions of Treason Insurrections Rebellions Murders Felonies Manslaughter (w) Interfectionibus Killing Burglaries Rapes of Women unlawful Assemblies Conventicles (x) Verborum prolationibus false News Combinations Misprision Confederacies false Allegations Riots Routs Retainings Escapes Contempts Falsities Negligences Concealments Maintenances Oppressions Combinations (y) Cambipartiis of Parties Deceits and other ill Deeds Offences and Injuries whatever and to do thereupon what appertains to Justice according to the Law and Custom of the Kingdom Special Commissions were not granted unless for enormous (z) Nisi pro â—nermi transgressione ubi necesse apponere festinum remedium Cl. 14 E. 3. part 1. m. 41. dorso Hil. 2 H. 4. Rot. 4. Mich. 1 H. 8. Transgressions where there was a necessity of speedy Remedy In some cases we find the Justices of Oyer and Terminer have upon an Indictment found proceeded the same day against the Party indicted So Thomas Marks Bishop of Carlisle before Commissioners of Oyer and Terminer was Indicted tryed and adjudged all in one day for High-Treason Likewise Sir Richard Empson was indicted of High-Treason and tried all in one day So Robert Bell 10 Dec. 3 E. 6. and 10 Eliz. 4 Aug. John Felton was before Commissioners of Oyer and Terminer in London indicted of High-Treason and tried the same day by the advice of all the Judges of England SECT 9. Of the Kings Erection of Courts IN some Cases the King may erect new Courts of Justice What new Courts the King may erect and grant Conusance of Pleas to a Corporation to be kept after the Rules of the Law not in a way of a Court of Equity but may not alter the great Courts at Westminster that have been time out of mind nor erect a new Court of Chancery Kings-Bench Common Pleas Exchequer c. Although in a proper Court such as our Chancery a Judge of Equity be allowed yet if it were permitted in all other Courts to expound the Law against the letter and perhaps the meaning of the Makers according to Conscience as we speak there would soon be introduced absoluteness and Arbitrary Power Therefore great Care is taken by those that understand the Law that matters be not left to the discretion of any Persons Commissionated by the King to adjudge of any Causes So the plausible Statute (b) 11 H. 7. c. 3. of H. 7. to put in Execution the Penal Laws impowering Justices of Assize and of Peace upon Information for the King by their Discretion to hear and determine all Offences and Contempts against any Statute unrepealed was found to have Authorised Empson and Dudly to commit upon the Subject unsufferable pressures and oppressions So that (c) 1 H. 8. c. 6. soon after that Kings death it was repealed and those two brought to Tryal and executed for their oppressions So the Statute (d) C. 2. 8 E. 4. of Liveries c. by the discretion of the Judges to stand as an Original is deservedly repealed In
if after the obtaining great Authority and Power they are sensible of parties-making against them For then self-preservation is mixed with their Ambition and that prompts them to dangerous undertakings as it did the Earl of Essex in Queen Elizabeth's time For as Dio (o) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Lib. 2. Cassius notes Long and lasting Command lifts up mens Spirits and induceth them to alter Affairs So the long continued Favours of the Queen and the great Imployments under her made that unfortunate Earl impatient to see himself eclipsed and whether out of pure envy to the present Ministers of State or upon greater Designs I enquire not seek to remove at least those with a violent Hand that he thought were his Enemies in which attempt he fell worthily under the Severity of the Law which will allow no Man to expound the goodness of his Intentions when he offers force to his Prince When therefore there is any Necessity of State to make any great (p) Magna libertatis ac Principatus custodia si magna imperia diuturna esse non sinas Lib. 4. Livy's Rule is to be observed That his Authority be short for that is Safety to the Liberty of the People as well as to the Sovereignty of the Prince So the Lord Lieutenants of Ireland and elsewhere are not only removable at the King's Pleasure but they have not been used to be continued long for more durable Commands too much elevate ambitious Mens Genius's and gain them great Dependences who will be apt to own their Honour and places of Profit rather to such great Ministers than to the King himself whereby if they have a mind to make Innovations they have Opportunities and Coadjutors Sejanus is a great Example of Ambitious aspiring and most deserved violent and praecipitate Ruin Tacitus (q) Corpus illi laborem tolerans animus audax sui obtegens in alios criminator juxta aâ—â—lâ—tor superbus palam compesitus pudor intus summa apiscendi libido ejusque causa modo largitus luxus saepâ—us industria ac vigilantia haud minus noxiae quotiens parando Regno finguntur 1. Annal. gives us his Character thus