garment presenting pride or greatness chiefly in persons lately advanced though no man be thereby interessed or injured doth move in others a certain offence for the nature of man is such as beholdeth the new prosperity of others with an envious eye and wisheth a moderation of fortune nowhere so much as in those we have known in equall degree with our selves In all enterprises of Warr if present necessity doth not otherwise require leisure and deliberation ought to be used for often it sufficeth in lieu of Wisdom â—o take the advantage of other mens folly All men that are to consider of great actions ought to be informed whether that which is undertaken be profitable for the Commonweale honorable to themselves and easy to be effected or at least not greatly difficult Also he that perswadethâ— is to be examined whether besides bare words and Counsel he will joyn his own perill and if fortune favour the attempt to whom the principal glory shall redound The perils which accompanie private enterprises are far unlike to those which he doth enter that aspireth to principality For in private attempts a man may pause or proceed as he will But to him that aspires to Empire there remains no middle course but either by Victory to triumphâ— as a Prince or being vanquished to endure death as a Traytor Let no man in his prosperity give much credit to common applause or service assured by any of whom in meaner fortune he hath had no experience for the base people are learned in no lessonâ— only without difference of truth or falshood to flatter men in Authority and with shouts and words of great rejoycing make shew of great affection As overmuch haste is dangerous so too great delay oftentimes proveth disadvantagious for albeit consultation ought to foregoe action yet to dispute long and in the end reject the advice of either side or take a middle course whith in cases of doubt and danger is worst was ever accompted great discretion There is no course more comely nor any resolution so well beseeming a wise man having made proof of his own vertue and finding in age no fortune due to such effect as to retire himself from the Court and company for so shall he shun the inconveniences of contempt and the discommodity of travell Jucunda senectuti otia yet true it is that whoso hath lived a Prince or governed as a publick person cannot expect security in a private estate Whensoever danger draweth near and terror is at hand all men look about but none willingly adventure For in such cases every man will give Council but few will take parâ— of the peril In Commonwealths where Sects or Partialities he the Leader of any side is able to kindle Civil War yet is he unable to moderate the Victory For to stir up dissentions and troubles the worst man most commonly bears the stroke but peace and quietness are not established but by men of rare gifts and excellent vertue It may seem strange and contrary both to courtesie and Christian profession that men are far more mindful of injuries done unto them then of benefits received by them The reason thereof is that Thankfulness is accompted a burden but Revenge is sweet and reckoned a great gain Of reconciled foes and such as know that our harms were caused by their means we oft-times expect favor as perswaded that new friendship will repair the loss of old displeasure But the matter doth seldom so fall out for the quality of mans nature is ever to hate those whom he hath hurt and love them whom he hath made beholding Quos laeserunt oderunt Tac. To common persons and such as are ignorant in matters of State every Taxation and Imposition seemeth heavy or superfluous yet the wiser sort know that the end of all publick endeavour is to confirm people in Peace and Peace cannot be maintained without arms nor Arms without Pay nor Pay without Impositions As fortunate folk are envied so are the poor contemned which rule reacheth also to Princes The one lives in Plenty with War the other in Poverty with Peace For seldom is it seen that those people are assaulted where nothing is to be gained and whose base Beings afford no other spoils then blood and beggery Wisemen have observed that in matter of State and the managing thereof three things are especially to be looked unto The first is Occasion the second the â—ntentions of other Men the third our own Affection For there is nothing that slippeth away so soon as Occasion nothing so difficult as to judge what an other man intendeth nor any thing more nocent then our own immoderate desires It hath been ever a course observed by wise Princes but much more by Aristocraties and Popular States against Force and Fury of the multitude to defend themselves with Silver and Gold How much more it importeth all Princes to lead a vertuous life and give daily example of Piety and Justice appears apparantly in the proceedings of the Roman Bishops who by the well-doing of some few of them at the first became greatly honored but afterwards they became contemptible For the Reverence which men did bear to the â—anctity of their lives â—ailing it was impossible of so contrary Manners and Examples to look for like effects The success of the War cheifly dependeth on the Reputation of the Prince which declining the vertue also of the Soldiers faileth Likewise the fidelity of the people decayeth and their money to maintain the War ceaseth contrariwise the courage of the enemy is increased they that stood doubtful become resolved and every difficulty augmenteth The Authority which Princes give is chiefly in respect of Wisdom and Valor Yet true it is that for the most part they accompt them the wisest men that can best accommodate themselves to their humor The greatest distress and difficulty which can come to any Army doth proceed of these causes Want of money scarcity of victuals hatred of people discord of Captains disobedience of Soldiers and their flying to the enemy either of necessity or freewil A Prince or great Magistrate having long maintained the reputation of Wisdom and Vertue must take heed that no rash or dangerous resolution do taint the Honorable Fame of his former life For to be tâ—ansported with anger against his own profit is lightness and to esteem small dangers more then great is want of judgment A Prince or Person of great estate must be wary not to inure the conceit of double-dealing For little sincerity and trust is looked in his actions of whom there is an opinion of craft and falshood conceived Experience hath always proved that whatsoever the most part of men desire rarely cometh to pass The reason hereof is that the effects of Humane actions commonly depend on the will of a few and their intentions ever differing from the greater numberâ— the end and success cannot be other then as pleaseth the few that are to direct them There
