be imputed to the three Estates convened in Parliament or to any power or Act of theirs but only praefervido Scotorum ingenio z Rivet cont tenuit as one pleads it for them unto the natural disposition of that fierce and head-strong people yet easilier made subject unto rule and government The three Estates assembled in the Court of Parliament when in the judgement of our Author they are most fit to undertake the business have for the most part had no hand in those desperate courses 7. And now at last we ate come to England where since we came no sooner we will stay the longer and here we shall behold the King established in an absolute Monarchy from whom the meeting of the three Estates in Parliament detracteth nothing of his power and authority Royal. Bodin as great a Politick as any of his time in the Realm of France hath ranked our Kings amongst the absolute Monarch of these Western parts a Bodin de Rep. l. 1. c. 8. And Camden as renowned an Antiquary as any of the Age he lived in hath told us of the King of England supremam potestatem merum imperium habere b Camden in Britan. descript that he hath supreme power and absolute command in his dominions and that he neither holds his Crown in vassallage nor receiveth his investisture of any other nor acknowledgeth any Superiour but God alone To prove this last he cites these memorable words from Bracton an old English Lawyer omnis quidem sub Rege ipse sub nullo sed tantum sub deo that every man is under the King but the King under none saving only God But Bracton tells us more than this and affirms expresly that the King hath supreme power and jurisdiction over all causes and persons in this his Majesties Realm of England that all jurisdictions are vested in him and are issued from him and that he hath jus gladii or the right of the sword for the better governance of his people This is the substance of his words but the words are these c Bracton de leg Aâ—gl l. 2. c. 24. Sciendum est saith he quod ipse dominus Rex ordinariam habet jurisdictionem dignitatem potestatem super omnes qui in regno suo sunt Habet enim omnia jura in manu sua quae ad coronam laicalem pertinent potestatem materialem gladium qui pertinet ad Regni gubernandum c. He addes yet surther Habet item in potestate sua leges constitutiones d Id. l. 2. c. 16. that the Laws and constitutions of the Realm are in the power of the King by which words whether he meaneth that the Legislative power is in the King and whether the Legislative power be in him and in him alone we shall see anon But sure I am that he ascribes unto the King the power of interpreting the Law in all doubtfull cases in dubiis obscuris domini Regis expectanda interpretatio voluntas which is plain enough For though he speaketh only de chartis Regiis factis Regum of the Kings deeds and charters only as the words seem to import yet considering the times in which he lived being Chief Justice in the time of King Henry the 3d. wherein there was but little written Law more than what was comprehended in the Kings Grants and Charters he may be understood of all Laws whatever And so much is collected out of Bractons words by the L. Chancellor Egerton of whom it may be said without envy that he was as grave and learned a Lawyer as ever sat upon that Bench. Who gathereth out of Bracton that all cases not determined for want of foresight are in the King to whom belongs the right of interpretation not in plain and evident cases but only in new questions and emergent doubts and that the King hath as much right by the constitutions of this Kingdom as the Civil law gave the Roman Emperors where it is said Rex solus judicat de causa a jure non definita e Case of the Post-nati p. 107 108. And though the Kings make not any Laws without the counsel and consent of his Lords and Commons whereof we shall speak more in the following Section yet in such cases where the Laws do provide no remedy and in such matters as concern the politick administration of his Kingdoms he may and doth take order by his Proclamations He also hath authority by his Prerogative Royal to dispense with the rigour of the Laws and sometimes to pass by a Statute with a non obstante as in the Statute 1 Henr. 4. cap. 6. touching the value to be specified of such lands offices or annuities c as by the King are granted in his Letters patents But these will better come within the compasse of those jura Majestatis or rights of Soveraignty which our Lawyers call sacra individua f Camden in Bâ—it sacred by reason they are not to be pryed into with irreverent eyes and individual or inseparable because they cannot be communicated unto any other Of which kind are the levying of Arms g Case of our Assairs p. 3. suppressing of tumults and rebellions providing for the present safety of his Kingdom against sudden dangers convoking of Parliaments and dissolving them making of Peers granting liberty of sending Burgesses to Towns and Cities treating with forein States making war leagues and peace granting safe conduct and protection indenizing giving of honor rewarding pardoning coyning printing and the like to these But what need these particulars have been looked into to prove the absoluteness and soveraignty of the Kings of England when the whole body of the Realm hath affirmed the same and solemnly declared it in their Acts of Parliament In one of which is affirmed h 16 Rich. 2. c. 5. that the Crown of England hath been so free at all times that it hath been in no earthly subjection but immediatly to God in all things touching the regality of the said Crown and to none other And in another Act that the Realm of England is an Empire governed by one supreme head and King having the Dignity and Royal Estate of the Imperial Crown of the same unto whom a Body politick compact of all sorts and degrees of people divided in terms and by names of Spiritualty and Temporalty been bounden and ought to bear next to God a natural and humble obedience i 24 Henr. 8. c. 12. And more than so that the King being the supreme head of this Body Politick is instituted and furnished by the goodness and sufferance of Almighty God with plenary whole and entire power preheminence authority prerogative and jurisdiction to render and yield justice and final determination to all manner of Subjects within this Realm and in all causes whatsoever Nor was this any new Opinion invented only to comply with the Princes humour but such as is
declared to have been fortified by sundry Laws and Ordinances made in former Parliaments k Ibid. and such as hath been since confirmed by a solemn Oath taken and to be taken by most of the Subjects of this Kingdom Which Oath consisting of two parts the one Declaratory and the other Promissory in the Declaratory part the man thus taketh it doth declare and testifie in his conscience that the Kings Highness is the only supreme Governor of this Realm and of all other his Dominions and Countries aswell in all spiritual or ecclesiastical things or causes as temporal c. l 1 Eliz. c. 1. And in the Promissooy part they make Oath and swear that to their power they will assist and defend all Jurisdictions Privileges Preheminences and Authorities granted or belonging to the Kings Highness his Heirs and Succcesseors or united and annexed to the Imperial Crown of this Realm Put all which hath been said together and it will appear that if to have merum imperium a full and absolute command and all the jura majestatis which belong to Soveraignty if to be so supreme as to hold immediatly of God to have all persons under him none but God above him if to have all authority and jurisdiction to be vested in him and proceeding from him and the material sword at his sole disposal for the correcting of offenders and the well ordering of his people if to have whole and entire power of rendring justice and final determination of all causes to all manner of Subjects us also to interpret and dispence with Laws and all this ratified and confirmed unto him by the solemn Oath of his Subjects in the Court of Parliament be enough to make an absolute Monarch the Kings of England are more absolute Monarchs than either of their Neighbours of France or Spain 8. If any thing may be said to detract from this it is the new devise so much pressed of late of placing the chief Soveraignty or some part thereof in the two Houses of Parliament concerning which Mr. Prynne published a discourse entituled The supreme power of Parliaments and Kingdoms and others in their Pamphlets upon that Argument have made the Parliament so absolute and the King so limited that of the two the Members of the Houses are the greater Monarchs But this is but a new devise not heard of in our former Monuments Records of Law nor proved or to be proved indeed by any other Medium than the Rebellions of Cade Tiler Straw Kett Mackerell and the rest of that rascall rabble m Prynnes book of Parl. c. pâ— 3. or the seditious Parliaments in the time of K. Henry the 3d. King Edward the 2d and King Richard the 2d when civil war and faction carried all before it For neither have the Houses or either of them enjoyed such Soveraignty de facto in times well setled and Parliaments lawfully assembled nor ever could pretend to the same de jure Or if they did as many have been apt enough to raise false pretences it would much trouble them to determine whether this Soveraignty be conferred upon them by the King or the people whether it be in either of the Houses severally or in both united If they can challenge this pretended Soveraignty in neither of these capacities nor by none of these Titles it may be warrantably concluded that there is no such Soveraignty as they do pretend to And first there is no part nor branch of Soveraignty conferred upon them by the King The writs of Summons which the Declaration of the Lords and Commons assembled at Oxon. 1643. doth most truly call the foundation of all power in Parliament n Declaration of the Treaty p. 15. tell us no such matter The writ directed to the Lords doth enable them only to confer and treat with one another consilium vestrum impendere and to advise the King in such weighty matters as concern the safety of the Kingdom But they are only to advise not compell the King to counsell him but not controll him and to advise and counsel are no marks of Soveraignty but rather works of service and subordination Nor can they come to give this Counsel without he invite them and being invited by his writ cannot choose but come except he excuse them which are sure notes of duty and subjection but very sory signs of power and soveraignty 'T is true that being come together they may and sometimes do on a writ of Error examin and reverse or affirm such judgements as have been given in the Kings Bench and from their sentence in the case there is no appeal but only to the whole body of that Court the King and both the Houses the Head and Members o Case of our Affairs p. 7 8. But this they do not as the upper house of Parliament but as the distinct court of the Kings Barons of Parliament of a particular and ministerial jurisdiction to some intents and purposes and to some alone