That he was of Body able to endure Labour of Mind bold in his own Actions secret an Informer against others as proud as flattering in shew Modest but inwardly greedy of Aspiring for which Cause he used sometimes largesses and lavishing but more often Industry and Diligence means saith he dangerous alike when they are dissemblingly used to win a Kingdom This Sejanus poisoned Drusus by corrupting Livia his Wife and practised to destroy Agrippina and Germanicus's Children from whom he endeavoured to alienate Tiberius's Mind He requested Tiberius that he might Marry Livia widow of Drusus by which means he thought to get himself incorporated into the Royal Family and having destroyed the whole Race of Germanicus and Drusus the next Heirs of Augustus he might the easier have usurped the Empire in Tiberius's old Age whom he had got to retire to Capraea and commit the management of affairs to himself But for all these gradual and high Steps when he was almost at the top of his Ambition snatching the very Diadem having already got his Image with Tiberius's decreed by the Senate to be set about the Altars of Clemency and Friendship he was at last by Tiberius's Authority and Macro's Diligence utterly destroyed (r) Tiberium variis artibus devinxit adeo ut obscurum adversum alios sibi uni incautum intectumque assiceret Id. Though he had so overcome Tiberius by his Arts that though he was reserved to all others yet to him alone he was cautionless and uncovered For as by his cunning by which he was also circumvented saith Tacitus so by the Anger of the Gods to the affairs of Rome with equal mischiefs to it he flourished and fell So Juvenal (s) Satyra 10. tells us Sejanus ducitur unco Spectandus gaudent omnes nam qui nimios optabat honores Et nimias poscebat opes numerosa parabat Excelsae Turris tabulata unde altior esset Casus impulsae praeceps immane Ruinae Fifthly 5. The Envious The Envious are very carefully to be watched over they secretly sow the Tares that choak the Fruitful Crop of peaceable Government There are some Envies that are less prejudicial to a State as being against some Ministers of State only and not against the Government and these are so natural that in the calmest times they are practised and to prevent this it is only needful for Princes to take care of the choice of such as they commit matters of publick Administration to and that Persons envied so deport themselves as they may not deserve it Publick Envy saith the Learned (t) St. Alban 's Essays c. 1. p. 33. Chancellor is an Ostracism that Eclipseth Men when they grow too great and is a Bridle to great ones to keep them within Bounds Those above others are most subject to be envied Id. who carry the greatness of their Fortunes in an insolent proud and imperious manner whereas wise Men will rather sacrifice to Envy in suffering themselves to be crossed and overborn in things that do not much concern them So the carrying greatness in a plain and open manner without Arrogance and Vain-glory doth demolish Envy Therefore the wise sort of great Persons ever bring upon the Stage somebody upon whom to derive the Envy which otherwise would fall upon themselves Persons of eminent Vertues Id. when they are advanced are less envied for their Fortune seemeth but due to them especially if they be of noble Blood being that much is not added to their Fortune so those advanced by degrees are less envied than those per saltum Those that have joined with their Honours Id. great Cares and Perils are rarely envied son Men think they earn their Honour dearly and pity them sometimes and Pity healeth Envy There fore the more sober sort of Politick Persons in their Greatness are ever bemoaning themselves quanta patintur not that they feel it so though certainly to discharge great places honourably is a vast Fatiegue but to abate the Edge of Envy as my Lord St. Albans wisely observes Unworthy Persons are most envied at first Id. whereas Persons of Worth and Merit are most envied when their Fortunes continue long for by that time though their vertue be the same yet it hath not the same Lustre for fresh Men grow up to shade it These are not the Envies that are so perilous to States for that they are terminated on particular Persons only but that Envy which is dangerous to a State is when it is great upon the Ministers of State when the (u) Dolendi modus ti mendi non item Causes of it especially are small and the Fear greater than the Feeling for that shews the Envy raised upon Design and to be general upon all or most of the Ministers and then however it