Tribunes should command with like Authority so was nothing altered in the Government but the Governors title which alone did content them Nothing can corrupt and alter the nature of man so much or so soon as the immoderate desire of Honorâ— in so much as men of honest mindes and vertuous inclinations are sometimes by Ambition drawn to abuse that goodness whereunto they are inclined Example Appius Claudius having lived long an enemy to the Multitude hoping by their aid to continue his Authority of the Decemviri in Rome became their Friend and disfavored the factions of great men Likewise Q. Fabius a man of singular vertue being also called to that dignity by Appius self adulterated his nature and became like unto him Seldom or never is any people discontented without just cause yet if happily they be asked whereof their offence proceedeth many times for want of some fit man to pronounce their grief they â—â—and silent Example The Romans at the death of Virginia were gathered together armed upon Mount Sacrâ— and being asked by the Senate for what cause they so did no answer was made until Virginio Father of the Virgin had procured that twenty of the Tribunes might be made to be as head of the pâ—ople and confer with the Senate A great Folly or rather meer Madness it seemeth to desire any thing and tell before-hand that the end and purpose of the desire is evil for thereby he sheweth reason why it ought not to be granted Example The Romans required of the Senate that Appius and the rest of the Decemviri should be delivered into their hands being determined to burn them all alive The first part of their request seemed reasonable but the end thereof unreasonable A course very dangerous it is in all States by continual accusing and punishing to hold the Subject in doubt and daily fear For he that stands always looking for some trouble becometh careless and apt to attempt innovation Example The Decâ—mviri being opprest the Tribunes authorised in their place endeavored daily to call in question the most part of the Decâ—mviri and many other Citizens also whereof great inconveniences arose and much danger would have ensued had not a Decree propounded by M. Duillius been made that for one year no Roman Citizen should be accused Strange it is to see how men in seeking their own security lay the injuries which they fear uâ—on other men as though it were necessary either to offend or be offended Example The Romans among themselves united and strong always endeavored to offend the Nobles and the Nobles likewise being perswaded they were strong labored to oppress the people Which humors were the cause of continual troubles To make estimation and choice of men fit to govern the best course is to consider in particular otherwise it might be imaginedâ— that among the Multitude or meaner people they being the greatest number might be found some persons of more perfection Example The people of Rome desiring that the Consulship might be given among them as men of most merit did by all means endeavor to obtain that honor but being come to election and every mans vertue particularly considered there could not be among the Multitude onelâ— one found fit for so great a place and therefore the people themselves consented that the dignity should still remain as it was To perswade a Multitude to any enterprise is easie if that which is perswaded doth promise either profit or honor yet oft under that external apparence liâ—s hid loss or disadvantageâ— Example The Romans perswading themselves that the slow proceeding of Fâ—bius Maximus in the War was both chargable and cowardly requiredâ— That the General of the Horse might direct the War which course had ruined Rome if the wisdom of Fabius had not been Likewise when Hannibal had divers years raigned in Italâ— one M. Centenius Penula a man of base birth yet a Soldier oâ— some repute undertook that if he with such Voluntiâ—rs as would follow him might have authority to fight he would within few days deliver Hannibal either alive or dead Which offer was by the Senate accounted rash yet for fear to offend the people granted and Penula with his Soldiers was cut in pieces To appease a Mutiny or Tumult in any Camp or City there is no means more speedy or successful then if some person of great quality and respect present himself to the people and by his wisdom lay before them the damage of their Discords perswading them to Peace and Patience Example The faction of the â—rateschi and Arratiati in Florence the one ready to assault the other Francisco Soderini Bishop of Vâ—terra in his Episcopal Habit went between the parties and appeased them Also Count Egremont by the Authority of his wisdom and presence supprest a great mutiny in Antwerp between the Martinists and Papists A people corrupted do rarely or never observe any Order or Ordinance unless by force of some Princes power they be thereto inforced but where the Multitude is incorrupt and religious all things are done justly and without compulsion Example Camillus at the victory against the Urienti vowed that the tenth part of the pillage should be offered to Apollo but the Senate supposing that the people would not consent to so great a Contribution studied to dispence with that vow and to please Apollo and the people also by some other means Whereat the people shewed themselves openly offended and willingly gave no less then the sum formerly decreed When the Free-Cities of Germany are occasioned to make money for any Publick Service the Magistrates impose One or two in the hundred on every City which done every one is sworn to lay down so much as in his own Conscience he is able and he with his own hand no other witness being present casteth the money into a Coffer prepared for the purpose which he would not if his own Conscience did not inforce him When any extraordinary occasion happens to a City or Province some prodigious voice is heard or some marvellous sights are seen Before T. Gracchus General of the Roman Army was betraid by Flavius Lucanus the Aruspices discovered two Serpents eating the Entrails of the Beasts sacrified which done they vanished which vision as they divined prognosticated the Generals death Likewise F. Savanarâ—la foretold the coming of King Charls the Eight into Italy And M. Sedigitus when the Galls first came towards Rome informed the Senate he heard a voice much londer then any mans crying aloud Galli veniunt The multitude of base people is naturally audacious and apt to innovation yet unless they be directed by some persons of Reputation and Wisdom rarely do they joyn in any action of great import Example The Romans when their City was taken and sackt by the Galls went to Veio with determination to dwell there The Senate informed thereof commanded that upon great pain every Citizen should return to Rome whereat the people at first mocked but when