which though it doth invest them with a power of judicature confers not any thing upon them which belongs to Soveraignty Then for the Commons all which the writ doth call them to is facere consentire to do and consent unto such things which are ordained by the Lords and Common Counsel of the Kingdom of England and sure conformity and consent which is all the writ requireth from them are no marks of Soveraignty nor can an Argument be drawn from thence by the subtillest Sophister to shew that they are called to be partakers of the Soveraign power or that the King intends to denude himself of any branch or leaf thereof to hide their nakednesse And being met together in a body collective they are so far from having any share in Soveraignty that they cannot properly be called a Court of Judicature as neither having any power to minister an Oath p Id. p. 9. or to imprison any body except it be some of their own Members if they see occasion which are things incident to all Courts of Justice and to every Steward of a Leet insomuch that the House of Coâ—mons is compared by some â—and not incongruosly unto the Grand Inquest at a general Sessions q Review of the Observat p. 22. whose principal work it is to receive bils and prepare businesses and make them fit and ready for my Lords the Judges Nay so far were they heretofore from the thoughts of Soveraignty that they were lyable to sutes and punishments for things done in Parliament though only to the prejudice of a private Subject untill King Henry 8. most graciously passed a Law for their indemnity For whereas Richard Strode one of the company of Tinners in the County of Cornwall being a Member of the Commons House had spoken somwhat to the prejudice of that Society and contrary to the Ordinances of the Stanneries at his return into the Country â—e was arested fined imprisoned Complaint whereof being
to the number of the Spartan Ephori which they called Tribunes of the people of which Sicinius and Junius Brutus must be two at least We may be sure they took not all this pains for nothing 3 And yet all this was nothing if they got not more The Articles and Conditions which they had agreed on had bound them too precisely to their good behaviour and if they did not break those bonds they were Prisoners still But first they must be fortified with some special priviledges to keep their persons out of danger that they might boldly venture upon any project without fear of law and put themselves into such condition that whatsoever wrongs they did they would not be called to an accompt To that end Brutus taking his opportunitie whilest the heats were up and the Senate in a disposition to deny them nothing causeth a law to be propounded obtained for the perpetual indemnitie of the Tribunes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and for declaring of their Office to be sacred and inviolable n Dâ—oâ—ys Halicarn l. 6. The substance of the law was to this effect That no man should compell the Tribunes to doe any thing against their wills nor beat or cause them to be beaten nor kill or cause them to be killed if any should presume to do the contrarie 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he was to be pursued as an execrable person and his goods confiscate and whosoever slew him should escape unpunished and do a meritorious service to the Common-wealth A Priviledge which they found good use of in the times succeeding and made it serve their turns upon all occasions Martius complained of them in the Senate for disobedience to the Consuls and an intent to bring an Anarchie upon the State o Plutarh in Coriolano they vote this for a breach of priviledge and nothing but his death or banishment will give them satisfaction for it Apptus being Consul sends his Lictor to lay hands upon them for raising tumults in the City p Livie hist Rom. lib. 2. this is another breach of priviledge and he shall answer for it when his year was out Caeso Quintius like a noble Patriot joyns with the Consuls and the Senate to oppress their insolencies when neither law nor reason would prevail upon them this also is a breach of priviledge and his life shall pay for it q Id. l. 3. But to proceed having obtained this law for their own securitie their next work was to break or pass by those laws by which the State was governed in all times before and which themselves had yeelded to at their first creation It was the practise of the City from the first fnundation and a continual custom hath the force of law to give such respect unto the Senate that the people did not vote nor determine any thing 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 r Dionys Halicarnass l. 7. which the Senate had not first debated and resolved upon This though no breach of priviledge was a main impediment to the advancing of those projects which they had in hand and therefore fit to be removed as removed it was and so a way made open unto that confusion which did expose the State to so many changes that it was never constant to one form of government Which being obtained the next thing to be brought about was to bring the election of the Tribunes into the hands of the people who had before the least part in it that so depending mutually upon one another they might co-operate together to destroy the State and bring it absolutely under the command of the common people For at the first according to the Articles of the Institution the Tribunes were to be elected in Comitiis Centuriatis as before was said where none but men of years and substance such as were of the Liverie as we speak in England had the right of Suffrage By means whereof the Patricians had a very great stroke in the Elections Et per Clientum suffragia creandi quos vellent potestatem s 〈◊〉 hist and by the voyces of their Clients or dependents set up whom they listed They must no longer hold this power The Tribunes were the creatures of the Common people and must be made by none but them A law must therefore be propounded to put the Election wholly into the hands of the people and to transact the same in Comitiis Tributis where no Patrician was to vote but all things carried by the voyces of the rascal Rabble Which though it caused much heat and no small ado yet it was carried at the last Appius complaining openly as his custom was Rempub. per metum prodi that the Senate did destroy the Common-wealth by their want of courage And whereas at the first they had so much modestie as not to come into the Senate t Valer. Maxim lib. 2. c. 2. Sed positis subselliis ante fores decreta Patrum examinare but to sit without upon some benches whilest they examined the decrees which had passed the house they challenge now a place though no vote in Senate t and had free ingress and egress when they would themselves 4 But their main business was to pull down the Nobles and make them of no more esteem then the common sort And upon this they set their strength and made it the first hansel of their new authoritie Martius had spoke some words in Senate which displeased the Tribunes and they incense the people to revenge the injury who promising to assist them in their undertakings an Officer is forthwith sent to apprehend him This caused the Patricians whom the cause concerned to stand close together and to oppose this strange incroachment and generally to affirm as most true it was that when they yeelded to the setting up of this new authority there was no power given them by the Senate 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 u Dionys Halicarn l. 7. but only to preserve the Commons from unjust oppressions The like did Martius plead in his own behalf as we finde in Livie auxilii non poenae jus datum illi potestati plebisque non patrum Tribunos esse x Livie hist lib. 2. that they were trusted with a power to help the Commons but with none to punish and were not Tribunes of the Lords but of the people And so much also was affirmed in the open Senate that the authority of the Tribunes was at first ordained not to offend or grieve the Senate but that the Commons might not suffer any grievance by it and that they did not use their power according to such limitations as were first agreed on and as of right they ought to use it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 y Dionys Halicarn l. 7. but to the ruine and destruction of the Lawes established Enough of conscience to have staved them from the prosecution but that they had it in design and resolved to carry it For Brutus had before given out and
THE STUMBLING-BLOCK OF Disobedience and Rebellion Cunningly laid by Calvin in the Subjects way Discovered Censured and Removed By P. H. ROM 14. 13. Offendiculum fratri tuo ne ponas Let no man put a Stumbling-block or an occasion to fall in his brothers way 1 SAM 24. 6. And David said to his men The Lord forbid that I should do this thing unto my Master the Lords anointed to stretch forth my hand against him seeing he is the anointed of the Lord. LONDON Printed by E. Cotes for Henry Seile over against St. Dunstans Church in Fleet-street 1658. THE PREFACE IT will appear to any who shal read this Treatise that it was written in the times of Monarchical Government but in the later and declining times thereof when the change of that Government was in agitation and in part effected In which respect I doubt not but the publishing of this Discourse at this present time may seem unseasonable unto some and yet it may be thought by others to come out seasonably enough for these following reasons 1. To give warning to all those that are in Supreme Authority to have a care unto themselves and not to suffer any Popular and Tribunitian Spirits to grow amongst them who grounding upon Calvins Doctrine both may and will upon occasion create new disturbances 2. To preserve the Dignity of the Supreme Power in what Person soever it be placed and fix his Person in his own proper Orb the Primum Mobile of Government brought down of late to be but one of the three Estates and move in the same Planetary Sphere with the other two 3. To keep on foot the claim and Title of the Clergy unto the Reputation Rights and Priviledges of the Third Estate which doth of right belong unto them and which the Clergy have antiently enjoyed in all and to this day in most Christian Kingdoms 4. To shew unto the world on whose authority the Presbyterians built their damnable Doctrine not only of curbing and restraining the power of Princes but also of deposing them from their Regal Dignity whensoever they shall please to pretend cause for it For when the Scotch Commissioners were commanded by Queen Elizabeth to give a reason of their proceedings against their Queen whom not long before they had deposed from the Regal Throne they justified themselves by those words of Calvin which I have chosen for the Argument of this Discourse By the authority of Calvin as my Author hath it they endeavoured to prove that the Popular Magistrates are appointed and made to moderate and keep in order the excess and unruliness of Kings and that it is lawful for them to put the Kings that be evill and wicked into prison and also to deprive them