The Advantage of Hereditary Succession in Private Families Aristotle's Opinion Philosopher dividing Kingly Government into four kinds as I have before instanced allows all to be Haereditary except the Aesymnaetian which was Elective and since in many places he affirms Kingdoms to be more durable than Commonwealths we may conclude that the fundamental cause of that duration is the Lineal Succession We experience in private Families where a long Series of Ancestors have transmitted Inheritances to Posterity how by the settledness and encrease of their Estates their alliances and the Employments they have had in their respective Ages they have acquired Honour Renown Interest and Stability that not only a greater Respect is payed to them than to others of a later Rise but they are thereby enabled upon many accounts to manage publick or private affairs with more sure success and repute than those than have not acquired such a nodosam Aeternitatem (b) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 De Repub. l. 3. c. 11. Aristotle makes that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or natural Love of Parents to their Children to be one reason of the Succession of Sons to Fathers in their Kingdoms thence he makes it improbable that they who have obtained the Soveraignty should not deliver it to their Children because it would discover a Vertue beyond the ordinary Elevation of humane Nature to prefer the Benefit and good of the People by leaving them the Liberty of chusing upon every avoidance the most worthy if such a Prince's Son appeared not so rather than to establish the Principality in their own Family (c) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 pâ—ly 〈◊〉 lib. 6. p. 455. D. Edit Wickl 1509. Several Reasons why Succession is to be preferr'd before Election Polybius speaking of Kings being most eminent for Wisdom Polybius his Opinion Justice and Valour whereby they drew the People to reverence them and consequently to submit themselves to their Conduct and Command saith That the Son having his education under such a vertuous wise Father whereby he had been present with him when affairs of the greatest Importance had been debated in common presumption was judged to be better capacitated to govern than any of a strange Family and so none would envy him his dignity but all readilier judged him the fittest to succeed And there is good reason to consider the cause of it for Government is an Art not easily attained to and by the unskilfullness in the proper Rules and Maxims the wrong Applications the Ignorance in pursuing the right Methods and chusing fit Instruments the Factious and Populace get advantages to make unfortunate times Therefore those Monarchs who from their Infancies are trained up and accustomed to Instructions in the Rudiments of Government as they grow up must more readily comprehend them must attain the better understanding of the great affairs and secret reasons of Stâ—â—â— be more quick apprehensive and sagacious in perceiving what is conducive to the common good and what not and so more ready in all publick Dispatches than such who have not been educated with all these Advantages Besides Governours at first must be to seek in understanding the nature of great Affairs so that one may as well expect (c) Dr. Nalson's Common Interest p. 113. a Man taken from the Plough should be able to Conn a Ship and carry her an East-India Voyage as that a Person though of the greatest natural and acquired Parts should at first be fit to Pilot the Government or skilful and dexterous in the steerage of the important affairs of a publick State and as in Republicks it falls out by that time he hath arrived at a competent Skill he must resign his Place and Power to others as raw and unexperienced as he was Whereas Succession in Monarchy doth effectually prevent this Inconvenience and which is of great moment it gives them an Interest and desire of designing well for the publick good safety and security of the People and the opportunity of finishing whatever is well begun For though it have happened by the Succession of a weak or vitious Prince that damage and infelicity have befallen the People yet it is very rare in History that two such succeed one another So we find in this Kingdom that Ed. 1. and Ed. 3. brought as great Honour and Renown to their Countries as their Fathers had Misfortunes and even in such Princes Reigns the Calamities that have befallen their Kingdoms have rather sprung from the Potency of Factions that took the advantage by the weakness of the Prince to bring him to Contempt that they might obtain the managery of affairs than from other Causes For even under such unfortunate Princes if it were not for factious Disturbances the Laws and good Order might during their Reigns conserve their Kingdoms in Peace Whereas in Kingdoms that are Elective The Inconveniences that happen where Right Succession is not observed Competitors and Candidates cause not only great Disturbances and Mischiefs at the Instant as we have infinite Examples when the Roman Emperors were chosen by the Factions of the Senate or Army as also in Germany before the expedient of chusing a King of the Romans and in the Miseries that have befallen Poland but Aemulations and Animosities have been continued for Ages among the prime Nobility and thence it is that the (d) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Lib. 5. Polit. c. 10. Giphanii Comment Philosopher so long since hath ascribed it one of the Principal Causes of the Destruction of a Kingdom when there is Discord in the Royal Family or as his Interpreter saith among the participes Regni as Brethren and Kindred of the Royal Family as (e) In vita Cleomenis Aegidis Plutarch tells us in the Kingdom of Sparta and as Justin gives us an account of the slaughter of Brethren and Kinsmen in the Kingdom of Syria and as it occasioned the Destruction of the flourishing Kingdom of Egypt by the Competition betwixt Ptolomy and Cleopatra and as our Ancestors sadly experienced in the Civil Wars betwixt the Houses of York and Lancaâ—â—â— and France in the Faction of Orleance and Burgundy and of later Date in the Kingdom of Hungary betwixt King John and the Emperor Ferdinand If therefore such Calamities befal Countries where Factions ruine their Peace how much more shall we judge the miserable Confusions will be when any shall challenge a Power to make a Breach in the Royal Chain of Succession especially when we find even at Rome upon the Election of the Pope by custom the People plunder the Pallace of the Cardinal who is elected Pope and since that outrage is committed where such an one is chosen as is owned by so great a part of Europe to be Christ's Vicar we are not to wonder that at the Death of the Ottoman Heir the Janizaries and Soldiery rifle and plunder Jews and Christians and cease not to commit all manner of Outrages till the new Grand Signior by his
his Uncles Death was declared Tutor and Governour without any remission or being restored and if his Cousin King James had died without Issue he had been declared the true Successour of the Crown We have a memorable Instance of this in H. 7. who when he came to the Crown called his Parliament and the Judges having determined that those Members of the House that had been outlawed by the Parliament in Richard the Third's time and been declared Rebels should absent themselves till a Bill were brought in for their restoring It was moved among the Judges what should be done about the King who had been condemned and declared Traytor c. and it was by the unanimous consent of all the Judges saith the learned (q) St. Alban's Hist H. 7. p. 29. Chancellor declared That the Crown removed all the obstructions in the Blood which might in any manner impede its descent and from that time the King took the Crown Coronam ipsam omnes sanguinis oppilationes quae descensum Coronae ullatenus impediunt deobstruere Vt Regi opera Parliamentaria non fuisset opus the fountain of his Blood was purged and all the Corruptions and Impurities taken away so that he had no need of any Parliamentary help to supply him Thirdly The Consideration of the Oaths which the Subjects are bound to take and observe gives some further Proof of the Obligation of all the Subjects to maintain this lineal Succession The Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy bind the Subjects to bear Faith and true Allegiance to the King's Highness The Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy against altering Succession his Heirs and lawful Successors and that to their Power they shall assist and defend all Jurisdictions Priviledges Preheminences and Authorities granted to the King's Highness his Heirs and lawful Successors or united and annexed to the Imperial Crown of this Realm and of those Priviledges c. I think none will deny but that Hereditary Succession is one of the principal Prerogatives intended by those Oaths We are not in these only sworn to His Majesty but his Lawful Successors which word Lawful is inserted to cut off the Pretences of such as should not succeed by Law and the insolent Arbitrariness of such as being but Subjects themselves think they may chuse their King These being promissory Oaths as well to the Successors when their Right shall fall as to the present King they have every of them in their respective degrees and orders and indispensible Right confirmed to them by this Oath So that the Predecessor hath no legal right to deprive his Successor as hereafter I shall clear nor to remit the Peoples Obligation to him as lawful Heir and Successor (r) Address part 3. p. 64. much less can the two Houses do it for they are all within the Obligation of this Oath and it is unreasonable that Men should dispence with their own promissory Oaths to others for this would destroy all Faith and Confidence amongst Men and pull up the very roots of Society and Government Whereas some object out of my Lord (s) Coke on Littleton p. 8. Coke Objection That none is Heir before the death of his Ancestor but Heir apparent It is to be considered Answered that it must be the Heir presumptive or apparent that is here understood otherwise the inserting the word Heir were superfluous if by the Oaths were not intended he that is next Heir upon the Death of the King and if any Person think to