Tam Marti Quam Mercurio The true and lively Portraiture of the Hoble. and learned Knight Sr. Walter Ralegh Ro Vaughan sculp The Cabinet-Council Containing the Cheif ARTS OF EMPIRE And MYSTERIES of STATE DISCABINETED In Political and Polemical Aphorisms grounded on Authority and Experience And illustrated with the choicest Examples and Historical Observations By the Ever-renowned Knight Sir WALTER RALEIGH Published By JOHN MILTON Esq Quis Martem tunicâ tectum Adamantinâ dignè scripserit London Printed by Tho. Newcomb for Tho. Johnson at the sign of the Key in St. Pauls Churchyard near the West-end 1658. To the READER HAving had the Manuscript of this Treatise Written by Sir Walter Raleigh many years in my hands and finding it lately by chance among other Books and Papers upon reading thereof I thought it a kinde of injury to withhold longer the work of so eminent an Author from the Publick it being both answerable in Stile to other Works of his already Extant as far as the subject would permit and given me for a true Copy by a Learned Man at his Death who had Collected several such peices John Milton THE Principal Contents CHAP. I. THe Definition and Division of Publick Weals and Soveraign States according to their several Species or Kindes Pag. 1. Chap. 2. Of Soveraign or Monarchick Government with its essential Marks and specifical Differences Pag. 2. Chap. 3. Of Monarchies Seigniorile exemplified in the Turkish and West-Indian Empire Pag. 5. Chap. 4. Of Monarchies Royal with the Means to maintain them Pag. 7. Chap. 5. Of Monarchies Tyrannical Pag. 9. Chap. 6. Of new-found Monarchies and Principalities with the Means to perpetuate them Pag. 10. Chap. 7. Of Councils and Counsellors in general Pag. 14. Chap. 8. Of Councils in some particular Monarchies Aristocraties and Democraties Pag. 15. Chap. 9. Of Officers and Commissioners with their respective Distinctions Pag. 17. Chap. 10. Of Magistrates their Qualifications and Elections Pag. 18. Chap. 11. Observations intrinsically concerning every Publick State in Points of Justice Treasure and War P. 20. Chap. 12. Extrinsick Observations shewing how to deal with Neighbor Princes and Provinces respectively how to prevent their Designs and decypher their Intendments Pag. 24. Chap. 13. Observations confirmed by Authorities of Princes and Principalities charactering an excellent Prince or Governor Pag. 28. Chap. 14. Of the Princes intimate Counsellors and Ministers of State with their several Requisites Pag. 32. Chap. 15. The Art of Ruling or Mystery of Regiment Pag. 38. Chap. 16. Of Princely Authority wherein it consists and how far to be extended and delegated Pag. 40. Chap. 17. Of Power and Force and how to be raised and maintained P. 42. Chap. 18. Of Conspiracy and Treason with the causes and ways of prevention or discovery Pag. 44. Chap. 19. Of Publick Hate and Contempt with the occasions and means to redress and avoid it Pag. 47. Chap. 20. Of Diffidence and Dissimulation in the mannage of State Affairs Pag. 54. Chap. 21. Of War Defensive and Invasive with Instructions touching Laws of Arms Soldiers and Military Discipline Pag. 56. Chap. 22. Of Generals and Commanders and their requisite Abilities in Martial enterprises and expeditions Pag. 67. Chap. 23. Of Councils in War and Directions Tactick and Stratagematick with advice how to make an honorable Peace Pag. 71. Chap. 24. Of Civil War with the Causes and Remedies thereof Pag. 80. Chap. 25. A Collection of Political Observations confirmed by Reason and Experience advertising Princes Statesmen and private persons how to demean themselves in all Fortunes and Events Pag. 88. Chap. 26. Maximes of State or Prudential Grounds and Polemical Precepts concerning all Estates and forms of Policy in times of Peace or War c. confirmed by select Narrations and Historical Parallels Pag. 153. THE Cabinet Council Containing the chief Arts of EMPIRE AND Mysteries of State CHAP. I. The Definition and Division of Publick Weales and Soveraign States according to their several species or kinds A Common-wealth is a certain Soveraign Government of many Families with those things that are common among them All Common-wealths are either Monarchies Aristocraties Democraties A Monarchie is that State where the Soveraignty resteth in the person of one only Prince An Aristocratie is where some small part of the people have in theâ— as a body corporate the Soveraignty and supream power of the whole State A Democratiâ— is where all the people have Power and Authority Soveraign So doth it appear that the place and person where the Soveraigntie resteth doth cause the State to be either a Monarchie an Aristocratie or Popular Government CHAP. II. Of Soveraign or Monarchick Government with its Essential markes and Specifical differences SOveraigntie is an absolute and perpetual power in every publike State and he is properly and only a Soveraign that acknowledgeth no Superior or Equal nor holdeth of any other Prince person or power but God and his own sword The First mark of Soveraigntie is absolute Power and Authority to command all Subjects in general and every of them in particular without consent of any other person or persons either greater or inferior to himself The Second mark of Majesty is Authority to make War and conclude Peace at his pleasure The Third is Power to bestow all Honors and cheif Offices at his pleasure The Fourth marke of Soveraigntie is Appellation The Fifth mark and last is power to pardon all Subjects by rigor of Law or otherwise condemned in Life Lands Goods or Honors These Powers are not to be imparted to any Officer Deputy or other Magistrate but in the Princes absence and for some urgent occasion Monarchies are of three sorts Signioril Royal Tyrannical The Diverâ—â—tie of Monarchies doth noâ— proceed from the Nature of the State but the diverse proceedings of those Princes that governe for great difference there may be between the nature of the Common wealth and the Government thereof That Prince that giveth the Magistracies Honors and Offices without respect of Nobility Riches or Vertue may be said to governe popularly And that Monarchy may be said to bâ— governed Aristocratically when the Monarch imparteth the principal Honors and Offices to the Noble and Rich men only The same difference there is to be found in States Aristocratical and Popular for the one and the other may be both Signioril or Tyrannical A Monarch Signioril is he who by force of Arms and just War is made owner of mens bodies and goods and governeth them as a Master of a Familie governeth base Servants and Slaves A Monarch Royal is he whose Subjects are obedient unto his Laws and the Monarch himself obeyeth the Lawes of God and Nature suffering every Subject to enjoy liberty natural with property in Lands and Goods governing as a Father governeth his Children A Monarch Tyrannical is he who without regard to the Law of God or Nature commandeth Free-men as Slaves and useth their Lands and Goods as his own CHAP. III. Of Monarchie Signioril Exemplified in