of their Kingdoms If these reasons shall not prove the seasonableness of this Adventure I am the more to be condemned for my indiscretion the shame whereof I must endure as well as I can This being said in order to my justification I must add somewhat of the Book or Discourse it self in which the canvassing and confuting of Calvins Grounds about the Ephori of Sparta the Tribunes of Rome and the Demarchi of Athens hath forced me upon many Quotations both Greek and Latine which to the learned Reader will appear neither strange nor difficult And for the sake of the unlearned which are not so well verst and studyed in forein Languages I have kept my self to the direction of St. Paul not speaking any where in a strange tongue without an Interpreter the sense of every such Quotation being either declared before or delivered after it Lastly whereas the Name of Appius Claudius doth many times occur in the History of the Roman Tribunes it is not always to be understood of the same Man but of diverse men of the same Name in their several Ages as the name of Caesar in the New Testament signifieth not one man but three that is to say the Emperor Tiberius in the Gospels Claudius in the Book of the Acts and that most bloudy Tyrant Nero in the Epistle to the Philippians Which being premised I shall no longer keep the Reader in Portch or Entrance but let him take a view of the House it self the several Rooms Materials and Furniture of it long Prefaces to no long Discourses being like the Gates of Mindum amongst the Antients which were too great and large for so small a City The Argument occasion of this following Treatise Joh. Calvini Institution Lib. 4. cap. 20. sect 31. NEque enim si ultio Domini est effrenatae dominationis correctio ideo protinus demandatam nobis arbitremur quibus nullum aliud quam parendi patiendi datum est Mandatum De privatis hominibus semper loquor Nam siqui nunc sint Populares Magistratus ad moderandum Regum libidinem constituti quales olim erant qui Lacedaemoniis Regibuâ— oppositi erant Ephori aut Romanis Consulibus Tribuni Plebis aut Atheniensium Senatui Demarchi qua etiam forte potestate ut nunc res habent funguntur in singulis Regnis tres Ordines cum primarios Conventus peragunt adeo illos ferocienti Regum licentiae pro officio intercedere non veto ut si Regibus impotenter grâ—ssantibus humili plebeculae insultantibus conniveant eorum dissimulationem nefaria perfidia non carere affirmem qua populi libertatem cujus se Dei ordinatione tutores positos norunt fraudulenter produnt NOr may we think because the punishment of licentious Princes doth belong to God that presently this power is devolved on us to whom no other warrant hath been given by God but only to obey and suffer But still I must be understood of private persons For if there be now any popular Officers ordained to moderate the licentiousness of Kings such as were the Ephori set up of old against the Kings of Sparta the Tribunes of the people against the Roman Consuls and the Demarchi against the Athenian Senate and with w ch power perhaps as the world now goes the three Estates are seized in each several Kingdom when they are solemnly assembled so far am I from hindring them to put restraints upon the exorbitant power of Kings as their Office bindes them that I conceive them rather to be guilty of a perfidious dissimulation if they connive at Kings when they play the Tyrants or wantonly insult on the common people in that they treacherously betray the Subjects Liberties of which they knew they were made Guardians by Gods own Ordinance Syllabus Capitum CHAP. I. The Doctrine of Obedience laid down by Calvin and of the Popular Officers supposed by him whereby he overthroweth that Doctrine I THe purpose and design of the work in hand II The Doctrine of Obedience unto Kings and Princes soundly and piously laid down by CALVIN III And that not only to the good and gratious but even to cruel Princes and ungodly Tyrants IV With Answer unto such Objections as are made
pressed the points before delivered unto the conscience of the subject and utterly disabled them from lifting up their hands against the Supreme Magistrate or any occasion whatsoever he shews them how to help themselves and what course to take for the asserting of their liberties and the recovery of their rights if the Prince invade them by telling them that all he spake before was of private persons c Sect. 31. but that if there were any popular Officers such as the Ephori of Sparta the Tribunes of Rome the Demarchi of Athens ordained for the restraint of Kings and Supreme Governors it never was his meaning to include them in it And such power he doth suppose to be in the three Estates of every Kingdom when they are solemnly assembled whom he condemns as guiltie of perfidious dissimulation and the betrayers of the Subjects liberties whereof they are the proper and appointed Guardâ—ans if they connive at Kings when they play the Tyrants or want only insult on the Common people This is the gap through which rebellions and seditions have found so plausible a passage in the Christian world to the dethroning of some Kings and Princes the death of others For through this gap broke in those dangerous and seditious doctrines that the inferiour Magistrates are ordained by God and not appointed by the King or the Supreme Powers that being so ordained by God they are by him inabled to compel the King to rule according unto justice and the laws established that if the King be refractary and and unreclaimable they are to call him to account and to provide for the safety of the Common-wealth by all ways and means which may conduce unto the preservation of it and finally which is the darling doctrine of these later times that there is a mixture in all Governments and that the three Estates conveened in Parliament or by what other name so ever we do call their meeting are not subordinate to the King but co-ordinate with him and have not only a supplemental power to supply what is defective in him but a coercive also to restrain his Actions a corrective too to reform his Errors But this I give you now in the generals only hereafter you shall see it more particularly and every Author cited in his own words for the proof hereof Many of which as they did live in CALVINS time and by their writings gave great scandal to all soveraign Princes but more as to the progress of the Reformation so could not CALVIN choose but be made acquainted with the effects and consequences of his dangerous principles Which since he never did retract upon the sight of those seditious Pamphlets and worse then those those bloudie tumults and rebellions which ensued upon it but let it stand unaltered to his dying day is a cleer argument to me that this passage fell not from his pen by chance but was laid of purpose as a Stumbling-block in the Subjects way to make him fall in the performance of his Christian duty both to God and man For though the Book of Institutions had been often printed in his life time and received many alterations and additions as being enlarged from a small Octavo of not above 29 sheets to a large folio of 160 yet this particular passage still remained unchanged and hath continued as it is from the first Edition of it which was in the year 1536. not long after his first coming to Geneva 10. But to proceed in our design What fruits these dangerous doctrines have produced amongst us we have seen too plainly and we may see as plainly if we be not blinde through what gap these doctrines entred on what foundation they were built and unto whose authoritie we stand indebted for all those miseries and calamities which are fallen upon us Yet to say truth the man desired to be concealed and not reputed for the Author of such strange conclusions which have resulted from his principles and therefore laies it down with great art and caution Si qui and Fortè and ut nunc res habent that is to say Perhaps and as the world now goes and if there be such Officers as have been formerly are the three disguises which he hath masked himself and the point withall that he might pass away unseen And if there be such Officers as perhaps there are or that the world goes here as it did at Sparta or in the States of Rome and Athens as perhaps it doth or that the three Estates of each several Kingdom have the same authoritie in them as the Ephori the Demarchi and the Tribunes had as perhaps they have the Subject is no doubt in a good condition as good a man as the best Monarch of them all But if the Ephori the Demarchi and the Tribunes were not appointed at the first for the restiaint and regulating of the Supreme Powers as indeed they were not and if the three Estates in each several Kingdom have not that authoritie which the Ephori and the Tribunes did in fine usurp and the Demarchi are supposed to have as indeed they have not perhaps and peradventure will not serve the turn The subject stands upon no better grounds then before he did Therefore to take away this stumbling-block and remove this rub I shall propose and prove these three points ensuing 1. That the Ephori the Demarchi and the Roman Tribunes were not instituted at the first for those ends and purposes which are supposed by the Author 2. If they were instituted for those ends yet the illation thereupon would be weak and childish as it relates to Kings and Kingdoms And 3. That the three Estates in each several Kingdom without all peradventures have no such authoritie as the Author dreams of and therefore of no power to controul their King Which if I clearly prove as I hope I shall I doubt not but to leave the cause in a better condition then I found it And in the proof of these the first point especially if it be thought that I insist longer then I needed on the condition of the Spartan Ephori the Roman Tribunes and the Demarchi of Athens and spend more cost upon it then the thing is worth I must intreat the Reader to excuse me in it I must first lay my grounds and make sure work there before I go about my building And being my design relates particularly to the information and instruction of the English Subject I could not make my way unto it but by a discoverie of the means and Artifices by which some petit popular Officers attained unto so great a masterie in the game of Government as to give the Check unto their Kings Which being premised once for all I now proced unto the proof of the points proposed and having proved these points I shall make an end Haec tria cum docuero perorabo in the Orators language CHAP. II. Of the Authority of Ephori in the State of