evade it by affirming that if the Parliament declare any Person to be no next Heir he ceaseth to be so as also not to be lawful Successor because by such an Act he is outlawed Let such Persons consider that this is neither better nor worse than palpable Aequivocation For we swear in the common Sence of the words and so by Heir we understand such as by proximity of Blood have greatest right to succeed in the Inheritance It may be farther considered that the Lord Chancellor Treasurer and Judges (t) See 18 E. 3. all the great Officers of State the Privy-Council c. are all sworn to defend the Rights of the Crown and that they shall not concurr or assent to any thing which may turn to the King in Damage or Dis-herison How then can any of these much less the Judges who are to expound and interpret the Law consent without palpable violation of their Oaths to the changing of the Essence of the Monarchy I shall now endeavour to prove Acts of Parliament cannot alter Lineal Succession that no Parliament by a compleat Act can legally alter the Succession in an Hereditary Monarchy For first all (u) Jus Reg. p. 153. Kings and Parliaments are subordinate to the Laws of God the Laws of Nature and Nations So that unless we give the Inferior Power and Jurisdiction over the Superior no Act of Parliament can be binding to overturn what those three Laws have have established and I hope I have proved under all these Heads in the preceding part of this discourse that the right of Succession is founded on them As to the Law of God it is clear not only from the general dictates of Religion but 28 H. 8. c. 7. the Parliament uses these words For no Man can dispence with God's Laws which we also affirm and think As to the Laws of Nature they are acknowledged to be immutable from the Principles of Reason So the (w) Sect. sed naturale Institut de Jure naturali Law it self confesseth Naturalia quaedam Jura quae apud omnes gentes observantur divina quadam providentia constituta semper firma atque immutabilia permanent Certain natural Laws which are observed by all Nations and such is that of Primogeniture by Divine Providence being constituted remain always firm and immutable So when the Law declares that a supreme Prince is free from the obligation of Laws solutus Legibus yet Lawyers (x) Voet. de Statutis sect 5. c. 1 Accursius in L. Princeps F. de Leg. Clementina pasturalis de re Judicata still acknowledge that this does not exclude these Supream Powers from being liable to the Laws of God Nature and Nations as is evident by all that treat of that Point Nor can the Law of Nations be overturned by private municipal Laws so all Statutes to the prejudice of Ambassadors who are secured by the Law of Nations are confessed by all to be null and the highest Power whatsoever cannot take off the denouncing of a War before a War can be lawful Besides secondly a Parliament cannot do more than (y) Jus Reg. p. 154. any absolute Monarch in his own Kingdom for they when joyned are but in place of the supreme Power sitting in Judgment We must not think our Parliaments have an unlimited Power de jure so as they may make a forfeiture or take away Life without a cause or pass Sentence against the Subjects
without citing or hearing them For if they had such Power we should be the greatest Slaves and live under the most arbitrary Government imaginable Therefore an absolute Prince cannot in an Hereditary Kingdom where the Successor is to succeed Jure Regni (z) Nulla clausula Successori Jus auferri potest modo succedat ille Jure Regni Aristaeus c. 7. num 5. prejudge the Successors right of Succession for the same right the present King hath to the Possession the next of Blood hath to the Succession Therefore Hottoman Lib. 2. de Regno Galliae affirms That ea quae Jure Regni primogenito competunt ne Testamento quidem Patris adimi possunt That in the absolute Monarchy of France The Father cannot by his last Will deprive the First-born of those things which belong to him by Royal right So when the King of France designed to break the Salique Law of Succession as in the Reign of Charles the Fifth it was found impracticable by the three States So when Pyrrhus would have preferred his younger Son to the Crown (a) Pausanias lib. 1. the Epirots following the Law of Nations and then own refused him So Anno 1649. when Amurat the Grand Signior left the Empire to Han the Tartarian passing his Brother Ibrahim the whole Officers of State did unanimously cancel the Testament and restored Ibrahim the true Heir though no other than a Fool. So if Kings could have inverted their Succession Saint Lewis had preferred his own Third Son to Lewis his Eldest and Alphonsus King of Leon in Spain had preferred his Daughter to Ferdinand his Eldest Son and Edward the Sixth of England had preferred and did actually prefer the Lady Jane Grey to his Sisters Mary and Elizabeth Thirdly It is undeniable in the opinion of all Lawyers That a King cannot in Law alienate his