and like unto God Oportet principem res divinas videri curare seriâ— antâ— omnia Arist. Providence is a forecast and likely conjecture of things to come supposed to be in those Princes that in their actions proceed slowly and circumspectly it seemeth also a course of Princely discretion to be retired and not ordinarily to converse with many Autoritatem absentiâ tueare Suet. CHAP. XVIII Of Conspiracy and Treason with the Causes and ways of prevention or discovery COnspiracy is commonly addressed to the Princes person Treasons are addressed againâ—t his Government Authority Country Subjects or places of strength These Mischiefs are easily feared but hardly eschewedâ— for albeit open Enemies are openly encountred yet Fraud and Subtilty are secret foes and consequently not to be avoided Occulta pericula nâ—que praevidere n qâ—e vitare in promptu â—st Salust The danger of conspiracy preceedeth of divers causes as Avarice Infidelity of Subjects Ambition in Servants and coruption in Soldiers therefore with great difficulty to be avoided Vitae tuae dominus est quisquis suam contempsit Sen. Notwithstanding it seemeth that either by Inquisition Punishment Innocency or Destiny the evill affection of men may be oftentimes discovered 1. For whoso will curiously inquire and consider the actions and ordinary speeches of men I mean those that be persons of honor and reputation may oftentimes vent the Myne that lurketh in the minds Quoniam raro nisi male loqunti male faciunt Lips 2. Punishment is likewise a thing so terrible that the consideration thereof with the hope of reward doth often discover those dangerous intentions Cruciaiu aut praemio cuncta pervia sunt Tac. But as it is wisdom in Princes to give ear to informers so are they not always to be believed for Hope Envy Hate or some other passion oftentimes draws them to speak untruly Quis innocens esse potest si accusare sufficit Tac. 3. The third and likeliest defence against conspiracy is the Princes own Innocency for never having injured any man it cannot be thought there liveth any Subject so lewde as will endeavor to hurt him Fidelissima custodia principis ipsius inâ—ocentia Pliâ— 4. The last and best bulwark to withstand the force of this mischief we call destiny which preceeding from the Fountain of divine providence may be truly called the will of God in whose only power it resteth to protect and defend good Priâ—ces Ille erit à latere tuo custodiet pedem tuum nâ— capiaris Salo. Treasons are most commonly enterprized by covetous persons who preferring private profit before fame or fidelity do not fear to enter into any impious action To this humor ambitious men dissentious and all such as be desirous of Innovation are inclined Pulcra loquentes iidem in pectore prava strueâ—tes Hom. To these Offenders no punishment as equal to their impious merit can be devised being persons odious as well to friend as foes Proditores etiam in quos antepoâ—unt invisi sâ—â—t Tac. CHAP. XIX Of publick Hate and Contempt with the occasions and means to redress and avoid it HAving briefly touched the Vertues and Means whereby Princes are maintained â—n Authority and Honor let something be said of the causes from whence their ruine doth proceed the cheif whereof seemeth to be Hate and Contempt Hate cometh of Feare which the more Common it is the more Dangerousâ—Nulla vis imperii tanta est quae prementâ— metâ— possit esse diâ—turnaâ— Cic. The causes of Feare are Punishments Impositions and Rigor and therefore it behooveth a Prince not only to shun them but to eschew those actions whereby he may reasonably incur their suspition Sentias enim homines ut metuant aâ—t oderint â—non minus opinioâ—e fama quam certa aliqua ratione moveri Cic. Yet Punishmentâ— Imposition and Censure are in all States necessary although they shew and seem terrible and consequently breed a certain desperation in Subiects unless they be discreetly and modestly used for extreme and frequent punishments taste of cruelty great and many Imposts â—avour of Covetousness censure of manners when it exceedeth the quality of offences doth seem Rigor in these matters therefore it behooveth the Prince to be moderate and cautelous chiefly in Capital Punishment which must be confined within the bounds of Justice Sit apud principem parsimonia etiam vilissimi sanguinis Sen. But if for securitie sake the Prince be forced to punish let the same be done with shew of great sorrow and lothness Tanquam invitus magnocum tormento ad castigandum veniat Sâ—n Let all punishments also be slowly executedâ— for they that are hastily punished do seem to have bin willingly condemned neither ought any Capitalâ— Punishment to be inflicted but only that which is profitable to the Commonweale and for example sake Non â—am ut ipsi pereant quam ut alios pereundo deterreant Sen. In punishing also a special respect must be had that no shew of content or pleasure be taken therein Formarabiei est sanguine vulneribus gaudere Sen. Also in punishing equality must be observed and the nature of the punishment according to the Custom Nec eisdem de causis alii plectantur alii ne appellentur quidemâ— Cic. But in punishing publick offences whereiâ— a multitude have part the execution ought to be otherwise and as it were at an instant which may haply seem terrible but in effect is not Frequens vindicta paucorum odium reprimit omnium irritat Sen. Another meanes to satisfie a people offended is to punish the Ministers of cruelty and with their blood to wash away the common hatred Piaculares publici odii victimae Plin. By this King David did appease the Gibeonites The next cause of discontent cometh of Impositions under which word is comprehended all levies of mony a matter nothing pleasing to people as that which they esteem equall to their own lives Pecunia anima sanguis est mortalibus Plaut. First to remove hate conceived of this cause there is nothing better then publick expostulation of necessity for what Commonwealth or Kingdom can be without Tributes Nulla quies gentium sine armis nec arma sine stipendiis nec stipendia sine Tributis haberi queunt Tac. The second remedy against Hate for impositions is to make moderate Levies and rare For as Tiberius the Emperor was wont to say a Sheep should be fleeced not flead Qui nimis emungit elicit sanguinâ—m Tac. Thirdly also to eschew the offence of People it behoveth the Prince to have a vigilant eye on Informers Promoters and such fiscal Ministers whose cruelty and covetous proceedings do oftentimes occasion great hate but this mischief may be though hardly encountred either by choosing honest Officers or proving otherwise not only to remaine them but to use them as spunges Exprimendi post quâ—m biberint Suet. In all impositions or Taxations no cruelty or force ought to be used the second cause to