were long a making When first the discontented Nobles had expulsed their Kings and found they could not master all those difficulties which so great a business as that was did present unto them without being sure to have the people theirs without fear of lapsing Poplicola advised and at last enacted it for Law that no man should presume upon pain of death to take upon him any Office 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 t Plutarch in Publicola unlesse it come unto him by the gift of the people and that if any were condemned and appealed to them the execution should be respited till the people should give sentence in it But then withall the Nobility kept all Offices both of power and State in their own hands only the people being uncapable of the meanest office which did relate unto the Government of the Common-wealth untill they gained the Tribunes and the two Aediles which were under officers to the Tribunes to be chosen out of their own body Which once obtained there was no place how high soever which they did not aim at and which their Tribunes did not finde some way to compasse for them the Nobles and Patricians still in vain complaining how much they were dishonoured in the competition First therefore having gained a Law but with much adoe that the Commons might be married into Noble Families they presently propose another ut populo potestas esset seu de Plebe seu de Patribus vellet Consules faciendi u Livie l. 4. that the people might have liberty to choose the Consuls out of which rank of men they listed and at the first attempt did prevail so far that in stead of the two Consuls which they had before six Military Tribunes should be chosen by them to be possessed of all the Consular authority and they to be promiscuously elected out of the Patricians and the People as they saw convenient x Livie l. 4. and having got this ground they went on a main For not long after P. Licinius Calvus a meer Plebeian is made one of these Military Tribunes and shortly after that the Magister Equitum or the Commander of the horse Thus Silius and Aelius are made Questors those of Patrician rank having had the canvass and next that followed a Decree that the Docemviri Sacrorum who had the custody and charge of the Sibyls Books partim ex Plebe partim ex Patriciis a Id. lib. 6. should be indifferently chosen out of both Estates In little time the Tribunes pressing hotly for it L. Sextus obtains the Consulship b Id. ibid. C. Martius Rutilius is first made Dictator afterwards one of the Censors also c Id. lib. 7. and P. Philo is advanced to the place and dignity of the Prator d Id. lib. 8. Having thus took possession of all Civil Magistracy which were of any power and dignity in the Common-wealth the Tribunes would not rest nor content themselves untill the Commons were made capable of the Priesthood also which after some slight opposition made by Appius Claudius a Family that never yeelded any thing to advance the people was conferred upon them five Augures and four Pontifiâ—es being added to the former number all chosen and for ever to be chosen by and out of the Commons e Id. lib. 10. There were only now two places of respect and credit that of the Maximus Curio and the Pontifex Maximus both which the Nobles did pretend to belong to them but the Tribunes were resolved to have it otherwise According to which resolution C. Manilius got the Office of the Maximus Curio f Id. lib. 26. and in the close of all but a good while after Omnibus honoribus plebi communicatis g Rofin Antiq. Rom. l. 3. c. 22. after all other honors were conferred upon them or rather communicated to them one T. Coruncanius was declared the Pontifex Maximus All this and more they had but it would not satisfie 8 For there was wanting still both the power of Judicature and the Supreme Majestie of the State to make all compleat and to gain this the Tribunes must bestir themselves both with art and violence or else they could not hope to estate it on them A business of so high a nature that it was never in a way to be brought about till the two Gracehi undertook the contrivance of it who being men of excellent parts and great abilities did most unfortunately fall on the undertaking and being fallen upon it did devise all ways which either art or wit could present unto them to effect the work Of these Tiberius was the eldest who stumbling in the way on the Lex Agraria as being a means to make the poor people more confiderable and the rich less powerful and finding that Octavius one of his Colleagues did oppose him in it deposed him from his Office by force and violence only because he stood upon the right of his negative voice h Plutarch in Tib. Caio He had before inflamed the people by making a seditious speech to prefer their business and now he takes a course to inflame them more for the advancement of his own For one of his friends being found dead upon a sudden not without some suspicion of poyson as he gave it out he put on mourning apparrel and brought his sons before the people into the Common Forum beseeching them to have compassion on his Wife and Children as one that utterly despaired of his own safetie having for their sakes got the hatred of the Noble men And sometimes he would be the first man in the Market-place apparelled all in black his face swelled with tears and looking heavily upon the matter would pray the people to stand to him saying he was afraid his Enemies would come in the night and overthrow his house to kill him By means of which devices he so wrought upon them that many of them bought tents and lay about his house continually to keep him from the hands of his deadly Enemies So that being sure of their concurrence and assistance in any project which he should set on foot to advance himself under pretence of doing service to the Common-wealth he presently proposed a law 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that any man that would might appeal from the Judges to the people in what cause soever And that he might be sure to embase the Senate to the improvement and increase of the peoples power he had prepared another of an higher nature which was to adde unto the Senate an equal number of the Equites or the Roman Knights who were to be of equal power and to have libertie of voting in all publick businesses with the antient Senators In passing which and other of his Popular laws he got this trick and he was very constant to it that if he found the sense of the house to be against him and was not like to carry with him the major part of the voyces he would
quarrel with his fellow Tribunes to spin out the time till his partie were all come together and if that could not do it neither then he adjourned the Assembly to some other day But yet for all these artifices and unworthy practises he could not compass the design but left it to be finished by his Brother Caius Who taking the same course to ingage the people which his Brâ—ther had pursued before brought those designes about which Tiberius failed in i Id. ibid. For first whereas the Senate were the only Judges in matters which concerned the affairs of the Common-wealth which made them no less reverenced by the Roman Knights then by others of the common people Caius prevailed so far that he gained a law for adding three hundred of these Equites to as many Senators for the Senate did consist of three hundred antiently 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 giving them equall power of judging in all causes which were brought before them So that by gaining this and the former law of appealing to the people upon all occasions the people were estated in the power of Judicature and the dernier resort as the Lawyers call it was in them alone The only point now left was the Supreme Majestie and that did Caius very handsomely confer upon them without noise or trouble For whereas all other Orators when when they made their speeches turned themselves towards the Palace where the Senate sate he on the contrary turned himself towards the Market place where the people were and taught all other Orators by his Example to doe the like And thus saith Plutarch by the only turning of his look he gained a point of infinite consequence and importance 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 changing the Common-wealth from an Aristocratie to a meer Democratie which was the matter so aimed at by his Predecessors 9 The Tribunes had been insolent enough in the former times but the obtaining of these laws made them more unsufferable Before they used to quarrel all the greatest Officers as if the State could not consist but by their contentions there being no Magistrate so great nor man so innocent whom they exposed not sometimes to contempt and scorn and made not subject to their tyranniâ— The renowned Scipio himself the very Atlas of the State when it was in danger a man in whom there was not any thing but brave and gallant could not scape so clear but that he was accused by these factious Tribunes k Livie hist lib. 28. and forced to live retired in his Countrey-house far from the employments of that State which did not otherwise subsist but by his abilities Nor could they look on their Dictators but with eyes of malice although they had as much authoritie as that State could give them or any of their Kings had enjoyed before whom they endevour to make subject to their pride and tyrannie by all means imaginable And to that end sometimes denyed him the honor of a Triumph though he had deserved it in all mens judgements but their own and sometimes making this Magister Equitum l Id. lib. 22. to be of equal power and authoritie with him and finally sometimes they declaim against him m Id. ibid. to make him of no reputation with the common people And for their dealing with the Consuls it had been a complaint of old even in the dawning of the day of their new authoritie Consulatum captum oppressum a Tribunitiae potestate n Id. lib. 2. that the Consulship was suppressed and captivated by the power of the Tribunes and we can no where finde that they improved their modestie as they did their power Nor did they only quarrel with the Consuls and proceed no further though that had been an high affront to the Supreme Magistrate but threatned to commit them to the Prison also and many times their threatnings were not made in vain For thus we read that Caius Marius being Tribune o Plutarch in Mario threatned to send Cotta the Consul unto Prison but afterwards was taken off by fair perswasions and Sulpitus one as violent as he though not so valiant assaulted both the Consuls as they sate in the Senate house p Id. ibid. and killed one of their sons there who was not so quick of foot as to scape his hands Which though they were but bare attempts were yet lewd enough sufficiently to the dishonor of such eminent Magistrates and to the infamy and disgrace of the publick Government And therefore to make sure work of it and that the world might see they could more then threaten Quintius will tell you in the Dialogue with his Brother Cicero Brutum P. Scipionem tales tantos viros hominum omnium infimum sordidissinum Trib. Pl. C. Curiatium in vincula conjecisse q Cicero de Legibus lib. 3. that C. Curiatius a most base and unworthy person had caused such gallant men as Brutus and P. Scipio to be cast in Prison And if we make a further search we shall quickly finde that M. Drusus being Tribune caused Philip the Consul to be cast headlong out of his seat to the no small danger of his life only for interrupting him in the middle of a factious speech which was an insolencie beyond imprisonment To speak of their behaviour towards the other Magistrates were a thing impertinent For if the Consuls and Dictators could not scape their hands there is no question to be made but that the Praetors Censors Quaestors yea the Pontifices themselves were most abundantly debased and insulted on by these popular Tyrants 10 Thus have we brought the Tribunes to as great an height both for power and insolencie as were the Ephori before and thereby made them ready for the greater fall A fall which was not long a coming after they had made up the measure of their pride and tyrannie For Lucius Sylla having brought the estate of Rome under his command and knowing full well how dangerous these men would be to him if they were suffered to continue in their former power set forth a law by which they were reduced to their antient bounds inabled only to relieve not to wrong the Subject Sylla Tribunis Plâ—bis lege sua injuriae faciendae potestatem ademit auxilii ferendi reliquit as we read in Tullie r Id. ibid. A thing that much displeased the people and the Tribunes more But Sylla was no 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 no great applier of himself to the peoples humors and therefore cared but little how they took the matter Pompey succeeding him in power and in purpose too took a course quite contrary and re-established them in that authoritie whereof Sylla had of late deprived them For finding that the common people longed for nothing more then to see the Office of the Tribunes in the height again and being resolved to lay the foundation of his greatness on the affections and dependence of the common people