Crown but that the Deed is void nor can he in Law consent to an Act of Parliament declaring that he should be the last King For if such consents and Acts (b) Jus Regium p. 163. had been sufficient to bind Successors then weak Kings by their own simplicity and gentle Kings by the Rebellion of their Subjects or being wrought upon by the importunity of their Wives or Concubines or the mis-representation of Favourites might do great mischiefs to their People in raising up continual Factions of the miseries of which I shall speak hereafter This is owned in Subjects That the Honour and Nobility that is bestowed upon a man and his Heirs doth so necessarily descend upon those Heirs that the Father or Predecessor cannot exclude the Successor or derogate from his Right by renouncing resigning following base or mean Trades or such like For Fab. Cod. 9. tiâ— 28. say the Lawyers since he derives his Right from his old Progenitors and owes it not to his Father his Fathers Deed should not prejudge him so much more in Kings the ill consequences of such violations of Justice and Right being infinitely more destructive the Predecessor should not do any Act to prejudice his Successor For that right of blood which makes the Eldest First makes the other Second and all the Statutes that acknowledge the present Kings Prerogative acknowledge that they belong to him and his Heirs For as a Prince cannot even ex plenitudine potestatis legitimate a Bastard in prejudice of former Children though they have only but an hope of Succession much less can he bastardize or disinherit the Right Heir who is so made by God and honoured from him with the Character If therefore Kings how absolute soever cannot de jure invert the natural order of Succession there is no reason that the States of Parliament should have such a Power For by the known Laws they have no Legislative Power otherwise than by assenting to what the King does and all that their assent could do would be no more than that they and their Successors should not oppose his nomination because of their consent but that can never amount to a Power of transferring For if the States of Parliament had this Power originally in themselves to bestow why might they not reserve it for themselves and so perpetuate the Government in their own hands So Judge Jenkin asserts according to Law That no King can be named or in any time made in this Kingdom (d) Liberty of Subject p. 25. by the People Kings being before there were Parliaments and there is good reason for then the Monarchy should not be Hereditary but Elective the very Essence of Hereditary Monarchy consisting in the Right of Succession whereas if the Parliament can prefer the next save one they may prefer the last of all the Line and the same reason by which they can chuse a Successor which can only be that they have Power above him should likewise in the opinion of a very (e) Jus Regium p. 167. learned Person justify their deposing of Kings as we saw in the last Age that such reasons as of late have been urged to incapacitate the Children of King Charles the First from the hope of Succession viz. Popery and Arbitrary Government did embolden men to dethrone and murther the Father who was actual King For if it were once yielded that the Houses had a Right in themselves to take care for the Salus populi that none but such Princes should succeed who were approved of by the prevailing Faction in their body nothing but confusion would follow one Party having their Votes seconded by force one time and a quite contrary another yet all pretending the Publick Weal and so a large breach should be made by pretending to stop one dangerous Successor to the inflowing of successive Usurpers and thereby the Crown should not only by ambulatory but unstable upon every head that wore it and alwaies in danger of a bloody surprise till at last the Regalia being secured from the expectant Heir the Factious would find a way to pillage them from the present Soveraign and convert them into a Mace for an House of Commons I writ this Part with greater Enlargements in answer to the plausiblest Arguments for the Bill of Seclusion while that matter was in the hottest agitation But since there will be no need of dilating upon that Subject now that God Almighty hath so signally determined the Controversie by the peaceable settlement of his Majesty upon his Throne I shall close this Chapter with some few remarks of the miseries have been brought upon Kingdoms and especially upon this by the disjoynting the Succession So we read what dreadful (f) Jus Regium p. 166. mischiefs arose from Pelops preferring his younger Son to the Kingdom of Mycene The Miseries which Kingdoms have sustained where the Succession hath been interrupted from Oedipus commanding that Polynices his Youngest Son should reign interchangeably with the Eldest From Parisatis the Queen of Persia's preferring her Youngest Son Cyrus to her Eldest Artaxerxes From Aristodomus admitting