kindle hate and to meet with that mischief nothing is better then to proceed moderately and without extremity Ne Boves ipsos mox agros postremò corpora servitio aut poenae tradant Tac. The fourth remedy is the Princes own parsimony not giving so largely to private persons as thereby to be forced to take from the multitude Magnae opes noâ— tam multa capiendo quam haud multa perdendo quaeruntâ—r Maecaenasâ— The last help against hate is in taxation to proceed equally indifferently and without favor or respect and that the Assessors of Taxes may be elected of the meaner sort of people Populus maximam fidem rerum suarum habâ—t Tac. Touching Censure which we numbred amongst the causes whereof hate is conceived much needeth not to be spoken because the same is discontinuedâ— or rather utterly forgotten yet doth it seem a thing necessary being a certain observation and controlement of such evill manners and disorders as were not by Law Corrigible these Officers were of the Romans called Magistri pudoris modâ—stiae Livi. To the Function of Censures these two things are anciently subject Manners and Excess Under Manners I comprehend Wantonness Drunkenness Dicing Brawling Perjury and all such Lewdness as Modesty condemneth These disorders were anciently punished by the discretion of â—ensors in all Ages and Sexes to the end that Idleness might be generally avoided Vniversa plebs habeat negâ—tia sua quibus à malâ— publico detineatur Salust Excess includeth Riotousness expence of Money Prodigal housekeeping Banqueting and Superfluitie in Apparrel which things are the mothers of many mischeifs It also seemeth in some sort perillous to the Prince that the Subject should exceed either in Covetize or Consuming Nemo nimis excedat sive amicorum copiâ sine opum Arist. The punishment inflicted upon these sorts of offenders were either Ignomâ—ny or Pecuniarie punishments Censoris judicium dâ—mnato nihil affert nisâ— ruborem Tac. The first and chiefest meanes to remove these inconveniences is the Princes own example whose life being well censured easily reduceth others to order â—ita principis censura perpetuâ— Plin. Secondly Those disorders may be taken away without danger if the Censures doe proceed by degrees and leasurely for the nature of man may not suddenly be alteredâ—Vitia quaedam tolâ—it facilius princeps si eorum sit pâ— tiâ—nâ— Sen. These are the cheifest rules whereby to eschew hate but impossible it is for any Prince or Minister utterly to avoid it for being himself good he incurreth the offence of all bad folk if he be evil good men will hate him this danger therefore Wise and Vertuous Princes have little regarded because hate may be gained as well by good as evil doing Odia qui nimium timet regnare nescit Sen. One other means to remove this error is to reward the good and well deserving Subjects for no man can think him cruell that for love to Vertue useth Austeritie which wil appear when he bestoweth bountifâ—lly on the good Praemio â—oena Respublica continetur Solon The other Vice which indangereth the State of Princes we call Contempt being a certain base and vile conceipt which entereth into the Subjects strangers or servants of the Prince and his Proceedings for the Authority of a King may be resembled to the powers of mans mind whereunto the hands the feet the eyes do by consent obey Vires imperii in consensu obedientium sunt Livi. The causes of Contempt do proceed chiefly from the form of Government Fortune or the Princes manners the form of Government becometh contemptible when the Prince desiring to be thought merciful ruleth rather pittifully then justly which manner of proceeding taketh away all reverence in the people and in liew thereof entereth liberty or at least a certain boldness to offend Facultas faciendi quod cuilibet visum non pâ—test comprimere ingenitam siâ—gulis hominibus pravitatem Tac. Also to be Mutable Irresolute light and Inconsiderate in bestowing the Honors and Offices of State maketh the Prince contemptible Qui praesentibus fruitur nec in longiâ—s consultatâ— Arist. But if contempt be caused by Fortune or as may be said more reasonably by destiny and that those friâ—nds do fail who ought in duty to defend the Prince and his Authority then is there small hope to eschew contempt Fato obnoxia virtus Plâ—ut The Princes manners do breed contempt when he yeildeth his affections to sensuality and sloth or if he incur the suspition of Simplicity Cowardise or any such Vice unworthy the Dignity he bearethâ— Common people do sometimes also disesteem the Prince for external and light causes as deformity of person sickness or such like Mos vulgi est fortuita externa ad culpam traheâ—e Tac. CHAP. XX Of Diffidence and Dissimulation in the mannage of State Affairs ALbeit roundness and plain dealing be most worthy praise chiefly in private persons yet because all men in their actions do not so proceed it behooveth Wise Men and Princes above others at occasions to semble and dissemble for as in all actions a Prince ought to be slow and advised so in consent and beleiving haste and facility is most dangerous and though credulity be rather an error then a fault yet for Princes it is both unfit and perilous Wherefore it importeth them to be defended with this caution Nihil credendo atque omnia cavâ—ndo Ciâ— Notwithstanding he must not shew himself diffident or distrustful utterly but as I wish he should not over-slightly believe all men so ought he not for small causes distrust every man Multi fallerâ— dâ—cuerunt dum timent falli Sen. Dissimulation is as it were begotten by diffidence a quality in Princes of so great necessity as moved the Emperor Tiberiâ—â— to say Nescit regnare qui nescit dissimâ—lare The necessity of dissimulation is chiefly to be uâ—ed with strangers and enemies it also sheweth a certain diâ—cretion in Magistrates sometimes to disguise with friends when no offence doth thereof follow Doâ—i non sunt dâ—li nisi astâ— colas Plaut. This kind of crafâ— albeit in every mans conceipt not praisable is nevertheless tolerable and for Princes and Magistrates the same being â—sed to good ends very necessary But those cunnings which are contrary to vertue ought not of honest men to be used neither dare I commend Adulation and Corruption though they be often used in Court and are of some learned writers allowed Decipere pro moribus temporum prudentia est Plin. By great subtiltie and frauds contrary to Vertue and Piety I mean Perjury and Injustice which though all men in words detest yet in deeds are used of many perswading themselves by Cavillations and Sophistications to excuse the impiety oâ— their false Oathes as it is written of Lysander Pueros â—â—lis viros juramentis circumvenire solebat Plut. CHAP. XXI Of Warr Defensive and Invasive with Instructions touching Laws of Armes Soldiers and Military Discipline THe Art Military is of all other