s Plutarch in Pompeio 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he gratified them in that point and thought himself an happy man to finde so fair an opportunitie to oblige them to him On which deceitful grounds for they proved no other he set them in their power again as before was said for which he stands accused by Quintus t Cicero de Legâ—buâ— l 3. and I think deservedly Certain I am that Pompey bought the short affection and applause of the common people at no less a price then his own destruction the Tribunes being the very men which pulled down his pâ—ide u Plutarch in I. Caesare and set up Caesar to oppose him Who going the same way to work that Sylla did and knowing that a Tribune and a Tribunitian spirit were no friends to Monarchie left them the name but nothing else The power and priviledge of the Office he kept unto himself for his own security x Dion histor Rom. lib. 53. as one that understood none better how many notable advantanges he should gain thereby for the confirming of his Empire Which course Augustus followed also taking the Tribunitian power into his own hands posito Triumviri nomine y Tacitus Annal lib. 1. assoon as the Triumvirate was expired by the death of his partners and from thence reckoned the years of his Government as Tribunitiae potestatis tertium quartum c. which his Successors did after his example till the time of Constantine when the name of Tribune was laid by as a thing forgotten z Rosin Antiq. Rom. The Empire was then cast into another kinde of mould then it had been formerly new Offices ordained new forms of Government introduced and a new Rome built and to what purpose should they keep the name when the thing was gone 11 Let us look back on all that is said before and we shall finde but little reason to relie upon Calvins word He saith the Tribunes were fet up to oppose the Consuls but the best Writers do affirm that they were instituted only to protect the people and to protect the people in such cases only when they did suffer any tort or unjust oppression He reckoneth them for instances of such popular Magistrates as were ordained to moderate and restrain the vast power of Kings and other Supreme Magistrates but the best Writers do affirm that the Tribunes were not instituted till the Kings were outed nor instituted at the first to restrain the Consular power though by degrees they did restrain it as they pleased and finally that they were again abridged of their power and tyrannie assoon as Monarchie was restored and the State brought to be obedient to one Soveraign Prince He seems to intimate that the Consuls were not wronged by such oppositions as the Tribunes daily made against them and that the Tribunes did no more in such oppositions then by their place and office they were bound to do But the best Writers do affirm that the Consuls made complaint from time to time of those wrongs and insolencies which those proud creatures of the people did afflict them with and they complained not without cause as their stories tell us So that there is but little ground for the supposition touching the first creation of these mighty Tyrants which Calvin trimly puts upon us less for the application of it to his end and purpose What other power soever they enjoyed or exercised more then the power of interceding when any Bill or Ordinance was to pass the Senate by which the people might have suffered in their goods and liberties was an incroachment on the Consuls and wrested from them by strong hand sometimes with bloud but never without dangerous tumults The best use can be made of such false surmises especially when they are false and factious too and some good uses may be made of the strongest poysons is that an Item may be taken by all Kings Princes and Supreme Governors to have a care of their Estates and neither suffer any Tribunes or men of Tribunitian spirits or such as challenge to themselves Tribunitian power to grow up under them or live within the verge of their Dominions The Tribune and the Tribunitian spirit are no friend to Monarchie and have so much of Pompey in them who restored the Office that they will never be content to endure an equall much less to suffer a Superior For further proof of which if more proof be requisite and for discovering to the world with what arts and practises those factious and seditious spirits did attain their height it would be a most excellent piece of service to all Soveraign Princes if a just Tribunitian historie were composed by some man of judgement for the recovery of this Age from the present maladies and a Memento to the future But this I leave to those who have time and leisure and other fit abilities to goe through with it I have another task in hand and the Demarchi call upon me to pass on to Athens where we are like to finde worse work then we met with hitherto Worse work I mean in this respect that we are like to finde less ground for the supposition for otherwise we are like to finde no work at all as will appear more evidently by that which followeth CHAP. IV. Of what authority the DEMARCHI were in the State of ATHENS and of the danger and unfitness of the instances produced by CALVIN I Athens first governed by Kings and afterwards by one Soveraign Prince under other titles II The Annual Magistrates of Athens what they were and of what authoritie III By whom and what degrees the State of Athens was reduced to a Democratie IV Of the authoritie of the Senate and the famous Court of the Areopagites V What the Demarchi were in the State of Athens and of what authoritie VI The Demarchi never were of power to oppose the Senate nor were ordained to that end VII Calvins ill luck in making choyce of three such instances which if true would not serve his turn VIII The danger which lyeth hidden under the disguise of such popular Magistrates as are here instanced in by Calvin IX What moved Calvin to lay these dangerous stumbling-blocks in the Subjects way X The dangerous oppositions and practises which have hence ensued in most parts of Europe XI The sect of CALVIN professed Enemies to Monarchie and the power of Princes 1 THE State of Athens as were all others at the first was under the Government of Kings all of them of the race of Cecrops from whom his Successors were called Cecropidae and they as other Kings in those antient times ut libitum imperitabant a Tacit. Annal. lib. 3. governed the people under them by no other rule then their own discretion Theseus the tenth from Cecrops was the first King of Athens which let goe his hold and parted with so many of the Regal rights as made the Kings weak and the Subjects wanton For having
a desire to incorporate all the Inhabitants of Attica into the City of Athens the better to unite them against forein force and to assemble them together as occasion served he was fain to win them to it by large promises of giving them some share in the publick Government without which bait the wealthier sort and such as had authoritie in their several Burroughs could not be drawn into the City b Plutarch in Theseo Yet still he kept unto himself and to his successors 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as we finde in Plutarch the chief Cnmmandery in the wars and the preservation of the laws together with a superintendency in matters which concerned Religion the main points of Soveraigntie And in this State things stood till the death of Codrus the seventh from Theseus who giving up his own life to preserve his Countrey became so honored and admired amongst his people that they resolved for his sake to have no more Kings for fear they should never meet with any who might be worthy to succeed him which was one of the prettiest wanton quarrels that ever was picked against a Monarchie The Princes which succeeded after his decease they called not Kings but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Governors but the change was only in the name and in the manner of their getting the Supreme authoritie For being once invested with the Supreme power they held it during life without check or censure as is affirmed by Africanus an antient writer who laying down the succession of the Kings of Athens to the death of Codrus d African apud Eusib Chron. edit Scaliger addes this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that after them succeeded the perpetual Archonteâ— who held the Government during life The like Eusebius doth affirm e Euseb in Chro. and all Authors else which treat of the affairs of Athens The difference was that formerly the Kingdom was successive meerly entailed upon the Princes of the line of Cecrops now it began to be Elective and to be given to them who best pleased the people Et loco libertatis erat quod eligi coeperunt f Tacit. hist l. 1. and it was some degree of liberty and a great one too that they had power to nominate and elect their Princes But long they did not like of this although no doubt a great intrusion on the Regal dignity The Princes were too absolute when they held for life not so observant of the people as it was expected because not liable to accompt nor to be called unto a reckoning till it was too late till death had freed them from their faults and the peoples censure And therefore having tryed the Government of 13 of these perpetual Archontes of which Medon the son of Codrus was the first and the last Alâ—maeon In decem annos Magistratuum consuetudo conversa est g Euseb in Chr. they introduced another custom and every tenth year changed their Governors These they