qualities most necessary for Princes for without it they cannot be defended force of men only sufficeth not unless the same be governed by Council and Martial Wisdom Duo sunt quibus respâ— servatur in hostes fortitudo domi concordia Tac. Military knowledge concerneth Warr and every Warr is either Forreign or Domestical Touching Forriegn it must be considered when it must be begun how to continue it and when to be ended to begin War a Prince is to take heed that the cause be just and the enterprise advisedly entred into Sunt enim belli sicut pacis jura jâ—stâ—que ea non minus ac fortiter gerere debes Liv. The Laws of Arms are in all Common-weales to be duly observed for to enter fight rashly and without respect to reason were beastly also to kill or slay would work no better effect then that all Nations should without mercy murder one another Barbarority coeâ—em coede sanguinem sangnine expiare Salâ— No Warr therefore is to be made but such as is just And in every just War these three things are to be looked into viz that the Author be of Authority that the cause be good and the end just for in all States the Prince or they in whom the Soveraignty resteth are the just Authorâ— of Warr others have no such Authority Si quis privatim siâ—e publicâ— sâ—ito pacem bellumve feceriâ— capitale esto Platâ— Warrs are of two sorts Defensive and Offensiveâ— the one to resist the other to invadeâ— against defence nothing can be said because it is natural and necessary Est non modo justum sedetiam necâ—ssarium cum vi vis illata defendiâ—ur Cic. Defensive Warr is of two sorts either to defend thine own or thy friends for it is reason that every one should keep securely that which to him appertaineth and therewith also by Arms to defend the liberty of Country Parents and Friends Nullum bellum à civitate suscipitur nisi aut pro fidâ— aut pro salute Câ—c The like reason leadeth us to assist and protect friends for the common obligation of humane society doth so require Qui enim non obsistit si potest injuriae tam est in vitiâ— quam si parentes aut patriam aut socios deserat Cic. Invasion is also just and allowable but not ever for who so hath bin robbed or spoiled of his Lands or Goods may lawfully seek repossession by force yet soâ— as before any force be used he first civilly seek restitution wherein if Justice be denied then is the use of Arms necessary â—ustum bellum quibâ—s necessarium pia armâ— quibus nulla nisi in armis relinquitur spes Liv. Likewise invasion is lawfull against Barbarians whose Religion and Impiety ought to be abhorred chiefly if they be potent and apt to offend for the cause of such Warr is compulsion and suppression of evil Cui lioentiâ— iniquitatis eripitur utiliter vincitur August Finally To conclude this matter of inâ—asion I say That no revenge no desire of â—onor or Empire are any lawful causes of â—ar but the intent thereof ought to be â—irected onely to defâ—nce and security For â—ise men do take arms to win Peace and â—n hope of rest they endure travel Ita bilâ—um suscipiatur uâ— nihil aliud quam pax â—uaesita vidâ—atur Cic. Having said somewhat against unjust â—ar let us speak of temerity and unadâ—ised War an enterprise worthy discomâ—endation Omnes bellum sumunt facilâ— â—gerrimè deâ—inunt nâ—c in ejusdem potâ—state inâ—tium finis est Sal. A wise Prince therefore ought neither to undertake any unlawful invasion nor without sober and mature deliberation enter â—nto any War as he that is unwilling to offend yet of courage eâ—ough to defend Nec prâ—voces bellum nec timeas Plin. To make War three things are required Money Men and Arms and to maintain a War Provision and Council are needful Therefore a wise Prince before he begins a War doth carefully consider what forces and charge thereunto belongeth Diu â—pparandum est bellum ut vincas melius Pub. Above all other Provisions carâ— must be had that Bread be not wanting for without it neither victory nor life can be looked for Qui frumentum necessariumque commeatum non praeparâ—t vincitur sine ferroâ— Vegetius Lastly it behoveth a Prince always to have Arms in readiness I mean Harness Horses Weapons Artillery Engines Powder and every other thing necessary either for service on Horse or Foot We may adde hereunto Ships and Shipping of all sorts with every furniture of offence or defence for these preparations make a Prince formidable because no man dare do or attempt injury to that King or people where preparation is ever ready to revenge Qui deâ—iderat pacem praeparat bellumâ— Caâ—â— By men we mean a multitude of Subjects armed trained to defend or offend These are of two sorts Captains and Soldiers and Soldiers are either Footmen or Horsemenâ— the one of great use in the Champion the other in Mountainous places also for defence or assault of Towns or Grounds fortified most necessary and consequently meet for service in all places which moved Tacitus to say Omne in pedite robur Tac. For sudden service Horses do seem most â—eet and the execution of any enterprise â—s by them most speedily performed Neâ—ertheless the actions of â—ootmen do seem more certainly executed chiefly if they be well armed and skilfully led for so exâ—erience hath of late time proved beâ—ides â—hat they are of less expence and of greater â—umber In universum aestimanti plus in â—edite roburâ— Tac. Having thus proved that both Horse and â—oot be necessary let us remember that â—nless they be serviceableâ— great numbers â—re to small purpose Manibus opus est bello â—on multis nominibus Livi. To make Soldiers serviceable consisteth â—n good choice and good Discipline the one at this day little regarded Emunt miliâ—em non legunt Livi. Soldiers ought to be elected out of the most honest and able number of Bodies and every Company composed of men known one to the other for thereby they are made the more confident But hereof is small heed taken for commonly they are Purgamenta urbium suarum Curt. Touching Discipline it seemeth that thereof the external Form and not the certain Substance is observed For as in former ages Soldiers endeavoured to be vertuous and modest so now they rather study to excel in Riot then in Martial knowledge Exâ—ercitus lingua quam manu promptiorâ— praedator est sociis ipse praeda hostiumâ— Sal. For as much as Soldiers are made good by election and choice it seemeth that the foundation and ground of service consisteth in the discretion and judgment oâ— those that have authority to make Election yet will we adde that they must be chosen of natural Subjectsâ— for strangers are covetous and consequently corruptible they are also mutinous and cowardly Theiâ— custom likewise is to rob