called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 h African apud Euseb Chronic. or Decennial Archontes of which they had but seven in all and then gave them over and from that time were governed by nine Officers or Magistrates chosen every year who for that cause waa called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or the Annual Magistrates And yet it is to be observed that in both these changes the Archon whosoever he was and whether he was for term of life or for ten years only had all the power which formerly was belonging to the Kings save the very name in which regard Eusebius doth not stick to call them by the name of Kings where speaking of the institution of these Annual Magistrates he doth thus express it Athenis Annui principes constituti sunt cessantibus Regibus i Euseb Chron. as St. Hierom renders it 2 Now for these Annual Magistrates they were these that follow that is to say 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 k Iul. Pollux in Onomast l. 8. c. 9. which we may call the Provost who 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 was called the Archon the Bishop or High Priest the Marshal and the six Chief Justices Of these the Provost was the chief 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of whom they did denominate the ensuing year and by whose name they dated all their private contracts and Acts of State l Id. ibid. Sect. 2. To him it appertained to have a care of celebrating the Orgies of Bacchus and the great festival which they termed Thargelia consecrated to Apollo and Diana as also to take cognizance of misdemeanors and in particular to punish those who were common drunkards and to determine in all cases which concerned matter of inheritance and furthermore to nominate Arbitrators for the ending of fuits and private differences to appoint Guardians unto Orphans and Overseers unto women left with childe by their husbands The 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whom we call the Bishop or high Priest had the charge of all the sacred mysteries m Id. ibid. Sect. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the administration of the usual and accustomed sacrifices together with the cognizance of sacriledge prophaneness and all other actions which concerned Religion as also power to interâ—â—ct litigious persons or Common Barretters as we call them from being present at the celebrating of the holy mysteries And he retained the name of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because that antiently their Kings as in all places else had the chief hand in matters which related to the publick service of the Gods and the solemn sacrifices On the which reason and no other the Romans had their Regem Sacrificulum whom Plutarch calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 n Plutarch in Problemat in imitation of the Latine but Dionysius 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 o Dionys Halicarnens hist l. 5. in the true Greek phrase of which Livie thus Rerum deinde divinarum habita cura quia quaedam publica sacra per ipsos Reges factitata erant necubi Regum desiderium esset Regem Sacrificulum creant p Livie hist Rman lib. 2. But to proceed the Polemarchus whom we English by the name of Marshall sate judge in cases of sedition and such whereby the grandour of the State might suffer detriment as also in all actions which concerned either Denizens or Merchant-strangers and unto him it appertained to sacrifice to Diana and to Mars the two military Deities q Jul. Pollux in Onomast l. 8. c. 9. 3. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and to prescribe the funeral pomp for such as lost their lives in their Countries service Each of these had their two Assessors of their own election but so that they were bound to choose them out of the Senate of five hundred r Id. ibid. Sect. from no lower rank Finally for the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whom we call Chief Justices they were six in number 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 s Suidas in Lex and had authority to give judgement absolutely in all
Countrey and true Religion which though they are the words of Paraeus only yet they contain the minde and meaning of all the rest of that faction as his son Philip doth demonstrate e In Append. ad Cap. 13. Epist ad Rom. Hence was it that John Knox delivered for sound Orthodox doctrine Procerum esse propria autoritâ—te Idololatrian tollere Principes intra legum rescripta per vim reducere f Camden Annal Eliz. An. 1559. that it belonged unto the Peers of each several Kingdom to reform matters of the Church by their own authoritie and to confine their Kings and Princes within the bounds prescribed by law even by force of Arms. Hence that Geselius one of the Lecturers of Roterdam preached unto his people that if the Magistrates and Clergie did neglect their duty in the reformation of Religion necesse est id facere plâ—beios that then it did belong to the Common people g Necessaria Respons who were bound to have a care thereof and proceed accordingly And as for points of practise should we look that way what a confusion should we finde in most parts of Europe occasioned by no other ground then the entertainment of these principles and the scattering of these positions amongst the people Witness the Civil wars of France g Jean de Serres inventaire de Fr. the revolt of Holland h History of the Netherlands the expulsion of the Earl of East-Friezland out the City of Embden i Thuan hâ—st l. 114. the insurrections of the Scots k Camden Annal An. 1559. the tumults of Bohemia l Laurca Austriaca the commotions of Brandenbourg m Continuati Thuan. hist l. 8. the translation of the Crown of Sweden from the King of Pole to Charles Duke of Finland n Thuan. hist l. 8. the change of Government in England all acted by the Presbyterian or Calvinian partie in those several States under pretence of Reformation and redress of grievances 11 And to say truth such is the Genius of the sect that though they may admit an equal as paritie is the thing most aimed at by them both in Church and State yet they will hardly be perswaded to submit themselves to a Superiour to no Superiours more unwillingly then to Kings and Princes whose persons they disgrace whose power they ruinate whose calling they indevour to decry and blemish by all means imaginable First for their calling they say it is no other then an humane Ordinance and that the King is but a creature of the peoples making whom having made they may as easily destroy and unmake make again Which as it is the darling doctrine of this present time so is it very eagerly pursued by Buchannan who affirms expressly Quicquid juris populus alicui dederit idem justis de causis posse reposcere o Buchann de â—ure Regni that whatsoever power the people give unto their King or Supreme Magistrate they may resume again upon just occasions Their power they make so small and inconsiderable that they afford them very little even in matters temporal and no authoritie at all in things spiritual CALVIN professeth for himself that he was very much agrieved to hear that King Henry the eight had took unto himself the title of Supreme Head of the Church of England accuseth them of inconsiderate zeal nay blasphemie who conferred it on him and though he be content at last to allow Kings a Ministerial power in matters which concern the Reformation of Gods Publick Worship yet he condemns them as before of great inconsiderateness Qui facerent eos nimis spirituales p Calvin in Amos cap. 7. who did ascribe unto them any great authoritie in spiritual matters The designation of all those who bear publick office in the Church the calling of Councels or Assemblies the Presidencie in those Councels ordaining publick Fasts and appointing Festivals which anciently belonged unto Christian Princes as the chief branches of the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction which is vested in them are utterly denied to Kings and Princes in their Books of Discipline In so much that when the Citizens of Embden did expel their Earl they did it chiefly for this reason Quod se negotiis Ecclesiasticis Consistorialibus praeter jus aequitatem immisceret q Thuan. hist l. 114. that he had intermedled more then they thought fit in Ecclesiastical causes and intrenched too much upon their Consistorie As for their power in temporal or civil causes by that time Knoxes Peers and Buchannans Judges Paraeus his inferior Magistrates and CALVINS popular Officers have performed their parts in keeping them within the compass of the laws arraigning them for their offences if they should transgress opposing them by force of arms if any thing be done unto the prejudice of the Church or State and finally in regulating their authoritie after the manner of the Spartan Ephori and the Roman Tribunes all that is left will be by much too little for a Roy d' Ivitot or for a King of Clouts as we English phrase it Last of all for their persons which God held so sacred that he gave it for a law to his people Israel not to speak evill of their Princes saying Thou shalt not speak evil of the Ruler of thy people Let us but look upon these men and we shall finde the basest attributes too good for the greatest Kings Calvin calls Mary Queen of England by the name of Proserpine r Calvin in Amos cap. 7. and saith that she did superare omnes Diabolos that all the Devils of hell were not half so mischeivous Beza affords Queen Mary of Scotland no better titles then those of Medea and Athaliah s Beza in Epist ad Jo. of which the last was most infamous in divine the other no less scandalous in humane stories the one a Sorceress and a Witch the other a Tyrant and usurper The Author of the Altare Damascenum whosoever he was can finâ—e no better a tribute for King James of most blessed memorie then infensissimus Evangelii hostis t Didoclavius in Epistola ad Lâ—ctor the greatest and deadly enemie of the Gospel of Christ And Queen Elizabeth her self did not scape so clear but that the zealous Brethren were too bold sometimes with her name and honor though some of them paid dearly for it and were hanged for their labour How that seditious Hugonot the Author of the lewd and unworthy Dialogue entituled Eusebius Philadelphus hath dealt with three great Princes of the House of France and what reproachful names he gives them I had rather you should look for in the Author then expect from me being loath to wade too far in these dirtie pudoles save that I shall be bold to adde this general Character which Didoclavius gives to all Kings in general viz. Naturâ insitum est in â—mnibus Regibus Christi odium that all Kings naturally hate Christ which may