is nothing more dangerous then to enterprise a War or other actions of importance upon popular perswasion for such expectations are vain and such designs fallible Also the Fury of the multitude is great when danger is little or far off but perils growing great and near their courageth quailethâ— as they whose Passions have no rule or measure It is strange to see how apt men are to doubt displeasure threatned by enemies cheifly when they draw near for the people do naturally over-much fear dangers at hand and esteem less then is fit of things present Also to make small accompt of those that are far from them because divers remedies may be hoped as well by time as other accidents The offensive words or answers of indignation proceeding from great Princes ought never to admit displeasure into the mindes of them against whom they are spoken For having by Speech uttered a great part of Choler the edge of their Deeds becomes the calmer and more easily appeased Such is the condition of noble and generous Spirits To judge right of other mens merit seems of great difficulty for time and tryal is thereto required also it is not easie to answer the expectation of men but oft-times inconsiderate and not measured in due proportion It is a part of great discretion to divide the seasons of Affairs and Vacations For as it fitteth well a Prince or Person of Dignity in times of Audience and Judgment to be grave heedful and austere So those Offices performed all shew of authority and sad looks ought to be set apart for by that means neither courteous behavior shall detract from the Reverence due to his place nor severity diminish the love which to his Behavior appertaineth Magistrates must look into all things but not exact all things to rigor Light faults may be pardoned but great offences severely corrected yet not always proceeding to punishing but oft contented with repentance To be bitter in rebuking is also fit for a Magistrate shewing himself sowre to the bad and sweet to the good framing both Countenance and Condition according to the merit of men and be perswaded that it is more honest to offend then to hate Soldiers must be encouraged in all Fortunes to stand resolved and not to be danted with any passed misadventure ever attending a time and opportunity of revenge which commonly cometh to passwhere mens mindes are united For common danger must be repelled with union and concord Among other reasons wherewith Soldiers are encouraged Necessity and Distress doth oft inforce them For as men of vertue perform the actions of Arms for Honor so the coward must do them for his security All Enterprises attempted by Arms are honorable but those that are done in Countreys remote are more praisable For the less they be in knowledge the greater is the glory to atchieve them To be truly and faithfully loved is a thing greatly to be desired for Terror and Fear are weak works of Affection For they being taken away he that ceaseth to fear will soon begin to hate and as they that by force are kept under obey with ill will so they that govern without Line justly rule against Right Some men either deserving to be accompted of excellent wisdom or singular in that skill whereof they make proâ—ession do ordinarily love the proceedings of others taking that advantage of their ill success yet sure it is that Disaster and unhappy Event of some Actions proceed not of disorder nor Humane imperfection but from a certain fatal Fury which neither Council nor Constancy of Men can withstand It is a matter of much difficulty or rather impossible for any Prince to maintain the Law Civil or Military without severity For where men hope to be easily pardoned there are they apt to offend Contrarily where mens actions are precisely fitted there do they live in over great aw and Hatred doth always accompany such Severity The best course therefore is to punish offences severely and reward vertuous Merits liberally so shall Fear be converted to reverend respect and none have cause to complain For as it lies in each mans power to shun offending so is it in their power also to deserve well and merit reward Whosoever after mature deliberation hath resolved what course to hold in the Action he hath in hand must not after repent or fear any difficulty For such thoughts would break the vigor of the Minde and impeach the proceedings of that which was resolved And albeit some differences do happily arise yet must he believe that every other course would have been accompanied with the same or greater impediments Yong men for the warmness of their Blood and for not having before-time been deceived by Fortune more willingly enterprise Actions rather honorable then severe But old men as well for that their heat is cooled as also for having attempted many things in vain make choice of Enterprises severe rather then those that are followed with Fame and Glory The greatness of one Prince is nothing else but the ruine and distress of another Likewise his strength is the weakness and oppression of others Some Conquests are of such quality as albeit a victorious Captain merit triumphal Honor yet a modest refusal becomes his greater glory The Dignity of Magistrates is not assured without Arms for when Obedience faileth no other means is left to continue a people united As willing Obedience in Subjects is the Princes strength so is the same their own security For as by the Princes Authority the people are governed so by their consent he is maintained Three things men covet with immoderate desire Lands Riches and Honors but as seldom they compass their full content so are they for the most part to endure a destiny far other then they wished Strange it is yet by experience proved true that in time of danger Fortune or rather Destiny so much amazeth the judgment of wise men as seldom they conceive what resolution is best to be taken No great Free-City can long continue quiet unless the same be used to foreign assaults For wanting foes without some inward enmity will arise not unlike to strange bodies of men which being secure from external injury are nevertheless by their own poise oppressed As every Pilot of ordinary skill knoweth in calm and quiet Seas to direct the course of his Ship so every Governor of capacity doth understand how the affairs of State are in peaceable times to be handled But when Tempests are and Subjects bent to Sedition the one requires an excellent Sailer the other the aid of some excellent Wisdom It oft happens that publick Duty is opposite to private Friendship so as we are either forced to omit the Offices due to our Countrey or draw our dearest friends into danger In which case we are to prefer publick respect before particular Obligation The nature of base people is such as either they obey slavishly or command insolently For liberty being the mark whereat they aim