been employed in the like affairs under the Gospel of Christ and that too in the best and happiest times of the Christian Church In search whereof it is not to be looked for by the ingenuous Reader that we should aim fo high as the first 300 years after Christs Nativitie The Prelates of the Church were suspected then to have their different aims and interesses from those who had the government of the Civil State and therefore thought uncapable of trust and imployment in it But after that according to that memorable maxime of Optatus Ecclesia erat in Republicâ i Deschismat Denâ—â—â—st l 3. the Church became a part of the Commonâ—wealth and had their ends and aims united there followed these two things upon it first that the Supreme Government of the Church depended much upon the will and pleasure of the Supreme Magistrate insomuch as Socrates observeth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 k Socrat. Eccl. hist lib. 5. c. 1. that the greatest Councels have been called by their authoritie and appointment And 2 ly that the Governours and Rulers of the Church of God came to have place and power in disposing matters that appertained to the well ordering of the Civil State And this they did not out of any busie or pragmatical desire to draw the cognizance of secular causes into their own hands or to increase their power and reputation with the common people but meerly for the ease and benefit of those who did repair unto them for their help and counsel and to comply with the command of the Apostle who imposed it on them S. Austin tells us of S. Ambrose with how great difficultie he obtained an opportunitie of conversing with him privately and at large as his case required Secludentibus â—um ab ejus aure atque ore catervis negociosorum hominum the multitude of those who had business to him l August Confes l. 6. c. 3. and suits to be determined by him debarring him from all advantages of access and conference Which took up so much of his time that he had little leasure to refresh his body with necessary food or his minde with the reading of good Authors And Posidonius telâ—s us of S. Austin causas audisse diligenter piè that he diligently and religiously attended such businesses as were brought before him not only spending all the morning in that troublesome exercise m Posidon in vita August c. 19. but sometimes fasting all day long the better to content the suitor and dispatch the business The like S. Austin tells us of himself and his fellow Prelates first that the Christians of those times pro secularibus causis suis nos non raro quaererent n August in Psalm 1 8. serm 74 Epist 147. did ordinarily apply themselves unto them for the determing of secular causes and cheerfully submitted unto their decisions next that the Prelates did comply with their earnest solicitations and desires therein Tu multuosissimas causarum alienarum perplexitates patiendo o Id. de opeâ—e Monach c. 29. by intermitting their own studies to ingage themselves in the determining of such secular causes as were brought before them for the contentation of the people and the discharge of their own duty both to God and man And this is that which both S. Ambrose and S. Augustine tell us in their several writings viz. that they did undergoe this trouble for no other reason then out of a conformitie and obedience to the words and intimation of S. Paul 1 Cor. cap. 6. touching the ending of such suits and differences as did arise amongst the Faithful S. Austin saying Constituisse Apostolum talibus causis Ecclesiasticos cognitores p Id. in Psal 118. serm 174. and iisdem molestiis eos affixisse Apostolos q Id. de opere Monach. 29. S. Ambrose that he had undertook the businesses which were brought before him Secundum sacrae formam praeceptionis qua eum Apostolus induebat r Amb. Epist 24. which did impose such a necessitie upon him that he was not able to decline it Both of them doe agree in this and Posidonius doth agree with both in the same particular s Posidon in vita August c. 19. that they were not only warranted but obliged by S. Pauls injunction to undertake the cognizance of such secular causes as were from time to time committed to their care and trust and that they had not done their dutie had they made any scruple of the undertaking But these being only private matters let us next see whether their service was not used in affairs of State and we shall finde that Constantine did always take some Bishops with him when he went to war not only for their ghostly counsel in spiritual matters but for advise in matters which concerned the occasion t Euseb in vita Constant l. 4. c. 54. the prosecution of the war which was then in hand that Ambrose was twice sent Ambassadour from Valentinian the younger to the Tyrant Maximus which he performed to the great contentment of his Prince and the preservation of the Empire u Amb. Epist 27. lib. 5. whereof he gives us an accompt in an express unto the Emperour that when Firmus had rebelled in Africk and saw himself too weak to resist the Forces which were raised against him under Theodosius Antistites ritus Christiani pacem oraturos misit x Ammian Marcel hist l. 29. he sent the African Prelates his Ambassadours to treat of peace that Marutha Bishop of Mesopotamia was in like nature sent to the Court of Persia y Socrat. Eccles hist l. 7. c. 8. in the time of the Emperour Honorius I. as after that Epiphanius Bishop of Ticinum which we now call Pavie employed from the Ligurians to Athalaricus King of the Gothes in Italy from him unto the Court of Burgundie as Cassiodorus and Ennodius doe describe at large that James the godly Bishop of Nisibis a frontier Town against the Persians was also 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 both Governour of the place and Captain of the Souldiers which were there in Garrison z Theodoret. hist Eccl. l. 2. c. 30. and did most manfully defend it against all the force and fury of the Persian Armies An. 338. or thereabouts and finally which was an argument of great power and trust that the Bishops in Justinians time were by him appointed to oversee the Civil Magistrates and to give notice to the Emperour if they failed in any thing which did concern the Government oâ— the Estate in their several places of which the very Edicts are still extant in the Book of Novels a Novel 56. in Append. ad Novel 8. 5 The Prelates being grown into this esteem for their integritie and wisdom with the Roman Emperours it is no wonder if they were imployed in the greatest Offices of trust and counsel after the Empire was dismembred and shared betwixt such several Princes as grew
that this is only yielded unto such of the Clergy as are possessed os Lands and Houses in those several places where such elections are to be made and not then neither in most places except it be to make a party for particular ends especially where some good man or the main cause it self is concerned therein which as it totally excludeth the greatest part of the Clergy from having any voyce at all in these Elections the greatest part of the Clegy the more the pity having neither Lands nor Houses to such a value in fee simple so it gives no more power unto those that have than what of necessity must serve I am sure occasionally it may to their own undoing For to say truth those that give out that the Clergy may give voice at such elections use it but as a shift for the present turn intending nothing less indeed as hath oft been seen than that the Clergy should be capable of so great a trust The reason is because there is not any Free-man of a City or a Corporate town who hath a voice in the election of a Citizen to serve in Parliament nor almost any Cottager or Free-holder who hath a voice in the election either of a Knight or Burgesse but is directly eligible to the place himself Of Citizens Burgesses â—lected from the very meanest of the people we have many instances and shall have more according as they find their strength and have received a taste of the sweets of Goverment And for the choosing of the Knights of the seveveral Shires it is determined by the Statutes that as 40 s. land of free-hold per Annum q 8 Hen. 6. c. 7. is enough to qualifie a Clown for giving a voice at the election so the same Clown if he have 20l. land per Annum is capable of being chosen for a Knight of the Shire as appears plainly and expresly by the Statute law For though the writ directed to the severall and respective Sheriffs prescribe a choice of duos milites gladio cinctos yet we know well that by the Statute of King Henry 6. which is explanatory in this case of the Common law such notable Esquires or Gentlemen born of the same Counties as shall be able to be Knights r 23 Hen. 6. 15. are made as capable as a dubbed Knight to attend that service and he that hath no more than 20 l. per Annum either in Capite or Socage is not only able by the law to be made a Knight s 1 Ed. 2. c. 1. but was compellable thereunto even by the Statute-Law it self untill the Law was lately altered in that point t 17 Carâ—l c. 1. And on the other side it is clear enough for there have been of late some experiments of it that though a Clergy-man be born an Esquire or Gentleman for they are not all born ex fece Plebis as the late Lord Brook u L. Brook against Episcopacy forgetting his own poor extraction hath been pleased to say and though he be possessed of a fair Estate descended to him from his Ancestors or otherwise possessed of some Lands or Houses in Town Burrough or City whereby he stands as eligible in the eye of the Law as any Lay-Gentleman of them all yet either he is held uncapable and so pretermitted or if returned rejected at the House it self to his fowl reproach It is a Fundamental constitution of the Realm of England that every Free-man hath a voice in the Legislative power of Parliament it is an old rule in Politicâ—s â—uod omnes tangit ab omnibus tractari debet x And so acknowleged in a writ of Summons of K. Edw. 1. Which being now denyed to the English Clergy reduceth to them to that condition which St. Paul complains of and make them no otherwise accounted of by the Common people than as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the filth and off-scowring of the world to this very day 12. This tempts me to a brief discussion of a question exceeding weighty in it self but not so much as thought of in this great disfranchisement the slavery obtruded lately on the English Clergy that is to say whether that any two of the three Estates conspiring or agreeiug together can conclude on any thing unto the prejudice of the third Bodinus that renowned States-man doth resolve it negatively and states it thus nihil a duobus ordinibus discerni posse quo uni ex tribus incommodum inferatur si res ad singulos ordines seorsum pertinet z Bodin de Rep. l. 3. c. 7. that nothing can be done by two of the Estates to the disprofit of the third in case the point proposed be such as concerns them severally The point was brought into debate upon this occasion Henry the 3d. of France had summoned an Assembly of the three Estates or Conventus Ordinum to be held at Bloys Anno 1577. The form and order of the which we have at large described by Thuanus Lib. 63. But finding that he could not bring his ends about so easily with that numerous body as if they were contracted to a narrower compass he caused it to be mov'd unto them that they should make choice of 36 twelve of each Estate quosâ— Rex cum de postulatis decerneret in consilium adhibere dignaretur a Thuanus in hist temp l. 63. whom the King would deign call to counsail for the dispatch of such affairs and motions as had been either moved or proposed unto him Which being very readily assented to by the Clergy and Nobility who hoped thereby to find some favour in the Court and by degrees to be admitted to the Privy Counsel was very earnestly opposed by Bodinus being then Delegate or Commissioner for the Province of Veromandois who saw full well that if businesses were so carried the Commons which made the third Estate would find but little hopes to have their grievances redressed their petitions answered b Bodin de Rep. l. 1. c. 7 And therefore laboured the rest of the Commissioners not to yield unto it as being utterly destructive of the Rights and Liberties of the Common people which having done he was by them intrusted to debate the business before the other two Estates and did it to so good effect that at the last he took them off from their resolution and obtained the cause What Arguments he used in particular neither himself nor Thuanus telleth us But sure I am that he insisted both on the antient customes of the Realm of France as also of the Realms of Spain and England and the Roman Empire in each of which it was received for a ruled case nihil a duobus ordinibus statui posse quo uni ex tribus prejudicium crearetur that nothing could be done by any of the two Estates unto the prejudice of the third And if it were a ruled case then in the Parliament of England there is no reason why