then banisht as also to sack the City promising that so soon as the Army of Spain did come into the Florentine dominion the faction of Medici would be ready armed to receive them But the Spaniards being come found no forces at all to joyn with them and therefore wanting victual offered composition The Florentines finding the Enemy distressed grew insolent and refused peace whereof followed the loss of Prato and many other inconveniencies The like happened to them of Tyre as before The denial or delay of Justice desired in revenge of injuries either publick or privately offered is a thing very dangerous to every Prince or other State for that the party injured doth oft by indirect meanes though with hazard of his country and himself seek satisfaction Example the complaint which the Galli made against the Fabii who sent Ambassadors in favor of the Tossani not being heard nor any punishment inflicted upon them for fighting against the Law of Nations was the cause that the Galli were offended with the States whereof followed the sack of Rome and the delay of Justice in Philip of Macedon for not revenging the incestuous oppression of Attalus to Pausanias was the motive to murther that King Whoso endeavors the alteration of any State must of necessity proceed with all severity and leave some memorable example to those that shall impunge the Ordinance of Government newly settled Example when Junius Brutus had by his great valor banisht the Tarquins and sworn the People that no King should ever raign in Rome within short time after many young Nobles among whom was Brutus son impatient of the equality of the new government conspired to recall the Tarquins but Brutus thereof informed caused his own son not only to be condemned to death but was himself present at the execution As health and soundness of the hands legs and other outward members cannot continue life unless the heart and vital spirits within be strong and firm so fortifications and Frontier-defences do not prevail unless the whole Corps of the Kingdom and People be well armed Example when the Emperor came into â—talâ— and had with some difficulty past the confines of the Venetians welnear without ressistance his army marcht to Venice and might doubtless have possest the City had it not been defended with water Likewise the English in their assault of France excepting a few encounters on the Frontires found no puissant resistance within the Realm And Anno 1513 they forced all that State and the King himself to tremble as oft before they had done but contrariwise the Romans knowing that life lay in the heart ever held the body of their State strongest for the nearer the enemy approacht Rome the better they found the Countrey armed and defended The desire to command soveraignly is of so great force as doth not only work in those that are in expectation of principality but also in them that have no title at all Example this appetite moved the wife of Taâ—quinius Priscus contrary to all natural duty to incite her husband to murder her own Father Servius and possesse his Kingdom as bâ—ing perswaded it were much more honorable to be a Queen then to be the daughter of a King The violation of ancient Laws Orders and Customs under which people have long time lived is the chief anâ— only cause whereby Princes hazard their Estate and Royal Dignity Example albeit the deflowring of Lucrece was the occasion yet was it not the cause that moved the â—omans to take arms against Tarquin for he hâ—ving before that fact of Sexâ—us his Son governed Tyrannically and taken from the Senate all Authority was become odious both to the Senate Nobility and People who finding themselves well governed never seek or wish any other liberty or alteration A Prince that desires to live secure from conspiracy hath cause rather to fear those on whom he hath bestowed over great riches and honors then those whom he hath greatly injured because they want meanes to offend the other have many opportunities to do it Example Perennius the Prime favorite of â—ommodus the Emperor conspired his deathâ—Plantianus did the like to Sâ—verus and Sâ—janus to Tiberius for being advanced to so great honors riches and Offices as nothing remained desirable but the Imperial title they conspired against the persons of their Soveraigns in hope of the dignity but in the end they endured that punishment which to such disloyalty and ingratitude appertaineth An Army which wants Experience albeit the Captain be expert is not greatly to be fearedâ— neither ought an Army of well traind Soldiers to be much esteemed whose Captain is ignorant Example Caesar going into Africa against Afranius and Petraeus whose army was full of old Soldiers said he feared them little Quia ibat ad exercitum sine duce Contrariwise when he went to Pâ—arsalia to encounter Pompey he said Ibo ad duceâ— sine exercitu A Captain-General commanding an Army ought rather to governe with curtesie and mildness then with over-much austerity and severity Example Q. and Appius Claudius being Consuls were appointed to govern the War To Q. was allotted one Army which served very dutifully but Appius commanding the other with great cruelty was by his Soldiers unwillingly obeyed Nevertheless Tacitus seems of contrary opinion saying Plus poena quam obsequium valâ—t Therefore to reconcile these different Conceits I say that a General having power to command men either they are confederates or Subjects If confederates or voluntaries he may not proceed to eâ—tream punishment if Subjects and his power absolute they may be governed otherwiseâ— yet with such respect as the insolence of the General inforce not the Soldiers to hate him Honor may sometime be got as well by the loss as gaining of victory Every man knoweth glory is due to the Victor and we deny not the same priviledge to the vanquished being able to make proof that the loss proceeded not from his default Neither is it dishonorable to violate those promises whereto the necessity or disadvantage of War inforceth And forced promises which concern a whole State are not binding and rarely or never kept nor is the Breaker thereby to receive disgrace Example Posthumus the Consul having made a dishonorable peace with the Samnits was by them with his whole Army sent home disarmed Being arived at Rome the Consul informed the people they were not bound to perform the base conditions he was compelled to yield unto albeit he and those few that promised were bound to perform them The Senate thereupon concluded to send him prisoner to Samno where he constantly protested the fault to be onely his own wherefore the people by that peace incurred no dishonor at all And Fortune so much favored Posthumus as the Samnites were content presently to return him to Rome where he became more glorious for losing the Victory then was Pontius at Samno for having won the victory Wise men have long observedâ— that who so will