between St. Peter and St. Paul by which last the Supreme Powers whatsoever they be are called the Ordinance of God The Powers saith that Apostle are ordained of God and therefore he that resisteth the Powers resisteth the Ordinance of God Upon which words Deodate gives this Glosse or Comment That the supreme Powers are called the Ordinance of God because God is the Author of this Order in the world and all those who attain to these Dignities do so either by his manifest will and approbation when the means are lawfull or by his secret Providence by meer permission or toleration when they are unlawfull Now it is fitting that man should approve and tolerate that which God approves and tolerates But thirdly I conceive that those words in the Greek Text of St. Peter viz. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are not so properly translated as they might have been and as the same words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are rendred by the same Translators somewhat more neer to the Original in another place For in the 8. chapt to the Romans vers 22. we finde them rendring 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by the whole Creation and why not rather every Creature as both our old Translation and the Rhemists read it conform to omnis Creatura in the vulgar Latine which had they done and kept themselves more near to the Greek Original in St. Peters Text they either would have rendred it by every humane Creature as the Rhemists do or rather by all Men or by all Man-kinde as the words import And then the meaning will be this that the Jewes living scattered and disperst in Pontus Galatia Cappadocia and other Provinces of the Empire were to have their conversation so meek and lowly for fear of giving scandal to the Gentiles amongst whom they lived as to submit themselves to all Man-kinde or rather to every Man unto every humane Creature as the Rhemists read it that was in Authority above whether it were unto the Emperor himself as their supreme Lord or to such Legats Prefects and Procurators as were appointed by him for the government of those several Provinces to the end that they may punish the evil-doers and incourage such as did well living comformably to the Lawes by which they were governed Small comfort in this Text as in any of the rest before for those popular Officers which Calvin makes the Overseers of the soveraign Prince and Guardians of the Liberties of the common people If then there be no Text of Scripture no warrant from the word of God by which the popular Officers which Calvin dreams of are made the Keepers of the Liberties of the Common people or vested with the power of opposing Kings and soveraign Princes as often as they wantonly insult upon the people or wilfully infringe their Priviledges I would fain learn how they should come to know that they are vested with such power or trusted with the defence of the Subjects Liberties cujus se Dei ordinatione Tutores positos esse norunt as Calvin plainly saies they do If they pretend to know it by inspiration such inspiration cannot be known to any but themselves alone neither the Prince or people whom it most concerneth can take notice of it Nor can they well assure themselves whether such inspirations come from God or the Devil the Devil many times insnaring proud ambitious and vain-glorious Men by such strange Delusions If they pretend to know it by the Dictate of their private Spirit the great Diana of Calvin and his followers in expounding Scripture we are but in the same uncertainties as we were before And who can tell whether the private Spirit they pretend unto and do so much brag of 1 King 22. 22. may not be such a lying Spirit as was put into the mouthes of the Prophets when Ahab was to be seduced to his own destruction Adeo Argumenta ex absurdo petita ineptos habent exitus as Lactantius notes it All I have now to add is to shew the difference between Calvin and his followers in the propounding of this Doctrine delivered by Calvin in few words but Magisterially enough and with no other Authority then his ipse dixit enlarged by David Paraeus in his Comment on the 13. chapter to the Romans into divers branches and many endevours used by him as by the rest of Calvins followers to finde out Arguments and instances out of several Authors to make good the cause For which though Calvin scap'd the fire yet Paraeus could not Ille Crucem pretium sceleris tulit hic Diadema For so it hapned that one Mr. Knight of Brodegates now Pembroke Colledge in Oxford had preach'd up the Authority of these popular officers in a Sermon before the University about the beginning of the year 1622. for which being presently transmitted to the King and Councel he there ingenuously confessed that he had borrowed both his Doctrine and his proofs and instances from the Book of Paraeus above mentioned Notice whereof being given to the University the whole Doctrine of Paraeus as to that particular was drawn into several Propositions which in a full and frequent Convocation held on the 25. of June 1622. were severally condemned to be erroneous scandalous and destructive of Monarchical Government Upon which Sentence or determination the King gave order that as many of those books as could be gotten should solemnly and publickly be burnt in each of the Universities and St. Pauls Church-yard which was done accordingly An accident much complained of by the Puritan party for a long time after who looked upon it as the funeral pile of their Hopes and Projects till by degrees they got fresh courage carrying on their designs more secretly by consequence more dangerously then before they did The terrible effects whereof we have seen and felt in our late Civil Wars and present confusions But it is time to close this point and come to a conclusion of the whole Discourse there be no other Objections that I know of but what are easily reduced unto those before or not worth the Answering 15. Thus have we took a brief Survey of those insinuations grounds or Principles call them what you will which CALVIN hath laid down in his Book of Institutions for the incouragement of the Subjects to rebellious courses and putting them in Arms against their Soveraign either in case of Tyrannie Licentiousness or Mal-administration of what sort soever by which the Subjects may pretend that they are oppressed either in point of liberty or in point of property And we have shewn upon what false and weak foundations he hath raised his building how much he hath mistook or abused his Authors but how much more he hath betrayed and abused his Readers For we have clearly proved and directly manifested out of the best Records and Monuments of the former times that the Ephori were not instituted in the State of Sparta to oppose the Kings nor the Tribunes in the State of Rome to oppose the Consuls nor the Demarchi in the Common-wealth of Athens to oppose the Senate or if they were that this could no way serve to advance his purpose of setting up such popular Officers in the Kingdoms of Christendom those Officers being only found in Aristocraties or Democraties but never heard or dreampt of in a Monarchical Government And we have shewn both who they are which constitute the three Estates in all Christian Kingdoms and that there is no Christian Kingdom in which the three Estates convened in Parliament or by what other name soever they do call them have any authority either to regulate the person of the Soveraign Prince or restrain his power in case he be a Soveraign Prince and not meerly titular and conditional and that it is not to be found in Holy Scripture that they are or were ordained by God to be the Patrons and Protectors of the Common people and therefore chargeable with no lesse a crime than a most perfidious Dissimulation should they connive at Kings when they play the Tyrants or want only abuse that power which the Lord hath given them to the oppression of their Subjects In which last points touching the designation of the three Estates and the authority pretended to be vested in them I have carried a more particular eye on this Kingdom of England where those pernicious Principles and insinuations which our Author gives us have been too readily imbraced and too eagerly pursued by those of his party and opinion If herein I have done any service to Supreme Authority my Countrey and some misguided Zelots of it I shall have reason to rejoyce in my undertaking If not posterity shall not say that Calvins memory was so sacred with me and his name so venerable as rather to suffer such a Stumbling-block to be laid in the Subjects way without being censured and removed than either his authority should be brought in question or any of his Dictates to a legal tryal Having been purchased by the Lord at so dear a price we are to be no longer the Servants of men or to have the truth of God with respect of persons I have God to be my Father and the Church my Mother and therefore have not only pleaded the Cause of Kings and Supreme Magistrates who are the Deputies of God but added somewhat in behalf of the Church of England whose Rights and priviledges I have pleaded to my best abilities The issue and success I refer to him by whom Kings do reign and who appointed Kings and other Supreme Magistrates to be nursing Fathers to his Church that as they do receive authority and power from the hands of God so they may use the same in the protection and defence of the Church of God and God even their own God will give them his Blessing and save them from the striving of unruly people whose mouth speaketh proud words and their right hand is a right hand of iniquity FINIS